The Complete Histories of Polybius

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THE COMPLETE HISTORIES

OF POLYBIUS

TRANSLATED BY W. R. PATON

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THE HISTORIES
OF POLYBIUS

BOOK I

Had previous chroniclers neglected to speak in praise of History in general, it might perhaps have been necessary for me to recommend everyone to choose for study and welcome such treatises as the present, since men have no more ready corrective of conduct than knowledge of the past. But all historians, one may say without exception, and in no half-hearted manner, but making this the beginning and end of their labour, have impressed on us that the soundest education and training for a life of active politics is the study of History, and that surest and indeed the only method of learning how to bear bravely the vicissitudes of fortune, is to recall the calamities of others. Evidently therefore no one, and least of all myself, would think it his duty at this day to repeat what has been so well and so often said. For the very element of unexpectedness in the events I have chosen as my theme will be sufficient to challenge and incite everyone, young and old alike, to peruse my systematic history. For who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what means and under what system of polity the Romans in less than fifty-three years have succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole inhabited world to their sole government—a thing unique in history? Or who again is there so passionately devoted to other spectacles or studies as to regard anything as of greater moment than the acquisition of this knowledge?

How striking and grand is the spectacle presented by the period with which I purpose to deal, will be most clearly apparent if we set beside and compare with the Roman dominion the most famous empires of the past, those which have formed the chief theme of historians. Those worthy of being thus set beside it and compared are these. The Persians for a certain period possessed a great rule and dominion, but so often as they ventured to overstep the boundaries of Asia they imperilled not only the security of this empire, but their own existence. The Lacedaemonians, after having for many years disputed the hegemony of Greece, at length attained it but to hold it uncontested for scarce twelve years. The Macedonian rule in Europe extended but from the Adriatic region to the Danube, which would appear a quite insignificant portion of the continent. Subsequently, by overthrowing the Persian empire they became supreme in Asia also. But though their empire was now regarded as the greatest geographically and politically that had ever existed, they left the larger part of the inhabited world as yet outside it. For they never even made a single attempt to dispute possession of Sicily, Sardinia, or Libya, and the most warlike nations of Western Europe were, to speak the simple truth, unknown to them. But the Romans have subjected to their rule not portions, but nearly the whole of the world and possess an empire which is not only immeasurably greater than any which preceded it, but need not fear rivalry in the future. In the course of this work it will become more clearly intelligible by what steps this power was acquired, and it will also be seen how many and how great advantages accrue to the student from the systematic treatment of history.

The date from which I propose to begin my history is the 140th Olympiad [220-216 B.C.], and the events are the following: (1) in Greece

the so-called Social War, the first waged against the Aetolians by the Achaeans in league with and under the leadership of Philip of Macedon, the son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, (2) in Asia the war for Coele-Syria between Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator, (3) in Italy, Libya, and the adjacent regions, the war between Rome and Carthage, usually known as the Hannibalic War. These events immediately succeed those related at the end of the work of Aratus of Sicyon. Previously the doings of the world had been, so to say, dispersed, as they were held together by no unity of initiative, results, or locality; but ever since this date history has been an organic whole, and the affairs of Italy and Libya have been interlinked with those of Greece and Asia, all leading up to one end. And this is my reason for beginning their systematic history from that date. For it was owing to their defeat of the Carthaginians in the Hannibalic War that the Romans, feeling that the chief and most essential step in their scheme of universal aggression had now been taken, were first emboldened to reach out their hands to grasp the rest and to cross with an army to Greece and the continent of Asia.

Now were we Greeks well acquainted with the two states which disputed the empire of the world, it would not perhaps have been necessary for me to deal at all with their previous history, or to narrate what purpose guided them, and on what sources of strength they relied, in entering upon such a vast undertaking. But as neither the former power nor the earlier history of Rome and Carthage is familiar to most of us Greeks, I thought it necessary to prefix this Book and the next to the actual history, in order that no one after becoming engrossed in the narrative proper may find himself at a loss, and ask by what counsel and trusting to what power and resources the

Romans embarked on that enterprise which has made them lords over land and sea in our part of the world; but that from these Books and the preliminary sketch in them, it may be clear to readers that they had quite adequate grounds for conceiving the ambition of a world-empire and adequate means for achieving their purpose. For what gives my work its peculiar quality, and what is most remarkable in the present age, is this. Fortune has guided almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and has forced them to incline towards one and the same end; a historian should likewise bring before his readers under one synoptical view the operations by which she has accomplished her general purpose. Indeed it was this chiefly that invited and encouraged me to undertake my task; and secondarily the fact that none of my contemporaries have undertaken to write a general history, in which case I should have been much less eager to take this in hand. As it is, I observe that while several modern writers deal with particular wars and certain matters connected with them, no one, as far as I am aware, has even attempted to inquire critically when and whence the general and comprehensive scheme of events originated and how it led up to the end. I therefore thought it quite necessary not to leave unnoticed or allow to pass into oblivion this the finest and most beneficent of the performances of Fortune. For though she is ever producing something new and ever playing a part in the lives of men, she has not in a single instance ever accomplished such a work, ever achieved such a triumph, as in our own times. We can no more hope to perceive this from histories dealing with particular events than to get at once a notion of the form of the whole world, its disposition and order, by visiting, each in turn, the most famous cities, or indeed by looking at separate plans of each: a result by no means

likely. He indeed who believes that by studying isolated histories he can acquire a fairly just view of history as a whole, is, as it seems to me, much in the case of one, who, after having looked at the dissevered limbs of an animal once alive and beautiful, fancies he has been as good as an eyewitness of the creature itself in all its action and grace. For could anyone put the creature together on the spot, restoring its form and the comeliness of life, and then show it to the same man, I think he would quickly avow that he was formerly very far away from the truth and more like one in a dream. For we can get some idea of a whole from a part, but never knowledge or exact opinion. Special histories therefore contribute very little to the knowledge of the whole and conviction of its truth. It is only indeed by study of the interconnexion of all the particulars, their resemblances and differences, that we are enabled at least to make a general survey, and thus derive both benefit and pleasure from history.

I shall adopt as the starting-point of this Book the first occasion on which the Romans crossed the sea from Italy. This follows immediately on the close of Timaeus' History and took place in the 129th Olympiad [264-261 B.C.]. Thus we must first state how and when the Romans established their position in Italy, and what prompted them afterwards to cross to Sicily, the first country outside Italy where they set foot. The actual cause of their crossing must be stated without comment; for if I were to seek the cause of the cause and so on, my whole work would have no clear starting-point and principle. The starting-point must be an era generally agreed upon and recognized, and one self-apparent from the events, even if this involves my going back a little in point of date and giving a summary of intervening occurrences. For if there is any ignorance or indeed any dispute as to what

are the facts from which the work opens, it is impossible that what follows should meet with acceptance or credence; but once we produce in our readers a general agreement on this point they will give ear to all the subsequent narrative.

It was, therefore, the nineteenth year after the battle of Aegospotami and the sixteenth before that of Leuctra, the year in which the Spartans ratified the peace known as that of Antalcidas with the King of Persia, that in which also Dionysius the Elder, after defeating the Italiot Greeks in the battle at the river Elleporos, was besieging Rhegium, and that in which the Gauls, after taking Rome itself by assault, occupied the whole of that city except the Capitol. The Romans, after making a truce on conditions satisfactory to the Gauls and being thus contrary to their expectation reinstated in their home and as it were now started on the road of aggrandizement, continued in the following years to wage war on their neighbours. After subduing all the Latins by their valour and the fortune of war, they fought first against the Etruscans, then against the Celts, and next against the Samnites, whose territory was conterminous with that of the Latins on the East and North. After some time the Tarentines, fearing the consequences of their insolence to the Roman envoys, begged for the intervention of Pyrrhus. (This was in the year preceding the expedition of those Gauls who met with the reverse at Delphi and then crossed to Asia.) The Romans had ere this reduced the Etruscans and Samnites and had vanquished the Italian Celts in many battles, and they now for the first time attacked the rest of Italy not as if it were a foreign country, but as if it rightfully belonged to them. Their struggle with the Samnites and Celts had made them veritable masters in the art of war, and after bravely supporting this war with Pyrrhus and finally

expelling himself and his army from Italy, they continued to fight with and subdue those who had sided with him. When, with extraordinary good fortune, they had reduced all these peoples and had made all the inhabitants of Italy their subjects excepting the Celts, they undertook the siege of Rhegium now held by certain of their compatriots.

For very much the same fortune had befallen the two cities on the Straits, Messene and Rhegium. Certain Campanians serving under Agathocles had long cast covetous eyes on the beauty and prosperity of Messene; and not long before the events I am speaking of they availed themselves of the first opportunity to capture it by treachery. After being admitted as friends and occupying the city, they first expelled or massacred the citizens and then took possession of the wives and families of the dispossessed victims, just as chance assigned them each at the time of the outrage. They next divided among themselves the land and all other property. Having thus possessed themselves so quickly and easily of a fine city and territory, they were not long in finding imitators of their exploit. For the people of Rhegium, when Pyrrhus crossed to Italy, dreading an attack by him and fearing also the Carthaginians who commanded the sea, begged from the Romans a garrison and support. The force which came, four thousand in number and under the command of Decius, a Campanian, kept the city and their faith for some time, but at length, anxious to rival the Mamertines and with their co-operation, played the people of Rhegium false, and eagerly coveting a city so favourably situated and containing so much private wealth, expelled or massacred the citizens and possessed themselves of the city in the same manner as the Campanians had done. The Romans were highly displeased, yet could do nothing at the time, as they were occupied with the wars I have

already mentioned. But when they had a free hand they shut up the culprits in the city and proceeded to lay siege to it as I have stated above. When Rhegium fell, most of the besieged were slain in the actual assault, having defended themselves desperately, as they knew what awaited them, but more than three hundred were captured. When they were sent to Rome the Consuls had them all conducted to the forum and there, according to the Roman custom, scourged and beheaded; their object being to recover as far as possible by this punishment their reputation for good faith with the allies. The city and territory of Rhegium they at once restored to the citizens.

The Mamertines (for this was the name adopted by the Campanians after their seizure of Messene) as long as they enjoyed the alliance of the Romans together with the Campanians who had occupied Rhegium, not only remained in secure possession of their own city and territory but caused no little trouble to the Carthaginians and Syracusans about the adjacent territories, levying tribute from many parts of Sicily. When, however, they were deprived of this support, the captors of Rhegium being now closely invested, they were at once in their turn driven to take refuge in their city by the Syracusans owing to the following causes. Not many years before the Syracusan army had quarrelled with those in the city. They were then posted near Mergane and appointed two magistrates chosen from their own body, Artemidorus and Hiero, who was subsequently king of Syracuse. He was still quite young but because of his royal descent qualified to be a ruler and statesman of a kind. Having accepted the command, he gained admittance to the city through certain relatives, and after overpowering the opposite party, administered affairs with such mildness and magnanimity that the Syracusans, though by no means inclined to approve camp

elections, on this occasion unanimously accepted him as their general. From his first measures it was evident at once to all capable of judging that his ambition was not limited to military command.

For observing that the Syracusans, every time they dispatch their forces on an expedition accompanied by their supreme magistrates, begin quarrelling among themselves and introducing continual changes, and knowing that Leptines had a wider circle of dependents and enjoyed more credit than any other burgher and had an especially high name among the common people, he allied himself with him by marriage, so that whenever he had to take the field himself he might leave him behind as a sort of reserve force. He married, then, the daughter of this Leptines, and finding that the veteran mercenaries were disaffected and turbulent, he marched out in force professedly against the foreigners who had occupied Messene. He met the enemy near Centuripa and offered battle near the river Cyamosorus. He held back the citizen cavalry and infantry at a distance under his personal command as if he meant to attack on another side, but advancing the mercenaries he allowed them all to be cut up by the Campanians. During their rout he himself retired safely to Syracuse with the citizens. Having thus efficiently accompanied his purpose and purged the army of its turbulent and seditious element, he himself enlisted a considerable number of mercenaries and henceforth continued to rule in safety. Observing that the Mamertines, owing to their success, were behaving in a bold and reckless manner, he efficiently armed and trained the urban levies and leading them out engaged the enemy in the Mylaean plain near the river Longanus, and inflicted a severe defeat on them, capturing their leaders.

This put an end to the audacity of the Mamertines, and on his return to Syracuse he was with one voice proclaimed king by all the allies.

The Mamertines had previously, as I above narrated, lost their support from Rhegium and had now suffered complete disaster at home for the reasons I have just stated. Some of them appealed to the Carthaginians, proposing to put themselves and the citadel into their hands, while others sent an embassy to Rome, offering to surrender the city and begging for assistance as a kindred people. The Romans were long at a loss, the succour demanded being so obviously unjustifiable. For they had just inflicted on their own fellow-citizens the highest penalty for their treachery to the people of Rhegium, and now to try to help the Mamertines, who had been guilty of like offence not only at Messene but at Rhegium also, was a piece of injustice very difficult to excuse. But fully aware as they were of this, they yet saw that the Carthaginians had not only reduced Libya to subjection, but a great part of Spain besides, and that they were also in possession of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian Seas. They were therefore in great apprehension lest, if they also became masters of Sicily, they would be most troublesome and dangerous neighbours, hemming them in on all sides and threatening every part of Italy. That they would soon be supreme in Sicily, if the Mamertines were not helped, was evident; for once Messene had fallen into their hands, they would shortly subdue Syracuse also, as they were absolute lords of almost all the rest of Sicily. The Romans, foreseeing this and viewing it as a necessity for themselves not to abandon Messene and thus allow the Carthaginians as it were to build a bridge for crossing over to Italy, debated the matter for long, and, even at the end, the Senate did not sanction the proposal for the reason

given above, considering that the objection on the score of inconsistency was equal in weight to the advantage to be derived from intervention. The commons, however, worn out as they were by the recent wars and in need of any and every kind of restorative, listened readily to the military commanders, who, besides giving the reasons above stated for the general advantageousness of the war, pointed out the great benefit in the way of plunder which each and every one would evidently derive from it. They were therefore in favour of sending help; and when the measure had been passed by the people they appointed to the command one of the Consuls, Appius Claudius, who was ordered to cross to Messene. The Mamertines, partly by menace and partly by stratagem, dislodged the Carthaginian commander, who was already established in the citadel, and then invited Appius to enter, placing the city in his hands. The Carthaginians crucified their general, thinking him guilty of a lack both of judgement and of courage in abandoning their citadel. Acting for themselves they stationed their fleet in the neighbourhood of Cape Pelorias, and with their land forces pressed Messene close in the direction of Sunes. Hiero now, thinking that present circumstances were favourable for expelling from Sicily entirely the foreigners who occupied Messene, made an alliance with the Carthaginians, and quitting Syracuse with his army marched towards that city. Pitching his camp near the Chalcidian mountain on the side opposite to the Carthaginians he cut off this means of exit from the city as well. Appius, the Roman consul, at the same time succeeded at great risk in crossing the Straits by night and entering the city. Finding that the enemy had strictly invested Messene on all sides and regarding it as both inglorious and perilous for himself to be besieged, as they commanded both land and sea,

he at first tried to negotiate with both, desiring to deliver the Mamertines from the war. But when neither paid any attention to him, he decided perforce to risk an engagement and in the first place to attack the Syracusans. Leading out his forces he drew them up in order of battle, the king of Syracuse readily accepting the challenge. After a prolonged struggle Appius was victorious and drove the whole hostile force back to their camp. After despoiling the dead he returned to Messene. Hiero, divining the final issue of the whole conflict, retreated in haste after nightfall to Syracuse. On the following day Appius, learning of the result of this action and encouraged thereby, decided not to delay but to attack the Carthaginians. He ordered his troops to be in readiness early and sallied forth at break of day. Engaging the enemy he slew many of them and compelled the rest to retreat in disorder to neighbouring cities. Having raised the siege by these successes, he advanced fearlessly, devastating the territory of the Syracusans and of their allies, no one disputing the open country with him. Finally he sat down before Syracuse and commenced to besiege it.

Such then was the occasion and motive of this the first crossing of the Romans from Italy with an armed force, an event which I take to be the most natural starting-point of this whole work. I have therefore made it my serious base, but went also somewhat further back in order to leave no possible obscurity in my statements of general causes. To follow out this previous history—how and when the Romans after the disaster to Rome itself began their progress to better fortunes, and again how and when after conquering Italy they entered on the path of foreign enterprise—seemed to me necessary for anyone who hopes to gain a proper general survey of their present supremacy. My readers need not therefore be surprised if, even in

the further course of this work, I occasionally give them in addition some of the earlier history of the most famous states; for I shall do so in order to establish such a fundamental view as will make it clear in the sequel starting from what origins and how and when they severally reached their present position. This is exactly what I have just done about the Romans.

Enough of such explanations. It is now time to come to my subject after a brief summary of the events included in these introductory Books. To take them in order we have first the incidents of the war between Rome and Carthage for Sicily. Next follows the war in Libya and next the achievements of the Carthaginians under Hamilcar and after under Hasdrubal. At the same time occurred the first crossing of the Romans to Illyria and these parts of Europe, and subsequently to the preceding events their struggle with the Italian Celts. Contemporary with this the so-called Cleomenic war was proceeding in Greece, and with this war I wind up my Introduction as a whole and my second Book.

Now to recount all these events in detail is neither incumbent on me nor would it be useful to my readers; for it is not my purpose to write their history but to mention them summarily as introductory to the events which are my real theme. I shall therefore attempt by such summary treatment of them in their proper order to fit in the end of the Introduction to the beginning of the actual History. Thus there will be no break in the narrative and it will be seen that I have been justified in touching on events which have been previously narrated by others, while this arrangement will render the approach to what follows intelligible and easy for students. I shall, however, attempt to narrate somewhat more carefully the first war between Rome and Carthage for the possession of Sicily; since it is not easy to name

any war which lasted longer, nor one which exhibited on both sides more extensive preparations, more unintermittent activity, more battles, and greater changes of fortune. The two states were also at this period still uncorrupted in morals, moderate in fortune, and equal in strength, so that a better estimate of the peculiar qualities and gifts of each can be formed by comparing their conduct in this war than in any subsequent one.

An equally powerful motive with me for paying particular attention to this war is that, to my mind, the truth has not been adequately stated by those historians who are reputed to be the best authorities on it, Philinus and Fabius. I do not indeed accuse them of intentional falsehood, in view of their character and principles, but they seem to me to have been much in the case of lovers; for owing to his convictions and constant partiality Philinus will have it that the Carthaginians in every case acted wisely, well, and bravely, and the Romans otherwise, whilst Fabius takes the precisely opposite view. In other relations of life we should not perhaps exclude all such favouritism; for a good man should love his friends and his country, he should share the hatreds and attachments of his friends; but he who assumes the character of a historian must ignore everything of the sort, and often, if their actions demand this, speak good of his enemies and honour them with the highest praises while criticizing and even reproaching roundly his closest friends, should the errors of their conduct impose this duty on him. For just as a living creature which has lost its eyesight is wholly incapacitated, so if History is stripped of her truth all that is left is but an idle tale. We should therefore not shrink from accusing our friends or praising our enemies; nor need we be shy of sometimes praising and sometimes blaming the same people, since it is neither possible that men in

the actual business of life should always be in the right, nor is it probable that they should be always mistaken. We must therefore disregard the actors in our narrative and apply to the actions such terms and such criticism as they deserve.

The truth of what I have just said is evident from what follows. Philinus, in commencing his narrative at the outset of his second Book, tells us that the Carthaginians and Syracusans were besieging Messene, that the Romans reaching the city by sea, at once marched out against the Syracusans, but after being severely handled returned to Messene. They next sallied out against the Carthaginians and were not only worsted but lost a considerable number of prisoners. After making these statements he says that Hiero after the engagement so far lost his wits as not only to burn his camp and tents and take flight to Syracuse the same night, but to withdraw all his garrisons from the forts which menaced the territory of Messene. The Carthaginians, likewise, he tells us, after the battle at once quitted their camp and distributed themselves among the towns, not even daring to dispute the open country further: their leaders, he says, seeing how dispirited the ranks were, resolved not to risk a decisive engagement, and the Romans following up the enemy not only laid waste the territory of the Carthaginians and Syracusans, but sat down before Syracuse and undertook its siege. This account is, it seems to me, full of inconsistencies and does not require a lengthy discussion. For those whom he introduced as besieging Messene and victorious in the engagements, he now represents as in flight and abandoning the open country and finally besieged and dispirited, while those whom he represented as defeated and besieged are now stated to be in pursuit of their foes, and at once commanding the open country and finally

besieging Syracuse. It is absolutely impossible to reconcile the two assertions, and either his initial statements or his account of what followed must be false. But the latter is true; for as a fact the Carthaginians and Syracusans abandoned the open country, and the Romans at once began to lay siege to Syracuse and, as he says, even to Echetla too, which lies between the Syracusan and Carthaginian provinces. We must therefore concede that Philinus's initial statements are false, and that, while the Romans were victorious in the engagements before Messene, this author announces that they were worsted.

We can trace indeed the same fault throughout the whole work of Philinus and alike through that of Fabius, as I shall show when the occasion arises. Now that I have said what is fitting on the subject of this digression, I will return to facts and attempt in a narrative that strictly follows the order of events to guide my readers by a short road to a true notion of this war.

When news of the successes of Appius and his legions reached Rome, they elected Manius Otacilius and Manius Valerius Consuls, and dispatched their whole armed force and both commanders to Sicily. The Romans have four legions of Roman citizens in all apart from the allies. These they enrol annually, each legion comprising four thousand foot and three hundred horse. On their arrival in Sicily most of the cities revolted from the Carthaginians and Syracusans and joined the Romans. Hiero, observing both the confusion and consternation of the Sicilians, and at the same time the numbers and the powerful nature of the Roman forces, reached from all this the conclusion that the prospects of the Romans were more brilliant than those of the Carthaginians. His conviction therefore impelling him to side with the Romans, he sent several messages to the Consuls with

proposals for peace and alliance. The Romans accepted his overtures, especially for the sake of their supplies; for since the Carthaginians commanded the sea they were apprehensive lest they should be cut off on all sides from the necessities of life, in view of the fact that the armies which had previously crossed to Sicily had run very short of provisions. Therefore, supposing that Hiero would be of great service to them in this respect, they readily accepted his friendly advances. Having made a treaty by which the king bound himself to give up his prisoners to the Romans without ransom, and in addition to this to pay them a hundred talents, the Romans henceforth treated the Syracusans as allies and friends. King Hiero having placed himself under the protection of the Romans, continued to furnish them with the resources of which they stood in urgent need, and ruled over Syracuse henceforth in security, treating the Greeks in such a way as to win from them crowns and other honours. We may, indeed, regard him as the most illustrious of princes and the one who reaped longest the fruits of his own wisdom in particular cases and in general policy.

When the terms of the treaty were referred to Rome, and when the people had accepted and ratified this agreement with Hiero, the Romans decided not to continue to employ all their forces in the expedition, but only two legions, thinking on the one hand that, now the king had joined them, the war had become a lighter task and calculating that their forces would be better off for supplies. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, when they saw that Hiero had become their enemy, and that the Romans were becoming more deeply involved in the enterprise in Sicily, considered that they themselves required stronger forces in order to be able to confront their enemies and control Sicilian affairs. They therefore enlisted foreign

mercenaries from the opposite coasts, many of them Ligurians, Celts, and still more Iberians, and dispatched them all to Sicily. Perceiving that the city of Agrigentum had the greatest natural advantages for making their preparations, it being also the most important city in their province, they collected their troops and supplies there and decided to use it as a base in the war.

Meanwhile the Roman Consuls who had made the treaty with Hiero had left, and their successors, Lucius Postumius and Quintus Mamilius, had arrived in Sicily with their legions. On taking note of the plan of the Carthaginians, and their activity at Agrigentum, they decided on a bolder initiative. Abandoning therefore other operations they brought all their forces to bear on Agrigentum itself, and encamping at a distance of eight stades from the city, shut the Carthaginians up within the walls. It was the height of the harvest, and as a long siege was foreseen, the soldiers began gathering corn with more venturesomeness than was advisable. The Carthaginians, observing that the enemy were dispersed about the country, made a sortie and attacked the foragers. Having easily put these to flight, some of them pressed on to plunder the fortified camp while others advanced on the covering force. But on this occasion and often on previous ones it is the excellence of their institutions which has saved the situation for the Romans; for with them death is the penalty incurred by a man who deserts the post or takes flight in any way from such a supporting force. Therefore on this occasion as on others they gallantly faced opposites who largely outnumbered them, and, though they suffered heavy loss, killed still more of the enemy. Finally surrounding them as they were on the point of

tearing up the palisade, they dispatched some on the spot and pressing hard on the rest pursued them with slaughter to the city.

After this the Carthaginians were more inclined to be cautious in taking the offensive, while the Romans were more on their guard in foraging. As the Carthaginians did not advance beyond skirmishing range, the Roman generals divided their force into two bodies, remaining with one near the temple of Asclepius outside the walls and encamping with the other on that side of the city that is turned towards Heraclea. They fortified the ground between their camps on each side of the city, protecting themselves by the inner trench from sallies from within and encircling themselves with an outer one to guard against attacks from outside, and to prevent that secret introduction of supplies and men which is usual in the case of beleaguered cities. On the spaces between the trenches and their camps they placed pickets, fortifying suitable places at some distance from each other. Their supplies and other material were collected for them by all the other members of the alliance, and brought to Herbesus, and they themselves constantly fetching in live stock and provisions from this city which was at no great distance, kept themselves abundantly supplied with what they required. So for five months or so matters were at a standstill, neither side being able to score any decisive advantage, nothing in fact beyond incidental success in their exchange of shots; but when the Carthaginians began to be pressed by famine owing to the number of people cooped up in the city—fifty thousand at least in number—Hannibal, the commander of the besieged forces, found himself in a difficult situation and sent constant messages to Carthage explaining his position and begging for reinforcements. The Carthaginian government shipped the troops they had

collected and their elephants and sent them to Sicily to Hanno their other general. Hanno concentrated his troops and material of war at Heraclea and in the first place surprised and occupied Herbesus, cutting off the enemy's camps from their provisions and necessary supplies. The result of this was that the Romans were as a fact both besieged and besiegers at the same time; for they were so hard pressed by want of food and scarcity of the necessities of life, that they often contemplated raising the siege, and would in the end have done so, had not Hiero, by using every effort and every device, provided them with a moderate amount of strictly necessary supplies. In the next place Hanno, perceiving that the Romans were weakened by disease and privation, owing to an epidemic having broken out among them, and thinking that his own troops were in fit fighting condition, took with him all his elephants, about fifty in number, and all the rest of his force, and advanced rapidly from Heraclea. He had ordered the Numidian horse to precede him, and approaching the enemy's fortified camp to provoke him and attempt to draw his cavalry out, after which they were to give way and retire until they rejoined himself. The Numidians acting on these orders advanced up to one of the camps, and the Roman cavalry at once issued forth and boldly attacked them. The Libyans retreated as they had been ordered until they joined Hanno's army and then, wheeling round and encircling the enemy, they attacked them, killing many and pursuing the rest as far as the camp. After this Hanno encamped opposite the Romans, occupying the hill called Torus, at a distance of about ten stades from the enemy. For two months they remained stationary, without any action more decisive than shooting at each other every day: but as Hannibal kept on announcing to Hanno by fire-signals and messengers

from the city that the population could not support the famine, and that deserters to the enemy were numerous owing to privation, the Carthaginian general decided to risk battle, the Romans being no less eager for this owing to the reasons I stated above. Both therefore led out their forces to the space between the camps and engaged. The battle lasted for long, but at the end the Romans put to flight the advanced line of Carthaginian mercenaries, and as the latter fell back on the elephants and the other divisions in their rear, the whole Phoenician army was thrown into disorder. A complete rout ensued, and most of them were put to the sword, some escaping to Heraclea. The Romans captured most of the elephants and all the baggage. But after nightfall, while the Romans, partly from joy at their success and partly from fatigue, had relaxed the vigilance of their watch, Hannibal, regarding his situation as desperate, and thinking for the above reasons that this was a fine opportunity for saving himself, broke out of the city about midnight with his mercenaries. By filling up the trenches with baskets packed tightly with straw he managed to withdraw his force in safety unperceived by the enemy. When day broke the Romans became aware of what had happened, and, after slightly molesting Hannibal's rear-guard, advanced with their whole force to the gates. Finding nobody to oppose them they entered the city and plundered it, possessing themselves of many slaves and a quantity of booty of every description.

When the news of what had occurred at Agrigentum reached the Roman Senate, in their joy and elation they no longer confined themselves to their original designs and were no longer satisfied with having saved the Mamertines and with what they had gained in the war itself, but, hoping that it would be possible to drive the Carthaginians entirely out of the island

and that if this were done their own power would be much augmented, they directed their attention to this project and to plans that would serve their purpose. As regards their land force at least they noted that all progressed satisfactorily; for the Consuls appointed after those who had reduced Agrigentum, Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Titus Otacilius Crassus, seemed to be managing Sicilian affairs as well as possible; but as the Carthaginians maintained without any trouble the command of the sea, the fortunes of the war continued to hang in the balance. For in the period that followed, now that Agrigentum was in their hands, while many inland cities joined the Romans from dread of their land forces, still more seaboard cities deserted their cause in terror of the Carthaginian fleet. Hence when they saw that the balance of the war tended more and more to shift to this side or that for the above reasons, and that while Italy was frequently ravaged by naval forces, Libya remained entirely free from damage, they took urgent steps to get on the sea like the Carthaginians. And one of the reasons which induced me to narrate the history of the war named above at some length is just this, that my readers should, in this case too, not be kept in ignorance of the beginning—how, when, and for what reasons the Romans first took to the sea.

When they saw that the war was dragging on, they undertook for the first time to build ships, a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. As their shipwrights were absolutely inexperienced in building quinqueremes, such ships never having been in use in Italy, the matter caused them much difficulty, and this fact shows us better than anything else how spirited and daring the Romans are when they are determined to do a thing. It was not that they had fairly good resources for it, but they had none whatever, nor

had they ever given a thought to the sea; yet when they once had conceived the project, they took it in hand so boldly, that before gaining any experience in the matter they at once engaged the Carthaginians who had held for generations undisputed command of the sea. Evidence of the truth of what I am saying and of their incredible pluck is this. When they first undertook to send their forces across to Messene not only had they not any decked ships, but no long warships at all, not even a single boat, and borrowing fifty-oared boats and triremes from the Tarentines and Locrians, and also from the people of Elea and Naples they took their troops across in these at great hazard. On this occasion the Carthaginians put to sea to attack them as they were crossing the straits, and one of their decked ships advanced too far in its eagerness to overtake them and running aground fell into the hands of the Romans. This ship they now used as a model, and built their whole fleet on its pattern; so that it is evident that if this had not occurred they would have been entirely prevented from carrying out their design by lack of practical knowledge. Now, however, those to whom the construction of ships was committed were busy in getting them ready, and those who had collected the crews were teaching them to row on shore in the following fashion. Making the men sit on rowers' benches on dry land, in the same order as on the benches of the ships themselves, they accustomed them to fall back all at once bringing their hands up to them, and again to come forward pushing out their hands, and to begin and finish these movements at the word of command of the fugle-man. When the crews had been trained, they launched the ships as soon as they were completed, and having practised for a brief time actual rowing at sea, they sailed [1] along the coast of Italy as their commander had ordered. For the

Consul appointed by the Romans to the command of their naval force, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, had a few days previously given orders to the captains to sail in the direction of the Straits whenever the fleet was ready, while he himself, putting to sea with seventeen ships, preceded them to Messene, being anxious to provided for all the urgent needs of the fleet. While there a proposal happened to be made to him with regard to the city of Lipara, and embracing the prospect with undue eagerness he sailed with the above-mentioned ships and anchored off the town. The Carthaginian general Hannibal, hearing at Panormus what had happened, sent off Boödes, a member of the Senate, giving him twenty ships. Boödes sailed up to Lipara at night and shut up Gnaeus in the harbour. When day dawned the Roman crews hastily took refuge on land, and Gnaeus, falling into a state of terror and being unable to do anything, finally surrendered to the enemy. The Carthaginians now set off at once to rejoin Hannibal with the captured ships and commander of the enemy. But a few days later, though Gnaeus' disaster was so signal and recent, Hannibal himself came very near falling into the same error with his eyes open. For hearing that the Roman fleet which was sailing along the coast of Italy was near at hand, and wishing to get a glimpse of the numbers and general disposition of the enemy, he sailed towards them with fifty ships. As he was rounding the Cape of Italy he came upon the enemy sailing in good order and trim. He lost most of his ships and escaped himself with the remainder, which was more than he expected or hoped.

[1] It is often necessary to use the word "sail," but it should be borne in mind that the ships were propelled chiefly by oars.

After this the Romans approached to coast of Sicily and learning of the disaster that had befallen Gnaeus, at once communicated with Gaius Duilius, the commander of the land forces, and awaited his arrival. At the same time, hearing that the enemy's fleet was not far distant, they began to get ready for sea-battle. As their ships were ill-built and slow in their movements, someone suggested to them as a help in fighting the engines which afterwards came to be called "ravens". They were constructed as follows: On the prow stood a round pole four fathoms in height and three palms in diameter. This pole had a pulley at the summit and round it was put a gangway made of cross planks attached by nails, four feet in width and six fathoms in length. In this gangway was an oblong hole, [2] and it went round the pole at a distance of two fathoms from its near end. The gangway also had a railing on each of its long sides as high as a man's knee. At its extremity was fastened an iron object like a pestle pointed at one end and with a ring at the other end, so that the whole looked like the machine for pounding corn. To this ring was attached a rope with which, when the ship charged an enemy, they raised the ravens by means of the pulley on the pole and let them down on the enemy's deck, sometimes from the prow and sometimes bringing them round when the ships collided broadsides. Once the ravens were fixed in the planks of the enemy's deck and grappled the ships together, if they were broadside on, they boarded from all directions but if they charged with the prow, they attacked by passing over the gangway of the raven itself two abreast. The leading pair protected the front by holding up their shields, and those who followed secured the two flanks by resting the rims of their shields on the top of the railing. Having, then, adopted this device, they awaited an opportunity for going into action.

[2] The gangway (36 feet long) was composed of two parts united by a joint, the near part (12 feet long), which always remained horizontal, and the far part (24 feet long) which could be drawn up at right angles to the near part, thus reaching the top of the pole (also 24 feet long) and remaining vertical until lowered. The whole could be moved round the pole which pierced it at the junction of the two parts.

As for Gaius Duilius, no sooner had he learnt of the disaster which had befallen the commander of the naval forces than handing over his legions to the military tribunes he proceeded to the fleet. Learning that the enemy were ravaging the territory of Mylae, he sailed against them with his whole force. The Carthaginians on sighting him put to sea with a hundred and thirty sail, quite overjoyed and eager, as they despised the inexperience of the Romans. They all sailed straight on the enemy, not even thinking it worth while to maintain order in the attack, but just as is they were falling on a prey that was obviously theirs. They were commanded by Hannibal—the same who stole out of Agrigentum by night with his army—in the seven-banked galley that was formerly King Pyrrhus'. On approaching and seeing the ravens nodding aloft on the prow of each ship, the Carthaginians were at first nonplussed, being surprised at the construction of the engines. However, as they entirely gave the enemy up for lost, the front ships attacked daringly. But when the ships that came into collision were in every case held fast by the machines, and the Roman crews boarded by means of the ravens and attacked them hand to hand on deck, some of the Carthaginians were cut down and others surrendered from dismay at what was happening, the battle having become just like a fight on land. So the

first thirty ships that engaged were taken with all their crews, including the commander's galley, Hannibal himself managing to escape beyond his hopes by a miracle in the jolly-boat. The rest of the Carthaginian force was bearing up as if to charge the enemy, but seeing, as they approached, the fate of the advanced ships they turned aside and avoided the blows of the engines. Trusting in their swiftness, they veered round the enemy in the hope of being able to strike him in safety either on the broadside or on the stern, but when the ravens swung round and plunged down in all directions and in all manner of ways so that those who approached them were of necessity grappled, they finally gave way and took to flight, terror-stricken by this novel experience and with the loss of fifty ships.

When the Romans had thus, contrary to all expectation, gained the prospect of success at sea their determination to prosecute the war became twice as strong. On this occasion they put in on the coast of Sicily, raised the siege of Segesta which was in the last stage of distress, and in leaving Segesta took the city of Macella by assault.

After the battle at sea Hamilcar, the Carthaginian commander of their land forces, who was quartered in the neighbourhood of Panormus, heard that in the Roman camp the allies and the Romans were at variance as to which had most distinguished themselves in the battles, and that the allies were encamped by themselves between the Paropus and the Hot Springs of Himera. Suddenly falling on them with his whole force as they were breaking up their camp he killed about four thousand. After this action Hannibal with the ships that escaped sailed away to Carthage and shortly after crossed from there to Sardinia, taking with him additional ships and some of the most celebrated naval officers. Not long afterwards he was

blockaded in one of the harbours of Sardinia by the Romans and after losing many of his ships was summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified. The Romans, I should explain, from the moment they concerned themselves with the sea, began to entertain designs on Sardinia.

The Roman troops in Sicily did nothing worthy of note during the following year; but at its close when they had received their new commanders the Consuls of next year, Aulus Atilius and Gaius Sulpicius, they started to attack Panormus, because the Carthaginian forces were wintering there. The Consuls, when they got close up to the city, offered battle with their whole forces, but as the enemy did not come out to meet them they left Panormus and went off to attack Hippana. This city they took by assault and they also took Myttistratum which withstood the siege for long owing to its strong situation. They then occupied Camarina which had lately deserted their cause, bringing up a siege battery and making a breach in the wall. They similarly took Enna and several other small places belonging to the Carthaginians, and when they had finished with these operations they undertook the siege of Lipara.

Next year Gaius Atilius Regulus the Roman Consul, while anchored off Tyndaris, caught sight of the Carthaginian fleet sailing past in disorder. Ordering his crews to follow the leaders, he dashed out before the rest with ten ships sailing together. The Carthaginians, observing that some of the enemy were still embarking, and some just getting under weigh, while those in the van had much outstripped the others, turned and met them. Surrounding them they sunk the rest of the ten, and came very near to taking the admiral's ship with its crew. However, as it was well manned and swift, it foiled their expectation and got out of danger. The rest of the

Roman fleet sailed up and gradually got into close order. As soon as they faced the enemy, they bore down on them and took ten ships with their crews, sinking eight. The rest of the Carthaginian fleet withdrew to the islands known as Liparaean.

The result of this battle was that both sides thought that they had fought now on equal terms, and both threw themselves most thoroughly into the task of organizing naval forces and disputing the command of the sea, while in the mean time the land forces accomplished nothing worthy of mention, but spent their time in minor operations of no significance. The Romans, therefore, after making preparations as I said, for the coming summer, set to sea with a fleet of three hundred and thirty decked ships of war and put in to Messene. Starting again from there they sailed with Sicily on their right hand, and doubling Cape Pachynus they came round to Ecnomus, because their land forces too happened to be just in that neighbourhood. The Carthaginians, setting sail with three hundred and fifty decked vessels, touched at Lilybaeum, and proceeding thence came to anchor off Heraclea Minoa. The plan of the Romans was to sail to Libya and deflect the war to that country, so that the Carthaginians might find no longer Sicily but themselves and their own territory in danger. The Carthaginians were resolved on just the opposite course, for, aware as they were that Africa is easily accessible, and that all the people in the country would be easily subdued by anyone who had once invaded it, they were unable to allow this, and were anxious to run the risk of a sea-battle. The object of the one side being to prevent and that of the other to force a crossing, it was clear that their rival aims would result in the struggle which followed. The Romans had made suitable preparations for both contingencies—for an action at sea

and for a landing in the enemy's country. For the latter purpose, selecting the best men from their land forces, they divided into four corps the total force they were about to embark. Each corps had two names; it was called either the First Legion or the First Squadron, and the others accordingly. The fourth had a third name in addition; they were called *triarii* after the usage in the land forces. The whole body embarked on the ships numbered about a hundred and forty thousand, each ship holding three hundred rowers and a hundred and twenty marines. The Carthaginians were chiefly or solely adapting their preparations to a maritime war, their numbers being, to reckon by the number of ships, actually above one hundred and fifty thousand. These are figures calculated to strike not only one present and with the forces under his eyes but even a hearer with amazement at the magnitude of the struggle and at that lavish outlay and vast power of the two states, if he estimates them from the number of men and ships.

The Romans taking into consideration that the voyage was across the open sea and that the enemy were their superiors in speed, tried by every means to range their fleet in an order which would render it secure and difficult to attack. Accordingly, they stationed their two six-banked galleys, on which the commanders, Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius, were sailing, in front and side by side with each other. Behind each of these they placed ships in single file, the first squadron behind the one galley, the second behind the other, so arranging them that the distance between each pair of ships in the two squadrons grew ever greater. The ships were stationed in column with their prows directed outwards. [3] Having thus arranged the first and second squadrons in the form of a simple wedge, they stationed the third in a single line at the base, so that when these ships had

taken their places the resulting form of the whole was a triangle. Behind these ships at the base they stationed the horse-transports, attaching them by towing-lines to the vessels of the third squadron. Finally, behind these they stationed the fourth squadron, known as *triarii*, making a single long line of ships so extended that the line overlapped that in front of it at each extremity. When all had been put together in the manner I have described, the whole arrangement had the form of a wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact, and the whole effective and practical, while also difficult to break up.

[3] This can only mean that the prow of each ship was directed to the open sea and not to the ship in front of it; i.e. they were in echelon.

About the same time the Carthaginian commanders briefly addressed their forces. They pointed out to them that in the event of victory in the battle they would be fighting afterwards for Sicily, but that if defeated they would have to fight for their own country and their homes, and bade them take this to heart and embark. When all readily did as they were ordered, as their general's words had made clear to them the issues at stake, they set to sea in a confident and menacing spirit. The commanders when they saw the enemy's order adapted their own to it. Three-quarters of their force they drew up in a single line, extending their right wing to the open sea for the purpose of encircling the enemy and with all their ships facing the Romans. The remaining quarter of their force formed the left wing of their whole line, and reached shoreward at angle with the rest. Their right wing was under the command of the same Hanno who had been worsted in the engagement near Agrigentum. He had vessels for charging and also the

swiftest quinqueremes for the outflanking movement. The left wing was in charge of Hamilcar, the one who commanded in the sea-battle at Tyndaris, and he, fighting as he was in the centre of the line, used in the fray the following stratagem. The battle was begun by the Romans who, noticing that the Carthaginian line was thin owing to its great extent, delivered an attack on the centre. The Carthaginian centre had received Hamilcar's orders to fall back at once with the view of breaking the order of the Romans, and, as they hastily retreated, the Romans pursued them vigorously. While the first and second squadrons thus pressed on the flying enemy, the third and fourth were separated from them, the third squadron towing the horse-transports, and the *triarii* remaining with them as a supporting force. When the Carthaginians thought they had drawn off the first and second squadrons far enough from the others, they all, on receiving a signal from Hamilcar's ship, turned simultaneously and attacked their pursuers. The engagement that followed was a very hot one, the superior speed of the Carthaginians enabling them to move round the enemy's flank as well as to approach easily and retire rapidly, while the Romans, relying on their sheer strength when they closed with the enemy, grappling with the ravens every ship as soon as it approached, fighting also, as they were, under the very eyes of both the Consuls, who were personally taking part in the combat, had no less high hopes of success. Such then was the state of the battle in this quarter. At one and the same time Hanno with the right wing, which had held its distance in the first attack, sailed across the open sea and fell upon the ships of the *triarii*, causing them great embarrassment and distress. Meanwhile that part of the Carthaginian force which was posted near the shore, changing their former formation and deploying into

line with their prows facing the enemy, attacked the vessels which were towing the horse-transports. Letting go their tow-lines this squadron met and engaged the enemy. Thus the whole conflict consisted of three parts, and three sea-battles were going on at a wide distance from each other. As the respective forces were in each case of equal strength owing to their disposition at the outset, the battle also was fought on equal terms. However, in each case things fell out as one would expect, when the forces engaged are so equally matched. Those who had commenced the battle were the first to be separated, for Hamilcar's division was finally forced back and took to flight. Lucius was now occupied in taking the prizes in tow, and Marcus, observing the struggle in which the *triarii* and horse-transports were involved, hastened to their assistance with such of the ships of the second squadron as were undamaged. When he reached Hanno's division and came into conflict with it, the *triarii* at once took heart, though they had had much the worst of it, and recovered their fighting spirit. The Carthaginians, attacked both in front and in the rear, were in difficulties, finding themselves surrounded, to their surprise, by the relieving force, and giving way, they began to retreat out to sea. Meanwhile both Lucius, who was by this time sailing up and observed that the third squadron was shut in close to the shore by the Carthaginian left wing, and Marcus, who had now left the horse-transports and *triarii* in safety, hastened together to the relief of this force which was in grave peril; for the state of matters now was just like a siege, and they all would evidently have been lost if the Carthaginians had not been afraid of the ravens and simply hedged them in and held them close to the land instead of charging, apprehensive as they were of coming to close quarters. The Consuls, coming up rapidly and surrounding the

Carthaginians, captured fifty ships with their crews, a few managing to slip out along shore and escape. The separate encounters fell out as I have described, and the final result of the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. The latter lost twenty-four sail sunk and the Carthaginians more than thirty. Not a single Roman ship with its crew fell into the enemy's hands, but sixty-four Carthaginian ships were so captured.

After this the Romans, laying in a further supply of provisions, repairing the captured ships, and bestowing on their men the attention which their success deserved, put to sea and sailed towards Libya, reaching the shore with their advanced ships under the promontory known as the Hermaeum which lies in front of the whole Gulf of Carthage and stretches out to sea in the direction of Sicily. Having waited there until their other ships came up, and having united their whole fleet, they sailed along the coast till they reached the city of Aspis. Landing there and beaching their ships, which they surrounded with a trench and palisade, they set themselves to lay siege to the town, the garrison of which refused to surrender voluntarily. Those Carthaginians who made good their escape from the naval battle sailed home, and being convinced that the enemy, elated by their recent success, would at once attack Carthage itself from the sea, kept watch at different points over the approaches to the city with their land and sea forces. But when they learnt that the Romans had safely landed and were laying siege to Aspis, they abandoned the measures taken to guard against an attack from the sea, and uniting their forces devoted themselves to the protection of the capital and its environs. The Romans, after making themselves masters of Aspis, where they left a garrison to hold the town and district, sent a mission to Rome to report on recent events, and to inquire what they

should do in future and how they were to deal with the whole situation. They then hastily advanced with their whole force and set about plundering the country. As nobody tried to prevent them, they destroyed a number of handsome and luxuriously furnished dwelling-houses, possessed themselves of a quantity of cattle, and captured more than twenty thousand slaves, taking them back to their ships. Messengers from Rome now arrived with instructions for one of the Consuls to remain on the spot with an adequate force and for the other to bring the fleet back to Rome. Marcus Regulus, therefore, remained, retaining forty ships and a force of fifteen thousand infantry and five hundred horse, while Lucius, taking with him the ship's crews and all the prisoners, passed safely along the coast of Sicily and reached Rome.

The Carthaginians, observing that the Romans were preparing for a long occupation, in the first place elected two generals from among themselves, Hasdrubal, the son of Hanno, and Bostarus, and next sent to Heraclea to Hamilcar, ordering him to return instantly. Taking with him five hundred horse and five thousand foot, he came to Carthage where, being appointed third general, he held a consultation with Hasdrubal and his staff as to what steps should be taken. They decided on marching to the assistance of the country and no longer looking on while it was plundered with immunity. A few days later Regulus had begun to advance, taking by assault and pillaging the unwalled places and laying siege to those which had walls. On reaching Adys, a town of some importance, he encamped about it and busied himself with raising works to besiege it. The Carthaginians, being anxious to attempt to regain the command of the open country, led out their forces. They took possession of a hill which, while overlooking the enemy,

was not a favourable position for their own army; and there they encamped. In this manner, though their best hope lay in their cavalry and elephants, yet by quitting the level country and shutting themselves up in a precipitous place, difficult of access, they were sure to make it plain to their adversaries how best to attack them, and this is exactly what did happen. For the Roman commanders, perceiving from their experience of war that the most efficient and formidable part of the enemy's force was rendered unserviceable by their position, did not wait for the Carthaginians to come down and offer battle on the plain, but, seizing on their own opportunity, advanced at daybreak on the hill from both sides. And so their elephants and cavalry were absolutely useless to the Carthaginians, but their mercenaries sallying out with great gallantry and dash compelled the first legion to give way and take to flight; but on their advancing too far and being surrounded and driven back by the force that was attacking on the other side, the whole Carthaginian army were at once dislodged from their camp. The elephants and cavalry, as soon as they reached level ground, effected their retreat in safety, and the Romans, after pursuing the infantry for a short distance and destroying the camp, henceforth over-ran and plundered the country and its towns unmolested. Having made themselves masters of the town named Tunis, which was a suitable base for these raids, and also well situated for operations against the capital and its immediate environs, they established themselves there.

The Carthaginians, having thus been twice defeated, shortly before at sea and now on land, in both cases owing to no lack of bravery in their troops, but owing to the incompetence of their commanders, had now fallen into a thoroughly difficult position. For, in addition to the misfortunes I have

mentioned, the Numidians, attacking them at the same time as the Romans, inflicted not less but even more damage on the country than the latter. The terror-stricken inhabitants took refuge in the city of Carthage where utter despondency and extreme famine prevailed, the latter owing to overcrowding and the former owing to the expectation of a siege. Regulus, perceiving that the Carthaginians were utterly worsted both by land and sea and expecting to capture the city in a very short time, was yet apprehensive lest his successor in the Consulate should arrive from Rome before Carthage fell and receive the credit of the success, and he therefore invited the enemy to enter into negotiations. The Carthaginians gave a ready ear to these advances, and sent out an embassy of their leading citizens. On meeting Regulus, however, the envoys were so far from being inclined to yield to the conditions he proposed that they could not even bear listening to the severity of his demands. For, imagining himself to be complete master of the situation, he considered they ought to regard any concessions on his part as gifts and acts of grace. As it was evident to the Carthaginians that even if they became subject to the Romans, they could be in no worse case than if they yielded to the present demands, they returned not only dissatisfied with the conditions proposed but offended by Regulus's harshness. The attitude of the Carthaginian Senate on hearing the Roman general's proposals was, although they had almost abandoned all hope of safety, yet one of such manly dignity that rather than submit to anything ignoble or unworthy of their past they were willing to suffer anything and to face every exertion and every extremity.

Just about this time there arrived at Carthage one of the recruiting-officers they had formerly dispatched to Greece, bringing a considerable

number of soldiers and among them a certain Xanthippus of Lacedaemon, a man who had been brought up in the Spartan discipline, and had had a fair amount of military experience. On hearing of the recent reverse and how and in what way it occurred, and on taking a comprehensive view of the remaining resources of the Carthaginians and their strength in cavalry and elephants, he at once reached the conclusion and communicated it to friends that the Carthaginians owed their defeat not to the Romans but to themselves, through the inexperience of their generals. Owing to the critical situation Xanthippus's remarks soon got abroad and reached the ears of the generals, whereupon the government decided to summon him before them and examine him. He presented himself before them and communicated to them his estimate of the situation, pointing out why they were now being worsted, and urging that if they would take his advice and avail themselves of the level country for marching, encamping and offering battle they could easily not only secure their own safety, but defeat the enemy. The generals, accepting what he said and resolving to follow his advice, at once entrusted their forces to him. Now even when the original utterance of Xanthippus got abroad, it had caused considerable rumour and more or less sanguine talk among the populace, but on his leading the army out and drawing it up in good order before the city and even beginning to manœuvre some portions of it correctly and give the word of command in the orthodox military terms, the contrast to the incompetency of the former generals was so striking that the soldiery expressed their approval by cheers and were eager to engage the enemy, feeling sure that if Xanthippus was in command no disaster could befall them. Upon this the generals, seeing the extraordinary recovery of courage among the troops, addressed them in

words suitable to the occasion and after a few days took the field with their forces. These consisted of twelve thousand foot, four thousand horse and very nearly a hundred elephants.

When the Romans saw that the Carthaginians were marching through the flat country and pitching their camps on level ground, they were surprised indeed and somewhat disturbed by this in particular, but yet were anxious on the whole to get into contact with the enemy. On coming into touch they encamped on the first day at a distance of about ten stades from him. On the following day the Carthaginian government held a council to discuss what should be done for the present and the means thereto. But the troops, eager as they were for a battle, collecting in groups and calling on Xanthippus by name, clearly indicated their opinion that he should lead them forward at once. The generals when they saw the enthusiasm and keenness of the soldiers, Xanthippus at the same time imploring them not to let the opportunity slip, ordered the troops to get ready and gave Xanthippus authority to conduct operations as he himself thought most advantageous. Acting on this authority, he sent the elephants forward and drew them up in a single line in front of the whole force, placing the Carthaginian phalanx at a suitable distance behind them. Some of the mercenaries he stationed on the right wing, while the most active he placed together with the cavalry in front of both wings. The Romans, seeing the enemy drawn up to offer battle, issued forth to meet them with alacrity. Alarmed at the prospect of the elephants' charge, they stationed the velites in the van and behind them the legions many maniples deep, dividing the cavalry between the two wings. In thus making their whole line shorter and deeper than before they had been correct enough in so far as concerned the coming encounter with

the elephants, but as to that with the cavalry, which largely outnumbered theirs, they were very wide of the mark. When both sides had made that general and detailed disposition of their forces that best suited their plan, they remained drawn up in order, each awaiting a favourable opportunity to attack. No sooner had Xanthippus ordered the elephant-drivers to advance and break the enemy's line and the cavalry on each wing to execute a turning movement and charge, than the Roman army, clashing their shields and spears together, as is their custom and uttering their battle-cry, advanced against the foe. As for the Roman cavalry on both wings it was speedily put to flight owing to the superior numbers of the Carthaginians; while of the infantry, the left wing, partly to avoid the onset of the elephants, and partly owing to the contempt they felt for the mercenary force, fell upon the Carthaginian right wing, and having broken it, pressed on and pursued it as far as the camp. But the first ranks of those who were stationed opposite the elephants, pushed back when they encountered them and trodden under foot by the strength of the animals, fell in heaps in the mêlée, while the formation of the main body, owing to the depths of the ranks behind, remained for a time unbroken. At length, however, those in the rear were surrounded on all sides by the cavalry and obliged to face round and fight them, while those who had managed to force a passage through the elephants and collect in the rear of those beasts, encountered the Carthaginian phalanx quite fresh and in good order and were cut to pieces. Henceforth the Romans were in sore straits on all sides, the greater number were trampled to death by the vast weight of the elephants, while the remainder were shot down by the numerous cavalry in their ranks as they stood. Only quite a small body of these tried to effect their escape, and of

these, as their line of retreat was over level ground, some were dispatched by the elephants and cavalry, and about five hundred who got away with their general Regulus shortly afterwards fell into the enemy's hands and were made prisoners, himself included. It resulted that in this battle the Carthaginians lost about eight hundred of the mercenaries, who had faced the Roman left wing, while of the Romans there were saved but about two thousand, whom the pursuit of the mercenaries I mentioned above carried out of the main battle. All the rest perished with the exception of the general Regulus and those who took to flight together with him. The maniples which escaped got through by extraordinary luck to Aspis. The Carthaginians stripped the dead, and taking with them the Consul and the other captives, returned to the city in high glee at the turn of affairs.

In these events there will be found by one who notes them aright much to contribute to the better conduct of human life. For the precept to distrust Fortune, and especially when we are enjoying success, was most clearly enforced on all by Regulus's misfortunes. He who so short a time previously had refused to pity or take mercy on those in distress was now, almost immediately afterwards, being led captive to implore pity and mercy in order to save his own life. And again Euripides' words, so long recognized as just, that "one wise counsel conquers many hands" were then confirmed by the actual facts. For one man and one brain laid low that host which seemed so invincible and efficient, and restored the fortunes of a state which in the eyes of all was utterly fallen and the deadened spirit of its soldiers. This I mention for the sake of the improvement of the readers of this history. For there are two ways by which all men can reform themselves, the one through their own mischances, the other through those

of others, and of these the former is the more impressive, but the latter less hurtful. Therefore we should never choose the first method if we can help it, as it corrects by means of great pain and peril, but ever pursue the other, since by it we can discern what is best without suffering hurt. Reflecting on this we should regard as the best discipline for actual life the experience that accrues from serious history; for this alone makes us, without inflicting any harm on us, the most competent judges of what is best at every time and in every circumstance. Well, on this subject I have said enough.

All having now fallen out with the Carthaginians as they could best desire, there was no extravagance of rejoicing in which they did not indulge, paying thank-offerings to the gods and giving congratulatory entertainments. But Xanthippus, to whom this revolution and notable advance in the fortunes of Carthage was due, after a little time sailed again for home, and this was a very prudent and sensible decision on his part; for brilliant and exceptional achievements are wont to breed the deepest jealousy and most bitter slander. Natives of a place, supported as they are by their kinsmen and having many friends, may possibly be able to hold their own against those for some time, but foreigners when exposed to either speedily succumb and find themselves in peril. There is another account given of Xanthippus's departure which I will endeavour to set forth on an occasion more suitable than the present.

The Romans, who had never expected to receive such bad news from Libya, at once directed their efforts to fitting out their fleet and rescuing their surviving troops there. The Carthaginians after the battle encamped before Aspis and laid siege to it with the object of capturing these survivors, but as they had no success owing to the gallantry and daring of the

defenders they at length abandoned the siege. When news reached them that the Romans were preparing their fleet and were about to sail again for Libya, they set to repairing the ships they had and building other entirely new ones, and having soon manned a fleet of two hundred sail, they put to sea and remained on the watch for an attack by the enemy.

In the early summer the Romans, having launched three hundred and fifty ships, sent them off under the command of Marcus Aemilius and Servius Fulvius, who proceeded along the coast of Sicily making for Libya. Encountering the Carthaginian fleet near the Hermaeum they fell on them and easily routed them, capturing one hundred and fourteen ships with their crews. Then having taken on board at Aspis the lads who remained in Libya they set sail again for Sicily. They had crossed the strait in safety and were off the territory of Camarina when they were overtaken by so fierce a storm and so terrible a disaster that it is difficult adequately to describe it owing to its surpassing magnitude. For of their three hundred and sixty-four ships only eighty were saved; the rest either foundered or were dashed by the waves against the rocks and headlands and broken to pieces, covering the shore with corpses and wreckage. History tells of no greater catastrophe at sea taking place at one time. The blame must be laid not so much on ill-fortune as on the commanders; for the captains had repeatedly urged them not to sail along the outer coast of Sicily, that turned towards the Libyan sea, as it was very rugged and had few safe anchorages: they also warned them that one of the dangerous astral periods was not over and another just approaching (for it was between the rising of Orion and that of Sirius [4] that they undertook the voyage). The commanders, however, paid no attention to a single word they said, they took the outer course and there

they were in the open sea thinking to strike terror into some of the cities they passed by the brilliancy of their recent success and thus win them over. But now, all for the sake of such meagre expectations, they exposed themselves to this great disaster, and were obliged to acknowledge their lack of judgement. The Romans, to speak generally, rely on force in all their enterprises, and think it is incumbent on them to carry out their projects in spite of all, and that nothing is impossible when they have once decided on it. They owe their success in many cases to this spirit, but sometimes they conspicuously fail by reason of it and especially at sea. For on land they are attacking men and the works of man and are usually successful, as there they are employing force against forces of the same nature, although even here they have in some rare instances failed. But when they come to encounter the sea and the atmosphere and choose to fight them by force they meet with signal defeats. It was so on this occasion and on many others, and it will always continue to be so, until they correct this fault of daring and violence which makes them think they can sail and travel where they will at no matter what season.

[4] Sirius rises in July, Orion early in December.

The Carthaginians, on hearing of the destruction of the Roman fleet, conceiving themselves to be now a match for the Romans both on land owing to their recent success and at sea owing to this disaster, were encouraged to make more extensive military and naval preparations. They at once dispatched Hasdrubal to Sicily, giving him the troops they previously had and a force which had joined them from Heraclea, together with a hundred and forty elephants. After dispatching him they began to get ready for sea two hundred ships and to make all other preparations for a

naval expedition. Hasdrubal having crossed in safety to Lilybaeum occupied himself in drilling unopposed his elephants and the rest of his force, and plainly intended to dispute the possession of the open country.

The Romans, on receiving full information about the disaster from the survivors of the shipwreck, were deeply grieved, but being resolved on no account to give in, they decided to put on the stocks a fresh fleet of two hundred and twenty ships. In three months they were completed—a thing difficult to believe—and the new Consuls, Aulus Atilius and Gnaeus Cornelius, having fitted out the fleet, put to sea, and passing the straits picked up at Messene the ships that had escaped shipwreck. Descending with their total fleet of three hundred sail on Panormus, the most important city in the Carthaginian province, they undertook its siege. They threw up works in two places and after making the other necessary preparations brought up their battering-rams. The tower on the sea shore was easily knocked down, and, the soldiers pressing in through this breach, the so-called New Town was stormed, and the part known as the Old Town being now in imminent danger, its inhabitants soon surrendered it. Having taken possession of it the Consuls sailed back to Rome leaving a garrison in the town.

Their successors, Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Sempronius, put to sea with their whole fleet as soon as it was summer and after crossing to Sicily proceeded thence to Libya, and sailing along the coast, made a number of descents in which they accomplished nothing of importance, and finally reached the isle of the Lotus-eaters, which is called Menix and is not far distant from the lesser Syrtis. Here, owing to their ignorance of these seas, they ran on to some shoals, and, on the tide retreating and the ships

grounding fast, they were in a most difficult position. However, as the tide unexpectedly rose again after some time, they managed with difficulty to lighten their ships by throwing overboard all heavy objects. Their departure now was so hasty as to resemble a flight, and having made Sicily and rounded Cape Lilybaeum they anchored at Panormus. As they were rashly crossing the open sea on the way hence to Rome they again encountered such a terrific storm that they lost more than a hundred and fifty ships.

The Roman Government upon this, although in all matters they are exceedingly ambitious of success, still on the present occasion, owing to the magnitude and frequency of the disasters they met with, were obliged by the force of circumstances to renounce the project of getting another fleet together. Relying now solely on their land forces, they dispatched to Sicily with some legions the Consuls Lucius Caecilius and Gaius Furius and only manned sixty ships to revictual the legions. The above disasters resulted in the prospects of the Carthaginians becoming once more brighter; for they had now undisturbed command of the sea, the Romans having retired from it, and they had great hopes of their army. These hopes were not unjustified, for the Romans, when the report circulated regarding the battle in Libya that the elephants had broken the Romans' ranks and killed most of their men, grew so afraid of the beasts that for the two years following this period, though often both in the district of Lilybaeum and in that of Selinus they were drawn up at a distance of five or six stades from the enemy, they never dared to begin a battle, and in fact never would come down at all to meet the enemy on flat ground, so much did they dread a charge of the elephants. During this period all they accomplished was the reduction by siege of Therma and Lipara, keeping as they did to mountainous and difficult

country. Consequently the Government, observing the timidity and despondency that prevailed in their land forces, changed their minds and decided to try their fortunes at sea again. In the consulship of Gaius Atilius and Lucius Manlius we find them building fifty ships and actively enrolling sailors and getting a fleet together.

The Carthaginian commander-in-chief, Hasdrubal, had noted the lack of courage which the Romans exhibited, on the occasions when they were in presence of the enemy, and when he learnt that while one of the Consuls with half the whole force had left for Italy, Caecilius and the rest of the army remained at Panormus with the object of protecting the corn of the allies—it now being the height of the harvest— removed his forces from Lilybaeum and encamped on the frontier of the territory of Panormus. Caecilius, observing Hasdrubal's aggressive spirit and wishing to provoke him to attack, kept his own soldiers within the gates. Hasdrubal gained fresh confidence from this, thinking that Caecilius did not venture to come out, and boldly advancing with his whole force, descended through the pass on the territory of Panormus. Caecilius, adhering to his original plan, let him ravage the crops up to the walls, until he had led him on to cross the river that runs in front of the town. Once the Carthaginians had got their elephants and other forces across, he kept sending out light-armed troops to molest them, until he had compelled them to deploy their whole force. When he saw that what he had designed was taking place he stationed some of his light troops before the wall and the trench, ordering them, if the elephants approached, not to spare their missiles, and when driven from their position, they were to take refuge in the trench and sallying from it again shoot at those elephants which charged at them. Ordering the lower

classes of the civil population to bring the missiles and arrange them outside at the foot of the wall, he himself with his maniples took up his position at the gate which faced the enemy's left wing and kept sending constant reinforcements to those engaged in shooting. When this latter force more generally engaged with the enemy, the drivers of the elephants, anxious to exhibit their prowess to Hasdrubal and wishing the victory to be due to themselves, all charged those of the enemy who were in advance and putting them easily to flight pursued them to the trench. When the elephants charged the trench and began to be wounded by those who were shooting from the wall, while at the same time a rapid shower of javelins and spears fell on them from the fresh troops drawn up before the trench, they very soon, finding themselves hit and hurt in many places, were thrown into confusion and turned on their own troops, trampling down and killing the men and disturbing and breaking the ranks. Caecilius, on seeing this, made a vigorous sally and falling on the flank of the enemy, who were now in disorder, with his own fresh and well-ordered troops caused a severe rout among them, killing many and compelling the rest to quit the field in headlong flight. He took ten elephants with their mahouts, and after the battle, having penned up the others who had thrown their mahouts, he captured them all. By this exploit he was universally acknowledged to have caused the Roman land forces to pluck up courage again and gain the command of the open country.

When news of this success reached Rome it caused great rejoicing, not so much because of the enemy being weakened by the loss of their elephants as because of the confidence which the capture of these gave to their own troops. They were consequently encouraged to revert to their

original plan of sending out the Consuls to the campaign with a fleet of naval force; for they were eager by all means in their power to put an end to the war. When all that was required for the expedition was ready, the Consuls set sail for Sicily with two hundred ships. This was in the fourteenth year of the war. Anchoring off Lilybaeum, where they were joined by their land forces, they undertook its siege, thinking that if it fell into their possession it would be easy for them to transfer the war to Libya. On this matter at least the Carthaginian Government agreed more or less with the Romans, sharing their estimate of the place's value; so that, shelving all other projects, they devoted their whole attention to the relief of this city and were ready to undertake every risk and burden for this purpose; for if it fell, no base was left for them, as the Romans were masters of all the rest of Sicily except Drepana.

To prevent my narrative from being obscure to readers owing to their ignorance of the geography, I will try to convey briefly to them an idea of the natural advantages and exact position of the places referred to. Sicily, then, as a whole occupies the same position with regard to Italy and its extremity that the Peloponnese occupies with regard to Greece and its extremity, the difference lying in this, that the Peloponnese is a peninsula whereas Sicily is an island, the communication being in the one case by land and in the other by sea. Sicily is triangular in shape, the apices of all three angles being formed by capes. The cape that looks to the south and stretches out into the Sicilian Sea is called Pachynus, that on the north forms the extremity of the western coast of the Strait; it is about twelve stades distant from Italy and is called Pelorias. The third looks towards Libya itself, and is favourably situated as a base for attacking the

promontories in front of Carthage, from which it is distant about one thousand stades. It is turned to the south-west, separating the Libyan from the Sardinian Sea, and its name is Lilybaeum. On the cape stands the city of the same name, of which the Romans were now opening the siege. It is excellently defended both by walls and by a deep moat all round, and on the side facing the sea by shoaly water, the passage through which into the harbour requires great skill and practice.

The Romans encamped by this city on either side, fortifying the space between their camps with a trench, a stockade, and a wall. They then began to throw up works against the tower that lay nearest the sea on the Libyan side, and, gradually advancing from the base thus acquired and extending their works, they succeeded at last in knocking down the six adjacent towers, and attacked all the others at once with battering rams. The siege was now so vigorously pursued and so terrifying, each day seeing some of the towers shaken or demolished and the enemy's works advancing further and further into the city, that the besieged were thrown into a state of utter confusion and panic, although, besides the civil population, there were nearly ten thousand mercenaries in the town. Their general, Himilco, however, omitted no means of resistance in his power, and by counter-building and counter-mining caused the enemy no little difficulty. Every day he would advance and make attempts on the siege works, trying to succeed in setting them on fire, and with this object was indeed engaged by night and day in combats of so desperate a character, that at times more men fell in these encounters than usually fell in a pitched battle.

About this time some of the superior officers in the mercenary force, after talking the matter over among themselves and in the full conviction

that their subordinates would obey them, sallied from the town by night to the Roman camp and made proposals to the Consul for the surrender of the city. But the Achaean Alexon, who had on a former occasion saved the Agrigentines, when the Syracusan mercenaries had formed a project of breaking faith with them, was now too the first to get wind of what was going on and informed the Carthaginian general. Himilco on hearing of it at once summoned the remaining officers and urgently implored their aid, promising them lavish gifts and favours if they remained loyal to him and refused to participate in the plot of those who had left the city. On their readily consenting, he bade them return at once to their troops, sending with them to the Celts Hannibal, the son of that Hannibal who had died in Sardinia, as they had served under him and were well acquainted with him, while to the other mercenaries he sent Alexon, owing to his popularity and credit with them. They called a meeting of the soldiery and partly by entreating them, partly moreover by assuring them that each man would receive the bounty the general had offered, easily persuaded them to bide by their engagements. So, afterwards, when the officers who had quitted the city advanced openly to the walls and attempted to entreat them and tell them of the promises made by the Romans, not only did they pay no attention but would not lend ear to them at all, and chased them away from the wall with stones and other missiles. The Carthaginians, then, for the above reasons very narrowly escaped a complete disaster due to the treachery of their mercenaries, and Alexon, who had previously saved by his loyalty not only the city and district but the laws and liberties of Agrigentum, now was the cause of the Carthaginians being saved from total ruin.

The Carthaginian government knew nothing of all this, but calculating the requirements of a besieged town, they filled fifty ships with troops. After addressing the soldiers in terms befitting the enterprise, they sent them off at once under the command of Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, trierarch and most intimate friend of Adherbal, with orders not to delay, but at the first opportunity to make a bold attempt to relieve the besieged. Setting sail with ten thousand troops on board, he came to anchor off the islands called Aegusae, which lie between Lilybaeum and Carthage, and there awaited favourable weather. As soon as he had a fine stern breeze he hoisted all sail and running before the wind sailed straight for the mouth of the harbour, his men drawn up on deck armed ready for action. The Romans, partly owing to the suddenness of the fleet's appearance and partly because they feared being carried into the hostile harbour by the force of the wind together with their enemies, made no effort to prevent the entrance of the relieving force, but stood out at sea amazed at the audacity of the Carthaginians. The whole population had assembled on the walls in an agony of suspense on the one hand as to what would happen, and at the same time so overjoyed at the unexpected prospect of succour that they kept on encouraging the fleet as it sailed in by cheers and clapping of hands. Hannibal, having entered the harbour in this hazardous and daring manner, anchored and disembarked his troops in security. All those in the city were delighted not so much at the arrival of the relief, although their prospects were much improved and their force increased thereby, as at the fact that the Romans had not ventured to try to prevent the Carthaginians from sailing in.

Himilco, the commander of the garrison, seeing that all were full of spirit and confidence, the original garrison owing to the arrival of relief, and the newcomers owing to their ignorance as yet of the perilous situation, desired to avail himself of this fresh spirit in both parties and make another attempt to fire the enemy's works. He therefore summoned the soldiers to a general assembly, and addressing them at some length in words suitable to the occasion, roused them to great enthusiasm by his lavish promises of reward to those who distinguished themselves personally, and his assurance that the force as a whole would be duly recompensed by the Government. On their all applauding him and shouting to him not to delay but to lead them on at once, he dismissed them for the present after praising them and expressing his pleasure at their eagerness, ordering them to retire to rest early and obey their officers. Soon afterwards he summoned the commanding officers and assigned to each his proper place in the assault, giving them the watchword and informing them of the hour. He ordered all the commanders with the whole of their forces to be on the spot at the morning watch, and his orders having been executed, he led the whole force out as it was getting light and attacked the works in several places. The Romans, who had foreseen what was coming, were not idle or unprepared, but promptly ran to defend the threatened points and opposed a vigorous resistance to the enemy. Soon the whole of both forces were engaged, and a desperate fight was going on all round the walls, the salliers numbering not less than twenty thousand and the force outside being rather more numerous. Inasmuch as they were fighting confusedly and in no order, each man as he thought best, the battle was all the more fierce, such a large force being engaged man to man and company to company, so that there was something of the keenness of single

combat in the whole contest. It was, however, particularly at the siege-works themselves that there was most shouting and pressure. For those on both sides whose task from the outset was on the one hand to drive the defenders from the works, and on the other not to abandon them, exhibited such emulation and resolution, the assailants doing their very best to turn the Romans out, and the latter refusing to give way, that at last owing to this resolute spirit the men remained and fell on the spot where they had first stood. Yet, in spite of all, the bearers of pine-brands, tow, and fire intermingled with the combatants, attacked the engines from every side, hurling the burning matter at them with such pluck that the Romans were in the utmost peril, being unable to master the onset of the enemy. But the Carthaginian general, observing that many were falling in the battle, and that his object of taking the works was not being attained, ordered his trumpeters to sound the retreat. Thus the Romans who had come very near losing all their siege-material, at length were masters of their works, and remained in secure possession of them.

As for Hannibal he sailed out with his ships after the affair while it was still night, unobserved by the enemy, and proceeded to Drepana to meet the Carthaginian commander there, Adherbal. Owing to the convenient situation of Drepana and the excellency of its harbour, the Carthaginians had always given great attention to its protection. The place lies at a distance of about a hundred and twenty stades from Lilybaeum.

The Carthaginians at home wishing to know what was happening at Lilybaeum, but being unable to do so as their own forces were shut up in the town and the Romans were active in their vigilance, one of their leading citizens, Hannibal, surnamed the Rhodian, offered to sail into Lilybaeum

and make a full report from personal observation. They listened to his offer eagerly, but did not believe he could do this, as the Romans were anchored outside the mouth of the port. But after fitting out his own ship, he set sail, and crossed to one of the islands that lie before Lilybaeum, and next day finding the wind happily favourable, sailed in at about ten o'clock in the morning in full sight of the enemy who were thunderstruck by his audacity. Next day he at once made preparations for departure, but the Roman general, with the view of guarding the entrance more carefully, had fitted out in the night ten of his fastest ships, and now he himself and his whole army stood by the harbour waiting to see what would happen. The ships were waiting on either side of the entrance as near as the shoals would allow them to approach, their oars out and ready to charge and capture the ship that was about to sail out. But the "Rhodian," getting under weigh in the sight of all, so far outbraved the Romans by his audacity and speed that not only did he bring his ship and her whole crew out unhurt, passing the enemy's ships just as if they were motionless, but after sailing on a short way, he pulled up without shipping his oars as if to challenge the enemy, and no one venturing to come out against him owing to the speed of his rowing, he sailed off, after thus having with one ship successfully defied the whole Roman fleet. After this he several times performed the same feat and was of great service by continuing to report at Carthage the news of most urgent importance, while at the same time he kept up the spirits of the besieged and struck terror into the Romans by his venturesomeness. What tended most to give him confidence was that from experience he had accurately noted the course to be followed through the shoals in entering. For as soon as he had crossed and come into view, he would get the sea-

tower on the Italian side on his bows so that it covered the whole line of towers turned towards Africa; and this is the only way that a vessel running before the wind can hit the mouth of the harbour in entering. Several others who had local knowledge, gaining confidence from the "Rhodian's" audacity, undertook to do the same, and in consequence the Romans, to whom this was a great annoyance, tried to fill up the mouth of the harbour. For the most part indeed their attempt was resultless, both owing to the depth of the sea, and because none of the stuff that they threw in would remain in its place or hold together in the least, but all they shot in used to be at once shifted and scattered as it was sinking to the bottom, by the surge and the force of the current. However, in one place where there were shoals a solid bank was formed at the cost of infinite pains, and on this a four-banked ship which was coming out at night grounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. This ship was of remarkably fine build, and the Romans, after capturing it and manning it with a select crew, kept watch for all the blockade-runners and especially for the "Rhodian." It so happened that he had sailed in that very night, and was afterwards sailing out quite openly, but, on seeing the four-banked vessel putting out to sea again together with himself and recognizing it, he was alarmed. At first he made a spurt to get away from it, but finding himself overhauled owing to the good oarsmanship of its crew he had at length to turn and engage the enemy. Being no match for the boarders, who were numerous and all picked men, he fell into the enemy's hands. His ship was, like the other, very well built, and the Romans when they were in possession of her fitted her out too for this special service and so put a stop to all this venturesome blockade-running at Lilybaeum.

The besieged were still counterbuilding energetically though they had renounced their effort to spoil or destroy the enemy's works, when there arose a turbulent storm of wind, blowing with such violence and fury on the actual apparatus for advancing the engines, that it shook the protecting pent-houses from their foundations and carried away the wooden towers in front of these by its force. During the gale it struck some of the Greek mercenaries that here was an admirable opportunity for destroying the works, and they communicated their notion to the general, who approved it and made all suitable preparations for the enterprise. The soldiers in several bodies threw fire on the works at three separate points. The whole apparatus being old and readily inflammable, and the wind blowing very strongly on the actual towers and engines, the action of the flames as they spread was most effective, whereas the efforts of the Romans to succour and save the works were quite the reverse, the task being most difficult. The defenders were indeed so terrified by the outbreak that they could neither realize nor understand what was happening, but half blinded by the flames and sparks that flew in their faces and by the dense smoke, many of them succumbed and fell, unable even to get near enough to combat the actual conflagration. The difficulties that the enemy encountered for these various reasons were immense, while the exertions of the incendiaries were correspondingly facilitated. Everything that could blind or injure the enemy was blown into flame and pushed at them, missiles and other objects hurled or discharged to wound the rescuers or to destroy the works being easily aimed because the throwers could see in front of them, while the blows were most effective as the strong wind gave them additional force. At the end the completeness of the destruction was such that the bases of the towers and the posts that

supported the battering-rams were rendered useless by the fire. After this the Romans gave up the attempt to conduct the siege by works, and digging a trench and erecting a stockade all round the city, at the same time building a wall round their own encampment, they left the result to time. But the garrison of Lilybaeum rebuilt the fallen portions of the wall and now confidently awaited the issue of the siege.

On the news reaching Rome, and on it being reported from various quarters that the greater part of the crews of their fleet had perished in the works or in the siege operations in general, they set about actively enlisting sailors, and when they had collected about ten thousand dispatched them to Sicily. These reinforcements were ferried over the Straits and thence proceeded on foot to the camp, where on their arrival the Roman Consul, Publius Claudius Pulcher, called a meeting of the Tribunes and told them that now was the time to attack Drepana with the whole fleet. The Carthaginian general Adherbal who commanded there was, he said, unprepared for such a contingency, as he was ignorant of the arrival of the crews, and convinced that their fleet was unable to take the sea owing to the heavy loss of men in the siege. On the Tribunes readily consenting, he at once embarked the former crews and the new arrivals, and chose for marines the best men in the whole army, who readily volunteered as the voyage was but a short one and the prospect of booty seemed certain. After making these preparations he put to sea about midnight unobserved by the enemy, and at first sailed in close order with the land on his right. At daybreak when the leading ships came into view sailing on Drepana, Adherbal was at first taken by surprise at the unexpected sight, but soon recovering his composure and understanding that the enemy had come to

attack, he decided to make every effort and incur every sacrifice rather than expose himself to the certitude of a blockade. He himself at once collected the crews on the beach and summoned by crier the mercenaries from the city. On all being assembled he tried in a few words to impress on their minds the prospect of victory if they risked a battle, and the hardships of a siege should they delay now that they clearly foresaw the danger. Their spirit for the fight was readily aroused, and on their calling on him to lead them on and not delay, he thanked them, praised their zeal, and then ordered them to get on board at once, and keeping their eyes on his ship, to follow in his wake. Having made these orders quite clear to them he quickly got under weigh and took the lead, making his exit close under the rocks on the opposite side of the harbour from that on which the Romans were entering. Publius, the Roman commander, had expected that the enemy would give way and would be intimidated by his attack, but when he saw that on the contrary they intended to fight him, and that his own fleet was partly inside the harbour, partly at the very mouth, and partly still sailing up to enter, he gave orders for them all to put about and sail out again. On the ships already in the harbour fouling those which were entering owing to their sudden turn there was not only great confusion among the men but the ships had the blades of their oars broken as they came into collision. The captains, however, bringing the ships as they cleared the harbour into line, soon drew them up close to shore with their prows to the enemy. Publius himself from the start had been bringing up the rear of the entire fleet, and now veering out to sea without stopping his course, took up a position on the extreme left. At the same time Adherbal, outflanking the enemy's left with five beaked ships, placed his own ship facing the enemy from the direction of

the open sea. As the other ships came up and joined getting into line, he ordered them by his staff officers to place themselves in the same position as his own, and when they all presented a united front he gave the signal to advance that had been agreed upon and at first bore down in line on the Romans, who kept close to the shore awaiting those of their ships that were returning from the harbour. This position close inshore placed them at a great disadvantage in the engagement. When the two fleets approached each other, the signals for battle were raised on both the admirals, and they closed. At first the battle was equally balanced, as the marines in both fleets were the very best men of their land forces; but the Carthaginians gradually began to get the best of it as they had many advantages throughout the whole struggle. They much surpassed the Romans in speed, owing to the superior build of their ships and the better training of the rowers, as they had freely developed their line in the open sea. For if any ships found themselves hard pressed by the enemy it was easy for them owing to their speed to retreat safely to the open water and from thence, fetching round on the ships that pursued and fell on them, they either got in their rear or attacked them on the flank, and as the enemy then had to turn round and found themselves in difficulty owing to the weight of the hulls and the poor oarsmanship of the crews, they rammed them repeatedly and sunk many. Again if any other of their own ships were in peril they were ready to render assistance with perfect security to themselves, as they were out of immediate danger and could sail in open water past the sterns of their own line. It was, however, just the opposite with the Romans. Those in distress could not retire backwards, as they were fighting close to the land, and the ships, hard pressed by the enemy in front, either ran on the shallows stern

foremost or made for the shore and grounded. To sail on the one hand through the enemy's line and then appear on the stern of such of his ships as were engaged with others (one of the most effective manœuvres in naval warfare) was impossible owing to the weight of the vessels and their crews' lack of skill. Nor again could they give assistance where it was required from astern, as they were hemmed in close to the shore, and there was not even a small space left for those who wished to come to the rescue of their comrades in distress. Such being their difficult position in every part of the battle, and some of the ships grounding on the shallows while others ran ashore, the Roman commander, when he saw what was happening, took to flight, slipping out on the left along shore, accompanied by about thirty of the ships nearest to him. The remainder, ninety-three in number, were captured by the Carthaginians, including their crews, with the exception of those men who ran their ships ashore and made off.

The battle having resulted so, Adherbal gained a high reputation at Carthage, the success being regarded as due to his foresight and boldness. Publius, on the contrary, fell into ill repute among the Romans, and there was a great outcry against him for having acted rashly and inconsiderately and done all a single man could to bring a great disaster on Rome. He was accordingly brought to trial afterwards, condemned to a heavy fine, and narrowly escaped with his life.

Yet so determined were the Romans to bring the whole struggle to a successful issue, that, notwithstanding this reverse, they left undone nothing that was in their power, and prepared to continue the campaign. The time for the elections was now at hand, and accordingly when the new Consuls were appointed they dispatched one of them, Lucius Junius Pullus, [5] with

corn for the besiegers of Lilybaeum and such other provisions and supplies as the army required, manning sixty ships to act as a convoy to him. Junius, on arriving at Messene and being joined by the ships from Lilybaeum and the rest of Sicily, coasted along with all speed to Syracuse, having now a hundred and twenty ships and the supplies in about eight hundred transports. There he entrusted half the transports and a few of the war-ships to the Quaestors and sent them on, as he was anxious to have what the troops required conveyed to them at once. He himself remained in Syracuse waiting for the ships that were left behind on the voyage from Messene and procuring additional supplies and corn from the allies in the interior.

[5] This is a mistake; L. Junius was one of the consuls of 249 B.C., the colleague of Publius.

At about the same time Adherbal sent the prisoners from the naval battle and the captured ships to Carthage, and giving Carthalo his colleague thirty vessels in addition to the seventy with which he had arrived, dispatched him with orders to make a sudden descent on the enemy's ships that were moored near Lilybaeum, capture all he could and set fire to the rest. When Carthalo acting on these orders made the attack at dawn and began to burn some of the ships and carry off others, there was a great commotion in the Roman camp. For as they rushed to rescue the ships with loud cries, Himilco, on the watch at Lilybaeum, heard them, and as day was just beginning to break, he saw what was happening, and sent out the mercenaries from the town to attack the Romans also. The Romans were now in danger from all sides and in no little or ordinary distress. The Carthaginian admiral, having made off with a few ships and broken up others, shortly afterwards left Lilybaeum, and after coasting along for some

distance in the direction of Heraclea remained on the watch, as his design was to intercept the ships that were on their way to join the army. When his look-out men reported that a considerable number of ships of every variety were approaching and at no great distance, he got under weigh and sailed towards them eager to engage them, as after the recent success he had great contempt for the Romans. The approach of the enemy was also announced by the light boats that usually sail in front of a fleet to the Quaestors who had been sent on in advance from Syracuse. Considering themselves not strong enough to accept a battle, they anchored off a certain small fortified town subject to the Romans, which had indeed no harbour, but a roadstead shut in by headlands projecting from the land in a manner that made it a more or less secure anchorage. Here they disembarked, and setting up the catapults and mangonels procured from the fortress, awaited the enemy's attack. The Carthaginians on their approach at first thought of besieging them, supposing that the crews would be afraid and retreat to the city, and that they would then easily possess themselves of the ships; but when their hopes were not realized, the enemy on the contrary making a gallant defence, and the situation of the place presenting many difficulties of every kind, they carried off a few of the ships laden with provisions and sailed away to a certain river where they anchored, and waited for the Romans to put out to sea again.

The Consul, who had remained in Syracuse, when he had concluded his business there, rounded Cape Pachynus and sailed in the direction of Lilybaeum in entire ignorance of what had befallen the advance force. The Carthaginian admiral, when his look-outs again reported that the enemy were in sight, put to sea and sailed with all haste, as he wished to engage

them at as great a distance as possible from their own ships. Junius had sighted the Carthaginian fleet for some time, and noticed the number of their ships, but he neither dared to engage them nor could he now escape them, as they were so near. He therefore diverted his course to a rugged and in every way perilous part of the coast and anchored there, thinking that, no matter what happened to him, it would be preferable to his whole force of ships and men falling into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginian admiral, on seeing what Junius had done, decided not to incur the risk of approaching such a dangerous shore, but, gaining a certain cape and anchoring off it, remained on the alert between the two fleets, keeping his eye on both. When the weather now became stormy, and they were threatened with a heavy gale from the open sea, the Carthaginian captains who were acquainted with the locality and with the weather signs, and foresaw and prophesied what was about to happen, persuaded Carthalo to escape the tempest by rounding Cape Pachynus. He very wisely consented, and with great labour they just managed to get round the cape and anchor in a safe position. But the two Roman fleets, caught by the tempest, and the coast affording no shelter at all, were so completely destroyed that not even the wrecks were good for anything. In this unlooked for manner, then, the Romans had both their fleets disabled.

Owing to this occurrence the hopes of the Carthaginians rose again, and it seemed to them that the fortune of war was inclining in their favour, while the Romans, on the contrary, who had been previously to a certain extent unlucky but never had met with so complete a disaster, relinquished the sea, while continuing to maintain their hold on the country. The Carthaginians were now masters of the sea and were not hopeless of regaining their

position on land. Subsequently, though all, both at Rome and in the army at Lilybaeum, continued to lament their whole situation after these recent defeats, yet they did not abandon their purpose of pursuing the siege, the government not hesitating to send supplies over land, the besiegers thereby keeping up the investment as well as they could. Junius, returning to the army after the shipwreck in a state of great affliction, set himself to devise some novel and original step that would be of service, being most anxious to make good the loss inflicted by the disaster. Therefore on some slight pretext offering itself, he surprised and occupied Eryx, possessing himself both of the temple of Venus and of the town. Eryx is a mountain on the sea on that side of Sicily which looks towards Italy. It is situated between Drepana and Panormus, or rather it is adjacent to Drepana, on the borders, and is much the biggest mountain in Sicily after Etna. [6] On its summit, which is flat, stands the temple of Venus Erycina, which is indisputably the first in wealth and general magnificence of all the Sicilian holy places. The city extends along the hill under the actual summit, the ascent to it being very long and steep on all sides. He garrisoned the summit and also the approach from Drepana, and jealously guarded both these positions, especially the latter, in the conviction that by this means he would securely hold the city and the whole mountain.

[6] This is not a fact.

The Carthaginians shortly afterwards appointed Hamilcar surnamed Barcas to the command and entrusted naval operations to him. He started with the fleet to ravage the Italian coast (this, I should say, was in the eighteenth year of the war) and after laying waste Locris and the Bruttiium quitted those parts and descended with his whole fleet on the territory of

Panormus. Here he seized on a place called Hercte [7] lying near the sea between Eryx and Panormus, and thought to possess peculiar advantages for the safe and prolonged stay of an army. It is an abrupt hill rising to a considerable height from the surrounding flat country. The circumference of its brow is not less than a hundred stades and the plateau within affords good pasturage and is suitable for cultivation, being also favourably exposed to the sea-breeze and quite free of animals dangerous to life. On the side looking to the sea and on that which faces the interior of the island, this plateau is surrounded by inaccessible cliffs, while the parts between require only a little slight strengthening. There is also a knoll on it which serves for an acropolis as well as for an excellent post of observation over the country at the foot of the hill. Besides this Hercte commands a harbour very well situated for ships making the voyage from Drepana and Lilybaeum to Italy to put in at, and with an abundant supply of water. [8] The hill has only three approaches, all difficult, two on the land side and one from the sea. Here Hamilcar established his quarters, at great risk indeed, since he had neither the support of any of their towns nor any prospect of support from elsewhere, but had thrown himself into the midst of the enemy. Notwithstanding this, the peril to which he put the Romans, and the combats to which he forced them, were by no means slight or insignificant. For in the first place he would sally out with his fleet from this place, and devastate the coast of Italy as far as Cumae, and next, after the Romans had taken up a position on land in front of the city of Panormus and at a distance of about five stades from his own camp, he harassed them by delivering during almost three years constant and variously contrived attacks by land. These combats I am unable to describe in detail here. For as

in a boxing-match when two champions, both distinguished for pluck and both in perfect training, meet in the decisive contest for the prize, continually delivering blow for blow, neither the combatants themselves nor the spectators can note or anticipate every attack or every blow, but it is possible, from the general action of each, and the determination that each displays, to get a fair idea of their respective skill, strength, and courage, so it was with these two generals. The causes or the modes of their daily ambuscades, counter-ambuscades, attempts, and assaults were so numerous that no writer could properly describe them, while at the same time the narrative would be most tedious as well as unprofitable to the reader. It is rather by a general pronouncement about the two men and the result of their rival efforts that a notion of the facts can be conveyed. Nothing was neglected; neither traditional tactics nor plans suggested by the occasion and by actual pressure of circumstances, nor those strokes which depend on a bold and strong initiative. Yet there were several reasons why no decisive success could be obtained. For the forces on each side were evenly matched; their trenches were so strong as to be equally unapproachable, and the camps were at a quite small distance from each other, this being the chief reason why there were daily conflicts at certain points, but no decisive engagement. The losses in these combats consisted only of those who fell in the hand-to-hand fighting, while the side which once gave way used to get out of danger at once behind their defences, from whence they would issue again and resume the fight.

[7] Now Monte Pellegrino.

[8] This cannot be the harbour of Palermo, which was in the hands of the Romans, and must be looked for on the opposite side of

Monte Pellegrino.

But Fortune, however, like a good umpire, unexpectedly shifted the scene and changed the nature of the contest, confining both in a narrower field, where the struggle grew even more desperate. The Romans, as I said, had garrisons at Eryx on the summit of the mountain and at the foot. Hamilcar now seized the town which lies between the summit and the spot at the foot where the garrison was. The consequence of this was that the Romans on the summit—a thing they had never expected—remained besieged and in considerable peril, and that the Carthaginians, though it is scarcely credible, maintained their position though the enemy were pressing on them from all sides and the conveyance of supplies was not easy, as they only held one place on the sea and one single road connecting with it. However, here again both sides employed every device and effort that the siege demanded: both endured every kind of privation and both essayed every means of attack and every variety of action. At length not, as Fabius Pictor says, owing to their exhaustion and sufferings, but like two uninjured and invincible champions, they left the contest drawn. For before either could get the better of the other, though the struggle in this place lasted for another two years, the war had been decided by other means.

Such then was the condition of affairs at Eryx and as far as regarded land forces. We may compare the spirit displayed by both states to that of game cocks engaged in a death-struggle. For we often see that when these birds have lost the use of their wings from exhaustion, their courage remains as high as ever and they continue to strike blow upon blow, until closing involuntarily they get a deadly hold of each other, and as soon as this happens one or the other of the two will soon fall dead. So the Romans and

Carthaginians, worn out by their exertions owing to the continual fighting, at length began to be despairing, their strength paralysed and their resources exhausted by protracted taxation and expense. But, in spite of all, the Romans, as if fighting for their lives, although they had for nearly five years utterly withdrawn from the sea owing to their disasters and their belief that they would be able to decide the war by the aid of their land forces alone, now, when they saw that chiefly owing to the bold action of the Carthaginian general they were not making the progress on which they had reckoned, decided for the third time to court the prospect of using sea-forces. They thought that this course, if they could but strike a deadly blow, was the only way of bringing the war to a favourable conclusion. And this they finally accomplished. It was yielding to the blows of Fortune that they had retired from the sea on the first occasion; the second time it was owing to their defeat at Drepana, but now they made this third attempt, and through it, by gaining a victory and cutting off the supplies from the sea of the Carthaginian army at Eryx, they put an end to the whole war. The attempt was indeed of the nature of a struggle for existence. For there were no funds in the public treasury for this purpose; but yet, owing to the patriotic and generous spirit of the leading citizens, enough was found to carry out the project; as either one, two, or three of them, according to their means, undertook to provide a quinquereme fully equipped on the understanding that they would be repaid if all went well. In this way a fleet of two hundred quinqueremes was rapidly got ready, all built on the model of the "Rhodian's" ship. They then appointed Gaius Lutatius to the command and dispatched him at the beginning of summer. Suddenly appearing off the coast of Sicily, he seized on the harbour of Drepana and

the road-steads near Lilybaeum, the whole Carthaginian navy having retired to their own country. First of all he constructed works round the city of Drepana and made all preparations for its siege, but while continuing to prosecute this by every means in his power, he foresaw that the Carthaginian fleet would arrive, and was not forgetful of the original motive of the expedition, the belief that it was only by a sea battle that the war could be decisively finished. He did not, then, allow the time to pass uselessly and idly, but every day was spent in exercising and practising the crews properly for this purpose. He also paid unremitting attention to the matter of good food and drink, so that in a very short time he got his sailors into perfect condition for the anticipated battle.

When the unexpected news reached Carthage that the Romans were at sea with a fleet and were again disputing the naval supremacy, they at once got their ships ready, and filling them with corn and other provisions, dispatched their fleet on its errand, desiring that the troops at Eryx should be in no need of necessary supplies. Hanno, whom they had appointed to command the naval force, set sail and reached the so-called Holy Isle from whence he designed to cross as soon as possible to Eryx, unobserved by the enemy, and, after lightening the ships by disembarking the supplies, to take on board as marines the best qualified mercenaries together with Barcas himself and then engage the enemy. Lutatius, learning of Hanno's arrival and divining his intentions, took on board a picked force from the army and sailed to the island of Aegusa which lies off Lilybaeum. There, after exhorting his troops as became the occasion, he informed the captains that the battle would take place next day. In the early morning, just as day was breaking, he saw that a brisk breeze was coming down favourable to the

enemy, but that it had become difficult for himself to sail up against the wind, the sea too being heavy and rough. At first he hesitated much what to do under the circumstances, but reflected that if he risked an attack now that the weather was stormy, he would be fighting against Hanno and the naval forces alone and also against heavily laden ships, whereas if he waited for calm weather and by his delay allowed the enemy to cross and join the army, he would have to face ships now lightened and manageable as well as the pick of the land forces and above all the bravery of Hamilcar which was what they dreaded most at that time. He therefore decided not to let the present opportunity slip. When he saw the Carthaginian ships under full sail he at once got under weigh. As his crews easily mastered the waves owing to their good training, he soon brought his fleet into a single line with their prows to the enemy. The Carthaginians, seeing that the Romans were intercepting their crossing, lowered their masts and cheering each other on in each ship closed with the enemy. As the outfit of each force was just the reverse of what it had been at the battle of Drepana, the result also was naturally the reverse for each. The Romans had reformed their system of shipbuilding and had also put ashore all heavy material except what was required for the battle; their crews rendered excellent service, as their training had got them well together, and the marines they had were men selected from the army for their steadfastness. With the Carthaginians it was just the opposite. Their ships, being loaded, were not in a serviceable condition for battle, while the crews were quite untrained, and had been put on board for the emergency, and their marines were recent levies whose first experience of the least hardship and danger this was. The fact is that, owing to their never having expected the Romans to dispute the sea with them

again, they had, in contempt for them, neglected their naval force. So that immediately on engaging they had the worst in many parts of the battle and were soon routed, fifty ships being sunk and seventy captured with their crews. The remainder raising their masts and finding a fair wind got back to Holy Isle, very fortunate in the wind having unexpectedly gone round and helping them just when they required it. As for the Roman Consul, he sailed away to Lilybaeum and the legions, and there occupied himself with the disposal of the captured ships and men, a business of some magnitude, as the prisoners made in the battle numbered very nearly ten thousand.

Even on hearing of this unexpected defeat the Carthaginians, had they let themselves be guided by passion and ambition, would readily have continued the war, but when it came to a matter of cool calculation they were quite at a loss. For one thing they were no longer able to send supplies to their forces in Sicily as the enemy commanded the sea, and if they abandoned and in a manner betrayed them, they had neither other men nor other leaders with whom to pursue the war. They therefore at once sent a message to Barcas giving him full powers to deal with the situation. Hamilcar acted thoroughly like the good and prudent leader he was. As long as there had been some reasonable hope in the situation he had left no means, however perilous and venturesome it seemed, unemployed, and if there ever was a general who put to proof in a war every chance of success, it was he. But now that fortunes were reversed and there was no reasonable prospect left of saving the troops under his command, he showed his practical good sense in yielding to circumstance and sending an embassy to treat for peace. For our opinion should be that a general ought to be qualified to discern both when he is victorious and when he is beaten.

Lutatius readily consented to negotiate, conscious as he was that the Romans were by this time worn out and enfeebled by the war, and he succeeded in putting an end to the contest by a treaty more or less as follows. "There shall be friendship between the Carthaginians and Romans on the following terms if approved by the Roman people. The Carthaginians to evacuate the whole of Sicily and not to make war on Hiero or bear arms against the Syracusans or the allies of the Syracusans. The Carthaginians to give up to the Romans all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians to pay to the Romans by instalments in twenty years two thousand two hundred Euboean talents." But when these terms were referred to Rome, the people did not accept the treaty, but sent ten commissioners to examine the matter. On their arrival they made no substantial changes in the terms, but only slight modifications rendering them more severe for Carthage: for they reduced the term of payment by one half, added a thousand talents to the indemnity, and demanded the evacuation by the Carthaginians of all islands lying between Sicily and Italy.

Such then was the end of the war between the Romans and Carthaginians for the possession of Sicily, and such were the terms of peace. It had lasted without a break for twenty-four years and is the longest, most unintermittent, and greatest war we know of. Apart from all the other battles and armaments, the total naval forces engaged were, as I mentioned above, on one occasion more than five hundred quinqueremes and on a subsequent one very nearly seven hundred. Moreover the Romans lost in this war about seven hundred quinqueremes, inclusive of those that perished in the shipwrecks, and the Carthaginians about five hundred. So that those who marvel at the great sea-battles and great fleets of an Antigonus, a Ptolemy,

or a Demetrius would, if I mistake not, on inquiring into the history of this war, be much astonished at the huge scale of operations. Again, if we take into consideration the difference between quinqueremes and the triremes in which the Persians fought against the Greeks and the Athenians and Lacedaemonians against each other, we shall find that no forces of such magnitude ever met at sea. This confirms the assertion I ventured to make at the outset that the progress of the Romans was not due to chance and was not involuntary, as some among the Greeks choose to think, but that by schooling themselves in such vast and perilous enterprises it was perfectly natural that they not only gained the courage to aim at universal dominion, but executed their purpose. Some of my readers will wonder what can be the reason why, now that they are masters of the world and far more puissant than formerly, they could neither man so many ships, nor put to sea with such large fleets. Those, however, who are puzzled by this, will be enabled to understand the reason clearly when we come to deal with their political institutions, a subject not to be treated incidentally by the writer or followed inattentively by the reader. It offers a noble spectacle and one almost wholly unrevealed hitherto, owing to the incompetence of the authors who have dealt with it, some of whom sinned from lack of knowledge, while the account given by others is wanting in clearness and entirely unprofitable. As regards, however, the war of which we are speaking, one will find its purpose and prosecution on the part of the two states equally characterized on both sides by enterprise, by lofty spirit, and above all by ambition for supremacy. In individual courage indeed the Romans were far superior on the whole, but the general to whom the palm

must be given both for daring and for genius is Hamilcar called Barcas, the actual father of that Hannibal who afterwards made war on the Romans.

Shortly after this treaty it so happened that both states found themselves placed in circumstances peculiarly similar. For at Rome there followed civil war against the Falisci, but this they brought to a speedy and favourable conclusion, taking Falerii in a few days. But the war the Carthaginians had to face was no little or contemptible one, being against their mercenaries, the Numidians and those Libyans who joined in the revolt. In this war they encountered many great perils and finally were in danger of losing not only their territory, but their own liberty and the soil of their native town. For several reasons I think it worth my while to dwell on this war, and, according to the plan I stated at the outset, to give a summary and brief narrative of it. In the first place one could not indicate a better illustration of the nature and character of what is vulgarly known as a truceless war than the circumstances of this one, and secondly one can see very clearly from all that took place what kind of dangers those who employ mercenary forces should foresee and take early precautions to avert, as well as in what lies the great difference of character between a confused herd of barbarians and men who have been brought up in an educated, law-abiding, and civilized community. But the most important thing is that from the events of that period one can get an idea of the causes of the Hannibalic war between the Romans and the Carthaginians. As it is still a matter of dispute, not only among historians, but among the combatants, what were the actual causes of this latter war, it will be useful to students of history if I lay before them the explanation that is nearest to the truth.

It is this. When, at once on the conclusion of the treaty, Barcas had transferred his forces from Eryx to Lilybaeum he immediately resigned his command, and Gesco the commandant there took steps for sending the troops over to Africa. Foreseeing what was likely to happen, he very wisely embarked them in detachments and at certain intervals in order to give the Carthaginians time to pay them their arrears as they arrived and to pack them off to their own countries before the next batch that crossed could catch them up. Such was the idea Gesco had, and he managed to dispatch the troops in this manner, but the Carthaginians partly because, owing to their recent outlay, they were not very well off for money, and partly because they were convinced that the mercenaries would let them off part of their arrears of pay, once they had got them all collected in Carthage, detained them there on their arrival in this hope, confining them to the city. As they committed frequent offences there both by night and by day, the government in the first place, suspicious of their numbers and their present licentious spirit, asked their commanding officers, until arrangements had been made for paying them in full and those who were still missing had arrived, to withdraw them all to a town called Sicca, each man receiving a gold stater for pressing expenses. The troops readily consented to leave the capital, but wished to leave their baggage there, as they had formerly done, thinking that they would be soon returning to be paid off. The Carthaginians, however, were afraid lest, longing to be with their wives or children after their recent protracted absence, they might in many cases refuse to leave Carthage, or, if they did, would come back again to their families, so that there would be no decrease of outrages in the city. In anticipation then of this, they compelled the men, much against their will

and in a manner calculated to cause much offence, to take their baggage with them. The mercenaries, when assembled in Sicca, lived in a free and easy manner, having not enjoyed for a long time relaxation of discipline and leisure, things most prejudicial to a force raised abroad, and nearly always the very arch-instigators and sole causes of mutiny. At the same time, as they had nothing else to do, some of them began reckoning up the total pay due to them, all to their own advantage, and having arrived at a most exorbitant result, submitted that this was the sum they should demand from the Carthaginians. The whole force remembered the promises the generals had made to them in critical situations, and had great hopes and indeed quite expected that the government would thus correct in their favour the account of the sum they had earned. The consequence was that when the total force was assembled at Sicca, and when Hanno, who was then commander-in-chief of Africa, came there and not only said that it was impossible to meet their claims and fulfil their hopes, but on the contrary tried by dwelling on the present heavy taxation and general distress of Carthage to induce them to renounce some of their stipulated wage, it produced at once a spirit of dissension and sedition, and the soldiers began to hold constant meetings, sometimes of particular nations and sometimes general. As they were neither all of the same nationality nor spoke the same language, the camp was full of confusion and tumult and what is known as ÄÍÁ²· or turbulence. For the Carthaginian practice of employing hired troops of various nationalities is indeed well calculated to prevent them from combining rapidly in acts of insubordination or disrespect to their officers, but in cases of an outburst of anger or of slanderous rumours or disaffection it is most prejudicial to all efforts to convey the truth to them,

to calm their passions, or to show the ignorant their error. Indeed, such forces, when once their anger is aroused against anyone, or slander spreads among them, are not content with mere human wickedness, but end by becoming like wild beasts or men deranged, as happened in the present case. Some of these troops were Iberians, some Celts, some Ligurians, and some from the Balearic islands; there were a good many Greek half-breeds, mostly deserters and slaves, but the largest portion consisted of Libyans. It was therefore impossible to assemble them and address them as a body or to do so by any other means; for how could any general be expected to know all their languages? And again to address them through several interpreters, repeating the same thing four or five times, was, if anything, more impracticable. The only means was to make demands or entreaties through their officers, as Hanno continued to attempt on the present occasion, and even these did not understand all that was told them, or at times, after seeming to agree with the general, addressed their troops in just the opposite sense either from ignorance or from malice. The consequence was that everything was in a state of uncertainty, mistrust and confusion. For one thing, they thought the Carthaginians had acted purposely in not communicating with them through the generals who were acquainted with their performances in Sicily and who had made them the promises of bounties, but in sending one who had not been present on any of those occasions. At length, then, refusing to treat with Hanno, thoroughly distrusting their divisional officers, and highly indignant with the Carthaginians, they marched on the capital and encamped at a distance of about one hundred and twenty stades from Carthage at the place called Tunis. They were more than twenty thousand in number.

Now, when there was no mending, it was brought home to the Carthaginians how blind they had been. For they had committed two great mistakes. The first was in collecting at one place so large a body of mercenaries while themselves they could hope for nothing from the fighting power of their civic force. Their second error was even more serious, to let out of their hands the women and children of the mercenaries as well as their movables, all which would have served as hostages, giving themselves greater security in their deliberations about the circumstances and ensuring a more favourable reception for their demands. Still now, in their alarm at the troops encamping so near, they were ready to put up with anything in their eagerness to propitiate them, sending out lavish supplies of provisions which they sold to them at any price they chose to pay and constantly dispatching envoys from the Senate, promising to meet all their demands as far as it was in their power. These increased daily, the mercenaries continuing to invent new claims, gaining confidence as they witnessed the terror and cowardice of the Carthaginians, and being convinced in their arrogance, owing to their success in Sicily against the Roman legions, that not only the Carthaginians, but any other people in the world would not readily face them in arms. When, therefore, the Carthaginians had agreed to their claims for pay, they went a step further and asked for the value of the horses they had lost. This also was conceded, whereupon they maintained that they ought to get the value of the rations of corn due to them for a considerable time at the highest price corn had stood at during the war. In short they always went on devising some new claim, putting matters off so as to make it impossible to come to terms, a great many of them being disaffected and mutinous. However, on the Carthaginians promising to

concede everything in their power, they agreed to refer the disputed points to one of the generals who had been present in Sicily. Now to Hamilcar Barcas, with whom they had served there, they were ill disposed, thinking that it was largely his fault that they had been slighted, since he never came himself as an envoy to them and was believed to have resigned his command voluntarily. But being very favourably inclined to Gesco, who had been general in Sicily and had been full of attention to them in other matters and in that of their transport, they submitted the points in dispute to him. Gesco, on reaching Tunis by sea bringing the money, at first conferred privately with the officers, and subsequently held meetings of the troops according to their nationalities. He rebuked them for their past conduct, attempted to enlighten them about the present, but most of all dwelt on the future, begging them to show themselves well-disposed to those in whose pay they had been from the outset. Finally he proceeded to discharge their arrears, paying off each nationality separately. There was a certain Campanian, a runaway Roman slave, called Spendius, a man of great physical strength and remarkable courage in war. He was afraid of his master coming to claim him, when, if given up, he would by Roman law be tortured and put to death. He therefore hesitated at nothing in his endeavour both by speech and action to break off the negotiations with the Carthaginians. He was supported by a Libyan called Mathos, who was indeed a freeman and a member of the force, but had taken a leading part in the late disturbances. Consequently he stood in great fear of being singled out to bear the whole penalty and therefore was of one mind with Spendius. Taking the Libyans aside, he pointed out to them that when the other nations departed to their own countries after being paid off, they would be

left to bear the whole weight of the wrath of the Carthaginians, whose object it would be by the punishment they inflicted on them to terrorize all their Libyan subjects. The men were soon stirred by such arguments, and availing themselves of the slender pretext that Gesco while discharging their pay postponed the compensation for the horses and corn, they at once held a meeting. When Spendius and Mathos began to traduce and accuse Gesco and the Carthaginians, they were all ears, and listened with great attention, but if anyone else came forward to offer an opinion, they did not even wait to find out if he were going to speak in favour of Spendius or against him, but at once stoned him to death. Numbers both of the officers and privates perished thus in the different meetings, and in fact this phrase "Stone him" was the only one that became intelligible to all the different nations, owing to the frequency of the act. They used to behave thus mostly when they held meetings after their morning meal in a drunken condition, so that the moment anyone called out "Stone him," the stones flew from all sides and so quickly that it was impossible for anyone who once came forward to address them to escape. As for this reason no one dared any longer to express an opinion, they appointed Mathos and Spendius Generals.

Gesco saw how complete was the disorganization and disturbance, but valuing more than anything the interest of his country and foreseeing that if these troops became utterly deaf to all considerations of humanity, Carthage would evidently be in the gravest danger, he persisted, at great personal risk, in his conciliatory efforts, sometimes conferring privately with their officers, and at other times summoning and addressing meetings of the separate nations. The Libyans, however, had not yet received their pay, and

considering it overdue, came to him to demand it in a very insolent manner, when Gesco, thinking to rebuke their presumption, told them to go and ask Mathos their "General" for it. This aroused their anger to such a pitch, that without a moment's delay they, first of all, seized on what money they could lay their hands on and next arrested Gesco and the Carthaginians who were with him. As for Mathos and Spendius, thinking that the most expeditious means of setting war ablaze would be to commit some violation of law or good faith, they co-operated in the excesses of the soldiery, plundering the personal effects as well as the money-chests of the Carthaginians, and after subjecting Gesco and those with him to the outrage of putting them in fetters, gave them into custody. From this time forward they were at open war with Carthage, having bound themselves by certain impious oaths contrary to the principles recognized by all mankind.

Such then was the origin and beginning of the war against the mercenaries, generally known as the Libyan war. Mathos, having so far carried out his purpose, at once sent envoys to the Libyan towns urging them to strike a blow for liberty and imploring their support and practical assistance. Hereupon, when nearly all the Libyans had agreed to join in the revolt against Carthage and willingly contributed troops and supplies, they divided their forces into two and undertook the sieges of Utica and Hippacritae, since these cities had refused to participate in the rebellion.

The Carthaginians had ever been accustomed to depend for their private supplies on the produce of the country, their public expenses for armaments and commissariat had been met by the revenue they derived from Libya, and they had always been in the habit of employing hired soldiers. At the present moment not only did they find themselves deprived of all these

resources at one blow, but actually saw them turned against themselves. Consequently they fell into a state of utter depression and despondency, things having turned out quite otherwise than they expected. For they had been much worn by the long continued war for Sicily, and had hoped that the peace would procure them some rest and a grateful period of tranquillity, and what happened was just the reverse, as they were now threatened by the outbreak of a greater and more formidable war. In the former case they were disputing the dominion of Sicily with the Romans, but now, with a civil war on their hands, they were about to fight for their own existence and that of their native city. Besides neither had they a sufficient supply of arms, nor a proper navy, nor the material left to construct one, so many had been the battles in which they had been engaged at sea. They had not even the means of providing supplies and not a single hope of external assistance from friends or allies. So it was now that they thoroughly realized how great is the difference between a war against a foreign state carried on over sea and civil discord and disturbance.

They had chiefly themselves to thank for all these grievous mischances. During the former war they had thought themselves reasonably justified in making their government of the Libyans very harsh. They had exacted from the peasantry, without exception, half of their crops, and had doubled the taxation of the townsmen without allowing exemption from any tax or even a partial abatement to the poor. They had applauded and honoured not those governors who treated the people with gentleness and humanity, but those who procured for Carthage the largest amount of supplies and stores and used the country people most harshly—Hanno for example. The consequence was that the male population required no incitement to revolt

—a mere messenger was sufficient—while the women, who had constantly witnessed the arrest of their husbands and fathers for non-payment of taxes, solemnly bound themselves by oath in each city to conceal none of their belongings, and stripping themselves of their jewels contributed them ungrudgingly to the war fund. Mathos and Spendius were thus so well off that not only could they pay the soldiers their arrears, as they had promised in inciting them to mutiny, but found themselves furnished with ample means for a protracted war. This teaches us that it is the right policy not only to look to the present, but to look forward still more attentively to the future.

Yet, although the Carthaginians were in such straits, they first of all appointed Hanno to the command, as he had, they thought, on a former occasion brought matters concerning Hecatompylus in Libya to a satisfactory conclusion; they next busied themselves with enrolling mercenaries and arming the citizens of military age. They also mustered and drilled their civic cavalry and got ready what ships they had left, consisting of triremes, quinqueremes and the largest of their skiffs. Meanwhile Mathos, when about seventy thousand Libyans had joined him, divided them into several forces with which he maintained unmolested the sieges of Utica and Hippacritae, secured his main camp at Tunis and thus shut out the Carthaginians from all outer Libya. Carthage, I should explain, lies in a gulf, on a promontory or peninsula surrounded mostly by the sea and in part by a lake. The isthmus which connects it with Libya is about twenty-five stades in width and on the side of this isthmus which faces the sea, at no great distance from the capital, lies Utica, while Tunis is on the other side by the lake. So that the mutineers, encamped now as they were before both

of these towns and thus shutting off Carthage from the land, continued to threaten the capital itself, appearing before the walls sometimes by day and sometimes by night and creating the utmost terror and commotion within.

Hanno was doing fairly well in the matter of outfit, his talent lying in that direction, but when it came to taking the field with his forces, he was another man. He had no idea how to avail himself of opportunities and generally showed an entire lack of experience and energy. It was then that, as regards Utica, he began by coming to the help of the besieged and terrifying the enemy by his strong force of elephants, of which he had no less than a hundred; but when, in consequence of this, he had a chance of gaining a decisive success, he made such poor use of his advantage that he very nearly brought a catastrophe on the besieged, as well as on himself. For bringing from Carthage catapults, missiles and all requirements for a siege and encamping before the city he undertook the assault of the enemy's entrenched camp. When the elephants forced their way into the camp, the enemy unable to face the weight of their attack all evacuated it. Many of them were mangled and killed by the elephants, but those who escaped rallied on a steep hill overgrown with brushwood, relying on the natural security of the position. Hanno had been accustomed to fight with Numidians and Libyans, who once they give way continue their flight for two or three days, trying to get as far away as possible. Thinking then, on the present occasion too, that the war was over and he had secured a complete victory he took no precaution for the safety of his army and camp, but entered the city and occupied himself with the care of his person. The mercenaries, who had rallied on the hill, were men schooled in the daring tactics of Barcas and accustomed from their fighting in Sicily to make in

one day repeated retirements followed by fresh attacks. At present, on seeing that the general was absent in the city, while the troops were at their ease owing to their success and streaming out of their camp, they drew themselves up and attacked the camp, putting many to the sword and compelling the rest to take refuge ignominiously under the walls and at the gates. They captured all the baggage and all the artillery of the besieged, which Hanno had brought out of the town and added to his own, thus putting it in the enemy's hands. This was not the only occasion on which he acted so negligently, but a few days later at a place called Gorza, when the enemy were encamped opposite him and owing to their proximity he had four opportunities of beating them, twice in a pitched battle and twice by a surprise attack, he is said in each case to have thrown them away by his heedlessness and lack of judgement.

The Carthaginians, in consequence, seeing that he was mismanaging matters, again appointed Hamilcar Barcas to the command and dispatched him to the war on hand, giving him seventy elephants, all the additional mercenaries they had been able to collect, and the deserters from the enemy, besides their burgher forces, horse and foot, so that in all he had about ten thousand men. Hamilcar, on his very first expedition, struck terror into the enemy by the unexpectedness of the attack, cowing their spirit, raising the siege of Utica, and showing himself worthy of his past exploits and of the high expectations of the populace. What he accomplished in this campaign was as follows. On the neck of land connecting Carthage with Libya is a chain of hills difficult of access and with several passes to the country artificially cut in them. Mathos had posted guards in all those spots which were favourable for the passage of the hills. In addition to this there is a

river called Macaras [9] which shuts off in certain places the access from the town to the country. This river is for the most part unfordable owing to the volume of water, and there is only one bridge, which Mathos had also secured, building a town at the bridge-head. So that not only was it impossible for the Carthaginians to reach the country with an army, but it was not even an easy matter for single persons wishing to get through to elude the vigilance of the enemy. Hamilcar, seeing all these obstacles, after passing in review every means and every chance of surmounting this difficulty about a passage, thought of the following plan. He had noticed that when the wind blew strongly from certain quarters the mouth of the river got silted up and the passage became shallow just where it falls into the sea. He therefore got his force ready to march out, and keeping his project to himself, waited for this to occur. When the right time came he started from Carthage at night, and without anyone noticing him, had by daybreak got his army across at the place mentioned. Both those in the city and the enemy were taken by surprise, and Hamilcar advanced through the plain making for the guardians of the bridge. Spendius, on learning what had happened, put his two forces in movement to meet in the plain and render mutual assistance to each other, those from the town near the bridge being not less than ten thousand in number and those from Utica over fifteen thousand. When they got in sight of each other, thinking that they had caught the Carthaginians in a trap between them, they exhorted each other with loud shouts and engaged the enemy. Hamilcar was advancing in the following order. In front were the elephants, after them the cavalry and light-armed troops and last of all the heavy-armed. When he saw that the enemy were attacking him in such precipitation he ordered his whole force

to face about. He bade those in front, after facing about, retire with all speed, and reversing the order of those who originally were in the rear he deployed them to await the onslaught of the enemy. The Libyans and mercenaries, thinking that the Carthaginians were afraid of them and retreating, broke their ranks and closed with them vigorously. But when the cavalry, on approaching the line of hoplites, wheeled round again and faced the Libyans, while at the same time the remainder of the Carthaginian army was coming up, the enemy were so much surprised that they at once turned and fled panic-stricken, in the same loose order and confusion in which they had advanced. Consequently some of them came into collision with their comrades who were advancing in their rear with disastrous effect, causing the destruction both of themselves and the latter, but the larger number were trampled to death, the cavalry and elephants attacking them at close quarters. About six thousand Libyans and mercenaries fell and nearly two thousand were made prisoners. The rest escaped, some to the town by the bridge and some to the camp before Utica. Hamilcar, successful in this fashion, followed closely on the retreating enemy and took by assault the town by the bridge, the enemy in it deserting it and flying to Tunis. He next traversed the rest of the country, winning over some towns and taking others by assault. He thus restored some confidence and courage to the Carthaginians, delivering them in a measure from their previous despondency.

[9] The same as Bagraclas.

Matho for his own part continued to prosecute the siege of Hippacritae, advising Autaritus, the leader of the Gauls, and Spendius to harass the enemy, keeping away from the plains owing to the numbers of the cavalry

and elephants opposed to them but marching along the foothills parallel to the Carthaginians and descending on them whenever they were on difficult ground. While adopting this plan he at the same time sent messages to the Numidians and Libyans, begging them to come to his assistance and not lose the chance of gaining their freedom. Spendius, taking with him from Tunis a force of about six thousand men in all drawn from all the tribes, advanced along the slopes parallel to the Carthaginians. He had also with him Autaritus and his Gauls numbering only about two thousand, the rest of the original corps having deserted to the Romans when encamped near Eryx. Hamilcar had established his camp in a plain surrounded by mountains, and just at this time Spendius was joined by the Numidian and Libyan reinforcements. The Carthaginians, suddenly finding the additional force of Libyans in their front, and that of the Numidians in their rear, while Spendius was on their flank, were in a very difficult situation, from which it was not easy to extricate themselves.

There was a certain Naravas, a Numidian of high rank and full of martial spirit. He had always had that attachment to the Carthaginians which was traditional in his family, and it was now strengthened by his admiration for Hamilcar. Thinking that this was a favourable opportunity for meeting Hamilcar and introducing himself, he rode up to the camp escorted by about a hundred Numidians. Coming close to the palisade he remained there quite fearlessly making signals with his hand. Hamilcar wondered what his object could be and sent out a horseman to meet him, when he said that he desired an interview with the general. The Carthaginian leader remaining still much amazed and distrustful, Naravas handed over his horse and spears to his attendants, and very boldly came into the camp unarmed. The Carthaginians

looked on in mixed admiration and amazement at his daring, but they met and received him, and when he was admitted to the interview, he said that he wished all the Carthaginians well but particularly desired the friendship of Barcas, and this was why he had come to introduce himself and offer his cordial assistance in all actions and enterprises. Hamilcar, on hearing this, was so delighted at the young man's courage in coming to him and his simple frankness at their interview that not only did he consent to associate him in his undertakings but swore to give him his daughter in marriage if he remained loyal to Carthage.

The agreement having thus been made, Naravas came in with the Numidians under his command, about two thousand in number, and Hamilcar, thus reinforced, offered battle owing to the enemy. Spendius, after effecting a junction with the Libyans, descended into the plain and attacked the Carthaginians. The battle was a stubborn one, but ended in the victory of Hamilcar, the elephants fighting well and Naravas rendering brilliant services. Autaritus and Spendius escaped, but with the loss of about ten thousand killed and four thousand prisoners. After the victory Hamilcar gave permission to those of the prisoners who chose to join his own army, arming them with the spoils of the fallen enemies; those who were unwilling to do so he collected and addressed saying that up to now he pardoned their offences, and therefore they were free to go their several ways, wherever each man chose, but in future he threatened that if any of them bore arms against Carthage he would if captured meet with inevitable punishment.

About the same time the mercenaries who garrisoned Sardinia, emulous of the exploits of Mathos and Spendius, attacked the Carthaginians in the

island. They began by shutting up in the citadel and putting to death Bostarus, the commander of the foreign contingent, and his compatriots. Next, when the Carthaginians sent Hanno over in command of a fresh force, this force deserted him and joined the mutineers, who thereupon took him prisoner and at once crucified him. After this, devising the most exquisite torments, they tortured and murdered all the Carthaginians in the island, and when they had got all the towns into their power continued to hold forcible possession of Sardinia, until they quarrelled with the natives, and were driven out by them to Italy. Thus was Sardinia lost to the Carthaginians, an island of great extent, most thickly populated and most fertile. Most authors have described it at length, and I do not think it necessary to repeat statements which no one disputes.

Mathos and Spendius, as well as the Gaul Autaritus, were apprehensive of the effect of Hamilcar's leniency to the prisoners, fearing that the Libyans and the greater part of the mercenaries might thus be won over and hasten to avail themselves of the proffered immunity. They therefore set themselves to devise some infamous crime which would make the hatred of the troops for Carthage more savage. They decided to call a general meeting and at this they introduced a letter-bearer supposed to have been sent by their confederates in Sardinia. The letter advised them to keep careful guard over Gesco and all the others whom they had, as above narrated, treacherously arrested at Tunis, since some persons in the camp were negotiating with the Carthaginians about their release. Spendius, seizing on this pretext, begged them in the first place to have no reliance on the Carthaginian general's reported clemency to the prisoners. "It is not," he said, " with the intention of sparing their lives that he has taken this course

regarding his captives, but by releasing them he designs to get us into his power, so that he may take vengeance not on some, but on all of us who trust him." Moreover, he warned them to take care lest by giving up Gesco and the others they incur the contempt of their enemies and seriously damage their own situation by allowing to escape them so able a man and so good a general, who was sure to become their most formidable enemy. He had not finished his speech when in came another post supposed to be from Tunis with a message similar to that from Sardinia. Autaritus the Gaul was the next speaker. He said that the only hope of safety for them was to abandon all reliance on the Carthaginians. Whoever continued to look forward to clemency from them could be no true ally of their own. Therefore he asked them to trust those, to give a hearing to those, to attend to those only who bring the most hateful and bitterest accusations against the Carthaginians, and to regard speakers on the other side as traitors and enemies. Finally, he recommended them to torture and put to death not only Gesco and those arrested with him, but all the Carthaginians they had subsequently taken prisoners. He was much the most effective speaker in their councils, because a number of them could understand him. He had been a long time in the service and had learned Phoenician, a language which had become more or less agreeable to their ears owing to the length of the previous war. His speech therefore met with universal approbation, and he retired from the platform amid applause. Numerous speakers from each nationality now came forward all together, maintaining that the prisoners should be spared at least the infliction of torture in view of Gesco's previous kindness to them. Nothing, however, they said was intelligible, as they were all speaking together and each stating his views in

his own language. But the moment it was disclosed that they were begging for a remission of the sentence someone among the audience called out "Stone them," and they instantly stoned all the speakers to death. These unfortunates, mangled as if by wild beasts, were carried off for burial by their friends. Spendius and his men then led out from the camp Gesco and the other prisoners, in all about seven hundred. Taking them a short distance away, they first of all cut off their hands, beginning with Gesco, that very Gesco whom a short time previously they had selected from all the Carthaginians, proclaiming him their benefactor and referring the points in dispute to him. After cutting off the hands they cut off the wretched men's other extremities too, and after thus mutilating them and breaking their legs, threw them still alive into a trench.

The Carthaginians, when news came of this unhappy event, could take no action, but their indignation was extreme, and in the heat of it they sent messengers to Hamilcar and their other general Hanno imploring them to come and avenge the unfortunate victims. To the assassins they sent heralds begging that the bodies might be given up to them. Not only was this request refused but the messengers were told to send neither herald nor envoy again, as any who came would meet with the same punishment that had just befallen Gesco. With regard to treatment of prisoners in the future, the mutineers passed a resolution and engaged each other to torture and kill every Carthaginian and send back to the capital with his hands cut off every ally of Carthage, and this practice they continued to observe carefully. No one looking at this would have any hesitation in saying that not only do men's bodies and certain of the ulcers and tumours afflicting them become so to speak savage and brutalized and quite incurable, but that this is true in

a much higher degree of their souls. In the case of ulcers, if we treat them, they are sometimes inflamed by the treatment itself and spread more rapidly, while again if we neglect them they continue, in virtue of their own nature, to eat into the flesh and never rest until they have utterly destroyed the tissues beneath. Similarly such malignant lividities and putrid ulcers often grow in the human soul, that no beast becomes at the end more wicked or cruel than man. In the case of men in such a state, if we treat the disease by pardon and kindness, they think we are scheming to betray them or deceive them, and become more mistrustful and hostile to their would-be benefactors, but if, on the contrary, we attempt to cure the evil by retaliation they work up their passions to outrival ours, until there is nothing so abominable or so atrocious that they will not consent to do it, imagining all the while that they are displaying a fine courage. Thus at the end they are utterly brutalized and no longer can be called human beings. Of such a condition the origin and most potent cause lies in bad manners and customs and wrong training from childhood, but there are several contributory ones, the chief of which is habitual violence and unscrupulousness on the part of those in authority over them. All these conditions were present in this mercenary force as a whole and especially in their chiefs.

This desperation of the enemy made Hamilcar anxious, and he begged Hanno to join him, being convinced that if both armies united, an end would be put sooner to the whole war. Meanwhile he continued to put to the sword those of the enemy who were conquered in the field, while those brought to him captive prisoners he threw to the elephants to be trampled to death, as it was clear to him that the rebellion would never be stamped out until the enemy were utterly exterminated.

The prospects of the Carthaginians in the war now seemed much brighter, but the tide of events suddenly turned completely against them. For when the two generals met, they quarrelled so seriously, that this difference caused them not only to neglect many opportunities of striking a blow at the enemy, but to afford many such to the latter. The Carthaginians perceiving this, ordered one of the two to leave his post and the other to remain in sole command, leaving the choice to the troops. In addition to this they suffered the total loss at sea in a storm, of the supplies they were conveying from the place they call Emporia, supplies on which they entirely relied for their commissariat and other needs. And again, as I said above, they had lost Sardinia, an island which had always been of great service to them in difficult circumstances. The severest blow of all, however, was the defection of Hippacritae and Utica, the only two cities in Libya which had not only bravely faced the present war, but had gallantly held out during the invasion of Agathocles and that of the Romans; indeed they never had on any occasion given the least sign of hostility to Carthage. But now, apart from their unjustifiable defection to the cause of the Libyans, their sympathies so suddenly changed, that they exhibited the greatest friendship and loyalty to the rebels, while beginning to show every symptom of passionate and determined hatred of Carthage. After butchering the troops the Carthaginians had sent to assist them, about five hundred in number, together with their commander, they threw all the bodies from the wall, and surrendered the city to the Libyans. They would not even give the Carthaginians the permission they requested to bury their unfortunate compatriots. Mathos and Spendius in the meantime, elated by these events, undertook the siege of Carthage itself. Barcas had now been joined in the

command by Hannibal, the general whom the citizens had dispatched to the army, on the soldiers voting that Hanno should be the one to retire, when the decision was left in their hands by the Carthaginians at the time the two generals had quarrelled. Accompanied then by this Hannibal and by Naravas, Hamilcar scoured the country, intercepting the supplies of Mathos and Spendius, receiving the greatest assistance in this and all other matters from the Numidian Naravas.

Such were the positions of the field forces. The Carthaginians, being shut in on all sides, were obliged to resort to an appeal to the states in alliance with them. Hiero during the whole of the present war had been most prompt in meeting their requests, and was now more complaisant than ever, being convinced that it was in his own interest for securing both his Sicilian dominions and his friendship with the Romans, that Carthage should be preserved, and that the stronger power should not be able to attain its ultimate object entirely without effort. In this he reasoned very wisely and sensibly, for such matters should never be neglected, and we should never contribute to the attainment by one state of a power so preponderant, that none dare dispute with it even for their acknowledged rights. But now the Romans as well as Hiero observed loyally the engagements the treaty imposed on them. At first there had been a slight dispute between the two states for the following reason. The Carthaginians when they captured at sea traders coming from Italy to Libya with supplies for the enemy, brought them into Carthage, and there were now in their prisons as many as five hundred such. The Romans were annoyed at this, but when on sending an embassy, they recovered all the prisoners by diplomatic means, they were so much gratified, that in return they gave back to the Carthaginians all the

remaining prisoners from the Sicilian war and henceforth gave prompt and friendly attention to all their requests. They gave permission to their merchants to export all requirements for Carthage, but not for the enemy, and shortly afterwards, when the mercenaries in Sardinia on revolting from Carthage invited them to occupy the island, they refused. Again on the citizens of Utica offering to surrender to them they did not accept, but held to their treaty engagements.

The Carthaginians, then, on thus obtaining assistance from their friends continued to withstand the siege. But Mathos and Spendius were just as much in the position of besieged as of besiegers. Hamilcar had reduced them to such straits for supplies that they were finally forced to raise the siege. A short time afterwards, collecting a picked force of mercenaries and Libyans to the number of about fifty thousand and including Zarzas the Libyan and those under his command, they tried again their former plan of marching in the open parallel to the enemy and keeping a watch on Hamilcar. They avoided level ground, as they were afraid of the elephants and Naravas' horse, but they kept on trying to anticipate the enemy in occupying positions on the hills and narrow passes. In this campaign they were quite equal to the enemy in terms of assault and enterprise, but were often worsted owing to their want of tactical skill. This was, it seems, an opportunity for seeing by the light of actual fact, how much the methods gained by experience and the skill of a general, differ from a soldier's inexperience in the art of war and mere unreasoning routine. For in many partial engagements, Hamilcar, like a good draught-player, by cutting off and surrounding large numbers of the enemy, destroyed them without their resisting, while in the more general battles he would sometimes inflict large

loss by enticing them into unsuspected ambuscades and sometimes throw them into panic by appearing when they least expected it by day or by night. All those he captured were thrown to the elephants. Finally, taking them by surprise and encamping opposite to them in a position unfavourable for action on their part but favouring his own strong point—generalship—he brought them to such a pass, that not daring to risk a battle and unable to escape, as they were entirely surrounded by a trench and palisade, they were at last driven by famine to eat each other— a fitting retribution at the hands of Providence for their violation of all law human and divine in their treatment of their neighbours. They did not venture to march out and do battle, as they were faced by the certainty of defeat and condign punishment for all captured, and they did not even think of asking for terms, as they had their evil deeds on their conscience. Always expecting the relief from Tunis that their leaders continued to promise them, there was no crime against themselves that they scrupled to commit. But when they had used up their prisoners in this abominable manner by feeding on them, and had used up their slaves, and no help came from Tunis, and their leaders saw that their persons were in obvious danger owing to the dreadful extremity to which the common soldiers were reduced, Autaritus, Zarzas and Spendius decided to give themselves up to the enemy and discuss terms with Hamilcar. They therefore dispatched a herald, and when they had obtained leave to send envoys, they went, ten in all, to the Carthaginians. The terms Hamilcar made with them were, that the Carthaginians might choose from the enemy any ten they wished, the remainder being free to depart with one tunic apiece. These terms having been agreed to, Hamilcar at once said that by virtue of them he chose the

ten envoys. By this means the Carthaginians got into their power Autaritus, Spendius, and the other principal leaders. The Libyans, when they learnt of their officers' arrest, thought they had been betrayed, as they were ignorant of the treaty, and rushed to arms, but Hamilcar, surrounding them (more than forty thousand) with his elephants and the rest of his forces, cut them all to pieces. This occurred near the place called the Saw; it got this name from its resemblance to the tool so called.

By this achievement Hamilcar again made the Carthaginians very hopeful of better fortune, although by this time they had nearly given up all for lost. In conjunction with Naravas and Hannibal he now raided the country and its towns. The Libyans in general gave in and went over to them owing to the recent victory, and after reducing most of the cities, the Carthaginians reached Tunis and began to besiege Mathos. Hannibal encamped on the side of the town next Carthage and Hamilcar on the opposite side. Their next step was to take Spendius and the other prisoners up to the walls and crucify them there in the sight of all. Mathos noticed that Hannibal was guilty of negligence and over-confidence, and attacking his camp, put many Carthaginians to the sword and drove them all out of the camp. All the baggage fell into the rebels' hands and they made Hannibal himself prisoner. Taking him at once to Spendius' cross they tortured him cruelly there, and then, taking Spendius down from the cross, they crucified Hannibal alive on it and slew round the body of Spendius thirty Carthaginians of the highest rank. Thus did Fortune, as if it were her design to compare them, give both the belligerents in turn cause and opportunity for inflicting on each other the cruellest punishments. Owing to the distance between the two camps it was some time before Hamilcar

heard of the sortie and attack, and even then he was slow to give assistance owing to the difficult nature of the interjacent ground. He therefore broke up his camp before Tunis and on reaching the river Macaras, encamped at its mouth by the seaside.

The suddenness of this reverse took the Carthaginians by surprise, and they became again despondent and low-spirited. It was only the other day that their spirits had begun to revive so they at once fell again. Yet they did not omit to take steps for their safety. They appointed a committee of thirty senators and dispatched them to Hamilcar accompanied by Hanno, the general who had previously retired from command, but now resumed it, and by all their remaining citizens of military age, whom they had armed as a sort of forlorn hope. They enjoined these commissioners to put an end by all means in their power to the two generals' long-standing quarrel, and to force them, in view of the circumstances, to be reconciled. The senators, after they had brought the generals together, pressed them with so many and varied arguments, that at length Hanno and Barcas were obliged to yield and do as they requested. After their reconciliation they were of one mind, and consequently everything went as well as the Carthaginians could wish, so that Mathos, unsuccessful in the many partial engagements which took place around the place called Leptis and some other cities, at length resolved to decide matters by a general battle, the Carthaginians being equally anxious for this. Both sides then, with this purpose, called on all their allies to join them for the battle and summoned in the garrisons from the towns, as if about to stake their all on the issue. When they were each ready to attack, they drew up their armies confronting each other and at a preconcerted signal closed. The Carthaginians gained the victory, most of

the Libyans falling in the battle, while the rest escaped to a certain city and soon afterwards surrendered, but Mathos himself was taken by the enemy.

The rest of Libya at once submitted to Carthage after the battle, but Hippacritae and Utica still held out, feeling they had no reasonable grounds to expect terms in view of their having been so proof to all considerations of mercy and humanity when they first rebelled. This shows us that even in such offences it is most advantageous to be moderate and abstain from unpardonable excesses willingly. However, Hanno besieging one town and Barcas the other soon compelled them to accept such conditions and terms as the Carthaginians thought fit to impose.

This Libyan war, that had brought Carthage into such peril, resulted not only in the Carthaginians regaining possession of Libya, but in their being able to inflict exemplary punishment on the authors of the rebellion. The last scene in it was a triumphal procession of the young men leading Mathos through the town and inflicting on him all kinds of torture. This war had lasted for three years and four months, and it far excelled all wars we know of in cruelty and defiance of principle.

The Romans about the same time, on the invitation of the mercenaries who had deserted to them from Sardinia, undertook an expedition to that island. When the Carthaginians objected on the ground that the sovereignty of Sardinia was rather their own than Rome's, and began preparations for punishing those who were the cause of its revolt, the Romans made this the pretext of declaring war on them, alleging that the preparations were not against Sardinia, but against themselves. The Carthaginians, who had barely escaped destruction in this last war, were in every respect ill-fitted at this moment to resume hostilities with Rome. Yielding therefore to

circumstances, they not only gave up Sardinia, but agreed to pay a further sum of twelve hundred talents to the Romans to avoid going to war for the present.

THE END OF BOOK I

BOOK II

In the preceding book I stated in the first place at what date the Romans having subjected Italy began to concern themselves in enterprises outside the peninsula; next I narrated how they crossed to Sicily and what were their reasons for undertaking the war with Carthage for the possession of that island. After relating when and how they first built naval forces, I pursued the history of the war on both sides until its end, at which the Carthaginians evacuated all Sicily, and the Romans acquired the whole island except the parts which were Hiero's dominions. In the next place I set myself to describe how the mercenaries mutinied against Carthage and set ablaze the so-called Libyan war; I described all the terrible atrocities committed in this war, all its dramatic surprises, and their issues, until it ended in the final triumph of Carthage. I will now attempt to give a summary view, according to my original project, of the events immediately following.

The Carthaginians, as soon as they had set the affairs of Libya in order, dispatched Hamilcar to the land of Spain entrusting him with an adequate force. Taking with him his army and his son Hannibal now nine years of age, he crossed the straits of Gibraltar and applied himself to subjugating Spain to the Carthaginians. In this country he spent about nine years during which he reduced many Iberian tribes to obedience either by force of arms or by diplomacy, and finally met with an end worthy of his high achievements, dying bravely in a battle against one of the most warlike and

powerful tribes, after freely exposing his person to danger on the field. The Carthaginians handed over the command of the army to Hasdrubal his son-in-law and chief naval officer.

It was at this period that the Romans first crossed with an army to Illyria and that part of Europe. This is a matter not to be lightly passed over, but deserving the serious attention of those who wish to gain a true view of the purpose of this work and of the formation and growth of the Roman dominion. The circumstances which decided them to cross were as follows: Agron, king of Illyria, was the son of Pleuratus, and was master of stronger land and sea forces than any king of Illyria before him. Demetrius, the father of Philip V, had induced him by a bribe to go to the assistance of the town of Medion which the Aetolians were besieging. The Aetolians being unable to persuade the Medionians to join their league, determined to reduce them by force. Levying all their forces they encamped round the city and strictly besieged it, employing every forcible means and every device. The date of the annual elections was now at hand, and they had to choose another Strategus. As the besieged were in the utmost extremity and were expected to surrender every day, the actual Strategus addressed the Aetolians, maintaining that as it was he who had supported the dangers and hardships of the siege, it was only just, on the town falling, he should have the privilege of dealing with the booty and inscribing with his name the shields dedicated in memory of the victory. Some, more especially the candidates for the office, disputed this, and begged the people not to decide the matter in advance, but leave it, as things stood, to Fortune to determine to whom she should award this prize. The Aetolians hereupon passed a resolution, that if it was the new Strategus whoever he might be, to whom

the city fell, he should share with the present one the disposition of the booty and the honour of inscribing the shields.

This decree had been passed, and next day the election was to be held, and the new Strategus was to enter at once into office, as is the practice of the Aetolians, when that night a hundred boats containing a force of five thousand Illyrians arrived at the nearest point on the coast to Medion. Anchoring there they landed, as soon as it was daylight, with promptitude and secrecy, and forming in the order customary in Illyria, advanced by companies on the Aetolian camp. The Aetolians, on becoming aware of it, were taken aback by the unexpected nature and boldness of the attack, but having for many years ranked very high in their own estimation and relying on their strength, they were more or less confident. Stationing the greater part of their hoplites and cavalry on the level ground just in front of their lines, they occupied with a portion of their cavalry and their light-armed infantry certain favourable positions on the heights in front of the camp. The Illyrians, charging their light infantry, drove them from their positions by their superior force and the weight of their formation, compelling the supporting body of cavalry to fall back on the heavy-armed troops. After this, having the advantage of attacking the latter, who were drawn up on the plain, from higher ground, they speedily put them to flight, the Medionians also joining in the attack from the city. They killed many Aetolians and took a still larger number of prisoners, capturing all their arms and baggage. The Illyrians, having thus executed the orders of their king, carried off to their boats the baggage and other booty and at once set sail for home. The Medionians, thus unexpectedly saved, met in assembly and discussed, among other matters, that of the proper inscription for the shields. They

decided, in parody of the Aetolian decree, to inscribe them as won *from* and not *by* the present Aetolian chief magistrate and the candidates for next year's office. It seemed as if what had befallen this people was designed by Fortune to display her might to men in general. For in so brief a space of time she put it in their power to do to the enemy the very thing which they thought the enemy were just on the point of doing to themselves. The unlooked-for calamity of the Aetolians was a lesson to mankind never to discuss the future as if it were the present, or to have any confident hope about things that may still turn out quite otherwise. We are but men, and should in every matter assign its share to the unexpected, this being especially true of war.

King Agron, when the flotilla returned and his officers gave him an account of the battle, was so overjoyed at the thought of having beaten the Aetolians, then the proudest of peoples, that he took to carousals and other convivial excesses, from which he fell into a pleurisy that ended fatally in a few days. He was succeeded on the throne by his wife Teuta, who left the details of administration to friends on whom she relied. As, with a woman's natural shortness of view, she could see nothing but the recent success and had no eyes for what was going on elsewhere, she in the first place gave letters of marque to privateers to pillage any ships they met, and next she collected a fleet and force of troops as large as the former one and sent it out, ordering the commanders to treat all countries alike as belonging to their enemies. The expedition began by making a descent on Elis and Messenia, lands which the Illyrians had always been in the habit of pillaging, because, owing to the extent of their sea-board and owing to the principal cities being in the interior, help against their raids was distant and

slow in arriving; so that they could always overrun and plunder those countries unmolested. On this occasion, however, they put in at Phoenice in Epirus for the purpose of provisioning themselves. There they fell in with certain Gaulish soldiers, about eight hundred in number, at present in the employ of the Epirots. They approached these Gauls with a proposal for the betrayal of the city, and on their agreeing, they landed and captured the town and its inhabitants by assault with the help from within of the Gauls. When the Epirots learnt of this they hastened to come to help with their whole force. On reaching Phoenice they encamped with the river that runs past the town on their front, removing the planking of the bridge so as to be in safety. On news reaching them that Scerdilaïdas with five thousand Illyrians was approaching by land through the pass near Antigonia, they detached a portion of their force to guard Antigonia, but they themselves henceforth remained at their ease, faring plenteously on the produce of the country, and quite neglecting night and day watches. The Illyrians, learning of the partition of the Epirot force and of their general remissness, made a night sortie, and replacing planks on the bridge, crossed the river in safety and occupied a strong position where they remained for the rest of the night. When day broke, both armies drew up their forces in front of the town and engaged. The battle resulted in the defeat of the Epirots, many of whom were killed and still more taken prisoners, the rest escaping in the direction of Atintania.

The Epirots, having met with this misfortune and lost all hope in themselves, sent embassies to the Aetolians and to the Achaean league imploring their succour. Both leagues took pity on their situation and consented, and shortly afterwards this relieving force reached Helicranum.

The Illyrians holding Phoenice at first united with Scerdilaïdas, and advancing to Helicranum encamped opposite the Achaeans the Aetolians who had come to the rescue, and were anxious to give battle. But the ground was very difficult and unfavourable to them, and just at this time a dispatch came from Teuta ordering them to return home by the quickest route, as some of the Illyrians had revolted to the Dardanians. They therefore, after plundering Epirus, made a truce with the Epirots. By the terms of this they gave up to them the city and its free population on payment of a ransom; the slaves and other goods and chattels they put on board their boats, and while the one force sailed off home, Scerdilaïdas marched back through the pass near Antigonia. They had caused the Greek inhabitants of the coast no little consternation and alarm; for, seeing the most strongly situated and most powerful town in Epirus thus suddenly taken and its population enslaved, they all began to be anxious not, as in former times, for their agricultural produce, but for the safety of themselves and their cities.

The Epirots, thus unexpectedly saved, were so far from attempting to retaliate on the wrongdoers or from thanking those who had come to their relief, that, on the contrary, they sent an embassy to Teuta, and together with the Acarnanians entered into an alliance with Illyria, engaging in future to co-operate with the Illyrians and work against the Achaeans and Aetolians. Their whole conduct showed them not only to have acted now towards their benefactors without judgement, but to have blundered from the outset in the management of their own affairs. For we are but men, and to meet with some unexpected blow is not the sufferer's fault, but that of Fortune and those who inflict it on him; but when we involve ourselves by sheer lack of

judgement and with our eyes open in the depth of misfortune, everyone acknowledges that we have none to blame but ourselves. It is for this reason that those whom Fortune leads astray meet with pity, pardon and help, but if their failures are due to their own indiscretion, all right-thinking men blame and reproach them. And in this case the Greeks would have been amply justified in their censure of the Epirots. To begin with would not anyone who is aware of the general reputation of the Gauls, think twice before entrusting to them a wealthy city, the betrayal of which was easy and profitable? In the second place who would not have been cautious in the case of a company with such a bad name? First of all they had been expelled from their own country by a general movement of their fellow-countrymen owing to their having betrayed their own friends and kinsmen. Again, when the Carthaginians, hard pressed by the war, received them, they first availed themselves of a dispute about pay between the soldiers and the generals to pillage the city of Agrigentum of which they formed the garrison, being then above three thousand strong. Afterwards, when the Carthaginians sent them on the same service to Eryx, then besieged by the Romans, they attempted to betray the city and those who were suffering siege in their company, and when this plan fell through, they deserted to the Romans. The Romans entrusted them with the guard of the temple of Venus Erycina, which again they pillaged. Therefore, no sooner was the war with Carthage over, than the Romans, having clear evidence of their infamous character, took the very first opportunity of disarming them, putting them on board ship and banishing them from the whole of Italy. These were the men whom the Epirots employed to guard their most flourishing city. How then can they be acquitted of the charge of causing their own misfortunes?

I thought it necessary to speak at some length on this subject in order to show how foolish the Epirots were, and that no people, if wise, should ever admit a garrison stronger than their own forces, especially if composed of barbarians. To return to the Illyrians. For a long time previously they had been in the habit of maltreating vessels sailing from Italy, and now while they were at Phoenice, a number of them detached themselves from the fleet and robbed or killed many Italian traders, capturing and carrying off no small number of prisoners. The Romans had hitherto turned a deaf ear to the complaints made against the Illyrians, but now when a number of persons approached the Senate on the subject, they appointed two envoys, Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius, to proceed to Illyria, and investigate the matter. Teuta, on the return of the flotilla from Epirus, was so struck with admiration by the quantity and beauty of the spoils they brought back (Phoenice being then far the wealthiest city there), that she was twice as eager as before to molest the Greeks. For the present, however, she had to defer her projects owing to the disturbance in her own dominions; she had speedily put down the Illyrian revolt, but was engaged in besieging Issa, which alone still refused to submit to her, when the Roman ambassadors arrived by sea. Audience having been granted them, they began to speak of the outrages committed against them. Teuta, during the whole interview, listened to them in a most arrogant and overbearing manner, and when they had finished speaking, she said she would see to it that Rome suffered no public wrong from Illyria, but that, as for private wrongs, it was contrary to the custom of the Illyrian kings to hinder their subjects from winning booty from the sea. The younger of the ambassadors was very indignant at these words of hers, and spoke out with a frankness most proper indeed, but

highly inopportune: "O Teuta," he said, the Romans have an admirable custom, which is to punish publicly the doers of private wrongs and publicly come to the help of the wronged. Be sure that we will try, God willing, by might and main and right soon, to force thee to mend the custom toward the Illyrians of their kings." Giving way to her temper like a woman and heedless of the consequences, she took this frankness ill, and was so enraged at the speech that, defying the law of nations, when the ambassadors were leaving in their ship, she sent emissaries to assassinate the one who had been so bold of speech. On the news reaching Rome, the woman's outrage created great indignation and they at once set themselves to prepare for an expedition, enrolling legions and getting a fleet together.

Teuta, when the season came, fitted out a larger number of boats than before and dispatched them to the Greek coasts. Some of them sailed through the strait to Corcyra, while a part put in to the harbour of Epidamnus, professedly to water and provision, but really with the design of surprising and seizing the town. They were received by the Epidamnians without any suspicion or concern, and landing as if for the purpose of watering, lightly clad but with swords concealed in the water-jars, they cut down the guards of the gate and at once possessed themselves of the gate-tower. A force from the ships was quickly on the spot, as had been arranged, and thus reinforced, they easily occupied the greater part of the walls. The citizens were taken by surprise and quite unprepared, but they rushed to arms and fought with great gallantry, the result being that the Illyrians, after considerable resistance, were driven out of the town. Thus the Epidamnians on this occasion came very near losing their native town by their negligence, but through their courage escaped with a salutary

lesson for the future. The Illyrian commanders hastened to get under weigh and catching up the rest of their flotilla bore down on Corcyra. There they landed, to the consternation of the inhabitants, and laid siege to the city. Upon this the Corcyreans, in the utmost distress and despondency, sent, together with the peoples of Apollonia and Epidamnus, envoys to the Achaeans and Aetolians, imploring them to hasten to their relief and not allow them to be driven from their homes by the Illyrians. The two Leagues, after listening to the envoys, consented to their request, and both joined in manning the ten decked ships belonging to the Achaeans. In a few days they were ready for sea and sailed for Corcyra in the hope of raising the siege. The Illyrians, now reinforced by seven decked ships sent by the Acarnanians in compliance with the terms of their treaty, put to sea and encountered the Achaean ships off the island called Paxi. The Acarnanians and those Achaean ships which were told off to engage them fought with no advantage on either side, remaining undamaged in their encounter except for the wounds inflicted on some of the crew. The Illyrians lashed their boats together in batches of four and thus engaged the enemy. They sacrificed their own boats, presenting them broadside to their adversaries in a position favouring their charge, but when the enemy's ships had charged and struck them and getting fixed in them, found themselves in difficulties, as in each case the four boats lashed together were hanging on to their beaks, the marines leapt on to the decks of the Achaean ships and overmastered them by their numbers. In this way they captured four quadriremes and sunk with all hands a quinquereme, on board of which was Margos of Caryneia, a man who up to the end served the Achaeans most loyally. The ships that were engaged with the Acarnanians, seeing the

success of the Illyrians, and trusting to their speed, made sail with a fair wind and escaped home in safety. The Illyrian forces, highly elated by their success, continued the siege with more security and confidence, and the Corcyreans, whose hopes were crushed by the repulse of their allies, after enduring the siege for a short time longer, came to terms with the Illyrians, receiving a garrison under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. After this the Illyrian commanders at once sailed off and coming to anchor at Epidamnus, again set themselves to besiege that city.

At about the same time one of the Consuls, Gnaeus Fulvius, sailed out from Rome with the two hundred ships, while the other, Aulus Postumius, left with the land forces. Gnaeus' first intention had been to make for Corcyra, as he supposed he would find the siege still undecided. On discovering that he was too late, he none the less sailed for that island, wishing on the one hand to find out accurately what had happened about the city, and on the other hand to put to a test the sincerity of communications made to him by Demetrius. Accusations had been brought against the latter, and being in fear of Teuta he sent messages to the Romans undertaking to hand over to them the city and whatever else was under his charge. The Corcyreans were much relieved to see the Romans arrive, and they gave up the Illyrian garrison to them with the consent of Demetrius. They unanimously accepted the Romans' invitation to place themselves under their protection, considering this the sole means of assuring for the future their safety from the violence of the Illyrians. The Romans, having admitted the Corcyreans to their friendship, set sail for Apollonia, Demetrius in future acting as their guide. Simultaneously Postumius was bringing across from Brundisium the land forces consisting of about twenty thousand foot

and two thousand horse. On the two forces uniting at Apollonia and on the people of that city likewise agreeing to put themselves under Roman protection, they at once set off again, hearing that Epidamnus was being besieged. The Illyrians, on hearing of the approach of the Romans, hastily broke up the siege and fled. The Romans, taking Epidamnus also under their protection, advanced into the interior of Illyria, subduing the Ardiaeans on their way. Many embassies met them, among them one from the Parthini offering unconditional surrender. They admitted this tribe to their friendship as well as the Atintanes, and advanced towards Issa which was also being besieged by the Illyrians. On their arrival they forced the enemy to raise the siege and took the Issaeans also under their protection. The fleet too took several Illyrian cities by assault as they sailed along the coast, losing, however, at Nutria not only many soldiers, but some of their military tribunes and their quaestor. They also captured twenty boats which were conveying the plunder from the country. Of the besiegers of Issa those now in Pharos were allowed, through Demetrius' influence, to remain there unhurt, while the others dispersed and took refuge at Arbo. Teuta, with only a few followers, escaped to Rhizon, a place strongly fortified at a distance from the sea and situated on the river Rhizon. After accomplishing so much and placing the greater part of Illyria under the rule of Demetrius, thus making him an important potentate, the Consuls returned to Epidamnus with the fleet and army. Gnaeus Fulvius now sailed for Rome with the greater part of both forces, and Postumius, with whom forty ships were left, enrolled a legion from the cities in the neighbourhood and wintered at Epidamnus to guard the Ardiaeans and the other tribes who had placed themselves under the protection of Rome. In the early spring Teuta sent an

embassy to the Romans and made a treaty, by which she consented to pay any tribute they imposed, to relinquish all Illyria except a few places, and, what mostly concerned the Greeks, undertook not to sail beyond Lissus with more than two hundred vessels. When this treaty had been concluded Postumius sent legates to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues. On their arrival they first explained the causes of the war and their reason for crossing the Adriatic, and next gave an account of what they had accomplished, reading the treaty they had made with the Illyrians. After meeting with all due courtesy from both the leagues, they returned by sea to Corcyra, having by the communication of this treaty, delivered the Greeks from no inconsiderable dread; for the Illyrians were not then the enemies of this people or that, but the common enemies of all.

Such were the circumstances and causes of the Romans crossing for the first time with an army to Illyria and those parts of Europe, and of their first coming into relations through an embassy with Greece. But having thus begun, the Romans immediately afterwards sent other envoys to Athens and Corinth, on which occasion the Corinthians first admitted them to participation in the Isthmian games.

We have said nothing of affairs in Spain during these years. Hasdrubal had by his wise and practical administration made great general progress, and by the foundation of the city called by some Carthage, and by others the New Town, made a material contribution to the resources of Carthage, especially owing to its favourable position for action in Spain or Libya. On a more suitable occasion we will describe its position and point out the services it can render to both these countries. The Romans, seeing that Hasdrubal was in a fair way to create a larger and more formidable empire

than Carthage formerly possessed, resolved to begin to occupy themselves with Spanish affairs. Finding that they had hitherto been asleep and had allowed Carthage to build up a powerful dominion, they tried, as far as possible, to make up for lost time. For the present they did not venture to impose orders on Carthage, or to go to war with her, because the threat of a Celtic invasion was hanging over them, the attack being indeed expected from day to day. They decided, then, to smooth down and conciliate Hasdrubal in the first place, and then to attack the Celts and decide the issue by arms, for they thought that as long as they had these Celts threatening their frontier, not only would they never be masters of Italy, but they would not even be safe in Rome itself. Accordingly, after having sent envoys to Hasdrubal and made a treaty, in which no mention was made of the rest of Spain, but the Carthaginians engaged not to cross the Ebro in arms, they at once entered on the struggle against the Italian Celts.

I think it will be of use to give some account of these peoples, which must be indeed but a summary one, in order not to depart from the original plan of this work as defined in the preface. We must, however, go back to the time when they first occupied these districts. I think the story is not only worth knowing and keeping in mind, but quite necessary for my purpose, as it shows us who were the men and what was the country on which Hannibal afterwards relied in his attempt to destroy the Roman dominion. I must first describe the nature of the country and its position as regards the rest of Italy. A sketch of its peculiarities, regionally and as a whole land, will help us better to comprehend the more important of the events I have to relate.

Italy as a whole has the shape of a triangle of which the one or eastern side is bounded by the Ionian Strait and then continuously by the Adriatic

Gulf, the next side, that turned to the south and west, by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian Seas. The apex of the triangle, formed by the meeting of these two sides, is the southernmost cape of Italy known as Cocynthus and separating the Ionian Strait from the Sicilian Sea. The remaining or northern and inland side of the triangle is bounded continuously by the chain of the Alps which beginning at Marseilles and the northern coasts of the Sardinian Sea stretches in an unbroken line almost to the head of the whole Adriatic, only failing to join that sea by stopping at quite a short distance from it. At the foot of this chain, which we should regard as the base of the triangle, on its southern side, lies the last plain of all Italy to the north. It is with this that we are now concerned, a plain surpassing in fertility any other in Europe with which we are acquainted. The general shape of the lines that bound this plain is likewise triangular. The apex of the triangle is formed by the meeting of the Apennines and Alps not far from the Sardinian Sea at a point above Marseilles. Its northern side is, as I have said, formed by the Alps themselves and is about two thousand two hundred stades in length, the southern side by the Apennines which extend for a distance of three thousand six hundred stades. The base of the whole triangle is the coast of the Adriatic, its length from the city of Sena [1] to the head of the gulf being more than two thousand five hundred stades; so that the whole circumference of this plain is not much less than ten thousand stades. Its fertility is not easy to describe. It produces such an abundance of corn, that often in my time the price of wheat was four obols per Sicilian medimnus [2] and that of barley two obols, a metretes of wine costing the same as the medimnus of barley. Panic and millet are produced in enormous quantities, while the amount of acorns grown in the woods dispersed over the plain can

be estimated from the fact that, while the number of swine slaughtered in Italy for private consumption as well as to feed the army is very large, almost the whole of them are supplied by this plain. The cheapness and abundance of all articles of food will be most clearly understood from the following fact. Travellers in this country who put up in inns, do not bargain for each separate article they require, but ask what is the charge per diem for one person. The innkeepers, as a rule, agree to receive guests, providing them with enough of all they require for half an *as* per diem, *i.e.* the fourth part of an obol, the charge being very seldom higher. As for the numbers of the inhabitants, their stature and beauty and their courage in war, the facts of their history will speak.

[1] Siniglia.

[2] About 5 Roman *modii* or 10 gallons. The *metretes* of wine was about 9 gallons.

The hilly ground with sufficient soil on both slopes of the Alps, that on the north towards the Rhone and that towards the plain I have been describing, is inhabited in the former case by the Transalpine Gauls and in the latter by the Taurisci, Agones and several other barbarous tribes. Transalpine is not a national name but a local one, trans meaning "beyond," and those beyond the Alps being so called. The summits of the Alps are quite uninhabitable owing to their ruggedness and the quantity of snow which always covers them. The Apennines, from their junction with the Alps above Marseilles, are inhabited on both slopes, that looking to the Tyrrhenian sea and that turned to the plain, by the Ligurians whose territory reaches on the seaboard-side as far as Pisa, the first city of western Etruria, and on the land side as far as Arretium. [3] Next come the Etruscans and

after them both slopes are inhabited by the Umbrians. After this the Apennines, at a distance of about five hundred stades from the Adriatic, quit the plain and, turning to the right, pass along the centre of the rest of Italy as far as the Sicilian sea, the remaining flat part of this side of the triangle continuing to the sea and the city of Sena. The river Po, celebrated by poets as the Eridanus, rises in the Alps somewhere near the apex of the triangle and descends to the plain, flowing in a southerly direction. On reaching the flat ground, it takes a turn to the East and flows through the plain, falling into the Adriatic by two mouths. It cuts off the larger half of the plain, which thus lies between it on the south and the Alps and head of the Adriatic on the north. It has a larger volume of water than any other river in Italy, since all the streams that descend into the plain from the Alps and Apennines fall into it from either side, and is highest and finest at the time [4] of the rising of the Dog-star, as it is then swollen by the melting of the snow on those mountains. It is navigable for about two thousand stades from the mouth called Olana; for the stream, which has been a single one from its source, divides at a place called Trigaboli, one of the mouths being called Padua and the other Olana. At the latter there is a harbour, which affords as safe anchorage as any in the Adriatic. The native name of the river is Bodencus. The other tales the Greeks tell about this river, I mean touching Phaëthon and his fall and the weeping poplar-trees and the black clothing of the inhabitants near the river, who, they say, still dress thus in mourning for Phaëthon, and all matter for tragedy and the like, may be left aside for the present, detailed treatment of such things not suiting very well the plan of this work. I will, however, when I find a suitable occasion make

proper mention of all this, especially as Timaeus has shown much ignorance concerning the district.

[3] Arezzo.

[4] Middle of July.

The Etruscans were the oldest inhabitants of this plain at the same period that they possessed also the Phlegraean plain in the neighbourhood of Capua and Nola, which, accessible and well known as it is to many, has such a reputation for fertility. Those therefore who would know something of the dominion of the Etruscans should not look at the country they now inhabit, but at these plains and the resources they drew thence. The Celts, being close neighbours of the Etruscans and associating much with them, cast covetous eyes on their beautiful country, and on a small pretext, suddenly attacked them with a large army and, expelling them from the plain of the Po, occupied it themselves. The first settlers at the eastern extremity, near the source of the Po, were the Laevi and Lebecii, after them the Insubres, the largest tribe of all, and next these, on the banks of the river, the Cenomani. The part of the plain near the Adriatic had never ceased to be in the possession of another very ancient tribe called the Veneti, differing slightly from the Gauls in customs and costume and speaking another language. About this people the tragic poets tell many marvellous stories. On the other bank of the Po, by the Apennines, the first settlers beginning from the west were the Anares and next them the Boii. Next the latter, towards the Adriatic, were the Lingones and lastly, near the sea, the Senones.

These are the names of the principal tribes that settled in the district. They lived in unwalled villages, without any superfluous furniture; for as

they slept on beds of leaves and fed on meat and were exclusively occupied with war and agriculture, their lives were very simple, and they had no knowledge whatever of any art or science. Their possessions consisted of cattle and gold, because these were the only things they could carry about with them everywhere according to circumstances and shift where they chose. They treated comradeship as of the greatest importance, those among them being the most feared and most powerful who were thought to have the largest number of attendants and associates.

On their first invasion they not only conquered this country but reduced to subjection many of the neighbouring peoples, striking terror into them by their audacity. Not long afterwards they defeated the Romans and their allies in a pitched battle, and pursuing the fugitives, occupied, three days after the battle, the whole of Rome with the exception of the Capitol, but being diverted by an invasion of their own country by the Veneti, they made on this occasion a treaty with the Romans, and evacuating the city, returned home. After this they were occupied by domestic wars, and certain of the neighbouring Alpine tribes, witnessing to what prosperity they had attained in comparison with themselves, frequently gathered to attack them. Meanwhile the Romans re-established their power and again became masters of Latium. Thirty years after the occupation of Rome, the Celts again appeared before Alba with a large army, and the Romans on this occasion did not venture to meet them in the field, because, owing to the suddenness of the attack, they were taken by surprise and had not had time to anticipate it by collecting the forces of their allies. But when, twelve years later, the Celts again invaded in great strength, they had early word of it, and, assembling their allies, marched eagerly to meet them, wishing for

nothing better than a decisive battle. The Gauls, alarmed by the Roman advance and at variance among themselves, waited until nightfall and then set off for home, their retreat resembling a flight. After this panic, they kept quiet for thirteen years, and then, as they saw how rapidly the power of the Romans was growing, they made a formal peace with them, to the terms of which they adhered steadfastly for thirty years. But then, when a fresh movement began among the Transalpine Gauls, and they feared they would have a big war on their hands, they deflected from themselves the inroad of the migrating tribes by bribery and by pleading their kinship, but they incited them to attack the Romans, and even joined them in the expedition. They advanced through Etruria, the Etruscans too uniting with them, and, after collecting a quantity of booty, retired quite safely from the Roman territory, but, on reaching home, fell out with each other about division of the spoil and succeeded in destroying the greater part of their own forces and of the booty itself. This is quite a common event among the Gauls, when they have appropriated their neighbour's property, chiefly owing to their inordinate drinking and surfeiting. Four years later the Gauls made a league with the Samnites, and engaging the Romans in the territory of Camerinum inflicted on them considerable loss; meanwhile the Romans, determined on avenging their reverse, advanced again a few days after with all their legions, and attacking the Gauls and Samnites in the territory of Santinum, put the greater number of them to the sword and compelled the rest to take precipitate flight each to their separate homes. Again, ten years afterwards, the Gauls appeared in force and besieged Arretium. The Romans, coming to the help of the town, attacked them in front of it and were defeated. In this battle their Praetor Lucius Caecilius fell, and they

nominated Manius Curius in his place. When Manius sent legates to Gaul to treat for the return of the prisoners, they were treacherously slain, and this made the Romans so indignant that they at once marched upon Gaul. They were met by the Gauls called Senones, whom they defeated in a pitched battle, killing most of them and driving the rest out of their country, the whole of which they occupied. This was the first part of Gaul in which they planted a colony, calling it Sena after the name of the Gauls who formerly inhabited it. This is the city I mentioned above as lying near the Adriatic at the extremity of the plain of the Po. Hereupon the Boii, seeing the Senones expelled from their territory, and fearing a like fate for themselves and their own land, implored the aid of the Etruscans and marched out in full force. The united armies gave battle to the Romans near Lake Vadimon, and in this battle most of the Etruscans were cut to pieces while only quite a few of the Boii escaped. But, notwithstanding, in the very next year these two peoples once more combined and arming their young men, even the mere striplings, again encountered the Romans in a pitched battle. They were utterly defeated and it was only now that their courage at length gave way and that they sent an embassy to sue for terms and made a treaty with the Romans. This took place three years before the crossing of Pyrrhus to Italy and five years before the destruction of the Gauls at Delphi; for it really seems that at this time Fortune afflicted all Gauls alike with a sort of epidemic of war. From all these struggles the Romans gained two great advantages. In the first place, having become accustomed to be cut up by Gauls, they could neither undergo nor expect any more terrible experience, and next, owing to this, when they met Pyrrhus they had become perfectly trained athletes in war, so that they were able to daunt the courage of the

Gauls before it was too late, and henceforth could give their whole mind first to the fight with Pyrrhus for Italy and afterwards to the maintenance of the contest with Carthage for the possession of Sicily.

After these reverses, the Gauls remained quiet and at peace with Rome for forty-five years. But when, as time went on, those who had actually witnessed the terrible struggle were no more, and a younger generation had taken their place, full of unreflecting passion and absolutely without experience of suffering or peril, they began again, as was natural, to disturb the settlement, becoming exasperated against the Romans on the least pretext and inviting the Alpine Gauls to make common cause with them. At first these advances were made secretly by their chiefs without the knowledge of the multitude; so that when a force of Transalpine Gauls advanced as far as Ariminum the Boian populace were suspicious of them, and quarrelling with their own leaders as well as with the strangers, killed their kings, Atis and Galatus, and had a pitched battle with the other Gauls in which many fell on either side. The Romans had been alarmed by the advance of the Gauls, and a legion was on its way; but, on hearing of the Gauls' self-inflicted losses, they returned home. Five years after this alarm, in the consulship of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the Romans divided among their citizens the territory in Gaul known as Picenum, from which they had ejected the Senones when they conquered them. Gaius Flaminius was the originator of this popular policy, which we must pronounce to have been, one may say, the first step in the demoralization of the populace, as well as the cause of the war with the Gauls which followed. For what prompted many of the Gauls and especially the Boii, whose territory bordered on that of Rome, to take action was the conviction that now the Romans no longer

made war on them for the sake of supremacy and sovereignty, but with a view to their total expulsion and extermination.

The two largest tribes, therefore, the Insubres and Boii, made a league and sent messengers to the Gauls dwelling among the Alps and near the Rhone, who are called Gaesatae because they serve for hire, this being the proper meaning of the word. They urged and incited their kings Concolitanus and Aneroëstus to make war on Rome, offering them at present a large sum in gold, and as to the future, pointing out to them the great prosperity of the Romans, and the vast wealth that would be theirs if they were victorious. They had no difficulty in persuading them, as, in addition to all this, they pledged themselves to be loyal allies and reminded them of the achievement of their own ancestors, who had not only overcome the Romans in combat, but, after the battle, had assaulted and taken Rome itself, possessing themselves of all it contained, and, after remaining masters of the city for seven months, had finally given it up of their own free will and as an act of grace, and had returned home with their spoil, unbroken and unscathed. When the kings had been told all this, they became so eager for the expedition that on no occasion has that district of Gaul sent out so large a force or one composed of men so distinguished or so warlike. All this time, the Romans, either hearing what was happening or divining what was coming, were in such a state of constant alarm and unrest, that at times we find them busy enrolling legions and making provision of corn and other stores, at times marching to the frontier, as if the enemy had already invaded their territory, while as a fact the Celts had not yet budged from their own country. This movement of the Gauls contributed in no small measure to the rapid and unimpeded subjugation of

Spain by the Carthaginians; for the Romans, as I said above, regarded this matter as of more urgency, since the danger was on their flank, and were compelled to neglect the affairs of Spain until they had dealt with the Gauls. They therefore secured themselves against the Carthaginians by the treaty with Hasdrubal, the terms of which I stated above, and threw their whole effort into the struggle with their enemies in Italy, considering it their main interest to bring this to a decisive conclusion.

The Gaesatae, having collected a richly equipped and formidable force, crossed the Alps, and descended into the plain of the Po in the eighth year after the partition of Picenum. The Insubres and Boii held stoutly to their original purpose; but the Veneti and Cenomani, on the Romans sending an embassy to them, decided to give them their support; so that the Celtic chiefs were obliged to leave part of their forces behind to protect their territory from invasion by these tribes. They themselves marched confidently out with their whole available army, consisting of about fifty thousand foot and twenty thousand horse and chariots, and advanced on Etruria. The Romans, the moment they heard that the Gauls had crossed the Alps, sent Lucius Aemilius, their Consul, with his army to Ariminum to await the attack of the enemy, and one of their Praetors to Etruria, their other Consul, Gaius Atilius having already gone to Sardinia with his legions. There was great and general alarm in Rome, as they thought they were in imminent and serious peril, and this indeed was but natural, as the terror the old invasion had inspired still dwelt in their minds. No one thought of anything else therefore, they busied themselves mustering and enrolling their own legions and ordered those of the allies to be in readiness. All their subjects in general were commanded to supply lists of men of

military age, as they wished to know what their total forces amounted to. Of corn, missiles and other war material they had laid such a supply as no one could remember to have been collected on any previous occasion. On every side there was a ready disposition to help in every possible way; for the inhabitants of Italy, terror-struck by the invasion of the Gauls, no longer thought of themselves as the allies of Rome or regarded this war as undertaken to establish Roman supremacy, but every man considered that the peril was descending on himself and his own city and country. So there was great alacrity in obeying orders.

But, that it may appear from actual facts what a great power it was that Hannibal ventured to attack, and how mighty was that empire boldly confronting which he came so near his purpose as to bring great disasters on Rome, I must state what were their resources and the actual number of their forces at this time. Each of the Consuls was in command of four legions of Roman citizens, each consisting of five thousand two hundred foot and three hundred horse. The allied forces in each Consular army numbered thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse. The cavalry of the Sabines and Etruscans, who had come to the temporary assistance of Rome, were four thousand strong, their infantry above fifty thousand. The Romans massed these forces and posted them on the frontier of Etruria under the command of a Praetor. The levy of the Umbrians and Sarsinates inhabiting the Apennines amounted to about twenty thousand, and with these were twenty thousand Veneti and Cenomani. These they stationed on the frontier of Gaul, to invade the territory of the Boii and divert them back from their expedition. These were the armies protecting the Roman territory. In Rome itself there was a reserve force, ready for any war-contingency, consisting of

twenty thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, all Roman citizens, and thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse furnished by the allies. The lists of men able to bear arms that had been returned were as follows. Latins eighty thousand foot and five thousand horse, Samnites seventy thousand foot and seven thousand horse, Iapygians and Messapians fifty thousand foot and sixteen thousand horse in all, Lucanians thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani, and Vestini twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse. In Sicily and Tarentum were two reserve legions, each consisting of about four thousand two hundred foot and two hundred horse. Of Romans and Campanians there were on the roll two hundred and fifty thousand foot and twenty-three thousand horse; so that the total number of Romans and allies able to bear arms was more than seven hundred thousand foot and seventy thousand horse, while Hannibal invaded Italy with an army of less than twenty thousand men. On this matter I shall be able to give my readers more explicit information in the course of this work.

The Celts, descending on Etruria, overran the country devastating it without let or hindrance and, as nobody appeared to oppose them, they marched on Rome itself. When they had got as far as Clusium, a city three days' journey from Rome, news reached them that the advanced force which the Romans had posted in Etruria was on their heels and approaching. On hearing this, they turned to meet it, eager to engage it. At sunset the two armies were in closed proximity, and encamped for the night at no great distance from each other. After nightfall, the Celts lit their camp-fires, and, leaving orders with their cavalry to wait until daybreak and then, when visible to the enemy, to follow on their track, they themselves secretly

retreated to a town called Faesulae and posted themselves there, their intention being to wait for their cavalry, and also to put unexpected difficulties in the way of the enemy's attack. At daybreak, the Romans, seeing the cavalry alone and thinking the Celts had taken to flight, followed the cavalry with all speed on the line of the Celts' retreat. On their approaching the enemy, the Celts left their position and attacked them, and a conflict, at first very stubborn, took place, in which finally the numbers and courage of the Celts prevailed, not fewer than six thousand Romans falling and the rest taking to flight. Most of them retreated to a hill of some natural strength where they remained. The Celts at first attempted to besiege them, but as they were getting the worst of it, fatigued as they were by their long night march and the suffering and hardships it involved, they hastened to rest and refresh themselves, leaving a detachment of their cavalry to keep guard round the hill, intending next day to besiege the fugitives, if they did not offer to surrender.

At this very time Lucius Aemilius, who was in command of the advanced force near the Adriatic, on hearing that the Celts had invaded Etruria and were approaching Rome, came in haste to help, fortunately arriving in the nick of time. He encamped near the enemy, and the fugitives on the hill, seeing his camp-fires and understanding what had occurred, immediately plucked up courage and dispatched by night some unarmed messengers through the wood to announce to the commander the plight they were in. On hearing of it and seeing that there was no alternative course under the circumstances, the latter ordered his Tribunes to march out the infantry at daybreak, he himself proceeding in advance with the cavalry towards the hill mentioned above. The leaders of the Gauls, on seeing the

camp-fires at night, surmised that the enemy had arrived and held a council at which the King Aneroestes expressed the opinion, that having captured so much booty (for it appears that the quantity of slaves, cattle and miscellaneous spoil was enormous), they should not give battle again nor risk the fortune of the whole enterprise, but return home in safety, and having got rid of all their encumbrances and lightened themselves, return and, if advisable, try issues with the Romans. It was decided under the circumstances to take the course recommended by Aneroestes, and having come to this resolution in the night, they broke up their camp before daybreak and retreated along the sea-coast through Etruria. Lucius now took with him from the hill the survivors of the other army and united them with his other forces. He thought it by no means advisable to risk a general battle, but decided to hang on the enemy's rear and watch for times and places favourable for inflicting damage on them or wresting some of the spoil from their hands.

Just at this time, Gaius Atilius, the other Consul, had reached Pisa from Sardinia with his legions and was on his way to Rome, marching in the opposite direction to the enemy. When the Celts were near Telamon in Etruria, their advanced foragers encountered the advance guard of Gaius and were made prisoners. On being examined by the Consul they narrated all that had recently occurred and told him of the presence of the two armies, stating that the Gauls were quite near and Lucius behind them. The news surprised him but at the same time made him very hopeful, as he thought he had caught the Gauls on the march between the two armies. He ordered his Tribunes to put the legions in fighting order and to advance thus at marching pace in so far as the nature of the ground allowed the attack in

line. He himself had happily noticed a hill situated above the road by which the Celts must pass, and taking his cavalry with him, advanced at full speed, being anxious to occupy the crest of the hill before their arrival and be the first to begin the battle, feeling certain that thus he would get the largest share of credit for the result. The Celts at first were ignorant of the arrival of Atilius and imagined from what they saw, that Aemilius' cavalry had got round their flank in the night and were engaged in occupying the position. They therefore at once sent on their own cavalry and some of their light-armed troops to dispute the possession of the hill. But very soon they learnt of Gaius' presence from one of the prisoners brought in, and lost no time in drawing up their infantry, deploying them so that they faced both front and rear, since, both from the intelligence that reached them and from what was happening before their eyes, they knew that the one army was following them, and they expected to meet the other in their front. Aemilius, who had heard of the landing of the legions at Pisa but had not any idea that they were already so near him, now, when he saw the fight going on round the hill, knew that the other Roman army was quite close. Accordingly, sending on his cavalry to help those who were fighting on the hill, he drew up his infantry in the usual order and advanced against the foe. The Celts had drawn up facing their rear, from which they expected Aemilius to attack, the Gaesatae from the Alps and behind them the Insubres, and facing in the opposite direction, ready to meet the attack of Gaius' legions, they placed the Taurisci and the Boii from the right bank of the Po. Their wagons and chariots they stationed at the extremity of either wing and collected their booty on one of the neighbouring hills with a protecting force round it. This order of the Celtic forces, facing both ways, not only presented a formidable

appearance, but was well adapted to the exigencies of the situation. The Insubres and Boii wore their trousers and light cloaks, but the Gaesatae had discarded these garments owing to their proud confidence in themselves, and stood naked, with nothing but their arms, in front of the whole army, thinking that thus they would be more efficient, as some of the ground was overgrown with brambles which would catch in their clothes and impede the use of their weapons. At first the battle was confined to the hill, all the armies gazing on it, so great were the numbers of cavalry from each host combating there pell-mell. In this action Gaius the Consul fell in the mellay fighting with desperate courage, and his head was brought to the Celtic kings; but the Roman cavalry, after a stubborn struggle, at length overmastered the enemy and gained possession of the hill. The infantry were now close upon each other, and the spectacle was a strange and marvellous one, not only to those actually present at the battle, but to all who could afterwards picture it to themselves from the reports. For in the first place, as the battle was between three armies, it is evident that the appearance and the movements of the forces marshalled against each other must have been in the highest degree strange and unusual. Again, it must have been to all present, and still is to us, a matter of doubt whether the Celts, with the enemy advancing on them from both sides, were more dangerously situated, or, on the contrary, more effectively, since at one and the same time they were fighting against both their enemies and were protecting themselves in the rear from both, while, above all, they were absolutely cut off from retreat or any prospect of escape in the case of defeat, this being the peculiarity of this two-faced formation. The Romans, however, were on the one hand encouraged by having caught the enemy

between their two armies, but on the other they were terrified by the fine order of the Celtic host and the dreadful din, for there were innumerable horn-blowers and trumpeters, and, as the whole army were shouting their war-cries at the same time, there was such a tumult of sound that it seemed that not only the trumpets and the soldiers but all the country round had got a voice and caught up the cry. Very terrifying too were the appearance and the gestures of the naked warriors in front, all in the prime of life, and finely built men, and all in the leading companies richly adorned with gold torques and armlets. The sight of them indeed dismayed the Romans, but at the same time the prospect of winning such spoils made them twice as keen for the fight. But when the javelineers advanced, as is their usage, from the ranks of the Roman legions and began to hurl their javelins in well-aimed volleys, the Celts in the rear ranks indeed were well protected by their trousers and cloaks, but it fell out far otherwise than they had expected with the naked men in front, and they found themselves in a very difficult and helpless predicament. For the Gaulish shield does not cover the whole body; so that their nakedness was a disadvantage, and the bigger they were [5] the better chance had the missiles of going home. At length, unable to drive off the javelineers owing to the distance and the hail of javelins, and reduced to the utmost distress and perplexity, some of them, in their impotent rage, rushed wildly on the enemy and sacrificed their lives, while others, retreating step by step on the ranks of their comrades, threw them into disorder by their display of faint-heartedness. Thus was the spirit of the Gaesatae broken down by the javelineers; but the main body of the Insubres, Boii, and Taurisci, once the javelineers had withdrawn into the ranks and the Roman maniples attacked them, met the enemy and kept up a

stubborn hand-to-hand combat. For, though being almost cut to pieces, they held their ground, equal to their foes in courage, and inferior only, as a force and individually, in their arms. The Roman shields, it should be added, were far more serviceable for defence and their swords for attack, the Gaulish sword being only good for a cut and not for a thrust. But finally, attacked from higher ground and on their flank by the Roman cavalry, which rode down the hill and charged them vigorously, the Celtic infantry were cut to pieces where they stood, their cavalry taking to flight.

[5] Literally "so that the more naked and the bigger they were. . ."

About forty thousand Celts were slain and at least ten thousand taken prisoners, among them the king Concolitanus. The other king, Aneroestes, escaped with a few followers to a certain place where he put an end to his life and to those of his friends. The Roman Consul collected the spoils and sent them to Rome, returning the booty of the Gauls to the owners. With his legions he traversed Liguria and invaded the territory of the Boii, from whence, after letting his legions pillage to their heart's content, he returned at their head in a few days to Rome. He sent to ornament the Capitol the standards and necklaces (the gold necklets worn by the Gauls), but the rest of the spoil and the prisoners he used for his entry into Rome and the adornment of his triumph.

Thus were destroyed these Celts during whose invasion, the most serious that had ever occurred, all the Italians and especially the Romans had been exposed to great and terrible peril. This success encouraged the Romans to hope that they would be able entirely to expel the Celts from the plain of the Po and both the Consuls of the next year, Quintus Fulvius and Titus Manlius, were sent against them with a formidable expeditionary force.

They surprised and terrified the Boii, compelling them to submit to Rome, but the rest of the campaign had no practical results whatever, owing to the very heavy rains, and an epidemic which broke out among them.

Next year's Consuls, however, Publius Furius and Gaius Flaminius, again invaded the Celtic territory, through the country of the Anares who dwelt not far from Marseilles. Having admitted this tribe to their friendship, they crossed into the territory of the Insubres, near the junction of the Po and Adda. Both in crossing and in encamping on the other side, they suffered some loss, and at first remained on the spot, but later made a truce and evacuated the territory under its terms. After a circuitous march of some days, they crossed the river Clusius and reached the country of the Cenomani, who were their allies, and accompanied by them, again invaded from the district at the foot of the Alps the plains of the Insubres and began to lay the country waste and pillage their dwellings. The chieftains of the Insubres, seeing that the Romans adhered to their purpose of attacking them, decided to try their luck in a decisive battle. Collecting all their forces in one place, they took down the golden standards called "immovable" from the temple of Minerva, and having made all other necessary preparations, boldly took up a menacing position opposite the enemy. They were about fifty thousand strong. The Romans, on the one hand, as they saw that the enemy were much more numerous than themselves, were desirous of employing also the forces of their Celtic allies, but on the other hand, taking into consideration Gaulish fickleness and the fact that they were going to fight against those of the same nation as these allies, they were wary of asking such men to participate in an action of such vital importance. Finally, remaining themselves on their side of the river, they sent the Celts who

were with them across it, and demolished the bridges that crossed the stream, firstly as a precaution against their allies, and secondly to leave themselves no hope of safety except in victory, the river, which was impassable, lying in their rear. After taking these measures they prepared for battle.

The Romans are thought to have managed matters very skilfully in this battle, their tribunes having instructed them how they should fight, both as individuals and collectively. For they had observed from former battles that Gauls in general are most formidable and spirited in their first onslaught, while still fresh, and that, from the way their swords are made, as has been already explained, only the first cut takes effect; after this they at once assume the shape of a strigil, being so much bent both length-wise and side-wise that unless the men are given leisure to rest them on the ground and set them straight with the foot, the second blow is quite ineffectual. The tribunes therefore distributed among the front lines the spears of the triarii who were stationed behind them, ordering them to use their swords instead only after the spears were done with. They then drew up opposite the Celts in order of battle and engaged. Upon the Gauls slashing first at the spears and making their swords unserviceable the Romans came to close quarters, having rendered the enemy helpless by depriving them of the power of raising their hands and cutting, which is the peculiar and only stroke of the Gauls, as their swords have no points. The Romans, on the contrary, instead of slashing continued to thrust with their swords which did not bend, the points being very effective. Thus, striking one blow after another on the breast or face, they slew the greater part of their adversaries. This was solely due to the foresight of the tribunes, the Consul Flaminius being

thought to have mismanaged the battle by deploying his force at the very edge of the river-bank and thus rendering impossible a tactical movement peculiar to the Romans, as he left the lines no room to fall back gradually. For had the troops been even in the slightest degree pushed back from their ground during the battle, they would have had to throw themselves into the river, all owing to their general's blunder. However, as it was, they gained a decisive victory by their own skill and valour, as I said, and returned to Rome with a quantity of booty and many trophies.

Next year the Celts sent ambassadors begging for peace and engaging to accept any conditions, but the new Consuls Marcus Claudius and Gnaeus Cornelius strongly urged that no peace should be granted them. On meeting with a refusal, the Celts decided to resort to their last hope and again appealed to the Gaesatae on the Rhone, and hired a force of about thirty thousand men. When they had these troops they kept them in readiness and awaited the attack of the enemy. The Roman Consuls, when the season came, invaded the territory of the Insubres with their legions. Encamping round a city called Acerrae lying between the Po and the Alps, they laid siege to it. The Insubres could not come to the assistance of the besieged, as the Romans had occupied all the advantageous positions, but, with the object of making the latter raise the siege, they crossed the Po with part of their forces, and entering the territory of the Anares, laid siege to a town there called Clastidium. On the Consuls learning of this, Marcus Claudius set off in haste with the cavalry and a small body of infantry to relieve the besieged if possible. The Celts, as soon as they were aware of the enemy's arrival, raised the siege and advancing to meet them, drew up in order of battle. When the Romans boldly charged them with their cavalry alone, they

at first stood firm, but afterwards, being taken both in the rear and on the flank, they found themselves in difficulties and were finally put to rout by the cavalry unaided, many of them throwing themselves into the river and being swept away by the current, while the larger number were cut to pieces by the enemy. The Romans now took Acerrae, which was well stocked with corn, the Gauls retiring to Mediolanum the chief place in the territory of the Insubres. Gnaeus followed close on their heels, and suddenly appeared before Mediolanum. The Gauls at first did not stir, but, when he was on his way back to Acerrae, they sallied out, and made a bold attack on his rear, in which they killed a considerable number of the Romans and even forced a portion of them to take to flight, until Gnaeus, calling back the forces in advance, urged the fugitives to rally and withstand the enemy. After this the Romans, on their part obeying their Consul, continued to fight vigorously with their assailants, and the Celts after holding their ground for a time, encouraged as they were by their momentary success, were shortly put to flight and took refuge on the mountains. Gnaeus, following them, laid waste the country and took Mediolanum itself by assault, upon which the chieftains of the Insubres, despairing of safety, put themselves entirely at the mercy of the Romans.

Such was the end of the war against the Celts, a war which, if we look to the desperation and daring of the combatants and the numbers who took part and perished in the battles, is second to no war in history, but is quite contemptible as regards the plan of the campaigns, and the judgement shown in executing it, not most steps but every single step that the Gauls took being commended to them rather by the heat of passion than by cool calculation. As I have witnessed them not long afterwards entirely expelled

from the plain of the Po, except a few regions close under the Alps, I did not think it right to make no mention either of their original invasion or of their subsequent conduct and their final expulsion; for I think it is the proper task of History to record and hand down to future generations such episodes of Fortune, that those who live after us may not, owing to entire ignorance of these incidents, be unduly terrified by sudden and unexpected invasions of barbarians, but that, having a fair comprehension of how short-lived and perishable is the might of such peoples, they may confront the invaders and put every hope of safety to the test, before yielding a jot of anything they value. For indeed I consider that the writers who chronicled and handed down to us the story of the Persian invasion of Greece and the attack of the Gauls on Delphi have made no small contribution to the struggle of the Hellenes for their common liberty. For there is no one whom hosts of men or abundance of arms or vast resources could frighten into abandoning his last hope, that is to fight to the end for his native land, if he kept before his eyes what part the unexpected played in those events, and bore in mind how many myriads of men, what determined courage and what armaments were brought to nought by the resolve and power of those who faced the danger with intelligence and coolness. It is not only in old times but more than once in my own days that the Greeks have been alarmed by the prospect of a Gaulish invasion; and this especially was my motive for giving here an account of these events, summary indeed, but going back to the beginnings.

This digression has led us away from the affairs of Spain, where Hasdrubal, after governing the country for eight years, was assassinated at night in his lodging by a certain Celt owing to wrongs of a private nature.

He had largely increased the power of Carthage, not so much by military action as by friendly intercourse with the chiefs. The Carthaginians appointed Hannibal to the chief command in Spain, although he was still young, owing to the shrewdness and courage he had evinced in their service. From the moment that he assumed the command, it was evident from the measures he took that he intended to make war on Rome, as indeed he finished by doing, and that very shortly. The relations between Carthage and Rome were henceforth characterized by mutual suspicion and friction. The Carthaginians continued to form designs against Rome as they were eager to be revenged for their reverses in Sicily, while the Romans, detecting their projects, mistrusted them profoundly. It was therefore evident to all competent judges that it would not be long before war broke out between them.

It was about this time that the Achaeans and King Philip with their allies began the war against the Aetolians known as the Social War. I have now given a continuous sketch, suitable to this preliminary plan of my book, of events in Sicily, Libya and so forth, down to the beginning of the Social War and that second war between the Romans and Carthaginians usually known as the Hannibalic War. This, as I stated at the outset, is the date at which I purpose to begin my general history, and, now bidding good-bye for the present to the West, I must turn to the affairs of Greece, so that everywhere alike I may bring down this preliminary or introductory sketch to the same date, and, having done so, start on my detailed narrative. For as I am not, like former historians, dealing with the history of one nation, such as Greece or Persia, but have undertaken to describe the events occurring in all known parts of the world—my own times having, as I will more clearly

explain elsewhere, materially contributed to my purpose—I must, before entering on the main portion of my work, touch briefly on the state of principal and best known nations and countries of the world. As for Asia and Egypt, it will suffice to mention what took place there after the above date, since their previous history has been written by many and is familiar to all, besides which in our own times Fortune has wrought no such surprising change in these countries as to render any notice of their past necessary. But as regards the Achaean nation and the royal house of Macedon it will be proper to refer briefly to earlier events, since our times have seen, in the case of the latter, its complete destruction, and in the case of the Achaeans, as I said, a growth of power and a political union in the highest degree remarkable. For while many have attempted in the past to induce the Peloponnesians to adopt a common policy, no one ever succeeding, as each was working not in the cause of general liberty, but for his own aggrandizement, this object has been so much advanced, and so nearly attained, in my own time that not only have they formed an allied and friendly community, but they have the same laws, weights, measures and coinage, as well as the same magistrates, senate, and courts of justice, and the whole Peloponnesus only falls short of being a single city in the fact of its inhabitants not being enclosed by one wall, all other things being, both as regards the whole and as regards each separate town, very nearly identical.

In the first place it is of some service to learn how and by what means all the Peloponnesians came to be called Achaeans. For the people whose original and ancestral name this was are distinguished neither by the extent of their territory, nor by the number of their cities, nor by exceptional

wealth or the exceptional valour of their citizens. Both the Arcadian and Laconian nations far exceed them, indeed, in population and the size of their countries, and certainly neither of the two could ever bring themselves to yield to any Greek people the palm for military valour. How is it, then, that both these two peoples and the rest of the Peloponnesians have consented to change not only their political institutions for those of the Achaeans, but even their name? It is evident that we should not say it is the result of chance, for that is a poor explanation. We must rather seek for a cause, for every event whether probable or improbable must have some cause. The cause here, I believe to be more or less the following. One could not find a political system and principle so favourable to equality and freedom of speech, in a word so sincerely democratic, as that of the Achaean league. Owing to this, while some of the Peloponnesians chose to join it of their own free will, it won many others by persuasion and argument, and those whom it forced to adhere to it when the occasion presented itself suddenly underwent a change and became quite reconciled to their position. For by reserving no special privileges for original members, and putting all new adherents exactly on the same footing, it soon attained the aim it had set itself, being aided by two very powerful coadjutors, equality and humanity. We must therefore look upon this as the initiator and cause of that union that has established the present prosperity of the Peloponnese.

These characteristic principles and constitution had existed in Achaea from an early date. There is abundant testimony of this, but for the present it will suffice to cite one or two instances in confirmation of this assertion. When, in the district of Italy, then known as Greater Hellas, [6] the club-

houses of the Pythagoreans were burnt down, there ensued, as was natural, a general revolutionary movement, the leading citizens of each city having then unexpectedly perished, and in all the Greek towns of the district murder, sedition, and every kind of disturbance were rife. Embassies arrived from most parts of Greece offering their services as peacemakers, but it was the Achaeans on whom these cities placed most reliance and to whom they committed the task of putting an end to their present troubles. And it was not only at this period that they showed their approval of Achaean political principles; but a short time afterwards, they resolved to model their own constitution exactly on that of the League. The Crotonians, Sybarites and Caulonians, having called a conference and formed a league, first of all established a common temple and holy place of Zeus Amarius [7] in which to hold their meetings and debates, and next, adopting the customs and laws of the Achaeans, decided to conduct their government according to them. It was only indeed the tyranny of Dionysius of Syracuse and their subjection to the barbarian tribes around them which defeated this purpose and forced them to abandon these institutions, much against their will. Again, subsequently, when the Lacedaemonians were unexpectedly defeated at Leuctra, and the Thebans, as unexpectedly, claimed the hegemony of Greece, great uncertainty prevailed in the whole country and especially among these two peoples, the Lacedaemonians not acknowledging their defeat, and the Thebans not wholly believing in their victory. They, however, referred the points in dispute to the Achaeans alone among all the Greeks, not taking their power into consideration, for they were then almost the weakest state in Greece, but in view of their trustworthiness and high

character in every respect. For indeed this opinion of them was at that time, as is generally acknowledged, held by all.

[6] "Magna Graecia" in Latin. When the name was first given, Hellas cannot have meant the whole of Greece.

[7] Such as the Achaean League had.

Up to now, these principles of government had merely existed amongst them, but had resulted in no practical steps worthy of mention for the increase of the Achaean power, since the country seemed unable to produce a statesman worthy of those principles, anyone who showed a tendency to act so being thrown into the dark and hampered either by the Lacedaemonian power or still more by that of Macedon. When, however, in due time, they found statesmen capable of enforcing them, their power at once became manifest, and the League achieved the splendid result of uniting all the Peloponnesian states. Aratus of Sicyon should be regarded as the initiator and conceiver of the project; it was Philopoemen of Megalopolis who promoted and finally realized it, while Lycortas [8] and his party were those who assured the permanency, for a time at least, of this union. I will attempt to indicate how and at what date each of the three contributed to the result, without transgressing the limits I have set to this part of my work. Aratus' government, however, will be dealt with here and in future quite summarily, as he published a truthful and clearly written memoir of his own career; but the achievements of the two others will be narrated in greater detail and at more length. I think it will be easiest for myself to set forth the narrative and for my readers to follow it if I begin from the period when, after the dissolution of the Achaean League by the kings of Macedonia, the cities began again to approach each other with a

view to its renewal. Henceforward the League continued to grow until it reached in my own time the state of completion I have just been describing.

[8] The father of Polybius.

It was in the 124th Olympiad that Patrae and Dyme took the initiative, by entering into a league, just about the date of the deaths of Ptolemy son of Lagus, Lysimachus, Seleucus, and Ptolemy Ceraunus, which all occurred in this Olympiad. The condition of the Achaean nation before this date had been more or less as follows. Their first king was Tisamenus the son of Orestes, who, when expelled from Sparta on the return of the Heraclidae, occupied Achaea, and they continued to be ruled by kings of his house down to Ogyges. Being dissatisfied with the rule of Ogyges' sons, which was despotical and not constitutional, they changed their government to a democracy. After this, down to the reigns of Alexander and Philip, their fortunes varied according to circumstances, but they always endeavoured, as I said, to keep their League a democracy. This consisted of twelve cities, which still all exist with the exception of Olenus and of Helice which was engulfed by the sea a little before the battle of Leuctra. These cities are Patrae, Dyme, Pharae, Tritaea, Leontium, Aegium, Aegira, Pellene, Bura, and Caryneia. After the time of Alexander and previous to the above Olympiad they fell, chiefly thanks to the kings of Macedon, into such a state of discord and ill-feeling that all the cities separated from the League and began to act against each others' interests. The consequence was that some of them were garrisoned by Demetrius and Cassander and afterwards by Antigonus Gonatas, and some even had tyrants imposed on them by the latter, who planted more monarchs in Greece than any other king. But, as I said above, about the 124th Olympiad they began to repent and form fresh

leagues. (This was about the date of Pyrrhus' crossing to Italy.) The first cities to do so were Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae, and for this reason we do not even find any formal inscribed record of their adherence to the League. About five years afterwards the people of Aegium expelled their garrison and joined the League, and the Burians were the next to do so, after putting their tyrant to death. Caryneia joined almost at the same time, for Iseas, its tyrant, when he saw the garrison expelled from Aegium, and the monarch of Bura killed by Margos and the Achaeans, and war just about to be made on himself by all the towns round, abdicated and, on receiving an assurance from the Achaeans that his life would be spared, added his city to the League.

Why, the reader will ask, do I go back to these times? It is, firstly, to show which of the original Achaean cities took the first steps to re-form the League and at what dates, and, secondly, that my assertion regarding their political principle may be confirmed by the actual evidence of facts. What I asserted was that the Achaeans always followed one single policy, ever attracting others by the offer of their own equality and liberty and ever making war on and crushing those who either themselves or through the kings attempted to enslave their native cities, and that, in this manner and pursuing this purpose, they accomplished their task in part unaided and in part with the help of allies. For the Achaean political principle must be credited also with the results furthering their end, to which their allies in subsequent years contributed. Though they took so much part in the enterprises of others, and especially in many of those of the Romans which resulted brilliantly, they never showed the least desire to gain any private profit from their success, but demanded, in exchange for the zealous aid

they rendered their allies, nothing beyond the liberty of all states and the union of the Peloponnesians. This will be more clearly evident when we come to see the League in active operation.

For twenty-five years, then, this league of cities continued, electing for a certain period a Secretary of state and two Strategi. After this they decided to elect one Strategus and entrust him with the general direction of their affairs, the first to be nominated to this honourable office being Margos of Caryneia. Four years later during Margos' term of office, Aratus of Sicyon, though only twenty years of age, freed his city from its tyrant by his enterprise and courage, and, having always been a passionate admirer of the Achaean polity, made his own city a member of the League. Eight years after this, during his second term of office as Strategus, he laid a plot to rule the citadel of Corinth which was held by Antigonus, thus delivering the Peloponnesians from a great source of fear, and induced the city he had liberated to join the League. In the same term of office he obtained the adhesion of Megara to the Achaeans by the same means. These events took place in the year before that defeat of the Carthaginians which forced them to evacuate Sicily and submit for the first time to pay tribute to Rome. Having in so short a space of time thus materially advanced his projects, he continued to govern the Achaean nation, all his schemes and action being directed to one object, the expulsion of the Macedonians from the Peloponnese, the suppression of the tyrants, and the re-establishment on a sure basis of the ancient freedom of every state. During the life of Antigonus Gonatas he continued to offer a most effectual opposition both to the meddlesomeness of this king and the lust for power of the Aetolians, although the two were so unscrupulous and venturesome that they entered

into an arrangement for the purpose of dissolving the Achaean League. But, on the death of Antigonus, the Achaeans even made an alliance with the Aetolians and supported them ungrudgingly in the war against Demetrius, so that, for the time at least, their estrangement and hostility ceased, and a more or less friendly and sociable feeling sprang up between them. Demetrius only reigned for ten years, his death taking place at the time the Romans first crossed to Illyria, and after this the tide of events seemed to flow for a time in favour of the Achaeans' constant purpose; for the Peloponnesian tyrants were much cast down by the death of Demetrius, who had been, so to speak, their furnisher and paymaster, and equally so by the threatening attitude of Aratus, who demanded that they should depose themselves, offering abundance of gifts and honours to those who consented to do so, and menacing those who turned a deaf ear to him with still more abundant chastisement on the part of the Achaeans. They therefore hurried to accede to his demand, laying down their tyrannies, setting their respective cities free, and joining the Achaean League. Lydiades of Megalopolis had even foreseen what was likely to happen, and with great wisdom and good sense had forestalled the death of Demetrius and of his own free will laid down his tyranny and adhered to the national government. Afterwards Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, Xenon, tyrant of Hermione, and Cleonymus, tyrant of Phlius, also resigned and joined the democratic Achaean League.

The League being thus materially increased in extent and power, the Aetolians, owing to that unprincipled passion for which is natural to them, either out of envy or rather in the hope of partitioning the cities, as they had partitioned those of Acarnania with Alexander and had previously proposed

to do regarding Achaea with Antigonus Gonatas, went so far as to join hands with Antigonus, then regent of Macedonia and guardian to Philip, who was still a child, and Cleomenes, king of Sparta. They saw that Antigonus was undisputed master of Macedonia and at the same time the open and avowed enemy of the Achaeans owing to their seizure by treachery of the Acrocorinthus, and they supposed that if they could get the Lacedaemonians also to join them in their project, exciting first their animosity against the League, they could easily crush the Achaeans by attacking them at the proper time all at once and from all quarters. This indeed they would in all probability soon have done, but for the most important factor which they had overlooked in their plans. They never took into consideration that in this undertaking they would have Aratus as their opponent, a man capable of meeting any emergency. Consequently the result of their intrigues and unjust aggression was that not only did they entirely fail in their designs, but on the contrary consolidated the power of the League, and of Aratus who was then Strategus, as he most adroitly diverted and spoilt all their plans. How he managed all this the following narrative will show.

Aratus saw that the Aetolians were ashamed of openly declaring war on them, as it was so very recently that the Achaeans had helped them in their war against Demetrius, but that they were so much of one mind with the Lacedaemonians and so jealous of the Achaeans that when Cleomenes broke faith with them and possessed himself of Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus, cities which were not only allies of the Aetolians, but at the time members of their league, they not only showed no resentment, but actually set their seal to his occupation. He saw too that they, who on

previous occasions, owing to their lust of aggrandizement, found any pretext adequate for making war on those who had done them no wrong, now allowed themselves to be treacherously attacked and to suffer the loss of some of their largest cities simply in order to see Cleomenes become a really formidable antagonist of the Achaeans. Aratus, therefore, and all the leading men of the Achaean League decided not to take the initiative in going to war with anyone, but to resist Spartan aggression. This at least was their first resolve; but when shortly afterwards Cleomenes boldly began to fortify against them the so-called Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis, and to show himself their avowed and bitter enemy, they called the Council of the League together and decided on open war with Sparta.

This was the date at which the war known as the Cleomenic war began; and such was its origin. The Achaeans at first decided to face the Lacedaemonian single-handed, considering it in the first place most honourable not to owe their safety to others but to protect their cities and country unaided, and also desiring to maintain their friendship with Ptolemy owing to the obligations they were under to him, and not to appear to him to be seeking aid elsewhere. But when the war had lasted for some time, and Cleomenes, having overthrown the ancient polity at Sparta and changed the constitutional kingship into a tyranny, showed great energy and daring in the conduct of the campaign, Aratus, foreseeing what was likely to happen and dreading the reckless audacity of the Aetolians, determined to be beforehand with them and spoil their plans. He perceived that Antigonus was a man of energy and sound sense, and that he claimed to be a man of honour, but he knew that kings do not regard anyone as their natural foe or

friend, but measure friendship and enmity by the sole standard of expediency. He therefore decided to approach that monarch and put himself on confidential terms with him, pointing out to him to what the present course of affairs would probably lead. Now for several reasons he did not think it expedient to do this overtly. In the first place he would thus expect himself to being outbidden in his project by Cleomenes and the Aetolians, and next he would damage the spirit of the Achaean troops by thus appealing to an enemy and appearing to have entirely abandoned the hopes he had placed in them—this being the very last thing he wished them to think. Therefore, having formed his plan, he decided to carry it out by covert means. He was consequently compelled in public both to do and to say many things quite contrary to his real intention, so as to keep his design concealed by creating the exactly opposite impression. For this reason there are some such matters that he does not even refer to in his Memoirs.

He knew that the people of Megalopolis were suffering severely from the war, as owing to their being on the Lacedaemonian border, they had to bear the full brunt of it, and could not receive proper assistance from the Achaeans, as the latter were themselves in difficulties and distress. As he also knew for a surety that they were well disposed to the royal house of Macedon ever since the favours received in the time of Philip, son of Amyntas, he felt sure that, hard pressed as they were by Cleomenes, they would be very ready to take refuge in Antigonus and hopes of safety from Macedonia. He therefore communicated his project confidentially to Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis who were family friends of his own and well suited for the business, and he had no difficulty through them in inciting the Megalopolitans to send an embassy to the Achaeans begging

them to appeal to Antigonus for help. Nicophanes and Cercidas themselves were appointed envoys by the Megalopolitans, in the first place to the Achaeans and next, if the League consented, with orders to proceed at once to Antigonus. The Achaeans agreed to allow the Megalopolitans to send an embassy; and with the other ambassadors hastened to meet the king. They said no more than was strictly necessary on the subject of their own city, treating this matter briefly and summarily, but dwelt at length on the general situation, in the sense that Aratus had directed and prompted. He had charged them to point out the importance and the probable consequences of the common action of the Aetolians and Cleomenes, representing that in the first place the Achaeans were imperilled by it and next and in a larger measure Antigonus himself. For it was perfectly evident to all that the Achaeans could not hold out against both adversaries, and it was still more easy for any person of intelligence to see that, if the Aetolians and Cleomenes were successful, they would surely not rest content and be satisfied with their advantage. The Aetolian schemes of territorial aggrandizement would never stop short of the boundaries of the Peloponnese or even those of Greece itself, while Cleomenes' personal ambition, and far-reaching projects, though for the present he aimed only at supremacy in the Peloponnese, would, on his attaining this, at once develop into a claim to be over-lord of all Hellas, a thing impossible without his first putting an end to the dominion of Macedon. They implored him then to look to the future and consider which was most in his interest, to fight in the Peloponnese against Cleomenes for the supremacy of Greece with the support of the Achaeans and Boeotians, or to abandon the greatest of the Greek nations to its fate and then do battle in Thessaly for the throne of

Macedonia with the Aetolians, Boeotians, Achaeans, and Spartans all at once. Should the Aetolians, still pretending to have scruples owing to the benefits received from the Achaeans in their war with Demetrius, continue their present inaction, the Achaeans alone, they said, would fight against Cleomenes, and, if Fortune favoured them, would require no help; but should they meet with ill-success and be attacked by the Aetolians also, they entreated him to take good heed and not let the opportunity slip, but come to the aid of the Peloponnesians while it was still possible to save them. As for conditions of alliance and the return they could offer him for his support, they said he need not concern himself, for once the service they demanded was being actually rendered, they promised him that Aratus would find terms satisfactory to both parties. Aratus himself, they said, would also indicate the date at which they required his aid.

Antigonus, having listened to them, felt convinced that Aratus took a true and practical view of the situation, and carefully considered the next steps to be taken, promising the Megalopolitans by letter to come to their assistance if such was the wish of the Achaeans too. Upon Nicophanes and Cercidas returning home and delivering the king's letter, assuring at the same time their people of his good-will towards them and readiness to be of service, the Megalopolitans were much elated and most ready to go to the Council of the League and beg them to invite the aid of Antigonus and at once put the direction of affairs in his hands. Aratus had private information from Nicophanes of the king's favourable inclination towards the League and himself, and was much gratified to find that his project had not been futile, and that he had not, as the Aetolians had hoped, found Antigonus entirely alienated from him. He considered it a great advantage that the

Megalopolitans had readily consented to approach Antigonus through the Achaeans; for, as I said above, what he chiefly desired was not to be in need of asking for help also, but if it became necessary to resort to this, he wished the appeal to come not only from himself personally, but from the League as a whole. For he was afraid that if the king appeared on the scene and, after conquering Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians, took any measures the reverse of welcome regarding the League, he himself would be universally blamed for what happened, as the king would seem to have justice on his side owing to Aratus' offence against the house of Macedon in the case of the Acrocorinthus. Therefore, when the Megalopolitans appeared before the General Council of the League, and showing the king's letter, assured them of his general friendly sentiments, at the same time begging the Achaeans to ask for his intervention at once, and when Aratus saw that this was the inclination of the Achaeans also, he rose, and after expressing his gratification at the king's readiness to assist them and his approval of the attitude of the meeting, he addressed them at some length, begging them if possible to attempt to save their cities and country by their own efforts, that being the most honourable and advantageous course, but, should adverse fortune prevent this, then, but only when they had no hope left in their own resources, he advised them to resort to an appeal to their friends for aid. The people applauded his speech, and a decree was passed to leave things as they were for the present and conduct the war unaided. But a series of disasters overtook them. In the first place Ptolemy threw over the League and began to give financial support to Cleomenes with a view of setting him on to attack Antigonus, as he hoped to be able to keep in check more effectually the projects of the Macedonian kings with the

support of the Lacedaemonians than with that of the Achaeans. Next the Achaeans were worsted by Cleomenes while on the march near the Lycaeum and again in a pitched battle at a place in the territory of Megalopolis called Ladoceia, Lydiades falling here, and finally their whole force met with utter defeat at the Hecatombaeum in the territory of Dyme. Circumstances now no longer permitting delay, they were compelled by their position to appeal with one voice to Antigonus. Aratus on this occasion sent his son as envoy to the king and ratified the terms of the alliance. They were, however, in considerable doubt and difficulty about the Acrocorinthus, as they did not think Antigonus would come to their assistance unless it were restored to him, so that he could use Corinth as a base for the present war, nor could they go to the length of handing over the Corinthians against their will to Macedon. This even caused at first an adjournment of the Council for the consideration of the guarantees they offered.

Cleomenes, having inspired terror by the victories I mentioned, henceforth made an unimpeded progress through the cities, gaining some by persuasion and others by threats. He annexed in this manner Caphyae, Pellene, Pheneus, Argos, Phlius, Cleonae, Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, and finally Corinth. He now sat down in front of Sicyon, but he had solved the chief difficulty of the Achaeans; for the Corinthians by ordering Aratus, who was then Strategus, and the Achaeans to quit Corinth, and by sending to invite Cleomenes, furnished the Achaeans with good and reasonable ground for offering to Antigonus the Acrocorinthus then held by them. Availing himself of this, Aratus not only atoned for his former offence to

the royal house, but gave sufficient guarantee of future loyalty, further providing Antigonus with a base for the war against the Lacedaemonians.

Cleomenes, when he became aware of the understanding between the Achaeans and Antigonus, left Sicyon and encamped on the Isthmus, uniting by a palisade and trench the Acrocorinthus and the mountain called the Ass's Back, regarding confidently the whole Peloponnese as being henceforth his own domain. Antigonus had been for long making his preparations, awaiting the turn of events, as Aratus had recommended, but now, judging from the progress of events that Cleomenes was on the point of appearing in Thessaly with his army, he communicated with Aratus and the Achaeans reminding them of the terms of their treaty, and passing though Euboea with his forces, reached the Isthmus, the Aetolians having, in addition to other measures they took to prevent his assisting the Achaeans, forbidden him to advance with an army beyond Thermopylae, threatening, if he attempted it, to oppose his passage.

Antigonus and Cleomenes now faced each other, the former bent on penetrating into the Peloponnese and the latter on preventing him. The Achaeans, although they had suffered such very serious reverses, yet did not abandon their purpose or their self-reliance, but on Aristoteles of Argos revolting against the partisans of Cleomenes, they sent a force to his assistance and entering the city by surprise under the command of their Strategus, Timoxenus, established themselves there. We should look on this achievement as the principal cause of the improvement in their fortunes which ensued. For events clearly showed that it was this which checked Cleomenes' ardour and subdued in advance the spirit of his troops. Though his position was stronger than that of Antigonus, and he was much better off

for supplies, as well as animated by greater courage and ambition, no sooner did the news reach him the Argos had been seized by the Achaeans than he instantly took himself off, abandoning all these advantages, and made a precipitate retreat, fearing to be surrounded on all sides by the enemy. Gaining entrance to Argos he possessed himself of part of the city, but, on the Achaeans making a gallant resistance, in which the Argives joined with all the zeal of renegades, this plan broke down too, and, marching by way of Mantinea, he returned to Sparta.

Antigonus now safely entered the Peloponnese and took possession of the Acrocorinthus and, without wasting any time there, pushed on and reached Argos. Having thanked the Argives and put matters in the city on a proper footing, he moved on again at once, making for Arcadia. After having ejected the garrisons from the forts that Cleomenes had built there to command the country in the territory of Aegys and Belbina, and handed over these forts to the Megalopolitans, he returned to Aegium where the Council of the Achaean League was in session. He gave them an account of the measures he had taken and arranged with them for the future conduct of the war. They thereupon appointed him commander-in-chief of all the allied forces, and after this he retired for a short time to his winter quarters near Sicyon and Corinth. Early in spring he advanced with his army and reached Tegea in three days. Here the Achaeans joined him, and the siege of the city was opened. The Macedonians conducted the siege energetically, especially by mining, and the Tegeans soon gave up all hope of holding out and surrendered. Antigonus, after securing the city, continued to pursue his plan of campaign and advanced rapidly on Laconia. He encountered Cleomenes posted on the frontier to defend Laconia and began to harass him, a few

skirmishes taking place; but on learning from his scouts that the troops from Orchomenus had left to come to the aid of Cleomenes, he at once hastily broke up his camp and hurried thither. He surprised Orchomenus, and captured it by assault, and after this he laid siege to Mantinea which likewise the Macedonians soon frightened into submission and then he advanced on Heraea and Telphusa which the inhabitants surrendered to him of their own accord. The winter was now approaching. Antigonus came to Aegium to be present at the meeting of the Achaean Synod, and dismissing all his Macedonians to their homes for the winter, occupied himself in discussing the present situation with the Achaeans and making joint plans for the future.

Cleomenes at this juncture had observed that Antigonus had dismissed his other troops and, keeping only his mercenaries with him, was spending the time at Aegium at a distance of three days' march from Megalopolis. He knew that this latter city was very difficult to defend, owing to its extent and partial desolation, that it was at present very carelessly guarded owing to the presence of Antigonus in the Peloponnese, and above all that it had lost the greater part of its citizens of military age in the battles at the Lycaeum and at Ladoceia. He therefore procured the co-operation of certain Messenian exiles then living in Megalopolis and by their means got inside the walls secretly by night. On day breaking, he came very near not only being driven out, but meeting with complete disaster owing to the bravery of the Megalopolitans, who had indeed expelled and defeated him three months previously when he entered the city by surprise in the quarter called Colaeum. But on this occasion, owing to the strength of his forces, and owing to his having had time to seize on the most advantageous positions,

his project succeeded, and finally he drove out the Megalopolitans and occupied their city. On possessing himself of it, he destroyed it with such systematic cruelty and animosity, that nobody would have thought it possible that it could ever be re-inhabited. I believe him to have acted so, because the Megalopolitans and Stymphalians were the only peoples from among whom in the varied circumstances of his career he could never procure himself a single partisan to share in his projects or a single traitor. For in the case of the Clitorians their noble love of freedom was sullied by the malpractices of one man Thearces whom, as one would expect, they naturally deny to have been a native-born citizen, affirming that he was the son of a foreign soldier and foisted in from Orchomenus.

Since, among those authors who were contemporaries of Aratus, Phylarchus, who on many points is at variance and in contradiction with him, is by some received as trustworthy, it will be useful or rather necessary for me, as I have chosen to rely on Aratus' narrative for the history of the Cleomenic war, not to leave the question of their relative credibility undiscussed, so that truth and falsehood in their writings may no longer be of equal authority. In general Phylarchus through his whole work makes many random and careless statements; but while perhaps it is not necessary for me at present to criticize in detail the rest of these, I must minutely examine such as relate to events occurring in the period with which I am now dealing, that of the Cleomenic war. This partial examination will however be quite sufficient to convey an idea of the general purpose and character of his work. Wishing, for instance, to insist on the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians and also on that of Aratus the Achaeans, he tells us that the Mantineans, when they surrendered, were exposed to

terrible sufferings and that such were the misfortunes that overtook this, the most ancient and greatest city in Arcadia, as to impress deeply and move to tears all the Greeks. In his eagerness to arouse the pity and attention of his readers he treats us to a picture of clinging women [9] with their hair dishevelled and their breasts bare, or again of crowds of both sexes together with their children and aged parents weeping and lamenting as they are led away to slavery. This sort of thing he keeps up throughout his history, always trying to bring horrors vividly before our eyes. Leaving aside the ignoble and womanish character of such a treatment of his subject, let us consider how far it is proper or serviceable to history. A historical author should not try to thrill his readers by such exaggerated pictures, nor should he, like a tragic poet, try to imagine the probable utterances of his characters or reckon up all the consequences probably incidental to the occurrences with which he deals, but simply record what really happened and what really was said, however commonplace. For the object of tragedy is not the same as that of history but quite the opposite. The tragic poet should thrill and charm his audience for the moment by the verisimilitude of the words he puts into his characters' mouths, but it is the task of the historian to instruct and convince for all time serious students by the truth of the facts and the speeches he narrates, since in the one case it is the probable that takes precedence, even if it be untrue, in the other it is the truth, the purpose being to confer benefit on learners. Apart from this, Phylarchus simply narrates most of such catastrophes and does not even suggest their causes or the nature of these causes, without which it is impossible in any case to feel either legitimate pity or proper anger. Who, for instance, does not think it an outrage for a free man to be beaten? but if

this happen to one who was the first to resort to violence, we consider that he got only his desert, while where it is done for the purpose of correction or discipline, those who strike free men are not only excused but deemed worthy of thanks and praise. Again, to kill a citizen is considered the greatest of crimes and that deserving the highest penalty, but obviously he who kills a thief or adulterer is left untouched, and the slayer of a traitor or tyrant everywhere meets with honour and distinction. [10] So in every such case the final criterion of good and evil lies not in what is done, but in the different reasons and different purposes of the doer.

[9] Clinging either to each other or to the altars of their gods.

[10] Literally "a front seat" in the theatre or elsewhere.

Now the Mantineans had, in the first instance, deserted the Achaean League, and of their own free will put themselves and their city into the hands first of the Aetolians and then of Cleomenes. They had deliberately ranged themselves on his side and been admitted to Spartan citizenship, when, four years before the invasion of Antigonus, their city was betrayed to Aratus and forcibly occupied by the Achaeans. On this occasion, so far from their being cruelly treated owing to their recent delinquency, the circumstances became celebrated because of the sudden revulsion of sentiments on both sides. For immediately Aratus had the city in his hands, he at once issued orders to his troops to keep their hands off the property of others, and next, calling an assembly of the Mantineans, bade them be of good courage and retain possession of all they had; for if they joined the Achaean League he would assure their perfect security. The prospect of safety thus suddenly revealed to them took the Mantineans completely by surprise, and there was an instantaneous and universal reversal of feeling.

The very men at whose hands they had seen, in the fight that had just closed, many of their kinsmen slain and many grievously wounded, were now taken into their houses, and received into their families with whom they lived on the kindest possible terms. This was quite natural, for I never heard of any men meeting with kinder enemies or being less injured by what is considered the greatest of calamities than the Mantineans, all owing to their humane treatment by Aratus and the Achaeans. Subsequently, as they foresaw discord among themselves and plots by the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians, they sent an embassy to the Achaeans asking for a garrison. The Achaeans consented and chose by lot three hundred of their own citizens, who set forth, abandoning their own houses and possessions, and remained in Mantinea to watch over the liberty and safety of its townsmen. At the same time they sent two hundred hired soldiers, who aided this Achaean force in safeguarding the established government. Very soon however the Mantineans fell out with the Achaeans, and, inviting the Lacedaemonians, put the city into their hands and massacred the garrison the Achaeans had sent them. It is not easy to name any greater or more atrocious act of treachery than this. For in resolving to foreswear their friendship and gratitude, they should at least have spared the lives of these men and allowed them all to depart under terms. Such treatment is, by the common law of nations, accorded even to enemies; but the Mantineans, simply in order to give Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians a satisfactory guarantee of their good faith in this undertaking violated the law recognized by all mankind and deliberately committed the most heinous of crimes. Vengeful murderers of the very men who previously on capturing their city had left them unharmed, and who now were guarding their liberties and

lives—against such men, one asks oneself, can any indignation be too strong? What should we consider to be an adequate punishment for them? Someone might perhaps say that now when they were crushed by armed force they should have been sold into slavery with their wives and children. But to this fate the usage of war exposes those who have been guilty of no such impious crime. These men therefore were worthy of some far heavier and more extreme penalty; so that had they suffered what Phylarchus alleges, it was not to be expected that they should have met with pity from the Greeks, but rather that approval and assent should have been accorded to those who executed judgement on them for their wickedness. Yet, while nothing more serious befel the Mantineans, in this their hour of calamity, than the pillage of their property and the enslavement of the male citizens, Phylarchus, all for the sake of making his narrative sensational, composed a tissue not only of falsehoods, but of improbable falsehoods, and, owing to his gross ignorance, was not even able to compare an analogous case and explain how the same people at the same time, on taking Tegea by force, did not commit any such excesses. For if the cause lay in the barbarity of the perpetrators, the Tegeans should have met with the same treatment as those who were conquered at the same time. If only the Mantineans were thus exceptionally treated, we must evidently infer that there was some exceptional cause for anger against them.

Again he tells us that Aristomachus of Argos, a man of most noble birth, having himself been tyrant of Argos and being descended from tyrants, was led away captive to Cenchreae and there racked to death, no man deserving less such a terrible fate. Exercising in this case too his peculiar talent, the author gives us a made-up story of his cries when on the rack having

reached the ears of the neighbours, some of whom, horrified at the crime, others scarcely crediting their senses and others in hot indignation ran to the house. About Phylarchus' vice of sensationalism I need say no more, for I have given sufficient evidence of it; but as for Aristomachus, even if he had been guilty of no other offence to the Achaeans, I consider that the general tenor of his life and his treason to his own country rendered him worthy of the most severe punishment. Our author, it is true, with the view of magnifying his importance and moving his readers to share his own indignation at his fate, tells us that he "not only had been a tyrant himself but was descended from tyrants." It would be difficult for anyone to bring a graver or more bitter accusation against a man. Why! the very word "tyrant" alone conveys to us the height of impiety and comprises in itself the sum of all human defiance of law and justice. Aristomachus, if it is true that he was subjected to the most terrible punishment, as Phylarchus tells us, did not get his full deserts for the doings on one day; I mean the day on which when Aratus with the Achaeans had gained entrance to the town and fought hard to free the Argives at great risk, but was finally driven out, because none of those inside the city who had agreed to join him ventured to stir owing to their fear of the tyrant, Aristomachus, availing himself of the pretext that certain persons were cognisant of the entrance of the Achaeans, put to death eighty of the leading citizens who were quite innocent, after torturing them before the eyes of their relatives. I say nothing of the crimes that he and his ancestors were guilty of all through their lives: it would be too long a story. We must not therefore think it shocking if he met with treatment similar to what he had inflicted: it would have been much more so had he died in peace, without experiencing any such. Nor should we charge Antigonus and

Aratus with criminal conduct, if having captured him in war they had tortured and put to death a tyrant, any man who killed and punished whom even in the time of peace would have been applauded and honoured by all right-thinking people. When I add that in addition to all his other offences he broke his faith with the Achaeans, what fate shall we say was too bad for him? Not many years previously he had laid down his tyranny, finding himself in an embarrassed position owing to the death of Demetrius, and quite contrary to his expectation suffered no harm, being protected by the Achaeans, who showed themselves most lenient and generous; for not only did they inflict no punishment on him for the crimes he had committed during his tyranny, but receiving him with the highest dignity, making him their Strategus and Commander-in-chief. But instantly dismissing from his mind all these benefits, the moment it seemed to him that his prospects would be somewhat more brilliant if he sided with Cleomenes, he broke away from the Achaeans, transferring from them to the enemy at a most critical time his personal support and that of his country. Surely when they got him into their hands, he should not have been racked to death at night in Cenchreae, as Phylarchus says, but should have been led round the whole Peloponnesus and tortured as a spectacle for the public until dead. Yet notwithstanding his abominable character, all the harm he suffered was to be drowned in the sea by the officers in command at Cenchreae.

To take another instance, Phylarchus, while narrating with exaggeration and elaboration the calamities of the Mantineans, evidently deeming it a historian's duty to lay stress on criminal acts, does not even make mention of the noble conduct of the Megalopolitans at nearly the same date, as if it were rather the proper function of history to chronicle the commission of

sins than to call attention to right and honourable actions, or as if readers of his memoirs would be improved less by account of good conduct which we should emulate than by criminal conduct which we should shun. He tells us how Cleomenes took the city, and before doing any damage to it, sent at once a post to the Megalopolitans at Messene offering to hand back their own native country to them uninjured on condition of their throwing in their lot with him. So much he lets us know, wishing to show the magnanimity of Cleomenes and his moderation to his enemies, and he goes on to tell how when the letter was being read out they would not allow the reader to continue until the end, and how they came very near stoning the letter-bearers. So far he makes everything quite clear to us, but he deprives us of what should follow and what is the special virtue of history, I mean praise and honourable mention of conduct noteworthy for its excellence. And yet he had an opportunity ready to his hand here. For if we consider those men to be good who by speeches and resolutions only expose themselves to war for the sake of their friends and allies, and if we bestow not only praise but lavish thanks and gifts on those who have suffered their country to be laid waste and their city besieged, what should we feel for the Megalopolitans? Surely the deepest reverence and the highest regard. In the first place they left their lands at the mercy of Cleomenes, next they utterly lost their city owing to their support of the Achaeans, and finally, when quite unexpectedly it was put in their power to get it back undamaged, they preferred to lose their land, their tombs, their temples, their homes, and their possessions, all in fact that is dearest to men, rather than break faith with their allies. What more noble conduct has there ever been or could there be? But Phylarchus, blind, as it seems to me, to the most noble actions and

those most worthy of an author's attention, has not said a single word on the subject.

Further he tells us that from the booty of Megalopolis six thousand talents fell to the Lacedaemonians, of which two thousand were given to Cleomenes according to usage. Now in this statement one marvels first at his lack of practical experience and of that general notion of the wealth and power of Greece so essential to a historian. For, not speaking of those times, when the Peloponnese had been utterly ruined by the Macedonian kings and still more by continued intestinal wars, but in our own times, when all are in complete unison and enjoy, it is thought, very great prosperity, I assert that a sale of all the goods and chattels, apart from slaves, in the whole Peloponnese would not bring in such a sum. That I do not make this assertion lightly but after due estimate will be evident from the following consideration. Who has not read that when the Athenians, in conjunction with the Thebans, entered on the war against the Lacedaemonians, sending out a force of ten thousand men and manning a hundred triremes, they decided to meet the war expenses by a property-tax and made a valuation for this purpose of the whole of Attica including the houses and other property. This estimate, however, fell short of 6000 talents by 250, from which it would seem that my assertion about the Peloponnese at the present day is not far wide of the mark. But as regards the times of which we are dealing, no one, even if he were exaggerating, would venture to say that more than three hundred talents could be got out of Megalopolis, since it is an acknowledged fact that most of the free population and the slaves had escaped to Messene. But the best proof of what I have to say is the following: Mantinea, both in wealth and power, was second to no city in

Arcadia, as Phylarchus himself says, and it surrendered after a siege, so that it was not easy for anyone to escape or for anything to be stolen, but yet the value of the whole booty together with slaves amounted at this very period to but three hundred talents.

What he tells us next is still more astounding; after this assertion about the booty, he states that just ten days before the battle an envoy from Ptolemy reached Cleomenes informing him that that king withdrew his subvention and requested him to come to terms with Antigonus. He says that Cleomenes on hearing this resolved to stake his all on a battle before it reached the ears of his troops, as he had no hope of being able to meet their pay from his own resources. But if at this very time he had six thousand talents at his command, he could have been more generous than Ptolemy himself in the matter of subventions; and if he could only dispose of three hundred talents it was enough to enable him to continue the war against Antigonus with absolute financial security. But to state in one breath that Cleomenes depended entirely on Ptolemy for money and that at the very same time he was in possession of such a large sum, is a sign of the greatest levity and want of reflection. Phylarchus has made many similar statements not only about this period but all through his work. I think, however, that what I have said at such length as the plan of this history allows should suffice.

After the capture of Megalopolis, while Antigonus was still in winter quarters at Argos, Cleomenes at the beginning of spring collected his troops, and after addressing them in terms suitable to the occasion, led them out and invaded Argolis. Most people think that this was rash and hazardous on his part, owing to the strength of the frontier, but if we judge rightly it

was really a safe and wise course. For as he saw that Antigonus had dismissed his forces, he knew well that, in the first place, he would be exposed to no danger in invading, and secondly, that, if the country were laid waste up to the walls, the Argives on seeing it would certainly be much vexed and lay the blame on Antigonus. If, therefore, unable to support the reproaches of the people, he marched out and risked a battle with such forces as he had, the probabilities were in favour of Cleomenes gaining an easy victory; but if, adhering to his plan, he remained quiet, he thought he could, after terrifying his enemies and inspiring his own troops with fresh courage, effect a safe retreat to Laconia, as actually happened. For, when the country was being laid waste, the populace held meetings in which they heaped abuse on Antigonus; but he, like a true general and prince, paid no attention to anything but a wise conduct of affairs, and remained quiet, while Cleomenes, having carried out his intention of devastating the country and thus striking terror into the enemy and encouraging his own troops to face the coming danger, retired in safety to his own country.

Early in summer, on the Macedonians and Achaeans rejoining from their winter quarters, Antigonus advanced with his own army and the allies into Laconia. His Macedonian forces consisted of ten thousand to form the phalanx, three thousand peltasts, and three hundred horse. He had besides a thousand Agrianians, and a thousand Gauls, while his mercenary force numbered three thousand foot and three hundred horse. The Achaeans furnished three thousand picked infantry and three hundred horse. There were also a thousand Megalopolitans armed in the Macedonian manner under the command of Cercidas of Megalopolis. The allies consisted of two thousand Boeotian foot and two hundred horse, a thousand Epirot foot and

fifty horse, the same number of Acarnanians, and one thousand six hundred Illyrians under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. His total force thus amounted to twenty-eight thousand foot and one thousand two hundred horse. Cleomenes, who expected the invasion, had occupied the other passes into Laconia, placing garrisons in them and fortifying them by means of trenches and barricades of trees, and himself encamped at a place called Sellasia, with a force of twenty thousand men, as he conjectured that the invaders would most likely take this route, as in fact they did. At the actual pass there are two hills, one called Euas and the other Olympus, the road to Sparta running between these along the bank of the river Oenous. Cleomenes, having fortified both of these hills with a trench and palisade, posted on Euas the perioeci and allies under the command of his brother Eucleidas, while he himself held Olympus with the Spartans and mercenaries. On the low ground beside the river on each side of the road he drew up his cavalry and a certain portion of the mercenaries. Antigonus on his arrival observed the great natural strength of the position and how Cleomenes had so cleverly occupied the advantageous points with the portions of his force suitable in each case, that his whole formation resembled a charge. For attack and defence alike nothing was wanting, the position being at one and the same time a fortified camp difficult to approach and a line of battle ready for action. Antigonus therefore decided to make no hasty attempt to force the position and come to blows with the enemy, but encamped at a short distance with the river Gorgylus on his front, and for several days remained there noting the peculiar features of the country and the character of the forces, while at the same time, by threatening certain movements, he attempted to make the enemy show his

hand. But being unable to find any weak or unprotected spot, since Cleomenes always checked him at once by a counter-movement, he abandoned this project, and finally the kings agreed to try issues in a battle: for they were very gifted and evenly-matched, these two generals whom Fortune had brought face to face. To confront those on Euas Antigonus drew up the brazen-shielded Macedonians and the Illyrians in alternate lines, placing them under the command of Alexander son of Acmetus, and Demetrius of Pharos. Behind these stood the Acarnanians and Cretans, and in the rear as a reserve were two thousand Achaeans. His cavalry he opposed to that of the enemy by the river Oenous under the command of Alexander and supported by a thousand Achaean and as many Megalopolitan infantry. He himself in person decided to attack Cleomenes on Olympus with the mercenaries and the rest of the Macedonians. Putting the mercenaries in front, he drew up the Macedonians behind them in two phalanxes with no interval between, the narrowness of the space rendering this necessary. It was arranged that the Illyrians were to begin their assault on the hill upon seeing a flag of linen waved from the neighbourhood of Olympus, for in the night they had succeeded in taking up a position close under the hill in the bed of the river Gorgylus. The signal for the Megalopolitans and cavalry was to be a scarlet flag waved by the king.

When the time to begin the action came, the signal was given to the Illyrians, and, the officers calling on their men to do their duty, they all instantly showed themselves and began the attack on the hill. The light-armed mercenaries, who had been posted near Cleomenes' cavalry, upon seeing that the rear of the Achaean line was exposed, attacked them from behind, and the whole force that was pressing on to the hill was thus

threatened with a serious disaster, as Eucleidas' troops were facing them from above while the mercenaries were vigorously attacking their rear. At this critical moment Philopoemen of Megalopolis, who saw what was happening and foresaw what was likely to happen, first attempted to call the attention of the commanding officers to it, but as no one paid any attention to him, since he had never held any command and was quite a young man, he called on his own fellow-citizens to follow him and boldly fell upon the enemy. Upon this the mercenaries who were attacking the assailants of the hill in the rear, hearing the clamour and seeing the cavalry engaged, abandoned what they had in hand and running back to their original position came to the aid of their cavalry. The Illyrians and Macedonians and the rest of this attacking force were now disengaged, and threw themselves with great dash and courage on the enemy. Thus, as became evident afterwards, the success of the attack on Eucleidas was due to Philopoemen. Hence it is said that subsequently Antigonus asked Alexander, the commander of the cavalry, to convict him of his shortcomings, why he had begun the battle before the signal was given. On Alexander denying this and saying that a stripling from Megalopolis had begun it contrary to his own judgement, the king said that this stripling in grasping the situation had acted like a good general and Alexander himself, the general, like an ordinary stripling.

To continue our narrative, Eucleidas' troops, on seeing the enemy's lines advancing, cast away the advantage the ground gave him. They should have charged the enemy while still at a distance, thus breaking his ranks and throwing them into disorder, and then retreating slowly, have returned in safety to the higher ground. Thus having in the first instance spoilt and broken up that peculiar serried formation of the enemy so well adapted to

their special equipment, they would easily have put them to flight owing to their favourable position. Instead of doing this, they acted as if the victory were already in their hand and did exactly the opposite. They remained, that is, at the summit in their original position with the view of getting their opponents as high up the hill as possible so that the enemy's flight would be for a long distance down the steep and precipitous slope. As might have been expected, the result was just the reverse. They had left themselves no means of retreat and on being charged by the Macedonian cohorts which were still fresh and in good order, they were so hard put to it that they had to fight with the assailants for the possession of the extreme summit. From now onwards, wherever they were forced back by the weight of their adversaries' weapons and formation, the Illyrians at once occupied the place where they had stood, while each backward step Eucleidas' men took was on to lower ground, since they had not left themselves any room for orderly retreat or change of formation. The consequence was that very soon they had to turn and take to a flight which proved disastrous, as, for a long distance, it was over difficult and precipitous ground.

At this same time the cavalry action was going on, all the Achaean horsemen, and especially Philopoemen, rendering most distinguished service, as the whole struggle was for their liberty. Philopoemen's horse fell mortally wounded, and he, fighting on foot, received a serious wound through both thighs. Meanwhile the two kings at Olympus opened the battle with their light-armed troops and mercenaries, of which each had about five thousand. These, now attacking each other in detachments and now along the whole line, exhibited the greatest gallantry on both sides, all the more so as they were fighting under the eyes of the kings and the armies. Man

therefore vied with man and regiment with regiment in a display of courage. Cleomenes, seeing his brother's troops in flight and the cavalry on the level ground on the point of giving way, was afraid of being charged from all sides and was compelled to pull down part of his defences and to lead out his whole force in line from one side of the camp. Each side now recalled by bugle their light-armed troops from the space between them, and shouting their war-cry and lowering their lances, the two phalanxes met. A stubborn struggle followed. At one time the Macedonians gradually fell back facing the enemy, giving way for a long distance before the courage of the Lacedaemonians, at another the latter were pushed from their ground by the weight of the Macedonian phalanx, until, on Antigonus ordering the Macedonians to close up in the peculiar formation of the double phalanx with its serried line of pikes, they delivered a charge which finally forced the Lacedaemonians from their stronghold. The whole Spartan army now fled in rout, followed and cut down by the enemy; but Cleomenes with a few horsemen reached Sparta in safety. At nightfall he went down to Gythion, where all had been prepared some time previously for the voyage in view of contingencies, and set sail with his friends for Alexandria.

Antigonus having attacked and taken Sparta, treated the Lacedaemonians in all respects with great generosity and humanity, and, after restoring the ancient form of government, left the city in a few days with his whole army, as he had received news that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia and were ravaging the country. Thus ever is it the way of Fortune to decide the most weighty issues against rule and reason. For on this occasion Cleomenes, had he deferred giving battle for merely a few days, or had he, on returning to

Sparta after the battle, waited ever so short a time to avail himself of the turn of events, would have saved his crown.

Antigonus however, on reaching Tegea, restored the old form of government there also, and two days later arrived at Argos just in time for the Nemean festival, at which the Achaean League and each several city heaped on him every honour they could think of to immortalize his memory. He then hastily left for Macedonia, where he found the Illyrians. Engaging them in a pitched battle, he was victorious, but in the course of the fight he strained himself so much by shouting to his troops to cheer them on that from a rupture of a blood-vessel or some such accident he fell sick and died shortly afterwards. He had aroused high hopes of himself throughout Greece, not so much by his support in the field as by his general high principles and excellence. He was succeeded on the throne of Macedon by Philip son of Demetrius.

Now to explain why I have dealt with this at such length. As this period immediately precedes those times, the history of which I am about to write, I thought it would be of service, or rather that the original plan of this work made it necessary for me, to make clearly known to everyone the state of affairs in Macedonia and Greece at this time. Just about the same time Ptolemy Euergetes fell sick and died, being succeeded by Ptolemy surnamed Philopator. Seleucus, the son of the Seleucus surnamed Callinicus or Pogon, also died at this time, his brother Antiochus succeeding him in the kingdom of Syria. The same thing in fact occurred in the case of these three kings, as in that of the first successors of Alexander in the three kingdoms, Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus, who all, as I stated above, died in the 124th Olympiad, while these kings died in the 139th.

I have thus completed this Introduction or preliminary part of my History. In it I have shown in the first place when, how, and why the Romans, having mastered Italy, first entered on enterprises outside that land and disputed the command of the sea with the Carthaginians, and next I have dealt with the state of Greece and Macedonia and with that of Carthage as this existed then. So having, as was my original purpose, reached the date at which the Greeks were on the eve of the Social War, the Romans on the eve of the Hannibalic War, and the kings of Asia about to enter on the war for Coele-Syria, I must now bring this Book to its close, which coincides with the final events preceding these wars and the death of the three kings who had up to now directed affairs.

THE END OF BOOK II

BOOK III

In my first Book, the third, that is, from this counting backwards, I explained that I fixed as the starting-points of my work, the Social war, the Hannibalic war, and the war for Coele-Syria. I likewise set forth in the same place the reasons why I wrote the two preceding Books dealing with events of an earlier date. I will now attempt to give a well attested account of the above wars, their first causes and the reasons why they attained such magnitude; but in the first place I have a few words to say regarding my work as a whole.

The subject I have undertaken to treat, the how, when, and wherefore of the subjection of the known parts of the world to the dominion of Rome, should be viewed as a single whole, with a recognized beginning, a fixed duration, and an end which is not a matter of dispute; and I think it will be advantageous to give a brief prefatory survey of the chief parts of this whole from the beginning to the end. For I believe this will be the best means of giving students an adequate idea of my whole plan. Since a previous general view is of great assistance to the mind in acquiring a knowledge of details, and at the same time a previous notion of the details helps us to knowledge of the whole, I regard a preliminary survey based on both as best and will draw up these prefatory remarks to my history on this principle. I have already indicated the general scope and limits of this history. The particular events comprised in it begin with the above-mentioned wars and culminate and end in the destruction of the

Macedonian monarchy. Between the beginning and end lies a space of fifty-three years, comprising a greater number of grave and momentous events than any period of equal length in the past. Starting from the 140th Olympiad I shall adopt the following order in my exposition of them.

First I shall indicate the causes of the above war between Rome and Carthage, known as the Hannibalic war, and tell how the Carthaginians invaded Italy, broke up the dominion of Rome, and cast the Romans into great fear for their safety and even for their native soil, while great was their own hope, such as they had never dared to entertain, of capturing Rome itself. Next I shall attempt to describe how at the same period Philip of Macedon, after finishing his war with the Aetolians and settling the affairs of Greece, conceived the project of an alliance with Carthage; how Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator first quarrelled and at length went to war with each other for the possession of Coele-Syria, and how the Rhodians and Prusias, declaring war on the Byzantines, compelled them to stop levying toll on ships bound for the Euxine. Interrupting my narrative at this point, I shall draw up my account of the Roman Constitution, as a sequel to which I shall point out how the peculiar qualities of the Constitution conduced very largely not only to their subjection of the Italians and Sicilians, and subsequently of the Spaniards and Celts, but finally to their victory over Carthage and their conceiving the project of universal empire. Simultaneously in a digression I shall narrate how the dominion of Hiero of Syracuse fell and after this I shall deal with the troubles in Egypt, and tell how, on the death of Ptolemy, Antiochus and Philip, conspiring to partition the dominions of his son, a helpless infant, began to be guilty of acts of

unjust aggression, Philip laying hands on the islands of the Aegean, and on Caria and Samos, while Antiochus seized on Coele-Syria and Phoenicia.

Next, after summing up the doings of the Romans and Carthaginians in Spain, Africa, and Sicily I shall shift the scene of my story definitely, as the scene of action shifted, to Greece and its neighbourhood. I shall describe the sea-battles in which Attalus and the Rhodians met Philip, and after this deal with the war between the Romans and Philip, its course, its reason, and its result. Following on this I shall make mention of the angry spirit of the Aetolians yielding to which they invited Antiochus over, and thus set ablaze the war from Asia against the Achaeans and Romans. After narrating the causes of this war, and how Antiochus crossed to Europe, I shall describe in the first place how he fled from Greece; secondly how on his defeat after this he abandoned all Asia up to the Taurus; and thirdly, how the Romans, suppressing the insolence of the Galatian Gauls, established their undisputed supremacy in Asia and freed its inhabitants on this side of the Taurus from the fear of barbarians and the lawless violence of these Gauls. Next I shall bring before the reader's eyes the misfortune that befel the Aetolians and Cephallenians, and then make mention of the war of Eumenes with Prusias and the Gauls and of that between Ariarathes and Pharnaces. Subsequently, after some notice of the unification and pacification of the Peloponnese and of the growth of the Rhodian State, I shall bring the whole narrative of events to a conclusion, narrating finally the expedition of Antiochus Epiphanes against Egypt, the war with Perseus, and the abolition of the Macedonian monarchy. All the above events will enable us to perceive how the Romans dealt with each contingency and thus subjected the whole world to their rule.

Now if from their success or failure alone we could form an adequate judgement of how far states and individuals are worthy of praise or blame, I could here lay down my pen, bringing my narrative and this whole work to a close with the last-mentioned events, as was my original intention. For the period of fifty-three years finished here, and the growth and advance of Roman power was now complete. Besides which it was now universally accepted as a necessary fact that henceforth all must submit to the Romans and obey their orders. But since judgements regarding either the conquerors or the conquered based purely on performance are by no means final—what is thought to be the greatest success having brought the greatest calamities on many, if they do not make proper use of it, and the most dreadful catastrophes often turning out to the advantage of those who support them bravely—I must append to the history of the above period an account of the subsequent policy of the conquerors and their method of universal rule, as well as of the various opinions and appreciations of their rulers entertained by the subjects, and finally I must describe what were the prevailing and dominant tendencies and ambitions of the various peoples in their private and public life. For it is evident that contemporaries will thus be able to see clearly whether the Roman rule is acceptable or the reverse, and future generations whether their government should be considered to have been worthy of praise and admiration or rather of blame. And indeed it is just in this that the chief usefulness of this work for the present and the future will lie. For neither rulers themselves nor their critics should regard the end of action as being merely conquest and the subjection of all to their rule; since no man of sound sense goes to war with his neighbours simply for the sake of crushing an adversary, just as no one sails on the open sea just for the

sake of crossing it. Indeed no one even takes up the study of arts and crafts merely for the sake of knowledge, but all men do all they do for the resulting pleasure, good, or utility. So the final end achieved by this work will be, to gain knowledge of what was the condition of each people after all had been crushed and had come under the dominion of Rome, until the disturbed and troubled time that afterwards ensued. About this latter, owing to the importance of the actions and the unexpected character of the events, and chiefly because I not only witnessed most but took part and even directed some, I was induced to write as if starting on a fresh work. This period of disturbance comprises, firstly the war waged by Rome against the Celtiberians and Vaccaei, that between Carthage and Massinissa the King of the Libyans and that between Attalus and Prusias in Asia. Next, Ariarathes, King of Cappadocia was expelled from his kingdom by Orophernes through the agency of King Demetrius and recovered his ancestral throne by the help of Attalus. Then Demetrius, son of Seleucus, after reigning in Syria for twelve years lost both his kingdom and his life, the other kings combining against him. Next the Romans restored to their homes the Greeks who had been accused in consequence of the war with Perseus, acquitting them of the charges brought against them. A little later the Romans attacked Carthage, having resolved in the first place on changing its site and subsequently on its utter destruction for the reasons that I shall state in due course. Close upon this followed the withdrawal of the Macedonians from their alliance with Rome and that of the Lacedaemonians from the Achaean League, and hereupon the beginning and the end of the general calamity that overtook Greece.

Such is the plan I propose, but all depends on Fortune's granting me a life long enough to execute it. However I am convinced that in the event of my death, the project will not fall to the ground for want of men competent to carry it on, since there are many others who will set their hands to the task and labour to complete it.

Now having given a summary of the most important events, with the object of conveying to my readers a notion of this work as a whole and its contents in detail, it is time for me to call to mind my original plan and return to the starting-point of my history.

Some of those authors who have dealt with Hannibal and his times, wishing to indicate the causes that led to the above war between Rome and Carthage, allege as its first cause the siege of Saguntum by the Carthaginians and as its second their crossing, contrary to treaty, the river whose native name is the Iber. I should agree in stating that these were the beginnings of the war, but I can by no means allow that they were its causes, unless we call Alexander's crossing to Asia the cause of his war against Persia and Antiochus' landing at Demetrias the cause of his war against Rome, neither of which assertions is either reasonable or true. For who could consider these to be causes of wars, plans and preparations for which, in the case of the Persian war, had been made earlier, many by Alexander and even some by Philip during his life, and in the case of the war against Rome by the Aetolians long before Antiochus arrived? These are pronouncements of men who are unable to see the great and essential distinction between a beginning and a cause or purpose, these being the first origin of all, and the beginning coming last. By the beginning of something I mean the first attempt to execute and put in action plans on which we have

decided, by its causes what is most initiatory in our judgements and opinions, that is to say our notions of things, our state of mind, our reasoning about these, and everything through which we reach decisions and projects. The nature of these is evident from the instances adduced above; it is easy for anyone to see the real causes and origin of the war against Persia. The first was the retreat of the Greeks under Xenophon from the upper Satrapies, in which, though they traversed the whole of Asia, a hostile country, none of the barbarians ventured to face them. The second was the crossing of Agesilaus, King of Sparta, to Asia, where he found no opposition of any moment to his projects, and was only compelled to return without effecting anything owing to the disturbances in Greece. From both of these facts Philip perceived and reckoned on the cowardice and indolence of the Persians as compared with the military efficiency of himself and his Macedonians, and further fixing his eyes on the splendour of the great prize which the war promised, he lost no time, once he had secured the avowed good-will of the Greeks, but seizing on the pretext that it was his urgent duty to take vengeance on the Persians for their injurious treatment of the Greeks, he bestirred himself and decided to go to war, beginning to make every preparation for this purpose. We must therefore look on the first considerations I have mentioned as the causes of the war against Persia, the second as its pretext and Alexander's crossing to Asia as its beginning. Similarly it is evident that the cause of the war between Antiochus and the Romans was the anger of the Aetolians, who (as I above stated) looking upon themselves as having been slighted in many ways by the Romans as regards their share in bringing the war with Philip to an end, not only invited Antiochus over, but were ready to do and suffer anything

owing to the anger they conceived under the above circumstances. But the liberation of Greece, which they announced in defiance of reason and truth going round with Antiochus from city to city, we must consider to be a pretext of this war, and its beginning the landing of Antiochus at Demetrias.

In speaking at such length on this matter, my object has not been to censure previous writers, but to rectify the ideas of students. For of what use to the sick is a physician who is ignorant of the causes of certain conditions of the body? And of what use is a statesman who cannot reckon how, why, and whence each event has originated? The former will scarcely be likely to recommend proper treatment for the body and it will be impossible for the latter without such knowledge to deal properly with circumstances. Nothing, therefore, should be more carefully guarded against and more diligently sought out than the first causes of each event, since matters of the greatest moment often originate from trifles, and it is the initial impulses and conceptions in every matter which are most easily remedied.

Fabius, the Roman annalist, says that besides the outrage on the Saguntines, a cause of the war was Hasdrubal's ambition and love of power. He tells us how, having acquired a great dominion in Spain, he arrived in Africa and attempted to abolish the constitution of Carthage and change the form of government to a monarchy. The leading statesmen, however, got wind of his project and united to oppose him, upon which Hasdrubal, suspicious of their intentions, left Africa and in future governed Iberia as he chose, without paying any attention to the Carthaginian Senate. Hannibal from boyhood had shared and admired Hasdrubal's principles; and on succeeding to the governor-generalship of Iberia, he had employed the same

method as Hasdrubal. Consequently, he now began this war against Rome on his own initiative and in defiance of Carthaginian opinion, not a single one of the notables in Carthage approving his conduct towards Saguntum. After telling us this, Fabius says that on the capture of this city the Romans came forward demanding that the Carthaginians should either deliver Hannibal into their hands or accept war. Now if anyone were to pose the following question to this writer—how opportunity could have better favoured the Carthaginians' wishes or what could have been a juster act and more in their interest (since, as he says, they had disapproved Hannibal's action from the outset) than to yield to the Roman demand, and by giving up the man who had caused the offence, with some show of reason to destroy by the hands of others the common enemy of their state and secure the safety of their territory, ridding themselves of the war that menaced them and accomplishing their vengeance by a simple resolution—if anyone, I say, were to ask him this, what would he have to say? Evidently nothing; for so far were they from doing any of the above things that after carrying on the war, in obedience to Hannibal's decision, for seventeen years, they did not abandon the struggle, until finally, every resource on which they relied being now exhausted, their native city and her inhabitants stood in deadly peril.

One may ask why I make any mention of Fabius and his statement. It is not from apprehension lest it may find acceptance from some owing to its plausibility; for its inherent unreasonableness, even without my comment, is self-evident to anyone who reads it. But what I wish is to warn those who consult his books not to pay attention to the title, but to facts. For there are some people who pay regard not to what he writes but to the writer himself

and, taking into consideration that he was a contemporary and a Roman senator, at once accept all he says as worthy of credit. But my own opinion is that while not treating his authority as negligible we should not regard it as final, but that readers should in most cases test his statements by reference to the actual facts.

To return to the war between Rome and Carthage, from which this digression has carried us away, we must regard its first cause as being the indignation of Hamilcar surnamed Barcas, the actual father of Hannibal. Unvanquished in spirit by the war for Sicily, since he felt that he had kept the army of Eryx under his command combative and resolute until the end, and had only agreed to peace yielding to circumstances after the defeat of the Carthaginians in the naval battle, he maintained his resolve and waited for an opportunity to strike. Had not the mutinous outbreak among the mercenaries occurred, he would very soon, as far as it lay in his power, have created some other means and other resources for resuming the contest, but he was hampered by these civil disturbances which occupied all his time and attention. When, on the suppression of this disturbance by the Carthaginians, the Romans announced their intention of making war on Carthage, the latter at first was ready to negotiate on all points, thinking that, justice being on her side, she would prevail (about this I have spoken in the preceding Books, without a perusal of which it is impossible to follow properly what I am now saying and what I am about to say); but as the Romans refused to negotiate, the Carthaginians had to yield to circumstances, and though deeply aggrieved they were powerless, and evacuated Sardinia, agreeing also to pay twelve hundred talents in addition to the sum previously exacted, in order not to be forced to accept war at that

time. This, then, we must take to be the second and principal cause of the subsequent war; for Hamilcar, with the anger felt by all his compatriots at this last outrage added to his old indignation, as soon as he had finally crushed the mutiny of the mercenaries and secured the safety of his country, at once threw all his efforts into the conquest of Spain, with the object of using the resources thus obtained for the war against Rome. This success of the Carthaginian project in Spain must be held to be the third cause of the war, for relying on this increase of strength, they entered upon it with confidence.

Of the fact that Hamilcar, although he died ten years before the beginning of the Second Punic War, contributed much to its origin many evidences can be found; but the anecdote I am about to relate suffices, I think, to confirm this. At the time when Hannibal on his final defeat by the Romans had left his native land and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the Romans, who saw through the project of the Aetolians, sent an embassy to Antiochus, wishing to be fully aware what the king's purpose was. The legates, as they saw that Antiochus was lending an ear to the Aetolians and was disposed to go to war with Rome, paid many attentions to Hannibal, wishing to make Antiochus suspicious of him, as in fact they succeeded in doing. For as time went on, the king's mistrust of Hannibal grew ever more strong; and it fell out on one occasion that they came to have a talk about the alienation which had been secretly growing up between them. In the course of the conversation Hannibal defended himself on various grounds, and at length, being at a loss for further arguments, resorted to the following. He said that at the time when his father was about to start with his army on his expedition to Spain, he himself, then nine years of age, was

standing by the altar, while Hamilcar was sacrificing to Zeus. When, on the omens being favourable, Hamilcar had poured a libation to the gods and performed all the customary rites, he ordered the others who were attending the sacrifice to withdraw to a slight distance and calling Hannibal to him asked him kindly if he wished to accompany him on the expedition. On his accepting with delight, and, like a boy, even begging to do it besides, his father took him by the hand, led him up to the altar, and bade him lay his hand on the victim and swear never to be the friend of the Romans. He begged Antiochus, then, now he knew this for a fact, as long as his intentions were hostile to Rome, to rely on him confidently and believe that he would have in him his sincerest supporter, but from the moment he made peace and alliance with her he had no need to wait for accusations but should mistrust and beware of him; for there was nothing he would not do against the Romans. Antiochus, listening to this, thought he spoke genuinely and sincerely and in consequence abandoned all his former mistrust. However, we should consider this as an unquestionable proof of Hamilcar's hostility and general purpose, and it is confirmed by the facts. For he made of his daughter's husband Hasdrubal and his own son Hannibal such enemies of Rome that none could be more bitter. As Hasdrubal died before putting his purpose into execution, it was not in his case fully evident, but circumstance put it in the power of Hannibal to give only too manifest proof of his inherited hatred of Rome. Therefore, statesmen should above all take care that the true motives of the reconciliation of enmities and the formation of friendships do not escape them. They should observe when it is that men come to terms under pressure of circumstances and when owing to their spirit being broken, so that in the former case they may

regard them as reserving themselves for a favourable opportunity and be constantly on their guard, and in the latter they may trust them as true friends and subjects and not hesitate to command their services when required.

We must consider, then, the causes of the Hannibalic War to have been those I have stated, while its beginnings were as follows. The Carthaginians could ill bear their defeat in the war for Sicily, and, as I said above, they were additionally exasperated by the matter of Sardinia and the exorbitancy of the sum they had been last obliged to agree to pay. Therefore, when they had subjugated the greater part of Iberia, they were quite ready to adopt any measures against Rome which suggested themselves. On the death of Hasdrubal, to whom after that of Hamilcar they had entrusted the government of Iberia, they at first waited for a pronouncement on the part of the troops, and when news reached them from their armies that the soldiers had unanimously chosen Hannibal as their commander, they hastened to summon a general assembly of the commons, which unanimously ratified the choice of the soldiers. Hannibal on assuming the command, at once set forth with the view of subduing a tribe called the Olcades, and arriving before their most powerful city Althaea, [1] encamped there and soon made himself master of it by a series of vigorous and formidable assaults, upon which the rest of the tribe were overawed and submitted to the Carthaginians. After exacting tribute from the towns and possessing himself of a considerable sum, he retired to winter quarters at New Carthage. By the generosity he now displayed to the troops under his command, paying them in part and promising further payment, he inspired in them great good-will to himself and high hopes of the future. Next

summer he made a fresh attack on the Vaccaei, assaulted and took Hermandica at the first onset, but Arbacala being a very large city with a numerous and brave population, he had to lay siege to it and only took it by assault after much pains. Subsequently on his return he unexpectedly found himself in great peril, the Carpetani, the strongest tribe in the district gathering to attack him and being joined by the neighbouring tribes, all incited to this by the fugitive Olcades, and also by those who had escaped from Hermandica. Had the Carthaginians been obliged to meet all this host in a pitched battle, they would assuredly have suffered defeat; but, as it was, Hannibal very wisely and skilfully faced about and retreated so as to place the river Tagus in his front, and remained there to dispute the crossing, availing himself of the aid both of the river and of his elephants, of which he had about forty, so that everything went as he had calculated and as no one else would have dared to expect. For when the barbarians tried to force a crossing at various points, the greater mass of them perished in coming out of the river, the elephants following its bank and being upon them as soon as they landed. Many also were cut down in the stream itself by the cavalry, as the horses could bear up better against the current, and the mounted men in fighting had the advantage of being higher than the unmounted enemy. Finally, Hannibal in his turn crossed the river and attacked the barbarians, putting to flight a force of more than one hundred thousand. After their defeat none of the peoples on that side of the Ebro ventured lightly to face the Carthaginians, with the exception of the Saguntines. Hannibal tried as far as he could to keep his hands off this city, wishing to give the Romans no avowed pretext for war, until he had secured

his possession of all the rest of the country, following in this his father Hamilcar's suggestions and advice.

[1] Livy calls it Castala.

But the Saguntines sent repeated messages to Rome, as on the one hand they were alarmed for their own safety and foresaw what was coming, and at the same time they wished to keep the Romans informed how well things went with the Carthaginians in Spain. The Romans, who had more than once paid little attention to them, sent on this occasion legates to report on the situation. Hannibal at the same time, having reduced the tribes he intended, arrived with his forces to winter at New Carthage, which was in a way the chief ornament and capital of the Carthaginian empire in Spain. Here he found the Roman legates, to whom he gave audience and listened to their present communication. The Romans protested against his attacking Saguntum, which they said was under their protection, or crossing the Ebro, contrary to the treaty engagements entered into in Hasdrubal's time. Hannibal, being young, full of martial ardour, encouraged by the success of his enterprises, and spurred on by his long-standing enmity to Rome, in his answer to the legates affected to be guarding the interests of the Saguntines and accused the Romans of having a short time previously, when there was a party quarrel at Saguntum and they were called in to arbitrate, unjustly put to death some of the leading men. The Carthaginians, he said, would not overlook this violation of good faith for it was from of old the principle of Carthage never to neglect the cause of the victims of injustice. To Carthage, however, he sent, asking for instructions, since the Saguntines, relying on their alliance with Rome, were wronging some of the peoples subject to Carthage. Being wholly under the influence of unreasoning and violent

anger, he did not allege the true reasons, but took refuge in groundless pretexts, as men are wont to do who disregard duty because they are prepossessed by passion. How much better would it have been for him to demand from the Romans the restitution of Sardinia, and at the same time of the tribute which they had so unjustly exacted, availing themselves of the misfortunes of Carthage, and to threaten war in the event of refusal! But as it was, by keeping silent as to the real cause and by inventing a non-existing one about Saguntum, he gave the idea that he was entering on the war not only unsupported by reason but without justice on his side. The Roman legates, seeing clearly that war was inevitable, took ship for Carthage to convey the same protest to the Government there. They never thought, however, that the war would be in Italy, but supposed they would fight in Spain with Saguntum for a base.

Consequently, the Senate, adapting their measures to this supposition, decided to secure their position in Illyria, as they foresaw that the war would be serious and long and the scene of it far away from home. It so happened that at that time in Illyria Demetrius of Pharos, oblivious of the benefits that the Romans had conferred on him, contemptuous of Rome because of the peril to which she was exposed first from the Gauls and now from Carthage, and placing all his hopes in the Royal House of Macedon owing to his having fought by the side of Antigonus in the battles against Cleomenes, was sacking and destroying the Illyrian cities subject to Rome, and, sailing beyond Lissus, contrary to the terms of the treaty, with fifty boats, had pillaged many of the Cyclades. The Romans, in view of those proceedings and of the flourishing fortunes of the Macedonian kingdom, were anxious to secure their position in the lands lying east of Italy, feeling

confident that they would have time to correct the errors of the Illyrians and rebuke and chastise Demetrius for his ingratitude and temerity. But in this calculation they were deceived; for Hannibal forestalled them by taking Saguntum, and, as a consequence, the war was not waged in Spain but at the very gates of Rome and through the whole of Italy. However, the Romans now moved by these considerations dispatched a force under Lucius Aemilius just before summer in the first year of the 140th Olympiad to operate in Illyria.

Hannibal at the same time quitted New Carthage with his army and advanced towards Saguntum. This city lies on the seaward foot of the range of hills connecting Iberia and Celtiberia, at a distance of about seven stades from the sea. The territory of the Saguntines yields every kind of crop and is the most fertile in the whole of Iberia. Hannibal, now encamping before the town, set himself to besiege it vigorously, foreseeing that many advantages would result from its capture. First of all he thought that he would thus deprive the Romans of any prospect of a campaign in Iberia, and secondly he was convinced that by this blow he would inspire universal terror, and render the Iberian tribes who had already submitted more orderly and those who were still independent more cautious, while above all he would be enabled to advance safely with no enemy left in his rear. Besides, he would then have abundant funds and supplies for his projected expedition, he would raise the spirit of his troops by the booty distributed among them and would conciliate the Carthaginians at home by the spoils he would send them. From all these considerations he actively pursued the siege, now setting an example to the soldiers by sharing personally the fatigue of the battering operations, now cheering on the troops and exposing

recklessly to danger. At length after eight months of hardship and anxiety he took the city by storm. A great booty of money, slaves, and property fell into his hands. The money, as he had determined, he set aside for his own purposes, the slaves he distributed among his men according to rank, and the miscellaneous property he sent off at once to Carthage. The result did not deceive his expectations, nor did he fail to accomplish his original purpose; but he both made his troops more eager to face danger and the Carthaginians more ready to accede to his demands on them, while he himself, by setting aside these funds, was able to accomplish many things of much service to him.

While this was taking place Demetrius, getting wind of the Romans' purpose, at once sent a considerable garrison to Dimale with the supplies requisite for such a force. In the other cities he made away with those who opposed his policy and placed the government in the hands of his friends while he himself, selecting six thousand of his bravest troops, quartered them at Pharos. The Roman Consul, on reaching Illyria with his army and observing that the enemy were very confident in the natural strength of Dimale and the measures they had taken for its defence, there being also a general belief that it was impregnable, decided to attack it first, wishing to strike terror into them. Having given instructions to his officers and erected batteries in several places he began to besiege it. By capturing it in seven days, he at one blow broke the spirit of all the enemy, so that from every city they at once flocked to surrender themselves unconditionally to Rome. Having accepted their submission and imposed suitable conditions on each he sailed to Pharos to attack Demetrius himself. Learning that the city was very strong, that a large force of exceptionally fine troops was assembled

within it and that it was excellently furnished with supplies and munitions of war, he was apprehensive that the siege might prove difficult and long. In view of this, therefore, he employed the following impromptu stratagem. Sailing up to the island at night with his whole force he disembarked the greater part of it in certain well-wooded dells, and at daybreak with twenty ships sailed openly against the harbour which lies nearest to the town. Demetrius, seeing the ships and contemptuous of their small number, sallied from the city down to the harbour to prevent the enemy from landing. On his encountering them the struggle was very violent, and more and more troops kept coming out of the town to help, until at length the whole garrison had poured out to take part in the battle. The Roman force which had landed in the night now opportunely arrived, having marched by a concealed route, and occupying a steep hill between the city and the harbour, shut off from the town the troops who had sallied out. Demetrius, perceiving what had happened, desisted from opposing the landing and collecting his forces and cheering them on started with the intention of fighting a pitched battle with those on the hill. The Romans, seeing the Illyrians advancing resolutely and in good order, formed their ranks and delivered a terrible charge, while at the same time those who had landed from the ships, seeing what was going on, took the enemy in the rear, so that being attacked on all sides the Illyrians were thrown into much tumult and confusion. At the end, being hard pressed both in front and in the rear, Demetrius' troops turned and fled, some escaping to the city, but the greater number dispersing themselves over the island across country. Demetrius had some boats lying ready for such a contingency at a lonely spot, and retreating there and embarking sailed away at nightfall and managed to

cross and reach King Philip, at whose court he spent the rest of his life. He was a man of a bold and venturesome spirit, but with an entire lack of reasoning power and judgement, defects which brought him to an end of a piece with the rest of his life. For having, with the approval of Philip, made a foolhardy and ill-managed attempt to seize Messene, he perished in the action, as I shall narrate in detail when we reach that date. Aemilius, the Roman Consul, took Pharos at once by assault and razed it to the ground, and after subduing the rest of Illyria and organizing it as he thought best, returned to Rome late in summer and entered the city in triumph, acclaimed by all, for he seemed to have managed matters not only with ability, but with very high courage.

The Romans, when the news of the fall of Saguntum reached them, did not assuredly hold a debate on the question of the war, as some authors allege, even setting down the speeches made on both sides—a most absurd proceeding. For how could the Romans, who a year ago had announced to the Carthaginians that their entering the territory of Saguntum would be regarded as a casus belli, now when the city itself had been taken by assault, assemble to debate whether to go to war or not? How is it that on the one hand these authors draw a wonderful picture of the gloomy aspect of the Senate and on the other tell us that fathers brought their sons from the age of twelve upwards to the Senate House, and that these boys attended the debate but divulged not a syllable even to any of their near relatives? Nothing in this is the least true or even probable, unless, indeed, Fortune has bestowed on the Romans among other gifts that of being wise from their cradles. No further criticism, indeed, of such works as those of

Chaereas and Sosylus [2] is necessary; they rank in authority, it seems to me, not with history, but with the common gossip of a barber's shop.

[2] Of Chaereas nothing is known. Sosylus was Hannibal's Greek teacher and accompanied him on his campaign.

The Romans, on hearing of the calamity that had befallen Saguntum, at once appointed ambassadors and sent them post-haste to Carthage, giving the Carthaginians the option of two alternatives, the one of which, if they accepted it, entailed disgrace and damage, while the other would give rise to extreme trouble and peril. Either they must give up Hannibal and the members of his Council or war would be declared. On the Roman envoys arriving and appearing before the Senate and delivering their message the Carthaginians listened with indignation to this choice of alternatives, but putting up their most able member to speak, they entered upon their justification. They said not a word of the treaty with Hasdrubal, considering it as not existent, or if existent, as not concerning them, since it was made without their approval. Here they quoted the precedent of the Romans themselves, alleging that the treaty made in the war for Sicily under Lutatius, though agreed to by Lutatius, had been repudiated by the Romans as having been made without their approval. In all their plea of justification they founded and insisted on the treaty at the end of the war for Sicily, in which they said there was no mention of Iberia, but it was expressly set down that the allies of each power should be secure from attack by the other. They pointed out that at that time the Saguntines were not the allies of Rome, and to prove their point they read aloud several extracts from the treaty. The Romans refused definitely to discuss the matter of justification, saying that while Saguntum still stood unharmed matters admitted of a plea

of justification and it was possible to reach a decision on the disputed points by argument, but now that the treaty had been broken by the seizure of the city either they must give up the culprits, which would make it clear to all that they had no share in the wrong, but that it had been done without their approval, or if they refused to do so and thus confessed that they were participators in the misdeed they must accept war.

On this occasion the question was dealt with in more or less general terms, but I think it necessary for myself not to neglect it, so that neither those whose duty and interest it is to be accurately informed about this may deviate from the truth in critical debates, nor students, led astray by the ignorance or partisanship of historians, acquire mistaken notions on the subject, but that there may be some survey generally recognized as accurate of the treaties between Rome and Carthage up to our own time.

The first treaty between Rome and Carthage dates from the consulship of Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, the first Consuls after the expulsion of the kings, and the founders of the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. This is twenty-eight years before the crossing of Xerxes to Greece. I give below as accurate a rendering as I can of this treaty, but the ancient Roman language differs so much from the modern that it can only be partially made out, and that after much application, by the most intelligent men. The treaty is more or less as follows: "There is to be friendship between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians and their allies on these terms: The Romans and their allies not to sail with long ships beyond the Fair Promontory unless forced by storm or by enemies: it is forbidden to anyone carried beyond it by force to buy or carry away anything beyond what is required for the repair of his ship or for sacrifice,

and he must depart within five days. Men coming to trade may conclude no business except in the presence of a herald or town-clerk, and the price of whatever is sold in the presence of such shall be secured to the vendor by the state, if the sale take place in Libya or Sardinia. If any Roman come to the Carthaginian province in Sicily, he shall enjoy equal rights with the others. The Carthaginians shall do no wrong to the peoples of Ardea, Antium, Laurentium, Circeii, Terracina, or any other city of the Latins who are subject to Rome. Touching the Latins who are not subjects, they shall keep their hands off their cities, and if they take any city shall deliver it up to the Romans undamaged. They shall build no fort in the Latin territory. If they enter the land in arms, they shall not pass a night therein."

The "Fair Promontory" is that lying in front of Carthage to the North. The Carthaginians forbid the Romans absolutely to sail south of this on its western side in long ships, the reason being, I think that they did not wish them to become acquainted either with the district round Byssatis or that near the lesser Syrtis, which they call Emporia, owing to their great fertility. If anyone, carried there by a storm or driven by his enemies, requires anything for the purpose of sacrificing to the gods or of repairing his ships, he may have this, but nothing beyond it, and those who touch there must leave within five days. To Carthage itself and all parts of Libya on this side of the Fair Promontory, to Sardinia and the Carthaginian province of Sicily the Romans may come for trading purposes, and the Carthaginian state engages to secure payment of their just debts. The phrasing of this treaty shows that they consider Sardinia and Libya as their own, whereas they distinctly express themselves otherwise about Sicily, mentioning only in the treaty those parts of it which are under Carthaginian rule. Similarly, the

Romans include in the treaty Latium alone, making no mention of the rest of Italy as it was not then subject to their authority.

At a later date they made another treaty, in which the Carthaginians include Tyre and Utica, and mention, in addition to the Fair Promontory, Mastia and Tarseum as points beyond which the Romans may not either make marauding expeditions, or trade, or found cities. This treaty is more or less as follows: "There is to be friendship on the following conditions between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, and the people of Utica and their respective allies. The Romans shall not maraud or trade or found a city on the farther side of Fair Promontory, Mastia, and Tarseum. If the Carthaginians capture any city in Latium not subject to Rome, they shall keep the valuables and the men, but give up the city. If any Carthaginians take captive any of a people with whom the Romans have a treaty of peace, but who are not subject to Rome, they shall not bring them into Roman harbours, but if one be brought in and a Roman lay hold of him, [3] he shall be set free. The Romans shall not do likewise. If a Roman gets water or provisions from any place over which the Carthaginians rule, he shall not use these provisions to wrong any member of a people with whom the Carthaginians have peace and friendship. The Carthaginians shall not do likewise. If either do so, the aggrieved person shall not take private vengeance, and if he do, his wrongdoing shall be public. No Roman shall trade or found a city in Sardinia and Libya nor remain in a Sardinian or Libyan post longer than is required for taking in provisions or repairing his ship. If he be driven there by stress of weather, he shall depart within five days. In the Carthaginian province of Sicily and at Carthage he may do and

sell anything that is permitted to a citizen. A Carthaginian in Rome may do likewise."

[3] *i.e.* claims him as his slave.

Again in this treaty they lay particular stress on Libya and Sardinia, asserting them to be their own private property and closing all landing-places to the Romans, but of Sicily they distinctly speak contrariwise, mentioning the part of it subject to them. Similarly, the Romans in referring to Latium forbid the Carthaginians to wrong the people of Ardea, Antium, Circeii, and Terracina, the cities that stand on the coast of that Latin territory with which the treaty is concerned.

A further and final treaty with Carthage was made by the Romans at the time of Pyrrhus' invasion before the Carthaginians had begun the war for Sicily. In this they maintain all the previous agreements and add the following: "If they make an alliance with Pyrrhus, both shall make it an express condition that they may go to the help of each other in whichever country is attacked. No matter which require help, the Carthaginians are to provide the ships for transport and hostilities, but each country shall provide the pay for its own men. The Carthaginians, if necessary, shall come to the help of the Romans by sea too, but no one shall compel the crews to land against their will."

The oaths they had to swear were as follows. In the case of the first treaty the Carthaginians swore by their ancestral gods and the Romans, following an old custom, by Jupiter Lapis, and in the case of this latter treaty by Mars and Quirinus. The oath by Jupiter Lapis is as follows. The man who is swearing to the treaty takes in his hand a stone, and when he has sworn in the name of the state, he says, "If I abide by this my oath may

all good be mine, but if I do otherwise in thought or act, let all other men dwell safe in their own countries under their own laws and in possession of their own substance, temples, and tombs, and may I alone be cast forth, even as this stone," and so saying he throws the stone from his hand.

The treaties being such, and preserved as they are on bronze tablets beside the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus in the treasury of the Quaestors, who can fail to be surprised at Philinus the historian, not indeed for his ignorance of them, for that is by no means surprising, since still in my time, the most aged among the Romans and Carthaginians and those best versed in public affairs were ignorant of them; but how did he venture and on what authority to state just the opposite, to wit that there was a treaty between Rome and Carthage by which the Romans were obliged to keep away from the whole of Sicily and the Carthaginians from the whole of Italy, and that the Romans broke the treaty and their oath by their first crossing to Sicily? There is, as a fact, no such document at all, nor ever was there; yet in his Second Book he states thus in so many words. I mentioned the subject in the introductory part of this work, but deferred until the present occasion the detailed treatment it deserves, in view of the fact that many people, relying on Philinus' work, have false notions on the subject. True, if as regards the crossing of the Romans to Sicily anyone chooses to blame them for having ever consented to receive into their friendship and afterwards to help those Mamertines who seized treacherously not only Messene but Rhegium, he would have good reason for his disapproval, but if he supposes that they crossed contrary to treaty and to their oath he is obviously ignorant of the true facts.

At the close of the war for Sicily, then, they made another treaty, the clauses of which run as follows: "The Carthaginians are to evacuate the whole of Sicily and all the islands between Italy and Sicily. The allies of both parties are to be secure from attack by the other. Neither party is entitled to impose any contribution to construct public buildings, or to enrol soldiers, in the dominions of the other, nor to form alliances with the allies of the other. The Carthaginians are to pay twenty-two hundred talents within ten years, and a sum of a thousand talents at once. The Carthaginians are to give up to the Romans all prisoners free of ransom." Later, at the end of the Libyan War, after the Romans had actually passed a decree declaring war on Carthage, they added the following clauses, as I stated above: "The Carthaginians are to evacuate Sardinia and pay a further sum of twelve hundred talents." The very last of this series of agreements that made with Hasdrubal in Spain, that "The Carthaginians are not to cross the Ebro in arms." Such is the diplomatic history of the relations between Rome and Carthage up to the time of Hannibal.

While therefore we find that the crossing of the Romans to Sicily was not contrary to treaty, for the second war, that in which they made the treaty about Sardinia, it is impossible to discover any reasonable pretext or cause. In this case everyone would agree that the Carthaginians, contrary to all justice, and merely because the occasion permitted it, were forced to evacuate Sardinia and pay the additional sum I mentioned. For from the charge brought by the Romans against them in justification of this, that in the Libyan war they inflicted wrongs on the crews of ships sailing from Rome, they had freed them on the occasion when they had received back from them all their sailors who had been brought into Carthage and in

return gave back all their own prisoners as an act of grace and without ransom. Of this I have spoken at length in my previous Book.

Having established these facts it remains for us to consider, after thorough investigation, to which of the two states we should attribute the cause of the Hannibalic war.

I have already stated what the Carthaginians alleged, and will now give the reply of the Romans—a reply indeed which they did not make at the time owing to their indignation at the loss of Saguntum, but it has been given on many occasions and by many different people at Rome. In the first place they contend that the treaty with Hasdrubal should not be ignored, as the Carthaginians had the audacity to say; for there was no conditioning clause at the end as in the treaty made by Lutatius: "This treaty shall be valid if the Roman people also agree to it," but Hasdrubal finally and unconditionally made the agreement in which was the clause, "The Carthaginians shall not cross the Ebro in arms." Again, in the treaty about Sicily there was, as the Carthaginians admit, the clause: "The allies of either party are to be secure from attack by the other," and this does not mean "those who were allies at that time," as the Carthaginians interpret it; for in that case there would have been a further clause to the effect that neither party should enter into other alliances than their existing ones or that those subsequently received into alliance should not be admitted to the benefits of the treaty. But since neither of these clauses was appended, it is evident that each party undertook that all allies of the other, both those then existing and those subsequently admitted to alliance, should be secure from attack. This indeed seems a quite reasonable view; for surely they would never have made a treaty by which they deprived themselves of the freedom to admit

into alliance from time to time any peoples whose friendship seemed to be of advantage to them, nor, having taken such under their protection, was it to be supposed that they would ignore injuries done to them by certain people. But the chief meaning of the treaty to both parties when they made it was, that they should each leave unmolested the existing allies of the other and in no way admit any of those into their own alliance, whereas, regarding subsequent alliances, to which this clause particularly applies, they undertook not to enlist soldiers or levy contributions in the provinces of each or in countries allied to each, and that all allies of each in general should be secure from attack by the other.

This being so, it is an acknowledged fact that the Saguntines, a good many years before the time of Hannibal, placed themselves under the protection of Rome. The surest proof of this, and one accepted by the Carthaginians themselves, is that when a civil disturbance broke out at Saguntum they did not call in the mediation of the Carthaginians, although they were close at hand and already concerning themselves with Spanish matters, but that of the Romans, and with their help set right the affairs of the state. Therefore, if we take the destruction of Saguntum to be the cause of the war we must allow that the Carthaginians were in the wrong in beginning the war, both in view of the treaty of Lutatius, in which it was stipulated that the allies of each should be secure from attack by the other, and in view of the convention made with Hasdrubal, by which the Carthaginians undertook not to cross the Ebro in arms. If, however, we take the cause of the war to have been the robbery of Sardinia and the tribute then exacted, we must certainly confess that they had good reason for entering on the Hannibalic war, since having yielded only to circumstances,

they now availed themselves of circumstances to be avenged on those who had injured them.

It might be said by some of these who look on such things without discernment, that these are matters which it was not necessary for me to treat in such detail. My answer is, that if there were any man who considered that he had sufficient force in himself to face any circumstances, I should say perhaps that knowledge of the past was good for him, but not necessary; but if there is no one in this world at least who would venture to speak so of himself either as regards his private fortunes or those of his country—since, even if all is well with him now no man of sense could from his present circumstances have any reasonable confidence that he will be prosperous in the future—I affirm for this reason that such knowledge is not only good but in the highest degree necessary. For how can anyone when wronged himself or when his country is wronged find helpmates and allies; how can he, when desirous of acquiring some possession or initiating some project, stir to action those whose co-operation he wishes; how, finally, if he is content with present conditions, can he rightly stimulate others to establish his own convictions and maintain things as they are, if he knows nothing at all of the past history of those he would influence? For all men are given to adapt themselves to the present and assume a character suited to the times, so that from their words and actions it is difficult to judge of the principles of each, and in many cases the truth is quite overcast. But men's past actions, bringing to bear the test of actual fact, indicate truly the principles and opinions of each, and show us where we may look for gratitude, kindness, and help, and where for the reverse. It is by this means that we shall often and in many circumstances find those who will

compassionate our distresses, who will share our anger or join us in being avenged on our enemies, all which is most helpful to life both in public and in private. Therefore both writers and readers of history should not pay so much attention to the actual narrative of events, as to what precedes, what accompanies, and what follows each. For if we take from history the discussion of why, how, and wherefore each thing was done, and whether the result was what we should have reasonably expected, what is left is a clever essay but not a lesson, and while pleasing for the moment of no possible benefit for the future.

For this reason I must pronounce those to be much mistaken who think that this my work is difficult to acquire and difficult to read owing to the number and length of the Books it contains. How much easier it is to acquire and peruse forty Books, all as it were connected by one thread, and thus to follow clearly events in Italy, Sicily, and Libya from the time of Pyrrhus to the capture of Carthage, and those in the rest of the world from the flight of Cleomenes of Sparta on till the battle of the Romans and Achaeans at the Isthmus, than to read or procure the works of those who treat of particular transactions. Apart from their being many times as long as my history, readers cannot gather anything with certainty from them, firstly because most of them give different accounts of the same matter, and next because they omit those contemporary events by a comparative review and estimation of which we can assign its true value to everything much more surely than by judging from particulars; and, finally, because it is out of their power even to touch on what is most essential. For I maintain that far the most essential part of history is the consideration of the remote or immediate consequences of events and especially that of causes. Thus I

regard the war with Antiochus as deriving its origin from that with Philip, the latter as resulting from that with Hannibal, and the Hannibalic war as a consequence of that about Sicily, the intermediate events, however many and various their character, all tending to the same purpose. All this can be recognized and understood from a general history, but not at all from the historians of the wars themselves, such as the war with Perseus or that with Philip, unless indeed anyone reading their descriptions of the battles alone conceives that he has acquired an adequate knowledge of the management and nature of the whole war. This, however, is not at all so, and I consider that my history differs to its advantage as much from the works on particular episodes as learning does from listening.

I interrupted my narrative to enter on this digression at the point where the Roman ambassadors were at Carthage. After listening to the Carthaginians' statement of their case, they made no other reply but the following. The oldest member of the embassy, pointing to the bosom of his toga, told the Senate that it held both war and peace for them: therefore he would let fall from it and leave with them whichever of the two they bade him. The Carthaginian Suffete bade him let fall whichever the Romans chose, and when the envoy said he would let fall war, many of the senators cried out at once, "We accept it." The ambassadors and the Senate parted on these terms.

Hannibal, who was wintering in New Carthage, in the first place dismissed the Iberians to their own cities hoping thus to make them readily disposed to help in the future; next he instructed his brother Hasdrubal how to manage the government of Spain and prepare to resist the Romans if he himself happened to be absent; in the third place he took precautions for the

security of Africa, adopting the very sensible and wise policy of sending soldiers from Africa to Spain, and *vice versa*, binding by this measure the two provinces to reciprocal loyalty. The troops who crossed to Africa were supplied by the Thersitae, Mastiani, Iberian Oretes and Olcades, and numbered twelve hundred horse and thirteen thousand eight hundred and seventy Balearians, a popular appellation, derived from *ballein*, "to throw," and meaning slingers, given to them owing to their skill with this weapon and extended to their nation and islands. He stationed most of these troops at Metagonia in Libya and some in Carthage itself. From the so-called Metagonian towns he sent four thousand foot to Carthage to serve both as a reinforcement and as hostages. In Spain he left with his brother Hasdrubal fifty quinqueremes, two quadriremes and all the triremes being fully manned. He also gave him as cavalry Liby-Phoenicians and Libyans to the number of four hundred and fifty, three hundred Ilergetes and eighteen hundred Numidians drawn from the Masylii, Masaesylii, Maccoei and Maurusi, who dwell by the ocean, and as infantry eleven thousand eight hundred and fifty Libyans, three hundred Ligurians, and five hundred Balearians, as well as twenty-one elephants.

No one need be surprised at the accuracy of the information I give here about Hannibal's arrangements in Spain, an accuracy which even the actual organizer of the details would have some difficulty in attaining, and I need not be condemned off-hand under the idea that I am acting like those authors who try to make their misstatements plausible. The fact is that I found on the Lacinian promontory a bronze tablet on which Hannibal himself had made out these lists during the time he was in Italy, and

thinking this an absolutely first-rate authority, decided to follow the document.

Hannibal, after taking all precautions for the safety of Africa and Spain, was anxiously awaiting the arrival of the messengers he expected from the Celts. He had informed himself accurately about the fertility of the land at the foot of the Alps and near the river Po, the denseness of its population, the bravery of the men in war, and above all their hatred of Rome ever since that former war with the Romans which I described in the preceding Book to enable my readers to follow all I am about to narrate. He therefore cherished high hopes of them, and was careful to send messengers with unlimited promises to the Celtic chiefs both on this side of the Alps and in the mountains themselves, thinking that the only means of carrying the war against the Romans into Italy was, after surmounting, if possible, the difficulties of the route, to reach the above country and employ the Celts as co-operators and confederates in his enterprise. When the messengers arrived and reported that the Celts consented and awaited him, at the same time saying that the crossing of the Alps was very toilsome and difficult, but by no means impossible, he drew out his troops from their winter quarters in the early spring. As the news of what had happened in Carthage had just reached him, his spirits were now high, and trusting in the favourable disposition of the citizens, he now called openly on his men to join him in the war against Rome, impressing upon them the demand of the Romans that he and all his principal officers should be given up to them, and pointing out at the same time the wealth of the country they were bound for and the friendly feelings of the Gauls who would be their allies. When he saw that the soldiers listened gladly and were as eager as himself to be

off, he commended their alacrity and after ordering them to be ready on the day fixed for his departure, dismissed the meeting.

Having completed the arrangements I mentioned above during the winter and thus assured the security of Africa and Spain, he advanced on the day he had fixed with an army of about ninety thousand foot and twelve thousand horse. Crossing the Ebro, he set about subduing the tribes of the Ilurgetes, Bargusii, Aerenosii, and Andosini as far as the Pyrenees, and having reduced them all and taken some cities by assault, with unexpected rapidity indeed, but after many severe engagements and with great loss, he left Hanno in command of all the country on this side of the river, placing the Bargusii under his absolute rule, as he mistrusted them most, owing to their friendly sentiments toward Rome. He assigned to Hanno out of his own army ten thousand foot and one thousand horse, and he left with him all the heavy baggage of the expeditionary force. He dismissed at the same time an equal number of troops to their homes, with the view of leaving them well disposed to himself and encouraging the hope of a safe return in the rest of the Spaniards, not only those who were serving with him, but those who remained at home, so that if he ever had to call on them for reinforcements, they might all readily respond. With the rest of his force, thus lightened of its impedimenta and consisting now of fifty thousand foot and about nine thousand horse, he advanced throughout the Pyrenees towards the crossing of the Rhone, having now an army not so strong in number as serviceable and highly trained owing to the unbroken series of wars in Spain.

That my narrative may not be altogether obscure to readers owing to their ignorance of the topography I must explain whence Hannibal started,

what countries he traversed, and into what part of Italy he descended. Nor must I simply give the names of countries, rivers, and cities, as some authors do under the idea that this is amply sufficient for a clear knowledge. I am of opinion that as regards known countries the mention of names is of no small assistance in recalling them to our memory, but in the case of unknown lands such citation of names is just of as much value as if they were unintelligible and inarticulate sounds. For the mind here has nothing to lean upon for support and cannot connect the words with anything known to it, so that the narrative is associated with nothing in the readers' mind, [4] and therefore meaningless to him. We must therefore make it possible when speaking of unknown places to convey to the reader a more or less real and familiar notion of them.

[4] *Cf*. Bk. v. 21. 4.

Now the primary and most general conception and one common to all mankind is the division and ordering of the heavens by which all of us, even those of the meanest capacity, distinguish East, West, South, and North. The next step in knowledge is to classify the parts of the earth under each of these divisions, ever mentally referring each statement to one of them until we arrived at a familiar conception of unknown and unseen regions. This once established as regards the whole earth, it remains for me to lay before my readers the division on the same principle of that portion of the world known to us. This is divided into three parts, each with its name, the one part being called Asia, the second Africa, and the third Europe. Their respective boundaries are the river Don, the Nile, and the straits at the Pillars of Hercules. Asia lies between the Nile and Don and falls under that portion of the heaven lying between the north-east and the south. Africa lies

between the Nile and the Pillars of Hercules, and it falls under the south to the south-west and west, as far as the point of the equinoctial sunset, in which latter quarter are the Pillars of Hercules. These two divisions of the earth, then, regarded from a general point of view, occupy the part of it which lies to the south of the Mediterranean, reaching from east to west. Europe lies opposite to them on the north shore of this sea, extending continuously from east to west, its most compact and deepest portion lying due north between the Don and the Narbo, the latter river being not far to the west of Marseilles and of the mouths by which the Rhone discharges itself into the Sardinian Sea. The Celts inhabit the country near the Narbo and beyond it as far as the chain of the Pyrenees which stretches in an unbroken line from the Mediterranean to the Outer Sea. The remaining part of Europe beyond the Pyrenees reaching to its western end and to the Pillars of Hercules is bounded on the one side by the Mediterranean and on the other by the Outer Sea, that portion of which is washed by the Mediterranean as far as the Pillars of Hercules being called Iberia, while that part which lies along the Outer or Great Sea has no general name, as it has only recently come under notice, but is all densely inhabited by barbarous tribes of whom I shall speak more particularly on a subsequent occasion. Just as with regard to Asia and Africa where they meet in Aethiopia no one up to the present has been able to say with certainty whether the southern extension of them is continuous land or is bounded by a sea, so that part of Europe which extends to the north between the Don and Narbo is up to now unknown to us, and will remain so unless the curiosity of explorers lead to some discoveries in the future. We must pronounce that those who either by word of mouth or in writing make rash

statements about these regions have no knowledge of them, and invent mere fables.

I have said so much in order that my narrative should not be without something to range itself under in the minds of those who are ignorant of the localities, but that they should have some notion at least of the main geographical distinctions, with which they can connect in thought and to which they can refer my statements, calculating the position of places from the quarter of the heaven under which they lie. For as in the case of physical sight we are in the habit of turning our faces in the direction of any object pointed out to us, so should we mentally ever turn and shift our glance to each place to which the story calls our attention.

Dismissing this matter I will now continue my narrative. At the time of which we are speaking the Carthaginians were masters of all that part of Africa which looks towards the Mediterranean from the Altars of Philaenus [5] on the Greater Syrtis as far as the Pillars of Hercules. The length of this coast-line is more than sixteen thousand stades. Crossing the straits at the Pillars of Hercules they had similarly subdued all Iberia as far as the point on the coast of the Mediterranean where the Pyrenees, which separate the Celts from the Iberians, end. This spot is about eight thousand stades distant from the mouth of this sea at the Pillars of Hercules, the distance being three thousand stades from the Pillars to New Carthage, from which place Hannibal started for Italy, two thousand six hundred stades from hence to the Ebro, and from the Ebro to Emporium one thousand six hundred stades. From Emporium to Narbo it is about six hundred stades, and from Narbo to the passage of the Rhone about sixteen hundred, this part of the road having now been carefully measured by the Romans and marked with milestones at

every eighth stade. From the passage of the Rhone, following the bank of the river in the direction of its source as far as the foot of the pass across the Alps to Italy, the distance is fourteen hundred stades, and the length of the actual pass which would bring Hannibal down into the plain of the Po, about twelve hundred. So that to arrive there he had, starting from New Carthage, to march about nine thousand stades. Of this, as far as distance goes, he had nearly traversed the half, but if we look to difficulty far the largest part lay before him.

[5] Originally the boundary between Egypt and Cyrene.

While Hannibal was thus attempting to cross the Pyrenees, in great fear of the Celts owing to the natural strength of the passes, the Romans, having received from the envoys they had sent to Carthage an account of the decision arrived at, and the speeches made there, and on news reaching them sooner than they had expected that Hannibal had crossed the Ebro with his army, determined to send, with their legions, the Consuls Publius Cornelius Scipio to Spain and Tiberius Sempronius Longus to Africa.

While occupied in enrolling the legions and making other preparations they were pushing on the project of establishing in Cisalpine Gaul the colonies on which they had decided. They took active steps to fortify the towns, and ordered the colonists, who were about six thousand in number for either city, to be on the spot within thirty days. The one city they founded on this side of the Po, calling it Placentia, the other, which they named Cremona, on the far side. Scarce had both these colonies been established when the Boii Gauls, who had been for long as it were lying in wait to throw off their allegiance to Rome, but had hitherto found no opportunity, elated now by the messages they received assuring them of the

near arrival of the Carthaginians, revolted from Rome, abandoning the hostages they gave at end of the former war which I described in my last Book. Calling on the Insubres to join them, whose support they easily gained owing to their long-standing rancour against Rome, they overran the lands which the Romans had allotted to their colonies and on the settlers taking to flight, pursued them to Mutina, a Roman colony, and there besieged them. Among those shut up there were three men of high rank who had been sent to carry out the partitionment of the country, Gaius Lutatius, a former Consul, and two former Praetors. On these three requesting a parley with the Boii, the latter consented, but when they came out for the purpose they treacherously made them prisoners, hoping by means of them to get back their own hostages. When the Praetor Lucius Manlius, who with his troops was occupying an advanced position in the neighbourhood, heard of this, he hastened up to give help. The Boii had heard of his approach, and posting ambuscades in a certain forest attacked him from all sides at once as soon as he reached the wooded country, and killed many of the Romans. The remainder at first took to flight, but on getting to higher ground rallied just enough to give their retreat an appearance of order. The Boii following at their heels shut this force too up in the place called Vicus Tannetis. [6] When the news reached Rome that the fourth legion was surrounded by the Boii and besieged, they instantly sent off the legions destined for Publius under the command of a Praetor to its assistance, ordering Publius to enrol other legions from the allies.

[6] Near Parma.

The condition and course of Celtic affairs from the outset up to the arrival of Hannibal were such as I have narrated here and in the previous

Book. The two Roman Consuls, having made all preparations for their respective enterprises, set sail early in summer to take in hand the operations determined on, Publius bound for Iberia with sixty ships and Tiberius Sempronius for Africa with a hundred and sixty quinqueremes. With these he threatened such a redoubtable expedition and made such vast preparations at Lilybaeum, collecting all kinds of forces from everywhere, that it seemed as if he expected to sail up to Carthage and at once lay siege to it. Publius, coasting along Liguria, reached the neighbourhood of Marseilles from Pisa in five days, and coming to anchor off the first mouth of the Rhone, known as the Massaliotic mouth, disembarked his forces there, having heard that Hannibal was already crossing the Pyrenees, but convinced that he was still at a distance of many days' march owing to the difficulty of the country and the numbers of Celtic tribes between them. Hannibal, however, who had bribed some of the Celts and forced others to give him passage, unexpectedly appeared with his army at the crossing of the Rhone, having marched with the Sardinian Sea on his right. Publius, when the arrival of the enemy was reported to him, being partly incredulous owing to the cupidity of their advance and partly desirous of ascertaining the exact truth—while he himself was refreshing his troops after their voyage and consulting with his Tribunes in what place it would be wisest to offer battle to the enemy—sent out three hundred of his bravest cavalry, giving them as guides and supports certain Celts who were in the service of the Massaliots as mercenaries.

Hannibal, on reaching the neighbourhood of the river, at once set about attempting to cross it where the stream is single at a distance of about four days' march from the sea. Doing his best to make friends with the

inhabitants of the bank, he bought up all their canoes and boats, amounting to a considerable number, since many of the people on the banks of the Rhone engage in maritime traffic. He also got from them the logs suitable for making the canoes, so that in two days he had an innumerable quantity of ferry-boats, every one doing his best to dispense with any assistance and relying on himself for his chance of getting across. In the meantime a large force of barbarians had gathered on the opposite bank to prevent the Carthaginians from crossing. Hannibal observing this and concluding that as things stood it was neither possible to force a crossing in face of such a strong hostile force nor to put it off, lest he should find himself attacked on all sides, sent off on the third night after his arrival a portion of his army, giving them native guides and placing them under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar the Suffete. Advancing up the bank of the river for two hundred stades they reached a place at which the stream divides, forming an island, and here they stopped. Using the timber they found ready to hand and either nailing or lashing logs together they soon constructed a number of rafts sufficient for their present need, and on these they crossed in safety, meeting with no opposition. Occupying a post of some natural strength they remained there for that day to rest after their exertions and at the same time to prepare for the movement which they had been ordered to execute. Hannibal, moreover, with the part of the army that remained behind with him, was similarly occupied. The question that caused him the greatest embarrassment was how to get the elephants, thirty-seven in number, across.

On the fifth night, however, the force which had already crossed began a little before dawn to advance along the opposite bank against the barbarians

there, while Hannibal had got his soldiers ready and was waiting till the time for crossing came. He had filled the boats with his light horse and the canoes with his lightest infantry. The large boats were placed highest up stream and the lighter ferry-boats farther down, so that the heavier vessels receiving the chief force of the current the canoes should be less exposed to risk in crossing. They hit on the plan of towing the horses astern of the boats swimming, one man at each side of the stern guiding three or four horses by their leading reins, so that a considerable number were got across at once in the first batch. The barbarians seeing the enemy's project poured out of their camp, scattered and in no order, feeling sure that they would easily prevent the Carthaginians from landing. Hannibal, as soon as he saw that the force he had previously sent across was near at hand on the opposite bank, they having announced their approach by a smoke-signal as arranged, ordered all in charge of the ferry-boats to embark and push up against the current. He was at once obeyed, and now with the men in the boats shouting as they vied with one another in their efforts and struggled to stem the current, with the two armies standing on either bank at the very brink of the river, the Carthaginians following the progress of the boats with loud cheers and sharing in the fearful suspense, and the barbarians yelling their war-cry and challenging to combat, the scene was in the highest degree striking and thrilling. At this moment, the barbarians having deserted their tents, the Carthaginians on the far bank attacked suddenly and unexpectedly, and while some of them set fire to the enemy's encampment, the larger portion fell upon the defenders of the passage. The barbarians, taken quite by surprise, rushed some of them to save their tents, while others defended themselves against their assailants. Hannibal, all falling out favourably as

he had purposed, at once marshalled those of his men who were the first to land, and after addressing some words of exhortation to them, led them to meet the barbarians, upon which the Celts, owing to their disordered condition and to their being taken by surprise, soon turned and took to flight.

The Carthaginian general, having thus made himself master of the passage and defeated the enemy, at once occupied himself in fetching over the men who had been left on the other bank, and having in a very short time brought his whole army across encamped for that night beside the river. Next morning, hearing that the Roman fleet was anchored off the mouths of the Rhone, he selected five hundred of his Numidian horse and sent them off to observe the whereabouts and number of the enemy and what they were about. At the same time he set the proper men to the task of bringing the elephants across and then called a meeting of his soldiers and, introducing Magilus and the other chieftains who had come to him from the plain of the Po, made the troops acquainted through a dragoman with what they reported to be the decision of their tribes. What encouraged the soldiers most in their address was firstly the actual and visible presence of those Gauls who were inviting them to Italy and promising to join them in the war against Rome, and secondly the reliance they placed on their promise to guide them by a route which would take them without their being exposed to any privations, rapidly and safely to Italy. In addition to this the Gauls dwelt on the richness and extent of the country they were going to, and the eager spirit of the men by whose side they were about to face the armies of Rome. The Celts, after speaking in this sense, withdrew, and Hannibal himself now came forward and began by reminding them of

their achievements in the past: though, he said, they had undertaken many hazardous enterprises and fought many a battle they had never met with ill success when they followed his plans and counsels. Next he bade them be of good heart considering that the hardest part of their task was now accomplished, since they had forced the passage of the river and had the testimony of their own eyes and ears to the friendly sentiments and readiness to help of their allies. He begged them therefore to be at their ease about details which were his own business, but to obey orders and behave like brave men and in a manner worthy of their own record in the past. When the men applauded him, exhibiting great enthusiasm and ardour, he commended them and, after offering a prayer to the gods on behalf of all, dismissed them, bidding them get everything ready expeditiously as they would start on their march next day.

After the assembly had broken up the Numidian scouts who had been sent out to reconnoitre returned, the greater part of the force lost and the remainder in headlong flight. Not far from their own camp they had fallen in with the Roman cavalry sent out by Publius on the same errand, and both forces had shown such heroism in the engagement that the Romans and Celts lost about a hundred and forty horsemen and the Numidians more than two hundred. Afterwards the Romans carried their pursuit close up to the Carthaginian camp, and having surveyed it, turned and hastily rode off to report to the Consul the arrival of the enemy, and on reaching their camp did so. Publius at once put his baggage on board the ships and started with his whole army marching up the river bank with the view of encountering the Carthaginians.

Hannibal, on the day after the assembly, advanced his cavalry in the direction of the sea to act as a covering force and then moved his infantry out of the camp and sent them off on their march, while he himself waited for the elephants and the men who had been left with them. The way they got the elephants across was as follows. They built a number of very solid rafts and lashing two of these together fixed them very firmly into the bank of the river, their united width being about fifty feet. To these they attached others on the farther side, prolonging the bridge out into the stream. They secured the side of it which faced the current by cables attached to the trees that grew on the bank, so that the whole structure might remain in place and not be shifted by the current. When they had made the whole bridge or pier of rafts about two hundred feet long they attached to the end of it two particularly compact ones, very firmly fastened to each other, but so connected with the rest that the lashings could easily be cut. They attached to these several towing-lines by which boats were to tow them, not allowing them to be carried down stream, but holding them up against the current, and thus were to convey the elephants which would be in them across. After this they piled up a quantity of earth on all the line of rafts, until the whole was on the same level and of the same appearance as the path on shore leading to the crossing. The animals were always accustomed to obey their mahouts up to the water, but would never enter it on any account, and they now drove them along over the earth with two females in front, whom they obediently followed. As soon as they set foot on the last rafts the ropes which held these fast to the others were cut, and the boats pulling taut, the towing-lines rapidly tugged away from the pile of earth the elephants and the rafts on which they stood. Hereupon the animals becoming very alarmed

at first turned round and ran about in all directions, but as they were shut in on all sides by the stream they finally grew afraid and were compelled to keep quiet. In this manner, by continuing to attach two rafts to the end of the structure, they managed to get most of them over on these, but some were so frightened that they threw themselves into the river when half-way across. The mahouts of these were all drowned, but the elephants were saved, for owing to the power and length of their trunks they kept them above the water and breathed through them, at the same time spouting out any water that got into their mouths and so held out, most of them passing through the water on their feet.

After the elephants had been put across, Hannibal, taking them and his cavalry and forming these into a rear-guard, advanced up the river bank away from the sea in an easterly direction as though making for the centre of Europe. The Rhone rises north-west of the head of the Adriatic on the northern slope of the Alps, and running in a south-westerly direction, falls into the Sardinian Sea. A great part of its course is through a deep valley, to the north of which lives the Celtic tribe of the Ardyes, while on the south it is bounded for its whole extent by the northern spurs of the Alps. The plain of the Po which I described above at length is separated from the Rhone valley by the lofty main chain of these mountains, which starting from Marseilles extends to the head of the Adriatic. It is this chain which Hannibal now crossed to enter Italy from the Rhone valley.

Some of the writers who have described this passage of the Alps, from the wish to impress their readers by the marvels they recount of these mountains, are betrayed into two vices ever most alien to true history; for they are compelled to make both false statements and statements which

contradict each other. While on the one hand introducing Hannibal as a commander of unequalled courage and foresight, they incontestably represent him to us as entirely wanting in prudence, and again, being unable to bring their series of falsehoods to any close or issue they introduce gods and the sons of gods into the sober history of the facts. By representing the Alps as being so steep and rugged that not only horses and troops accompanied by elephants, but even active men on foot would have difficult in passing, and at the same time picturing to us the desolation of the country as being such, that unless some god or hero had met Hannibal and showed him the way, his whole army would have gone astray and perished utterly, they unquestionably fall into both the above vices. For in the first place can we imagine a more imprudent general or a more incompetent leader than Hannibal would have been, if with so large an army under his command and all his hopes of ultimate success resting on it, he did not know the roads and the country, as these writers say, and had absolutely no idea where he was marching or against whom, or in fact if his enterprise were feasible or not? What they would have us believe is that Hannibal, who had met with no check to diminish his high hopes of success, ventured on a course that no general, even after a crushing defeat and utterly at his wits' end, would take, to march, that is, into a country as to which he had no information. Similarly, in what they say about the loneliness, and the extreme steepness and difficulty of the road, the falsehood is manifest. For they never took the trouble to learn that the Celts who live near the Rhone not on one or on two occasions only before Hannibal's arrival but often, and not at any remote date but quite recently, had crossed the Alps with large armies and met the Romans in the field side by side with the Celts who inhabit the plain of the

Po (as I narrated in an earlier Book) nor are they aware that there is a considerable population in the Alps themselves; but in entire ignorance of all this they tell us that some hero appeared and showed the road. The natural consequence is that they get into the same difficulties as tragic dramatists all of whom, to bring their dramas to a close, require a deus ex machina, as the data they choose on which to found their plots are false and contrary to reasonable probability. These writers are necessarily in the same spirit and invent apparitions of heroes and gods, since the beginnings on which they build are false and improbable; for how is it possible to finish conformably to reason what has been begun in defiance of it? Of course Hannibal did not act as these writers describe, but conducted his plans with sound practical sense. He had ascertained by careful inquiry the richness of the country into which he proposed to descend and the aversion of the people to the Romans, and for the difficulties of the route he employed as guides and pioneers natives of the country, who were about to take part in his adventure. On these points I can speak with some confidence as I have inquired about the circumstances from men present on the occasion and have personally inspected the country and made the passage of the Alps to learn for myself and see.

Now the Roman Consul Publius arrived at the crossing of the river three days after the departure of the Carthaginians, and finding the enemy gone was in the highest degree astonished, as he had been convinced that they would never venture to march on Italy by this route owing to the number and unruly character of the native inhabitants. On seeing that they had done so he returned with all speed to his ships and began to embark his forces. Sending his brother to conduct the campaign in Spain, he himself turned

back and made sail for Italy with the design of marching rapidly through Etruria and reaching the foot of the pass over the Alps before the enemy.

Hannibal, marching steadily from the crossing-place for four days, reached a place called the "Island," a populous district producing abundance of corn and deriving its name from its situation; for the Rhone and Isère running along each side of it meet at its point. It is similar in size and shape to the Egyptian Delta; only in that case the sea forms the base line uniting the two branches of the Nile, while here the base line is formed by a range of mountains difficult to climb or penetrate, and, one may say, almost inaccessible. On arriving there he found two brothers disputing the crown and posted over against each other with their armies, and on the elder one making overtures to him and begging him to assist in establishing him on the throne, he consented, it being almost a matter of certainty that under present circumstances this would be of great service to him. Having united with him therefore to attack and expel the other, he derived great assistance from the victor; for not only did he furnish the army with plenty of corn and other provisions but he replaced all their old and worn weapons by new ones, thus freshening up the whole force very opportunely. He also supplied most of them with warm clothing and foot-wear, things of the greatest possible service to them in crossing the mountains. But the most important of all was, that the Carthaginians being not at all easy on the subject of their passage through the territory of the Allobroges, he protected them in the rear with his own forces and enabled them to reach the foot of the pass in safety.

After a ten days' march of eight hundred stades along the bank of the Isère [7] Hannibal began the ascent of the Alps and now found himself

involved in very great difficulties. For as long as they had been in flat country, the various chiefs of the Allobroges had left them alone, being afraid both of the cavalry and of the barbarians who were escorting them. But when the latter had set off on their return home, and Hannibal's troops began to advance into the difficult region, the Allobrogian chieftains got together a considerable force and occupied advantageous positions on the road by which the Carthaginians would be obliged to ascend. Had they only kept their project secret, they would have utterly annihilated the Carthaginian army, but, as it was, it was discovered, and though they inflicted a good deal of damage on Hannibal, they did more injury to themselves; for the Carthaginian general having learnt that the barbarians had seized on these critical positions, encamped himself at the foot of the pass, and remaining there sent on in advance some of his Gaulish guides, to reconnoitre and report on the enemy's plan and the whole situation. His orders were executed, and on learning that the enemy remained most strictly at their post during the day-time but retired at night to a neighbouring township, he adapted his measures to this intelligence and arranged the following plan. He advanced openly with his whole army, and on approaching the difficult points he encamped not far from the enemy. As soon as it was night, he ordered the fires to be lit, and leaving the greater part of his forces there, took the men most fitted for the enterprise, whom he had lightened of their accoutrements, and passing through the narrow part of the road occupied the posts abandoned by the enemy, who had retired as usual to the town. At daylight the enemy observed what had happened and at first desisted from their project, but afterwards on seeing the long string of sumpter-animals and horsemen slowly and with difficulty winding up the

narrow path, they were tempted by this to molest their march. On their doing so and attacking at several different points, the Carthaginians suffered great loss chiefly in horses and sumpter-mules, not so much at the hands of the barbarians as owing to the ground. For the road up the pass being not only narrow and uneven but precipitous, the least movement or disturbance caused many of the animals to be pushed over the precipice with their packs. It was chiefly the horses on being wounded which caused the disturbance, some of them, terrified by the pain, turning and meeting the pack-animals and others rushing on ahead and pushing aside in the narrow path everything that came in their way, thus creating a general confusion. Hannibal, on seeing this and reflecting that there would be no chance of safety even for those who escaped from the battle if the pack-train were destroyed, took with him the men who had occupied the heights at night and hastened to render assistance to the head of the marching column. He inflicted great loss on the Allobroges, as he was charging from higher ground, but the loss was equally heavy among his own troops, since the column on the march was thrown into further confusion in both directions at once owing to the shouting and struggling of those taking part in this combat. It was only when he had put the greater part of the Allobroges to the sword and compelled the rest to take to flight and run for their own land, that the remainder of the pack-train and the horses got slowly and with great difficulty over the dangerous part, and he himself rallying as many troops as he could after the fight, attacked the town from which the enemy had issued to make their onslaught. He found it nearly deserted, as all the inhabitants had been tempted out by hope of pillage, and seized on it. This proved of great service to him for the future as well as the present; for not only did he

recover a number of pack-animals and horses and the men who had been captured together with them, but he got a supply of corn and cattle amply sufficient for two or three days, and in addition to this he struck such terror into the next tribes that none of those in the neighbourhood of the ascent were likely to venture to molest him.

[7] Polybius says simply "the river."

For the present, he encamped here, and after a stay of one day resumed his march. For the following days he conducted the army in safety up to a certain point, but on the fourth day he was again placed in great danger. The natives near the pass conspired together and came out to meet him with treacherous intentions, holding olive-branches and wreaths, which nearly all the barbarians use as tokens of friendship, just as we Greeks use the herald's staff. Hannibal, who was a little suspicious of such proffer of alliance, took great pains to ascertain what their project and general motives were. When they told him that they knew all about the capture of the city and the destruction of those who had attempted to do him wrong, and assured him that for this reason they were come to him, as they neither wished to inflict nor to suffer any injury, and on their promising to give him hostages from among themselves, he for long hesitated, distrusting their word. But, reflecting that if he accepted their offers, he might perhaps make them more chary of attacking him and more pacific, but that if he refused, they would certainly be his declared enemies, he finally agreed to their proposals, and feigned to accept their friendship. Upon the barbarians now delivering the hostages and providing him with cattle in abundance, and altogether putting themselves unreservedly into his hands, he trusted them in so far as to employ them as guides for the next difficult part of the road. But after two

days march these same barbarians collecting and following on the heels of the Carthaginians, attacked them as they were traversing a certain difficult and precipitous gorge. On this occasion Hannibal's whole army would have been utterly destroyed, had he not still been a little apprehensive and foreseeing such a contingency placed the pack-train and cavalry at the head of the column and the heavy infantry in the rear. As the latter now acted as a covering force, the disaster was less serious, the infantry meeting the brunt of the attack. But in spite of all this a great many men, pack-animals, and horses were lost. For the enemy being on higher ground skirted along the slopes and either by rolling rocks down or by hurling stones from the hand threw the Carthaginians into such extreme peril and confusion that Hannibal was compelled to pass the night with half his force at a certain place defended by bare rocks and separated from his horses and pack-train, whose advance he waited to cover, until after a whole night's labour they managed to extricate themselves from the defile. Next day, the enemy having taken their departure, he joined the cavalry and pack-animals and advanced to the summit of the pass, encountering no longer any massed force of barbarians, but molested from time to time and in certain places by some of them who took advantage of the ground to attack him either from the rear or from the front and carry off some of the pack-animals. In these circumstances the elephants were of the greatest service to him; for the enemy never dared to approach that part of the column in which these animals were, being terrified by the strangeness of their appearance. After an ascent of nine days Hannibal reached the summit, and encamping there remained for two days to rest the survivors of his army and wait for stragglers. During this interval a good many of the horses which had broken away in terror and a number

of those sumpter-animals which had thrown off their packs returned strangely enough, having followed the track of the march, and came into the camp. As it was now close on the setting of the Pleiads snow had already gathered on the summit, and noticing that the men were in bad spirits owing to all they had suffered up to now and expected to suffer he summoned them to a meeting and attempted to cheer them up, relying chiefly for this purpose on the actual view of Italy, which lies so close under these mountains, that when both are viewed together the Alps stand to the whole of Italy in the relation of a citadel to a city. Showing them, therefore, the plain of the Po, and reminding them of the friendly feelings of the Gauls inhabiting it, while at the same time pointing out the situation of Rome itself, he to some extent restored their spirits. Next day he broke up his camp and began the descent. During this he encountered no enemy, except a few skulking marauders, but owing to the difficulties of the ground and the snow his losses were nearly as heavy as on the ascent. The descending path was very narrow and steep, and as both men and beasts could not tell on what they were treading owing to the snow, all that stepped wide of the path or stumbled were dashed down the precipice. This trial, however, they put up with, being by this time familiar with such sufferings, but they at length reached a place where it was impossible for either the elephants or the pack-animals to pass owing to the extreme narrowness of the path, a previous landslip having carried away about one and a half stades of the face of the mountain and a further landslip having recently occurred, and here the soldiers once more became disheartened and discouraged. The Carthaginian general at first thought of avoiding the difficult part by a detour, but as a fresh fall of snow made progress impossible he had to abandon this project.

The state of matters was altogether peculiar and unusual. The new snow which had fallen on the top of the old snow remaining since the previous winter, was itself yielding, both owing to its softness, being a fresh fall, and because it was not yet very deep, but when they had trodden through it and set foot on the congealed snow beneath it, they no longer sunk in it, but slid along it with both feet, as happens to those who walk on ground with a coat of mud on it. But what followed on this was even more trying. As for the men, when, unable to pierce the lower layer of snow, they fell and then tried to help themselves to rise by the support of their knees and hands, they slid along still more rapidly on these, the slope being exceedingly steep. But the animals, when they fell, broke through the lower layer of snow in their efforts to rise, and remained there with their packs as if frozen into it, owing to their weight and the congealed condition of this old snow. Giving up this project, then, Hannibal encamped on the ridge, sweeping it clear of snow, and next set the soldiers to work to build up the path along the cliff, a most toilsome task. In one day he had made a passage sufficiently wide for the pack-train and horses; so he at once took these across and encamping on ground free of snow, sent them out to pasture, and then took the Numidians in relays to work at building up the path, so that with great difficulty in three days he managed to get the elephants across, but in a wretched condition from hunger; for the summits of the Alps and the parts near the tops of the passes are all quite treeless and bare owing to the snow lying there continuously both winter and summer, but the slopes half-way up on both sides are grassy and wooded and on the whole inhabitable.

Hannibal having now got all his forces together continued the descent, and in three days' march from the precipice just described reached flat

country. He had lost many of his men by the hands of the enemy in the crossing of rivers and on the march in general, and the precipices and difficulties of the Alps had cost him not only many men, but a far greater number of horses and sumpter-animals. The whole march from New Carthage had taken him five months, and he had spent fifteen days in crossing the Alps, and now, when he thus boldly descended into the plain of the Po and the territory of the Insubres, his surviving forces numbered twelve thousand African and eight thousand Iberian foot, and not more than six thousand horse in all, as he himself states in the inscription on the column at Lacinium relating to the number of his forces.

About the same time, as I stated above, Publius Scipio, leaving his forces with his brother Gnaeus with orders to conduct operations in Spain and vigorously combat Hasdrubal, arrived by sea at Pisa with a small following. Marching through Etruria and taking over from the Praetors the frontier legions which were engaged with the Boii, he reached the plain of the Po, and encamping there, waited for the enemy, being anxious to give him battle.

Now that I have brought my narrative and the war the two generals into Italy, desire, before entering upon the struggle, to say a few words on what I think proper to my method in this work. Some readers will perhaps ask themselves why, since most of what I have said relates to Africa and Spain, I have not said a word more about the mouth of the Mediterranean at the Pillars of Hercules, or about the Outer Sea and its peculiarities, or about the British Isles and the method of obtaining tin, and the gold and silver mines in Spain itself, all matters concerning which authors dispute with each other at great length. I have omitted these subjects not because I think they are

foreign to my history, but in the first place because I did not wish to be constantly interrupting the narrative and distracting readers from the actual subject, and next because I decided not to make scattered and casual allusions to such matters, but assigning the proper place and time to their special treatment to give as true an account of all as is in my power. No one then need be surprised when in the course of my history I reach such localities, if I avoid for the reason here stated any description of them. But if there be any who insist on such descriptions of each place that may be mentioned, they are perhaps unaware that they are much in the case of gourmands at a supper party who taste everything on the table and neither truly enjoy any dish at the moment nor digest any enough to derive beneficial nourishment from it in the future. So those who act in the same way about reading do not properly attain either present entertainment or future benefit.

That no part of history requires more circumspection and more correction by the light of truth than this is evident from many considerations and chiefly from the following. While nearly all authors or at least the greater number have attempted to describe the peculiarities and the situation of the countries at the extremities of the known world, most of them are mistaken on many points. We must therefore by no means pass over the subject, but we must say a word to them, and that not casually and by scattered allusions, but giving due attention to it, and in what we say we must not find fault with or rebuke them, but rather be grateful to them and correct them when wrong, knowing as we do that they too, had they the privilege of living at the present day, would correct and modify many of their own statements. In old times, indeed, we find very few Greeks who

attempted to inquire into the outlying parts of the world, owing to the practical impossibility of doing so; for the sea had so many perils that it is difficult to enumerate them, and the land ever so many more. Again, even if anyone by his own choice or by the force of circumstances reached the extremity of the world, that did not mean that he was able to accomplish his purpose. For it was a difficult matter to see many things at all closely with one's own eyes, owing to some of the countries being utterly barbarous and others quite desolate, and it was still more difficult to get information about the things one did see, owing to the difference of the language. Then, even if anyone did see for himself and observe the facts, it was even still more difficult for him to be moderate in his statements, to scorn all talk of marvels and, preferring truth for its own sake, to tell us nothing beyond it. As, therefore, it was almost impossible in old times to give a true account of the regions I speak of, we should not find fault with the writers for their omissions or mistakes, but should praise and admire them, considering the times they lived in, for having ascertained something on the subject and advanced our knowledge. But in our own times since, owing to Alexander's empire in Asia and that of the Romans in other parts of the world, nearly all regions have become approachable by sea or land, since our men of action in Greece are relieved from the ambitions of a military or political career and have therefore ample means for inquiry and study, we ought to be able to arrive at a better knowledge and something more like the truth about lands which were formerly little known. This is what I myself will attempt to do when I find a suitable place in this work for introducing the subject, and I shall then ask those who are curious about such things to give their undivided attention to me, in view of the fact that I underwent the perils of

journeys through Africa, Spain, and Gaul, and of voyages on the seas that lie on the farther side of these countries, mostly for this very purpose of correcting the errors of former writers and making those parts of the world also known to the Greeks.

But now returning to the point at which I digressed from my narrative I shall attempt to describe the battles between the Romans and Carthaginians in Italy.

I have already stated the strength of Hannibal's army when he entered Italy. Once arrived there he at first encamped at the very foot of the Alps to refresh his forces. For his men had not only suffered terribly from the toil of ascent and descent of the passes and the roughness of the road but they were also in wretched condition owing to the scarcity of provisions and neglect of their persons, many having fallen into a state of utter despondency from prolonged toil and want of food. For it had been impossible to transport over such ground a plentiful supply of provisions for so many thousand men, and with the loss of the pack-animals the greater part of what they were carrying perished. So that while Hannibal started from the passage of the Rhone with thirty-eight thousand foot and more than eight thousand horse he lost in crossing the passes, as I said above, about half his whole force, while the survivors, owing to the continued hardships they had suffered, had become in their external appearance and general condition more like beasts than men. Hannibal, therefore, made every provision for carefully attending to the men and the horses likewise until they were restored in body and spirit. After this, his forces having now picked up their strength, when the Taurini who live at the foot of the mountains quarrelled with the Insubres and showed no confidence in the Carthaginians, he at first

made overtures for their friendship and alliance, but on their rejecting these he encamped round their chief city and reduced it in three days. By massacring those who had been opposed to him he struck such terror into the neighbouring tribes of barbarians that they all came in at once and submitted to him. The remaining Celtic inhabitants of the plains were impatient to join the Carthaginians, as had been their original design, but as the Roman legions had advanced beyond most of them and cut them off, they kept quiet, some even being compelled to serve with the Romans. Hannibal, in view of this, decided not to delay, but to advance and try by some action to encourage those who wished to take part in his enterprise.

Such was the purpose he had in view when the news reached him that Publius had already crossed the Po and was quite near at hand. At first he refused to believe it, reflecting that he had left him only a few days previously near the crossing of the Rhone and that the coasting voyage from Marseilles to Etruria was long and difficult, and learning further by inquiry that the road through Italy from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Alps was likewise very long and not suited for the march of troops. But when more messengers continued to arrive bringing the same news in a more definite form, he was struck with amazement at the whole project of the Consul and the way he had carried it out. Publius had very much the same feeling; for at first he had never expected that Hannibal would even attempt to cross the Alps with foreign forces, and if he ventured on it he thought that certain destruction awaited them. So that, his anticipations being such, when he heard that Hannibal was safe and was already besieging towns in Italy he was amazed too at his daring and venturesomeness. In Rome itself the intelligence had much the same effect. The stir created by the last news of

the Carthaginians—that they had captured Saguntum—had only just subsided, measures had been taken to meet this situation by sending one Consul to Libya who was to besiege Carthage itself, and the other to Spain to fight, as they thought, with Hannibal there; and now news came that Hannibal was in Italy with his army and already laying siege to some cities. The thing therefore seemed altogether astounding to them, and in great alarm they sent urgent orders to Tiberius at Lilybaeum, informing him of the arrival of the enemy and bidding him abandon his present project and hasten to the help of his own country. Tiberius at once collected the crews of his fleet and dispatched it with orders to make for home. From his soldiers he exacted through the Tribunes an oath that they would all be at Ariminum on a certain day before bed-time. This is a city on the Adriatic at the southern edge of the plains of the Po. So that as there was great stir and activity all round, and as the news that arrived was what nobody expected, there was on both sides that intense concern for the future which an enemy cannot afford to neglect.

Hannibal and Publius were now near each other, and they both thought it proper to address their troops in a manner suitable to the occasion. The device by which Hannibal tried to encourage his men was as follows. Mustering the troops, he brought forward certain young men from among the prisoners he had taken molesting his march in the difficult part of the Alpine pass. He had purposely, with a view to the use he was going to make of them, ill-used them: they wore heavy fetters, they had suffered much from hunger, and their bodies were disfigured by the marks of blows. Placing them in the middle of the meeting he exhibited some Gaulish suits of armour, such as their kings are wont to deck themselves with when about

to engage in single combat. In addition to these he placed there some horses and had some rich military cloaks brought in. He then asked the young men which of them were willing to do combat with each other, the prizes exhibited being destined for the victor, while the vanquished would be delivered by death from his present misery. When all shouted out with one voice that they were willing to fight, he ordered them to draw lots, and the two on whom the lot fell to arm themselves and do combat. The young men, the moment they heard this, lifted up their hands and prayed to the gods, each eager to be himself one of the chosen. When the result was announced, those on whom the lot had fallen were overjoyed and the rest mournful and dejected, and after the combat was over the remaining prisoners congratulated the fallen champion no less than the victor, as having been set free from many and grievous evils which they themselves were left alive to suffer. The sentiment of most of the Carthaginians was identical; for looking on the misery of the other prisoners as they were led away alive, they pitied them on comparing their fate with that of the dead whom they all pronounced to be fortunate. When Hannibal had by this means produced the disposition he desired in the minds of his troops, he rose and told them that he had brought the prisoners before them designedly in order that clearly seeing in the person of the others what they might themselves have to suffer, they should thence take better counsel at the present crisis. "Fortune," he said, "has brought you to a like pass, she has shut upon in on a like listed field of combat, and the prizes and prospects she offers you are the same. For either you must conquer, or die, or fall alive into the hands of your foes. For you the prize of victory is not to possess horses and cloaks, but to be the most envied of mankind, masters of all the wealth of Rome.

The prize of death on the battle-field is to depart from life in the heat of the fight, struggling till your last breath for the noblest of objects and without having learnt to know suffering. But what awaits those of you who are vanquished and for the love of life consent to fly, or who preserve their lives by any other means, is to have every evil and every misfortune for their lot. There is not one of you so dull and unreflecting as to hope to reach his home by flight, when he remembers the length of the road he traversed from his native land, the numbers of the enemies that lie between, and the size of the rivers he crossed. I beg you, therefore, cut off as you are entirely from any such hope, to take the same view of your own situation that you have just expressed regarding that of others. For as you all accounted both the victor and the fallen fortunate and pitied the survivors, so now should you think about yourselves and go all of you to battle resolved to conquer if you can, and if this be impossible, to die. And I implore you not to let the hope of living after defeat enter your minds at all. If you reason and purpose as I urge upon you, it is clear that victory and safety will follow; for none ever who either by necessity or choice formed such a resolve have been deceived in their hope of putting their enemies to flight. And when the enemy have the opposite hope, as is now the case with the Romans, most of them being sure of finding safety in flight as their homes are near at hand, it is evident that the courage of those who despair of safety will carry all before it." The object-lesson and the speech were well received by the troops, in whom they produced the enthusiasm and self-confidence that the speaker desired, and after commending them he dismissed them, ordering them to be ready to start at daybreak.

At about the same time date Publius Scipio, who had already crossed the Po and had decided to advance across the Ticinus, ordered those qualified for that task to build a bridge and, summoning a meeting of the rest of his forces, addressed them. Most of what he said related to the exalted position of their country and the achievements of their ancestors; what concerned the present situation was as follows. He said that even if they had had no recent experience of the enemy, the knowledge alone that they were going to fight against Carthaginians should give them unshaken hope of victory. They should regard it as altogether an outrageous and surprising that Carthaginians should dare to face Romans, by whom they had been so often beaten, to whom they had paid so much tribute, and whose slaves almost they had been for so many years. "But now," he went on to say, "when apart from this we can judge more or less by our own experience that these actual men here on the spot do not venture to look us in the face, what should our opinion be as to the future, if we estimate chances correctly? Why! not even their cavalry when they met ours near the Rhone came off well, but after losing many of their number fled disgracefully to their own camp, upon which their general and all his forces, as soon as they knew our soldiers were coming, made a retreat more resembling a flight, and contrary to their original intention chose the route through the Alps from pure fear of us. Hannibal has now arrived," he said, "but he has lost most of his army and the rest are weak and useless owing to hardship; he has lost most of his horses too, and those he has left he has rendered fit for nothing by the length and difficulty of his march." From all this he tried to convince them that they had only to show themselves to the enemy. He bade them above all be encouraged by his own presence, for never would he have abandoned

his fleet and the Spanish expedition on which he was dispatched, and made such haste to reach Italy, had it not been evident to him that he was doing a necessary service to his country and that victory was a matter of certainty. When all the troops, owing to the authority of the speaker, and the truth of what he said, showed themselves most ardent for a battle, he commended their alacrity and dismissed them, bidding them hold themselves in readiness to execute his orders.

Next day they both advanced along the Po on the bank nearest the Alps, the Romans having the stream on their left and the Carthaginians on their right. Learning on the following day from their scouts that they were near each other, they both encamped where they were and remained there for the present. But next morning both generals took the whole of their cavalry, and Publius his javelineers also, and advanced through the plain with the object of reconnoitring each other's forces. Upon their approaching each other and seeing the clouds of dust they at once got into order for action. Publius, placing his javelineers and the Gaulish cavalry which was with them in front and the rest behind, advanced slowly. Hannibal, putting his bridled cavalry and all the heavier part of it in front, led them to meet the enemy, having his Numidian horse ready on each wing to execute an outflanking movement. Both of the leaders and their cavalry were so anxious to join battle that at the opening of the action the javelineers had no time to discharge their first volley, but gave way at once and retired through the gaps between the troops of their own cavalry, in terror of the impending charge and fearful of being trodden under foot by the horsemen who were bearing down on them. The cavalry met front to front and for some time maintained an evenly balanced contest, the engagement being both a

cavalry and infantry one, owing to the number of men who dismounted during its progress. When, however, the Numidians outflanked the Romans and took them in the rear, the javelineers on foot who had at first escaped from the charge of the cavalry were now ridden down by the numbers and force of the Numidians, while the cavalry, who from the outset had been facing the Carthaginians, after suffering heavy loss and inflicting still greater on the enemy, being now attacked by the Numidians also in the rear, broke into flight, most of them scattering in every direction but a few gathering closely round the Consul.

Publius now broke up his camp and advanced through the plain to the bridge of the Po, hastening to get his legions across before it was too late. For since the country was all flat, since the enemy was superior in cavalry, and since he himself was severely wounded, he decided to place his forces in safety. Hannibal had at first supposed that the Romans would risk an infantry engagement, but on seeing that they had moved out of their camp, followed them as far as the bridge over the first river, [8] but finding most of the planking from it torn up, but the force set to guard it still remaining at their post by the river side, he took them prisoners to the number of about six hundred, and on hearing that the rest of the Romans were far in advance of him he now wheeled round and marched in the opposite direction up the Po with the object of reaching a place where it was easy to bridge it. After two days' march he halted and, constructing a bridge of boats, ordered Hasdrubal to see to the passage of the army and he himself crossing at once gave a hearing to the envoys who had arrived from the districts round. For immediately upon his success, all the neighbouring Celts hastened, as had been their wish from the outset, to make alliance with the Carthaginians, to

provide them with supplies and send them contingents. He received them all courteously, and being now joined by his troops from the opposite bank, he advanced along the Po in the opposite direction to his previous march; for now he marched down stream with the object of encountering the enemy. Meanwhile Publius, having crossed the Po and encamped at Placentia, a Roman colony, where he occupied himself with the cure of himself and the other wounded, and thinking that his forces were now firmly established in a safe position, made no move. But two days after his crossing Hannibal appeared close at hand and next day drew up his army in full view of the enemy. Upon their refusing his challenge, he encamped at a distance of about fifty stades from the Roman position.

[8] *i.e.* the Ticino. Livy wrongly makes it to be the bridge of boats over the Po. The engagement took place near Victumulae, the modern Vigevano, on the right bank of the Ticino.

The Celtic contingents in the Roman army, seeing that the prospects of the Carthaginians were now brighter, had come to an understanding with each other, and while all remaining quiet in their tents were waiting for an opportunity to attack the Romans. All in the entrenched camp had had their supper and retired to rest, and the Celts, letting the greater part of the night go by, armed themselves about the morning watch and fell upon the Romans who were encamped nearest to them. They killed or wounded many, and finally, cutting off the heads of the slain, went over to the Carthaginians, being in number about two thousand foot and rather less than two hundred horse. They were gladly welcomed on their arrival by Hannibal, who at once, after addressing some words of encouragement to them and promising suitable gifts to all, sent them off to their own cities to

announce to their countrymen what they had done and urge them to join him. For he was now quite sure that all would take his part on learning of this act of treachery to the Romans on the part of their own countrymen. When at the same time the Boii came to him and delivered up to him the three Roman officials charged with the partition of their lands, whom, as I mentioned above, they had originally captured by treachery, Hannibal welcomed their friendly advances and made a formal alliance with them through the envoys. He gave the three Romans, however, back to them, advising them to keep them in order through them to get their own hostages back, as had been their original design.

Publius was much concerned at this act of treachery, and taking into consideration that as the Celts had been disaffected for some time, now with this additional incentive all the Gauls round about would go over to the Carthaginians, decided to take precautions for the future. In consequence he broke up his camp that same night a little before daybreak and marched towards the river Trebia and the hills in its neighbourhood, relying on the natural strength of the country and the loyalty of the neighbouring allies. Hannibal, on being apprised of their departure, at once sent off his Numidian horse, and shortly afterwards the rest of his cavalry, and himself with his army followed close behind. The Numidians, finding the camp deserted, stopped to set fire to it, which proved of great advantage to the Romans, for had the cavalry at once followed them up and overtaken the baggage-train they would have suffered great loss in the flat country. As it was, most of them succeeded in crossing the Trebia, but those who were left behind in the extreme rear were either cut to pieces or captured by the Carthaginians.

Publius, crossing the Trebia, encamped on the first hills he reached and fortifying his camp with a trench and palisade awaited the arrival of Tiberius and his forces. In the meantime he attended carefully to the treatment of his wound, as he was anxious to be able to take part in the coming battle. Hannibal encamped at a distance of about forty stades from the enemy. The numerous Celtic population of the plain, enthusiastically taking up the cause of the Carthaginians, kept the camp furnished with abundance of provisions and were ready to take their part in any of Hannibal's operations or battles.

When the news of the cavalry engagement reached Rome they were surprised that it had not resulted as they would have expected, but were in no want of pretexts to convince themselves that it was not a defeat, some of them putting down to the Consul's rashness and some to wilful poltroonery on the part of the Celts, assuming this from their subsequent desertion. But on the whole, as their infantry forces were still unimpaired, their trust in final success was likewise undiminished. So that when Tiberius and his legions arrived and marched through the city, the general opinion was that they had only to show themselves to decide the battle. On the soldiers, as they had pledged themselves by oath, assembling at Ariminum, the Consul put himself at their head and advanced with all speed to join Publius. When he had done so he encamped with his own forces near Scipio's, to refresh his men after their forty days' continuous march from Lilybaeum to Ariminum. Meanwhile he made all preparations for a battle and had many close conferences with Scipio, ascertaining the truth about what had occurred, and discussing the present situation with him.

At about the same time the town of Clastidium was betrayed to Hannibal by a native of Brundisium, to whom the Romans had entrusted it, the garrison and all the stores of grain falling into his hands. The latter he used for his present needs, but he took the men he had captured with them without doing them any hurt, wishing to make a display of leniency, so that those who were overtaken by adversity would not be terrified and give up hope of their lives being spared by him. He conferred high honours on the traitor, as he was anxious to win over those in positions of authority to the Carthaginian cause.

After this, on observing that some of the Celts who lived between the Trebia and the Po had made alliance with himself, but were negotiating with the Romans also, under the idea that thus they would be safe from both, he dispatched two thousand foot and about a thousand Celtic and Numidian horse with orders to raid their country. On his orders being executed and a large amount of booty secured, the Celts at once came into the Roman camp asking for help. Tiberius had long been on the look-out for some ground justifying an active step and now that he had this pretext sent out the greater part of his cavalry and about a thousand javelineers on foot. Making all dispatch they met the enemy beyond the Trebia and on their disputing possession of the booty with them the Celts and Numidians gave way and began to retire on their own camp. Those in command of the advanced posts outside the Carthaginian camp soon understood what had happened and sent out a covering force to support the fugitives, upon which the Romans in their turn were put to flight and fell back on their camp. Tiberius on seeing this ordered out all his remaining cavalry and javelineers, and when these had joined the rest, the Celts again gave way and retreated to a position of

safety. The Carthaginian general, as he was not at this time prepared for a general battle, and took the view that a decisive engagement should never be undertaken on any chance pretext and without a definite purpose—as we must pronounce to be the part of a good general—made the men in retreat halt and face about when they approached the camp, but he would not allow them to advance and engage the enemy, calling them back by his officers and buglers. The Romans after waiting for a short time retired after losing a few of their own number, but inflicting a larger loss on the Carthaginians.

Tiberius, elated and overjoyed by his success, was all eagerness to bring on a decisive battle as soon as possible. He was, it is true, at liberty to act as he thought best owing to the illness of Scipio, but wishing to have his colleague's opinion he spoke to him on the subject. Scipio's view of the situation was just the opposite. He considered that their legions would be all the better for a winter's drilling, and that the notoriously fickle Celts would not remain loyal to the Carthaginians if the latter were kept in forced inaction, but would throw them over in their turn. Besides he hoped himself when his wound was healed to be of some real service in their joint action. On all these grounds therefore he advised Tiberius to let matters remain where they were. Tiberius was quite conscious of the truth and cogency of all these reasons, but, urged on by his ambition and with an unreasonable confidence in his fortune, he was eager to deliver the decisive blow himself and did not wish Publius to be able to be present at the battle, or that the Consuls designate should enter upon office before all was over—it being now nearly the time for this. Since, then, he did not choose the time indicated by circumstances, but his own time, his action was bound to be mistaken.

Hannibal's view of the situation was very much the same as Scipio's; so that he on the other hand was anxious to force a battle on the enemy, wishing in the first place to avail himself of the enthusiasm of the Celts while still fresh, secondly to encounter the Roman legions while still newly-levied and undrilled, thirdly to fight the battle before Scipio had recovered, but most of all to be up and doing and not let the time slip away resultlessly. For when a general has brought his army into a foreign country and is engaged in such a risky enterprise, his only hope of safety lies in constantly keeping alive the hopes of his allies.

Such, then, was the purpose of Hannibal, who knew that Tiberius was sure to be aggressively inclined. He had long ago noticed a place between the two camps, flat indeed and treeless, but well adapted for an ambuscade, as it was traversed by a water-course with steep banks densely overgrown with brambles and other thorny plants, and here he proposed to lay a stratagem to surprise the enemy. It was probable that he would easily elude their vigilance; for the Romans, while very suspicious of thickly-wooded ground, which the Celts usually chose for their ambuscades, were not at all afraid of flat and treeless places, not being aware that they are better adapted than woods for the concealment and security of an ambush, because the men can see all round them for a long distance and have at the same time sufficient cover in most cases. Any water-course with a slight bank and reeds or bracken or some kind of thorny plants can be made use of to conceal not only infantry, but even the dismounted horsemen at times, if a little care be taken to lay shields with conspicuous devices inside uppermost on the ground and hide the helmets under them. The Carthaginian general now consulted with his brother Mago and the rest of the staff about the

coming battle, and on their all approving of his plan, after the troops had had their supper, he summoned Mago, who was still quite young, but full of martial enthusiasm and trained from boyhood in the art of war, and put under his command a hundred men from the cavalry and the same number of infantry. During the day he had ordered these men, whom he had marked as the most stout-hearted in his army, to come to his tent after supper. After addressing them and working up their zeal to the required pitch, he ordered each of them to pick out ten of the bravest men from his own company and to come to a certain place in the camp known to them. They did as they were bidden and in the night he sent out the whole force, which now amounted to a thousand horse and as many foot, to the ambuscade, furnishing them with guides and giving his brother orders about the time to attack. At daybreak he mustered his Numidian horsemen, all men capable of great endurance, whom he ordered, after having addressed them and promised certain gifts to those who distinguished themselves, to ride up to the enemy's camp, and crossing the river with all speed to draw out the Romans by shooting at them, his wish being to get the enemy to fight him before they had breakfasted or made any preparations. He then collected the other officers and exhorted them likewise to battle, and he ordered the whole army to get their breakfasts and to see to their arms and horses.

Tiberius, when he saw the Numidian horse approaching, sent out at first only his cavalry with orders to close with the enemy. He next dispatched about six thousand javelineers on foot and then began to move his whole army out of the camp, thinking that the mere sight of them would decide the issue, so much confidence did his superiority in numbers and the success of his cavalry on the previous day give him. The time of year was about the

winter solstice, and the day exceedingly cold and snowy, while the men and horses nearly all left the camp without having had their morning meal. At first their enthusiasm and eagerness sustained them, but when they had to cross the Trebia, swollen as it was owing to the rain that had fallen during the night higher up the valley than where the armies were, the infantry had great difficulty in crossing, as the water was breast-high. The consequence was that the whole force suffered much from cold and also from hunger, as the day was now advancing. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, who had eaten and drunk in their tents and looked after their horses, were all anointing and arming themselves around their fires. Hannibal, who was waiting for his opportunity, when he saw that the Romans had crossed the river, threw forward as a covering force his pikemen and slingers about eight thousand in number and led out his army. After advancing for about eight stades he drew up his infantry, about twenty thousand in number, and consisting of Spaniards, Celts, and Africans, in a single line, while he divided his cavalry, numbering, together with the Celtic allies, more than ten thousand, and stationed them on each wing, dividing also his elephants and placing them in front of the wings so that his flanks were doubly protected. Tiberius now recalled his cavalry, perceiving that they could not cope with the enemy, as the Numidians easily scattered and retreated, but afterwards wheeled round and attacked with great daring—these being their peculiar tactics. He drew up his infantry in the usual Roman order. They numbered about sixteen thousand Romans and twenty thousand allies, this being the strength of their complete army for decisive operations, when the Consuls chance to be united. Afterwards placing his cavalry, numbering about four thousand, on each wing he advanced on the enemy in imposing

style marching in order at a slow step. When they were nearly at close quarters, the light-armed troops in the van of each army began the combat, and here the Romans laboured under many disadvantages, the efficiency of the Carthaginians being much superior, since the Roman javelineers had had a hard time since daybreak, and had spent most of their missiles in the skirmish with the Numidians, while those they had left had been rendered useless by the continued wet weather. The cavalry and the whole army were in much the same state, whereas just the opposite was the case with the Carthaginians, who, standing in their ranks fresh and in first-rate condition, were ready to give efficient support wherever it was required. So when the skirmishers had retired through the gaps in their line and the heavy-armed infantry met, the Carthaginian cavalry at once pressed on both flanks of the enemy, being greatly superior in numbers and the condition of themselves and their horses, having, as I explained above, started quite fresh. When the Roman cavalry fell back and left the flanks of the infantry exposed, the Carthaginian pike-men and the Numidians in a body, dashing past their own troops that were in front of them, fell on the Romans from both flanks, damaging them severely and preventing them from dealing with the enemy in their front. The heavy-armed troops on both sides, who occupied the advanced centre of the whole formation, maintained for long a hand-to-hand combat with no advantage on either side. But now the Numidians issued from their ambuscade and suddenly attacked the enemy's centre from the rear, upon which the whole Roman army was thrown into the utmost confusion and distress. At length both of Tiberius' wings, hard pressed in front by the light-armed troops, turned and were driven by their pursuers back on the river behind them. After this, while the rear of the Roman

centre was suffering heavy loss from the attack of the ambuscade, those in the van, thus forced to advance, defeated the Celts and part of the Africans, and after killing many of them broke through the Carthaginian line. But seeing that both their flanks had been forced off the field, they despaired of giving help there and of returning to their camp, afraid as they were of the very numerous cavalry and hindered by the river and the force and heaviness of the rain which was pouring down on their heads. They kept, however, in close order and retired on Placentia, being not less than ten thousand in number. Of the remainder the greater part were killed near the river by the elephants and cavalry, but the few infantry who escaped and most of the cavalry retreated to join the body I just mentioned and with them got safely into Placentia. The Carthaginian army, after pursuing the enemy as far as the river, being unable to advance further owing to the storm, returned to their camp. They were all highly elated at the result of the battle, regarding it as a signal success; for very few Africans and Spaniards had been killed, the chief loss having fallen on the Celts. They suffered so severely, however, from the rain and the snow that followed that all the elephants perished except one, and many men and horses also died of the cold.

Tiberius, though well knowing the facts, wished as far as possible to conceal them from those in Rome, and therefore sent messengers to announce that a battle had taken place and that the storm had deprived him of the victory. The Romans at first gave credence to this news, but when shortly afterwards they learnt that the Carthaginians still kept their camp and that all the Celts had gone over to them, but that their own forces had abandoned their camp and retreated from the field and were now all

collected in cities, and getting their supplies up from the sea by the river Po, they quite realized what had been the result of the battle. Therefore, although they were much taken by surprise, they adopted all manner of steps to prepare for the war and especially to protect exposed points, dispatching legions to Sardinia and Sicily and sending garrisons to Tarentum and other suitable places, and getting ready also a fleet of sixty quinqueremes. Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius, the Consuls designate, were busy mustering the allies and enrolling their own legions, sending depots of supplies at the same time to Ariminum and Etruria which they meant to be their bases in the campaign. They also applied for help to Hiero, who sent them five hundred Cretans and a thousand light infantry, and on all sides they made active preparations. For the Romans both in public and in private are most to be feared when they stand in real danger.

During this time Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who, as I said, had been left by his brother Publius in command of the naval forces, sailing from the mouths of the Rhone with his whole fleet to the place in Spain called Emporium, and starting from there made a series of landings, reducing by siege the towns on the coast as far as the Ebro, which refused his advances, but bestowing favours on those which accepted them and taking all possible precautions for their safety. After securing all the sea-board places which had submitted to him he advanced with his whole army into the interior, having now got together also a considerable force of Iberian allies. He won over some of the towns on the line of his march and subdued others, and when the Carthaginians who had been left to guard this district under the command of Hanno encamped opposite to him near a city called Cissa, Gnaeus defeated them in a pitched battle, possessing himself of a large

amount of valuable booty—all the heavy baggage of the army that had set out for Italy having been left under their charge—securing the alliance of all the tribes north of the Ebro and taking prisoners the Carthaginian general Hanno and the Iberian general Andobales. The latter was despot of all central Iberia and a strenuous supporter of the Carthaginians. Hasdrubal soon got news of the disaster and crossing the Ebro came to the rescue. Learning that the crews of the Roman ships had been left behind and were off their guard and unduly confident owing to the success of the land forces, he took with him about eight thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry from his own force, and finding the men from the ships scattered over the country, killed a large number of them and compelled the remainder to take refuge on board their vessels. He then retreated, and recrossing the Ebro busied himself with fortifying and garrisoning the places south of the Ebro, passing the winter in New Carthage. Gnaeus, on rejoining the fleet, inflicted the customary penalty on those responsible for what had happened, and now uniting his land and sea forces went into winter quarters at Tarraco. By dividing the booty in equal shares among his soldiers he made them very well disposed to him and ready to do their best in the future.

Such was the state of matters in Spain. In the early spring Gaius Flaminius with his army advanced through Etruria and encamped before Arretium, while Gnaeus Servilius advanced as far as Ariminum to watch for the invasion of the enemy from that side. Hannibal, who was wintering in Cisalpine Gaul, kept the Roman prisoners he had taken in the battle in custody, giving them just sufficient to eat, but to the prisoners from the allies he continued to show the greatest kindness, and afterwards called a meeting of them and addressed them, saying that he had not come to make

war on them, but on the Romans for their sakes and therefore if they were wise they should embrace his friendship, for he had come first of all to re-establish the liberty of the peoples of Italy and also to help them to recover the cities and territories of which the Romans had deprived them. Having spoken so, he dismissed them all to their homes without ransom, his aim in doing so being both to gain over the inhabitants of Italy to his own cause and to alienate their affections from Rome, provoking at the same time to revolt those who thought their cities or harbours had suffered damage by Roman rule.

During this winter he also adopted a truly Punic artifice. Fearing the fickleness of the Celts and possible attempts on his life, owing to his establishment of the friendly relations with them being so very recent, he had a number of wigs made, dyed to suit the appearance of persons differing widely in age, and kept constantly changing them, at the same time also dressing in a style that suited the wig, so that not only those who had seen him but for a moment, but even his familiars found difficulty in recognizing him.

Observing that the Celts were dissatisfied at the prosecution of the war in their own territory, but were eagerly looking forward to an invasion of that of the enemy, professedly owing to their hatred of the Romans, but as a fact chiefly in hope of booty, he decided to be on the move as soon as possible and satisfy the desire of his troops. As soon, then, as the weather began to change he ascertained by inquiring from those who knew the country best that the other routes for invading the Roman territory were both long and obvious to the enemy, but that the road through the marshes to Etruria was difficult indeed but expeditious and calculated to take Flaminius by

surprise. As he was by nature always inclined to such expedients, he decided to march by this road. When the news spread in the camp that the general was going to lead them through marshes, everyone was very reluctant to start, imagining that there would be deep bogs and quagmires. But Hannibal had made careful inquiries, and having ascertained that the water on the ground would have to pass over was shallow and the bottom solid, broke up his quarters and started, placing in the van the Africans and Spaniards and all the most serviceable portion of his army, intermingling the baggage train with them, so that for the present they might be kept supplied with food. For as regards the future he did not trouble himself about the pack-animals at all, as he calculated that on reaching the enemy's country he would, if defeated, have no need of provisions, and if he gained command of the open country would be in no want of supplies. Behind the troops I mentioned he placed the Celts and in the extreme rear his cavalry, leaving his brother Mago in charge of the rear-guard. This course he took for various reasons, but chiefly owing to the softness and aversion to labour of the Celts, so that if, owing to the hardships they suffered, they tried to turn back Mago could prevent them by falling on them with his cavalry. The Spaniards and Africans for their part, as the marshes were still firm when they marched over them, got across without suffering seriously, being all inured to fatigue and accustomed to such hardships, but the Celts not only progressed with difficulty, the marshes being now cut up and trodden down to some depth, but were much fatigued and distressed by the severity of the task, being quite unused to suffering of the kind. They were prevented, however, from turning back by the cavalry in their rear. All the army, indeed, suffered much, and chiefly from want of sleep, as they had to march

through water for three continuous days and nights, but the Celts were much more worn out and lost more men than the rest. Most of the pack-animals fell and perished in the mud, the only service they rendered being that when they fell the men piled the packs on their bodies and lay upon them, being thus out of the water and enabled to snatch a little sleep during the night. Many of the horses also lost their hooves by the continuous march through the mud. Hannibal himself on the sole remaining elephant got across with much difficulty and suffering, being in great pain from a severe attack of ophthalmia, which finally led to the loss of one eye as he had no time to stop and apply any treatment to it, the circumstances rendering that impossible.

Having thus almost beyond expectation crossed the marshes, and, finding that Flaminius was encamped in Etruria before the city of Arretium, he pitched his camp for the present at the edge of the marshes, with the view of refreshing his forces and getting information about the enemy and about the country in front of him. On learning that this country promised a rich booty, and that Flaminius was a thorough mob-courtier and demagogue, with no talent for the practical conduct of war and exceedingly self-confident withal, he calculated that if he passed by the Roman army and advanced into the country in his front, the Consul would on the one hand never look on while he laid it waste for fear of being jeered at by his soldiery; and on the other hand he would be so grieved that he would be ready to follow anywhere, in his anxiety to gain the coming victory himself without waiting for the arrival of his colleague. From all this he concluded that Flaminius would give him plenty of opportunities of attacking him. And all this reasoning on his part was very wise and sound. For there is no

denying that he who thinks that there is anything more essential to a general than the knowledge of his opponent's principles and character, is both ignorant and foolish. For as in combats between man and man and rank and rank, he who means to conquer must observe how best to attain his aim, and what naked or unprotected part of the enemy is visible, so he who is in command must try to see in the enemy's general not what part of his body is exposed, but what are the weak spots that can be discovered in his mind. For there are many men who, owing to indolence and general inactivity, bring to utter ruin not only the welfare of the state but their private fortunes as well; while there are many others so fond of wine that they cannot even go to sleep without fuddling themselves with drink; and some, owing to their abandonment to venery and the consequent derangement of their minds, have not only ruined their countries their fortunes but brought their lives to a shameful end. But cowardice and stupidity are vices which, disgraceful as they are in private to those who have them, are when found in a general the greatest of public calamities. For not only do they render his army inefficient but often expose those who confide in him to the greatest perils. Rashness on the other hand on his part and undue boldness and blind anger, as well as vaingloriousness and conceit, are easy to be taken advantage of by his enemy and are most dangerous to his friends; for such a general is the easy victim of all manner of plots, ambushes, and cheatery. Therefore the leader who will soonest gain a decisive victory, is he who is able to perceive the faults of others, and to choose that manner and means of attacking the enemy which will take full advantage of the weaknesses of their commander. For just as a ship if deprived of its pilot will fall with its whole crew into the hands of the enemy, so the general who is his

opponent's master in strategy and reasoning may often capture his whole army.

And in this case too, as Hannibal had correctly foreseen and reckoned on the conduct of Flaminius, his plan had the success he expected. For as soon as he left the neighbourhood of Faesulae and advancing a short way beyond the Roman camp invaded the country in front of him, Flaminius swelled with fury and resentment, thinking that the enemy were treating him with contempt. And when very soon they began to lay waste the country, and the smoke rising from all quarters told its tale of destruction, he was still more indignant, regarding this as insufferable. So that when some of his officers gave it as their opinion that he should not instantly pursue and engage the enemy, but remain on his guard and beware of their numerous cavalry, and when they especially urged him to wait until his colleague joined him and to give battle with all their united legions, he not only paid no attention to the advice, but could not listen with patience to those who offered it, begging them to consider what would be said in Rome if, while the country was laid waste almost up to the walls, the army remained encamped in Etruria in the rear of the enemy. Finally, with these words, he broke up the camp, and advanced with his army, utterly regardless of time or place, but bent only on falling in with the enemy, as if victory were a dead certainty. He had even inspired the people with such confident hopes that the soldiery were outnumbered by the rabble that followed him for the sake of the booty, bringing chains, fetters, and other such implements.

Hannibal in the meantime while advancing on Rome through Etruria, with the city of Cortona and its hills on the left and the Thrasymene lake on his right, continued to burn and devastate the country on his way, with the

view of provoking the enemy. When he saw Flaminius already approaching him and had also observed a position favourable for his purpose, he made his plans for battle. The road led through a narrow strip of level ground with a range of high hills on each side of it lengthwise. This defile was overlooked in front crosswise by a steep hill difficult to climb, and behind it lay the lake, between which and the hill side the passage giving access to the defile was quite narrow. Hannibal coasting the lake and passing through the defile occupied himself the hill in front, encamping on it with his Spaniards and Africans; his slingers and pikemen he brought round to the front by a detour and stationed them in an extended line under the hills to the right of the defile, and similarly taking his cavalry and the Celts round the hills on the left he placed them in a continuous line under these hills, so that the last of them were just at the entrance to the defile, lying between the hillside and the lake.

Having made all these preparations during the night and thus encompassed the defile with troops waiting in ambush, Hannibal remained quite. Flaminius was following close on his steps impatient to overtake him. He had encamped the night before at a very late hour close to the lake itself; and next day as soon as it was dawn he led his vanguard along the lake to the above-mentioned defile, with the view of coming in touch with the enemy. It was an unusually misty morning, and Hannibal, as soon as the greater part of the enemy's column had entered the defile and when the head was already in contact with him, giving the signal for battle and sending notice to those in the ambuscades, attacked the Romans from all sides at the same time. The sudden appearance of the enemy took Flaminius completely by surprise, and as the condition of the atmosphere rendered it very difficult

to see, and their foes were charging down on them in so many places from higher ground, the Roman Centurions and Tribunes were not only unable to take any effectual measures to set things right, but could not even understand what was happening. They were charged at one and the same instant from the front, from the rear, and from the flanks, so that most of them were cut to pieces in marching order as they were quite unable to protect themselves, and, as it were, betrayed by their commander's lack of judgement. For while they were still occupied in considering what was best to do, they were being slaughtered without realizing how. Flaminius himself, who was in the utmost dismay and dejection, was here attacked and slain by certain Celts. So there fell in the valley about fifteen thousand of the Romans, unable either to yield to circumstances, or to achieve anything, but deeming it, as they had been brought up to do, their supreme duty not to fly or quit their ranks. Those again who had been shut in between the hillside and the lake perished in a shameful and still more pitiable manner. For when they were forced into the lake in a mass, some of them quite lost their wits and trying to swim in their armour were drowned, but the greater number, wading into the lake as far as they could, stood there with only their heads out of the water, and when the cavalry approached them, and death stared them in the face, though lifting up their hands and entreating to be spared in the most piteous terms, they were finally dispatched either by the horsemen or in some cases by begging their comrades to do them this service. About six thousand of those in the defile, who had defeated the enemy in their front, were unable to render any assistance to their own army or to get to the rear of their adversaries, as they could see nothing of what was happening, although they might have been of very material service.

They simply continued to press forward in the belief that they were sure to meet with someone until they found themselves isolated on the high ground and on reaching the crest of the hill, the mist having now broken, they perceived the extent of the disaster, but were no longer able to help, as the enemy were now completely victorious and in occupation of all the ground. They therefore retired in a body to a certain Etruscan village. After the battle, on Maharbal being sent by the general with the Spaniards and pikemen to surround the village, finding themselves beset by a complication of dangers they laid down their arms and surrendered on condition of their lives being spared.

Such was the result of the battle in Etruria between the Romans and Carthaginians. Hannibal, when the prisoners who had surrendered on terms as well as the others were brought to him, assembled the whole body, more than fifteen thousand in number, and after informing them in the first place that Maharbal had no authority without consulting him to promise the former their safety, launched out into an invective the Romans, and at the end of it distributed such of the prisoners as were Romans among his troops to keep guard over, and setting all the allies free, sent them to their homes, adding, as on a previous occasion, that he was not come to fight with the Italians, but with the Romans for the freedom of Italy. He now allowed his own troops to rest and paid the last honours to those of the highest rank among the fallen, about thirty in number, his whole loss having been about fifteen hundred, most of them Celts. After this he consulted with his brother and friends as to where and how it was best to deliver his attack, being now quite confident of final success.

On the news of the defeat reaching Rome the chiefs of the state were unable to conceal or soften down the facts, owing to the magnitude of the calamity, and were obliged to summon a meeting of the commons and announce it. When the Praetor therefore from the Rostra said, "We have been defeated in a great battle," it produced such consternation that to those who were present on both occasions the disaster seemed much greater now than during the actual battle. And this was quite natural; for since for many years they had had no experience of the word or fact of avowed defeat, they could not bear the reverse with moderation and dignity. This was not, however, the case with the Senate, which remained self-possessed, taking thought for the future as to what should be done by everyone, and how best to do it.

At the time of the battle Gnaeus Servilius, the Consul in command in the district of Ariminum (the district that is on the coast of the Adriatic where the plain of Cisalpine Gaul joins the rest of Italy not far from the mouth of the river Po), hearing that Hannibal had invaded Etruria and was encamped opposite Flaminius, formed the project of joining the latter with his whole army, but as this was impossible owing to the weight of his forces he dispatched Gaius Cenetenius at once in advance, giving him four thousand horse, intending them, if the situation were critical, to press on and arrive before himself. When, after the battle, news reached Hannibal of the approach of these reinforcements, he sent off Maharbal with the pikemen and part of the cavalry. Encountering Gaius, they killed about half of his force in their first attack, and pursuing the others to a hill, made them all prisoners on the following day. Three days after the news of the great battle had reached Rome, and just when throughout the city the sore, so to speak,

was most violently inflamed, came the tidings of this fresh disaster, and now not only the populace but the Senate too were thrown into consternation. Abandoning therefore the system of government by magistrates elected annually they decided to deal with the present situation more radically, thinking that the state of affairs and the impending peril demanded the appointment of a single general with full powers.

Hannibal, now fully assured of success, dismissed the idea of approaching Rome for the present, but began to ravage the country unmolested, advancing towards the Adriatic. Passing through Umbria and Picenum he reached the coast on the tenth day, having possessed himself of so large an amount that his army could not drive or carry it all off and having killed a number of people on his road. For, as at the capture of cities by assault, the order had been given to put to the sword all adults who fell into their hands, Hannibal acting thus owing to his inveterate hatred of the Romans. He now encamped near the Adriatic in a country abounding in all kinds of produce, and paid great attention to recruiting the health of his men as well as his horses by proper treatment. In consequence of the cold from which they had sufficient while wintering in the open land of Gaul, combined with their being unable to get the friction with oil to which they were accustomed, and owing also to the hardships of the subsequent march through the marshes, nearly all the horses as well as the men had been attacked by so-called "hunger-mange" and its evil results. So that, now he was in occupation of such a rich country, he built up his horses and restored the physical and mental condition of his men. He also re-armed the Africans in the Roman fashion with select weapons, being, as he now was, in possession of a very large quantity of captured arms. He also sent at this

time messengers to Carthage by sea with the news of what had happened, this being the first time he had come in touch with the sea since he invaded Italy. The news was received with great rejoicing by the Carthaginians, who hastened to take steps to support in every possible manner the two campaigns in Italy and in Spain.

The Romans had appointed as Dictator Quintus Fabius, a man of admirable judgement and great natural gifts, so much so that still in my own day the members of this family bear the name of Maximus, "Greatest," owing to the achievements and success of this man. A dictator differs from the Consuls in these respects, that while each of the Consuls is attended by twelve lictors, the Dictator has twenty-four, and that while the Consuls require in many matters the co-operation of the Senate, the Dictator is a general with absolute powers, all the magistrates in Rome, except the Tribunes, ceasing to hold office on his appointment. However, I will deal with this subject in greater detail later. At the same time they appointed Marcus Minucius Master of the Horse. The Master of the Horse is subordinate to the Dictator but becomes as it were his successor when the Dictator is otherwise occupied.

Hannibal now shifting his camp from time to time continued to remain in the country near the Adriatic, and by bathing his horses with old wine, of which there was abundance, he thoroughly set right their mangy condition. In like manner he completely cured his wounded, and made the rest of his men sound in body and ready to perform cheerfully the services that would be required of them. After passing through and devastating the territories of Praetutia, Hadriana, Marrucina, and Frentana he marched on towards Iapygia. This province is divided among three peoples, the Daunii, Peucetii

and Messapii, and it was the territory of the Daunii that Hannibal first invaded. Starting from Luceria, a Roman colony in this district, he laid waste the surrounding country. He next encamped near Vibo and overran the territory of Argyripa [9] and plundered all Daunia unopposed.

At the same time Fabius on his appointment, after sacrificing to the gods, also took the field with his colleague and the four legions which had been raised for the emergency. Joining near Narnia the army from Ariminum, he relieved Gnaeus the Consul of his command on land and sent him with an escort to Rome with orders to take the steps that circumstances called for should the Carthaginians make any naval movements. Himself with his Master of the Horse taking the whole army under his command, he encamped opposite the Carthaginians near Aecae about six miles from the enemy.

[9] Otherwise Arpi.

When he learnt that Fabius had arrived, Hannibal, wishing to strike such a blow as would effectually cow the enemy, led his forces out and drew them up in order of battle at a short distance from the Roman camp, but after waiting some time, as nobody came out to meet him, he retired again to his own camp. For Fabius, having determined not to expose himself to any risk or to venture on a battle, but to make the safety of the army under his command his first and chief aim, adhered steadfastly to this purpose. At first, it is true, he was despised for this, and gave people occasion to say that he was playing the coward and was in deadly fear of an engagement, but as time went on, he forced everyone to confess and acknowledge that it was impossible for anyone to deal with the present situation in more sensible and prudent manner. Very soon indeed facts testified to the wisdom of his

conduct, and this was no wonder. For the enemy's forces had been trained in actual warfare constantly from their earliest youth, they had a general who had been brought up together with them and was accustomed from childhood to operations in the field, they had won many battles in Spain and had twice in succession beaten the Romans and their allies, and what was most important, they had cast to the winds everything else, and their only hope of safety lay in victory. The circumstances of the Roman army were the exact opposite, and therefore Fabius was not able to meet the enemy in a general battle, as it would evidently result in a reverse, but on due consideration he fell back on those means in which the Romans had the advantage, confined himself to these, and regulated his conduct of the war thereby. These advantages of the Romans lay in inexhaustible supplies of provisions and men. He, therefore, during the period which followed continued to move parallel to the enemy, always occupying in advance the positions which his knowledge of the country told him were the most advantageous. Having always a plentiful store of provisions in his rear he never allowed his soldiers to forage or to straggle from the camp on any pretext, but keeping them continually massed together watched for such opportunities as time and place afforded. In this manner he continued to take or kill numbers of the enemy, who despising him had strayed far from their own camp in foraging. He acted so in order, on the one hand, to keep on reducing the strictly limited numbers of the enemy, and, on the other, with the view of gradually strengthening and restoring by partial successes the spirits of his own troops, broken as they were by the general reverses. He was, however, not at all disposed to respond to the enemy's challenge and meet him in a set battle. But all this much displeased his colleague

Marcus, who, echoing the popular verdict, ran down Fabius to all for his craven and slow conduct of the campaign, while he himself was most eager to risk a battle.

The Carthaginians, after ravaging the country I mentioned, crossed the Apennines and descended into the territory of the Samnites, which was very fertile and had not for long been visited by war, so that they had such abundance of provisions that they could not succeed either in using or in destroying all their booty. They also overran the territory of Beneventum, a Roman colony, and took the city of Telesia, which was unwalled and full of all manner of property. The Romans continued to hang on their rear at a distance of one or two days' march, refusing to approach nearer and engage the enemy. Hannibal, consequently, seeing that Fabius, while obviously wishing to avoid battle, had no intention of withdrawing altogether from the open country, made a bold dash at Falernum in the plain of Capua, counting with certainty on one of two alternatives: either he would compel the enemy to fight or make it plain to everybody that he was winning and that the Romans were abandoning the country to him. Upon this happening he hoped that the towns would be much impressed and hasten to throw off their allegiance to Rome. For up to now, although the Romans had been beaten in two battles, not a single Italian city had revolted to the Carthaginians, but all remained loyal, although some suffered much. From which one may estimate the awe and respect that the allies felt for the Roman state.

Hannibal, however, had sufficient reason for reckoning as he did. The plain round Capua is the most celebrated in all Italy, both for its fertility and beauty, and because it is served by those sea-ports at which voyagers to

Italy from nearly all parts of the world land. It also contains the most celebrated and finest cities in Italy. On the coast lie Sinuessa, Cyme, and Dicaearchea, and following on these Naples and finally Nuceria. In the interior we find on the north Cales and Teanum and east and south Caudium [10] and Nola, while in the very middle of the plain lies Capua, once the wealthiest of cities. The mythical tale concerning this plain, and other celebrated plains which like it are called Phlegraean, has indeed much semblance of probability; for it was quite natural that they should have been a special cause of strife among the gods owing to their beauty and fertility. Besides the above advantages the whole plain of Capua is strongly protected by nature and difficult of approach, being completely surrounded on one side by the sea and for the greater part by lofty mountain-ranges, through which there are only three passes from the interior, all of them narrow and difficult, one from Samnium, the second from Latium, and the third from the country of the Hirpini. The Carthaginians, then, by quartering themselves in this plain made of it a kind of theatre, in which they were sure to create a deep impression on all by their unexpected appearance, giving a spectacular exhibition of the timidity of their enemy and themselves demonstrating indisputably that they were in command of the country.

[10] The text has Daunii.

Such being Hannibal's anticipations, he left Samnium and traversing the pass near the hill called Eribianus encamped beside the river Athyrnus, [11] which approximately cuts this plain in half. Establishing his camp on the side of the river towards Rome he overran and plundered the whole plain unmolested. Fabius, though taken aback by the audacity of this stroke on the part of the enemy, continued all the more to adhere to his deliberate

plan. But his colleague Marcus and all the tribunes and centurions in his army, thinking they had caught Hannibal famously, urged him to make all haste to reach the plain and not allow the finest part of the country to be devastated. Fabius did bestir himself to reach the district, sharing in so far the view of the more eager and venturesome spirits, but when he came in view of the enemy on approaching Falernum, while moving along the hills parallel to them so as not to appear to the allies to be abandoning the open country, he did not bring his army down into the plain, avoiding a general action both for the above-mentioned reasons and because the Carthaginians were obviously much his superiors in cavalry.

[11] Otherwise Volturnus.

Hannibal, having thus done his best to provoke the Romans by laying the whole plain waste, found himself in possession of a huge amount of booty and decided to withdraw, as he wished not to waste the booty, but to secure it in a place suitable for his winter quarters, so that his army should not only fare sumptuously for the present, but continue to have abundance of provisions. Fabius, divining that his plan was to retire by the same pass by which he had entered, and seeing that owing to its narrowness the place was exceedingly favourable for delivering an attack, stationed about four thousand men at the actual pass, bidding them act at the proper time with all spirit, while availing themselves fully of the advantage of the ground. He himself with the greater part of his army encamped on a hill in front of the pass and overlooking it. When the Carthaginians arrived and made their camp on the level ground just under the hill, Fabius thought that at least he would be able to carry away their booty without their disputing it and possibly even to put an end to the whole campaign owing to the great

advantage his position gave him. He was in fact entirely occupied in considering at what point and how he should avail himself of local conditions, and with what troops he should attack, and from which direction. But while the enemy were making these preparations for the next day, Hannibal, conjecturing that they would act so, gave them no time or leisure to develop their plan, but summoning Hasdrubal, who was in command of the Army Service, ordered him to get as many faggots as possible of any kind of dry wood made promptly and to collect in the front of the camp about two thousand of the strongest plough oxen among all the captured stock. When this had been done, he collected the army servants and pointed out to them a rise in the ground between his own camp and the pass through which he was about to march. For this eminence he ordered them to drive the oxen whenever they received the word as furiously as they could till they reached the top. He next ordered all his men to get their supper and retire to rest early. When the third watch of the night was nearly over he led out the army servants and ordered them bind the fagots to the horns of the oxen. This was soon done as there were plenty of hands, and he now bade them light all the fagots and drive the oxen up to the ridge. Placing his pikemen behind these men, he ordered them to help the drivers up to a certain point, but as soon as the animals were well started on their career, to run along on each side of them and keep them together, making for the higher ground. They were then to occupy the ridge, so that if the enemy advanced to any part of it, they might meet and attack him. At the same time he himself with his heavy-armed troops in front, next them his cavalry, next the captured cattle, and finally the Spaniards and Celts, made for the narrow gorge of the pass. The Romans who were guarding the gorge,

thinking that Hannibal was pressing on rapidly in that direction, left the narrow part of the pass and advanced to the hill to meet the enemy. But when they got near the oxen they were entirely puzzled by the lights, fancying that they were about to encounter something much more formidable than the reality. When the pikemen came up, both forces skirmished with each other for a short time, and then when the oxen rushed in among them they drew apart and remained on the heights waiting until day should break, not being able to understand what was the matter. Fabius, partly because he was at a loss to know what was occurring, and as Homer says, deeming it to be a trick, [12] and partly because he adhered to his former resolve not to risk or hazard a general engagement, remained quite in his camp waiting for daylight. Meanwhile Hannibal, whose plan had been entirely successful, brought his army and all his booty safely through the gorge, those who had been guarding the difficult passage having quitted their post. When at daybreak he saw the Romans on the hill drawn up opposite his pikemen, he sent there some Spaniards as a reinforcement. Attacking the Romans they killed about a thousand and easily relieved and brought down their own light infantry.

[12] Odyssey, x. 232.

Hannibal, having thus effected his retirement from Falernum, remained now safely in camp and began to take thought where and how he should establish his winter quarters. He had spread great terror and perplexity through all the cities and peoples of Italy. Fabius, to generally reproached for his craven conduct in letting the enemy escape from such a situation, still did not abandon his policy. But a few days afterwards he was compelled to leave for Rome to perform certain sacrifices and handed over

his legions to his Master of the Horse, enjoining on him strictly, in taking leave, not to attach so much importance to damaging the enemy as to avoiding disaster for himself. Marcus, instead of paying any attention to this advice, was, even while Fabius was tendering it, entirely wrapped up in the project of risking a great battle.

Such was the position of affairs in Italy. Contemporaneously with these events Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian commander in Spain, after fitting out during the winter the thirty ships his brother had left him, and manning ten others, put out at the beginning of summer from New Carthage with his fleet of forty decked ships, appointing Hamilcar his admiral. At the same time he collected his troops from their winter quarters and took the field. His fleet sailed close to the shore and his army marched along the beach, his object being to halt with both forces near the Ebro. Gnaeus, conjecturing that this was the plan of the Carthaginians, first of all designed to quit his winter quarters and meet them both by land and sea, but on learning the strength of their forces and the extensive scale of their preparations he renounced the project of meeting them by land, and manning thirty-five ships and embarking on them as marines the men from his army most suited for this service, appeared off the Ebro two days after sailing from Tarraco. Anchoring at a distance of about eighty stades from the enemy he sent on two swift Massaliot ships to reconnoitre, for these used to head the line both in sailing and in battle, and there was absolutely no service they were not ready to render. Indeed if any people have given generous support to the Romans it is the people of Marseilles both on many subsequent occasions and especially in the Hannibalic War. When the scouts reported that the enemy's fleet was anchored off the mouth of the river, he weighed anchor

and advanced rapidly, wishing to fall upon them suddenly. Hasdrubal, to whom his lookout men had given early notice of the approach of the enemy, drew up his land forces on the beach and ordered his crews to embark. The Romans being now close at hand, he gave the signal for battle, having decided on a naval action. The Carthaginians on meeting the enemy contested the victory only for a short time and then began to give way. For the covering military force on the beach did not benefit them so much by the confidence it inspired as it damaged them by ensuring an easy and safe retreat. After losing two ships with all their crews and the oars and marines of four others, they fell back on the shore. On the Romans pursuing them vigorously they ran their ships aground and leaping out of them took refuge with the troops. The Romans very boldly approached the shore, and taking in tow such ships as were in a condition to float, sailed off in high spirits, having beaten the enemy at the first onslaught, established their supremacy at sea and possessed themselves of five and twenty of the enemy's ships.

Owing to this success the prospects of the Romans in Spain began thenceforth to look brighter. But the Carthaginians, on the news of their defeat, at once manned and dispatched seventy ships, regarding the command of the sea as necessary for all their projects. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisa in Italy, the commander believing they would meet Hannibal there, but on learning that the Romans had at once put to sea from Rome itself with a hundred and twenty quinqueremes to attack them, they sailed back again to Sardinia and thence to Carthage. Gnaeus Servilius, the commander of this Roman fleet, followed up the Carthaginians for a certain distance, believing he would overtake them, but on being left a long way behind, he gave up the chase. He first of all put in

at Lilybaeum in Sicily and afterwards sailed to the African island of Cercina, which he quitted after receiving from the inhabitants a sum of money on condition of his not laying the country waste. On his return voyage he possessed himself of the island of Cossyrus, and leaving a garrison in the small town returned to Lilybaeum. After laying up his fleet in harbour there, he very shortly went off to join the land forces.

The Senate on hearing of Gnaeus Scipio's success in the naval battle, thinking it advantageous or rather imperative not to neglect the affairs of Spain but to keep up the pressure on the Carthaginians and increase their forces, got ready twenty ships, and placing them, as they had originally decided, under the command of Publius Scipio, dispatched him at once to join his brother Gnaeus and operate in Spain together with him. For they were very apprehensive lest the Carthaginians should master that country, and, collecting abundance of supplies and soldiers, make a more serious effort to regain the command of the sea and thus support the invasion of Italy by sending troops and money to Hannibal. Treating this war, then, also as of great moment they dispatched Publius with his fleet, and on reaching Iberia and joining his brother he rendered great service in their joint operations. For the Romans, who had never before dared to cross the Ebro, but had been content with the friendship and alliance of the peoples on its north bank, now crossed it, and for the first time ventured to aim at acquiring dominion on the other side, chance also greatly contributing to advance their prospects in the following manner.

When after overawing the Iberian tribes dwelling near the crossing of the Ebro they reached Saguntum, they encamped at a distance of about five miles from the town near the temple of Venus, choosing a place well

situated both as regards security from the enemy and facility for obtaining supplies from the sea, since their fleet was coasting down together with them. Here a remarkable development of events occurred. When Hannibal was starting on his march for Italy he took as hostages from those cities in Iberia on which he did not rely the sons of their principal men, and all these he placed in Saguntum owing to the strength of the place and the loyalty of the officers he left in charge of it. Now there was a certain Iberian named Abilyx, second to none in Iberia in rank and wealth and with the reputation of being more devoted and loyal to the Carthaginians than anyone else. Reviewing the situation and thinking that the prospects of the Romans were now the brightest, he reasoned with himself in a manner thoroughly Spanish and barbarian on the question of betraying the hostages. For, being convinced that if he both rendered the Romans a timely service and gave them proof of his good faith, he would become very influential with them, he formed the scheme of playing the traitor to the Carthaginians and handing over the hostages to the Romans. The Carthaginian general, Bostar, whom Hasdrubal had sent to oppose the Romans if they tried to cross the Ebro, but who had not ventured to do so, had now retreated and encamped between Saguntum and the sea. Abilyx, perceiving that he was of a guileless and mild disposition and placed full confidence in himself, approached him on the subject of the hostages, saying that now the Romans had once crossed the river it was no longer possible for the Carthaginians to control the Iberians by fear, but that present circumstances required the goodwill of all the subject peoples. So now, when the Romans had approached and were encamped close to Saguntum and the city was in danger, if he brought the hostages out and restored them to their parents and

cities, he would in the first place frustrate the ambitious project of the Romans, who were bent on taking just the same step if they got the hostages into their hands, and further he would elicit the gratitude of all the Iberians to the Carthaginians by thus foreseeing the future and taking thought for the safety of the hostages. This act of grace, he said, would be very much enhanced, if Bostar would let him take the matter in hand personally. For in restoring the children to the cities not only would he gain him the goodwill of their parents but that of the mass of the people, by thus bringing actually before their eyes this evidence of the magnanimous conduct of Carthage toward her allies. He told Bostar also that he could count on many presents to himself from those to whom their children were returned; for each and all, on thus unexpectedly receiving back their dearest, would view with each other in heaping benefits on the author of the measure. By these and more words to the like effect he persuaded Bostar to assent to his proposal. For the present he left to return home, fixing the day on which he would come with his followers to escort the children. At night he went to the Roman camp, and having found some of the Iberians who were serving in the army, gained access through them to the generals. Pointing out at some length how the Iberians if they recovered their hostages would with one impulse go over to the Romans, he undertook to give up the children to them. Publius, to whom the project was exceedingly welcome, having promised him a great reward, he now left for his own country, having fixed a day and agreed on the hour and place at which those who were to take over the hostages should await him. After this, taking his most intimate friends with him, he came to Bostar; and on the children being handed over to him from Saguntum, he sallied out from the town by night as if to keep

the matter secret, and marching along the enemies' entrenched camp reached the appointed place at the appointed hour and delivered all the hostages to the Roman generals. Publius conferred great honours on Abilyx, and employed him in the restoration of the hostages to their respective countries, sending certain of his friends with him. Going from city to city, and bringing, by the repatriation of the children, the gentleness and magnanimity of the Romans into manifest contrast with the suspiciousness and harshness of the Carthaginians, at the same time exhibiting the example of his own change of sides, he induced many of the Iberians to become allies of Rome. Bostar was judged in thus handing over the hostages to the enemy to have acted more like a child than became his years, and was in serious danger of his life. For the present both sides, as the season was now advanced, broke up their forces for the winter; chance in this matter of the children having materially contributed to assist the projects the Romans had in view.

Such was the position of affairs in Spain. Hannibal, whom we left in Italy looking out for winter quarters, learning from his scouts that there was plenty of corn in the country round Luceria and Geronium, and that the best place for collecting supplies was Geronium, decided to winter there and advanced to this district, marching past Mount Libyrnus. On reaching Geronium, which is two hundred stades from Luceria, he at first sent messages to the inhabitants asking for their alliance and offering pledges of the advantages he promised them, but as they paid not attention to them he began the siege. He soon took the city, upon which he put the inhabitants to the sword, but kept the walls and most of the houses uninjured, intending to use them as corn magazine for the winter. He encamped his army before the

town, fortifying his camp with a trench and palisade. When he had completed this he sent two divisions of his army out to gather corn, ordering each to bring in each day for its own use the quantity imposed by those in charge of the commissariat. With the remaining third he guarded the camp and covered the foraging parties here and there. As most of the country was flat and easy to overrun, and the foragers were one might say infinite in number, and the weather was very favourable for fetching in the grain, an enormous quantity was collected every day.

Minucius on taking over the command from Fabius at first followed the Carthaginians along the hills, always expecting to encounter them when attempting to cross. But on hearing that Hannibal had already occupied Geronium, and was foraging in the district, and had established himself in a fortified camp before the city, he turned and descended from the hills by a ridge that slopes down to the town. Arriving at the height in the territory of Larinum called Calena he encamped there, being eager at all hazards to engage the enemy. Hannibal, seeing the approach of the Romans, left the third part of his army to forage, and taking the other two-thirds advanced sixteen stades from the town and encamped on a hill with the view of overawing the enemy and affording protection to the foragers. There was a certain hillock between the two armies, and observing that it lay close to the enemy's camp and commanded it, he sent two thousand of his pikemen in the night to occupy it. Marcus, catching sight of them at daybreak, led out his light-armed troops and attacked the hill. A brisk skirmish took place in which the Romans were victorious, and afterwards they transferred their whole army to this hill. Hannibal for a certain time kept the whole of his forces within the camp owing to the propinquity of the enemy; but after

some days he was compelled to tell off a portion to pasture the animals, and send others to forage for corn, as he was anxious, according to his original plan, to avoid loss in the live stock he had captured and to collect as much corn as possible, so that for the whole winter there should be plenty of everything both for his men and also for the horses and pack-animals; for it was on his cavalry above all that he placed reliance.

Minucius, remarking that the greater number of the enemy were dispersed over the country on these services, chose the time when the day was at its height to lead out his forces, and on approaching the enemy's camp, drew up his legionaries, and dividing his cavalry and light-armed infantry into several troops sent them out to attack the foragers, with orders to take no prisoners. Hannibal hereupon found himself in a very difficult position, being neither strong enough to march out and meet the enemy nor able to go to the assistance of those of his men who were scattered over the country. The Romans who had been dispatched to attack the foraging parties, killed numbers of them, and finally the troops drawn up in line reached such a pitch of contempt for the enemy that they began to pull down the palisade and very nearly stormed the Carthaginian camp. Hannibal was in sore straits, but notwithstanding the tempest that had thus overtaken him he continued to drive off all assailants and with difficulty to hold his camp, until Hasdrubal, with those who had fled from the country for refuge to the camp before Geronium, about four thousand in number, came to succour him. He now regained a little confidence, and sallying from the camp drew up his troops a short distance in front of it and with difficulty averted the impending peril. Minucius, after killing many of the enemy in the engagement at the camp and still more throughout the country,

now retired, but with great hopes for the future, and next day, on the Carthaginians evacuating their camp, occupied it himself. For Hannibal, fearful lest the Romans, finding the camp at Geronium deserted at night, should capture his baggage and stores, decided to return and encamp there again. Henceforth the Carthaginians were much more cautious and guarded in foraging, while the Romans on the contrary, foraged with greater confidence and temerity.

People in Rome, when an exaggerated account of this success reached the city, were overjoyed, partly because this change for the better relieved their general despondency, and in the next place because they inferred that the former inaction and disheartenment of their army was not the result of any want of courage in the soldiers, but of the excessive caution of the general. All therefore found fault with Fabius, accusing him of not making a bold use of his opportunities, while Marcus's reputation rose so much owing to this event that they took an entirely unprecedented step, investing him like the Dictator with absolute power, in the belief that he would very soon put an end to the war. So two Dictators were actually appointed for the same field of action, a thing which had never before happened at Rome. When Minucius was informed of his popularity at home and the office given him by the people's decree, he grew twice as eager to run risks and take some bold action against the enemy. Fabius now returned to the army wholly unchanged by recent circumstances, and adhering even more firmly than before to his original determination. Observing that Minucius was unduly elated and was jealously opposing him in every way and altogether strongly disposed to risk a battle, he offered for his choice, either that he should be in full command on alternate days, or that he should take half the

army and use his own legions in any way he thought fit. Minucius having readily agreed to the division of the army, they divided it and encamped apart at a distance of about twelve stades from each other. Hannibal, partly from what he heard from prisoners and partly from what he saw was going on, was aware of the rivalry of the two generals and of Marcus' impulsiveness and ambition. Considering, then, that the present circumstances of the enemy were not against him but in his favour, he turned his attention to Minucius, being anxious to put a stop to his venturesomeness and anticipate his offensive. There was a small eminence between his own camp and that of Minucius capable of being used against either of them, and this he decided to occupy. While knowing that owing to his previous achievement Minucius would instantly advance to frustrate this project, he devised the following stratagem. The ground round the hill was treeless but had many irregularities and hollows of every description in it, and he sent out at night to the most suitable positions for ambuscade, in bodies of two or three hundred, five hundred horse and about five thousand light-armed and other infantry. In order that they should not be observed in the early morning by the Romans who were going out to forage, he occupied the hill with his light-armed troops as soon as it was daybreak. Minucius, seeing this and thinking a favourable chance, sent out at once his light infantry with orders to engage the enemy and dispute the position. Afterwards he sent his cavalry too and next followed in person leading his legions in close order, as on the former occasion, operating exactly in the same manner as then. The day was just dawning, and the minds and eyes of all were engrossed in the battle on the hill, so that no one suspected that the ambuscade had been posted. Hannibal kept constantly sending

reinforcements to his men on the hill, and when he very shortly followed himself with his cavalry and the rest of his force, the cavalry on both sides soon came into action. Upon this, the Roman light infantry were forced off the field by the numbers of the Carthaginian horse, and, falling back on the legions, threw them into confusion, while at the same time, on the signal being given to those lying in ambush, they appeared from all directions and attacked, upon which not only the Roman light infantry but their whole army found itself in a most perilous position. It was now that Fabius, seeing the state of matters and seriously fearing a total disaster, came up in haste with his own army to assist. On his approach the Romans again plucked up courage, although they had now entirely broken their ranks, and collecting round the standards retreated and took refuge under cover of Fabius' force after losing many of their light-armed troops, but still more of the legionaries and the very best men among them. Hannibal, being afraid of the legions, which, quite fresh and in admirable order, had come to the help of their comrades, abandoned the pursuit and brought the battle to a close. To those who were actually present at the action it was evident that all was lost by the rashness of Minucius, and that now, as on previous occasions, all had been saved by the caution of Fabius. And to those in Rome it became indisputably clear how widely the foresight, good sense, and calm calculation of a general differ from the recklessness and bravado of a mere soldier. The Romans, however, had received a practical lesson, and again fortifying a single camp, joined their forces in it, and in future paid due attention to Fabius and his orders. The Carthaginians dug a trench between the hill and their own camp, and erecting a stockade round the hill, which

was now in their hands, and placing a garrison on it, made their preparations henceforth for the winter undisturbed.

The time for the consular elections was now approaching, and the Romans elected Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro. On their appointment, the Dictators laid down their office, and the Consuls of the previous year, Gnaeus Servilius and Marcus Regulus—who had been appointed after the death of Flaminius—were invested with proconsular authority by Aemilius, and taking command in the field directed the operations of their forces as they thought fit. Aemilius after consulting with the Senate at once enrolled the soldiers still wanting to make up the total levy and dispatched them to the front, expressly ordering Servilius on no account to risk a general engagement, but to skirmish vigorously and unintermittently so as to train the lads and give them confidence for a general battle; for they thought the chief cause of their late reverses lay in their having employed newly raised and quite untrained levies. The Consuls also gave a legion to the Praetor Lucius Postumius, and sent him to Cisalpine Gaul to create a diversion among those Celts who were serving with Hannibal, they took measures for the return of the fleet that was wintering at Lilybaeum and sent the generals in Spain all the supplies of which they had need. The Consuls and Senate were thus occupied with these and other preparations, and Servilius, on receiving orders from the Consuls, conducted all petty operations as they directed. I shall therefore not make further mention of these, for nothing decisive or noteworthy was done owing to these orders and owing to circumstances, but only numerous skirmishes and minor engagements took place in which the Roman

commanders had the advantage, their conduct of the campaign being generally thought to have been both courageous and skilful.

All through the winter and spring the two armies remained encamped opposite each other, and it was not until the season was advanced enough for them to get supplies from the year's crops that Hannibal moved his forces out of the camp near Geronium. Judging that it was in his interest to compel the enemy to fight by every means in his power, he seized on the citadel of a town called Cannae, in which the Romans had collected the corn and other supplies from the country round Canusium, conveying hence to their camp from time to time enough to supply their wants. The city itself had previously been razed, but the capture now of the citadel and stores caused no little commotion in the Roman army; for they were distressed at the fall of the place not only owing to the loss of their supplies, but because it commanded the surrounding district. They continued, therefore, to send constant messages to Rome asking how they should act, stating that if they approached the enemy they would not be able to escape a battle, as the country was being pillaged and the temper of all the allies was uncertain. The Senate decided to give the enemy battle, but they ordered Servilius to wait, and dispatched the Consuls to the front. It was to Aemilius that the eyes of all were directed; and they placed their chiefest hope in him, owing to his general high character, and because a few years previously he was thought to have conducted the Illyrian war with courage and advantage to the state. They decided to bring eight legions into the field, a thing which had never been done before by the Romans, each legion consisting of about five thousand men apart from the allies. For, as I previously explained, they invariably employ four legions, each numbering about four thousand foot

and two hundred horse, but on occasions of exceptional gravity they raise the number of foot in each legion to five thousand and that of the cavalry to three hundred. They make the number of the allied infantry equal to that of the Roman legions, but, as a rule, the allied cavalry are three times as numerous as the Roman. They give each of the Consuls half of the allies and two legions when they dispatch them to the field, and most of their wars are decided by one Consul with two legions and the above number of allies, it being only on rare occasions that they employ all their forces at one time and in one battle. But now they were so alarmed and anxious as to the future that they decided to bring into action not four legions but eight.

Therefore after exhorting Aemilius and putting before his eyes the magnitude of the results which in either event the battle would bring about, they dispatched him with orders to decide the issue, when the time came, bravely and worthily of his country. On reaching the army he assembled the soldiers and conveyed to them the decision of the Senate, addressing them in a manner befitting the occasion and in words that evidently sprang from his heart. The greater part of his speech was devoted to accounting for the former reverses, for it was particularly the impression created by these that made the men disheartened and in need of encouragement. He attempted therefore to impress upon them, that while not one or two but many causes could be found owing to which the previous battles resulted in defeat, there was at present, if they behaved like men, no reason at all left why they should not be victorious "For then," he said, "the two Consuls never gave battle with their united armies, nor were the forces they disposed of well trained, but raw levies who had never looked danger in the face. But the most important consideration of all is that our troops were then so ignorant

of the enemy that one might almost say they ventured on decisive battles with them without ever having set eyes on them. Those who were worsted at the Trebia had only arrived from Sicily the day before, [13] and at daybreak on the following morning went into action, while those who fought in Etruria not only had not seen their enemies before, but could not even see them in the battle itself owing to the condition of the atmosphere. But now all the circumstances are precisely the opposite of what they were then. For in the first place we, the Consuls, are both present, and are not only about to share your perils ourselves but have given you also the Consuls of last year to stand by you and participate in the struggle. And you yourselves have not only seen how the enemy are armed, how they dispose their forces, and what is their strength, but for two years now you have been fighting with them nearly every day. As, therefore, all the conditions are now the reverse of those in the battles I spoke of, we may anticipate that the result of the present battle will likewise be the opposite. For it would be a strange or rather indeed impossible thing, that after meeting your enemies on equal terms in so many separate skirmishes and in most cases being victorious, now when you confront them by more than two to one you should be beaten. Therefore, my men, every measure having been taken to secure victory for you, one thing alone is wanting, your own zeal and resolution, and as to this it is not, I think, fitting that I should exhort you further. For those who in some countries serve for hire or for those who are about to fight for their neighbours by the terms of an alliance, the moment of greatest peril is during the battle itself, but the result makes little difference to them, and in such a case exhortation is necessary. But those who like you are about to fight not for others, but for yourselves, your

country, and your wives and children, and for whom the results that will ensue are of vastly more importance than the present peril, require not to be exhorted to do their duty but only to be reminded of it. For what man is there who would not wish before all things to conquer in the struggle, or if this be not possible, to die fighting rather than witness the outrage and destruction of all that is dearest to him? Therefore, my men, even without these words of mine, fix your eyes on the difference between defeat and victory and on all that must follow upon either, and enter on this battle as if not your country's legions but her existence were at stake. For if the issue of the day be adverse, she has no further resources to overcome her foes; but she has centred all her power and spirit in you, and in you lies her sole hope of safety. Do not cheat her, then, of this hope, but now pay the debt of gratitude you owe to her, and make it clear to all men that our former defeats were not due to the Romans being less brave than the Carthaginians, but to the inexperience of those who fought for us then and to the force of circumstances." Having addressed the troops in these words Aemilius dismissed them.

[13] This is not consistent with the statement in Chapter 69.

Next day the Consuls broke up their camp and advanced towards the place where they heard that of the enemy was. Coming in view of them on the second day, they encamped at a distance of about fifty stadia from them. Aemilius, seeing that the district round was flat and treeless, was opposed to attacking the enemy there as they were superior in cavalry, his advice being to lure them on by advancing into a country where the battle would be decided rather by the infantry. As Terentius, owing to his inexperience, was of the contrary opinion, difficulties and disputes arose between the generals,

one of the most pernicious things possible. Terentius was in command next day—the two Consuls according to the usual practice commanding on alternate days—and he broke up his camp and advanced with the object of approaching the enemy in spite of Aemilius's strong protests and efforts to prevent him. Hannibal met him with his light-armed troops and cavalry and surprising him while still on the march disordered the Romans much. They met, however, the first charge by advancing some of their heavy infantry, and afterwards sending forwards also their javelineers and cavalry got the better in the whole engagement, as the Carthaginians had no considerable covering force, while they themselves had some companies of their legions fighting mixed with the light-armed troops. The fall of night now made them draw off from each other, the attack of the Carthaginians not having had the success they hoped. Next day, Aemilius, who neither judged it advisable to fight nor could now withdraw the army in safety, encamped with two-thirds of it on the bank of the river Aufidus. This is the only river which traverses the Apennines, the long chain of mountains separating all the Italian streams, those on one side descending to the Tyrrhenian sea and those on the other to the Adriatic. The Aufidus, however, runs right through these mountains, having its source on the side of Italy turned to the Tyrrhenian Sea and falling into the Adriatic. For the remaining portion of his army he fortified a position on the farther side of the river, to the east of the ford, at a distance of about ten stadia from his own camp and rather more from that of the enemy, intending thus to cover the foraging parties from his main camp across the river and harass those of the Carthaginians.

Hannibal now seeing that it was imperative for him to give battle and attack the enemy, and careful lest his soldiers might be disheartened by this

recent reverse, thought that the occasion demanded some words of exhortation and called a meeting of the men. When they were assembled he bade them all look at the country round, and asked them what greater boon they could in their present circumstances crave from the gods, if they had their choice, than to fight the decisive battle on such ground, greatly superior as they were to the enemy in cavalry. As they could see this for themselves they all applauded and, he continued: "In the first place then thank the gods for this; for it is they who working to aid you to victory have led the enemy on to such ground, and next thank myself for compelling them to fight, a thing they can no longer avoid, and to fight here where the advantages are manifestly ours. I do not think it at all my duty to exhort you at further length to be of good heart and eager for the battle, and this is why. Then, when you had no experience of what a battle with the Romans was, this was necessary, and I often addressed you, giving examples, but now that you have beyond dispute beaten the Romans consecutively in three great battles, what words of mine could confirm your courage more than your own deeds? For by these former battles you have gained possession of the country and all its wealth, even as I promised you, and not a word I spoke but has proved true; and the coming battle will be for the cities and their wealth. Your victory will make you at once masters of all Italy, and through this one battle you will be freed from your present toil, you will possess yourselves of all the vast wealth of Rome, and will be lords and masters of all men and all things. Therefore no more words are wanted, but deeds; for if it be the will of the gods I am confident that I shall fulfill my promises forthwith." After he had spoken further to this effect, the army applauded him heartily, whereupon he thanked them and acknowledging

their spirit dismissed them, and immediately pitched his camp, placing his entrenchments by the same bank of the river with the larger camp of the enemy.

Next day he ordered all his troops to look to their persons and their accoutrements, and on the day following he drew up his army along the river with the evident intention of giving battle as soon as possible. Aemilius was not pleased with the ground, and seeing that the Carthaginians would soon have to shift their camp in order to obtain supplies, kept quiet, after securing his two camps by covering forces. Hannibal, after waiting for some time without anyone coming out to meet him, withdrew again the rest of his army into their intrenchments, but sent out the Numidians to intercept the water-bearers from the lesser Roman camp. When the Numidians came up to the actual palisade of the camp and prevented the men from watering, not only was this a further stimulus to Terentius, but the soldiers displayed great eagerness for battle and ill brooked further delay. For nothing is more trying to men in general than prolonged suspense, but when the issue has once been decided we make a shift to endure patiently all that men regard as the depth of misery.

When the news reached Rome that the armies were encamped opposite each other and that engagements between the outposts occurred every day, there was the utmost excitement and fear in the city, as most people dreaded the result owing to their frequent previous reverses, and foresaw and anticipated in imagination the consequences of total defeat. All the oracles that had ever been delivered to them were in men's mouths, every temple and every house was full of signs and prodigies, so that vows, sacrifices, supplicatory processions and litanies pervaded the town. For in seasons of

danger the Romans are much given to propitiating both gods and men, and there is nothing at such times in rites of the kind that they regard as unbecoming or beneath their dignity.

Next day it was Terentius' turn to take the command, and just after sunrise he began to move his forces out of both camps. Crossing the river with those from the larger camp he at once put them in order of battle, drawing up those from the other camp next to them in the same line, the whole army facing south. He stationed the Roman cavalry close to the river on the right wing and the foot next to them in the same line, placing the maniples closer together than was formerly the usage and making the depth of each many times exceed its front. The allied horse he drew up on his left wing, and in front of the whole force at some distance he placed his light-armed troops. The whole army, including the allies, numbered about eighty thousand foot and rather more than six thousand horse. Hannibal at the same time sent his slingers and pikemen over the river and stationed them in front, and leading the rest of his forces out of camp he crossed the stream in two places and drew them up opposite the enemy. On his left close to the river he placed his Spanish and Celtic horse facing the Roman cavalry, next these half his heavy-armed Africans, then the Spanish and Celtic infantry, and after them the other half of the Africans, and finally, on his right wing, his Numidian horse. After thus drawing up his whole army in a straight line, he took the central companies of the Spaniards and Celts and advanced with them, keeping rest of them in contact with these companies, but gradually falling off, so as to produce a crescent-shaped formation, the line of the flanking companies growing thinner as it was prolonged, his object being to

employ the Africans as a reserve force and to begin the action with the Spaniards and Celts.

The Africans were armed in the Roman fashion, Hannibal having equipped them with the choicest of the arms captured in the previous battles. The shields of the Spaniards and Celts were very similar, but they swords were entirely different, those of the Spaniards thrusting with as deadly effect as they cut, but the Gaulish sword being only able to slash and requiring a long sweep to do so. As they were drawn up in alternate companies, the Gauls naked and the Spaniards in short tunics bordered with purple, their national dress, they presented a strange and impressive appearance. The Carthaginian cavalry numbered about ten thousand, and their infantry, including the Celts, did not much exceed forty thousand. The Roman right wing was under the command of Aemilius, the left under that of Terentius, and the centre under the Consuls of the previous year, Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius. Hasdrubal commanded the Carthaginian left, Hanno the right, and Hannibal himself with his brother Mago the centre. Since the Roman army, as I said, faced south and the Carthaginians north, they were neither of them inconvenienced by the rising sun.

The advanced guards were the first to come into action, and at first when only the light infantry were engaged neither side had the advantage; but when the Spanish and Celtic horse on the left wing came into collision with the Roman cavalry, the struggle that ensued was truly barbaric; for there were none of the normal wheeling evolutions, but having once met they dismounted and fought man to man. The Carthaginians finally got the upper hand, killed most of the enemy in the mellay, all the Romans fighting with desperate bravery, and began to drive the rest along the river, cutting them

down mercilessly, and it was now that the heavy infantry on each side took the place of the light-armed troops and met. For a time the Spaniards and Celts kept their ranks and struggled bravely with the Romans, but soon, borne down by the weight of the legions, they gave way and fell back, breaking up the crescent. The Roman maniples, pursuing them furiously, easily penetrated the enemy's front, since the Celts were deployed in a thin line while they themselves had crowded up from the wings to the centre where the fighting was going on. For the centres and wings did not come into action simultaneously, but the centres first, as the Celts were drawn up in a crescent and a long way in advance of their wings, the convex face of the crescent being turned towards the enemy. The Romans, however, following up the Celts and pressing on to the centre and that part of the enemy's line which was giving way, progressed so far that they now had the heavy-armed Africans on both of their flanks. Hereupon the Africans on the right wing facing to the left and then beginning from the right charged upon the enemy's flank, while those on the left faced to the right and dressing by the left, did the same, the situation itself indicating to them how to act. The consequence was that, as Hannibal had designed, the Romans, straying too far in pursuit of the Celts, were caught between the two divisions of the enemy, and they now no longer kept their compact formation but turned singly or in companies to deal with the enemy who was falling on their flanks.

Aemilius, though he had been on the right wing from the outset and had taken part in the cavalry action, was still safe and sound; but wishing to act up to what he had said in his address to the troops, and to be present himself at the fighting, and seeing that the decision of the battle lay mainly with the

legions, he rode along to the centre of the whole line, where he not only threw himself personally into the combat and exchanged blows with the enemy but kept cheering on and exhorting his men. Hannibal, who had been in this part of the field since the commencement of the battle, did likewise.

The Numidians meanwhile on the right wing, attacking the cavalry opposite them on the Roman left, neither gained any great advantage nor suffered any serious loss owing to their peculiar mode of fighting, but they kept the enemy's cavalry out of action by drawing them off and attacking them from all sides at once. Hasdrubal, having by this time cut up very nearly all the enemy's cavalry by the river, came up from the left to help the Numidians, and now the Roman allied horse, seeing that they were going to be charged by him, broke and fled. Hasdrubal at this juncture appears to have acted with great skill and prudence; for in view of the fact that the Numidians were very numerous and most efficient and formidable when in pursuit of a flying foe he left them to deal with the Roman cavalry and led his squadrons on to where the infantry were engaged with the object of supporting the Africans. Attacking the Roman legions in the rear and delivering repeated charges at various points all at once, he raised the spirits of the Africans and cowed and dismayed the Romans. It was here that Lucius Aemilius fell in the thick of the fight after receiving several dreadful wounds, and of him we may say that if there ever was a man who did his duty by his country both all through his life and in these last times, it was he. The Romans as long as they could turn and present a front on every side to the enemy, held out, but as the outer ranks continued to fall, and the rest were gradually huddled in and surrounded, they finally all were killed where they stood, among them Marcus and Gnaeus, the Consuls of the

preceding year, who had borne themselves in the battle like brave men worthy of Rome. While this murderous combat was going on, the Numidians following up the flying cavalry killed most of them and unseated others. A few escaped to Venusia, among them being the Consul Gaius Terentius, who disgraced himself by his flight and in his tenure of office had been most unprofitable to his country.

Such was the outcome of the battle at Cannae between the Romans and Carthaginians, a battle in which both the victors and the vanquished displayed conspicuous bravery, as was evinced by the facts. For of the six thousand cavalry, seventy escaped to Venusia with Terentius, and about three hundred of the allied horse reached different cities in scattered groups. Of the infantry about ten thousand were captured fighting but not in the actual battle, while only perhaps three thousand escaped from the field to neighbouring towns. All the rest, numbering about seventy thousand, died bravely. Both on this occasion and on former ones their numerous cavalry had contributed most to the victory of the Carthaginians, and it demonstrated to posterity that in times of war it is better to give battle with half as many infantry as the enemy and an overwhelming force of cavalry than to be in all respects his equal. Of Hannibal's army there fell about four thousand Celts, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans and two hundred cavalry.

The Romans who were made prisoners were not in the battle for the following reason. Lucius had left a force of ten thousand foot in his own camp, in order that, if Hannibal, neglecting his camp, employed his whole army in the field, they might during the battle gain entrance there and capture all the enemy's baggage: if, on the other hand, Hannibal, guessing

this danger, left a strong garrison in the camp, the force opposed to the Romans would be reduced in numbers. The circumstances of their capture were more or less as follows. Hannibal had left an adequate force to guard his camp, and when the battle opened, the Romans, as they had been ordered, delivered an assault on this force. At first they held out, but as they were beginning to be hard pressed, Hannibal, who was now victorious in every part of the field, came to their assistance, and routing the Romans shut them up in their camp. He killed two thousand of them and afterwards made all the rest prisoners. The Numidians also reduced the various strongholds throughout the country which had given shelter to the flying enemy and brought in the fugitives, consisting of about two thousand horse.

The result of the battle being as I have described, the general consequences that had been anticipated on both sides followed. The Carthaginians by this action became at once masters of almost all the rest of the coast, Tarentum immediately surrendering, while Argyrippa and some Campanian towns invited Hannibal to come to them, and the eyes of all were now turned to the Carthaginians, who had great hopes of even taking Rome itself at the first assault. The Romans on their part owing to this defeat at once abandoned all hope of retaining their supremacy in Italy, and were in the greatest fear about their own safety and that of Rome, expecting Hannibal every moment to appear. It seemed indeed as if Fortune were taking part against them in their struggle with adversity and meant to fill the cup to overflowing; for but a few days afterwards, while the city was yet panic-stricken, the commander they had sent to Cisalpine Gaul was surprised by the Celts in an ambush and he and his force utterly destroyed. Yet the Senate neglected no means in its power, but exhorted and

encouraged the populace, strengthened the defences of the city, and deliberated on the situation with manly coolness. And subsequent events made this manifest. For though the Romans were now incontestably beaten and their military reputation shattered, yet by the peculiar virtues of their constitution and by wise counsel they not only recovered their supremacy in Italy and afterwards defeated the Carthaginians, but in a few years made themselves masters of the whole world.

I therefore end this Book at this point, having now described the events in Spain and Italy that occurred in the 140th Olympiad. When I have brought down the history of Greece in the same Olympiad to the same date, I shall pause to premise to the rest of the history a separate account of the Roman constitution; for I think that a description of it is not only germane to the whole scheme of my work, but will be of great service to students and practical statesmen for forming or reforming other constitutions.

THE END OF BOOK III

BOOK IV

In the preceding Book after pointing out the causes of the second war between Rome and Carthage, I described the invasion of Italy by Hannibal, and the engagements which took place between the belligerents up to the battle on the river Aufidus at the town of Cannae. I shall now give an account of the contemporary events in Greece from the 140th Olympiad onwards, after briefly recalling to the minds of my readers the sketch I gave in my second Book [1] of Greek affairs and especially of the growth of the Achaean League, the progress of that state having been surprisingly rapid in my own time and earlier. Beginning their history with Tisamenus, one of Orestes' sons, I stated that they were ruled by kings of his house down to the reign of Ogygus, after which they adopted a most admirable democratical constitution, until for a time their League was dissolved into cities and villages by the kings of Macedon. Next I went on to tell how they subsequently began to reunite, and which were the first cities to league therefore, and following on this I pointed out in what manner and on what principle they tried to attract other cities and formed the design of uniting all the Peloponnesians in one polity and under one name. After a general survey of this design, I gave a brief but continuous sketch of events in detail up to the dethronement of Cleomenes, king of Sparta. Summarizing, next, the occurrences dealt with in my introductory sketch up to the deaths of Antigonus Doson, Seleucus Ceraunus, and Ptolemy Euergetes, which all took place about the same time, I announced that I would enter on my main

history with the events immediately following the above period. This I considered to be the best starting-point, because in the first place, Aratus's book terminates just at this period and I had decided on taking up and carrying on the narrative of Greek affairs from the date at which he leaves off, and secondly because the period following on this date and included in my history coincides with my own and the preceding generation, so that I have been present at some of the events and have the testimony of eyewitnesses for others. It seemed to me indeed that if I comprised events of an earlier date, repeating mere hearsay evidence, I should be safe neither in my estimates nor in my assertions. But my chief reason for beginning at this date, was that Fortune had then so to speak rebuilt the world. For Philip, son of Demetrius, being still quite a boy, had inherited the throne of Macedonia, Achaeus, the ruler of all Asia on this side of the Taurus, had now not only the state, but power of a king, Antiochus surnamed "The Great" who was still very young had but a short time previously, on the death of his brother Seleucus, succeeded him in Syria, Ariarathes at the same time had become king of Cappadocia, and Ptolemy Philopator king of Egypt, while not long afterwards began the reign of Lycurgus, king of Sparta. The Carthaginians also had but recently appointed Hannibal to be their general in the campaign I mentioned. Since therefore the personalities of the rulers were everywhere new, it was evident that a new series of events would begin, this being the natural and usual consequence. And such indeed was the case; for the Romans and Carthaginians now entered on the war I mentioned, Antiochus and Ptolemy on that for Coele-Syria, and the Achaeans and Philip on that against the Aetolians and Spartans.

[1] Chapters 41-71.

The causes of the latter were as follows. The Aetolians had for long been dissatisfied with peace and with an outlay limited to their own resources, as they had been accustomed to live on their neighbours, and required abundance of funds, owing to that natural covetousness, enslaved by which they always led a life of greed and aggression, like beasts of prey, with no ties of friendship but regarding everyone as an enemy. Nevertheless up to now, as long as Antigonus was alive, they kept quiet owing to their fear of Macedonia, but when that king died leaving Philip still a child to succeed him, they thought they could ignore this king and began to look out for pretexts and grounds for interfering in the affairs of the Peloponnese, giving way to their old habit of looking for pillage from that country and thinking they were a match for the Achaeans now the latter were isolated. Such being their bent and purpose, and chance favouring them in a certain measure, they found the following pretext for putting their design in execution.

Dorimachus of Trichonium was the son of that Nicostratus who broke the solemn truce at the Pamboeotian congress. He was a young man full of the violent and aggressive spirit of the Aetolians and was sent on a public mission to Phigalea, a city in the Peloponnese near the Messenian border and at that time in alliance with the Aetolian League; professedly to guard the city and its territory, but really to act as a spy on Peloponnesian affairs. When a recently formed band of brigands came to join him there, and he could not provide them with any legitimate pretext for plundering, as the general peace in Greece established by Antigonus still continued, he finally, finding himself at a loss, gave them leave to make forays on the cattle of the Messenians who were friends and allies of the Aetolians. At first, then, they

only raided the flocks on the border, but later, growing ever more insolent, they took to breaking into the country houses, surprising the unsuspecting inmates by night. When the Messenians grew indignant at this and sent envoys to Dorimachus to complain, he at first paid no attention, as he wished not only to benefit the men under him but himself also by taking his share of their captives. But when such embassies began to arrive more frequently, owing to the continuance of the outrages, he announced that he would come himself to Messene to plead his cause against those who accused the Aetolians, and on appearing there when the victims approached him, he ridiculed and jeered at some of them, attacked some by recrimination and intimidated others by abusive language.

While he was still staying in Messene the banditti approached the city by night, and with the aid of scaling-ladders broke into the farm called Chyron's, where after killing those who offered resistance they bound the rest of the slaves and carried them off together with the cattle. The Messenian Ephors, who had long been annoyed by all that took place and by Dorimachus' stay in the town, thought this was adding insult to injury and summoned him before their college. On this occasion Scyron, then one of the ephors, and otherwise highly esteemed by the citizens, advised them not to let Dorimachus escape from the city, unless he made good all the losses of the Messenians and delivered up to justice those guilty of murder. When all signified their approval of what Scyron said, Dorimachus flew into a passion, and said they were utter simpletons if they thought it was Dorimachus they were now affronting and not the Aetolian League. He thought the whole affair altogether outrageous, and they would receive such public chastisement for it as would serve them right. There was at this time

a certain lewd fellow at Messene, one of those who had in every way renounced his claim to be a man, called Babrytas. If anyone had dressed this man up in Dorimachus' sun-hat and chlamys it would have been impossible to distinguish the two, so exact was the resemblance both in voice and in person, and of this Dorimachus was perfectly aware. Upon his speaking now in this threatening and overbearing manner, Scyron grew very angry and said, "Do you think we care a fig for you or your threats, Babrytas?" Upon his saying this Dorimachus, yielding for the moment to circumstances, consented to give satisfaction for all damage inflicted on the Messenians, but on his return to Aetolia he continued to resent this taunt so bitterly, that without having any other plausible pretext he stirred up a war against Messene on account of this alone.

The Strategus of the Aetolians at this time was Ariston. Being himself incapacitated for service in the field by certain bodily infirmities and being related to Dorimachus and Scopas, he had more or less ceded his whole office to the latter. Dorimachus did not venture to exhort the Aetolians by public speeches to make war on Messene, since he really had no valid pretext, but, as everybody knew, his animus was due to his own lawless violence and his resentment of a jibe. So he desisted from any such plan, and took to urging on Scopas in private to join him in his project against the Messenians, pointing out to him that they were safe as regards Macedonia owing to the youth of its ruler—Philip being now not more than seventeen—calling his attention to the hostility of the Lacedaemonians owing to the Messenians, and reminding him that Elis was the friend and ally of the Aetolians; from all which facts he deduced that they would be quite safe in invading Messenia. But next—this being the most convincing argument to

an Aetolian—he pictured to him the great booty that they would get from Messenia, the country being without warning of invasion and being the only one in Greece that the Cleomenic war had spared. Finally he dwelt on the popularity they themselves would gain in Aetolia. The Achaeans, he said, if they opposed their passage, could not complain if the Aetolians met force by force, but if they kept quiet they would not stand in the way of the project. Against the Messenians they would have no difficulty in finding a grievance, for they had long been inflicting wrong on the Aetolians by promising to ally themselves with the Achaeans and Macedonians. By these arguments and others in the same sense, he made Scopas and his friends so eager for the enterprise that without waiting for the General Assembly of the Aetolians, without taking the Special Council into their confidence, without in fact taking any proper steps, but acting solely as their own passion and their private judgement dictated, they made war all at once on the Messenians, Epirots, Achaeans, Acarnanians, and Macedonians.

By sea they immediately sent out privateers, who falling in with a ship of the royal Macedonian navy near Cythera brought her to Aetolia with all her crew, and there sold the officers, the troops, and the ship herself. Afterwards they pillaged the coast of Epirus, being aided in these outrages by the Cephallenian fleet. They also made an attempt to seize Thyrium in Acarnania. At the same time, sending a small force secretly through the Peloponnese, they occupied the forts called Clarium in the middle of the territory of Megalopolis, and continued to use it as a base for forays and a market for the sale of booty. This place, however, was shortly afterwards besieged and captured in a few days by Timoxenus, the Achaean Strategus, with the aid of Taurion, the officer left by Antigonus in charge of

Peloponnesian affairs. I should explain that Antigonus continued to hold Corinth, which the Achaeans had given up to him, to further his purposes in the Cleomenic war, but that after storming Orchomenus he did not restore it to the Achaeans, but annexed and occupied it, wishing, as I think, not only to be master of the entrance into the Peloponnese, but to safeguard his interests in the interior by means of his garrison and arsenal at Orchomenus. Dorimachus and Scopas waited for the time when Timoxenus' year of office had nearly expired, and Aratus, who had been appointed Strategus for the ensuing year by the Achaeans, would not yet be in office, and then, collecting the whole of the Aetolian forces at Rhium and preparing ferry-boats as well as the Cephallenian ships, they conveyed their men over to the Peloponnese and began to advance towards Messenia. On their march through the territory of Patrae, Pharae, and Tritaea, they pretended indeed not to wish to inflict any hurt on the Achaeans, but as the men could not keep their hands off the country, owing to their passion for pillaging, they went through it, spoiling and damaging, until they reached Phigalea. Thence by a bold and sudden rush they invaded Messenia, utterly regardless both of their long-existing alliance and friendship with the Messenians and of the established law of nations. Subordinating everything to their own selfish greed, they pillaged the country unmolested, the Messenians not daring to come out at all to attack them.

This being the time fixed by law for the meeting of their Federal Assembly, the Achaean deputies gathered at Aegium; and when the assembly met, the members from Patrae and Pharae gave an account of the injuries done to their country during the passage of the Aetolians, while an embassy from Messene arrived begging for help, as they had been

treacherously and unjustly attacked. The Achaeans listened to these statements, and as they shared the indignation of the people of Patrae and Pharae, and sympathized with the Messenians in their misfortune, but chiefly since they thought it outrageous that the Aetolians without getting leave of passage from anyone and without making the least attempt to justify the action, had ventured to enter Achaea in arms contrary to treaty, they were so exasperated by all these considerations that they voted that help should be given to the Messenians, that the Strategus should call a general levy of the Achaeans, and that this levy when it met should have full power to decide on what was to be done. Now Timoxenus, who was still Strategus, both because his term of office had very nearly expired, and because he had little confidence in the Achaean forces which had latterly much neglected their drilling, shrank from taking the field and even from levying the troops. For the fact is that ever since the fall of King Cleomenes of Sparta all the Peloponnesians, worn out as they were by the previous wars and trusting to the permanency of the present state of tranquillity, had paid no attention at all to preparations for war. But Aratus, incensed and exasperated by the audacity of the Aetolians, entered upon the business with much greater warmth, especially as he had a difference of long standing with that people. He therefore was in a hurry to call the levy of the Achaeans and to take the field against the Aetolians, and at length receiving the public seal from Timoxenus five days before the proper date of his entering office, wrote to the different cities with orders that all citizens of military age should present themselves in arms at Megalopolis.

Before proceeding I think I should say a few words about Aratus owing to the singularity of his character. He had in general all the qualities that go

to make a perfect man of affairs. He was a powerful speaker and a clear thinker and had the faculty of keeping his own counsel. In his power of dealing suavely with political opponents, of attaching friends to himself and forming fresh alliances he was second to none. He also had a marvellous gift for devising *coups de main*, stratagems, and ruses against the enemy, and for executing such with the utmost personal courage and endurance. Of this we have many clear proofs, but the most conspicuous instances are the detailed accounts we possess of his seizure of Sicyon and Mantinea, his expulsion of the Aetolians from Pellene, and first and foremost his surprise of the Acrocorinthus. But this very same man, when he undertook field operations, was slow in conception, timid in performance, and devoid in personal courage. The consequence was that he filled the Peloponnese with trophies commemorating his defeats, and in this respect the enemy could always get the better of him. So true it is that there is something multiform in the nature not only of men's bodies, but of their minds, so that not merely in pursuits of a different class the same man has a talent for some and none for others, but often in the case of such pursuits as are similar the same man may be most intelligent and most dull, or most audacious and most cowardly. Nor is this a paradox, but a fact familiar to careful observers. For instance some men are most bold in facing the charge of savage beasts in the chase but are poltroons when they meet an armed enemy, and again in war itself some are expert and efficient in a single combat, but inefficient when in a body and when standing in the ranks and sharing the risk with their comrades. For example the Thessalian cavalry are irresistible when in squadrons and brigades, but slow and awkward when dispersed and engaging the enemy single-handed as they chance to encounter them. The

Aetolian horse are just the reverse. The Cretans both by land and sea are irresistible in ambuscades, forays, tricks played on the enemy, night attacks, and all petty operations which require fraud, but they are cowardly and down-hearted in the massed face-to-face charge of an open battle. It is just the reverse with the Achaeans and Macedonians. I say this in order that my readers may not refuse to trust my judgement, because in some cases I make contrary pronouncements regarding the conduct of the same men even when engaged in pursuits of a like nature.

When the men of military age had assembled in arms at Megalopolis in accordance with the decree of the Achaeans—it was at this point that I digressed from my narrative—and when the Messenians again presented themselves before the people, entreating them not to disregard the flagrant breach of treaty committed against them, and at the same time offering to join the general alliance and begging that they should at once be enrolled among the members, the Achaean magistrates refused the latter request on the ground that they were not empowered to receive additional members without consulting Philip and the rest of the allies. For the alliance was still in force which Antigonus had concluded during the Cleomenic war between the Achaeans, Epirots, Phocians, Macedonians, Boeotians, Acarnanians, and Thessalians. They, however, agreed to march out to their assistance on condition that the envoys deposited in Sparta their own sons as hostages, to ensure that the Messenians should not come to terms with the Aetolians without the consent of the Achaeans. I should mention that the Spartans, too, had marched out according to the terms of the alliance, and were encamped on the borders of the territory of Megalopolis, in the position rather of reserves and spectators than of allies. Aratus having thus carried

out his intentions regarding the Messenians, sent a message to the Aetolians informing them of the resolutions, and demanding that they should evacuate Messenia and not set foot in Achaea, or he would treat trespassers as enemies. Scopas and Dorimachus, having listened to this message and knowing that the Achaean forces were assembled, thought it best for the time to cede to this demand. They therefore at once sent dispatches to Ariston, the Aetolian Strategus at Cyllene, begging him to send them the transports as soon as possible to the island called Pheias off the coast of Elis. After two days they themselves took their departure loaded with booty and advanced towards Elis; for the Aetolians have always courted the friendship of the Eleans, as through them they could get in touch with the rest of the Peloponnese for purposes of foraying and raiding.

Aratus waited two days: and thinking foolishly that the Aetolians would return by the way they had indicated, dismissed to their homes all the rest of the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians, and taking with him three thousand foot, three hundred horse, and Taurion's troops, advanced in the direction of Patrae with the intention of keeping on the flank of the Aetolians. Dorimachus, on learning that Aratus was hanging on his flank and had not broken up all his force, fearful on the one hand lest he should attack them while occupied in embarking and eager also to stir up war, sent his booty off to the ships, under charge of a sufficient force of competent men to superintend the passage, ordering those in charge of the ships to meet him at Rhium where it was his intention to embark, while he himself at first accompanied the booty to protect it during its shipment and afterwards reversed the direction of his march and advanced towards Olympia. There he heard that Taurion with the forces I mentioned above was in the

neighbourhood of Cleitor, and judging that, this being so, he would not be able to embark at Rhium in security and without an engagement, he thought it most in his interest to make all haste to encounter Aratus, whose army was still weak and who had no suspicion of his intention. He thought that if he defeated him, he could first ravage the country and then embark safely at Rhium, while Aratus was occupied in taking measures for again mustering the Achaeans, whereas, if Aratus were intimidated and refused a battle, he could safely withdraw whenever he thought fit. Acting therefore on these considerations he advanced and encamped near Methydrium in the territory of Megalopolis.

The Achaean commanders, when they became aware of the approach of the Aetolians, mismanaged matters to such an extent that it was impossible for anyone to have acted more stupidly. For, returning from the territory of Cleitor, they encamped near Caphyae, and when the Aetolians began to march from Methydrium past Orchomenus, they led out the Achaean forces and drew them up in the plain of Caphyae, with the river which traverses it in their front. The Aetolians, both owing to the difficulties of the ground between the two armies—for besides the river there were several awkward ditches—owing to the display of readiness for battle on the part of the Achaeans, were afraid of attacking the enemy as they had intended, but marched in admirable order towards the heights by Olygyrtus, thinking themselves lucky if no one attacked them and forced them to fight. But Aratus, when the van of the Aetolians was already beginning to mount the heights, and while their cavalry were protecting their rear and approaching the spot at the foot of the hill called Propous, or Foothill, send out his cavalry and light-armed infantry under the command of the Acarnanian

Epistratus, ordering him to get into touch with the enemy's rear and harass them. Now if he had decided to engage the enemy, he should not have attacked their rear after they had already got over the level ground, but their van the moment they entered the plain; for thus the whole battle would have been on flat ground, where the Aetolians are very inefficient, owing to their accoutrement and general tactics, while the Achaeans, owing to their total difference in both these respects, are very capable and strong. But now neglecting to avail themselves of the time and place that suited them they yielded up every advantage to the enemy. In consequence the result of the battle was what naturally follows on such an opening. For when the light-armed troops got in touch with them, the Aetolian cavalry retired to the foot of the hill in good order with the object of joining their infantry. But Aratus, who had neither observed well what was happening nor calculated properly what would follow, thinking, the moment he saw the cavalry retreating, that they were in flight, sent the cuirassed troops from his wings with orders to join and support his light-armed force, while he himself, forming his men in column, led them on at the double. The Aetolian horse, having traversed the plain, joined their infantry, and while halting there, themselves under the shelter of the hill, began to collect the infantry on their flanks by calling on them, the men on the march giving a ready ear to their shouts and running back and falling in to help. When they thought they were sufficiently strong, they formed up close and fell upon the leading lines of the Achaean horse and light infantry. As they were superior in number, and as they were charging from higher ground, after a somewhat lengthy struggle they at length put their adversaries to flight. When these gave way and ran, the cuirassed men who were hurrying up to help them, and kept arriving in no

order and in batches, some of them being at a loss to know what was the matter and others coming into collision with the fugitives, were compelled to turn round and take to flight also. The consequence was that while those routed on the field were not above five hundred, the number of those in flight exceeded two thousand. The circumstances of the moment making it clear to the Aetolians what was to be done, they followed on the heel of the enemy with insolent and continued shouts. The retreat of the Achaeans was at first an honourable retirement, as it seemed, to a position of safety, since they imagined they were falling back on their heavy-armed troops whom they supposed to be still strong in their original position. But upon seeing that the latter also had quitted their strong position and were already far off and marching in a straggling line, some of them at once dispersed and fled in disorder to the neighbouring towns, while those who encountered the men of their own phalanx marching in the opposite direction, had no need of the enemy, but threw their comrades as well as themselves into a panic and forced them to headlong flight. They fled, as I said, to the towns, Orchomenus and Caphyae being quite near and affording refuge to many: for if this had not been the case the whole force would have run the risk of a destruction as complete as unexpected.

Such was the issue of the battle at Caphyae. The Megalopolitans, on hearing that the Aetolians were encamped at Methydrium, summoned two whole levy by trumpet and arrived to help the day after the battle, so that they were compelled to bury, slain by the foe, the very men side by side with whom they had expected to stand and meet that foe in battle. Digging a trench in the plain of Caphyae, they collected the bodies and interred the unfortunates with all due honours.

The Aetolians, having in this remarkable manner won a battle with their cavalry and light infantry alone, continued to advance henceforth in safety through the middle of the Peloponnese. After making an attempt on Pellene during their march and pillaging the territory of Sicyon, they finally withdrew by way of the Isthmus.

Such was the cause and origin of the Social War, its beginning being the resolution passed by all the allies, who assembling at Corinth under the presidency of King Philip, confirmed this measure. [2] A few days afterwards the Achaean Federal Assembly held its regular general meeting, at which both the whole body and the individual members showed themselves very bitterly disposed towards Aratus as having indisputably cause the late disaster, and so when his political opponents accused him, producing clear proofs of his culpability, the assembly became still more exasperated and embittered against him. For the general opinion was that he had manifestly erred in the first place in usurping his predecessor's office before the time in order to undertake the sort of enterprise in which to his own knowledge he had often failed. His second and graver error lay in his having disbanded the Achaeans while the Aetolians were still in the very heart of the Peloponnese, especially as he had been previously aware that Scopas and Dorimachus were doing their best to disturb the existing settlement and stir up war. Thirdly, he had engaged the enemy with such a small force, when there was no urgent necessity to do so, as he might have retired safely to the towns close at hand and reassembled the Achaean forces before giving battle. But his fourth and greatest error was, that when he had decided to fight he managed matters so casually and inconsiderately, that neglecting to avail himself of the plain and make a proper use of his

hoplites, he elected to fight on the hill, with only his light-armed troops, against Aetolians to whom nothing is more advantageous and familiar than such conditions. Nevertheless, when Aratus rose, and after reminding them of his conduct of affairs and achievements in the past, defended himself against the accusations, maintaining that he was not responsible for what occurred; and when he asked their pardon if he had possibly been guilty of any oversight in the battle, and said he thought that in general it was better to view facts in no spirit of bitterness, but with human charity: he produced such a rapid and generous revulsion of feeling in the Assembly, that they remained for long displeased with those of his political opponents who had joined in the attack on him, and as to the immediate future adopted Aratus' opinion in every matter. This took place in the previous Olympiad; what follows falls in the 140th.

[2] See Chapter 25.

The resolution passed by the Achaeans was as follows: To send embassies to the Epirots, Boeotians, Phocians, Acarnanians, and to Philip, pointing out how the Aetolians had twice, in direct breach owing to the treaty, entered Achaea in arms, and begging for assistance according to the terms of their alliance and also for the admission of the Messenians into the confederacy. The Strategus of the Achaeans was to levy a force of five thousand foot and five hundred horse, and to go to the assistance of the Messenians, should the Aetolians invade their country. He was further to arrange with Sparta and Messene how many cavalry and infantry each state should contribute for the needs of the League. Having passed this resolution the Achaeans continued to bear their late reverse bravely, and neither abandoned the Messenians nor their own purpose. The ambassadors sent to

the allies executed their instructions, and the Strategus enrolled in Achaea the number of men decided on, and arranged with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians that they should each send two thousand five hundred foot and two hundred and fifty horse, so that the whole force available for the coming campaign amounted to ten thousand foot and a thousand horse.

The Aetolians, when the time came for their regular annual Assembly to meet, voted to maintain peace with the Lacedaemonians, Messenians and all the other states, with the mischievous design of corrupting and spoiling the allies of the Achaeans. As regards the Achaeans themselves they voted to be at peace with them if they abandoned the Messenian alliance, but if this alliance were maintained to go to war with them. Nothing could have been more unreasonable. For they were themselves allies of both the Achaeans and Messenians, and now if these two states remained in alliance with each other they threatened to declare war on the Achaeans, but they offered a separate peace to the Achaeans if they chose to be at enmity with the Messenians. So that no reasonable explanation can be given of their iniquity, so utterly wrong-headed were their designs.

The Epirots and Philip, after listening to the envoys, agreed to receive the Messenians into the alliance. They felt a momentary indignation at the proceedings of the Aetolians, but were not deeply shocked at them, as the Aetolians had not acted in a manner to surprise anyone, but simply as is their habit. Consequently their resentment was of brief duration, and they voted to remain at peace with the Aetolians. So true is it that persistent wrongdoing is more readily pardoned than occasional and startling acts of iniquity. The Aetolians at least, continuing to behave in this manner, constantly pillaging Greece and committing frequent acts of war without

declaration, not only never thought it worth the trouble to defend themselves against complaints, but ridiculed anyone who called them to account for their past offences or even for their future designs. As for the Lacedaemonians, though they had been so recently set free through Antigonus, and through the spirited action of the Achaeans, and should not have in any way acted against the Macedonians and Philip, they sent privately to the Aetolians and made a secret alliance with them.

The Achaean levy had been enrolled, and the Lacedaemonians and Messenians had contracted to send their contingents, when Scerdilaïdas, together with Demetrius of Pharos, sailed from Illyria with a fleet of ninety boats and passed Lissus, thus breaking the treaty with Rome. They touched first at Pylos and made some attacks on it which failed. Demetrius now with fifty of the boats started for the islands, and sailing through the Cyclades pillaged or levied blackmail on some of them. Scerdilaïdas on his voyage home touched at Naupactus with his forty boats at the request of Amynas, the king of Athamania, who was his connexion by marriage. Here, having come to terms with the Aetolians through Agelaus about the division of the spoil, he promised to join them in invading Achaea.

Agelaus, Dorimachus, and Scopas were negotiating for the betrayal to them of the city of Cynaetha, and having made this arrangement with Scerdilaïdas, they collected the Aetolian forces en masse and invaded Achaea with the Illyrians. Meanwhile Ariston, the Aetolian Strategus, in pretended ignorance of what was going on, kept quiet in Aetolia, asserting that he was not making war on the Achaeans but keeping the peace; which was most foolish and childish on his part. For it is obvious that a man who thinks he can cloak by words the clear evidence of facts must be regarded as

a foolish and futile person. Dorimachus, marching through Achaea, appeared suddenly before Cynaetha. The people of Cynaetha, who are Arcadians, had been for many years vexed by the never-ending and embittered strife of factions; there had been constant massacres, expulsions, robbery of goods, and confiscation of lands by the one party or the other, and now at length the Achaean party had the upper hand and were in possession of the city, the Achaeans furnishing them with a garrison to hold the walls and a military governor of the city. Such was the state of affairs, when a short time before the arrival of the Aetolians, upon the exiles sending frequent messages to those in the city entreating them to be reconciled and permit them to return home, the party in possession sent envoys to the Achaean League, wishing the reconciliation to be with their consent. The Achaeans readily agreed, as they felt sure that they would thus gain the goodwill of both factions, since those who were masters of the city were entirely devoted to them and the home-coming exiles would owe their safe return to the consent of the League. Accordingly, the Cynaetheans dismissed the garrison and commandant from the city and recalled the exiles, who numbered about three hundred, exacting from them such pledges as are generally regarded among mankind as most binding. But these repatriated citizens, not because they had any cause or pretext subsequent to their readmission for suspecting that other contentions were imminent, but on the contrary from the very moment of their return, set about conspiring against their city and their preservers. I am even inclined to think that at the very instant when they were mutually pledging their faith by solemn oaths over the sacrifice, their minds were full of the impious project of breaking their faith to heaven and to those who trusted in them.

For no sooner were they again associated in the government than they began to solicit the Aetolians and of to betray the city to them, taking the safest and swiftest means of bringing to utter destruction those to whom they owed their safety and the city in whose lap they had been nourished.

The *coup de main* by which they executed their project was as follows. Some among the returned exiles held the office of Polemarch. It is the duty of these magistrates to shut the gates: they keep the keys in their custody until the gates are reopened and by day reside in the gate-houses. The Aetolians then lay in readiness with their scaling-ladders awaiting the moment for attack. The Polemarchs of the party which had been in exile, after murdering their colleagues at one of the gate-houses, opened the gate, upon which some of the Aetolians rushed in through it, while others, planting their ladders against the wall, took forcible possession of the fortifications by this means. All the inhabitants were seized with consternation at this and knew not what course to take in these difficult circumstances. For neither were their hands free to oppose those who were streaming in through the gate, owing to the attack on the walls, nor could they defend the walls properly owing to the forcing of the gate. For these reasons the Aetolians soon made themselves masters of the town, and thereupon, amid all their iniquities, performed one act of exemplary justice. For in the first place they killed and plundered the property of the traitors who had introduced them into the city. All the rest of the citizens were treated in the same way. Finally, they quartered themselves in the houses and thoroughly pillaged all the property, putting to the torture many of the Cynaetheans whom they suspected of having concealed money, plate, or other valuables.

After this cruel treatment of the Cynaetheans, they took their departure, leaving a garrison to guard the walls and advanced towards Lusi. On arriving at the temple of Artemis which lies between Cleitor and Cynaetha, and is regarded as inviolable by the Greeks, they threatened to lift the cattle of the goddess and plunder the other property about the temple. But the people of Lusi very wisely induced them to refrain from their impious purpose and commit no serious outrage by giving them some of the sacred furniture. On receiving this they at once left the place and encamped before Cleitor.

Meanwhile Aratus, the Achaean Strategus, had sent to Philip begging for help, was collecting the Achaean levy, and had sent for the contingent which the Messenians and Lacedaemonians had agreed to furnish.

The Aetolians in the first place invited the Cleitorians to abandon their alliance with the Achaeans and form one with themselves. When the Cleitorians absolutely refused to listen to them, they began an assault, and attempted to take the town by escalading. But on meeting with a gallant and determined resistance from the inhabitants they yielded to the force of circumstances, and breaking up their camp advanced again towards Cynaetha, raiding and driving off the sacred cattle in spite of having undertaken not to do so. At first they wished to hand over Cynaetha to the Eleans; but on the latter declining they decided to hold the town themselves, appointing Euripidas commandant. But afterwards, as they were afraid from the intelligence they received of a relief force coming from Macedonia, they burnt the city and withdrew, marching again to Rhium, whence they had decided to make the crossing. Taurion had learnt of the Aetolian invasion and the fate of Cynaetha; and seeing that Demetrius of Pharos had sailed

back from the islands to Cenchreae, begged him to assist the Achaeans, and after conveying his boats across the Isthmus, to fall upon the Aetolians during their crossing. Demetrius, whose return from his expedition to the islands had been much to his advantage indeed, but somewhat ignominious, as the Rhodians were sailing to attack him, lent a ready ear to Taurion, who had engaged to meet the expense of transporting the boats. But having traversed the Isthmus and missed the crossing of the Aetolians by two days, he returned again to Corinth, after raiding some places on the Aetolian coast. The Lacedaemonians had culpably omitted to send the stipulated contingent of men, but dispatched quite an insignificant number of horse and foot to save appearances. But Aratus who had his Achaeans, displayed rather on this occasion the caution of a politician than the courage of a general; for he made no move, fearful of committing himself and mindful of his recent reverse, until Scopas and Dorimachus, having accomplished all they had purposed, returned home, and this although their march had taken them through narrow defiles, most advantageous for an attacking force and where a call of the bugle would have been sufficient.

The Cynaetheans, on whom the Aetolians had brought this terrible disaster, were, however, generally esteemed to have deserved their fate most than any men ever did. Since the Arcadian nation on the whole has a very high reputation for virtue among the Greeks, due not only to their humane and hospitable character and usages, but especially to their piety to the gods, it is worth while to give a moment's consideration to the question of the savagery of the Cynaetheans, and ask ourselves why, though unquestionably of Arcadian stock, they so far surpassed all other Greeks at this period in cruelty and wickedness. I think the reason was that they were

the first and indeed only people in Arcadia to abandon an admirable institution, introduced by their forefathers with a nice regard for the natural conditions under which all the inhabitants of that country live. For the practice of music, I mean real music, is beneficial to all men, but to Arcadians it is a necessity. For we must not suppose, as Ephorus, in the Preface to his History, making a hasty assertion quite unworthy of him, says, that music was introduced by men for the purpose of deception and delusion; we should not think that the ancient Cretans and Lacedaemonians acted at haphazard in substituting the flute and rhythmic movement for the bugle in war, or that the early Arcadians had no good reason for incorporating music in their whole public life to such an extent that not only boys, but young men up to the age of thirty were compelled to study it constantly, although in other matters their lives were most austere. For it is a well-known fact, familiar to all, that it is hardly known except in Arcadia, that in the first place the boys from their earliest childhood are trained to sing in measure the hymns and paeans in which by traditional usage they celebrated the heroes and gods of each particular place: later they learn the measures of Philoxenus and Timotheus, and every year in the theatre they compete keenly in choral singing to the accompaniment of professional flute-players, the boys in the contest proper to them and the young men in what is called the men's contest. And not only this, but through their whole life they entertain themselves at banquets not by listening to hired musicians but by their own efforts, calling for a song from each in turn. Whereas they are not ashamed of denying acquaintance with other studies, in the case of singing it is neither possible for them to deny knowledge of it because they all are compelled to learn it, nor, if they confess to such

knowledge can they excuse themselves, so great a disgrace is this considered in that country. Besides this the young men practise military parades to the music of the flute and perfect themselves in dances and give annual performances in the theatres, all under state supervision and at the public expense. Now all these practices I believe to have been introduced by the men of old time, not as luxuries and superfluities but because they had before their eyes the universal practice of personal manual labour in Arcadia, and in general the toilsomeness and hardship of the men's lives, as well as the harshness of character resulting from the cold and gloomy atmospheric conditions usually prevailing in these parts—conditions to which all men by their very nature must perforce assimilate themselves; there being no other cause than this why separate nations and peoples dwelling widely apart differ so much from each other in character, feature, and colour as well as in the most of their pursuits. The primitive Arcadians, therefore, with the view of softening and tempering the stubbornness and harshness of nature, introduced all the practices I mentioned, and in addition accustomed the people, both men and women, to frequent festivals and general sacrifices, and dances of young men and maidens, and in fact resorted to every contrivance to render more gentle and mild, by the influence of the customs they instituted, the extreme hardness of the natural character. The Cynaetheans, by entirely neglecting these institutions, though in special need of such influences, as their country is the most rugged and their climate the most inclement in Arcadia, and by devoting themselves exclusively to their local affairs and political rivalries, finally became so savage that in no city of Greece were greater and more constant crimes committed. As an indication of the deplorable condition of the Cynaetheans

in this respect and the detestation of the other Arcadians for such practices I may mention the following: at the time when, after the great massacre, the Cynaetheans sent an embassy to Sparta, the other Arcadian cities which they entered on their journey gave them instant notice to depart by cry of herald, but the Mantineans after their departure even made a solemn purification by offering piacular sacrifices and carrying them round their city and all their territory.

I have said so much on this subject firstly in order that the character of the Arcadian nation should not suffer for the crimes of one city, secondly to deter any other Arcadians from beginning to neglect music under the impression that its extensive practice in Arcadia serves no necessary purpose. I also spoke for the sake of the Cynaetheans themselves, in order that, if Heaven ever grant them better fortune, they may humanize themselves by turning their attention to education and especially to music; for by no other means can they hope to free themselves from that savagery which overtook them at this time. Having now said all that occurred to me on the subject of this people I return to the point whence I digressed.

The Aetolians, after those exploits in the Peloponnese, had returned home in safety, when Philip appeared at Corinth with an army to help the Achaeans. As he arranged too late for this, he sent couriers to all the allies, begging them to send as soon as possible to Corinth representatives to discuss the measures necessary for the common service. He himself quitting Corinth advanced towards Tegea, as he had heard that intestine disturbances accompanied by massacres had broken out at Sparta. For the Lacedaemonians, who had been accustomed to be ruled by kings and to unconditional obedience to their rulers, now having recently gained their

liberty through Antigonus and finding themselves without a king, began to fall into factions, as they all thought they should have an equal share of political power. At first two of the ephors did not pronounce for either side, but the other three threw in their lot with the Aetolians, as they were convinced that owing to his tender age Philip would not yet be able to control Peloponnesian affairs. But when, contrary to their expectation, the Aetolians made a hasty retreat from the Peloponnese, and Philip was even quicker in arriving from Macedonia, the three ephors in question, very suspicious of one of the other two, Adeimantus, as he was privy to all their projects and did not highly approve their attitude, were in much fear of his revealing all their designs to the king on his approach. Therefore, after a private conference with some of the younger men, they ordered by proclamation all those of military age to assemble in arms at the temple of Athene of the Brazen House as the Macedonians were advancing on the city. At an order so strange and unexpected all rapidly assembled, upon which Adeimantus, who disapproved of the proceeding, came forward and tried to address the people, pointing out that "These proclamations and orders to assemble in arms should have been made of late when we heard that our enemies the Aetolians were near our frontier, and not now when we learn that the Macedonians, our benefactors and preservers, are approaching with their king." While he was still haranguing in this fashion, those young men who had been appointed to the task by the ephors fell upon him and ran him through as well as Sthenelaus, Alcamenes, Thyestes, Bionidas, and a good many other citizens. Polyphyontas, however, and a few with him, foreseeing what was likely to occur, had wisely withdrawn and joined Philip. After these proceedings the ephors now in power at once sent

messengers to Philip bringing accusations against their victims, begging him to delay his arrival until the present disturbance had subsided and the town had returned to normal condition, and informing him that it was their intention to maintain all their obligations to Macedonia and remain friendly. These messengers met the king near Mt. Parthenium and spoke according to their instructions. After listening to them, he bade them return home at once, and inform the ephors that for his own part he would continue his march and take up his quarters in Tegea, where he demanded that they should send him as soon as possible some persons of sufficient weight to discuss the present situation with him. The messengers obeyed, and the Lacedaemonian magistrates, on receiving the king's communication, dispatched ten envoys to Philip, the chief of the mission being Omias, who on reaching Tegea and presenting themselves before the king's council, laid the responsibility of the late disturbance on Adeimantus, and engaged themselves to observe faithfully the terms of the alliance with Philip, and be second to none of those who were regarded as his true friends in their devotion to him. So the Lacedaemonians after these and other similar assurances withdrew, upon which there was a difference of opinion among the members of the council. Some knowing the evil disposition of the Spartan government, and convinced that Adeimantus and the others had met their fate owing to their favouring Macedonia, and that the project of the Lacedaemonians was to join the Aetolians, advised Philip to make an example of Sparta, treating it in the same way as Alexander had treated Thebes at the outset of his reign. But some of the older councilors declared that such vengeance was heavier than the offence deserved. Philip, they said, should punish the guilty parties and, removing them from office, place

the government in the hands of his own friends. Finally the king spoke, if indeed we are to suppose that the opinion he delivered was his own; for it is scarcely probable that a boy of seventeen should be able to decide about such grave matters. It is, however, the duty of us writers to attribute to the supreme ruler the expression of opinion which prevailed at his council, while it is open for the reader to suspect that such decisions and the arguments on which they rest are due to his associates and especially to those closest to his person. Among those in the present case Aratus is the one to whom we may most plausibly attribute the opinion delivered by the king. Philip said that, as far as regarded injuries inflicted by the allies on themselves, it was not incumbent on him to go beyond correcting and censoring such either by word of mouth or by letter; but that only injuries inflicted on the whole alliance called for punishment and redress by the joint action of all. As the Lacedaemonians had not committed any manifest offence against the alliance as a whole, and had engaged to meet faithfully all their obligations to himself, it would not be right to treat them with excessive harshness. Considering indeed that his father after conquering them as enemies, had done them no hurt, it would ill become himself to take extreme vengeance on them for such a trifling fault. When the council had voted to act thus and overlook the incident, the king sent Petraeus, one of his friends, together with Omias, to exhort the people in Sparta to remain faithful to their friendship with himself and the Macedonians and to exchange oaths confirm in general the alliance. He himself broke up his camp and began to march back to Corinth, having in his decision about the Spartans given the allies an excellent specimen of the policy he meant to pursue.

As he found the deputies from the allied cities assembled at Corinth, he held a Council to deliberate on the measures to be taken with regard to the Aetolians. The Boeotians accused the Aetolians of having plundered the temple of Athene Itonia in time of peace, the Phocians of having marched upon Ambrysus and Daulium and attempted to seize both cities, and the Epirots of having pillaged their territory. The Arcadians pointed out how they had organized a *coup de main* against Thyrium and had gone so far as to attack the city under cover of night. The Achaeans related how they had occupied Clarium in the territory of Megalopolis, and during their passage through Achaea ravaged the country of Patrae and Pharae, how they had sacked Cynaetha and despoiled the temple of Artemis at Lusi, laid siege to Cleitor, and made attempts by sea on Pylos and by land on Megalopolis, which was only just in process of being repopulated, intending to reduce it again to desolation with the help of the Illyrians. The deputies of the allies, after hearing all these complaints, decided unanimously to make war on Aetolia. After reciting the above reasons in the preamble of their decree, they subjoined a declaration that they would recover for the allies any city or land occupied by the Aetolians since the death of Demetrius, father of Philip; and likewise concerning those who had been compelled by circumstances to join the Aetolian League against their will, they pledged themselves that they should be reinstated in their ancient form of government, and should remain in possession of their cities and lands, without garrisons, exempt from tribute, and completely independent, in the enjoyment of their traditional constitution and laws. They also added a clause engaging to recover for the Amphictyonic Council its ancient laws,

and its authority over the Delphic temple, of which it had been deprived by the Aetolians, who wished to control the affairs of the temple themselves.

This decree was passed in the first year of the 140th Olympiad and the war known as the Social War thus began, a just war and a fitting sequel to the crimes that had been committed. The Congress at once sent envoys to the allies, so that on the confirmation of the decree by the popular Assembly in each state they might all join in the war against the Aetolians. Philip also sent a letter to the Aetolians, informing them that, if they had any just defence against the accusations with which they had been charged, they still had time to meet and arrive at a settlement by conference. If, however, they imagined that because they pillaged and despoiled every part of Greece without any previous declaration of war by their League, the injured parties were not to retaliate, or if they retaliated should be considered to have broken the peace, they were the most simple-minded people in the world. The Aetolian magistrates on the receipt of this letter at first, in the hope that Philip would not come, named a day on which they would meet him at Rhium, but on hearing that he was come there sent a courier to inform him that before the General Assembly of the Aetolians met they could take no steps on their own responsibility concerning any matters of state. The Achaeans, meeting in their regular annual Assembly, unanimously confirmed the decree and made a proclamation authorizing reprisals on the Aetolians. Upon the king's attending the Council at Aegium and addressing them at length, they received his speech favourably and renewed with Philip in person their friendly relations with the kings, his ancestors.

Meanwhile, it being the date of their annual election, the Aetolians elected as Strategus that very Scopas who had been the chief cause of all the

outrages I have narrated above. I really scarcely find words in which to express myself about this matter. After declaring by a public decree that they were not going to war, to make an expedition in full force and pillage the countries of their neighbours and then, instead of punishing any of the guilty persons, to honour by electing to their chief offices the directors of these proceedings seems to me the very height of villainy; for how can we characterize otherwise such base conduct?—conduct the nature of which the following examples will serve to illustrate. When the Lacedaemonians gained possession of the Cadmea by the treachery of Phoebidas, they punished the guilty general but did not withdraw the garrison, as if the injustice of the act were atoned for by the perpetrator being made to suffer for it, while if they had chosen, they might have done just the reverse, for the Thebans were concerned about the garrison, not about the man. Again by the terms of the peace of Antalcidas the same people proclaimed all Greek cities free and autonomous, but did not withdraw their harmosis from them, and again in expelling from their home the Mantineans, who were their friends and allies, they maintained that they inflicted no wrong on them by transferring them from one city to several. In all this they exhibited their folly as well as their knavery, they evidently thought that if a man shuts his own eyes his neighbours too are blind. Now to both states, the Aetolians and the Spartans, this unscrupulous policy resulted in the greatest calamities, and it should never be an object of imitation in the public or private life of men who are well advised.

King Philip now having finished his business with the Achaeans left with his army for Macedonia to hasten on the preparations for the war, having given by the above decree not only to the allies, but to all the Greeks a

happy prospect of mildness in his rule and of that magnanimity which befits a king.

This took place at the same time that Hannibal, after subduing all Iberia south of the Ebro, began his attack on Saguntum. Now had there been any connexion at the outset between Hannibal's enterprise and the affairs of Greece it is evident that I should have included the latter in the previous Book, and, following the chronology, placed my narrative of them side by side in alternate sections with that of the affairs of Spain. But the fact being that the circumstances of Italy, Greece, and Asia were such that the beginnings of these wars were particular to each country, while their ends were common to all, I thought it proper to give a separate account of them, until reaching the date when these conflicts came into connexion with each other and began to tend towards one end—both the narratives of the beginnings of each war being thus made more lucid, and a conspicuous place being given to that subsequent interconnexion of all three, which I mentioned at the outset, indicating when, how, and for what reason it came about—and, then upon reaching this point to comprise all three wars in a single narrative. The interconnexion I speak of took place towards the end of the Social War in the third year of the 140th Olympiad. After this date therefore I shall give a general history of events in chronological order; but up to it, as I said, a separate account of each war, merely recapitulating the contemporary occurrences set forth in the previous Book, so that the whole narrative may not only be easy to follow but may make a due impression on my readers.

While wintering in Macedonia Philip spent his time in diligently levying troops for the coming campaign, and in securing his frontiers from attack by

the barbarians of the interior. In the next place he met Scerdilaïdas, fearlessly putting himself in his power, and made him offers of friendship and alliance. By promising on the one hand to aid him in subduing Illyria and on the other hand by bringing accusations against the Aetolians, which was no difficult matter, he easily persuaded him to agree to his proposals. Public crimes, as a fact, differ from private ones only in the extent and quantity of their results. In private life also the whole tribe of thieves and swindlers come to grief most frequently by not treating their confederates justly and generally speaking by perfidy towards each other, and this was what happened now to the Aetolians. They had agreed with Scerdilaïdas to give him a part of the spoil if he joined them in their invasion of Achaea, and when he consented and did so and they had sacked Cynaetha, carrying off a large booty of slaves and cattle, they gave him no share at all of their captures. As he had been nursing anger against them for this ever since, it only required a brief mention by Philip of this grievance to make him at once consent and agree to adhere to the general alliance on condition of receiving an annual sum of twenty talents, in consideration of which he was to attack the Aetolians by sea with thirty boats.

Philip, then, was thus occupied. Meanwhile the envoys sent to the allies proceeded first to Acarnania and communicated with the people. The Acarnanians acted with perfect straightforwardness, confirming the decree and agreeing to make war on the Aetolians from Acarnania although they, if any people, might have been excused for deferring and hesitating and generally for dreading a war with a neighbouring state, and this for three reasons: the first being the immediate neighbourhood of Aetolia, the next and more important, their military weakness when isolated, but the gravest

of all, the terrible suffering they had recently undergone owing to their hostility to the Aetolians. But really straight and honourable men, both in public and private, value, I think, no considerations above their duty, and this principle the Acarnanians are found to have mentioned on most occasions more firmly than any other people in Greece, although their resources were but slender. No one, then, should hesitate to seek the alliance of this people in a crisis; rather it should be embraced with more eagerness than that of any other Greek people; for both in public and in private they are characterized by steadfastness and love of liberty. The Epirots, on the contrary, after receiving the envoys, while they also confirmed the decree and voted to make war on the Aetolians as soon as King Philip himself took the field, in their reply to the Aetolian embassy stated that they had passed a resolution to maintain peace with them, thus playing a part as ignoble as it was double-faced. Envoys were also sent to King Ptolemy requesting him neither to send funds to the Aetolians, nor to furnish them with any other supplies for use against Philip and the allies.

The Messenians, on whose account the war began, replied to the envoys sent to them, that seeing that Phigalea lay on their borders and was subject to the Aetolians, they would not undertake the war until this city had been detached from the Aetolians. This resolution was by no means generally approved, but was forced through by the ephors Oenis and Nicippus and certain other members of the oligarchical party, who in my opinion were much mistaken and took a course which was far from being correct. That war is a terrible thing I agree, but it is not so terrible that we should submit to anything in order to avoid it. For why do we all vaunt our civic equality and liberty of speech and all that we mean by the word freedom, if nothing

is more advantageous than peace? We do not indeed praise the Thebans because at the time of the Persian invasion they deserted Greece in the hour of peril and took the side of the Persians from fear, nor do we praise Pindar for confirming them in their resolution to remain inactive by the verses

Stablish in calm, the common weal,

Ye burghers all, and seek the light of lordly Peace that ever beameth bright. [3]

[3] Pindar probably meant civic peace and Polybius accuses him unjustly.

For though at the time this advice seemed plausible it was not long before the decision he recommended proved to be the source of the deepest disaster and disgrace. Peace indeed, with justice and honour is the fairest and most profitable of possessions, but when joined with baseness and disgraceful cowardice, nothing is more infamous and hurtful.

The oligarchs who were then in power in Messenia, aiming at their own immediate advantage, were always too warm advocates of peace. Consequently though they often found themselves in critical situations and were sometimes exposed to grave peril, they always managed to slip through without friction. But the sum of the evils caused by this policy of theirs continued to accumulate, and at last their country was forced to struggle with the worst calamities. The cause of this I believe to be, that living as they did on the borders of two of the greatest nations in the Peloponnese or even in Greece, the Arcadians and Laconians, of whom the latter had been their implacable enemies ever since their first occasion of the country, while the former were their friends and protectors, they were never thoroughly frank and whole-hearted either in their enmity to the

Lacedaemonians or in their friendship to the Arcadians. Consequently when the attention of these two peoples was distracted by wars between themselves or against other states, the Messenians were not ill treated, for they enjoyed tranquillity and peace owing to their country lying outside the theatre of war. But whenever the Lacedaemonians, finding themselves again at leisure and undistracted, took to maltreating them, they could neither face the might of Sparta alone, nor had they secured for themselves friends who would be ready to stand by them in all circumstances, and consequently they were compelled either to be the slaves and carriers of the Lacedaemonians, or if they wished to avoid slavery, to break up their homes and abandon their country with their wives and children, a fate which has overtaken them more than once in a comparatively short period of time. Heaven grant that the present tranquillity of the Peloponnese may be firmly established, so that the advice I am about to give may not be required; but should there be a change and a recurrence of disturbances the only hope I see for the Messenians and Megalopolitans of being able to continue in possession of their countries, is for them, as Epaminondas advised, to be of one mind and resolve on whole-hearted co-operation in all circumstances and in all action.

This counsel may perhaps find some support from circumstances that took place many years previously. For besides many other things I might mention, the Messenians set up in the time of Aristomenes, as Callisthenes tells us, a pillar beside the altar of Zeus Lycaeus bearing the inscription:

Time faileth ne'er to find the unjust and bring
A righteous doom on an unrighteous king.
Messene now, with ease, for Zeus did speed,

Found out the traitor. Yea, 'tis hard indeed

For the forsworn to hide him from God's eye.

All hail, O Zeus, the king; save Arcady.

It was, as a fact, after they had lost their own country that they dedicated this inscription praying the gods to save Arcadia as if it were a second fatherland to them. And in this they were quite justified; for the Arcadians not only received them on their expulsion from Messenia in the Aristomenean War, taking them to their homes and making them citizens, but passed a resolution to give their daughters in marriage to those Messenians who were of proper age. In addition to this, after holding an inquiry into the treachery of the king Aristocrates in the battle of the Trench, they put him and his whole family to death. [4] But, apart from these remote events, my assertion derives sufficient support from the circumstances that followed the recent foundation of the cities of Megalopolis and Messene. For at the time when, after the battle of Mantinea, the result of which was doubtful owing to the death of Epaminondas, the Spartans refused to allow the Messenians to participate in the truce, as they still hoped to re-annex Messenia, the Megalopolitans and all the Arcadians in alliance with them were so active in their efforts, that the Messenians were received by the allies and included in the general treaty of peace, while the Lacedaemonians alone among the Greeks were excluded from it. Anyone in the future who takes this into consideration will agree that the opinion I advanced a little above is correct. I have spoken at such length on the subject for the sake of the Arcadians and Messenians, in order that, bearing in mind the misfortunes that have befallen their countries at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, they may adhere in the spirit

as well as in the letter to their alliance and neither from fear of consequences or from a desire for peace desert each other in critical times.

[4] For details see the account of the second Messenian war in Pausanias iv. 14-24.

To continue my account of the reception of the envoys, the Lacedaemonians acted in the manner usual with them, dismissing the envoys without making any reply at all; so utterly incapable were they of arriving at a decision owing to the absurdity and viciousness of their late policy. Indeed it seems to me very true the saying that excessive daring ends in mere senselessness and nothingness. Subsequently, however, on the appointment of new ephors, the original movers of the sedition and authors of the massacre I described above sent messengers to the Aetolians inviting them to negotiate. The Aetolians were quite happy to agree to this, and shortly afterwards Machatas arrived in Sparta as their envoy and at once presented himself before the ephors accompanied by members of the party which had invited him who demanded that they should grant Machatas access to the general assembly and appoint kings in accordance with the ancient constitution, for they must no longer permit the royal house of the Heraclidae to be dethroned in defiance of law. The ephors, who were displeased by the whole proceeding, but were incapable of boldly confronting the party of violence as they were intimidated by the mob of young men, said that they would take time to decide about re-establishing the kings, but agreed to allow Machatas to address a meeting of the commons. On the people assembling, Machatas came forward and in a speech of some length exhorted them to declare for alliance with the Aetolians, bringing random and audacious accusations against the

Macedonians and praising the Aetolians in terms as absurd as they were false. On his withdrawal an animated discussion took place, some speaking on behalf of the Aetolians and advising the conclusion of an alliance with them, while other speakers took the opposite view. However when some of the elder citizens reminded the people of the benefits conferred on them by Antigonus and the Macedonians and of the injuries they had received at the hands of Charixenus and Timaeus—when the Aetolians invading Laconia in full force devastated the country, enslaved the villages of the Perioeci and formed a plot to capture Sparta, combining fraud and force to reinstate the exiles—the people were brought round to another opinion, and finally persuaded to maintain their alliance with Philip and the Macedonians. Hereupon Machatas returned home without effecting his purpose; but the original authors of the sedition had no mind to give way and again resolved to commit a most impious crime, having debauched for this purpose some of the younger men. At a certain sacrifice of ancient institution the citizens of military age had to form a procession in arms and march to the temple of Athene of the Brazen House, while the ephors remained in the sanctuary to perform the sacrificial rites. Certain of the young men who took part in the procession chose the moment when the ephors were sacrificing for suddenly attacking and slaying them. It must be remembered that the holy place secured the safety of anyone who took sanctuary in it, even if he were condemned to death; and yet its sanctity was held in such slight esteem by those who had the heart to do this savage deed, that all the ephors were butchered at the very altar and table of the goddess. Continuing to pursue their purpose, they next killed Gyridas, one of the elders, expelled those who had spoken against Aetolians, chose new ephors from their own faction

and concluded the alliance with the Aetolians. Their chief motive for all these proceedings and for exhibiting enmity to the Achaeans, ingratitude to Macedonia, and a general lack of consideration in their conduct to all mankind, was their attachment to Cleomenes, to whose safe return they were always looking forward with confidence. So true is it that men who have the faculty of tactfully treating those about them do not only arouse devotion to their persons when present, but even when far away keep the spark of loyalty bright and alive in the hearts of their adherents. These men, apart from other considerations, had now during the three years they had passed under their old constitution since the dethronement of Cleomenes never thought of appointing new kings of Sparta; but the moment the report of his death reached them they at once urged the people and the ephors to create kings. The ephors belonging to the faction of disorder whom I mentioned above, the same who had concluded the alliance with the Aetolians, hereupon made a choice which was legal and proper in the case of the one king, Agesipolis, still a minor, but the son of Agesipolis son of Cleombrotus who had succeeded to the throne on the deposition of Leonidas as being the next in blood of that house. They appointed to be the boy's guardian Cleomenes, the son of Cleombrotus and brother of Agesipolis. But as for the other house, notwithstanding that Archidamus, the son of Eudamidas, had left two sons born to him by the daughter of Hippomedon and that Hippomedon, who was the son of Agesilaus and grandson of Eudamidas, was still alive, there being also other members of the house more distant than these, but of the blood royal, they passed over all these and nominated as king Lycurgus, none of whose ancestors had borne this title, but he by giving each of the ephors a talent became a

descendant of Heracles and king of Sparta, so cheap everywhere had distinctions become. But it happened in consequence that not their children's children, but the very men who made the appointment were the first to suffer for their folly.

When Machatas heard what had happened in Sparta, he returned there and urged the ephors and kings to make war on the Achaeans, for that he said was the only means of putting a stop to the factious policy of those Lacedaemonians who wished by any and every means to break the alliance with the Aetolians and of those in Aetolia who were working for the same end. Upon the ephors and kings consenting, Machatas returned, having accomplished his purpose owing to the blindness of those who supported him. Lycurgus now, taking the regular army and some others of the citizens, invaded Argolis, the Argives being quite off their guard owing to the prevailing tranquillity. By a sudden assault he seized Polichna, Prasiae, Leucae, and Cyphanta, but was repulsed in his attack on Glympes and Zarax. After these achievements of the king the Lacedaemonians proclaimed the right of reprisal against the Achaeans. Machatas also persuaded the Eleans by the same arguments that he had used at Sparta to make war on the Achaeans.

Owing to their cause having thus prospered beyond their expectations the Aetolians entered on the war with confidence. But it was quite the opposite with the Achaeans; for Philip, in whom they chiefly trusted, had not completed his preparations, the Epirots were putting off the commencement of hostilities, the Messenians were entirely inactive, and the Aetolians, supported by the mistaken policy of Elis and Sparta, had enclosed them in a circle of war. Aratus' term of office was now expiring,

and his son Aratus who had been elected in his place was on the point of succeeding him as strategus. Scopas was still the Aetolian strategus, his term of office being now about half through; for the Aetolians hold their elections after the autumn equinox, but the Achaeans in early summer at about the time of the rising of the Pleiades. The date at which the younger Aratus assumed office, summer being than well advanced, marked the commencement of activity in all quarters. As I narrated in the previous Book, Hannibal at this date was opening the siege of Saguntum and the Romans were dispatching Lucius Aemilius to Illyria against Demetrius of Pharos. Simultaneously Antiochus, Ptolemais and Tyre having been surrendered to him by Theodotus, was about to invade Coele-Syria, Ptolemy was preparing for the war against Antiochus, Lycurgus, wishing to rival Cleomenes at the outset of his campaign, had encamped before the Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis and was investing it, the Achaeans were collecting mercenaries both horse and foot for the war which threatened them, and finally Philip was moving out of Macedonia with his forces consisting of ten thousand heavy-armed infantry, five thousand peltasts, and eight hundred horse, all the above being Macedonians.

Such were the projects and preparations on all sides, and at the same time the Rhodians went to war with the Byzantines for the following reasons. The site of Byzantium is as regards the sea more favourable security and prosperity than that of any other city in the world known to us, but as regards the land it is most disadvantageous in both respects. For, as concerning the sea, it completely blocks the mouth of the Pontus in such a manner that no one can sail in or out without the consent of the Byzantines.

So that they have complete control over the supply of all those many products furnished by the Pontus which men in general require in their daily life. For as regards necessities it is an undisputed fact that most plentiful supplies and best qualities of cattle and slaves reach us from the countries lying round the Pontus, while among luxuries the same countries furnish us with abundance of honey, wax, and preserved fish, while of the superfluous produce of our countries they take olive-oil and every kind of wine. As for corn there is a give-and-take, they sometimes supplying us when we require it and sometimes importing it from us. The Greeks, then, would entirely lose all this commerce or it would be quite unprofitable to them, if the Byzantines were disposed to be deliberately unfriendly to them, and had made common cause formerly with the Gauls and more especially at present with the Thracians, or if they had abandoned the place altogether. For, owing to the narrowness of the strait and the numbers of the barbarians on its banks, it would evidently be impossible for our ships to sail into the Pontus. Though perhaps the Byzantines themselves are the people who derive most financial benefit from the situation of their town, since they can readily export all their superfluous produce and import whatever they require on advantageous terms and without any danger or hardship, yet, as I said, they are of great service to other peoples. Therefore, as being the common benefactors of all, they naturally not only should meet with gratitude from the Greeks, but with general support when they are exposed to peril from the barbarians.

Now since the majority of people are unacquainted with the peculiar advantages of this site, as it lies somewhat outside those parts of the world which are generally visited, and as we all wish to have information about

such matters, if possible visiting personally places so peculiar and interesting, but if this be out of our power, acquiring impressions and ideas of them as near the truth as possible, I had better state the facts of the case and explain what is the cause of the singular prosperity of this city.

The sea known as the Pontus is very nearly twenty-two thousand stades in circumference and has two mouths exactly opposite each other, one communicating the Propontis and the other with the Palus Maeotis, which itself has a circumference of eight thousand stades. As many large rivers from Asia and still more numerous and larger ones from Europe fall into these two basins, the Maeotis being thus replenished flows into the Pontus and the Pontus into the Propontis. The mouth of the Palus Maeotis is called the Cimmerian Bosporus; it is thirty stades in width and sixty in length and is all of no great depth. The mouth of the Pontus is similarly called the Thracian Bosporus and is a hundred and twenty stades long and not of the same width throughout. From the side of the Propontis its beginning is the passage between Calchedon and Byzantium which is fourteen stades in width. On the side of the Pontus it begins at the so-called Holy Place, where they say that Jason on his voyage back from Colchis first sacrificed to the twelve gods. This lies in Asia and is about twelve stades distant from the opposite point in Thrace the temple of Sarapis. There are two causes of the constant flow from the Palus Maeotis and the Pontus, one, at once evident to all, being that where many streams fall into basins of limited circumference the water constantly increases and, if there were no outlets, would continue to mount higher and occupy a larger area of the basin. In the case, however, of there being outlets the surplus water runs off by these channels. The second cause is that as the rivers carry down into these basins

after heavy rains quantities of all kinds of alluvial matter, the water in the seas is forcibly displaced by the banks thus formed and continues to mount and flow out in like manner through the existing outlets. As the influx and deposit of alluvium by the rivers is constant, the outflow through the mouths must likewise be constant.

The true reasons then of the current flowing from the Pontus are these, depending as they do not on the reports of traders but on reasoning from the facts of nature, a more accurate method than which it is not easy to find. But since our attention is now fixed on this subject, I must leave no point unelaborated and barely stated, as is the habit of most writers, but must rather give a description of the facts supported by proofs, so that no doubts may be left in the reader's mind. For this is the characteristic of the present age, in which, all parts of the world being accessible by land or sea, it is no longer proper to cite the testimony of poets and mythographers regarding matters of which we are ignorant, "offering," as Heraclitus says, "untrustworthy sureties for disputed facts," but we should aim at laying before our readers a narrative resting on its own credit.

I say then that the silting up of the Pontus has gone on from time immemorial and still continues, and that in course of time both this sea and the Palus Maeotis will be entirely filled, if the existing local conditions remain the same and the causes of the alluvial deposit continue to act. For time being infinite, and the area of these basins being certainly limited, it is evident that even if the accretions were quite insignificant, the seas will be filled up in time; for by the law of nature if a finite quantity continually grows or decreases in infinite time, even if the increase or decrease be infinitesimal—for this is what I now assume—it stands to reason that the

process must finally be completed. But when, as in this case, the increase is no small one, but a very large quantity of soil is being deposited, it is evident that what I state will not happen at some remote date, but very shortly. And it is indeed visibly happening. As for the Palus Maeotis it is already silted up, the great part of it varying in depth between five and seven fathoms, so that large ships can no longer navigate it without a pilot. And while it was once, as all ancient authorities agree, a sea continuous with the Pontus, it is now a fresh-water lake, the salt water having been forced out by the deposits and the inflow from the rivers prevailing. Some day it will be the same with the Pontus; in fact the thing is actually taking place, and although not very generally noticed owing to the large size of the basin, it is apparent to anyone who gives some slight attention to the matter. For the Danube flowing from Europe and falling into the Pontus by several mouths, a bank formed of the matter discharged from these mouths and reaching out to sea for a day's journey, stretches for about a hundred miles opposite them, and ships navigating the Pontus, while still far out at sea, often at night when sailing unwarily run aground on certain parts of this belt, which are known to sailors as "The Paps." The reason why the deposit is not formed closer to land but is projected so far with must consider to be as follows. As far as the current of the rivers prevail owing to their strength and force a way through the sea, the earth and all other matter carried down by the stream must continue to be pushed forward and not suffered to rest or subside at all; but when owing to the increasing depth and volume of the sea the rivers lose their force, then of course the earth sinks by its natural weight and settles. This is why in the case of large and swift rivers the deposits are formed at a distance, the sea near the coast being deep, but in

that of small and sluggish streams the sand-banks are close to their mouths. This becomes especially evident during heavy rains; for then insignificant streams when they have overpowered the surge at their mouths push forward their mud out to sea for a distance exactly proportionate to the force of their currents. We must not at all refuse to believe in the extent of the bank at the mouth of the Danube and in the quantity of stones, timber, and earth carried down by the rivers in general. It would be folly to do so when we often see with our own eyes an insignificant torrent scooping out a bed and forcing its way through high ground, carrying down every kind of wood, stones, and earth and forming such vast deposits that the spot may in a short space of time be so changed in aspect as to be unrecognizable. We should not therefore be surprised if such great rivers flowing continuously produce some such effect as I have stated, and finally fill up the Pontus; we must indeed anticipate this not as a probability but as a certainty if we reason rightly. The following is an indication of what may be expected. The Palus Maeotis is at present less salt than the Pontus, and we find that the Pontus correspondingly is decidedly less salt than the Mediterranean. From which it is evident that when a period has elapsed which stands to the time it takes to fill up the Palus Maeotis in the same proportion as the cubic capacity of the larger basin to that of the smaller, the Pontus will become, like the Palus Maeotis, a shallow fresh-water lake. We must indeed anticipate this result still earlier, since the rivers that fall into the Pontus are larger and more numerous.

What I have said may suffice to satisfy the doubts of those who are unwilling to believe that the Pontus is filling up and will be filled up, and that so large a sea will be converted into a shallow lake. But I speak

especially in view of the falsehoods and sensational tales of seafarers, so that we may not be obliged owing to ignorance to listen greedily like children to anything that is told us, but having now some traces of the truth in our minds may be more or less able to form an independent judgement as to the truth or falsehood of the reports made by this or that person.

I must now resume my account of the specially favourable situation of Byzantium. The channel connecting the Pontus and the Propontis being a hundred and twenty stades in length, as I just said, the Holy Place marking its termination towards the Pontus and the strait of Byzantium that towards the Propontis, halfway between these on the European side stands the Hermaeum on a promontory running out into the channel at a distance of about five stades from Asia and situated at the narrowest part of the whole. It is here, they say, that Darius bridged the straits when he crossed to attack the Scythians. Now the force of the current from the Pontus has been so far uniform owing to the similarity of the country on each bank of the channel, but when it reaches the Hermaeum on the European side, which is, as I said, the narrowest point, this current from the Pontus being confined and sweeping strongly against the headland, rebounds as if from a blow, and dashes against the opposite coast of Asia. It now again recoils from this coast and is carried against the promontory on the European bank known as the Hearths, from which its force is once more deflected to the place on the Asiatic bank called the Cow, where legend says that Io first found a footing after crossing. Finally the current runs rapidly from the Cow to Byzantium itself, and dividing into two near the city, sends off its smaller branch into the gulf known as the Horn, while the larger branch is again deflected. It has however, no longer sufficient force to reach the coast opposite, on

which stands Calchedon; for as it has now several times crossed and recrossed the channel, which here is already of considerable width, the current has now become feebler, and ceases to make short rebounds to the opposite coast at an acute angle, but is rather deflected at an obtuse angle. It therefore fails to reach Calchedon and flows out through the strait. What therefore makes the situation of Byzantium so favourable and that of Calchedon the reverse is the fact here stated. To look at them indeed you would say they were equally well placed, but nevertheless it is not easy to reach Calchedon by sea, if one wishes, while to Byzantium the current carries one whether one wishes or not, as I just said. Evidence of this is that those who wish to cross from Calchedon to Byzantium cannot sail in a straight course owing to the current between, but steer obliquely for the Cow and the place called Chrysopolis—which the Athenians once occupied by the advice of Alcibiades and used it when they first attempted to levy toll on vessels bound for the Pontus—and from hence commit themselves to the current which perforce carries them to Byzantium The approaches by sea to Byzantium from the other side are equally favourable. For those sailing with a south wind from the Hellespont, or from the Pontus to the Hellespont with the Etesian winds, find the course from Byzantium along the European coast to the commencement of the narrows at Sestus and Abydus a straight and easy one, and so is the return voyage to Byzantium. But the voyage from Calchedon along the Asiatic coast is the reverse of this, because one must follow the shores of a deep gulf, and the headland formed by the territory of Cyzicus runs out to a great distance. Nor can ships sailing from the Hellespont to Calchedon easily coast along Europe and then on approaching Byzantium turn and make for Calchedon, as the current and the

circumstances mentioned above make it difficult. And similarly it is quite impossible for a ship leaving Calchedon to make the coast of Thrace at once owing to the current between, and owing to the wind. Both the south and north winds are adverse to both the attempts, since the south wind will carry one towards the Pontus and the north wind away from it, and these are the winds one must avail oneself of for the voyage from Calchedon to Hellespont or for the voyage back.

Such are the causes of the favourable position of Byzantium as regards the sea; its disadvantages on the land side being as follows. As Thrace encompasses their territory so effectually as to extend from one sea to the other, they are engaged in perpetual and most difficult warfare with its inhabitants. They cannot on the one hand rid themselves of the war once for all by a carefully prepared attack resulting in victory, owing to the number of the chieftains and their followers. For if they get the better of one, three other more powerful chieftains are sure to invade their territory. Nor are they at all better off if they give way and agree to terms and the payment of tribute; for the very fact of their making concessions to one chief raises against them enemies many times more numerous. So that they are, as I said, involved in a warfare both perpetual and most difficult; for what can be more full of peril, what more terrible than a war with near neighbours who are at the same time barbarians? Nay, such being in general the adverse circumstances against which they have to struggle on land, they have in addition to the other evils attendant on war to suffer too something like the torments of Tantalus that Homer describes; for, owners as they are of a fertile country, when they have carefully cultivated it and a superb harvest is the result, and when the barbarians now appear and destroy part of the

crops, collecting and carrying off the rest, then indeed, apart from their lost toil and expense, the very beauty of the harvest when they witness its destruction adds to their indignation and distress.

In spite of all, however, they continued to bear the burden to which they had grown accustomed of the war with the Thracians, without departing from their ancient engagements to the Greek states. But when they were attacked also by the Gauls under Comontorius, they found themselves in very grave danger. These Gauls had quitted their homes together with Brennus and his Gauls, and after escaping from the disaster at Delphi reached the Hellespont, where instead of crossing to Asia, they remained on the spot, as they took a fancy to the country near Byzantium. Here when they had conquered the Thracians and had established their capital at Tylis, they placed the Byzantines in extreme danger. At first, during the inroads made under Comontorius the first king, the Byzantines continued to pay on each occasion three thousand, five thousand, and sometimes even ten thousand gold pieces to save their territory from being laid waste, and finally they were compelled to consent to pay an annual tribute of eighty talents down to the reign of Cavarus, during which the kingdom came to an end and the whole tribe were in their turn conquered by the Thracians and annihilated. It was in these times that, being hard pressed by the tribute, they at first send embassies to the Greeks imploring them in their distress and danger. But when most states paid no attention to their solicitations they were driven by sheer necessity to begin exacting duties from vessels trading with the Pontus. When general inconvenience and loss of profit was caused by the Byzantines levying duties on exports from the Pontus, all the traders were aggrieved and brought their complaint before the Rhodians who were

considered the supreme authority in maritime matters. This was the origin of the war the history of which I am about to tell.

For the Rhodians, roused to action by the loss they suffered themselves and the detriment to neighbouring states, at first together with their allies sent an embassy to Byzantium demanding the abolition of the duty. The Byzantines were not disposed to make any concession, being convinced of the justice of their cause by the terms in which Hecatodorus and Olympiodorus, their chief magistrates at the time, replied to the Rhodian envoys. The Rhodians therefore took their departure without having accomplished anything, and on their return war was declared by Rhodes on Byzantium for the reasons above stated. They at once sent envoys to Prusias pressing him to take part in the war, for they knew that for various reasons he was offended with the Byzantines. The Byzantines took similar measures, sending envoys asking for help to Attalus and Achaeus. Attalus was heartily disposed to help, but his support at this time was of very little weight, as he had been confined within the limits of his ancestral dominions by Achaeus. But Achaeus, who was now master of all the country on this side of the Taurus and had recently assumed the royal title, promised his aid, and his decision to do so greatly raised the hopes of the Byzantines, while on the contrary, it alarmed Prusias and the Rhodians. Achaeus was a relative of that Antiochus who had just succeeded to the throne of Syria and had acquired the dominion I stated by the following means. When on the death of Seleucus, father of this Antiochus, his eldest son Seleucus succeeded him, Achaeus in his quality of a kinsman accompanied the king on his expedition across the Taurus about two years before the time I am speak of. For the young Seleucus, immediately on ascending the throne,

having learnt that Attalus had appropriated all his dominions on this side of the Taurus hastened there to defend his interests. He crossed the Taurus at the head of a great army, but perished assassinated by the Gaul Apaturius and Nicanor. Achaeus, as his kinsman, at once avenged his murder by putting Nicanor and Apaturius to death, and taking the command of the army and the direction of affairs in his hands, conducted both with prudence and magnanimity. For though the opportunity was favourable and he was eagerly urged by the troops to assume the diadem, he decided not to do so, and holding the throne for the younger brother Antiochus, advanced energetically and recovered the whole of the country on this side of Taurus. But when he met with a success that surpassed his expectations, having shut up Attalus in Pergamus itself and made himself master of all the rest of the country he was so elated by his good fortune that in a very short space of time he swerved clean away from rectitude, and having assumed the diadem and styled himself king he was at this moment the most imposing and formidable of all the kings and potentates on this side of the Taurus. This was the man on whom the Byzantines most relied when they undertook the war against Rhodes and Prusias.

One of Prusias's grievances against the Byzantines was that after having voted certain statues of him they had never erected them, but had neglected and finally forgotten the matter. He was likewise displeased with them for having employed every effort to reconcile Achaeus with Attalus and put an end to the war between them, thinking that a friendship between these two princes was in many ways prejudicial to his own interests. He was also irritated because it was said that the Byzantines had sent to Attalus representatives to take part in the sacrifice held at the festival of Athene,

whereas they had sent none to himself when he celebrated the Soteria. Therefore as he continued to nurse resentment for all these offences, he gladly availed himself of the pretext offered by the Rhodians and came to an agreement with their envoys demanding that they should undertake to carry on the war by sea, while he himself hoped to be able to damage the enemy no less severely on land.

Such were the causes and such was the beginning of the war between Rhodes and Byzantium. The Byzantines at first fought with great vigour, being confident that Achaeus would come to help them and trusting by bringing Tiboetes from Macedonia to throw Prusias in his turn into alarm and peril. For Prusias having begun the war with the feelings I have indicated had taken the place called "The Holy Place" on the Bosporus, which a few years previously they had acquired by purchase for a large sum, owing to its favourable situation, as they did not wish to leave anyone any base from which to attack traders with the Pontus or interfere with the slave-trade or the fishing. He had also seized their Asiatic territory, a part of Mysia which had long been in their possession. The Rhodians, manning six ships and getting four others from the allies, appointed Xenophantus admiral and sailed for the Hellespont with the ten ships. Anchoring the rest off Sestos to prevent the passage of vessels bound for the Pontus, the admiral left in one to find out if the Byzantines were already sufficiently alarmed at the war to have changed their minds. But as they paid no attention to his overtures, he sailed away and picking up the rest of his ships, left for Rhodes with the whole squadron. The Byzantines kept on sending to Achaeus, demanding succour, and sent a mission to bring Tiboetes from Macedonia; for Tiboetes was considered to have just as good

a claim to the throne of Bithynia as Prusias, as he was his uncle on the father's side. The Rhodians seeing that the Byzantines stood firm, thought of a plan for attaining their purpose likely to prove very efficient. For observing that the chief cause of the Byzantines' resolute endurance of the war lay in their hopes of support from Achaeus, and knowing that Achaeus' father was a prisoner at Alexandria and that Achaeus above all things desired his deliverance, they decided to send an embassy to Ptolemy begging him to give up Andromachus. They had indeed previously made this request without insisting much on it, the now they pressed it most seriously, in order that by doing this favour to Achaeus they might put him under such an obligation that he would do all they demanded. Ptolemy, on the arrival of the embassy, deliberated as to retaining Andromachus, whom he hoped to make use of at the proper time, considering that his differences with Antiochus had not yet been decided, and that Achaeus, who had just proclaimed himself king, could exercise a decisive influence in certain important matters; for Andromachus was Achaeus' father and brother of Laodice the wife of Seleucus. But nevertheless, as his sympathies in general were with the Rhodians and he was anxious to do them any favour, he yielded and gave up Andromachus to them to conduct back to his son. Having accomplished this and in addition conferred certain honours on Achaeus they deprived the Byzantines of their most important source of hope. At the same time the Byzantines met with another mischance; for Tiboetes on his way from Macedonia foiled their hopes by his death, upon which the Byzantines relaxed their efforts, while Prusias, fortified in his expectations of success in the war, at one and the same time was himself attacking the enemy from Asia with his whole energy, and on the European

side, by hiring the services of the Thracians, prevented the Byzantines from venturing out of their gates. The Byzantines, all their hopes being now defeated, were suffering on all sides from the war and began to look about for an honourable solution of the questions at issue. Accordingly when Cavarus, the Gallic king, came to Byzantium and did his best to put an end to the war, intervening heartily to part the combatants, both Prusias and the Byzantines yielded to his exhortations. The Rhodians, on hearing of Cavarus's efforts and Prusias's compliance and being anxious to effect their purpose at once, appointed Aridices as envoy to Byzantium and at the same time dispatched Polemocles with three triremes, wishing, as we say, to send Byzantines the spear and the herald's staff at once. [5] Upon their appearance treaties were made in the year of Cothon, son of Calligeiton, hieromnemon [6] in Byzantium, that with the Rhodians being simple and as follows: "The Byzantines engage not to levy toll on ships bound for the Pontus, and on this condition the Rhodians and their allies shall be at peace with the Byzantines." The terms they made with Prusias were these: "There is to be peace and friendship for all time between Prusias and the Byzantines and in no manner are the Byzantines to make war on Prusias or Prusias on the Byzantines. Prusias is to give up to the Byzantines the lands, the fortresses, the people, and the slaves taken from the enemy free from ransom, and in addition the ships taken at the outset of the war, the missiles captured in the forts; likewise the timbers, building stones, and tiles taken from the Holy Place" —for Prusias, dreading the return of Tiboetes, had destroyed all strong places that seemed favourably situated for any hostile design—"Prusias is to compel any Bithynians occupying lands in that part of Mysia subject to Byzantium to give these up to the farmers."

[5] That is, war and peace; the iron hand in the velvet glove.

[6] The eponymous annual magistrate.

Such was the beginning and such the end of the war of Prusias and the Rhodians with Byzantium. At about the same time the Cnossians sent an embassy to the Rhodians and persuaded them to send the squadron under Polemocles to them with three undecked vessels in addition. Upon this, when the fleet arrived in Crete, the people of Eleuthernae, conceiving a suspicion that Polemocles to please the Cnossians had killed Timarchus one of their citizens, first of all proclaimed reprisals against the Rhodians and next made open war on them.

A little before this the people of Lyttus had met with an irremediable disaster. The general condition of affairs in Crete had been as follows. The Cnossians in alliance with the Gortynians had subjected the whole of Crete with the exception of Lyttus. This being the only city that refused obedience, they undertook a war against it with the object of its final extermination as an example and terror to the rest of Crete. At first all the Cretans took part in the war against Lyttus, but jealousy having sprung up from some trifling cause, as is common with the Cretans, some separated from the rest, the people of Polyrrhenia, Ceraeae, Lappa, Horium, and Arcadia [7] unanimously abandoning the alliance with Cnossus and deciding to take the part of Lyttus, while Gortyna was in a state of civil war, the elder citizens taking the part of Cnossus and the younger that of Lyttus. The Cnossians, whom these disturbances among their allies took by surprise, obtained the assistance of a thousand Aetolians in virtue of their alliance, and once these had arrived the elder Gortynians, seizing the citadel and introducing the Cnossians and Aetolians, exiled or put to death the

younger men and delivered the city to the Cnossians. At about the same time the Lyttians having left with their whole force for an expedition into the enemy's country, the Cnossians getting word of it seized on Lyttus which was left without defenders, and having sent off the women and children to Cnossus, and burnt, demolished, and in every way they could wrecked the town, returned home. When the Lyttians came back to their city from the expedition and saw what had happened, they were so much affected that none of them had the heart even to enter his native town, but one and all after marching round it and many times bewailing and lamenting the fate of their country and themselves, turned their backs on it and retired to Lappa. The Lappaeans received them with the utmost kindness and cordiality; and thus having become in one day cityless aliens instead of citizens they went on fighting against Cnossus with the other allies. Thus was Lyttus, a colony of the Spartans and allied to them by blood, the most ancient city in Crete, and ever, as all acknowledged, the breeding-place of her bravest men, utterly and unexpectedly made away with.

[7] The town in Crete of that name.

The Polyrrhenians, Lappaeans, and all their allies seeing that the Cnossians clung to the alliance of the Aetolians who were the enemies of King Philip and the Achaeans, sent envoys to the king and to the League requesting their assistance and alliance. The Achaeans and Philip hereupon received them into the general confederacy and sent them as support four hundred Illyrians under the command of Plator, two hundred Achaeans and one hundred Phocians. The arrival of this force was of the greatest advantage to the Polyrrhenians and their allies; for in a very short space of

time they shut the Eleutherians, Cydoniats, and Apteraeans inside their walls and compelled them to desert the alliance of Cnossus and share their fortunes. After this success the Polyrrhenians and their allies sent to Philip and the Achaeans five hundred Cretans, while the Cnossians had a little earlier sent a thousand to the Aetolians and both these Cretan forces continued to take part in the present war. The Gortynian exiles seized on the harbour of Phaestus and even audaciously continued to hold that of Gortyna itself, and from both these positions made war on those in the city.

Such was the state of affairs in Crete. At the same period Mithridates too went to war with Sinope, and this proved as it were the beginning and first occasion of the misfortunes which finally befell this city. The Sinopeans sent an embassy to Rhodes begging for assistance towards this war and the Rhodians passed a decree to appoint three commissioners and to place in their hands a sum of 140,000 drachmae on receiving which they were to supply the requirements of the Sinopeans. The commissioners got ready ten thousand jars of wine, three hundred talents of prepared hair, a hundred talents of prepared bow-string, a thousand complete suits of armour, three thousand gold pieces, and four catapults with their artillerymen, on receiving which the Sinopean envoys returned home. These things were sent because the Sinopeans were in great dread of Mithridates undertaking the siege of the city by land and sea, and they therefore were making all their preparations with this view. Sinope lies on the southern shore of the Pontus on the route to the Phasis and is situated on a peninsula running out to the open sea. The neck of this peninsula connecting it with Asia is not more than two stades in width and is absolutely closed by the city which is situated upon it; the rest of the peninsula runs out to the open sea and is flat

and affords an easy approach to the town, but on its sea face it is very steep, difficult to anchor off, and with very few approaches from the sea. The Sinopeans were fearful lest Mithridates should lay siege to them by throwing up works on the side of the city next Asia, while at the same time effecting a disembarkation on the opposite side and occupying the flat ground overlooking the city; and consequently they busied themselves with strengthening all round that part of the peninsula which was washed by the sea, blocking up the approaches from the sea by means of stakes and stockades and placing soldiers and stores of missiles at suitable spots, the whole peninsula being of no great size but quite easily defensible by a moderate force.

Such was the situation at Sinope. But King Philip starting from Macedonia with his army—for it was here that I interrupted my account of operations in the Social War—marched on Thessaly and Epirus with the view of invading Aetolia from thence.

Alexander and Dorimachus at this time having formed a project for surprising Aegeira, had collected about twelve hundred Aetolians at Oeantheia in Aetolia, which is situated just opposite Aegeira, and having provided transports for this force were waiting for favourable weather to cross and make the attack. For a certain Aetolian deserter, who had spent some time at Aegeira and had noticed that the guards of the Aegium gate were constantly drunk and neglectful of their watch, had several times at some risk crossed over to Dorimachus and urged him to make the attempt, well knowing that such an enterprise was quite in his line. Aegeira is situated in the Peloponnese on the gulf of Corinth between Aegium and Sicyon and is built on steep hills difficult of access, looking towards

Parnassus and that part of the opposite coast, its distance from the sea being about seven stades. The weather being now favourable, Dorimachus set sail and anchored while it was still night at the mouth of the river which flows by the town. Then those with Alexander and Dorimachus and with them Archidamus the son of Pantaleon, now took the main body of the Aetolians and approached the city by the road leading from Aegium. The deserter with twenty picked men, leaving the path and mounting the precipice quicker than the others as he knew the ground, got in through an aqueduct and found the guard of the gate still asleep. Having killed them before they could rise from their beds and cut through the bolts with axes, he opened the gates to the Aetolians. They dashed brilliantly into the city, but afterwards conducted matters with such an entire lack of caution that finally the Aegeiratans were saved and they themselves destroyed. For considering that the occupation of a foreign city is finished when one is once within the gates, they acted on this principle, so that, after keeping together for only quite a short time in the neighbourhood of the market-place, their passion for plunder caused them disperse, and, breaking into the houses, they began to plunder the property, it being now daylight. The people of Aegeira had been entirely taken by surprise, and now those whose houses had been attacked by the enemy were all in the utmost state of terror and consternation, and fled out of the town in which they supposed the enemy to be already securely established. Those, however, who came to assist on hearing the shouting and whose houses were still intact, all ran to the citadel. Here they gradually increased in numbers and gained courage, while the collected force of the Aetolians on the contrary became ever smaller and more disordered for the reasons above-mentioned. But

Dorimachus, seeing now the danger that menaced them, got his men together and attacked the occupants of the citadel, thinking that by this bold and vigorous effort he would intimidate and put to flight those who had gathered to defend the city. But the Aegiratans, cheering each other on, resisted and met the Aetolian attack most gallantly. The citadel was unwalled, and the combat was a hand-to-hand one between man and man, so that at first there was a struggle as desperate as one would expect when the one side is fighting for their country and children and the other for their lives, but at the end the Aetolian invaders were put to flight. The pursuit of the enemy by the Aegiratans, who took advantage of their higher position, was so vigorous and formidable, that most of the Aetolians owing to the state of panic they were in trampled each other to death in the gate. Alexander fell fighting in the actual engagement and Archidamus perished in the suffocating crush at the gate. The rest of the Aetolians were either trampled to death there or were dashed to pieces in their attempt to escape down the cliffs where there was no path. The survivors who reached the ships after throwing away their shields managed, beyond hope and with the stigma of this disgrace, to sail away. Thus did the Aegiratans lose their city by their negligence, and recover it again beyond hope by their courage and valour.

About the same time Euripidas, whom the Aetolians had sent to the Eleans to command their forces, after an inroad on the territory of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea, in which he had collected a considerable amount of booty, was on his way back to Elis. But Miccus of Dyme, who was at this time the sub-strategus of the Achaeans, taking with him the complete levies of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea, marched out and attacked the enemy as they

were retiring. Pressing on too vigorously he fell into an ambush and was defeated with considerable loss, forty of his infantry being killed and about two hundred taken prisoners. Euripidas, elated by this success, made another expedition a few days afterwards and took a fort of the Dymaeans called "The Wall," favourably situated near the Araxus and fabled to have been built long ago by Heracles when he was making war on the Eleans to use as a place of arms against them. The Dymaeans, Pharaeans, and Tritaeans, thus worsted in their attack on the invaders and afraid of what might happen owing to the occupation of the fort, at first dispatched messengers to the strategus of the Achaeans informing him of what had occurred and begging for help, and subsequently sent a formal embassy with the same request. Aratus could not get a foreign force together, as after the Cleomenic War the Achaeans had not paid their mercenaries in full, and in general he exhibited a great lack of daring and energy in his plans and his whole conduct of the war. So that Lycurgus took the Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis, and Euripidas, in addition to his previous successes, captured Gortyna in the territory of Telphusa. Hereupon the peoples of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea, despairing of help from the strategus, came to an agreement with each other to refuse to pay their contributions to the Achaean League and to collect a private mercenary force of three hundred foot and fifty horse with which to secure the safety of their lands. In acting thus they were thought to have taken a proper course as regards their own affairs, but the reverse of this as regards the League; for they thus became the initiators and establishers of an evil precedent and pretext of which anyone who wished to dissolve the League could avail himself. It is true that the greater part of the blame for this action of theirs rested on the

Strategus, guilty as he was of habitual negligence, delay, and inattention to requests. For everyone in the hour of danger, as long as he keeps up any hope of assistance from his allies and friends, reposes his confidence on this, but when he abandons it in his distress he is forced to do all in his power to help himself. We should therefore not find fault with the Tritaeans, Pharaeans and Dymaeans for hiring a private force when the Head of their confederacy delayed to take action, but they must be blamed for refusing to pay their contribution to the League. While duly considering their own interests, especially as they could well afford to do so, they should have observed their engagements to the League; especially as according to the common laws they were perfectly assured of recovery; and above all considering they were the actual founders of the Confederacy.

Such was the state of affairs in the Peloponnese. Meanwhile King Philip, after passing through Thessaly, had arrived in Epirus. Uniting with his Macedonians the complete levy of the Epirots, three hundred slingers who had joined him for Achaea and five hundred Cretans sent by the Polyrrhenians, he advanced and passing through Epirus reached Ambracia. Had he only not turned aside but advanced rapidly into the interior of Aetolia, he would by thus suddenly and unexpectedly invading with so formidable a force have put an end to the whole war. But as it was, letting himself be persuaded by the Epirots to take Ambracus in the first place, he gave the Aetolians leisure to collect themselves, to take precautionary measures and to make preparations for the future. For the Epirots, setting their own particular advantage above all that of the allies and exceedingly eager to get Ambracus into their possession, implored Philip to besiege and capture this place in the first instance. They regarded it as of the highest

importance to recover Ambracia from the Aetolians, and the only way they hoped to do so was by making themselves masters of this place and laying siege to the city of Ambracia from it. For Ambracus is a place strongly fortified by outworks and a wall and lies in a lake with only one narrow approach from the town, and it is so situated as to command effectually both the country and the town.

Philip, then, acting as the Epirots wished and encamping before Ambracus, began to make preparations for the siege. But while he was thus employed, Scopas raised a general levy of the Aetolians and marching through Thessaly invaded Macedonia, where he destroyed the crops in Pieria and after collecting a quantity of booty, turned back and marched towards Dium. On its inhabitants deserting this place he entered it and demolished the walls, houses, and gymnasium, burning also the colonnade round the sanctuary and destroying all the other monuments of piety which served for adornment or for the convenience of those who frequented the festival. He also threw down all the royal statues. Having thus at the very outset of the war and by his first action made war not only on men but on the gods, he now returned, and on reaching Aetolia, just as if he had not been guilty of an impious outrage, but had done a great public service, he was universally honoured and admired, having succeeded in filling the Aetolians with empty hopes and foolish arrogance. For henceforth they had the notion that no one would ever date even to approach Aetolia, but that they themselves might pillage unhindered not only the Peloponnese, as had been their constant practice, but Thessaly and Macedonia also. Philip received the news from Macedonia, and having thus at once reaped the fruits of the folly and selfishness of the Epirots, began to besiege Ambracus.

Pushing on his earthworks and other operations energetically he soon intimidated the defenders and in forty days captured the place. Letting the garrison, consisting of five hundred Aetolians, depart on terms, he satisfied the desire of the Epirots by handing over Ambracus to them, and himself advanced with his army by way of Charadra, with the object of crossing the gulf of Ambracia at its narrowest point by the Acarnanian temple called Actium. For this gulf is an inlet of the Sicilian sea between Epirus and Acarnania, entered by a quite narrow mouth, less than five stades across, but as it advances into the interior it expands to a width of a hundred stades from the sea. It divides Epirus from Acarnania, Epirus lying north of it and Acarnania south. After taking his army across at its mouth and passing through Acarnania Philip reached the Aetolian city called Phoetiae, having been reinforced by two thousand Acarnanian foot and two hundred horse. He encamped before this city and delivered for two days a series of assaults so vigorous and formidable that the Aetolian garrison surrendered upon conditions and were dismissed unhurt. During the following night a force of five hundred Aetolians arrived to help under the impression that the city still held out. The king got word of their approach and, placing an ambuscade in a favourable spot, killed the greater number of them and took all the rest prisoners, except a very few. After this, having distributed enough of the captured corn to his troops to last thirty days—a large quantity having been found stored at Phoetiae—he advanced, marching on the territory of Stratus. Stopping at a distance of ten stades from the town he encamped by the river Achelous, and making forays from there, laid waste the country unopposed, none of the enemy venturing to come out to attack him.

The Achaeans at this time, finding themselves hard pressed by the war and learning that the king was close at hand, sent envoys asking for help. Encountering the king while still before Stratus they delivered the message with which they had been charged, and pointing out to him the large booty that his army would take in the enemy's country, tried to persuade him to cross at Rhium and invade Elis. The king after listening to them kept the envoys with him, saying he would give their request consideration, and breaking up his camp advanced in the direction of Metropolis and Conope. The Aetolians held to the citadel of Metropolis, abandoning the town, which the king burnt and then continued his advance on Conope. When a body of Aetolian cavalry ventured to meet him, at the ford of the river which runs in front of the town at a distance of about twenty stades from it, trusting either to prevent his passage entirely or to inflict considerable damage on the Macedonians as they were crossing, the king, perceiving their design, ordered his peltasts to enter the river first and land on the other bank in close order shield to shield and company to company. His orders were obeyed, and as soon as the first company had passed, the Aetolian cavalry, after a feeble attack on it, finding that it stood firm with shields interlocked and that the second and third companies as they landed closed up with it, were unable to effect anything, and seeing that they were getting into difficulties made off for the town; and henceforth the Aetolians, with all their haughty spirit, kept quiet within the shelter of their walls. Philip crossed with his army, and having pillaged this country too unopposed, advanced on Ithoria. This is a place absolutely commanding the road through the pass and of singular natural and artificial strength; but on his approach the garrison were terror-stricken and abandoned it. The king on

obtaining possession of it razed it to the ground, and ordered his advanced guards to demolish likewise the other small forts in the country. Having passed through the defile he continued to advance slowly and quietly, giving his troops leisure to pillage the country, and when he reached Oeniadae his army was abundantly furnished with provisions of every kind. Encamping before Paeonium he determined to capture the city in the first place and after several assaults took it by storm. It is a town of no great size, being less than seven stades in circumference, but inferior to none in the fine construction of its houses, walls, and towers. Philip razed the wall to the ground, and taking down the houses made the timbers and tiles into rafts and sent down the stones on them with the greatest care to Oeniadae. The Aetolians at first determined to hold the citadel of Oeniadae, feeling themselves safe behind walls furnished with all other defences, but on Philip's approach took fright and retired. The king, taking possession of this town too, advanced from it and encamped before a strong place in the territory of Calydon called Elaus admirably fortified by walls and other defences, Attalus having undertaken for the Aetolians the expense of construction. The Macedonians assaulted and took this place also and after laying waste the whole territory of Calydon returned to Oeniadae. But Philip, observing the natural advantages of the spot both in other respects and as a point from which to cross to the Peloponnese, conceived the plan of fortifying the town. Oeniadae lies at the extreme border of Acarnania on the coast of Aetolia, just at the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf. The part of the Peloponnese facing it is the coast territory of Dyme, the nearest point being the promontory of Araxus which is not more than a hundred stades distant. Looking to these facts Philip fortified the citadel separately and

surrounding the harbour and dockyards with a wall he intended to connect them with the citadel, using the building material he had brought down from Paeonium for the work.

But while the king was still thus engaged, a post arrived from Macedonia informing him that the Dardani, understanding that he contemplated a campaign in the Peloponnese, were collecting forces and making great preparations with the intention of invading Macedonia. On hearing this, he thought it necessary to hasten back to the help of Macedonia, and now dismissing the Achaean envoys with the reply that when he had done what was called for by the intelligence he had received he would make it his first object to assist them as far as was within his power, he broke up his camp and returned home with all speed by the same route as that by which he had come. As he was about to cross the Gulf of Ambracia from Acarnania to Epirus, Demetrius of Pharus appeared in a single frigate, having been driven by the Romans from Illyria, as I narrated in a previous Book. Philip received him kindly and bade him sail for Corinth and from thence make his way to Macedonia through Thessaly, while he himself crossed to Epirus and continued his advance. When he reached Pella in Macedonia, the Dardani, hearing of his arrival from some Thracian deserters, took fright and at once dismissed their army, although they were now close to Macedonia. Philip, on learning that the Dardani had abandoned their project, sent home all his Macedonians to gather in the harvest and returning to Thessaly spent the rest of the summer at Larisa.

It was at this time that Aemilius, on his return from Illyria, celebrated a splendid triumph in Rome, that Hannibal after taking Saguntum by assault dismissed his army to winter quarters, that the Romans on hearing of the

fall of Saguntum sent ambassadors to Carthage demanding that Hannibal should be given up to them, and at the same time began to prepare for war after electing as Consuls Publius Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius Longus. All these matters I have dealt with in detail in my previous Book, and now merely recall them to my readers in pursuance of my original plan that they may know what events were contemporaneous.

And so the first year of this Olympiad was drawing to its close. It was now the date for the elections in Aetolia, and Dorimachus was chosen strategus. As soon as he entered on office he summoned the Aetolians to arms and invading upper Epirus laid the country waste, carrying out the work of destruction in a thoroughly vindictive spirit; for the measures he took were all not so much meant to secure booty for himself as to inflict damage on the Epirots. On reaching the temple of Dodona he burnt the porticoes, destroyed many of the votive offerings and demolished the sacred building, so that we may say that for the Aetolians no restrictions exist either in peace or war, but that in both circumstances they pursue their designs in defiance of the common usages and principles of mankind.

Dorimachus after this and similar exploits returned home. As the winter was now advanced, everyone had given up any hope of Philip's reappearance owing to the season, but suddenly the king taking with him three thousand of his brazen-shielded hoplites, two thousand peltasts, three hundred Cretans, and about four hundred of his horse guards, started from Larisa. Transporting this force from Thessaly to Euboea and thence to Cynus, he passed through Boeotia and Megaris and reached Corinth about the winter solstice, having marched with such expedition and secrecy that no one in the Peloponnese was aware of what had happened. Shutting the

gates of Corinth and posting patrols in the streets, he sent next day to Sicyon for the elder Aratus, at the same time dispatching letters to the strategus of the Achaeans and to the different cities informing them at what date and place he required them all to meet him in arms. After making these arrangements he left Corinth, and advancing encamped near the temple of the Dioscuri in the territory of Phlius. Just at this time Euripidas with two companies of Eleans together with his freebooters and mercenaries, so that his whole force of infantry numbered about two thousand two hundred, and with a hundred horsemen, had left Psophis and was marching through the territories of Pheneus and Stymphalus, knowing nothing of Philip's arrival, but bent on laying waste the district round Sicyon. On the very night on which Philip was encamped near the temple of the Dioscuri, he passed close by the king's camp in the early morning and was just about to invade the territory of Sicyon. But some of Philip's Cretans, who had left their ranks and were prowling about in search of plunder, fell in with Euripidas' force. He questioned them, and on learning of the arrival of the Macedonians, without revealing the news to a soul, he led his force back by the road along which he had come, with the wish and hope of getting a start of the Macedonians and thus passing through the territory of Stymphalus and gaining the difficult highland country above it. The king, quite ignorant also of the enemy's vicinity and simply in pursuance of his plan, broke up his camp early in the morning and advanced, intending to march past Stymphalus itself in the direction of Caphyae; for it was there that he had written to the Achaeans to assemble in arms. As the advanced guard of the Macedonians was coming over the hill near the place called Apelaurus, about ten stades before you come to Stymphalus, it so happened that the

advanced guard of the Eleans converged on the pass also. Euripidas, who understood what had happened from the intelligence he had previously received, took a few horsemen with him and escaping from the danger retreated across country to Psophis. The rest of the Eleans, thus deserted by their commander and thoroughly alarmed by what had occurred, remained in marching order at a loss what to do or what direction to take. At first, I must explain, their officers thought it was an Achaean force which had come to opposite them, taken in chiefly by the brazen-shielded hoplites whom they supposed to be Megalopolitans, as the contingent from there had carried such shields in the battle at Sellasia against Cleomenes, King Antigonus having thus armed them for the occasion. They therefore kept their ranks and began to retire to some higher ground, not despairing of safety. But as soon as the Macedonians advancing on them drew close, they realized the truth and all took to flight throwing away their shields. About twelve hundred of them were made prisoners and the remainder perished, either at the hands of the Macedonians or by falling down the precipices, only about a hundred escaping. Philip, sending the prisoners and captured arms back to Corinth, continued his march. This event exceedingly astonished all the Peloponnesians, who heard at one and the same time of the king's arrival and of his victory.

Marching through Arcadia and encountering heavy snowstorms and many hardships in crossing the pass of Mount Olygyrtus, he reached Caphyae in the night of the third day. Having rested his troops here for two days and being joined by the young Aratus and the Achaeans he had collected, so that his whole force was now about ten thousand strong, he advanced on Psophis through the territory of Cleitor, collecting missiles and

ladders from the towns he passed through. Psophis is an undisputably Arcadian foundation of great antiquity in the district of Azanis lying in the interior of the Peloponnese taken as a whole, but on the western borders of Arcadia itself and coterminous with the up-country of western Achaea. It commands with great advantage the territory of the Eleans, with whom it was then politically united. Philip, reaching it in three days from Caphyae, encamped on the hills opposite, from which once can securely view the whole town and its environs. When he observed the great strength of Psophis, the king was at a loss what to do; for on its western side there descends a violent torrent, impassable for the greater part of the winter, and rendering the city very strongly protected and difficult of approach on this side, owing to the depth of the bed it has gradually formed for itself, descending as it does from a height. On the eastern side of the town flows the Erymanthus, a large and rapid stream of which many fables are told by various authors. The torrent falls into the Erymanthus to the south of the city, so that three faces of the city are surrounded and protected by the rivers in the manner I have described. On the fourth or northern side rises a steep hill protected by walls, serving very efficiently as a natural citadel. The town has also walls of unusual size and admirable construction, and besides all these advantages it had just received a reinforcement of Eleans, and Euripidas was present having taken refuge there after his flight.

Philip observing and reflecting on all this, was on the one hand deterred by his judgement from any attempt to carry the town by force or besiege it, but was again strongly disposed thereto when he considered the advantages of its situation. For just as it was now a menace to Achaea and Arcadia and a secure place of arms for the Eleans, so, if it were taken, it would be a

bulwark defending Arcadia and an excellent base of operations for the allies against Elis. These considerations finally prevailed, and he gave orders to the Macedonians to get all of them their breakfasts at daybreak and then prepare for action and hold themselves in readiness. This having been done, he crossed the bridge over the Erymanthus, no one opposing him owing to the unexpectedness of the movement, and unhesitatingly marched on the town in formidable array. Euripidas and all in the town were wholly take aback by this, as they had been convinced that the enemy would neither venture to attempt to assault by storm such a strong city, nor would open a lengthy siege at this disadvantageous season of the year. In this very conviction they now began to entertain suspicions of each other, fearing lest Philip had arranged with some of those inside the city for its betrayal. But when they saw no signs of such project among themselves, the greater number of them ran to the walls for help, while the mercenaries of the Eleans issued from one of the gates higher up the hill to attack the enemy. The king ordered the bearers of the scaling-ladders to set them up at three separate spots, and similarly dividing the rest of his Macedonians into three bodies, gave the signal by the sound of trumpet and attacked the wall simultaneously from every side. At first the holders of the city offered a stout resistance and threw down many of the assailants from the ladders, but when their supply of missiles and other requisites began to fall short—their preparations having been made on the spur of the moment—and the Macedonians were showing no sign of fear, the place of each man thrown off the ladder being instantly taken by the man next behind him, the defenders at length turned their backs and all fled to the citadel, while of the king's forces the Macedonians mounted the wall, and the Cretans, attacking

the mercenaries who had sallied from the upper gate, forced them to fly in disorder, throwing away their shields. Pressing close on their heels and cutting them down, they entered the gate together with them, and thus the city was taken from every side at once. The Psophidians with their wives and children retreated to the citadel together with Euripidas' force and the rest of the fugitives, and the Macedonians, breaking of the houses, pillaged them at once of all their contents and afterwards lodged in them and took regular possession of the town. The fugitives in the citadel, as they were not prepared for a siege, decided to anticipate matters by surrendering to Philip. They therefore sent a herald to the king; and on obtaining a safe-conduct for an embassy dispatched the magistrates accompanied by Euripidas on this mission, who made terms with the king, securing the lives and liberties of all the fugitives both natives and foreigners. They then returned whence they came with orders for all to remain where they were until the departure of the army, lest any of soldiery might disobey orders and plunder them. The king, owing to a snow-fall, was obliged to remain here for several days, in the course of which he called a meeting of the Achaeans present, and first of all pointing out to them the strength of the town and its excellent situation for the purposes of the present war, and next protesting his affection and esteem for their state, finally told them that he now handed over the city to the Achaeans as a free fit, it being his purpose to favour them by all means in his power and never fail to consult their interests. Aratus and the Achaean troops having expressed their thanks to him for this, Philip dismissed the meeting and departed with his army, marching towards Lasion. Hereupon, the Psophidians coming down from the citadel, their city and houses were restored to the them, and Euripidas went away to

Corinth and thence back to Aetolia. The Achaean magistrates present put Prolaus of Sicyon in command of the citadel with an adequate garrison and Pythias of Pellene in command of the town.

So ended the incident of Psophis. The Elean garrison of Lasion, hearing of the approach of the Macedonians and learning what had befallen Psophis, at once abandoned the town. The king took the city immediately on his arrival and, as a further testimony of his generous intentions towards the League, gave up Lasion also to the Achaeans. He likewise restored to the Telphusians the town of Stratus, which had been evacuated by the Eleans, and after completing these arrangements reached Olympia five days later, where he sacrificed to the god and entertained his captains, and, having given all his army a three days' rest, again moved on. Advancing into Elis he sent out foraging parties to scour the country, and himself encamped at the place called the Artemisium, where he waited for the booty and then went on to the Dioscurium.

When the country was plundered, the number of captives was great, and still more numerous were those who escaped to the neighbouring villages and strong places. For Elis is much more thickly inhabited and more full of slaves and farm stock than any other part of Peloponnese. Some of the Eleans in fact are so fond of country life, that though men of substance, they have not for two or three generations shown their faces in the law-courts, and this because those who occupy themselves with politics show the greatest concern for their fellow-citizens in the country and see that justice is done to them on the spot, and that they are plentifully furnished with all the necessaries of life. As it seems to me, they have adopted such a system from old time and legislated accordingly in a measure because of the large

extent of their territory, but chiefly owing to the sacrosanct life they formerly led, having, ever since the Greeks conferred immunity on them owing to the Olympian games, dwelt in a country which was holy and safe from pillage, with no experience of danger and entirely unmenaced by war. But later, when, owing to the Arcadians disputing their possession of Lasion and all the territory of Pisa, they were compelled to defend their country and change their mode of life, they never afterwards showed the least concern to recover from the Greeks their ancient heritage of inviolability, but remained as they now were, acting wrongly in my judgement in this neglecting their future interests. Peace is a blessing for which we all pray to the gods; we submit to every suffering from the desire to attain it, and it is the only one of the so-called good things in life to which no man refuses this title. If then there be any people which, while able by right and with all honour to obtain from the Greeks perpetual and undisputed peace, neglect this object or esteem any other of greater importance, everyone would surely agree that they are much in the wrong. Perhaps indeed they might plead that such a manner of life exposes them to the attack of neighbours bent on war and regardless of treaties. But this is a thing not likely to happen often and claiming if it does occur the aid of all the Greeks; while to secure themselves against any local and temporary damage, amidst a plentiful supply of wealth, such as will probably be theirs if they enjoy constant peace, they will be in no want of foreign mercenary soldiers to protect them at the place and time required. But now simply from fear of rare and improbable perils they expose their country and their properties to constant war and devastation. Let this be taken as said to remind the Eleans of the duty they owe themselves; since a more favourable opportunity never

offered itself than the present for recovering by universal consent their immunity from pillage.

But, as I said above, since some sparks of their old habits are still alive, Elis is an exceedingly populous country; and therefore, upon Philip's entering it, the number of captives was enormous, and the fugitives were still more numerous. A quantity of property and a vast crowd of slaves and cattle were collected at a place they call Thalamae or The Recess, because the approaches to it are narrow and difficult and the place itself secluded and not easily entered. The king, hearing of the numbers of fugitives who had taken refuge in this place and deciding to leave nothing unattempted or half-accomplished, occupied with his mercenaries such spots as commanded the approach, and himself, leaving his baggage and the greater part of his forces in the camp, advanced through the defile with his peltasts and light-armed infantry. He reached the place without encountering any opposition, and the fugitives, thrown into great dismay by the attack, as they had no knowledge of military matters and had made no preparations, and as it was a mixed rabble which had collected in the place, soon surrendered, among them being two hundred mercenaries of various nationalities brought there by Amphidamus the Elean Strategus. Philip, having captured a large amount of movable property, and more than five thousand persons, and having also driven off vast numbers of cattle, now returned to his camp, and shortly, as his army was loaded with booty of every variety and had become unwieldy and useless in the field, for this reason retired and again encamped at Olympia.

One of the guardians of the young Philip left by Antigonus was Apelles, who had at this time very great influence with the king. He now entered on

the base project of reducing the Achaeans to a position similar to that of the Thessalians. For the Thessalians, though supposed to be governed constitutionally and much more liberally than the Macedonians, were as a fact treated in just the same way and obeyed all the orders of the king's ministers. Apelles, therefore, in furtherance of this design began to test the temper of the Achaean contingent. He began by allowing the Macedonians to eject from their quarters such Achaeans as had secured billets, and also to appropriate their share of the booty. He next began to inflict personal chastisement on Achaeans by the hands of his subordinates for quite trivial reasons, and himself carried off to bondage anyone who protested against the floggings or attempted to help the victims, being persuaded that by these means he would gradually and imperceptibly accustom them to submit without remonstrance to any treatment the king chose to inflict on them—and this in spite of the fact that he had shortly before made the campaign with Antigonus, and seen how the Achaeans were ready to face any danger rather than obey the behest of Cleomenes. Some of the young Achaeans, however, met together, and coming before Aratus, pointed out the design that Apelles was pursuing, whereupon Aratus approached Philip, judging it better in such a matter to express his disapproval at the outset and without delay. He laid the matter before the king, who, when made aware of the circumstances, bade the young men lay aside all fear, since nothing of the kind would occur again, and ordered Apelles to issue no orders to the Achaeans without consulting their strategus.

Philip, then, both by his behaviour to those with whom he was associated in the camp and by his ability and daring in the field, was winning a high reputation not only among those serving with him but among all the rest of

the Peloponnesians. For it would be difficult to find a prince more richly endowed by nature with the qualities requisite for the attainment of power. He possessed a quick intelligence, a retentive memory, and great personal charm, as well as the presence and authority that becomes a king, and above all ability and courage as a general. What indeed it was that defeated all these advantages, and turned a king of such good natural parts into a savage tyrant, is not easy to explain in a few words, and therefore the examination and discussion of the matter must be left for a more suitable occasion than the present.

Setting out from Olympia by the road leading to Pharaea, Philip reached first Telphusa and thence Heraea. Here he held a sale of the booty and repaired the bridge over the Alphaeus, intending to invade Triphylia by this road. At about the same time Dorimachus, the Aetolian strategus, on the Eleans requesting him to come to the aid of their country which was being ravaged, dispatched six hundred Aetolians under the command of Phillidas. On reaching Elis, he took over the Elean mercenaries, about five hundred in number, and one thousand citizen soldiers, as well as the Tarentines, [8] and came to help Triphylia. This district derives its name from Triphylus, one of the sons of Arcas, and lies on the coast of the Peloponnese between Elis and Messenia, facing the Libyan Sea and forming the extreme south-west portion of Arcadia. It contains the following towns: Samicum, Lepreum, Hypana, Typanae, Pyrgus, Aepium, Bolax, Stylangium, and Phrixa, all of which the Eleans had annexed, adding to them Alipheira which had originally belonged to Arcadia proper, but had been given to the Eleans during his tyranny by Lydiades of Megalopolis in return for certain private services they rendered him.

[8] A particular kind of light mercenary cavalry were so called, whether they came from Tarentum of not.

Phillidas now sent the Eleans to Lepreum and the mercenaries to Alipheira, and remained himself with his Aetolians in Typaneae to see what would happen. The king, after ridding himself of his heavy baggage, crossed by the bridge the Alpheus which runs past Herae and arrived at Alipheira. This city lies on a hill defended on all sides by precipices, the ascent of which is more than ten stades. It has a citadel on the summit of the whole hill and a bronze statue of Athena, remarkable for its size and beauty. The origin of this statue—from what motive and at whose expense it was made—is a subject of dispute among the natives themselves, as there is nothing to show definitely who dedicated it and why; but all agree as to the excellence of the workmanship, it being one of the most magnificent and artistic statues in existence, the work of Hecatodorus and Sostratus.

The next day broke bright and cloudless, and at early dawn the king distributed at various points the ladder-bearers supported by the mercenaries in front, and dividing his Macedonians placed a body of them in the rear of each party. As soon as the sun was visible, he ordered them all to advance on the hill, and the Macedonians, executing his orders with great alacrity and in formidable style, the Alipheirians kept always running to whatever spots they saw the Macedonians approaching. But the king meanwhile with a picked force managed by climbing some precipitous rocks to reach unperceived the suburb of the citadel. The signal was now given and all at one and the same time planted the ladders against the walls and began the assault of the town. The king was the first to enter, taking the suburb of the citadel, which he found unoccupied, and when this suburb was in flames,

the defenders of the walls, seeing what was likely to happen and in dread lest with the fall of the citadel they should find their last hope gone, left the walls and rushed to take refuge within it. Upon this the Macedonians at once captured the walls and the town; and afterwards the garrison of the citadel sent commissioners to Philip and, on his promising to spare their lives, they surrendered it to him by treaty.

All the people of Triphylia were much alarmed by this achievement of Philip and began to consider how best to save themselves and their own cities. Phillidas now returned to Lepreum, evacuating Typaneae after plundering some of the houses. For this was the reward that the allies of the Aetolians used then to receive; not only to be barefacedly deserted in the hour of need, but to be plundered or betrayed and suffer at the hands of their allies the treatment that the vanquished may expect from their enemies. The people of Typaneae now gave up their city to Philip and those of Hypana followed their example. At the same time the Phigalians, hearing the news from Triphylia and ill-pleased with the Aetolian alliance, rose in arms and seized on the ground round the Polemarch's office. The Aetolian freebooters, who had quartered themselves in the city for the purpose of plundering Messenia, were at first disposed to put a bold face on it and attack the Phigalians, but when the citizens came flocking with one accord to the rescue, they desisted from their project, and came to terms, leaving the city with their possessions, upon which the Phigalians send deputies to Philip and delivered themselves and the town into his hands.

While these transactions were in progress, the people of Lepreum, seizing on a certain position in the city, demanded the evacuation of the citadel and city by the Eleans, Aetolians, and Lacedaemonians (for a

reinforcement had come from Sparta also). Phillidas at first paid no heed to the request but remained where he was, thinking to overawe the citizens. But when the king, having sent Taurion with some troops to Phigalia, advanced in person to Lepreum was approaching the town, Phillidas on hearing of it lost his assurance, while the people of the town were strengthened in their resolution. It was indeed a fine action on the part of the Lepreates, with no less than a thousand Eleans, a thousand Aetolians counting the freebooters, five hundred mercenaries and two hundred Lacedaemonians within the walls and with the citadel occupied, yet to strive to vindicate their country's freedom and not abandon hope. Phillidas, when he saw that the Lepreatans were gallantly holding out and that the Macedonians were approaching, quitted the city accompanied by the Eleans and the Lacedaemonian contingent. Those Cretans whom the Spartans had sent returned home by way of Messenia, while Phillidas retired in the direction of Samicum. The people of Lepreum being now masters of their city, sent envoys to Philip placing it in his hands. The king, on hearing of what had taken place, sent the rest of his forces to Lepreum, but placing himself at the head of his peltasts and light infantry, started in the hope of encountering Phillidas. He came up with him and captured all his baggage-train, but Phillidas and his men succeeded in throwing themselves into Samicum in time. Encamping before this place and fetching up the rest of his forces from Lepreum, Philip gave those within the impression of being about to besiege them. The Aetolians and Eleans had nothing wherewith to meet a siege but their numbers only, and alarmed by the prospect began to treat with Philip for their lives and liberties. On receiving permission to withdraw with their arms they marched off for Elis; and the king thus at

once became master of Samicum, and afterwards, when representatives of the other towns came begging for grace, he took possession of Phrixa, Stylangium, Aepium, Bolax, Pyrgus, and Epitalium, and after these achievements returned again to Lepreum, having in the space of six days subdued the whole of Triphylia. After addressing the Lepreates in a manner suitable to the occasion, and placing a garrison in the citadel, he left with his army for Heraea, leaving Ladicus the Acarnanian in charge of Triphylia. On his arrival at Heraea he divided all the booty, and picking up here his heavy baggage reached Megalopolis in mid-winter.

At the same time that Philip was operating in Triphylia, Chelion, the Lacedaemonian, considering that he was the lawful heir to the throne and deeply resenting having been passed over by the ephors when they selected Lycurgus as king, resolved to bring about a revolution. Thinking that if he followed in Cleomenes' footsteps and held out to the multitude the hope of allotments and redivision of the land, he would soon have the masses behind him, he set to work on his design. Having come to an understanding with his friends on this subject and secured the co-operation of about two hundred in the venture, he entered on the execution of the project. Perceiving that the greatest hindrance to the success of his plot lay in Lycurgus and the ephors who had set him on the throne, he directed his attack first on them. Falling on the ephors while they were at supper he slew them all on the spot, chance thus visiting them with the fitting penalty for their crime. For when we consider the person at whose hands and the person for whose sake they suffered death we must confess that they met with their deserts. Cheilon, after thus disposing of the ephors, hastened to the house of Lycurgus, where he found the king, but failed to get possession of his

person; for he was smuggled out by some servants and neighbours, and got away unperceived, escaping afterwards across country to Pellene in the Tripolis. Chelion, thus baulked of his most important object, had now little heart for his enterprise, but still was forced to continue his pursuit. He therefore advanced into the agora, cutting down his enemies, calling upon his relatives and friends to join him, and tempting the rest of the people by those hopes and promise I just spoke of. But as no one listened to him, but on the contrary a hostile crowd collected, as soon as he perceived how matters stood, he left Sparta secretly, and passing through Laconia arrived in Achaea, alone and an exile. The Lacedaemonians, now dreading the arrival of Philip, brought in all property from the country and evacuated the Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis after razing it to the ground.

Thus the Lacedaemonians who ever since the legislation of Lycurgus had enjoyed the best form of government and had the greatest power until the battle of Leuctra, when chance henceforth turned against them, and their system of government instead of improving began to go rapidly from bad to worse, finally had more experience than any other people of civic trouble and discord. No other nation was so harassed by banishment of citizens and confiscations of property, none had to submit to more cruel servitude culminating in the tyranny of Nabis, although formerly they could not even bear to hear the word "tyrant" mentioned. However, the ancient history of Sparta and the subsequent history of her elevation and decline had been narrated by many. The progress of the latter is most conspicuous since the entire subversion of the ancient constitution by Cleomenes; and I shall continue to speak of it whenever the occasion offers.

Leaving Megalopolis and passing through Tegea, Philip arrived at Argos, where he spent the rest of the winter, having won in this campaign universal admiration for a correctness of conduct and a brilliancy of achievement beyond his years. Apelles, however, had by no means given up his project, but was bent on gradually bringing the Achaeans under the yoke. Seeing that the elder and younger Aratus stood in the way of this design and that Philip paid great regard to them, especially to the elder owing to his former friendship with Antigonus and his great influence with the Achaeans, but still more owing to his talent and discernment, he formed a plan of damaging their credit in the following manner. Inquiring first of all the names of Aratus' political opponents in each city, he sent for them, and when he made their acquaintance began to cajole them and solicit their friendship. He also presented them to Philip pointing out to him in the case of each that if he gave ear to Aratus he must deal with the Achaeans according to the letter of the treaty of alliance; "but" he would say, "if you listen to me and secure the friendship of such men as this, you will be able to treat all the Peloponnesians exactly as you wish." He at once began to occupy himself with the approaching election, wishing to procure the office of strategus for one of these men and oust Aratus and his son from affairs. With this object he persuaded Philip to be present at Aegium for the Achaean elections, under the pretence that it was a station on his march to Elis. The king having consented to this, Apelles himself came for the occasion, and partly by solicitations partly by threats contrived, with difficulty it is true, to bring in as strategus Eperatus of Pharae. Timoxenus, the candidate nominated by Aratus, being defeated.

After this the king left Aegium and marching through Patrae and Dyme came to a fort called "The Wall," which defends the territory of Dyme, but which, as I said above, had been a short time before seized by Euripidas. Being anxious at all hazards to recover this place for Dyme, he encamped before it with his whole army. The Elean garrison in dismay surrendered the fort, which, though not a large place, was admirably fortified. Its circumference did not exceed one and a half stades, but the wall was nowhere less than thirty cubits in height. Handing over to the Dymeans he advanced, laying waste the territory of Elis. After pillaging it and collecting a quantity of booty he returned with his army to Dyme.

Apelles, thinking that he had succeeded so far in his plan, by the election of the Achaean strategus through his influence, renewed his attack on Aratus with the view of entirely alienating Philip from him. He devised the following plan for trumping up a false accusation against him. Amphidamus, the Elean strategus, had been captured at Thalamae together with the other fugitives, as I above narrated, and when he was brought to Olympia with the rest of the prisoners begged urgently through certain persons for an interview with Philip, and on this being granted, he discoursed at some length stating that it was in his power to gain over the Eleans to the king's side and persuade them to enter into alliance with him. Philip, believing this, sent back Amphidamus without ransom, bidding him promise the Eleans that if they joined him he would return all captured men and animals without ransom, would assure the future safety of the country from any outside attack, and would maintain the Eleans in freedom without garrison or tribute and in the enjoyment of their own form of government. Attractive and generous as these offers seemed, the Eleans refused to listen

to them, and Apelles, founding his false accusation on this circumstance, brought it before Philip, telling him that Aratus was not sincere in his friendship for the Macedonians or really attached to the king; for it was to him on the present occasion that the coldness of the Eleans was due: for he had when Amphidamus was sent from Olympia to Elis taken him apart and set him against the project, saying that it was by no means in the interest of the Peloponnesians that Philip should become master of Elis; this was why the Eleans had ignored all the king's offers and remaining faithful to their alliance with the Aetolians, chosen to persist in the war against the Macedonians. On receiving this report, Philip first ordered Apelles to summon Aratus and say the same thing in his presence, and when Aratus arrived, Apelles repeated his accusation in a confident and threatening manner, adding, before the king had spoken, some such words as these: "Since, Aratus, the king finds you to be so ungrateful and to have shown so little consideration for him he has decided to call a meeting of the Achaeans and after laying this matter before them to return to Macedonia." Hereupon the elder Aratus, interrupting him, exhorted Philip to make it a general principle never to give credence to reports rashly or without duly weighing the evidence; and especially when it was a friend or ally against whom he heard anything said, to examine most closely into the accusation, before accepting it. This he said was conduct becoming a king and in every way to his interest. Therefore he begged him now as regarded Apelles' allegation to summon those who had heard the words attempted to him spoken, to demand the attendance of Apelles' informant, and to take every possible means of getting at the truth before making any public statement to the Achaeans. Upon the king's consenting to this and engaging not to neglect

the matter, but to make inquiries, they separated. During the days that followed Amphidamus produced no proof of his assertions, and now a happy accident, most helpful to Aratus, occurred. The Eleans, at the time when Philip was ravaging their country, conceived suspicions of Amphidamus and formed the design of arresting him and sending him in chains to Aetolia. But, getting intelligence of their project, he first fled to Olympia and then, when he heard that Philip was in Dyme engaged in dealing with the booty, he hastened to escape to him there. Aratus, in consequence, when he heard that Amphidamus had fled from Elis and arrived, was exceedingly joyful, as he had nothing on his conscience, and coming to the king, demanded that Amphidamus should be summoned: "For the man," he said, "who knew best about the accusation was he to whom he was said to have spoken the words, and Amphidamus would be sure to tell the truth, as he had been exiled from his home for Philip's sake and depended on him now for his safety." On the Greek's consenting and sending for Amphidamus, he found the charge to be false, and henceforward he continued to like and esteem Aratus more and more, while becoming a little suspicious of Apelles. Prepossessed, however, as he was by his long prejudice in favour of this minister, he could not but overlook many of his errors.

Apelles, however, by no means desisted from his design, but in the first place began to traduce Taurion, who had been entrusted with the supervision of Peloponnesian affairs, not indeed by finding fault with him, but by praising him and saying that he was a most proper person to be attached to the king's person in the camp, his object being to get some one else appointed by his influence to this post. This is indeed a new kind of

calumny, to damage the fortunes of one's neighbours not by blame but by praise, and this variety of malice, envy, and trickery is especially and primarily the invention of courtiers to serve their mutual jealousies and ambitions. He also, whenever he had an opportunity, used to traduce Alexander, the Captain of the Body-guard, wishing to be himself charged with the protection of the king's person, and generally to subvert all the arrangements established by the testament of Antigonus. For not only was Antigonus during his lifetime a good ruler and an excellent guardian of his son, but on his death, he made admirable dispositions for the future regarding everything. In his will he gave to his people an account of his administration, and left orders how and by whom each matter was to be managed with the view of leaving no pretext for rivalries and quarrels among the courtiers. Of those officers who were on Antigonus' staff at the time Apelles was left one of the king's guardians, Leontius was made Captain of the Peltasts, Megaleas Secretary in Chief, Taurion High Commissioner for the Peloponnese, and Alexander Captain of the Body-guard. Apelles had Leontius and Megaleas entirely at his disposal, and his purpose was to remove Alexander and Taurion from their posts and direct these and all other matters through himself and his friends. And he would easily have accomplished this, had he not invited the opposition of Aratus; but as it was he was soon to experience the consequence of his folly and greed of power; for what he had plotted to bring upon his colleagues, he had to suffer himself within a very short space of time. As to how and by what means this happened, I shall defer speaking for the present and bring this Book to a close; but in subsequent ones I shall try to give a clear account of the whole matter. Philip, after making the arrangements I mentioned,

returned to Argos and there spent the remainder of the winter with his friends, dismissing his troops to Macedonia.

THE END OF BOOK IV

BOOK V

The year of office of the younger Aratus came to an end at the rising of the Pleiades, [1] such being then the Achaean reckoning of time. On his retirement he was succeeded by Eperatus, Dorimachus being still the strategus of the Aetolians. Contemporaneously in the early summer, Hannibal, having now openly embarked on the war against Rome, had started from New Carthage, and having crossed the Ebro was beginning to march on Italy in pursuit of his plan; the Romans at the same time sent Tiberius Sempronius Longus to Africa with an army and Publius Cornelius Scipio to Spain, and Antiochus and Ptolemy, having abandoned the attempt to settle by diplomatic means their dispute about Coele-Syria, went to war with each other.

[1] May 13th.

King Philip, being in want of corn and money for his army, summoned the Achaeans through their magistrates to a General Assembly. When this met at Aegium according to the law of the League, noticing that Aratus was little disposed to help him owing to the intrigues of Apelles against him at the late election, and that Eperatus was by nature no man of action and was held in contempt by all, he became convinced by these facts of the error that Apelles and Leontius had committed, and decided to take the part of Aratus. He therefore persuaded the magistrates to transfer the Assembly to Sicyon and there meeting the elder and younger Aratus in private and laying all the blame for what had happened on Apelles, he begged them not to desert their

original policy. Upon their readily consenting, he entered the assembly and with the support of these statesmen managed to obtain all he wanted for his purpose. For the Achaeans passed a vote to pay him at once fifty talents for his first campaign, to provide three months' pay for his troops and ten thousand medimni of corn, and for the future as long as he remained in the Peloponnese fighting in alliance with them he was to receive seventeen talents per month from the League.

After passing this decree the Achaeans dispersed to their several cities. When the troops had mustered from their winter quarters, the king at a council of his friends decided to prosecute the war by sea. This, he was convinced, was the only way by which he could himself fall suddenly on his enemies from every side, while at the same time his adversaries would be deprived of the power of rendering assistance to each other, separated as they were geographically and each in alarm for their own safety owing to the rapidity and secrecy with which the enemy could descend on them by sea. For it was against the Aetolians, Lacedaemonians, and Eleans that he was fighting. Having resolved on this he collected at the Lechaeum the Achaean ships and his own, and by constant practice trained the soldiers of the phalanx to row. The Macedonians obeyed his orders in this respect with the utmost alacrity, for they are not only most intrepid in regular battles on land, but very ready to undertake temporary service at sea, and also industrious in digging trenches, just as Hesiod represents the sons of Achaeus to be "joying in war as if it were a feast."

The king, then, and the bulk of the Macedonian army remained in Corinth occupied with this training and preparation. But Apelles, being unable either to keep Philip under his influence or to endure the

diminishment of his power that resulted from the king's disregard, formed a conspiracy with Leontius and Megaleas by which these two were to remain with Philip and in the actual hour of need damage the king's service by deliberate neglect, while he himself would withdraw to Chalcis and take care that the supplies required for Philip's project should not reach him from any quarter. Having come to this mischievous understanding with these two colleagues, he left for Chalcis, alleging some plausible pretext to the king, and remaining there so effectually kept his sworn word, all yielding him obedience owing to his former credit at court, that at length the king was in such want of money that he was compelled to pawn some of the plate in use at his table and subsist on the proceeds.

When the ships were collected, the Macedonians being now well instructed in rowing, the king, after issuing rations of corn to his troops and paying them, put to sea, and on the second day arrived at Patrae with six thousand Macedonians and twelve hundred mercenaries. At about the same time Dorimachus, the Aetolian strategus, dispatched to the Eleans Agelaus and Scopas with five hundred Neo-Cretans. The Eleans, afraid of Philip's attempting to besiege Cyllene, were collecting mercenaries, preparing their civic force and carefully strengthening Cyllene. Philip, aware of this, collected a force consisting of the Achaeans' mercenaries, a few of his own Cretans, some Gaulish horse and about two thousand picked infantry from Achaea, and left it in Dyme to act both as a reserve and as a protection against the danger from Elis. He himself, after first writing to the Messenians, Epirots, and Acarnanians and to Scerdilaïdas to man their ships and meet him at Cephallenia, put out from Patrae, as he had agreed, and reached Pronni on the coast of Cephallenia. Observing that this small town

was difficult to take by siege, and that the position was a confined one, he sailed past it with his fleet and anchored off Palus, where, finding the country full of corn and capable of providing subsistence for an army, he disembarked his forces and encamped before the town. Beaching his ships close together and surrounding them with a trench and palisade he sent out the Macedonians to gather in the corn. He himself made the circuit of the city to see how the wall could be attacked by siege-works and machines. He intended to wait here for his allies and at the same time to take the town, in order in the first place to deprive the Aetolians of their most indispensable aid—for they used the Cephallenian ships to cross to the Peloponnese and to plunder the coasts of Epirus and Acarnania—and next to provide for himself and his allies a base favourably situated from which to descend on the enemy's territory. For Cephallenia lies off the Gulf of Corinth, stretching out to the Sicilian Sea, and overlooks the north-western part of the Peloponnese, especially Elis and the south-western districts of Epirus, Aetolia, and Acarnania. Since, therefore, it was a convenient rendezvous for the allies and a favourable site for attacking enemy and defending friendly territory, he was very anxious to get the island into his hands. Observing that all the other parts of the city were surrounded either by the sea or by cliffs, and that the only little piece of level ground was on the side facing Zacynthus, he decided to throw up works and open the siege here. While the king was thus occupied, fifteen boats arrived from Scerdilaïdas, who had been prevented from sending the major part of his fleet owing to plots and disturbances among the city despots throughout Illyria, and there came also the contingents ordered from Epirus, Acarnania, and Messene; for now that Phigaleia had been taken, the Messenians had no longer any hesitation

in taking part in the war. All being now ready for the siege, the king placed his *balistae* and catapults at the proper spots for holding back the garrison, and after addressing the Macedonians brought his machines up to the walls and began to open mines under their cover. The Macedonians worked with such goodwill that about two hundred feet of the wall was soon undermined, and the king now approached the wall and invited the garrison to come to terms. On their refusal he set fire to the props and brought down all that part of the wall which had been underpinned, upon which he first of all sent forward the peltasts under Leontius, drawing them up in cohorts and ordering them to force their way through the breach. But Leontius, faithful to his agreement with Apelles, three times in succession deterred the soldiers after they had actually passed the breach from completing the conquest of the city, and having previously corrupted some of the principal officers and himself making a deliberate exhibition of cowardice on each occasion, he was finally driven out of the city with considerable loss, although he might easily have overcome the enemy. The king, when he saw that the commanding officers were playing the coward and a great number of the soldiers were wounded, abandoned the siege and consulted his friends about the next step to be taken.

About the same time Lycurgus had marched out to invade Messenia, and Dorimachus with half the Aetolian forces had attacked Thessaly, both under the belief that they would draw away Philip from the siege of Palus. Embassies reached the king on the matter from the Acarnanians and Messenians; those from Acarnania pressing him to invade Aetolia and thus force Dorimachus to abandon his attack on Macedonia, at the same time overrunning and plundering unhindered the whole of Aetolia, while the

Messenians implored him to come and help them, pointing out to him that now that the Etesian winds had set in, he could easily cross from Cephallenia to Messenia in a single day. In consequence, as Gorgus the Messenian urged, his attack on Lycurgus would be unexpected and sure of success. Leontius, still in pursuit of his plan, vigorously supported Gorgus, seeing that thus the summer would be entirely wasted by Philip. For it was an easy enough thing to sail to Messene, but to sail back again during the period of the Etesian winds was impossible. The evident result would be that Philip would be shut up in Messenia with his army and have to spend the rest of the summer in idleness, while the Aetolians would overrun and plunder unmolested both Thessaly and Epirus. Such were Leontius' pernicious motives in tendering this advice. But Aratus, who was present, spoke in support of the opposite view, advising Philip to set sail to Aetolia and give his whole attention to operations there; for as the Aetolians had left with Dorimachus on his expedition, it was an excellent opportunity for invading and pillaging Aetolia. The king had already entertained suspicions of Leontius owing to his deliberate cowardice at the siege, and perceiving now his treachery from the advice he gave to sail south, decided to yield to the opinion of Aratus. He therefore wrote to Eperatus the strategus of the Achaeans to give assistance to the Messenians with Achaean forces, and himself sailing from Cephallenia reached Leucas in the night after a two days' voyage. Having cleared the canal called Dioryctus he brought his ships through it and sailed up the Ambracian Gulf. This gulf, as I previously stated, runs up from the Sicilian sea for a long distance into the interior. Having passed up it he anchored a little before daylight at the place called Limnaea, where ordering his men to take their breakfast and then to get rid

of the greater part of their encumbrances and lighten themselves for the march, he himself collected the local guides and made inquiries about the district and neighbouring cities. Aristophantus the Acarnanian strategus now arrived in full force; for the Acarnanians had suffered so much from the Aetolians in former times that they were passionately desirous of being revenged on them and doing them all possible injury; and therefore, availing themselves now gladly of the arrival of the Macedonians, they came in arms and not only those who were legally obliged to serve, but even some of the elder men. The spirit of the Epirots was no less eager and for the same reason, but owing to the size of their country and the suddenness of Philip's arrival they were not able to gather their forces in time. As I said, Dorimachus had taken with him half of the total Aetolian levy and left the other half behind, thinking this force adequate for the protection of the towns and the country from a surprise attack. The king, leaving a sufficient guard for his baggage, began to march from Limnaea in the evening and having advanced about sixty stades encamped. Having supped and given his troops a little rest he again set out and marching all through the night reached the river Achelous at a spot between Conope and Stratus just as day was breaking, his object being to fall suddenly and unexpectedly on the district of Thermus.

Leontius saw that there were two circumstances which would lead to Philip's attainment of his purpose and render the Aetolians incapable of facing the situation, first the rapidity and unexpectedness of the Macedonian advance and secondly the fact that the Aetolians, never dreaming that Philip would so readily venture to throw himself into the country round Thermus owing to its great natural strength, would be caught

off their guard and absolutely unprepared for such an occurrence. In view of this, then, and still pursuing his purpose, he recommended Philip to encamp near the Achelous and give his troops a longer rest after their night march, his object being to give the Aetolians a brief time at least to organize their resistance. Aratus, however, seeing that the time for the enterprise was now or never and that Leontius was evidently hampering it, implore Philip not to let the opportunity slip by delaying his advance. The king, displeased as he already was with Leontius, took this advice continued his march. Crossing the Achelous he advanced briskly on Thermus plundering and devastating the country as he went, leaving as he proceeded Stratus, Agrinium, and Thestia on his left and Conope, Lysimachia, Trichonium, and Phytaeum on his right. Reaching a town called Metapa, situated on Lake Trichonis and close to the neighbouring pass, at a distance of about six miles from Thermus, he occupied this place, which the Aetolians had abandoned, with a force of five hundred men serving to cover his entrance into the pass and secure his retreat: for all this bank of the lake is steep, rugged and wooded to the water's edge, so that the path along it is quite narrow and very difficult. After this, putting his mercenaries at the head of the column, the Illyrians behind them, and last of all the peltasts and heavy-armed soldiers, he advanced through the pass, with the Cretans guarding his rear and the Thracians and light-armed troops advancing parallel to him through the country on his right flank, his left flank being protected by the lake for a distance of about thirty stades. Having got through this pass he reached a village called Pamphia, which he likewise garrisoned, and then continued his advance on Thermus by a path not only exceedingly steep and rugged, but having high precipices on each side, so that in some places the passage

was very narrow and dangerous, the total ascent being about thirty stades. Having accomplished this also in a very short time, as the Macedonians marched at a great pace, he reached Thermus late in the evening, and encamping there, sent out his men to sack the surrounding villages and at the same time to loot the houses in Thermus itself, which were not only full of corn and other provisions, but more richly furnished than any in Aetolia. For as it is here that they hold every year a very splendid fair and festival, as well as the election of their magistrates, they all kept the most precious of their goods stored up in this place to be used for the proper reception of their guests and for the various needs of the festive season. Apart too from the need for their use, they thought it was far the safest place in which to store them, as no enemy had ever dared to invade this district, and it was indeed, so to speak, the natural citadel of all Aetolia. Consequently, as it had enjoyed peace from time immemorial, the houses in the neighbourhood of the temple and all the places in the environs were full of every kind of valuables. For that night the army bivouacked on the spot laden with booty of every description, and next day they selected the richest and most portable portion of the household goods and making a heap of the rest in front of their tents set fire to it. Similarly as regards the suits of armour dedicated in the porticoes they took down and carried off the most precious, exchanged some for their own and collecting the rest made a bonfire of them. These were more than fifteen thousand in number.

Up to now all that had been done was right and fair according to the laws of war, but what shall I say of that which followed? For mindful of what the Aetolians had done at Dium and Dodona they burnt the colonnades and destroyed the rest of the rich and artistic votive offerings, some of which

were most elaborate and expensive works. And not only did they damage the roofs of these buildings by the fire, but razed them to the ground. They also threw down the statues numbering not less than two thousand and destroyed many of them, sparing however, such as represented gods or bore inscribed dedications to gods. On the walls they scribbled the often quoted verse due to Samus, son of Chrysogonus and a foster-brother of the king, whose talent was beginning already at this date to reveal itself:

Seest thou how far the bolt divine [2] hath sped?

[2] Or "the Dium-bolt."

and the king and his intimates indeed had a perverse conviction that they were acting rightly and properly in thus retaliating upon the Aetolians for their sacrilegious treatment of Dium. I am quite of the opposite opinion, and we have the material at hand for judging if I am right or not, by taking examples not from elsewhere but from the previous history of this royal house.

When Antigonus after defeating Cleomenes king of the Lacedaemonians in a pitched battle became master of Sparta and had absolute authority to treat the city and citizens as he chose, so far from injuring those who were at his mercy, he restored to them on the contrary their national constitution and their liberty, and did not return to Macedonia before he had conferred the greatest public and private benefits on the Lacedaemonians. Not only therefore was he regarded as their benefactor at the time but after his death he was venerated as their preserver, and it was not in Sparta alone but throughout Greece that he received undying honour and glory in acknowledgement of this conduct. Again Philip, who first raised their kingdom to the rank of a great power and the royal house to a position of

splendour, did not, when he conquered the Athenians in the battle of Chaeronea, obtain so much success by his arms as by the leniency and humanity of his character. For by war and arms he only defeated and subjugated those who met him in the field, but by his gentleness and moderation he brought all the Athenians and their city under his domination, not letting passion push him on to further achievement, but pursuing the war and striving for victory only until he found a fair occasion for exhibiting his clemency and goodness. So he dismissed the prisoners without ransom, paid the last honours to the Athenian dead, entrusting their bones to Antipater to convey to their homes, gave clothes to most of those who were released, and thus at a small expense achieved by this sagacious policy a result of the greatest importance. For having daunted the haughty spirit of the Athenians by his magnanimity, he gained their hearty co-operation in all his schemes instead of their hostility. And take Alexander. Though so indignant with the Thebans that he razed the city to the ground, yet he was so far from neglecting the reverence due to the gods when he captured the city, that he took the most anxious care that not even any unintentional offence should be committed against the temples and holy places in general. Even when he crossed to Asia to chastise the Persians for the outrages they had perpetrated against the Greeks, he strove to exact the punishment from men that their deeds deserved, but refrained from injuring anything consecrated to the gods, although it was in this respect that the Persians had offended most while in Greece.

With these examples constantly present to his mind Philip should now have shown himself to be the true heir and successor of those princes, not inheriting so much their kingdom as their high principles and magnanimity.

But, instead of this, though all through his life he was at great pains to prove that he was allied in blood to Alexander and Philip, he was not in the least anxious to show himself their emulator. Therefore since his practices were the reverse of theirs, as he advanced in years his general reputation came to be also the reverse. His conduct on the present occasion is an instance of the difference. For in allowing his passion to make him the rival of the Aetolians in their impiety, he thought he was doing nothing wrong. He was constantly reproaching Scopas and Dorimachus with brutality and lawless violence, alleging their outrages on religion at Dodona and Dium, but never reflected that he himself by behaving in precisely the same manner would earn the same reputation among the very people he was addressing. For it is one thing to seize on and destroy the enemy's forts, harbours, cities, men, ships, crops and other things of a like nature, by depriving him of which we weaken him, while strengthening our own resources and furthering our plans: all these indeed are measures forced on us by the usages and laws of war. But to do wanton damage to temples, statues and all such works with absolutely no prospect of any resulting advantage in the war to our own cause or detriment to that of the enemy must be characterized as the work of a frenzied mind at the height of its fury. For good men should not make war on wrong-doers with the object of destroying and exterminating them, but with that of correcting and reforming their errors, nor should they involve the guiltless in the fate of the guilty, but rather extend to those whom they think guilty the mercy and deliverance they offer to the innocent. It is indeed the part of a tyrant to do evil that he may make himself the master of men by fear against their will, hated himself and hating his subjects, but it is that of a king to do good to

all and thus rule and preside over a willing people, earning their love by his beneficence and humanity.

We can but realize the gravity of Philip's error by picturing to ourselves, what opinion of him the Aetolians would have held if he had done just the reverse, and had neither destroyed the colonnades and statues nor damaged any of the votive offerings. For my own part I think it would have been the best and kindest opinion, since they were conscious of their crimes at Dium and Dodona and would have been well aware that Philip was now at liberty to do exactly what he wished, and even if he acted most ruthlessly would be held to have done right as far at least as concerned themselves, but that owing to his gentle and magnanimous spirit he had chosen to avoid acting in any respect as they had done. It is evident from this, that they would naturally have condemned themselves, and approved and admired Philip, as having acted nobly and like a king in thus respecting religion and curbing his just anger against themselves. And surely to conquer one's enemies by generosity and equity is of far higher service than any victory in the field; for to arms the vanquished yield from necessity, to virtue from conviction; in the one case the correction of error is made with much sacrifice, in the other the erring are guided to better ways without suffering hurt. And, what is of greatest moment, in the one case the achievement is chiefly the work of subordinates, in the other the victory is solely due to the commander.

Possibly indeed we should not attach the whole blame to Philip for what happened, taking his extreme youth into consideration, but rather attribute it to the friends who associated and co-operated with him, among whom were Aratus and Demetrius of Pharos. To pronounce which of the two was likely to give such advice is not difficult even for one who was not actually

present. For apart from the general tenour of their lives, in which we never find Aratus to have been guilty of impulsiveness or want of judgement, while the contrary is true of Demetrius, we have an undisputed example of their divergent principles in the counsel they once both offered to Philip under similar circumstances. When the proper time comes I shall make due mention of this. [3]

[3] See Bk. vii. chap. 11.

We left Philip at Thermus. Taking all the booty which it was possible to drive or carry off he started from Thermus, returning by the same road as that by which he had come, and placing the booty and heavy-armed troops in front, and the Acarnanians and mercenaries in the rear. He was in great haste to get though the difficult pass, as he expected that the Aetolians, relying on the strength of the positions near it, would fall on his rear, as they actually did at once. They had gathered to defend their country to the number of about three thousand, and as long as Philip was on the heights did not approach him, but remained in certain hidden strongholds under the command of Alexander of Trichonium. As soon, however, as the rearguard had moved out of Thermus they entered the town at once and attacked the last ranks. When the rearguard had thus been thrown into some confusion, the Aetolians fell on it with more determination and did some execution, being emboldened by the nature of the ground. But Philip, having foreseen this, had concealed under a hill on the descent the Illyrians and a picked force of peltasts, and when they sprang up from their ambush and charged those of the enemy who had advanced farthest in the pursuit of the rearguard, the whole Aetolian force fled in complete rout across country with the loss of one hundred and thirty killed and about as many prisoners.

After this success the rearguard, setting fire to Pamphium, soon got through the pass in safety and joined the Macedonians, Philip having encamped at Metapa to wait for them there. Next day, after razing Metapa to the ground, he continued his march and encamped near a town called Acrae, and on the following day advanced laying the country waste, encamping that night at Conope, where he remained all the next day. On the following day he broke up his camp and marched along the Achelous upon Stratus, on reaching which he crossed the river and halted his army out of range, challenging the defenders to attack him. For he had learnt that a force of three thousand Aetolian foot, four hundred horse, and five hundred Cretans was collected in Stratus. When no one came out against him he again set his van in motion and began to march for Limnaea and his fleet. When the rearguard had passed the town, a few Aetolian horsemen to begin with sallied out to harass the hindmost men, and when all the Cretans from the town and some of the Aetolians came out to join their cavalry, the engagement became more general and the rearguard was forced to face about and engage the enemy. At first the fortunes of the battle were even, but when the Illyrians came to the help of Philip's mercenaries, the Aetolian cavalry and mercenaries gave way and scattered in flight. The king's troops pursued the greater part of them up to the gates and walls, cutting down about a hundred. After this affair, the garrison of the city took no further action and the rearguard safely reached the main army and the ships.

Philip, having pitched his camp early in the day, sacrificed a thank-offering to the gods for the success of his late enterprise and invited all his commanding officers to a banquet. It was indeed generally acknowledged that he had run great risk in entering such a dangerous country, and one that

no one before him had ever ventured to invade with an army. And now he had not only invaded it, but had made his retreat in safety after completely accomplishing his purpose. So that he was in high spirits and was now preparing to entertain his officers. But Megaleas and Leontius on the contrary were much annoyed at the king's success, for they had pledged themselves to Apelles to hamper Philip's plans and had not been able to do so, the tide of events having set against them. Still they came to the banquet.

From the very first their behaviour aroused the suspicions of the king and his guests, as they did not show the same joy as the rest at the recent events, but as the feast progressed and the drinking finally became excessive, they were obliged to join in the carousal and soon exhibited themselves in their true colours. For when the banquet had broken up, under the incitement of drink and passion they went about looking for Aratus and meeting him as he was on his way home, first of all abused him and then began to pelt him with stones. A number of people came up to help on both sides, and there was a great noise and commotion in the camp, until the king hearing the cries sent men to find out what was the matter and separate the disturbers. Aratus on their arrival, after telling them the facts and appealing to the testimony of those present, retired to his tent, and Leontius also slipped away in some mysterious manner. The king, when he understood what had happened, sent for Megaleas and Crinon and reprimanded them severely. Yet not only did they express no regret but aggravated their offence, saying that they would not desist from their purposes until they had paid out Aratus. The king was highly indignant at their language, and at once inflicted a fine of twenty talents on them and ordered them to be

imprisoned until they paid it. Next morning he summoned Aratus and bade him have no fear, as he would see that the matter was settled to his satisfaction. Leontius, hearing of what had happened to Megaleas, came to the royal tent accompanied by some peltasts, feeling confident that he would intimidate the king, who was but a boy, and soon make him change his mind. Coming into his presence he asked who had dared to lay hands on Megaleas and who had taken him to prison. But when the king confidently replied that he himself had given the order, Leontius was dismayed and with a muttered protest departed in a huff. The king now put to sea with his whole fleet and passing down the gulf, as soon as he came to anchor at Leucas ordered those who were charged with the disposal of the booty to dispatch this business, while he himself called a counsel of his friends and tried the case of Megaleas and Crinon. Aratus, who acted as accuser, recounted the malpractices of Leontius and his party from beginning to end, giving an account of the massacre they had perpetrated at Argos after the departure of Antigonus, their understanding with Apelles and their obstruction at the siege of Palus, supporting all his statements by proofs and bringing forward witnesses; upon which Megaleas and Crinon, having not a word to say in defence, were unanimously found guilty by the king's friends. Crinon remained in prison, but Leontius became surety for Megaleas' fine.

Such was the issue so far of the plot between Apelles and Leontius, which had progressed in a manner quite contrary to their expectation; for they had thought by intimidating Aratus and isolating Philip to do whatever they considered to be to their advantage, and the result was just the opposite.

Lycurgus at about the same time returned from his expedition to Messenia without having accomplished anything worthy of mention; and starting again from Sparta shortly afterwards, occupied the town of Tegea and undertook the siege of the citadel, into which the inhabitants had retired. But being utterly unable to effect anything he returned again to Sparta.

The Eleans also overran the territory of Dyme and easily defeated the cavalry who came to opposite them by decoying them into an ambush, killing not a few of the Gauls and taking Polymedes of Aegium and Agesipolis and Diocles of Dyme prisoners.

Dorimachus had originally made his raid with the Aetolians, fully persuaded, as I said above, that he could overrun Thessaly undisturbed and would force Philip to raise the siege of Palus, but finding Chrysogonus and Petraeus in Thessaly ready to give him battle, he did not venture to descend into the plain, but kept to the slopes of the hills. On hearing of the Macedonian invasion of Aetolia he quitted Thessaly and hastened to defend his country, but found that the Macedonians had already left Aetolia, and so failed and was too late at all points.

The king put out from Leucas, and after pillaging the territory of Oeanthe as he coasted along, reached Corinth with his whole fleet. Anchoring his ships in the Lechaeum he disembarked his troops, and sent couriers to all the allied cities in the Peloponnese to inform them of the day on which they must present themselves in arms at Tegea before bed-time. After taking this step, having spent no time at all in Corinth, he ordered the Macedonians to break up their camp, and marching through Argos reached Tegea on the second day. Picking up there the Achaeans who had

assembled, he advanced through the hilly country with the object of invading Laconia by surprise. Taking a circuitous route through an uninhabited district he seized on the fourth day the hills opposite Sparta and passing the city with the Menelaïum on his right made straight for Amyclae. The Lacedaemonians seeing from the city the army as it marched past were thunderstruck and in great fear, as they were completely surprised by what was happening. For they were still in a state of excitement over the news that had arrived about the doings of Philip in Aetolia and his destruction of Thermus, and there was some talk among them of sending Lycurgus to help the Aetolians, but no one ever imagined that the danger would descend on their heads so swiftly from such a long distance, the king's extreme youth still tending to inspire contempt for him. Consequently, as things fell out quite contrary to their expectations, they were naturally much dismayed; for Philip had shown a daring and energy beyond his years in his enterprises, and reduced all his enemies to a state of bewilderment and helplessness. For putting to sea from the centre of Aetolia, as I above narrated, and traversing the Ambracian Gulf in one night, he had reached Leucas, where he spent two days, and setting sail on the morning of the third day he came to anchor next day in Lechaeum after pillaging the coast of Aetolia on his voyage. After thus marching without a break he gained upon the seventh day the hills near the Menelaïum that look down on Sparta. So that most of Spartans though they saw what had happened, could not believe their eyes.

The Lacedaemonians, then, were in a state of the utmost terror at this unexpected invasion and quite at a loss how to meet it. Philip on the first day pitched his camp at Amyclae. The district of Amyclae is one of the most richly timbered and fertile in Laconia, lies about twenty stades from

Sparta, and contains a temple of Apollo which is about the most famous of all the Laconian holy places. It lies between Sparta and the sea. Next day Philip, continuing to pillage the country on his way, marched down to what is called Pyrrhus' camp. After spending the next two days in overrunning and plundering the immediate neighbourhood he encamped at Carnium, and starting thence advanced on Asine, which he assaulted, but making no progress, took his departure and subsequently continued to lay waste all the country bordering on the Cretan Sea as far as Taenarum. Changing the direction of his march he next made for the arsenal of the Lacedaemonians, which is called Gythium and has a secure harbour, being about two hundred and thirty stades distant from Sparta. Leaving this place on his right he encamped in the district of Helos, which taken as a whole is the most extensive and finest in Laconia. Sending out his foragers from here he set fire to every part of it, destroying the crops, and carried his devastation even as far as Acriae, Leucae, and Boeae.

The Messenians, on receipt of Philip's dispatch demanding troops, were no less eager to comply than the other allies, and at once started on the expedition sending their finest troops, a thousand foot and two hundred horse. Owing, however, to the distance they missed Philip at Tegea and at first were at a loss what to do, but anxious as they were not to seem intentionally remiss owing to the suspicions they had incurred on previous occasions, they marched hastily through the territory of Argos to Laconia with the object of joining Philip. On arriving at a village called Glympeis, which lies on the borders of Argolis and Laconia, they encamped near it with an unmilitary lack of precaution; for they neither protected their camp with a trench and palisade, nor did they look round for a favourable spot,

but relying in the simplicity of their hearts on the goodwill of the inhabitants pitched their camp just under the wall. Lycurgus, when the arrival of the Messenians was announced to him, set out with his mercenaries and a few Lacedaemonians, and reaching the place just as day was breaking, made a bold attack on the camp. The Messenians, who had acted foolishly in every way and especially in advancing from Tegea with such an inadequate force and without any expert advice, yet now when they were attacked and in actual danger took the best means open to them to ensure their safety. For as soon as they saw the enemy coming up, they abandoned everything and hastily took refuge within the walls of the village. So that Lycurgus captured most of their horses and their baggage, but did not make a single prisoner and only killed eight cavalry soldiers.

The Messenians, then, having met with this reverse returned home by way of Argos. But Lycurgus was highly elated at his success; and on arriving at Sparta began to make preparations and hold councils of his friends, with the view of not allowing Philip to retire from the country without giving battle. The king, leaving the territory of Helos, now advanced laying the country waste, and on the fourth day about midday again descended on Amyclae with his whole army. Lycurgus, after giving his orders for the approaching engagement to his officers and friends, himself sallied from the city and occupied the ground round the Menelaïum, his total force consisting of not less than two thousand men; but those who remained in the city he had ordered to be on the look out and when the signal was hoisted, to lead out their forces at several points with all speed, and draw them up facing the Eurotas, where the stream is at the shortest

distance from the city. Such was the position of Lycurgus and the Lacedaemonians.

But lest owing to ignorance of the localities my narrative tend to become vague and meaningless, I must describe their natural features and relative positions, as indeed I attempt to do throughout my whole work, by bringing any places with which my readers are unacquainted into connexion and relation with those familiar to them from personal knowledge or reading. For seeing that in the majority of land and sea battles in a war defeat is due to difference of position, and since we all wish to know not so much what happened as how it happened, we must by no means neglect to illustrate by local descriptions events of any sort, and least of all those of a war, nor must we hesitate to adopt as landmarks harbours, seas, and islands, or again temples, mountains, and local names of districts, and finally differences of climate, as these latter are most universally recognized by mankind. For this, as I said on a former occasion, is the only way of making readers acquainted with places of which they are ignorant. The following, then, are the features of the country in question. The general shape of Sparta is a circle; it lies in a country level on the whole but here and there with certain irregularities and hills. The river that runs past it on the east is called the Eurotas, and is usually too deep to be forded. The hills on which the Menelaïum stands are on the far side of the river to the south-east of the town, and are rocky, difficult to ascend, and of considerable height. They absolutely command the level space between the city and the river, which runs close along their foot, its distance from the city being not more than a stade and a half. It was along there that Philip was forced to pass in his retreat with the town on the left hand and the Lacedaemonians drawn up

outside it ready for him, and with the river on his right and across it Lycurgus' force posted on the hills. The Lacedaemonians had contrived still further to strengthen their position by damming the river higher up and making it overflow all the ground between the town and the hills, over which, when thus soaked, it was impossible even for the infantry to pass, not to speak of the cavalry. Thus the only passage left for the army was close along the foot of the hills, which would expose them on the march to the enemy in a long narrow column, no part of which if attacked could expect support from the rest.

Philip, taking this into consideration and having consulted his friends, decided that the most immediate necessity was to drive Lycurgus away from the neighbourhood of the Menelaïum. Taking therefore his mercenaries, peltasts, and Illyrians, he crossed the river and made for hills. Lycurgus, seeing what Philip had in view, got the men he had with him ready and addressed them in view of the approaching battle, and at the same time signalled to those in the town, upon which the officers in command there at once led out the troops, as had been arranged, and drew them up in front of the wall, placing the cavalry on the right wing. Philip, on approaching Lycurgus, first sent the mercenaries along against him, so that at the beginning the Lacedaemonians fought with more success, favoured as they were in no small degree by the ground and their heavier armour. But as soon as Philip had sent the peltasts to take part in the fight acting as a supporting force, and getting round the enemy with his Illyrians charged them on the flank, his mercenaries encouraged by this support fought with much greater spirit, while Lycurgus' force dreading the charge of heavier troops gave way and ran. About a hundred were killed and rather more

taken prisoners, the remainder escaping to the town: Lycurgus himself passing along the hills made his escape with a few others into the city. Philip, leaving the Illyrians in occupation of the hills, returned to his army with his light infantry and peltasts. Meanwhile Aratus had left Amyclae with the phalanx and was now close to Sparta. The king crossing the river remained with his light troops, peltasts, and cavalry to cover the heavy armed troops until they had traversed the narrow passage under the hills. When the Spartans from the city attempted an attack on the cavalry which was performing this service, the action became general, and the peltasts displaying great gallantry, Philip gained here too a distinct advantage, and after pursuing the Spartan horse up to the gates, recrossed the Eurotas in safety and placed himself in the rear of his phalanx.

The day was now far advanced, and Philip being obliged to encamp on the spot availed himself of a site just at the end of the narrow passage, his officers having by chance chosen as a camping ground the most advantageous spot it would be possible to find for anyone wishing to invade Laconia by passing close by the city of Sparta. For there is at the entrance of the narrow passage I described above, as one approaches Lacedaemon coming from Tegea or from any part of the interior, a certain site distant at the most two stades from the town and lying close to the river. On the side which looks to the town and the river it is entirely surrounded by a lofty and quite inaccessible cliff, but the ground at the top of the precipice is flat, covered with soil, and well supplied with water, and also very favourably situated for the entry or exit of an army, so that anyone encamping on it and holding the hill above it would seem to have chosen for his camp a somewhat insecure position owing to the vicinity of the city, but is really

encamped in the best possible position, as he commands the entrance and passage of the narrows. Philip, then, having encamped here in safety, sent on his baggage on the following day and marshalled his troops on the level ground in full view of those in the city. He waited for a short time and then wheeling round began to march towards Tegea. On reaching the site of the battle between Antigonus and Cleomenes, he encamped there, and next day after inspecting the field and sacrificing to the gods on each of the hills Olympus and Evas, he resumed his march, taking care to strengthen his rearguard. Reaching Tegea he there held a sale of all his booty, and afterwards marching through Argolis arrived with his army at Corinth. Here embassies from both Rhodes and Chios awaited him with proposals for bringing the war to an end. He received them both, and dissembling his real intentions told them that he was and always had been quite ready to come to terms with the Aetolians, and sent them off to address the Aetolians in the same sense, and he then went down to Lechaeum and prepared to take ship, as he had some very important business in Phocis.

In the meanwhile Leontius, Megaleas, and Ptolemaeus, still entertaining the hope of intimidating Philip and thus retrieving their former errors, disseminated among the peltasts and the body of troops which the Macedonians call the *Agema* suggestions to the effect that they were in risk of losing all their privileges, that they were most unfairly treated and did not get in full their customary largesses. By this means they excited the lads to collect in a body, and attempt to plunder the tents of the king's most prominent friends, and even to pull down the doors and break through the roof of the royal apartments. The whole city was thrown thereby into a state of disturbance and tumult, and Philip, on hearing of it, came running up in

hot haste from Lechaeum to Corinth, where he called a meeting of the Macedonians in the theatre and addressed them there, exhorting them all to resume discipline and rebuking them severely for their conduct. Upon this there was a mighty hubbub and much confusion of counsel, some advising that the offenders should be arrested and called to account, while others were in favour of coming to terms and granting a general amnesty, upon which the king, pretending for the time that he was convinced, addressed some words of exhortation to the whole army without distinction and took his departure, well knowing who the originators of the sedition had been, but pretending ignorance owing to the pressure of circumstances.

After these disturbances the king's Phocian schemes met with some impediments, but Leontius renouncing all hope of achieving anything by his own efforts, owing to all his plans having failed, appealed to Apelles, sending frequent messages to him to come back from Chalcis, alleging his own helplessness and embarrassment owing to his difference with the king. Now Apelles during his stay in Chalcis had assumed more authority than his position warranted, giving out that the king was still young and was ruled by him in most matters and could do nothing of his own accord, and taking the management of affairs and the supreme power into his own hands. Consequently the prefects and officials in Macedonia and Thessaly referred all matters to him, while the Greek cities in voting gifts and honours made little mention of the king, but Apelles was all in all to them. Philip, who was aware of this, had long been annoyed and aggrieved at it, especially as Aratus was always by him and took the most efficient means to work out his own project, but he bore with it for the time and let no one know what action he contemplated and what his real opinion was. Apelles,

ignorant of his own true position and convinced that if he had a personal meeting with Philip he would order matters exactly as he wished, left Chalcis and hastened to the help of Leontius. On his arrival at Corinth Leontius, Ptolemaeus, and Megaleas, who were in command of the peltasts and the other crack corps, were at much pains to work up the soldiers to give him a fine reception. After entering the city in great pomp owing to the number of officers and soldiers who had flocked to meet him, he proceeded without alighting to the royal quarters. He was about to enter as had been his former custom, when one of the ushers, acting by order, stopped him, saying that the king was engaged. Disconcerted by this unexpected rebuff, Apelles after remaining for some time in a state of bewilderment withdrew much abashed, upon which his followers at once began to drop away quite openly, so that finally he reached his lodging accompanied only by his own servants. So brief a space of time suffices to exalt and abase men all over the world and especially those in the courts of kings, for those are in truth exactly like counters on a reckoning-board. For these at the will of the reckoner are now worth a copper and now worth a talent, and courtiers at the nod of the king are at one moment universally envied and at the next universally pitied. Megaleas seeing that the result of Apelles' intervention had not been at all what he expected, was beset by fear, and made preparations for flight. Apelles was now invited to state banquets and received other such honours, but took no part in councils and was not admitted to the king's intimacy. When a few days afterwards the king again sailed from Lechaeum on his Phocian enterprise he took Apelles with him. Upon the project falling through, the king set out from Elatea on his return, and meanwhile Megaleas left for Athens, leaving Leontius to meet his bail

of the twenty talents; but when the Athenian strategi refused to receive him, he returned to Thebes. The king sailing from the neighbourhood of Cirrha reached the harbour of Sicyon with his guard, and going up to the city declined the invitation of the magistrates, but taking up his quarters in Aratus' house spent his whole time in his society, ordering Apelles to take ship for Corinth. On hearing the news about Megaleas, he sent away the peltasts who were under the command of Leontius to Triphylia with Taurion, on the pretence of some urgent service, and as soon as they had left ordered Leontius to be arrested to his bail for Megaleas. The peltasts, however, heard what had happened, as Leontius had sent them a messenger, and dispatched a deputation to the king, begging him, if he had arrested Leontius on any other charge, not to try the case in their absence, for if he did so they would all consider it a signal slight and affront—with such freedom did the Macedonians always address their kings—but if it was on account of his bail for Megaleas, they would subscribe among themselves and pay it off. But this warm support of Leontius by the peltasts served only to exasperate the king, who for this reason put Leontius to death sooner than he had purposed.

The Rhodian and Chian embassies now returned from Aetolia, where they had concluded a truce for thirty days. They reported that the Aetolians were ready to come to terms, and stated that they had themselves named a day on which they begged Philip to meet the Aetolians at Rhium, when they undertook that the latter would make peace at any price. Philip accepted the truce, and writing to his allies with the request to send commissioners to Patrae to meet him and confer about the conditions of peace with the Aetolians, proceeded there himself by sea from Lechaeum, arriving on the

second day. Just then certain letters were sent to him from Phocis, which Megaleas had addressed to the Aetolians exhorting them to persist in the war with confidence, since Philip's fortunes were at their last ebb owing to scarcity of supplies: the letters also contained certain accusations against the king coupled with venomous personal abuse. On reading them and being convinced that all the mischief was originally due to Apelles, he placed him in custody and at once dispatched him to Corinth together with his son and his minion, sending at the same time Alexander to Thebes to arrest Megaleas and bring him before the magistrates to answer to his bail. Upon Alexander's executing this order, Megaleas did not await the issue, but died by his own hand, and at about the same time, Apelles, his son and his favourite also ended their lives. Thus did these men meet with the end they deserved, and it was chiefly their outrageous conduct to Aratus that brought them to ruin.

The Aetolians were on the one hand anxious to make peace, since the war told heavily on them and things were turning out far otherwise than they had expected. For while they had hoped to find a helpless infant in Philip, owing to his tender years and inexperience, they really found him to be a grown-up man, both in his projects and in his performances, while they had shown themselves contemptible and childish both in their general policy and in their conduct of particular operations. But on the news reaching them of the outbreak among the peltasts and the deaths of Apelles and Leontius, they flattered themselves that there was some serious trouble at the Court and began to procrastinate, proposing to defer the date that had been fixed for the conference at Rhium. Philip, gladly availing himself of this pretext, as he was confident of success in the war, and had made up his

mind from the outset to shuffle off the negotiations, now begged the representatives of the allies who had arrived to meet him at Patrae not to occupy themselves with terms of peace but with the prosecution of the war, and himself sailed back to Corinth. Dismissing all his Macedonian troops and sending them through Thessaly home to winter, he took ship at Cenchreae and coasting along Attica passed through the Euripus to Demetrias. Here he put on his trial before a Macedonian court and executed Ptolemaeus, the last survivor of Leontius' band of conspirators.

The contemporary events were as follows. Hannibal had now entered Italy and encamped near the river Po opposite the Roman forces, Antiochus after subduing the greater part of Coele-Syria retired into winter-quarters, and Lycurgus the king of Sparta escaped to Aetolia for fear of the ephors. For the ephors, to whom he had been falsely accused of entertaining revolutionary designs, collected the young men and came to his house at night, but having received warning he escaped with his servants.

It was now winter; King Philip had left for Macedonia, and Eperatus the Achaean strategus was treated with contempt by the civic soldiers and utterly set at naught by the mercenaries, so that no one obeyed orders, and no preparations had been made for protecting the country. Pyrrhias, the general sent by the Aetolians to Elis, observed this; and taking about thirteen hundred Aetolians, the mercenaries of the Eleans and about a thousand foot and two hundred horse of their civic troops, so that he had in all about three thousand men, not only laid waste the territories of Dyme and Pharae but even that of Patrae. Finally establishing his camp on the so-called Panachaean Mountain which overlooks Patrae he pillaged all the country in direction of Rhium and Aegium. The consequence was, that the

cities suffering severely and getting no help were by no means disposed to pay their contributions, and the soldiery, as their pay had been deferred and was much in arrears, were as little inclined to give help. So citizens and soldiers thus playing into each others' hands, things went from bad to worse and finally the mercenaries disbanded—all this being the consequence of the chief magistrate's imbecility. The above was the condition of affairs in Achaea, when his year having now expired, Eperatus laid down his office, and the Achaeans at the beginning of summer elected the elder Aratus their strategus.

Such was the position in Europe. Now that I have arrived at a place that is suitable both chronologically and historically, I will shift the scene to Asia, and turning to the doings there during this same Olympiad will again confined my narrative to that field. And in the first place, in pursuit of my original design, I will attempt to give a clear description of the war between Antiochus and Ptolemy for Coele-Syria. I am perfectly aware that at the date I chose for breaking off my narrative of events in Greece this war was on the point of being decided and coming to an end, but I deliberately resolved to make a break here in this history and open a fresh chapter for the following reasons. I am confident that I have provided my readers with sufficient information to prevent them from going wrong about the dates of particular events by my parallel recapitulations of general history, in which I state in what year of this Olympiad and contemporaneously with what events in Greece each episode elsewhere began and ended. But in order that my narrative may be easy to follow and lucid, I think it most essential as regards this Olympiad not to interweave the histories of different countries, but to keep them as separate and distinct as possible until upon reaching the

next and following Olympiads I can begin to narrate the events of each year in the chronological order. For since my design is to write the history not of certain particular matters but of what happened all over the world, and indeed, as I previously stated, I have undertaken, I may say, a vaster task than any of my predecessors, it is my duty to pay particular attention to the matter of arrangement and treatment, so that both as a whole and in all its details my work may have the quality of clearness. I will therefore on the present occasion also go back a little and try in treating of the reigns of Antiochus and Ptolemy to take some generally recognized and accepted starting-point for my narrative: the most necessary thing to provide for. For the ancients, saying that the beginning is half the whole, advised that in all matters the greatest care should be taken to make a good beginning. And although this dictum is thought to be exaggerated, in my own opinion it falls short of the truth. One may indeed confidently affirm that the beginning is not merely half of the whole, but reaches as far as the end. For how is it possible to begin a thing well without having present in one's mind the completion of one's project, and without knowing its scope, its relation to other things, and the object for which one undertakes it? And again how is it possible to sum up events properly without referring to their beginnings, and understanding whence, how, and why the final situation was brought about? So we should think that beginnings do not only reach half way, but reach to the end, and both writers and readers of a general history should pay the greatest attention to them. And this I shall endeavour to do.

I am not indeed unaware that several other writers make the same boast as myself, that they write general history and have undertaken a vaster task

than any predecessor. Now, while paying all due deference to Ephorus, the first and only writer who really undertook a general history, I will avoid criticizing at length or mentioning by name any of the others, and will simply say this much, that certain writers of history in my own times after giving an account of the war between Rome and Carthage in three or four pages, maintain that they write universal history. Yet no one is so ignorant as not to know that many actions of the highest importance were accomplished then in Spain, Africa, Italy, and Sicily, that the war with Hannibal was the most celebrated and longest of wars if we except that for Sicily, and that we in Greece were all obliged to fix our eyes on it, dreading the results that would follow. But some of those who treat of it, after giving a slighter sketch of it even than those worthy citizens who jot down occasional memoranda of events on the walls of their houses, claim to have comprised in their work all events in Greece and abroad. This depends on the fact that it is a very simple matter to engage by words in the greatest undertakings, but by no means easy to attain actual excellence in anything. Promise therefore is open to anyone and the common property of all, one may say, who have nothing beyond a little audacity, while performance is rare and falls to few in this life. I have been led into making these remarks by the arrogance of those authors who extol themselves and their own writings, and I will now return to the subject I proposed to deal with.

When Ptolemy surnamed Philopator, at the death of his father, after making away with his brother Magas and his partisans, succeeded to the throne of Egypt, he considered that he had freed himself from domestic perils by his own action in thus destroying his rivals, but that chance had freed him from danger abroad, Antigonus and Seleucus having just died and

their successors, Antiochus and Philip, being quite young, in fact almost boys. Secure therefore in his present good fortune, he began to conduct himself as if his chief concern were the idle pomp of royalty, showing himself as regards the members of his court and the officials who administered Egypt inattentive to business and difficult of approach, and treating with entire negligence and indifference the agents charged with the conduct of affairs outside Egypt, to which the former kings had paid much more attention than to the government of Egypt itself. As a consequence they had been always able to menace the kings of Syria both by sea and land, masters as they were of Coele-Syria and Cyprus, and their sphere of control also extended over the lesser kingdoms of Asia Minor and the islands, since they had the chief cities, strong places and harbours in their hands all along the coast from Pamphylia to the Hellespont and the neighbourhood of Lysimachia; while by their command of Aenus, Maronea and other cities even more distant, they exercised a supervision over the affairs of Thrace and Macedonia. With so long an arm and such a far advanced fence of client states they were never in any alarm about the safety of their Egyptian dominions, and for this reason they naturally paid serious attention to foreign affairs. But this new king, neglecting to control all these matters owing to his shameful amours and senseless and constant drunkenness, found, as was to be expected, in a very short time both his life and his throne threatened by more than one conspiracy, the first being that of Cleomenes the Spartan.

Cleomenes, during the lifetime of Ptolemy Euergetes, to whom he had linked his fortunes and pledged his word, had kept quiet, in the constant belief that he would receive sufficient assistance from him to recover the

throne of his ancestors. But after the death of this king, as time went on, and circumstances in Greece almost called aloud for Cleomenes, Antigonus being dead, the Achaeans being engaged in war, and the Spartans now, as Cleomenes had from the first planned and purposed, sharing the hatred of the Aetolians for the Achaeans and Macedonians, he was positively compelled to bestir himself and do his best to get away from Alexandria. Consequently, he at first approached Ptolemy more than once with the request that he would furnish him with adequate supplies and troops for an expedition; but as the king would not listen to this, he earnestly besought him to allow him to leave with his own household, for the state of affairs, he said, held out a sufficiently fair prospect of his recovering his ancestral throne. The king, however, who for the reasons I stated above neither concerned himself at all with such questions, nor took any thought for the future, continued in his thoughtlessness and folly to turn a deaf ear to Cleomenes. Meanwhile Sosibius, who, if anyone, was now at the head of affairs, took counsel with his friends and came to the following decision with regard to him. On the one hand they judged it inadvisable to send him off on an armed expedition, as owing to the death of Antigonus they regarded foreign affairs as of no importance and thought that money they expended on them would be thrown away. Besides which, now that Antigonus was no more and there was no general left who was a match for Cleomenes, they were afraid that he would have little trouble in making himself the master of Greece and thus become a serious and formidable rival to themselves, especially as he had seen behind the scenes in Egypt and had formed a poor opinion of the king, and as he was aware that many parts of the kingdom were loosely attached or dissevered by distance, thus

offering plenty of opportunity for intrigue—for they had a good many ships at Samos and a considerable military force at Ephesus. These, then, were the reasons which made them dismiss the project of sending Cleomenes off with supplies for an expedition; but at the same time they thought it would by no means serve their interests to send away such an eminent man after inflicting a slight upon him, as this was sure to make him their enemy and antagonist. The only course left then was to keep him back against his will, and this they all indeed rejected at once and without discussion, thinking it by no means safe for a lion to lie in the same fold as the sheep, but it was especially Sosibius who was apprehensive of the effects of such a measure for the following reason. At the time when they were plotting the murder of Magas and Berenice, being in great fear of their project filing chiefly owing to the high courage of Berenice, they were compelled to conciliate the whole court, holding out hopes of favour to everyone if things fell out as they wished. Sosibius on this occasion observing that Cleomenes was in need of assistance from the king, and that he was a man of judgement with a real grasp of the facts, confided the whole plot to him, picturing the high favours he might expect. Cleomenes, seeing that he was in state of great alarm and in fear chiefly of the foreign soldiers and mercenaries, bade him be of good heart, promising him that the mercenaries would do him no harm, but would rather be helpful to him. When Sosibius showed considerable surprise at this promise, "Don't you see," he said, "that nearly three thousand of them are from the Peloponnese and about a thousand are Cretans, and I need but make a sign to these men and they will all put themselves joyfully at your service. Once they are united whom have you to fear? The soldiers from Syria and Caria I suppose!" At the time Sosibius

was delighted to hear this and pursued the plot against Berenice with doubled confidence, but afterwards, when he witnessed the king's slackness, the words were always coming back to his mind, and the thought of Cleomenes' daring and popularity with the mercenaries kept on haunting him. It was he therefore who on this occasion was foremost in instigating the king and his friends to take Cleomenes into custody before it was too late. To reinforce this advice he availed himself of the following circumstance.

There was a certain Messenian called Nicagoras who had been a family friend of Archidamus the king of Sparta. In former times their intercourse had been of the slightest, but when Archidamus took flight from Sparta for fear of Cleomenes, and came to Messenia, Nicagoras not only gladly received him in his house and provided for his wants but ever afterwards they stood on terms of the closest intimacy and affection. When therefore Cleomenes held out hopes to Archidamus of return and reconciliation, Nicagoras devoted himself to negotiating and concluding the treaty. When this had been ratified, Archidamus was on his way home to Sparta, relying on the terms of the agreement brought about by Nicagoras, but Cleomenes coming to meet them put Archidamus to death, sparing Nicagoras and the rest of his companions. To the outside world, Nicagoras pretended to be grateful to Cleomenes for having spared his life, but in his heart he bitterly resented what had occurred, for it looked as if had been the cause of the king's death. This Nicagoras had arrived not long ago at Alexandria with a cargo of horses and on disembarking he found Cleomenes, with Panteus and Hippitas, walking on the quay. When Cleomenes saw him he came up to him and greeted him affectionately and asked him on what business he had

come. When he told him he had brought horses to sell, Cleomenes said, "I very much wish you had brought catamites and sackbut girls instead of the horses, for those are the wares this king is after." Nicagoras at the time smiled and held his tongue, but a few days afterwards, when he had become quite familiar with Sosibius owing to the business of the horses, he told against Cleomenes the story of what he had recently said, and noticing that Sosibius listened to him with pleasure, he gave him a full account of his old grievance against that prince. When Sosibius saw that he was ill-disposed to Cleomenes, he persuaded him by a bribe in cash and a promise of a further sum to write a letter against Cleomenes and leave it sealed, so that a few days after Nicagoras had left his servant might bring him the letter as having been sent by Nicagoras. Nicagoras entered into the plot, and when the letter was brought to Sosibius by the servant after Nicagoras had sailed, he at once took both servant and letter to the king. The servant said that Nicagoras had left the letter with orders for him to deliver it to Sosibius, and as the letter stated that Cleomenes, unless he were furnished with a properly equipped expeditionary force, intended to revolt against the king, Sosibius at once availed himself of this pretext for urging the king not to delay, but to take the precaution of placing him in custody. This was done, a huge house being put at his disposal in which he resided under watch and ward, differing from ordinary prisoners only in that he had a bigger jail to live in. Seeing his position and having but poor hopes of the future, Cleomenes decided to make a dash for freedom at any cost, not that he really believed he would attain his object—for he had nothing on his side likely to conduce to success—but rather desiring to die a glorious death without submitting to anything unworthy of the high courage he had ever

exhibited, and I suppose that there dwelt in his mind and inspired him those words of the hero which are wont to commend themselves to men of dauntless spirit:

'Tis true I perish, yet I perish great:
Yet in a mighty deed I shall expire,
Let future ages hear it, and admire. [4]

[4] *Il.* xxii. 304, Pope's translation.

Waiting then for a day on which Ptolemy made an excursion to Canobus he spread a report among his guards that he was going to be set at liberty by the king, and upon this pretence he entertained his own attendants, and sent presents of meat, garlands, and wine to the guards. When the soldiers, suspecting nothing, had indulged freely in these good things and were quite drunk, he took the friends who were with him and his own servants and about midday they rushed out of the house unnoticed by the guards, and armed with daggers. As they advanced they met in the square with Ptolemy who had been left in charge of the city, and overawing his attendants by the audacity of their attack, they dragged him from his chariot and shut him up, and now began to call on the people to assert their freedom. But when no one paid any attention or consented to join the rising, as the whole plan had taken everyone completely by surprise, they retraced their steps and made for the citadel with the intention of forcing the gates and getting the prisoners to join them. But when this design also failed, as the guards of the prison got word of their intention and made the gates fast, they died by their own hands like brave men and Spartans.

Thus perished Cleomenes, a man tactful in his bearing and address, with a great capacity for the conduct of affairs and in a word designed by nature

to be a captain and a prince.

The next conspiracy shortly after this was that of Theodotus the governor of Coele-Syria, and Aetolian by birth. Holding the king in contempt owing to his debauched life and general conduct and mistrusting the court circles, because after recently rendering important service to Ptolemy in various ways and especially in connexion with the first attempt of Antiochus on Coele-Syria, he had not only received no thanks for this but on the contrary had been recalled to Alexandria and had barely escaped with his life, he now formed the project of entering into communication with Antiochus and handing over to him the cities of Coele-Syria. Antiochus gladly grasped at the proposal and the matter was soon in a fair way of being accomplished.

Now that I may perform for this royal house what I have done for that of Egypt, I will go back to Antiochus' succession to the throne and give a summary of events between that date and the outbreak of the war I am about to describe. Antiochus was the younger son of Seleucus Callinicus, and on the death of his father and the succession to the throne of his elder brother Seleucus, he at first resided in the interior, but when Seleucus crossed the Taurus with his army and was assassinated, as I have already stated, he succeeded him and began to reign, entrusting the government of Asia on this side of Taurus to Achaeus and that of the upper provinces to Molon and his brother Alexander, Molon being satrap of Media and Alexander of Persia. These brothers, despising the king on account of his youth, and hoping that Achaeus would associate himself with them in their design, dreading at the same time the cruelty and malice of Hermeias, who was now at the head of the government, entered on a revolt, attempting to engage the upper satrapies in it. This Hermeias was a Carian who had been

in power ever since Seleucus, Antiochus' brother, on leaving for his expedition against Attalus had entrusted him with the government. Having attained this position of authority he was jealous of all the holders of prominent posts at court, and as he was naturally of a savage disposition, he inflicted punishment on some for errors which he magnified into crimes, and trumping up false charges against others, showed himself a cruel and relentless judge. The man above all others whom he was particularly desirous of destroying was Epigenes, who had brought back the army that had been left under the command of Seleucus, as he saw he was capable both as a speaker and as a man of action and enjoyed great popularity with the soldiery. He was quite determined on this, but was biding his time on the look out for some pretext for attacking Epigenes. When the council was called to discuss the revolt of Molon, and the king ordered everyone to state his opinion as to how the rebellion should be dealt with, Epigenes was the first to speak and advised not to delay but to take the matter in hand at once. It was of the first importance, he said, that the king should proceed to the spot and be present at the actual theatre of events; for thus either Molon would not venture to disturb the peace, once the king presented himself before the eyes of the people with an adequate force, or if in spite of this he ventured to persist in his project, he would be very soon seized upon by the populace and delivered up to the king. Before Epigenes had even finished his speech, Hermeias flew into a passion and exclaimed that for long Epigenes had been in secret a plotter and a traitor to the kingdom, but that now he had revealed his evil intentions by the advice he had offered, his design being to put the king's person undefended, except by a small force, at the mercy of the rebels. For the present Hermeias contented himself with

thus laying the train of the slander and did not further molest Epigenes, affecting to have been guilty rather of a mistimed outburst of ill-temper than to have shown a spirit of enmity. The motives of the opinion he himself delivered were that he was disinclined owing to his lack of military experience to take the command in the campaign against Molon, as he dreaded the danger, while he was most anxious to take the field against Ptolemy, since he felt sure that the war there would be a safe one owing to that king's faineance. On the present occasion he overawed the whole Council and appointing Xenon and Theodotus surnamed Hemiolius to the command of the force sent against Molon, continued to work upon the king, advising him to seize on Coele-Syria, thinking that thus only by involving the young prince in wars on every side he could secure immunity from punishment to his former malpractices and freedom in the continued exercise of his present authority, owing to the pressure of affairs and the constant struggles and perils that the king would have to face. Finally, in pursuit of this purpose he forged and brought to the king a letter supposed to have been sent by Achaeus setting forth that Ptolemy urged him to usurp the government, promising to help all his undertakings with ships and money, once he assumed the diadem and claimed in the sight of all that sovereignty which as a fact he now exercised, although scrupling to take the title and declining the crown which Fortune offered him.

The king quite taken in by this letter was ready and eager to invade Coele-Syria. He was now near Seleucia, the city at the crossing of the Euphrates, and there he was joined by Diognetus, the admiral from Cappadocia Pontica, bringing Laodice, the daughter of Mithridates, a virgin, the affianced bride of the king. Mithridates claimed to be a descendant of

one of those seven Persians who had killed the Magus, and he had preserved in his family the kingdom on the Pontus originally granted to them by Darius. Antiochus received the maiden on her approach with all due pomp and at once celebrated his nuptials with right royal magnificence. After the wedding was over he went down to Antioch, where he proclaimed Laodice queen and henceforth busied himself with preparations for the war.

Meanwhile Molon, having worked upon the troops in his own satrapy till they were ready for anything, by the hopes of booty he held out and the fear which he instilled into their officers by producing forged letters from the king couched in threatening terms, having also a ready coadjutor in his brother Alexander, and having secured the support of the neighbouring satrapies by gaining the favour of their governors with bribes, marched out with a large army against the king's generals. Xenon and Theodotus, terror-struck by his approach, withdrew into the towns, and Molon making himself master of the territory of Apollonia was now abundantly furnished with supplies. Even previously he had been a formidable antagonist owing to the importance of the province over which he ruled. For all the royal herds of horses are in charge of the Medes, and they possess vast quantities of corn and cattle. It is difficult indeed to speak in adequate terms of the strength and extent of the district. Media lies in central Asia, and looked at as a whole, is superior in size and in the height of its mountain-ranges to any other district in Asia. Again it overlooks the country of some of the bravest and largest tribes. For outside its eastern border it has the desert plain that separates Persia from Parthia; it overlooks and commands the so-called Caspian Gates, and reaches as far as the mountains of the Tapyri, which are not far distant from the Hyrcanian Sea. Its southern portion

extends as far as Mesopotamia and the territory of Apollonia and borders on Persia, from which it is protected by Mount Zagrus, a range which has an ascent of a hundred stades, and consisting as it does of different branches meeting at various points, contains in the intervals depressions and deep valleys inhabited by the Cossaei, Corbrenae, Carchi and other barbarous tribes with a high reputation for their warlike qualities. On the western side it is bounded by the so-called Satrapies, which are not far distant from the tribes whose territories descend to the Euxine Sea. On the north it is surrounded by the Elymaeans, Aniarcae, Cadusii, and Matiani and overlooks those parts of the Pontus which join the Palus Maeotis. Media itself has several mountain chains running across it from east to west between which lie plains full of towns and villages. Molon therefore being master of the country, which might rank as a kingdom, was already, as I said sufficiently formidable owing to his superior power; but now that the royal generals, as it seemed, had retired from the field before him, and that his own troops were in high spirits, owing to their expectation of success having been so far fulfilled, he seemed absolutely terrible and irresistible to all the inhabitants of Asia. He first of all, therefore, formed the project of crossing the Tigris and laying siege to Seleucia, but on being prevented from crossing by Zeuxis who had seized the river boats, he withdrew to his camp at Ctesiphon and made preparations for quartering his troops there during the winter.

The king, on hearing of Molon's advanced and the retreat of his own generals, was himself prepared to abandon the campaign against Ptolemy and take the field against Molon, thus not letting slip the time for action; but Hermeias, adhering to his original design, sent Xenoetas the Achaean

against Molon with an army to take the chief command; saying that to fight against rebels was the business of generals but that against kings the king himself should plan the operations and command in the decisive battles. As he had the young king wholly subject to his influence, he set out and began to assemble his forces at Apamea, from which he proceeded to Laodicea. From this town the king took the offensive with his whole army and crossing the desert entered the defile known as Marsyas, which lies between the chains of Libanus and Antilibanus and affords a narrow passage between the two. Just where it is narrowest it is broken by marshes and lakes from which the perfumed reed is cut, and here it is commanded on the one side by a place called Brochi and on the other by Gerrha, the passage between being quite narrow. After marching through this defile for several days and reducing the towns in its neighbourhood, Antiochus reached Gerrha. Finding that Theodotus the Aetolian had occupied Gerrha and Brochi and had fortified the narrow passage by the lake with a trench and stockade, posting troops in suitable spots, he at first decided to force his way through, but as he suffered more loss than he inflicted owing to the strength of the position and the fact that Theodotus remained as staunch as ever, he desisted from the attempt. So that finding himself in this difficult position, when the news reached him that Xenoetas had suffered total defeat and that Molon was in possession of all the upper provinces he gave up this expedition and hastened to return to the relief of his own dominions.

For Xenoetas, when, as I stated above, he was appointed to independent command and found himself possessed of more authority than he had ever expected to hold, began to treat his friends somewhat disdainfully and to be too audacious in his schemes against his enemies. Reaching, however,

Seleucia and sending for Diogenes, the governor of Susiana, and Pythiades, the governor of the coasts of the Persian Gulf, he led out his forces and encamped opposite the enemy with the Tigris on his front. When numerous deserters swam over from Molon's camp and informed him that if he crossed the river, Molon's whole army would declare for him—for the soldiers were jealous of Molon and exceedingly well disposed to the king—Xenoetas, encouraged by this intelligence, decided to cross the Tigris. He first of all made a show of attempting to bridge the river at a place where it forms an island, but as he was not getting ready any of the material required for this purpose, Molon took little notice of the feint. Xenoetas, however, was all the time engaged in collecting and fitting out boats with all possible care. Selecting from his whole army the most courageous of the infantry and cavalry, he left Zeuxis and Pythiades in charge of the camp, and proceeded by night to a point about eighty stades below Molon's camp, where he took his forces safely across in the boats and encamped while it was still night on an advantageous position, the great part of which was surrounded by the river and the rest protected by pools and marshes. Molon when he was aware of what had happened, sent off his cavalry thinking to prevent easily any further troops from crossing and to crush the force that had already crossed. On approaching Xenoetas' force, unfamiliar as they were with the country, they had no need of any effort on the part of the enemy, but plunging or sinking by the impetus of their own advance into the pools and swamps were all rendered useless, while not a few perished. Xenoetas, fully confident that on his approach Molon's troops would desert to him, advanced along the river bank and encamped next the enemy. But Molon now, either as a ruse, or from lack of confidence in his men and fear

lest Xenoetas' expectations might be fulfilled, leaving his baggage in his camp, abandoned it under cover of night and marched hastily in the direction of Media. Xenoetas, supposing that Molon had taken to flight from fear of being attacked by him and from mistrust in his own troops, first attacked and occupied the enemy's camp and next brought across from the camp of Zeuxis his own cavalry and their baggage. After this he called a meeting of his soldiers and exhorted them to be of good courage and hope for a happy issue of the war, as Molon had fled. When he had finished this address he ordered them all to attend to their wants and refresh themselves, as he intended to start at once next more than in pursuit. The soldiers, filled with confidence and with abundance of provisions at hand, fell to feasting and drinking and lapsed into the state of negligence consequent on such excess. But Molon, after proceeding for a considerable distance and giving his men their supper, returned and reappeared at the spot, where, finding all the enemy scattered about and drowned in wine, he fell upon the camp in the early dawn. Dismayed by the unexpected attack and unable to awake the soldiers owing to their drunken condition, Xenoetas dashed madly into the ranks of the foe and perished. Most of the sleeping soldiers were killed in their beds, while the rest threw themselves into the river and attempted to cross to the camp on the opposite bank, most of these, however, also losing their lives. The scene in the camp was altogether one of the most varied confusion and tumult. The men were all in the utmost dismay and terror, and the camp across the river being in sight at quite a short distance, in their longing to escape they forgot the dangerous force of the stream, and losing their wits and making a blind rush for safety threw themselves into the river and forced the baggage animals with their packs to take to the water also, as

if the river would providentially hope them and carry them across to the camp opposite. So that the picture presented by the stream was indeed tragical and extraordinary, horses, mules, arms and corpses, and every kind of baggage being swept down by the current together with the swimmers. Molon took possession of Xenoetas' camp and afterwards crossing the river in safety, as he met with no opposition, Zeuxis having fled before his attack, took the camp of the latter also. After these successes he advanced with his army on Seleucia. He took it at the first assault, as Zeuxis and Diomedon, the governor of the city, had abandoned it, and advancing now at his ease, reduced the upper Satrapies. After making himself master of Babylonia and the coasts of the Persian gulf he reached Susa. This city he also took at the first assault, but the assaults he made on the citadel were unsuccessful, as the general Diogenes had thrown himself into it before his arrival. Abandoning this attempt, he left a force to invest it and hurried back with the rest of his army to Seleucia on the Tigris. Here he carefully refreshed his troops and after addressing them started again of pursue his further projects, and occupied Parapotamia as far as the town of Europus and Mesopotamia as far as Dura.

Antiochus, on intelligence reaching him of these events, abandoned, as I stated above, his designs on Coele-Syria and turned his whole attention to the field of action. The council having once more met and the king having requested advice as to the measures to be taken against Molon, Epigenes was again the first to give his view of the situation, which was that, as he had advised, there should have been no initial delay allowing the enemy to gain such advantages, but that now as before he maintained his opinion that the king must take the matter in hand with vigour. Upon which Hermeias,

flying for no reason into a violent passion, began to abuse him. By singing his own praises in the worst taste, bringing against Epigenes a number of false and random accusations and adjuring the king not to desist from his purpose and abandon his hope of conquering Coele-Syria for so slight a show of reason, he not only gave offence to most of the council, but displeased Antiochus himself, and it was with difficulty that he was persuaded to put an end to the altercation, the king having shown great anxiety to reconcile the two men. The general operation being that the action recommended by Epigenes was most to the purpose and most advantageous, the council decided that the king should take the field against Molon and make the matter his sole concern. Upon this Hermeias, pretending that he had suddenly come round to the same opinion, said that it was the duty of everyone to give unhesitating support to this decision and showed himself very willing and active in making preparations for war.

When the army assembled at Apamea and a mutiny broke out among the soldiers on account of some arrears of pay that were owing to them, observing that the king was very nervous and alarmed at such a movement taking place at so critical a time, Hermeias engaged to discharge the whole sum due, if the king would consent that Epigenes should take no part in the campaign; as he said there would be no chance otherwise of anything being properly managed in the army in view of the bitterness of the quarrel between them. The king was displeased at this request, and would fain have refused, being anxious for Epigenes to accompany him on the campaign owing to his military capacity, but beset as he was and preoccupied through Hermeias' nefarious machinations by court etiquette and by a host of guards and attendants, he was not his own master, so that he gave way and acceded

to the request. When Epigenes retired, as he was bidden, into civil life, the members of the council were intimidated by this consequence of Hermeias' jealousy, but the troops upon their demands being met experienced a revulsion of feeling and grew well disposed to the man who had procured payment of their pay. The Cyrrhestae, however, were an exception, as they to the number of about six thousand mutinied and quitted their quarters, giving considerable trouble for some time; but finally they were defeated in a battle by one of the king's generals, most of them being killed and the rest surrendering at discretion. Hermeias, having thus subjected to his will the councillors by fear and the troops by doing them a service, left Apamea and advanced in company with the king. With the connivance of Alexis, the commandant of the citadel at Apamea, he now engaged in the following plot against Epigenes. Forging a letter supposing to have been sent by Molon to Epigenes, he seduced by promise of a large reward one of Epigenes' slaves and persuaded him to take it and mix it up with Epigenes' papers. This having been done, Alexis at once appeared and asked Epigenes if he had received any letters from Molon. Upon his denying it with some acerbity, Alexis demanded to search his house and on entering it very soon found the letter, and on this ground at once put Epigenes to death. The king was induced to believe that Epigenes had merited his fate, and the courtiers, though they had their suspicions, were afraid to utter them.

Antiochus, on reaching the Euphrates, gave his troops a rest and then resumed his march. Arriving at Antioch in Mygdonia at about the winter solstice, he remained there, wishing to wait until the extreme rigour of the winter should be over. After passing forty days there he went off to Libba, and at a council held to determine what was the best line of advance against

Molon and whence supplies for the march should be obtained—Molon being now in the neighbourhood of Babylon—Hermeias advised marching along the Tigris, so that their flank should be covered by this river and by the Lycus and Caprus. Zeuxis, having the fate of Epigenes before his eyes, was afraid of the consequences if he stated his own view, but nevertheless, as Hermeias was obviously wrong, he plucked up courage to advise crossing the Tigris, giving as his reasons the general difficulty of the march along the river, and the fact that they would, after passing through a considerable extent of country, have to undertake a six days' march through the desert before reaching the king's canal. As this was held by the enemy, it would be impossible to cross, and a subsequent retreat through the desert would obviously be attended with great risk, especially as they would be badly off for provisions. If, on the contrary, they crossed the Tigris, he pointed out that the population of the Apolloniatis would evidently resumed their allegiance and join the king, since it was not by their own choice but from necessity and fear that they now yielded obedience to Molon. It was also evident, he said, that the army would be plenteously furnished with provisions owing to the fertility of the country. But the most important consideration was that Molon's retreat to Media and his sources of supplies from that province would be cut off, and that therefore he would be obliged to give battle, or if he refused, his troops would soon go over to the king. Zeuxis' advice was approved, and dividing the army into three parts they speedily crossed the river with their baggage at three different places, and marching on Dura, which city was then besieged by one of Molon's generals, forced the enemy at their first assault to raise the siege. Advancing

hence and marching continuously for eight days they crossed the mountain called Oreicum and arrived at Apollonia.

Meanwhile Molon had heard of the king's arrival, and mistrusting the population of Susiana and Babylonia, as his conquest of these provinces was so recent and sudden, fearing also that his return to Media might be cut off, he decided to bridge the Tigris and cross it with his army, being anxious if possible to gain the hilly part of the territory of Apollonia, as he relied on the numbers of his force of slingers known as Cyrtii. Having crossed the river he advanced marching rapidly and uninterruptedly. He was approaching the district in question at the very time that king had left Apollonia with the whole of his army, and the light infantry of both, which had been sent on in advance, came into contact in crossing a certain range of hills. At first they engaged in a skirmish with each other, but on the main bodies coming up they separated. The armies now withdrew to their separate camps, which were distant from each other about forty stades, but when evening set in Molon, reflecting that a direct attack by day on their king by the rebels would be hazardous and difficult, determined to attack Antiochus by night. Choosing the most competent and vigorous men in his whole army, he took them round in a certain direction, with the design of falling on the enemy from higher ground. But learning on his march that ten soldiers in a body had deserted to Antiochus, he abandoned this plan and retiring hastily appeared about daybreak at his own camp, where his arrival threw the whole army into confusion and panic; for the men there, started out of their sleep by the advancing force, were very nearly rushing out of the camp. Molon, however, quieted the panic as far as he could, and at dawn the king, who was quite prepared for battle, moved his whole army

out of camp. On his right wing he posted first his lancers under the command of Ardys, an officer of proved ability in the field, next them the Cretan allies and next them the Gallic Rhigosages. After these he placed the mercenaries from Greece and last of all the phalanx. The left wing he assigned to the cavalry known as "Companions." His elephants, which were ten in number, he posted at certain intervals in front of the line. He distributed his reserves of infantry and cavalry between the two wings with orders to outflank the enemy as soon as the battle had begun. After this he passed along the line and addressed his troops in a few words suitable to the occasion. He entrusted the left wing to Hermeias and Zeuxis and took command of the right wing himself. As for Molon, in consequence of the absurd panic that occurred during the night, it was with difficulty that he drew out his forces from camp, and there was much confusion in getting them into position. However, he divided his cavalry between his two wings, taking into consideration the enemy's disposition, and between the two bodies of cavalry he placed the scutati, the Gauls, and in general all his heavy-armed troops. His archers, slingers, and all such kind of troops he posted beyond the cavalry on either wing, and his scythed chariots at intervals in front of his line. He gave the command of his left wing to his brother Neolaus and took command of the right wing himself. When the armies now advanced against each other, Molon's right wing remained faithful and vigorously engaged Zeuxis' force, but the left wing, as soon as they closed and came in sight of the king, went over to the enemy, upon which Molon's whole force lost heart, while the confidence of the king's army was redoubled. Molon, aware of what had happened and already surrounded on every side, haunted by the tortures he would suffer if he were

taken alive, put an end to his life, and all who had taken any part in the plot escaped each to his home and perished in like manner. Neolaus, escaping from the battle to his brother Alexander in Persia, killed his mother and Molon's children and afterwards himself, persuading Alexander to follow his example. The king after plundering the enemy's camp ordered Molon's body to be crucified in the most conspicuous place in Media. This sentence was at once executed by the officials charged with it, who took the body to the Callonitis and crucified it at the foot of the ascent to Mount Zagrus. After this Antiochus rebuked the rebel troops at some length, and then giving them his right hand in sign of pardon charged certain officers with the task of conducting them back to Media and setting affairs there in order. He himself went down to Seleucia and restored order to the neighbouring satrapies, treating all offenders with mildness and wisdom. But Hermeias, keeping up his character for harshness, brought accusations against the people of Seleucia and fined the city a thousand talents; sent the magistrates called Adeiganes into exile and destroyed many of the Seleucians by mutilation, the sword, or the rack. It was with much difficulty that the king, by talking over Hermeias or by taking matters into his own hands, at length succeeded in quieting and pacifying the citizens, imposing a fine of only a hundred and fifty talents in punishment for their offense. After arranging these matters he left Diogenes in command of Media and Apollodorus of Susiana, and sent Tychon, the chief secretary of the army, to take the command of the Persian gulf province.

Thus were the rebellion of Molon and the consequent rising in the upper satrapies suppressed and quieted. Elated by his success and wishing to overawe and intimidate the barbarous princes whose dominions bordered on

and lay beyond his own provinces, so as to prevent their furnishing anyone who rebelled against him with supplies or armed assistance, the king decided to march against them and in the first place against Artabarzanes, who was considered the most important and energetic of these potentates, being master of the so-called satrapies and the tribes on their borders. But Hermeias at that time was afraid of an expedition into the interior owing to its danger and continued to yearn for the campaign against Ptolemy which he had originally planned. When, however, the news came that a son had been born to Antiochus, thinking that possibly in the interior Antiochus might meet with some misfortune at the hands of the barbarians and give him the opportunity of compassing his death, he gave his consent to the expedition, feeling sure that if he could put Antiochus out of the way he would be himself the child's guardian and master of the kingdom. The campaign once decided on, they crossed the river Zagrus into the territory of Artabarzanes which borders on Media, from which it is separated by the intervening chain of mountains. Above it lies that part of Pontus which descends to the river Phasis. It reaches as far as the Caspian Sea and has a large and warlike population chiefly mounted, while its natural resources provide every kind of warlike material. The principality still remains under Persian rule, having been overlooked in the time of Alexander. Artabarzanes, terror-struck at the king's attack, chiefly owing to his years as he was quite an old man, yielded to circumstances and made terms which satisfied Antiochus.

After the ratification of this treaty Apollophanes, the king's physician and a great favourite of his, seeing that Hermeias no longer put any restraint on his arbitrary exercise of authority, became anxious for the king's safety

and was still more suspicious and fearful on his own account. So when he found a suitable occasion he spoke to the king, entreating him not to neglect the matter or shut his eyes to Hermeias' unscrupulousness and wait until he found himself face to face with a disaster such as befel his brother. "And the danger," he said, "is not so very remote." He begged him therefore to give heed to it and lose no time in taking measures to save himself and his friends. Upon Antiochus confessing that he also disliked and suspected Hermeias, and assuring him that he was most grateful to him for having taken upon himself to speak to him on the subject with such affectionate regard, Apollophanes was much encouraged by finding that he had not misestimated the king's sentiment and opinion, while Antiochus begged Apollophanes not to confine his help to words but to take practical steps to assure the safety of himself and his friends. Apollophanes said he was ready to do anything in the world, and after this they agreed on a plan. Pretending that the king was attacked by fits of dizziness, he and his physicians relieved of their functions for a few days his usual civil and military attendants, but they were themselves enabled to admit any of their friends to interviews under the pretence of medical attendance. During these days they prepared suitable persons for the work in hand, all readily complying owing to their detestation of Hermeias, and now they set themselves to execute their design. The doctors having ordered early walks in the cool of the morning for the king, Hermeias came at the appointed hour accompanied by those of the king's friends who were privy to the plot, the rest being behindhand as the king took the air at a far earlier hour than usual. So they drew Hermeias away from the camp till they reached a solitary spot and then upon the king's retiring for a short distance as if for some necessary

occasion, they stabbed Hermeias with their poniards. So perished Hermeias, meeting with a punishment by no means adequate to his crimes. Thus freed from a source of fear and constant embarrassment, the king set out on his march home, all in the country approving his actions and designs and bestowing during his progress the most hearty applause of all on the removal of Hermeias. The women in Apamea at this time stoned the wife of Hermeias to death and the boys did the like to his sons.

Antiochus, on arriving at home, dismissed his troops for the winter. He now sent to Achaeus messages of remonstrance, protesting in the first place against his having ventured to assume the diadem and style himself king, and next informing him that it was no secret that he was acting in concert with Ptolemy and generally displaying an unwarranted activity. For Achaeus, while the king was absent on his expedition against Artabarzanes, feeling sure that Antiochus would meet with some misfortune and even if this were not the case, hoping owing to the king's being so far away to invade Syria before his return and with the assistance of the Cyrrhestae, who were in revolt, to make himself master speedily of the whole kingdom, set out on his march from Lydia with a large army. On reaching Laodicea in Phrygia he assumed the diadem and for the first time ventured to take the title of king and use it in his letters to towns, taking this step chiefly at the instigation of the exile Garsyeris. He continued to advance and was nearly in Lycaonia when his troops mutinied, the cause of their dissatisfaction being that, as it now appeared, the expected was against their original and natural king. Achaeus, therefore, when he was aware of the disaffection, abandoned his present enterprise and wishing to persuade the soldiers that from the outset he had had no intention of invading Syria, turned back and

began to plunder Pisidia, and having thus provided his soldiers with plenty of booty and gained the goodwill and confidence of them all, returned to his own province.

The king, who was perfectly well informed about all these matters, continued, as I above stated, to remonstrate with Achaeus and at the same time devoted his whole attention to preparing for the war against Ptolemy. Accordingly, collecting his forces at Apamea in early spring, he summoned a council of his friends to advise as to the invasion of Coele-Syria. Many suggestions having been made in this respect about the nature of the country, about the preparations requisite and about the collaboration of the fleet, Apollophanes, a native of Seleucia, of whom I have already spoken, cut short all these expressions of opinion. For, as he said, it was foolish to covet Coele-Syria and invade that country while permitting the occupation by Ptolemy of Seleucia which was the capital seat and, one might almost say, the sacred hearth of their empire. Apart from the disgrace inflicted on the kingdom by this city being garrisoned by the kings of Egypt, it was of first-class importance. "While held by the enemy" he said, "it is the greatest possible hindrance to all our enterprises; for in whatever direction we decide to advance, the precautions we have to take to protect our own country from the menace of this place give us just as much trouble as our preparations for attacking the enemy. Once, however, it is in our hands, not only will it securely protect our own country, but owing to its advantageous situation it will be of the greatest possible service for all our projects and undertakings by land and sea alike." All were convinced by these arguments, and it was decided to capture this city in the first place. For Seleucia had been garrisoned by the kings of Egypt ever since the time of

Ptolemy Euergetes, when that prince, owing to his indignation at the murder of Berenice, invaded Syria and seized on this town.

As soon as this decision had been taken, Antiochus ordered his admiral Diognetus to sail to Seleucia, while he himself, leaving Apamea with his army, came and encamped at the hippodrome about five stades from the town. He sent off Theodotus Hemiolius with a sufficient force to Coele-Syria to occupy the narrow passage and protect him on that side. The situation of Seleucia and the nature of its surroundings are as follows. It lies on the sea between Cilicia and Phoenicia, and above it rises a very high mountain called Coryphaeum, washed on its western side by the extreme waters of the sea separating Cyprus from Phoenicia, but overlooking with its eastern slopes the territories of Antioch and Seleucia. Seleucia lies on its southern slope, separated from it by a deep and difficult ravine. The town descends in a series of broken terraces to the sea, and is surrounded on most sides by cliffs and precipitous rocks. On the level ground at the foot of the slope which descends towards the sea lies the business quarter and a suburb defended by very strong walls. The whole of the main city is similarly fortified by walls of very costly construction and is splendidly adorned with temples and other fine buildings. On the side looking to the sea it can only be approached by a flight of steps cut in the rock with frequent turns and twists all the way up. Not far from the town is the mouth of the river Orontes, which rising in the neighbourhood of Libanus and Antilibanus and traversing what is known as the plain of Amyce, passes through Antioch carrying off all the sewage of that town by the force of its current and finally falling into the Cyprian Sea near Seleucia.

Antiochus first of all sent messages to those in charge of the town, offering them money and promising all kinds of rewards if he were put in possession of the place without fighting. But being unable to persuade the officers in command, he corrupted some of their subordinates, and relying on their assistance he got his forces ready, intending to deliver the attack on the seaward side with the men of his fleet and on the land side with his army. He divided his forces into three parts, and after addressing them in terms suitable to the occasion, and promising both the private soldiers and officers great rewards and crowns for valour, he stationed Zeuxis and his division outside the gate leading to Antioch, Hermogenes was posted near the Dioscurium, and the task of attacking the port and suburb was entrusted to Ardys and Diognetus, since an agreement had been come to with the king's partisans within, that if he could take the suburb by storm, the town would be delivered up to him. On the signal being given, a vigorous and powerful assault was simultaneously delivered from all sides, but the men under Ardys and Diognetus attacked with the greatest dash, because, while at the other points an assault by scaling-ladders was altogether out of the question, unless the men could scramble up clinging more or less on all fours to the face of the cliff, yet ladders could safely be brought up and erected against the walls of the port and suburb. So when the men from the fleet set up their ladders and made a determined attack on the port, and the force under Ardys in like manner assaulted the suburb, and no help could come from the city, as all points were threatened at once, the suburb very soon fell into the hands of Ardys. Once it was taken, the subordinate officers who had been corrupted rushed to the commander Leontius advising him to come to terms with Antiochus before the town had been

stormed. Leontius, ignorant as he was of the treachery of his officers, but much alarmed by their loss of heart, sent out commissioners to Antiochus to treat for the safety of all in the city. The king received them and agreed to spare the lives of all the free population, numbering about six thousand. When put in possession of the city he not only spared the free inhabitants, but brought home the Seleucian exiles and restored to them their civic rights and their property. He placed garrisons in the port and citadel.

On a letter reaching him while thus occupied from Theodotus, inviting him to come at once to Coele-Syria, which he was ready to put in his hands, he was much embarrassed and much at a loss to know what to do and how to treat the communication. Theodotus, an Aetolian by birth, had, as I previously mentioned, rendered great services to Ptolemy's kingdom, but in return for them had not only received no thanks, but had been in danger of his life at the time of Antiochus' campaign against Molon. He now, being disgusted with the king and mistrusting the courtiers, had himself seized on Ptolemais and sent Panaetolus to seize on Tyre, and he urgently invited Antiochus to come. The king, putting off his expedition against Achaeus and treating all other matters as of secondary importance, advanced with his army, marching by the same route as on the former occasion. Passing through the defile called Marsyas, he encamped at the narrow passage near Gerra by the lake that lies in the middle. Learning that Ptolemy's general Nicolaus was before Ptolemais besieging Theodotus there, he left his heavy-armed troops behind, giving the commanders orders to besiege Brochi, the place that lies on the lake and commands the passage, while he himself advanced accompanied by the light-armed troops, with the object of raising the siege of Ptolemais. But Nicolaus, who had heard of the king's

arrival, left the neighbourhood himself, but sent Lagoras the Cretan and Dorymenes the Aetolian to occupy the pass near Berytus. The king assaulted their position, put them to flight and encamped himself close to the pass. There he waited until the arrival of the rest of his forces, and then after addressing his men in such terms as his designs required, advanced with the whole army, being now confident of success and eagerly anticipating the realization of his hopes. On Theodotus, Panaetolus, and their friends meeting him, he received them courteously and took possession of Tyre, Ptolemais, and the material of war in these places, including forty ships, twenty of them decked vessels admirably equipped, none with less than four banks of oars, and the remainder triremes, biremes, and pinnaces. These he handed over to his admiral Diognetus, and on news reaching him that Ptolemy had come out to Memphis and that all his forces were collected at Pelusium, where they were opening the sluices and filling up the wells of drinking water, he abandoned his project of attacking Pelusium, and visiting one city after another attempted to gain them either by force or by persuasion. The minor cities were alarmed by his approach and went over to him, but those which relied on their defensive resources and natural strength held out, and he was compelled to waste his time in sitting down before them and besieging them.

Ptolemy whose obvious duty it was to march to the help of his dominions, attacked as they had been in such flagrant defiance of treaties, was too weak to entertain any such project, so completely had all military preparations been neglected. At length, however, Agathocles and Sosibius, who were then the king's chief ministers, took counsel together and decided on the only course possible under present circumstances. For they resolved

to occupy themselves with preparations for war, but in the meanwhile by negotiations to make Antiochus relax his activity, pretending to fortify him in the opinion of Ptolemy he had all along entertained, which was that he would not venture to fight, but would by overtures and through his friends attempt to reason with him and persuade him to evacuate Coele-Syria. On arriving at this decision Agathocles and Sosibius, who were charged with the conduct of the matter, began to communicate with Antiochus, and dispatching embassies at the same time to Rhodes, Byzantium, Cyzicus, and Aetolia invited these states to send missions to further the negotiations. The arrival of these missions, which went backwards and forwards between the two kings, gave them ample facilities for gaining time to prosecute at leisure their warlike preparations. Establishing themselves at Memphis they continued to receive these missions as well as Antiochus' own envoys, replying to all in conciliatory terms. Meanwhile they recalled and assembled at Alexandria the mercenaries in their employment in foreign parts, sending out recruiting officers also and getting ready provisions for the troops they already had and for those they were raising. They also attended to all other preparations, paying constant visit to Alexandria by turns to see that none of the supplies required for their purpose were wanting. The task of providing arms, selecting the men and organizing them they entrusted to Echecrates the Thessalian and Phoxidas of Melita, assisted by Eurylochus the Magnesian, Socrates the Boeotian, and Cnopias of Allaria. They were most well advised in availing themselves of the services of these men, who having served under Demetrius and Antigonus had some notion of the reality of war of campaigning in general. Taking the troops in hand they got them into shape by correct military methods. First of all they

divided them according to their ages and nationalities, and provided them in each case with suitable arms and accoutrements, paying no attention to the manner in which they had previously been armed; in the next place they organized them as the necessities of the present situation required, breaking up the old regiments and abolishing the existing paymasters' lists, and having effected this, they drilled them, accustoming them not only to the word of command, but to the correct manipulation of their weapons. They also held frequent reviews and addressed the men, great services in this respect being rendered by Andromachus of Aspendus and Polycrates of Argos, who had recently arrived from Greece and in whom the spirit of Hellenic martial ardour and fertility of resource was still fresh, while at the same time they were distinguished by their origin and by their wealth, and Polycrates more especially by the antiquity of his family and the reputation as an athlete of his father Mnasiades. These with officers, by addressing the men both in public and in private, inspired them with enthusiasm and eagerness for the coming battle. All the men I have mentioned held commands suited to their particular attainments. Eurylochus of Magnesia commanded a body of about three thousand men known as the Royal Guard, Socrates the Boeotian had under him two thousand peltasts, Phoxidas the Achaean, Ptolemy the son of Thraseas, and Andromachus of Aspendus exercised together in one body the phalanx and the Greek mercenaries, the phalanx twenty-five thousand strong being under the command of Andromachus and Ptolemy and the mercenaries, numbering eight thousand, under that of Phoxidas. Polycrates undertook the training of the cavalry of the guard, about seven hundred strong, and the Libyan and native Egyptian horse; all of whom, numbering about three thousand, were

under his command. It was Echecrates the Thessalian who trained most admirably the cavalry from Greece and all the mercenary cavalry, and thus rendered most signal service in the battle itself, and Cnopias of Allaria too was second to none in the attention he paid to the force under him composed of three thousand Cretans, one thousand being Neocretans whom he placed under the command of Philo of Cnossus. They also armed in the Macedonian fashion three thousand Libyans under the command of Ammonius of Barce. The total native Egyptian force consisted of about twenty thousand heavy-armed men, and was commanded by Sosibius, and they had also collected a force of Thracians and Gauls, about four thousand of them from among settlers in Egypt and their descendants, and two thousand lately raised elsewhere. These were commanded by Dionysius the Thracian.

Such were the numbers and nature of the army that Ptolemy was preparing. Antiochus, who in the meanwhile had opened the siege of a town called Dura, but made no progress with it owing to the strength of the tribes and the support given it by Nicolaus, now as winter was approaching agreed with Ptolemy's envoys to an armistice of four months, engaging to consent to a settlement of the whole dispute on the most lenient terms. This was however very far from being the truth, but he was anxious not to be kept long away from his own dominions, but to winter with his army in Seleucia, as Achaeus was evidently plotting against him and undisguisedly acting in concert with Ptolemy. This agreement having been made he dismissed the envoys, instructing them to meet him as soon as possible at Seleucia and communicate Ptolemy's decision to him. Leaving adequate garrisons in the district, and placing Theodotus in general charge of it, he took his departure,

and on reaching Seleucia dismissed his forces to their winter quarters and henceforward neglected to exercise his troops, feeling sure he would have no need to fight a battle, since he was already master of some portions of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia and expected to obtain possession of the rest by diplomacy and with the consent of Ptolemy, who would never dare to risk a general battle. This was the opinion held also by his envoys, as Sosibius, who was established at Memphis, always received them in a friendly manner, and never allowed the envoys he himself kept sending to Antiochus to be eyewitnesses of the preparations in Alexandria.

But, to resume, when on this occasion the ambassadors returned to Sosibius they found him prepared for any emergency, while the chief object of Antiochus was to prove himself in his interviews with embassies coming from Alexandria decidedly superior both in military strength and in the justice of his cause. So that when the envoys arrived at Seleucia, and as they had been instructed by Sosibius, consented to discuss in detail the terms of the proposed arrangement, the king in his arguments did not pretend to regard as a serious grievance the recent loss they had suffered by his obviously unjust occupation of Coele-Syria, and in fact did not on the whole reckon this act to have been an offence at all, since, as he maintained, he had only tried to recover possession of what was his own property, the soundest and justest title to the possession of Coele-Syria, according to which it was not Ptolemy's but his own, being its original occupation by Antigonus Monophthalmus and the rule of Seleucus over the district. For Ptolemy, he said, had waged war on Antigonus in order to establish the sovereignty of Seleucus over Coele-Syria and not his own. But above all he urged the convention entered into by the kings after their victory over

Antigonus, when all three of them, Cassander, Lysimachus, and Seleucus, after deliberating in common, decided that whole of Syria should belong to Seleucus. Ptolemy's envoys attempted to maintain the opposite case. They magnified the wrong they were suffering and represented the grievance as most serious, treating the treachery of Theodotus and Antiochus' invasion as a distinct violation of their rights, adducing as evidence the occupation by Ptolemy, son of Lagus, and alleging that Ptolemy had aided Seleucus in the war under the stipulation, that while investing Seleucus with the sovereignty of the whole of Asia, he was to obtain Coele-Syria and Phoenicia for himself. These and similar arguments were repeated again and again by both parties in the course of the negotiations and conferences, but absolutely no result was arrived at, since the controversy was conducted by the common friends of both monarchs, and there was no one to interpose between them with the power of preventing and restraining any disposition that displayed itself to transgress the bounds of justice. The chief difficulty on both sides was the matter of Achaeus; for Ptolemy wished him to be included in the treaty, but Antiochus absolutely refused to listen to this, thinking it a scandalous thing that Ptolemy should venture to take rebels under his protection or even allude to such persons.

The consequence was that both sides grew weary of negotiating, and there was no prospect yet of a conclusion being reached, when, on the approach of spring, Antiochus collected his forces with the object of invading Coele-Syria both by land and sea and reducing the remainder of it. Ptolemy, entrusting the direction of the war entirely to Nicolaus, sent him abundant supplies to the neighbourhood of Gaza, and dispatched fresh military and naval forces. Thus reinforced Nicolaus entered on the war in a

spirit of confidence, all his requests being readily attended to by Perigenes, the admiral, whom Ptolemy had placed in command of the fleet, which consisted of thirty decked ships and more than four hundred transports. Nicolaus was by birth an Aetolian, and in military experience and martial courage was excelled by none of the officers in Ptolemy's service. He had occupied with part of his forces the pass of Platanus, and with the rest, which he commanded in person, that near the town of Porphyrion, and here he awaited the king's attack, the fleet being anchored along shore to support him. Antiochus reaching Marathus, the people of Aradus came to him asking for an alliance, and he not only granted this request, but put an end to their existing civil dissensions, by reconciling those on the island with those on the mainland. After this, he advanced by the promontory called Theoprosopon and reached Berytus, having occupied Botrys on his way and burnt Trieres and Calamus. From hence he sent on Nicarchus and Theodotus with orders to occupy the difficult passes near the river Lycus, and after resting his army advanced himself and encamped near the river Damuras, his admiral Diognetus coasting along parallel to him. Thence once more taking with him the light-armed troops of his army which were under Theodotus and Nicarchus, he set out to reconnoitre the passes which Nicolaus had occupied. After noting the features of the ground he returned himself to the camp and next day, leaving behind under command of Nicarchus his heavy-armed troops, moved on with the rest of his army to attempt the passage.

At this part of the coast it is reduced by the slopes of Libanus to a small and narrow zone, and across this itself runs a steep and rocky ridge, leaving only a very narrow and difficult passage along the sea-shore. It was here

that Nicolaus had posted himself, occupying some of the ground with a numerous force and securing other portions by artificial defenses, so that he felt sure of being able to prevent Antiochus from passing. The king, dividing his force into three parts, entrusted the one to Theodotus, ordering him to attack and force the line under the actual foot of Libanus; the second he placed under the command of Menedemus, giving him detailed orders to attempt the passage of the spur in the centre, while he assigned to the third body under the command of Diocles, the military governor of Parapotamia, the task of attacking along the sea-shore. He himself with his bodyguard took up a central position, wishing to command a view of the whole field and render assistance where required. At the same time the fleets under Diognetus and Perigenes prepared for a naval engagement approach as near as possible to the shore, and attempting to make the battle at sea and on land present as it were a continuous front. Upon the word of command for the attack being given simultaneously all along the line, the battle by sea remained undecided, as the two fleets were equally matched in number and efficiency, while on land Nicolaus' forces at first had the upper hand, favoured as they were by the strength of their position; but when Theodotus forced back the enemy at the foot of the mountain and then charged from higher ground, Nicolaus and his whole force turned and fled precipitately. About two thousand of them perished in the rout, and an equal number were taken prisoners, the rest retreating to Sidon. Perigenes, who had high hope of success in the sea battle, when he saw the defeat of the army, lost confidence and retired in safety to the same place.

Antiochus, with his army, came and encamped before Sidon. He refrained from making any attempt on the town, owing to the abundance of

supplies with which it was furnished and the numbers of its inhabitants and of the forces which had taken refuge in it, but taking his army, marched himself on Philoteria, ordering the admiral Diognetus to sail back to Tyre with the fleet. Philoteria lies off the shore of the lake into which the river Jordan falls, and from which it issues again to traverse the plains round Scythopolis. Having obtained possession of both the above cities, which came to terms with him, he felt confident in the success of his future operations, as the territory subject to them was easily capable of supplying his whole army with food, and of furnishing everything necessary for the expedition in abundance. Having secured both by garrisons, he crossed the mountainous country and reached Atabyrium, which lies on a conical hill, the ascent of which is more than fifteen stades. By an ambuscade and a stratagem employed during the ascent he managed to take this city too: for having provoked the garrison to sally out and skirmish, he enticed those of them who were in advance to follow his own retreating troops for a considerable distance down hill, and then turning the latter round and advancing, he attacked the enemy and killed many of them; and finally following close on them and throwing them into panic took this city also by assault. At this time Ceraeas, one of Ptolemy's officers, deserted to him, and by his distinguished treatment of him he turned the head of many of the enemy's commanders. It was not long indeed before Hippolochus the Thessalian came to join him with four hundred horse who were in Ptolemy's service. After garrisoning Atabyrium also, he advanced and took Pella, Camus, and Gephrus. The consequence of this series of successes was that the Arab tribes in the neighbourhood, inciting each other to this step, unanimously adhered to him. Strengthened by the prospect of their help and

by the supplies with which they furnished him, he advanced and occupying Galatis, made himself master also of Abila and the force which had come to assist in its defence under the command of Nicias, a close friend and relative of Menneas. Gadara still remained, a town considered to be the strongest in that district, and sitting down before it and bringing siege batteries to bear on it he very soon terrified it into submission. In the next place, hearing that a considerable force of the enemy was collected at Rabbatamana in Arabia and was occupied in overrunning and pillaging the country of the Arabs who had joined him, he dismissed all other projects and starting off at once encamped under the hill on which the town lies. After making a circuit of the hill and observing that it was only accessible at two spots, he approached it there and chose those places for setting up his battering engines. Placing some of them in charge of Nicarchus and others under Theodotus, he devoted himself henceforth to directing and superintending their respective activities. Both Theodotus and Nicarchus displayed the greatest zeal, and there was continuous rivalry as to which would first cast down the wall in front of his machines; so that very shortly and before it was expected, the wall gave way in both places. After this they kept delivering assaults both by night and day, neglecting no opportunity and employing all their force. Notwithstanding these frequent attempts they met with no success owing to the strength of the force collected in the town, until a prisoner revealed to them the position of the underground passage by which the besieged went down to draw water. This they burst into and filled it up with wood, stones, and all such kinds of things, upon which those in the city yielded owing to the want of water and surrendered. Having thus got possession of Rabbatamana, Antiochus left Nicarchus in it with an

adequate garrison, and now sending the revolted leaders Hippolochus and Ceraeas with a force of five thousand foot to the district of Samaria, with orders to protect the conquered territory and assure the safety of all the troops he had left in it, he returned with his army to Ptolemais, where he had decided to pass the winter.

During the same summer the people of Pednelissus, being besieged by those of Selge and in danger of capture, sent a message to Achaeus asking for help. Upon his readily agreeing, the Pednelissians henceforth sustained the siege with constancy, buoyed up by their hopes of succour, and Achaeus, appointing Garsyeris to command the expedition, dispatched him with six thousand foot and five hundred horse to their assistance. The Selgians, hearing of the approach of the force, occupied with the greater part of their own troops the pass at the place called the Ladder: holding the entrance to Saporda and destroying all the passages and approaches. Garsyeris, when he heard that the pass had been occupied and that progress was therefore impossible, bethought himself of the following ruse. He broke up his camp, and began to march back, as if he despaired of being able to relieve Pednelissus owing to the occupation of the pass; upon which the Selgians, readily believing that Garsyeris had abandoned his attempt, retired some of them to their camp and others to their own city, as the harvest was near at hand. Garsyeris now faced round again, and by a forced march reached the pass, which he found abandoned; and having placed a garrison at it under the command of Phayllus, descended with his army to Perge, and thence sent embassies to the other Pisidian cities and to Pamphylia, calling attention to the growing power of Selge and inviting them all to ally themselves with Achaeus and assist Pednelissus. Meanwhile the Selgians

had sent out a general with an army, and were in hopes of surprising Phayllus owing to their knowledge of the ground and driving him out of his entrenchments. But on meeting with no success and losing many of their men in the attack, they abandoned this design, continuing, however, to pursue their siege operations more obstinately even than before. The Etennes, who inhabit the highlands of Pisidia above Side, sent Garsyeris eight thousand hoplites, and the people of Aspendus half that number; but the people of Side, partly from a wish to ingratiate themselves with Antiochus and partly owing to their hatred of the Aspendians, did not contribute to the relieving force. Garsyeris now, taking with him the reinforcements and his own army, came to Pednelissus, flattering himself that he would raise the siege at the first attack, but as the Selgians showed no signs of dismay he encamped at a certain distance away. As the Pednelissians were hard pressed by famine, Garsyeris, who was anxious to do all in his power to relieve them, got ready two thousand men, and giving each of them a medimnus of wheat, tried to send them in to Pednelissus by night. But the Selgians, getting intelligence of this, fell upon them, and most of the men carrying the corn were cut to pieces, the whole of the grain falling into the hands of the Selgians. Elated by this success they now undertook to storm not only the city, but the camp of Garsyeris; for the Selgians always show a bold and dare-devil spirit in war. Leaving, therefore, behind only the forces that were necessary to guard their camp, with the rest they surrounded and attack with great courage that of the enemy in several places simultaneously. Attacked unexpectedly on every side, and the stockade having been already forced in some places, Garsyeris, seeing the state of matters and with but slender hopes of victory,

sent out his cavalry at a spot which had been left unguarded. The Selgians, thinking that these horsemen were panic-struck and that they meant to retire for fear of the fate that threatened them, paid no attention to this move, but simply ignored them. But this body of cavalry, riding round the enemy and getting to his rear, delivered a vigorous onslaught, upon which Garsyeris' infantry, although already retreating, plucked up courage again and facing round defended themselves against their aggressors. The Selgians were thus surrounded on all sides, and finally took to flight, the Pednelissians at the same time attacking the camp and driving out the garrison that had been left in it. The pursuit continued for a great distance, and not less than ten thousand were killed, while of the rest the allies fled to their respective homes, and the Selgians across the hills to their own city.

Garsyeris at once broke up his camp and followed closely on the runaways, hoping to traverse the passes and approach the city before the fugitives could rally and resolve on any measures for meeting his approach. Upon his arriving with his army before the city, the Selgians, placing no reliance on their allies, who had suffered equally with themselves, and thoroughly dispirited by the disaster they had met with, fell into complete dismay for themselves and their country. Calling a public assembly, therefore, they decided to send out as commissioner one of their citizens named Logbasis, who had often entertained and had been for long on terms of intimacy with that Antiochus who lost his life in Thrace, [5] and who, when Laodice, who afterwards became the wife of Achaeus, was placed under his charge, had brought up the young lady as his own daughter and treated her with especial kindness. The Selgians sent him therefore, thinking that he was especially suited to undertake such a mission; but in a private

interview with Garsyeris he was so far from showing a disposition to be helpful to his country, as was his duty, that on the other hand he begged Garsyeris to send for Achaeus at once, engaging to betray the city to them. Garsyeris, eagerly catching at the proposal, sent messengers to Achaeus inviting him to come and informing him of what was doing, while he made a truce with the Selgians and dragged on the negotiations, raising perpetual disputes and scruples on points of detail, so that Achaeus might have time to arrive and Logbasis full leisure to communicate with his friends and make preparations for the design.

[5] Antiochus Hierax, son of Antiochus II.

During this time, as the two parties frequently met for discussion, it became a constant practice for those in the camp to enter the city for the purpose of purchasing provisions. This is a practice which has proved fatal to many on many occasions. And indeed it seems to me that man, who is supposed to be the most cunning of all animals, is in fact the most easily duped. For how many camps and fortresses, how many great cities have not been betrayed by this means? And though this has constantly happened in the sight of all men, yet somehow or other we always remain novices and display all the candour of youth with regard to such tricks. The reason of this is that we have not ready to hand in our memories the various disasters that have overtaken others, but while we spare no pains and expense in laying in supplies of corn and money and in constructing walls and providing missiles to guard against surprises, we all completely neglect the very easiest precaution and that which is of the greatest service at a critical moment, although we can gain this experience from study of history and

inquiry while enjoying honourable repose and procuring entertainment for our minds.

Achaeus, then, arrived at the time he was expected, and the Selgians on meeting him had great hopes of receiving the kindest treatment in every respect from him. Meanwhile Logbasis, who had gradually collected in his own house some of the soldiers from the camp who had entered the town, continued to advise the citizens, in view of the kindly feelings that Achaeus displayed, not to lose the opportunity, but to take action and put a finish to the negotiations, holding a general assembly to discuss the situation. The meeting soon assembled and the discussion was proceeding, all those serving on guard having been summoned, so that matter might be decided for good and all. Meanwhile Logbasis had given the signal to the enemy that the moment had come, and was getting ready the soldiers collected in his house and arming himself and his sons for the coming fight. Achaeus with half of his forces was advancing on the city itself, and Garsyeris with the rest was approaching the so-called Cesbedium, which is a temple of Zeus and commands the city, being in the nature of a citadel. A certain goat-herd happened to notice the movement and brought the news to the assembly, upon which some of the citizens hastened to occupy the Cesbedium and others repaired to their posts, while the larger number in their anger made for Logbasis' house. The evidence of his treachery being now clear, some mounted the roof, and others, breaking through the front gate, massacred Logbasis, his sons, and all the rest whom they found there. After this they proclaimed the freedom of their slaves, and dividing into separate parties, went to defend the exposed spots. Garsyeris, now, seeing that the Cesbedium was already occupied, abandoned his attempt, and on

Achaeus trying to force an entrance through the gates, the Selgians made a sally, and after killing seven hundred of the Mysians, forced the remainder to give up the attack. After the action Achaeus and Garsyeris withdrew to their camp, and the Selgians, afraid of civil discord among themselves and also of a siege by the enemy, sent their elders out in the guise of suppliants, and making a truce, put an end to the war on the following terms. They were to pay at once 400 talents and to give up the Pednelissian prisoners, and they engaged to pay a further sum of 300 talents after a certain interval.

Thus the Selgians, after nearly losing their country owing to the impious treachery of Logbasis, preserved it by their own valour and disgraced neither their liberty nor their kinship with the Lacedaemonians. Achaeus, now, after subjecting Milyas and the greater part of Pamphylia, departed, and on reaching Sardis continued to make war on Attalus, began to menace Prusias, and made himself a serious object of dread to all the inhabitants on this side of the Taurus.

At the time when Achaeus was engaged in his expedition against Selge, Attalus with the Gaulish tribe of the Aegosagae visited the cities in Aeolis and on its borders, which had formerly adhered to Achaeus out of fear. Most of them joined him willingly and gladly, but in some cases force was necessary. The ones which went over to his side on this occasion were firstly Cyme, Smyrna, and Phocaea, Aegae and Temnus subsequently adhering to him in fear of his attack. The Teians and Colophonians also sent embassies delivering up themselves and their cities. Accepting their adhesion on the same terms as formerly and taking hostages, he showed especial consideration to the envoys from Smyrna, as this city had been most constant in its loyalty to him. Continuing his progress and crossing the

river Lycus he advanced on the Mysian communities, and after having dealt with them reached Carseae. Overawing the people of this city and also the garrison of Didymateiche he took possession of these places likewise, when Themistocles, the general left in charge of the district by Achaeus, surrendered them to him. Starting thence and laying waste the plain of Apia he crossed Mount Pelecas and encamped near the river Megistus.

While he was here, an eclipse of the moon took place, and the Gauls, who had all along been aggrieved by the hardships of the march—since they made the campaign accompanied by their wives and children, who followed them in wagons—considering this a bad omen, refused to advance further. King Attalus, to whom they rendered no service of vital importance, and who noticed that they detached themselves from the column on the march and encamped by themselves and were altogether most insubordinate and self-assertive, found himself in no little perplexity. On the one hand he feared lest they should desert to Achaeus and join him in attacking himself, and on the other he was apprehensive of the reputation he would gain if he ordered his soldiers to surround and destroy all these men who were thought to have crossed to Asia relying on pledges he had given them. Accordingly, availing himself of the pretext of this refusal, he promised for the present to take them back to the place where they had crossed and give them suitable land in which to settle and afterwards to attend as far as lay in his power to all reasonable requests they made.

Attalus, then, after taking the Aegosagae back to the Hellespont and entering into friendly negotiations with the people of Lampsacus, Alexander Troas, and Ilium, who had all remained loyal to him, returned with his army to Pergamum.

By the beginning of spring Antiochus and Ptolemy had completed their preparations and were determined on deciding the fate of the Syrian expedition by a battle. Now Ptolemy started from Alexandria with an army of seventy thousand foot, five thousand horse, and seventy-three elephants, and Antiochus, on learning of his advance, concentrated his forces. These consisted first of Daae, Carmanians, and Cilicians, light-armed troops about five thousand in number organized and commanded by Byttacus the Macedonian. Under Theodotus the Aetolian, who had played the traitor to Ptolemy, was a force of ten thousand selected from every part of the kingdom and armed in the Macedonian manner, most of them with silver shields. The phalanx was about twenty thousand strong and was under the command of Nicarchus and Theodotus surnamed Hemiolius. There were Agrianian and Persian bowmen and slingers to the number of two thousand, and with them two thousand Thracians, all under the command of Menedemus of Alabanda. Aspasianus the Mede had under him a force of about five thousand Medes, Cissians, Cadusians, and Carmanians. The Arabs and neighbouring tribes numbered about ten thousand and were commanded by Zabdibelus. Hippolochus the Thessalian commanded the mercenaries from Greece, five thousand in number. Antiochus had also fifteen hundred Cretans under Eurylochus and a thousand Neocretans under Zelys of Gortyna. With these were five hundred Lydian javelineers and a thousand Cardaces under Lysimachus the Gaul. The cavalry numbered six thousand in all, four thousand of them being commanded by Antipater the king's nephew and the rest by Themison. The whole army of Antiochus consisted of sixty-two thousand foot, six thousand horse, and a hundred and two elephants.

Ptolemy, marching on Pelusium, made his first halt at that city, and after picking up stragglers and serving out rations to his men moved on marching through the desert and skirting Mount Casius and the marshes called Barathra. Reaching the spot he was bound for on the fifth day he encamped at a distance of fifty stades from Raphia, which is the first city of Coele-Syria on the Egyptian side after Rhinocolura. Antiochus was approaching at the same time with his army, and after reaching Gaza and resting his forces there, continued to advance slowly. Passing Raphia he encamped by night at a distance of ten stades from the enemy. At first the two armies continued to remain at this distance from each other, but after a few days Antiochus, with the object of finding a more suitable position for his camp and at the same time wishing of encourage his troops, encamped so near Ptolemy that the distance between the two camps was not more than five stades. Skirmishes were now frequent between the watering and foraging parties, and there was occasional interchange of missiles between the cavalry and even the infantry.

During this time Theodotus made a daring attempt, which, though characteristic of an Aetolian, showed no lack of courage. As from his former intimacy with Ptolemy he was familiar with his tastes and habits, he entered the camp at early dawn with two others. It was too dark for his face to be recognized, and there was nothing to attract attention in his dress and general appearance, as their army also was mixed. He had noticed on previous days the position of the king's tent, as the skirmishes had come up quite near to the camp, and making boldly for it, he passed all the first guards without being noticed and, bursting into the tent in which the king used to dine and transact business, searched everywhere. He failed indeed

to find the king, who was in the habit of retiring to rest outside the principal and official tent, but after wounding two of those who slept there and killing the king's physician Andreas, he returned in safety to his own camp, although slightly molested as he was leaving that of the enemy, and thus as far as daring went accomplished his enterprise, but was foiled only by his lack of foresight in omitting to ascertain exactly where the king was in the habit of sleeping.

The kings after remaining encamped opposite each other for five days both resolved to decide matters by a battle. The moment that Ptolemy began to move his army out of camp, Antiochus followed his example. Both of them placed the phalanxes of the picked troops armed in the Macedonian fashion confronting each other in the centre. Ptolemy's two wings were formed as follows. Polycrates with his cavalry held the extreme left wing, and between him and the phalanx stood first the Cretans, next the cavalry, then the royal guard, then the peltasts under Socrates, these latter being next those Lybians who were armed in the Macedonian manner. On the extreme right wing was Echecrates with his cavalry, and on his left stood Gauls and Thracians, and next them was Phoxidas with his Greek mercenaries in immediate contact with the Egyptian phalanx. Of the elephants forty were posted on the left where Ptolemy himself was about to fight, and the remaining thirty-three in front of the mercenary cavalry on the right wing. Antiochus placed sixty of his elephants under the command of his foster-brother Philip in front of his right wing, where he was to fight in person against Ptolemy. Behind the elephants he posted two thousand horse under Antipater and two thousand more at an angle with them. Next the cavalry facing the front, he placed the Cretans, then the mercenaries from Greece

and next these the five thousand armed in the Macedonian fashion under the command of Byttacus the Macedonian. On his extreme left wing he posted two thousand horse under the command of Themison, next these the Cardacian and Lydian javelineers, then three thousand light-armed troops under Menedemus, after these the Cissians, Medes, and Carmanians, and finally, in contact with the phalanx, the Arabs and neighbouring tribes. His remaining elephants he placed in front of his left wing under the command of Myïscus, one of the young men who had been brought up at court.

The armies having been drawn up in this fashion, both the kings rode along the line accompanied by their officers and friends, and addressed their soldiers. As they relied chiefly on the phalanx, it was to these troops that they made the most earnest appeal, Ptolemy being supported by Andromachus, Sosibius and his sister Arsinoë and Antiochus by Theodotus and Nicarchus, these being the commanders of the phalanx on either side. The substance of the addresses was on both sides very similar. For neither king could cite any glorious and generally recognized achievement of his own, so that it was by reminding the troops of the glorious deeds of their ancestors that they attempted to inspire them with spirit and courage. They laid the greatest stress, however, on the rewards which they might be expected to bestow in the future, and urged and exhorted both the leaders in particular and all those who were about to be engaged in general to bear themselves therefore like gallant men in the coming battle. So with these or similar words spoken either by themselves or by their interpreters they rode along the line.

When Ptolemy and his sister after their progress had reached the extremity of his left wing and Antiochus with his horse-guards had reached

his extreme right, they gave the signal for battle and brought the elephants first into action. A few only of Ptolemy's elephants ventured to close with those of the enemy, and now the men in the towers on the back of these beasts made a gallant fight of it, striking with their pikes at close quarters and wounding each other, while the elephants themselves fought still better, putting forth their whole strength and meeting forehead to forehead. The way in which these animals fight is as follows. With their tusks firmly interlocked they shove with all their might, each trying to force the other to give ground, until the one who proves strongest pushes aside the other's trunk, and then, when he has once made him turn and has him in the flank, he gores him with his tusks as a bull does with his horns. Most of Ptolemy's elephants, however, declined the combat, as is the habit of African elephants; for unable to stand the smell and the trumpeting of the Indian elephants, and terrified, I suppose, also by their great size and strength, they at once turn tail and take to flight before they get near them. This is what happened on the present occasion; and when Ptolemy's elephants were thus thrown into confusion and driven back on their own lines, Ptolemy's guard gave way under the pressure of the animals. Meanwhile Antiochus and his cavalry riding past the flank of the elephants on the outside attacked Polycrates and the cavalry under his command, while at the same time on the other side of the elephants the Greek mercenaries next the phalanx fell upon Ptolemy's peltasts and drove them back, their ranks having been already thrown into confusion by the elephants. Thus the whole of Ptolemy's left wing was hard pressed and in retreat. Echecrates who commanded the right wing at first waited for the result of the engagement between the other wings, but when he saw the cloud of dust being carried in

his direction, and their own elephants not even daring to approach those of the enemy, he ordered Phoxidas with the mercenaries from Greece to attack the hostile force in his front, while he himself with his cavalry and the division immediately behind the elephants moving off the field and round the enemy's flank, avoided the onset of the animals and speedily put to flight the cavalry of the enemy, charging them both in flank and rear. Phoxidas and his men met with the same success; for charging the Arabs and Medes they forced them to headlong flight. Antiochus' right wing then was victorious, while his left wing was being worsted in the manner I have described. Meanwhile the phalanxes stripped of both their wings remained intact in the middle of the plain, swayed alternately by hope and fear. Antiochus was still occupied in pursuing his advantage on the right wing, but Ptolemy having retired under shelter of the phalanx suddenly came forward and showing himself to his troops caused consternation among the enemy and inspired his own men with increased alacrity and spirit. Lowering their pikes, therefore, the phalanx under Andromachus and Sosibius advanced to the charge. For a short time the picked Syrian troops resisted, but those under Nicarchus quickly turned and fled. Antiochus all this time, being still young and inexperienced and supposing from his own success that his army was victorious in other parts of the field too, was following up the fugitives. But at length on one of his elder officers calling his attention to the fact that the cloud of dust was moving from the phalanx towards his own camp he realized what had happened, and attempted to return to the battle-field with his horse-guards. But finding that his whole army had taken to flight, he retired to Raphia, in the confident belief that as

far as it depended on himself he had won the battle, but had suffered this disaster owing to the base cowardice of the rest.

Ptolemy having thus obtained a decisive victory by his phalanx, and having killed many of the enemy in the pursuit by the hands of the cavalry and mercenaries of his right wing, retired and spent the night in his former camp. Next day, after picking up and burying his own dead and despoiling those of the enemy, he broke up his camp and advanced on Raphia. Antiochus after his flight had wished to take up at once a position outside the town collecting the scattered groups of fugitives; but as most of them had taken refuge in the city, he was compelled to enter it himself also. At daybreak he left for Gaza at the head of the surviving portion of his army, and encamping there sent a message asking for leave to collect his dead whom he buried under cover of this truce. His losses in killed alone had amounted to nearly ten thousand footmen and more than three hundred horsemen, while more than four thousand had been taken prisoners. Three of his elephants perished in the battle and two died of their wounds. Ptolemy had lost about fifteen hundred foot and seven hundred horse, killed; sixteen of his elephants were killed and most of them captured.

Such was the result of the battle of Raphia fought by the kings for the possession of Coele-Syria. After paying the last honours to the dead Antiochus returned to his own kingdom with his army, and Ptolemy took without resistance Raphia and the other towns, each community endeavouring to anticipate its neighbours in going over to him and resuming its allegiance. Possibly all men at such times are more or less disposed to adapt themselves to the needs of the hour, and the natives of these parts are naturally more prone than others to bestow their affections at

the bidding of circumstances. But at this juncture it was only to be expected that they should act so, as their affection for the Egyptian kings was of no recent growth; for the peoples of Coele-Syria have always been more attached to that house than to the Seleucidae. So now there was no extravagance of adulation to which they did not proceed, honouring Ptolemy with crowns, sacrifices, altars dedicated to him and every distinction of the kind.

Antiochus, on reaching the town which bears his name, at once dispatched his nephew Antipater and Theodotus Hemiolius to treat with Ptolemy for peace, as he was seriously afraid of an invasion by the enemy. For he had no confidence in his own soldiers owing to his recent reverse, and he feared lest Achaeus should avail himself of the opportunity to attack him. Ptolemy took none of these matters into consideration, but delighted as he was at his recent unexpected success and generally at having surpassed his expectations by regaining possession of Coele-Syria, was not averse to peace, in fact rather too much inclined to it, being drawn towards it by his indolent and depraved habit of life. When, therefore, Antipater and his fellow ambassador arrived, after a little bluster and some show of expostulation with Antiochus for his conduct, he granted a truce for a year. Sending back Sosibius with the ambassadors the ratify the treaty, he remained himself for three months in Syria and Phoenicia establishing order in the towns, and then, leaving Andromachus behind as military governor of the whole district, he returned with his sister and his friends to Alexandria, having brought the war to an end in a manner that astonished his subjects in view of his character in general. Antiochus after concluding the treaty with

Sosibius occupied himself with his original project of operations against Achaeus.

Such was the state of matters in Asia. At about the same time I have been speaking of the Rhodians, availing themselves of the pretext of the earthquake which had occurred a short time previously and which had cast down their great Colossus and most of the walls and arsenals, made such practical use of the incident that disaster was a cause of improvement to them rather than of damage. So great is the difference both to individuals and to states between carefulness and wisdom on the one hand, and folly with negligence on the other, that in the latter case good fortune actually inflicts damage, while in the former disaster is the cause of profit. The Rhodians at least so dealt with the matter, that by laying stress on the greatness of the calamity and its dreadful character and by conducting themselves at public audiences and in private intercourse with the greatest seriousness and dignity, they had such an effect on cities and especially on kings that not only did they receive most lavish gifts, but that the donors themselves felt that a favour was being conferred on them. For Hiero and Gelo not only gave seventy-five silver talents, partly at once and the rest very shortly afterwards, to supply oil in the gymnasium, but dedicated silver cauldrons with their bases and a certain number of water-pitchers, and in addition to this granted ten talents for sacrifices and ten more to qualify new men for citizenship, so as to bring the whole gift up to a hundred talents. They also relieved Rhodian ships trading to their ports from the payment of customs, and presented the city with fifty catapults three cubits long. And finally, after bestowing so many gifts, they erected, just as if they were still under an obligation, in the Deigma or Mart at Rhodes a group representing

the People of Rhodes being crowned by the People of Syracuse. Ptolemy also promised them three hundred talents of silver, a million artabae [6] of corn, timber for the construction of ten quinqueremes and ten triremes, forty thousand cubits (good measure) of squared deal planking, a thousand talents of coined bronze, three thousand talents [7] of tow, three thousand pieces of sail-cloth, three thousand talents (of bronze?) for the restoration of the Colossus, a hundred master builders and three hundred and fifty masons, and fourteen talents per annum for their pay, and besides all this, twelve thousand artabae of corn for the games and sacrifices and twenty thousand artabae to feed the crews of ten triremes. Most of these things and the third part of the money he gave them at once. Antigonus in like manner gave them ten thousand pieces of timber ranging from eight to sixteen cubits in length to be used as rafters, five thousand beams of seven cubits long, three thousand talents of silver, a thousand talents of pitch, a thousand amphorae of raw pitch and a hundred talents of silver, while Chryseis his wife gave them a hundred thousand medimni of corn and three thousand talents of lead. Seleucus, the father of Antiochus, besides exempting Rhodians trading to his dominions from custom duties, presented them with ten quinqueremes fully equipped, two hundred thousand medimni of corn, ten thousand cubits of timber and a thousand talents of hair and resin. Similar gifts were made by Prusias and Mithridates as well as by the other Asiatic princelets of the time, Lysanias, Olympichus, and Limnaeus. As for towns which contributed, each according to its means, it would be difficult to enumerate them. So that when one looks at the comparatively recent date of the foundation of the city of Rhodes and its small beginnings one is very much surprised at the rapid increase of public and private wealth which has

taken place in so short a time; but when one considers its advantageous position and the large influx from abroad of all required to supplement its own resources, one is no longer surprised, but thinks that the wealth of Rhodes fall short rather of what it should be.

[6] The Egyptian artaba is equal to the Attic medimnus.

[7] A talent is about 57 lbs.

I have said so much on this subject to illustrate in the first place the dignity with which the Rhodians conduct their public affairs—for in this respect they are worthy of all praise and imitation—and secondly the stinginess of the kings of the present day and the meanness of our states and cities, so that a king who gives away four or five talents may not fancy he has done anything very great and expect the same honour and the same affection from the Greeks that former kings enjoyed; and secondly in order that cities, taking into consideration the value of the gifts formerly bestowed on them, may not now forget themselves so far as to lavish their greatest and most splendid distinctions for the sake of a few mean and paltry benefits, but may endeavour to maintain the principle of estimating everything at its true value—a principle peculiarly distinctive of the Greek nation.

In the early summer of the year in which Agetas was strategus of the Aetolians and shortly after Aratus had entered on the same office in Achaea —that being the date at which I interrupted my narrative of the Social War —Lycurgus of Sparta came back from Aetolia; for the ephors, who had discovered that the charge of which he had been condemned to exile was false, sent to him and invited him to return. He began to make arrangements with Pyrrhias the Aetolian, who was then the strategus of the Eleans, for an

invasion of Messenia. Aratus had found the mercenary forces of the Achaeans disaffected and the cities not at all disposed to tax themselves for the purpose of maintaining them, a state of matters due to the incompetent and careless manner in which his predecessor Eperatus had, as I mentioned above, conducted the affairs of the League. However, he made an appeal to the Achaeans, and obtaining a decree on the subject, occupied himself actively with preparations for war. The substance of the decree was as follows. They were to keep up a mercenary force of eight thousand foot and five hundred horse and a picked Achaean force of three thousand foot and three hundred horse, including five hundred foot and fifty horse from Megalopolis, all brazen-shielded, and an equal number of Argives. They also decided to have three ships cruising off the Acte and in the Gulf of Argolis and three more in the neighbourhood of Patrae and Dyme and in those seas.

Aratus, being thus occupied and engaged in these preparations, Lycurgus and Pyrrhias, after communicating with each other and arranging to start at the same time, advanced towards Messenia. The Achaean strategus, on getting word of their project, came to Megalopolis with the mercenaries and some of the picked Achaean force to help the Messenians. Lycurgus, moving out of Laconia, took by treachery Calamae, a strong place in Messenia, and then advanced with the object of joining the Aetolians. But Pyrrhias, who had left Elis with quite a slight force and who had at once met with a check at the hands of the people of Cyparissia as he was entering Messenia, returned. Lycurgus, therefore, as he neither could manage to join Pyrrhias nor was strong enough by himself, after delivering some feeble assaults on Andania, returned to Sparta without having effected anything.

Aratus, after the failure of the enemy's project, took a very proper step in view of future contingencies by arranging with Taurion and the Messenians respectively to get ready and dispatch fifty horse and five hundred foot, designing to use these troops for protecting Messenia and the territories of Megalopolis, Tegea, and Argos—these being the districts which border of Laconia and are more exposed than the rest of the Peloponnese to an inroad from thence—and to guard the parts of Achaea turned towards Aetolia and Elis with his picked Achaean force and his mercenaries.

After having arranged this, he put an end to the intestine disputes of the Megalopolitans by a decree of the Achaeans. They had only recently been ejected from their city by Cleomenes, and as the saying is, utterly uprooted, and consequently they were in absolute want of many things and were ill provided with everything. It is true that they retained their high spirit; but in every respect the shortage of their supplies both in public and private was a source of weakness to them. In consequence disputes, jealousies, and mutual hatred were rife among them, as usually happens both in public and private life when men have not sufficient means to give effect to their projects. The first matter of dispute was the fortification of the city, some saying that it ought to be reduced to a size which would enable them to complete the wall if they undertook to build one and to defend it in time of danger. It was just its size, they said, and the sparseness of the inhabitants which had proved fatal to the town. The same party proposed that landowners should contribute the third part of their estates, for making up the number of additional citizens required. Their opponents neither approved of reducing the size of the city nor were disposed to contribute the third part of their property. The most serious controversy of all, however,

was in regard to the laws framed for them by Prytanis, an eminent member of the Peripatetic school, whom Antigonus had sent to them to draw up a code. Such being the matters in dispute, Aratus exerted himself by every means in his power to reconcile the rival factions, and the terms on which they finally composed their difference were engraved on a stone and set up beside the altar of Hestia in the Homarium.

After this settlement he left Megalopolis and went to take part in the Achaean Assembly, leaving the mercenaries under the command of Lycus of Pharae, who was then sub-strategus of the League. The Eleans, who were dissatisfied with Pyrrhias, now procured from the Aetolians the services of Euripidas, and he, waiting for the time when the Achaean Assembly met, took sixty horse and two thousand foot, and leaving Elis passed through the territory of Pharae and overran Achaea as far as that of Aegium. Having collected a considerable amount of booty, he was retreating towards Leontium, when Lycus, learning of the inroad, hastened to the rescue and encountering the enemy at once charged them and killed about four hundred, taking about two thousand prisoners, among whom were the following men of rank: Physsias, Antanor, Clearchus, Androlochus, Euanorides, Aristogeiton, Nicasippus, and Aspasius. He also captured all their arms and baggage. Just about the same time the Achaean naval commander made a landing at Molycria and came back with nearly a hundred captured slaves. Starting again he sailed to Chalceia, and on the enemy coming to the assistance of that town he captured two warships with their crews and afterwards took with its crew an Aetolian galley near Rhium. So that all this booty coming in from land and sea at the same time, with considerable benefit both to the exchequer and the commissariat, the

soldiers felt confident that they would receive their pay and the cities that they would not be unduly burdened by war contributions.

Simultaneously with these events Scerdilaïdas, considering himself wronged by the king, as the sum due to him by the terms of their agreement had not been paid in full, sent out fifteen galleys with the design of securing payment by trickery. They sailed to Leucas where they were received as friends by everyone, owing to their previous co-operation in the war. The only damage, however, that they managed to do here, was that when the Corinthians Agathinus and Cassander who were in command of Taurion's squadron anchored with four sail in the same harbour, regarding them as friends, they made a treacherous attack upon them, and capturing them together with the ships, sent them to Scerdilaïdas. After this they left Leucas, and sailing to Malea began to plunder and capture merchantmen.

It was now nearly harvest time, and as Taurion had neglected the task of protecting the cities I mentioned, Aratus with his picked Achaean force remained to cover harvesting operations in Argolis, and in consequence Euripidas with his Aetolians crossed the frontier with the view of pillaging the territory of Tritaea. Lycus and Demodocus, the commander of the Aetolians from Elis, collected the levies of Dyme, Patrae, and Pharae and with these troops and the mercenaries invaded Elis. Reaching the place called Phyxium, they sent out their light-armed infantry and their cavalry to overrun the country, placing their heavy-armed troops in ambush near this place. When the Eleans with their whole force arrived to defend the country from pillage and followed up the retreating marauders, Lycus issued from his ambuscade and fell upon the foremost of them. The Eleans did not await the charge, but turned and ran at once on the appearance of the enemy, who

killed about two hundred of them and captured eighty, bringing in all the booty they had collected in safety. At about the same time the Achaean naval commander made repeated descents on the coast of Calydon and Naupactus, ravaging the country and twice routing the force sent to protect it. He also captured Cleonicus of Naupactus, who since he was proxenus of the Achaeans, was not sold as a slave on the spot and was shortly afterwards set at liberty without ransom.

At the same period Agetas, the Aetolian strategus, with the whole Aetolian citizen force plundered Acarnania and overran the whole of Epirus, pillaging the country with impunity. After this performance he returned and dismissed the Aetolians to their several cities. The Acarnanians now made a counter-attack on the territory of Stratus and being overtaken by panic, effected a retreat, which if not honourable was at least unaccompanied by loss, as the garrison of Stratus were afraid of pursuing them since they suspected their retreat was a ruse to lead them into an ambush.

The following instance of treachery countered by treachery also took place at Phanoteus. Alexander, who had been appointed to the command in Phocis by Philip, made a plan for outwitting the Aetolians by the agency of a certain Jason whom he had placed in charge of Phanoteus. This Jason sent a message to Agetas the Aetolian strategus offering to betray the citadel of that town to him, and entered into an agreement to do so confirmed by oath. Of the appointed day Agetas with his Aetolians came to Phanoteus under cover of night, and concealing the rest of his force at a certain distance sent on a picked body of a hundred to the citadel. Jason had Alexander ready in the city with some troops, and receiving these Aetolian soldiers he

introduced them all into the citadel as he had sworn. Alexander now burst in at once with his men, and the hundred picked Aetolians were captured. Agetas, when day broke, perceived what had happened and withdrew his forces, having thus been the victim of a trick not dissimilar to many he had played on others.

At about the same time Philip occupied Bylazora, the largest town in Paeonia and very favourably situated as regards the pass from Dardania to Macedonia. So that by his conquest he very nearly freed himself from the fear of the Dardani, it being no longer easy for them to invade Macedonia, now that Philip commanded the passes by holding this city. After securing the place, he dispatched Chrysogonus with all speed to collect the levies of upper Macedonia and he himself with those of Boeotia and Amphaxites arrived at Edessa. Here he was joined by the Macedonians under Chrysogonus, and setting forth with his whole army reached Larisa on the sixth day. Pushing on vigorously all night without stopping, he arrived before Melitea at daybreak, and setting up his scaling-ladders, attempted to storm the town. He terrified the Meliteans so much by the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack that he could easily have taken the town; but the attempt was foiled by the ladders being far too short for the purpose. This is the sort of thing for which commanders deserve the severest censure. Who could indeed help blaming those who come up to a town with the expectation of taking it on the spur of the moment and without having given the matter the slightest thought, having made no preliminary examination, and no measurements of the walls, precipices, and suchlike approaches by which they hope to gain entrance to it? And they are equally blameworthy if, after getting as accurate measurements as possible, they

entrust at random to unskilled hands the construction of ladders and similar engines which require only a little pains in the making, but on their efficiency so much depends. For in such enterprises it is not a question of either succeeding or getting off without disaster, but failure here involves damage of various kinds; firstly in the action itself, where the bravest men are those most exposed to danger, and more especially in the retreat, when once they have incurred the contempt of the enemy. There are only too many examples of such consequences; for we find that there are many more instances of those who have failed in such attempts either perishing or being in extreme danger than of their getting away unhurt. Not only this, but by common consent they create distrust and hatred of themselves ever afterwards and bid all men be on their guard against them, for it is as though a warning is thus issued not only to the victims but to all who hear of the attempt to look well to themselves and be on the alert. Commanders therefore should never enter upon such projects without due consideration and care. The method of taking measurements and constructing ladders and so forth is quite easy and infallible, if we proceed scientifically. I must now resume my narrative, but when I find a suitable occasion and place in the course of this work for dealing with the subject again, I shall attempt to indicate the best means of avoiding mistakes in such undertakings.

Philip, foiled in this attempt, encamped near the river Enipeus, and brought up from Larisa and the other towns the siege material he had constructed during the winter, the chief objective of his whole campaign being the capture of Thebes in Phthiotis. This city is situated at no great distance from the sea, about three hundred stades away from Larisa, and commands both Magnesia and Thessaly, especially the territories of

Demetrias in Magnesia and of Pharsalus and Pherae in Thessaly. It was now held by the Aetolians who made constant incursions from it, inflicting serious damage on the people of Demetrias, Pharsalus, and Larisa; for they frequently extended their inroads as far as the plain of the Amyrus. For this reason Philip regarded the matter as of no slight importance, and was most anxious to capture this city. Having got together a hundred and fifty catapults and twenty-five engines for throwing stones, he approached Thebes, and dividing his army into three parts, occupied the environs of the city, stationing one division at the Scopium, another at the place called the Heliotropium, and the third on the hill which overlooks the town. He fortified the intervals between the three camps by a trench and a double palisade, as well as by wooden towers, adequately manned at intervals of a hundred feet. After completing these lines, he collected all his material and began to bring his engines up to the citadel.

For the first three days he could not make any progress at all with his works owing to the reckless gallantry of the garrison's resistance. But when owing to the constant skirmishing and showers of missiles, some of them had fallen and others were wounded, the resistance was slightly relaxed, and the Macedonians began their mines. By unremitting exertion, notwithstanding the difficulties of the ground, they managed in nine days to reach the wall. After this they worked in relays without any interruption by night and day and in three days had undermined and underpinned two hundred feet of the wall. The props, however, could not support the weight, but gave way, so that the wall fell before the Macedonians had set fire to them. They rapidly cleared away the ruins and were ready to enter the city, in fact just on the point of delivering the assault, when the Thebans in terror

surrendered the town. Philip, having by this achievement ensured the security of Magnesia and Thessaly, deprived the Aetolians of their chief source of plunder, and at the same time made it clear to his own forces that he was quite right in putting Leontius to death, the failure of the siege of Palae having been due to his treachery. Having thus gained possession of Thebes, he sold into slavery the existing inhabitants, and planting a Macedonian colony in the town, changed its name to Philippi.

Just as he had settled affairs at Thebes further ambassadors arrived from Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium and from King Ptolemy to mediate a peace. Giving them the same answer as on the previous occasion and telling them that he was by no means averse to peace, he sent them off enjoining them to approach the Aetolians also. He himself, however, paid no attention to the question of peace, but continued to prosecute operations.

Hearing, therefore, that the galleys of Scerdilaïdas were committing acts of piracy off Cape Malea and treating all merchants as enemies, and that he had treacherously seized some Macedonian ships which were anchored near him at Leucas, he manned twelve decked ships, eight undecked ones, and thirty *hemiolii*, and sailed through the Euripus, being anxious to capture the Illyrians also, and altogether in high hopes of success in the war with the Aetolians, as he had hitherto had no news of what was going on in Italy. It was while Philip was besieging Thebes that the Romans were defeated by Hannibal in Etruria, but the report of this event had not yet reached Greece. Philip missed the Illyrian galleys, and, anchoring off Cenchreae, sent off his decked ships with orders to sail round Cape Malea towards Aegium and Patrae: the rest of his vessels he dragged over the Isthmus, ordering them all to anchor at Lechaeum; and himself with his friends hastened to Argos to be

present at the celebration of the Nemean festival. A little after he had taken his place to witness the games a courier arrived from Macedonia bringing the intelligence that the Romans had been defeated in a great battle, and that Hannibal was master of the open country. The only man to whom he showed the letter at first, enjoining him to keep it to himself, was Demetrius of Pharos. Demetrius seized on this opportunity to advise him to get the Aetolian war off his shoulders as soon as possible, and to devote himself to the reduction of Illyria and a subsequent expedition to Italy. The whole of Greece, he said, was even now and would be in the future subservient to him, the Achaeans being his partisans by inclination and the spirit of the Aetolians being cowed by what had happened during the war. An expedition, however, to Italy was the first step towards the conquest of the world, an enterprise which belonged to none more properly than to himself. And now was the time, after this disaster to the Roman arms. By such words as these he soon aroused Philip's ambition, as I think was to be expected in the case of a king so young, who had achieved some much success, who had such a reputation for daring, and above all who came of a house which we may saw had always been inclined more than any other to covet universal dominion.

Philip, then, as I said, communicated the news that reached him in the letter to Demetrius alone, and afterwards summoned a council of his friends to discuss the question of peace with the Aetolians. Aratus also was not disinclined to negotiate, as he thought it an advantage to come to terms now the war was going in their favour; and so the king, without even waiting for the joint embassies which were acting in favour of peace, at once sent Cleonicus of Naupactus to the Aetolians—he had found him still awaiting

the meeting of the Achaea Assembly after his captivity—and taking his ships and his land forces from Corinth, came with them to Aegium. Advancing to Lasion and seizing on the castle in Perippia he made a feint of invading Elis, so as not to seem too ready to put an end to the war, and afterwards when Cleonicus had been backwards and forwards two or three times and the Aetolians begged him to meet them personally in conference, he consented to do so, and putting a stop to all hostilities sent couriers to the allied cities begging them to send representatives to the council to take part in the negotiations. Crossing himself with his army and encamping at Panormus, which is a harbour in the Peloponnese lying exactly opposite Naupactus, he awaited the delegates of the allies. During the time when they were assembling he sailed across to Zacynthus and personally set the affairs of that island in order, returning afterwards to Panormus.

The delegates having now assembled, he sent to the Aetolians, Aratus, Taurion and some of those who had accompanied them. Meeting the Aetolians, who had assembled in full force at Naupactus, and after a short discussion observing how eager they were for peace, they sailed back to inform Philip of this. The Aetolians, who were most anxious to bring the war to an end, sent with them on their own part envoys to Philip, begging him to come and meet them with his army, so that they might be in close conference and arrive at a satisfactory solution of the questions at issue. The king deferred to their request, and sailed across with his army to the so-called "Hollows" of Naupactus, distant about twenty stades from the town. Encamping there he surrounded his ships and camp with a palisade, and waited there till the conferences should begin. The Aetolians arrived in full force without their arms and establishing themselves at a distance of about

two stades from Philip's camp, began to send messages and discuss matters. The king in the first instance sent all the delegates from the allies, enjoining them to propose to the Aetolians to make peace on the condition of both parties retaining what they then possessed. The Aetolians readily consented to these terms, and henceforth there was a constant interchange of communications on points of detail. Most of these I shall pass over as they had nothing worthy of mention in them, but I shall report the speech that Agelaus of Naupactus made before the king and the allies at the first conference. It was as follows: "It would be best of all if the Greeks never made war on each other, but regarded it as the highest favour in the gift of the gods could they speak ever with one heart and voice, and marching arm in arm like men fording a river, repel barbarian invaders and unite in preserving themselves and their cities. And if such a union is indeed unattainable as a whole, I would counsel you at the present moment at least to agree together and to take due precautions for your safety, in view of the vast armaments now in the field and the greatness of this war in the west. For it is evident even to those of us who give but scanty attention to affairs of state, that whether the Carthaginians beat the Romans or the Romans the Carthaginians in this war, it is not in the least likely that the victors will be content with the sovereignty of Italy and Sicily, but they are sure to come here and extend their ambitions beyond the bounds of justice. Therefore I implore you all to secure yourselves against this danger, and I address myself especially to King Philip. For you, Sire, the best security is, instead of exhausting the Greeks and making them an easy prey to the invader, on the contrary to take thought for them as for your own body, and to attend to the safety of every province of Greece as if it were part and parcel of your

own dominions. For if such be your policy the Greeks will bear you affection and render sure help to you in case of attack, while foreigners will be less disposed to plot against your throne, impressed as they will be by the loyalty of the Greeks to you. If you desire a field of action, turn to the west and keep your eyes on the war in Italy, so that, wisely biding your time, you may some day at the proper moment compete for the sovereignty of the world. And the present times are by no means such as to exclude any hope of the kind. But defer your differences with the Greeks and your wars here until you have repose enough for such matters, and give your whole attention now to the more urgent question, so that the power may still be yours of making war or peace with them at your pleasure. For if once you wait for these clouds that loom in the west to settle on Greece, I very much fear lest we may all of us find these truces and wars and games at which we now play, so rudely interrupted that we shall be fain to pray to the gods to give us still the power of fighting in general with each other and making peace when we will, the power, in a word, of deciding our differences for ourselves."

Agelaus by this speech made all the allies disposed for peace and especially Philip, as the words in which he addressed him accorded well with his present inclination, Demetrius having previously prepared the ground by his advice. So that they came to an agreement on all the points of detail, and after ratifying the peace the conference broke up, each carrying back to his home peace instead of war.

All these events took place in the third year of the 140th Olympiad,—I mean the battle of the Romans in Etruria, that of Antiochus in Coele-Syria and the treaty of the Achaeans and Philip with the Aetolians.

It was at this time and at this conference that the affairs of Greece, Italy, and Africa were first brought into contact. For Philip and the leading statesmen of Greece ceased henceforth, in making war and peace with each other, to base their action on events in Greece, but the eyes of all were turned to the issues in Italy. And very soon the same thing happened to the islanders and the inhabitants of Asia Minor. For those who had grievances against Philip and some of the adversaries of Attalus no longer turned to the south and east, to Antiochus and Ptolemy, but henceforth looked to the west, some sending embassies to Carthage and others to Rome, and the Romans also sending embassies to the Greeks, afraid as they were of Philip's venturesome character and guarding themselves against an attack by him now they were in difficulties. Now that I have, as I promised, shown, I think clearly, how, when, and for what reason Greek affairs became involved with those of Italy and Africa, I shall continue my narrative of Greek history up to the date of the battle at Cannae in which the Romans were defeated by the Carthaginians, the decisive event with which I broke off my account of the war in Italy and will thus bring this book to a close, not overstepping the above date.

As soon as the Achaeans had the war off their shoulders, electing Timoxenus as their strategus and resuming their normal customs and mode of life, they set themselves, like the rest of the Peloponnesian towns, to re-establishing their private fortunes, to repairing the damage done to their lands, and to reviving their traditional sacrifices and festivals and various local religious rites. Such matters had indeed almost sunk into oblivion owing to the late uninterrupted state of war. For somehow or other the Peloponnesians, who are above all men disposed to a quiet and sociable life,

have enjoyed less of it in former times at least than any other people, having been rather as Euripides [8] expresses it "aye vexed with toil, their spears never at rest." It is only natural that this should be so, for as they are all naturally both ambitious of supremacy and fond of liberty, they are in a state of constant warfare, none being disposed to yield the first place to his neighbour.

[8] Euripides, fragm. 529 Nauck.

The Athenians were now delivered from the fear of Macedonia and regarded their liberty as securely established. Following the policy and inclination of their leading statesmen Eurycleidas and Micion, they took no part in the affairs of the rest of Greece, but were profuse in their adulation of all the kings, and chiefly of Ptolemy, consenting to every variety of decree and proclamation however humiliating, and paid little heed to decency in this respect owing to the lack of judgement of their leaders.

As for Ptolemy, his war against the Egyptians followed immediately on these events. This king, by arming the Egyptians for his war against Antiochus, took a step which was of great service for the time, but which was a mistake as regards the future. The soldiers, highly proud of their victory at Raphia, were no longer disposed to obey orders, but were on the look out for a leader and figure-head, thinking themselves well able to maintain themselves as an independent power, an attempt in which they finally succeeded not long afterwards.

Antiochus, after making preparations on a large scale during the winter, crossed the Taurus at the beginning of summer and, coming to an understanding with King Attalus, arranged for a joint campaign against Achaeus.

The Aetolians were at first quite satisfied with the terms of their peace with the Achaeans, as the fortune of the war had been adverse to them—they had in fact elected Agelaus of Naupactus as their strategus because they thought he had contributed more than of else to the peace—but in less than no time they began to be dissatisfied and to blame Agelaus for having cut off all their sources of booty and destroyed their future prospects by making peace with all the Greeks and not with certain states only. Agelaus, however, put up with these unreasonable complaints and kept them well in hand, so that they were obliged contrary to their nature to practise self-denial.

King Philip after the conclusion of peace returned by sea to Macedonia, where he found that Scerdilaïdas, on the identical pretence of moneys still due to him which he had used to seize treacherously the ships at Leucas, had now pillaged a town in Pelagonia called Pissaeum, had got into his hands by menaces or by promises several cities of the Dassaretae, namely Antipatreia, Chrysondyon, and Gertus, and had made extensive inroads on the neighbouring parts of Macedonia. He therefore set forth at once with his army to recover as soon as possible the revolted cities, and decided to make war all round on Scerdilaïdas, thinking it most essential for his other projects and for his contemplated crossing to Italy to arrange matters in Illyria to his satisfaction. For Demetrius continued to fire these hopes and ambitions of the king with such assiduity that Philip in his sleep dreamt of nothing else than this, and was full of his new projects. Demetrius did not do this out of consideration for Philip, whose cause was, I should say, only of third-rate importance to him in this matter, but actuated rather by his hostility to Rome and most of all for the sake of himself and his own

prospects, as he was convinced that this was the only way by which he could recover his principality of Pharos. Philip, then, advancing with his army recovered the cities I mentioned, took Creonium and Gerus in the Dassaretis, Enchelanae, Cerax, Sation, and Boei in the region of Lake Lychnis, Bantia in the district of the Caloecini and Orgyssus in that of the Pisantini. After these operations he dismissed his troops to winter quarters. This was the winter in which Hannibal after devastating the wealthiest part of Italy was going into winter quarters at Gerunium in Daunia, and the Romans had just elected Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paulus to the consulate.

During the winter Philip took into consideration that for his enterprise he would require ships and crews to man them, not it is true with the idea of fighting at sea—for he never thought he would be capable of offering battle to the Roman fleet—but to transport his troops, land where he wished, and take the enemy by surprise. Therefore, as he thought the Illyrian shipwrights were the best, he decided to build a hundred galleys, being almost the first king of Macedonia who had taken such a step. Having equipped these fleets he collected his forces at the beginning of summer and, after training the Macedonians a little in rowing, set sail. It was just at the time that Antiochus crossed the Taurus, when Philip sailing through the Euripus and round Cape Malea reached the neighbourhood of Cephallenia and Leucas, where he moored and awaited anxiously news of the Roman fleet. Hearing that they were lying off Lilybaeum, he was encouraged to put to sea again and advanced sailing towards Apollonia. Just as he was approaching the mouth of the river Aoüs, which runs past Apollonia, his fleet was seized by a panic such as sometimes overtakes land forces. For

some of the galleys in the rear, which had anchored off an island called Sason lying at the entrance to the Ionian Sea, came in the night and informed Philip that some vessels which had crossed from the Sicilian Strait had anchored in the same roadstead and announced to them that they had left at Rhegium some Roman quinqueremes which were on their voyage to Apollonia to join Scerdilaïdas. Philip, in the belief that the Roman fleet would be upon him in less than no time, was seized by fear, and at once weighed anchor and gave orders to sail back. Quitting his anchorage and making the return voyage in thorough disorder he reached Cephallenia on the second day, travelling continuously by day and night. Plucking up a little courage he remained there pretending that he had returned to undertake some operations in the Peloponnese. As it turned out, the whole had been a false alarm. For Scerdilaïdas, hearing that Philip had been building a considerable number of galleys in the winter and expecting him to arrive by sea, sent to inform the Romans and beg for help, upon which the Romans sent a squadron of ten ships from their fleet at Lilybaeum, these being the ships that had been sighted off Rhegium. Had Philip not taken alarm so absurdly and fled before this squadron, now was the opportunity for him to make himself master of Illyria, the whole attention and all the resources of the Romans being concentrated on Hannibal and the situation after the battle of Cannae; and most probably the ships would have fallen into his hands also. But as it was the news upset him so much, that he made his way back to Macedonia without suffering any loss indeed but that of prestige.

At this same period Prusias also achieved something worthy of mention. On the occasion when the Gauls whom King Attalus had brought over from

Europe for his war against Achaeus owing to their reputation for valour, left this king because of the suspicions I mentioned above and began to pillage the towns near the Hellespont with gross licentiousness and violence, finally attempting to take Ilium, the inhabitants of Alexandria Troas showed considerable gallantry. Dispatching Themistes with four thousand men they raised the siege of Ilium and expelled the Gauls from the whole of the Troad, cutting off their supplies, and frustrating their designs. The Gauls now occupied Arisba in the territory of Abydus and henceforth harassed the cities in the region either by secret plots or by open hostilities. Prusias, therefore, led and army against them, and after destroying all the men in a pitched battle, put to death nearly all the women and children in their camp and allowed his soldiers who had taken part in the battle to plunder the baggage. By this exploit he freed the cities on the Hellespont from a serious menace and danger, and gave a good lesson to the barbarians from Europe in future not to be over ready to cross to Asia.

Such was the state of affairs in Greece and Asia. The greater part of Italy, as I mentioned in the last Book, went over to the Carthaginians after the battle of Cannae. I choose this date for interrupting my narrative, having now described what took place in Asia and Greece during the 140th Olympiad. In the following Book, after a brief recapitulation of my introductory narrative, I will proceed according to my promise to treat of the Roman Constitution.

THE END OF BOOK V

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK VI

I. From the preface

I am aware that some will wonder why I have deferred until the present occasion my account of the Roman constitution, thus being obliged to interrupt the due course of my narrative. Now, that I have always regarded this account as one of the essential parts of my whole design, I have, I am sure, made evident in numerous passages and chiefly in the prefatory remarks dealing with the fundamental principles of this history, where I said that the best and most valuable result I aim at is that readers of my work may gain a knowledge how it was and by virtue of what peculiar political institutions that in less than in fifty-three years nearly the whole world was overcome and fell under the single dominion of Rome, a thing the like of which had never happened before. Having made up my mind to deal with the matter, I found no occasion more suitable than the present for turning my attention to the constitution and testing the truth of what I am about to say on the subject. For just as those who pronounce in private on the characters of bad or good men, do not, when they really resolve to put their opinion to the test, choose for investigation those periods of their life which they passed in composure and repose, but seasons when they were afflicted by adversity or blessed with success, deeming the sole test of a perfect man to be the power of bearing high-mindedly and bravely the most complete reverses of fortune, so it should be in our judgement of states. Therefore, as I could not see any greater or more violent change in the fortunes of the

Romans than this which has happened in our own times, I reserved my account of the constitution for the present occasion. . . .

What chiefly attracts and chiefly benefits students of history is just this —the study of causes and the consequent power of choosing what is best in each case. Now the chief cause of success or the reverse in all matters is the form of a state's constitution; for springing from this, as from a fountain-head, all designs and plans of action not only originate, but reach their consummation.

II. On the Forms of States

In the case of those Greek states which have often risen to greatness and have often experienced a complete change of fortune, it is an easy matter both to describe their past and to pronounce as to their future. For there is no difficulty in reporting the known facts, and it is not hard to foretell the future by inference from the past. But about the Roman state it is neither at all easy to explain the present situation owing to the complicated character of the constitution, nor to foretell the future owing to our ignorance of the peculiar features of public and private life at Rome in the past. Particular attention and study are therefore required if one wishes to attain a clear general view of the distinctive qualities of their constitution.

Most of those whose object it has been to instruct us methodically concerning such matters, distinguish three kinds of constitutions, which they call kingship, aristocracy, and democracy. Now we should, I think, be quite justified in asking them to enlighten us as to whether they represent these three to be the sole varieties or rather to be the best; for in either case my opinion is that they are wrong. For it is evident that we must regard as the best constitution a combination of all these three varieties, since we

have had proof of this not only theoretically but by actual experience, Lycurgus having been the first to draw up a constitution—that of Sparta—on this principle. Nor on the other hand can we admit that these are the only three varieties; for we have witnessed monarchical and tyrannical governments, which while they differ very widely from kingship, yet bear a certain resemblance to it, this being the reason why monarchs in general falsely assume and use, as far as they can, the regal title. There have also been several oligarchical constitutions which seem to bear some likeness to aristocratic ones, though the divergence is, generally, as wide as possible. The same holds good about democracies. The truth of what I say is evident from the following considerations. It is by no means every monarchy which we can call straight off a kingship, but only that which is voluntarily accepted by the subjects and where they are governed rather by an appeal to their reason than by fear and force. Nor again can we style every oligarchy an aristocracy, but only that where the government is in the hands of a selected body of the justest and wisest men. Similarly that is no true democracy in which the whole crowd of citizens is free to do whatever they wish or purpose, but when, in a community where it is traditional and customary to reverence the gods, to honour our parents, to respect our elders, and to obey the laws, the will of the greater number prevails, this is to be called a democracy. We should therefore assert that there are six kinds of governments, the three above mentioned which are in everyone's mouth and the three which are naturally allied to them, I mean monarchy, oligarchy, and mob-rule. Now the first of these to come into being is monarchy, its growth being natural and unaided; and next arises kingship derived from monarchy by the aid of art and by the correction of defects.

Monarchy first changes into its vicious allied form, tyranny; and next, the abolishment of both gives birth to aristocracy. Aristocracy by its very nature degenerates into oligarchy; and when the commons inflamed by anger take vengeance on this government for its unjust rule, democracy comes into being; and in due course the licence and lawlessness of this form of government produces mob-rule to complete the series. The truth of what I have just said will be quite clear to anyone who pays due attention to such beginnings, origins, and changes as are in each case natural. For he alone who has seen how each form naturally arises and develops, will be able to see when, how, and where the growth, perfection, change, and end of each are likely to occur again. And it is to the Roman constitution above all that this method, I think, may be successfully applied, since from the outset its formation and growth have been due to natural causes.

Perhaps this theory of the natural transformations into each other of the different forms of government is more elaborately set forth by Plato and certain other philosophers; but as the arguments are subtle and are stated at great length, they are beyond the reach of all but a few. I therefore will attempt to give a short summary of the theory, as far as I consider it to apply to the actual history of facts and to appeal to the common intelligence of mankind. For if there appear to be certain omissions in my general exposition of it, the detailed discussion which follows will afford the reader ample compensation for any difficulties now left unsolved.

What then are the beginnings I speak of and what is the first origin of political societies? When owing to floods, famines, failure of crops or other such causes there occurs such a destruction of the human race as tradition tells us has more than once happened, and as we must believe will often

happen again, all arts and crafts perishing at the same time, then in the course of time, when springing from the survivors as from seeds men have again increased in numbers and just like other animals form herds—it being a matter of course that they too should herd together with those of their kind owing to their natural weakness—it is a necessary consequence that the man who excels in bodily strength and in courage will lead and rule over the rest. We observe and should regard as a most genuine work of nature this very phenomenon in the case of the other animals which act purely by instinct and among whom the strongest are always indisputably the masters — I speak of bulls, boars, cocks, and the like. It is probable then that at the beginning men lived thus, herding together like animals and following the lead of the strongest and bravest, the ruler's strength being here the sole limit to his power and the name we should give his rule being monarchy.

But when in time feelings of sociability and companionship begin to grow in such gatherings of men, than kingship has struck root; and the notions of goodness, justice, and their opposites begin to arise in men. The manner in which these notions come into being is as follows. Men being all naturally inclined to sexual intercourse, and the consequence of this being the birth of children, whenever one of those who have been reared does not on growing up show gratitude to those who reared him or defend them, but on the contrary takes to speaking ill of them or ill treating them, it is evident that he will displease and offend those who have been familiar with his parents and have witnessed the care and pains they spent on attending to and feeding their children. For seeing that men are distinguished from the other animals by possessing the faculty of reason, it is obviously improbable that such a difference of conduct should escape them, as it

escapes the other animals: they will notice the thing and be displeased at what is going on, looking to the future and reflecting that they may all meet with the same treatment. Again when a man who has been helped or succoured when in danger by another does not show gratitude to his preserver, but even goes to the length of attempting to do him injury, it is clear that those who become aware of it will naturally be displeased and offended by such conduct, sharing the resentment of their injured neighbour and imagining themselves in the same situation. From all this there arises in everyone a notion of the meaning and theory of duty, which is the beginning and end of justice. Similarly, again, when any man is foremost in defending his fellows from danger, and braves and awaits the onslaught of the most powerful beasts, it is natural that he should receive marks of favour and honour from the people, while the man who acts in the opposite manner will meet with reprobation and dislike. From this again some idea of what is base and what is noble and of what constitutes the difference is likely to arise among the people; and noble conduct will be admired and imitated because it is advantageous, while base conduct will be avoided. Now when the leading and most powerful man among the people always throws the weight of his authority on the side of the notions on such matters which generally prevail, and when in the opinion of his subjects he apportions rewards and penalties according to desert, they yield obedience to him no longer because they fear his force, but rather because their judgement approves him; and they join in maintaining his rule even if he is quite enfeebled by age, defending him with one consent and battling against those who conspire to overthrow his rule. Thus by insensible degrees the monarch becomes a king, ferocity and force having yielded the supremacy to reason.

Thus is formed naturally among men the first notion of goodness and justice, and their opposites; this is the beginning and birth of true kingship. For the people maintain the supreme power not only in the hands of these men themselves, but in those of their descendants, from the conviction that those born from and reared by such men will also have principles like to theirs. And if they ever are displeased with the descendants, they now choose their kings and rulers no longer for their bodily strength and brute courage, but for the excellency of their judgement and reasoning powers, as they have gained experience from actual facts of the difference between the one class of qualities and the other. In old times, then, those who had once been chosen to the royal office continued to hold it until they grew old, fortifying and enclosing fine strongholds with walls and acquiring lands, in the one case for the sake of the security of their subjects and in the other to provide them with abundance of the necessities of life. And while pursuing these aims, they were exempt from all vituperation or jealousy, as neither in their dress nor in their food did they make any great distinction, they lived very much like everyone else, not keeping apart from the people. But when they received the office by hereditary succession and found their safety now provided for, and more than sufficient provision of food, they gave way to their appetites owing to this superabundance, and came to think that the rulers must be distinguished from their subjects by a peculiar dress, that there should be a peculiar luxury and variety in the dressing and serving of their viands, and that they should meet with no denial in the pursuit of their amours, however lawless. These habits having given rise in the one case to envy and offence and in the other to an outburst of hatred and passionate resentment, the kingship changed into a tyranny; the first steps towards its

overthrow were taken by the subjects, and conspiracies began to be formed. These conspiracies were not the work of the worst men, but of the noblest, most high-spirited, and most courageous, because such men are least able to brook the insolence of princes. The people now having got leaders, would combine with them against the ruling powers for the reasons I stated above; kingship and monarchy would be utterly abolished, and in their place aristocracy would begin to grow. For the commons, as if bound to pay at once their debt of gratitude to the abolishers of monarchy, would make them their leaders and entrust their destinies to them. At first these chiefs gladly assumed this charge and regarded nothing as of greater importance than the common interest, administering the private and public affairs of the people with paternal solicitude. But here again when children inherited this position of authority from their fathers, having no experience of misfortune and none at all of civil equality and liberty of speech, and having been brought up from the cradle amid the evidences of the power and high position of their fathers, they abandoned themselves some to greed of gain and unscrupulous money-making, others to indulgence in wine and the convivial excess which accompanies it, and others again to the violation of women and the rape of boys; and thus converting the aristocracy into an oligarchy aroused in the people feelings similar to those of which I just spoke, and in consequence met with the same disastrous end as the tyrant. For whenever anyone who has noticed the jealousy and hatred with which you are regarded by the citizens, has the courage to speak or act against the chiefs of the state he has the whole mass of the people ready to back him. Next, when they have either killed or banished the oligarchs, they no longer venture to set a king over them, as they still remember with terror the

injustice they suffered from the former ones, nor can they entrust the government with confidence to a select few, with the evidence before them of their recent error in doing so. Thus the only hope still surviving unimpaired is in themselves, and to this they resort, making the state a democracy instead of an oligarchy and assuming the responsibility for the conduct of affairs. Then as long as some of those survive who experienced the evils of oligarchical dominion, they are well pleased with the present form of government, and set a high value on equality and freedom of speech. But when a new generation arises and the democracy falls into the hands of the grandchildren of its founders, they have become so accustomed to freedom and equality that they no longer value them, and begin to aim at pre-eminence; and it is chiefly those of ample fortune who fall into this error. So when they begin to lust for power and cannot attain it through themselves or their own good qualities, they ruin their estates, tempting and corrupting the people in every possible way. And hence when by their foolish thirst for reputation they have created among the masses an appetite for gifts and the habit of receiving them, democracy in its turn is abolished and changes into a rule of force and violence. For the people, having grown accustomed to feed at the expense of others and to depend for their livelihood on the property of others, as soon as they find a leader who is enterprising but is excluded from the houses of office by his penury, institute the rule of violence; and now uniting their forces massacre, banish, and plunder, until they degenerate again into perfect savages and find once more a master and monarch.

Such is the cycle of political revolution, the course appointed by nature in which constitutions change, disappear, and finally return to the point

from which they started. Anyone who clearly perceives this may indeed in speaking of the future of any state be wrong in his estimate of the time the process will take, but if his judgement is not tainted by animosity or jealousy, he will very seldom be mistaken as to the stage of growth or decline it has reached, and as to the form into which it will change. And especially in the case of the Roman state will this method enable us to arrive at a knowledge of its formation, growth, and greatest perfection, and likewise of the change for the worse which is sure to follow some day. For, as I said, this state, more than any other, has been formed and has grown naturally, and will undergo a natural decline and change to its contrary. The reader will be able to judge of the truth of this from the subsequent parts of this work.

At present I will give a brief account of the legislation of Lycurgus, a matter not alien to my present purpose. Lycurgus had perfectly well understood that all the above changes take place necessarily and naturally, and had taken into consideration that every variety of constitution which is simple and formed on principle is precarious, as it is soon perverted into the corrupt form which is proper to it and naturally follows on it. For just as rust in the case of iron and wood-worms and ship-worms in the case of timber are inbred pests, and these substances, even though they escape all external injury, fall a prey to the evils engendered in them, so each constitution has a vice engendered in it and inseparable from it. In kingship it is despotism, in aristocracy oligarchy, and in democracy the savage rule of violence; and it is impossible, as I said above, that each of these should not in course of time change into this vicious form. Lycurgus, then, foreseeing this, did not make his constitution simple and uniform, but

united in it all the good and distinctive features of the best governments, so that none of the principles should grow unduly and be perverted into its allied evil, but that, the force of each being neutralized by that of the others, neither of them should prevail and outbalance another, but that the constitution should remain for long in a state of equilibrium like a well-trimmed boat, kingship being guarded from arrogance by the fear of the commons, who were given a sufficient share in the government, and the commons on the other hand not venturing to treat the kings with contempt from fear of the elders, who being selected from the best citizens would be sure all of them to be always on the side of justice; so that that part of the state which was weakest owing to its subservience to traditional custom, acquired power and weight by the support and influence of the elders. The consequence was that by drawing up his constitution thus he preserved liberty at Sparta for a longer period than is recorded elsewhere.

Lycurgus then, foreseeing, by a process of reasoning, whence and how events naturally happen, constructed his constitution untaught by adversity, but the Romans while they have arrived at the same final result as regards their form of government, have not reached it by any process of reasoning, but by the discipline of many struggles and troubles, and always choosing the best by the light of the experience gained in disaster have thus reached the same result as Lycurgus, that is to say, the best of all existing constitutions.

V. On the Roman Constitution at its Prime

From the crossing of Xerxes to Greece . . . and for thirty years after this period, it was always one of those polities which was an object of special study, and it was at its best and nearest to perfection at the time of the

Hannibalic war, the period at which I interrupted my narrative to deal with it. Therefore now that I have described its growth, I will explain what were the conditions at the time when by their defeat at Cannae the Romans were brought face to face with disaster.

I am quite aware that to those who have been born and bred under the Roman Republic my account of it will seem somewhat imperfect owing to the omission of certain details. For as they have complete knowledge of it and practical acquaintance with all its parts, having been familiar with these customs and institutions from childhood, they will not be struck by the extent of the information I give but will demand in addition all I have omitted: they will not think that the author has purposely omitted small peculiarities, but owing to ignorance he has been silent regarding the origins of many things and some points of capital importance. Had I mentioned them, they would not have been impressed by my doing so, regarding them as small and trivial points, but as they are omitted they will demand their inclusion as if they were vital matters, through a desire themselves to appear better informed than the author. Now a good critic should not judge authors by what they omit, but by what they relate, and if he finds any falsehood in this, he may conclude that the omissions are due to ignorance; but if all the writer says is true, he should admit that he has been silent about these matters deliberately and not from ignorance.

These remarks are meant for those who find fault with authors in cavilling rather than just spirit. . . .

In so far as any view of matter we form applies to the right occasion, so far expressions of approval or blame are sound. When circumstances change, and when applied to these changed conditions, the most excellent

and true reflections of authors seem often not only not acceptable, but utterly offensive. . . .

The three kinds of government that I spoke of above all shared in the control of the Roman state. And such fairness and propriety in all respects was shown in the use of these three elements for drawing up the constitution and in its subsequent administration that it was impossible even for a native to pronounce with certainty whether the whole system was aristocratic, democratic, or monarchical. This was indeed only natural. For if one fixed one's eyes on the power of the consuls, the constitution seemed completely monarchical and royal; if on that of the senate it seemed again to be aristocratic; and when one looked at the power of the masses, it seemed clearly to be a democracy. The parts of the state falling under the control of each element were and with a few modifications still are as follows.

The consuls, previous to leading out their legions, exercise authority in Rome over all public affairs, since all the other magistrates except the tribunes are under them and bound to obey them, and it is they who introduce embassies to the senate. Besides this it is they who consult the senate on matters of urgency, they who carry out in detail the provisions of its decrees. Again as concerns all affairs of state administered by the people it is their duty to take these under their charge, to summon assemblies, to introduce measures, and to preside over the execution of the popular decrees. As for preparation for war and the general conduct of operations in the field, here their power is almost uncontrolled; for they are empowered to make what demands they choose on the allies, to appoint military tribunes, to levy soldiers and select those who are fittest for service. They

also have the right of inflicting, when on active service, punishment on anyone under their command; and they are authorized to spend any sum they decide upon from the public funds, being accompanied by a quaestor who faithfully executes their instructions. So that if one looks at this part of the administration alone, one may reasonably pronounce the constitution to be a pure monarchy or kingship. I may remark that any changes in these matters or in others of which I am about to speak that may be made in present or future times do not in any way affect the truth of the views I here state.

To pass to the senate. In the first place it has the control of the treasury, all revenue and expenditure being regulated by it. For with the exception of payments made to the consuls, the quaestors are not allowed to disburse for any particular object without a decree of the senate. And even the item of expenditure which is far heavier and more important than any other—the outlay every five years by the censors on public works, whether constructions or repairs—is under the control of the senate, which makes a grant to the censors for the purpose. Similarly crimes committed in Italy which require a public investigation, such as treason, conspiracy, poisoning, and assassination, are under the jurisdiction of the senate. Also if any private person or community in Italy is in need of arbitration or indeed claims damages or requires succour or protection, the senate attends to all such matters. It also occupies itself with the dispatch of all embassies sent to countries outside of Italy for the purpose either of settling differences, or of offering friendly advice, or indeed of imposing demands, or of receiving submission, or of declaring war; and in like manner with respect to embassies arriving in Rome it decides what reception and what answer

should be given to them. All these matters are in the hands of the senate, nor have the people anything whatever to do with them. So that again to one residing in Rome during the absence of the consuls the constitution appears to be entirely aristocratic; and this is the conviction of many Greek states and many of the kings, as the senate manages all business connected with them.

After this we are naturally inclined to ask what part in the constitution is left for the people, considering that the senate controls all the particular matters I mentioned, and, what is most important, manages all matters of revenue and expenditure, and considering that the consuls again have uncontrolled authority as regards armaments and operations in the field. But nevertheless there is a part and a very important part left for the people. For it is the people which alone has the right to confer honours and inflict punishment, the only bonds by which kingdoms and states and in a word human society in general are held together. For where the distinction between these is overlooked or is observed but ill applied, no affairs can be properly administered. How indeed is this possible when good and evil men are held in equal estimation? It is by the people, then, in many cases the offences punishable by a fine are tried when the accused have held the highest office; and they are the only court which may try on capital charges. As regards the latter they have a practice which is praiseworthy and should be mentioned. Their usage allows those on trial for their lives when found guilty liberty to depart openly, thus inflicting voluntary exile on themselves, if even only one of the tribes that pronounce the verdict has not yet voted. Such exiles enjoy safety in the territories of Naples, Praeneste, Tibur, and other *civitates foederatae*. Again it is the people who bestow office on the

deserving, the noblest regard of virtue in a state; the people have the power of approving or rejecting laws, and what is most important of all, they deliberate on the question of war and peace. Further in the case of alliances, terms of peace, and treaties, it is the people who ratify all these or the reverse. Thus here again one might plausibly say that the people's share in the government is the greatest, and that the constitution is a democratic one.

Having stated how political power is distributed among the different parts of the state, I will now explain how each of the three parts is enabled, if they wish, the counteract or co-operate with the others. The consul, when he leaves with his army invested with the powers I mentioned, appears indeed to have absolute authority in all matters necessary for carrying out his purpose; but in fact he requires the support of the people and the senate, and is not able to bring his operations to a conclusion without them. For it is obvious that the legions require constant supplies, and without the consent of the senate, neither corn, clothing, nor pay can be provided; so that the commander's plans come to nothing, if the senate chooses to be deliberately negligent and obstructive. It also depends on the senate whether or not a general can carry out completely his conceptions and designs, since it has the right of either superseding him when his year's term of office has expired or of retaining him in command. Again it is in its power to celebrate with pomp and to magnify the successes of a general or on the other hand to obscure and belittle them. For the processions they call triumphs, in which the generals bring the actual spectacle of their achievements before the eyes of their fellow-citizens, cannot be properly organized and sometimes even cannot be held at all, unless the senate consents and provides the requisite funds. As for the people it is most indispensable for the consuls to conciliate

them, however far away from home they may be; for, as I said, it is the people which ratifies or annuls terms of peace and treaties, and what is most important, on laying down office the consuls are obliged to account for their actions to the people. So that in no respect is it safe for the consuls to neglect keeping in favour with both the senate and the people.

The senate again, which possesses such great power, is obliged in the first place to pay attention to the commons in public affairs and respect the wishes of the people, and it cannot carry out inquiries into the most grave and important offences against the state, punishable with death, and their correction, unless the *senatus consultum* is confirmed by the people. The same is the case in matters which directly affect the senate itself. For if anyone introduces a law meant to deprive the senate of some of its traditional authority, or to abolish the precedence and other distinctions of the senators or even to curtail them of their private fortunes, it is the people alone which has the power of passing or rejecting any such measure. And what is most important is that if a single one of the tribunes interposes, the senate is unable to decide finally about any matter, and cannot even meet and hold sittings; and here it is to be observed that the tribunes are always obliged to act as the people decree and to pay every attention to their wishes. Therefore for all these reasons the senate is afraid of the masses and must pay due attention to the popular will.

Similarly, again, the people must be submissive to the senate and respect its members both in public and in private. Through the whole of Italy a vast number of contracts, which it would not be easy to enumerate, are given out by the censors for the construction and repair of public buildings, and besides this there are many things which are farmed, such as navigable

rivers, harbours, gardens, mines, lands, in fact everything that forms part of the Roman dominion. Now all these matters are undertaken by the people, and one may almost say that everyone is interested in these contracts and the work they involved. For certain people are the actual purchasers from the censors of the contracts, others are the partners of these first, others stand surety for them, others pledge their own fortunes to the state for this purpose. Now in all these matters the senate is supreme. It can grant extension of time; it can relieve the contractor if any accident occurs; and if the work proves to be absolutely impossible to carry out it can liberate him from his contract. There are in fact many ways in which the senate can either benefit or indicate those who manage public property, as all these matters are referred to it. What is even most important is that the judges in most civil trials, whether public or private, are appointed from its members, where the action involves large interests. So that all citizens being at the mercy of the senate, and looking forward with alarm to the uncertainty of litigation, are very shy of obstructing or resisting its decisions. Similarly everyone is reluctant to oppose the projects of the consuls as all are generally and individually under their authority when in the field.

Such being the power that each part has of hampering the others or co-operating with them, their union is adequate to all emergencies, so that it is impossible to find a better political system than this. For whenever the menace of some common danger from abroad compels them to act in concord and support each other, so great does the strength of the state become, that nothing which is requisite can be neglected, as all are zealously competing in devising means of meeting the need of the hour, nor can any decision arrived at fail to be executed promptly, as all are co-

operating both in public and in private to the accomplishment of the task which they have set themselves; and consequently this peculiar form of constitution possesses an irresistible power of attaining every object upon which it is resolved. When again they are freed from external menace, and reap the harvest of good fortune and affluence which is the result of their success, and in the enjoyment of this prosperity are corrupted by flattery and idleness and wax insolent and overbearing, as indeed happens often enough, it is then especially that we see the state providing itself a remedy for the evil from which it suffers. For when one part having grown out of proportion to the others aims at supremacy and tends to become too predominant, it is evident that, as for the reasons above given none of the three is absolute, but the purpose of the one can be counterworked and thwarted by the others, none of them will excessively outgrow the others or treat them with contempt. All in fact remains *in statu quo*, on the one hand, because any aggressive impulse is sure to be checked and from the outset each estate stands in dread of being interfered with by the others. . . .

VI. The Roman Military System

After electing the consuls, they appoint military tribunes, fourteen from those who have seen five years' service and ten from those who have seen ten. As for the rest, a cavalry soldier must serve for ten years in all and an infantry soldier for sixteen years before reaching the age of forty-six, with the exception of those whose census is under four hundred drachmae, all of whom are employed in naval service. In case of pressing danger twenty years' service is demanded from the infantry. No one is eligible for any political office before he has completed ten years' service. The consuls, when they are about to enrol soldiers, announce at a meeting of the popular

assembly the day on which all Roman citizens of military age must present themselves, and this they do annually. On the appointed day, when those liable to service arrive in Rome, and assemble on the Capitol, the junior tribunes divide themselves into four groups, as the popular assembly or the consuls determine, since the main and original division of their forces is into four legions. The four tribunes first nominated are appointed to the first legion, the next three to the second, the following four to the third, and the last three to the fourth. Of senior tribunes the first two are appointed to the first legion, the next three to the second, the next two to the third, and the three last to the fourth. The division and appointment of the tribunes having thus been so made that each legion has the same number of officers, those of each legion take their seats apart, and they draw lots for the tribes, and summon them singly in the order of the lottery. From each tribe they first of all select four lads of more or less the same age and physique. When these are brought forward the officers of the first legion have first choice, those of the second choice, those of the third third, and those of the fourth last. Another batch of four is now brought forward, and this time the officers of the second legion have first choice and so on, those of the first choosing last. A third batch having been brought forward the tribunes of the third legion choose first, and those of the second last. By thus continuing to give each legion first choice in turn, each gets men of the same standard. When they have chosen the number determined on—that is when the strength of each legion is brought up to four thousand two hundred, or in times of exceptional danger to five thousand— the old system was to choose the cavalry after the four thousand two hundred infantry, but they now choose

them first, the censor selecting them according to their wealth; and three hundred are assigned to each legion.

The enrolment having been completed in this manner, those of the tribunes on whom this duty falls collect the newly-enrolled soldiers, and picking out of the whole body a single man whom they think the most suitable make him take the oath that he will obey his officers and execute their orders as far as is in his power. Then the others come forward and each in his turn takes his oath simply that he will do the same as the first man.

At the same time the consuls send their orders to the allied cities in Italy which they wish to contribute troops, stating the numbers required and the day and place at which the men selected must present themselves. The magistrates, choosing the men and administering the oath in the manner above described, send them off, appointing a commander and a paymaster.

The tribunes in Rome, after administering the oath, fix for each legion a day and place at which the men are to present themselves without arms and then dismiss them. When they come to the rendezvous, they choose the youngest and poorest to form the *velites*; the next to them are made *hastati*; those in the prime of life *principes*; and the oldest of all *triarii*, these being the names among the Romans of the four classes in each legion distinct in age and equipment. They divide them so that the senior men known as *triarii* number six hundred, the *principes* twelve hundred, the *hastati* twelve hundred, the rest, consisting of the youngest, being *velites*. If the legion consists of more than four thousand men, they divide accordingly, except as regards the *triarii*, the number of whom is always the same.

The youngest soldiers or *velites* are ordered to carry a sword, javelins, and a target (*parma*). The target is strongly made and sufficiently large to

afford protection, being circular and measuring three feet in diameter. They also wear a plain helmet, and sometimes cover it with a wolf's skin or something similar both to protect and to act as a distinguishing mark by which their officers can recognize them and judge if they fight pluckily or not. The wooden shaft of the javelin measures about two cubits in length and is about a finger's breadth in thickness; its head is a span long hammered out to such a fine edge that it is necessarily bent by the first impact, and the enemy is unable to return it. If this were not so, the missile would be available for both sides.

The next in seniority called *hastati* are ordered to wear a complete panoply. The Roman panoply consists firstly of a shield (*scutum*), the convex surface of which measures two and a half feet in width and four feet in length, the thickness at the rim being a palm's breadth. It is made of two planks glued together, the outer surface being then covered first with canvas and then with calf-skin. Its upper and lower rims are strengthened by an iron edging which protects it from descending blows and from injury when rested on the ground. It also has an iron boss (*umbo*) fixed to it which turns aside the most formidable blows of stones, pikes, and heavy missiles in general. Besides the shield they also carry a sword, hanging on the right thigh and called a Spanish sword. This is excellent for thrusting, and both of its edges cut effectually, as the blade is very strong and firm. In addition they have two *pila*, a brass helmet, and greaves. The *pila* are of two sorts—stout and fine. Of the stout ones some are round and a palm's length in diameter and others are a palm square. The fine *pila*, which they carry in addition to the stout ones, are like moderate-sized hunting-spears, the length of the haft in all cases being about three cubits. Each is fitted with a barbed

iron head of the same length as the haft. This they attach so securely to the haft, carrying the attachment halfway up the latter and fixing it with numerous rivets, that in action the iron will break sooner than become detached, although its thickness at the bottom where it comes in contact with the wood is a finger's breadth and a half; such great care do they take about attaching it firmly. Finally they wear as an ornament a circle of feathers with three upright purple or black feathers about a cubit in height, the addition of which on the head surmounting their other arms is to make every man look twice his real height, and to give him a fine appearance, such as will strike terror into the enemy. The common soldiers wear in addition a breastplate of brass a span square, which they place in front of the heart and call the heart-protector (*pectorale*), this completing their accoutrements; but those who are rated above ten thousand drachmas wear instead of this a coat of chain-mail (*lorica*). The *principes* and *triarii* are armed in the same manner except that instead of the pila the *triarii* carry long spears (*hastae*).

From each of the classes except the youngest they elect ten centurions according to merit, and then they elect a second ten. All these are called centurions, and the first man elected has a seat in the military council. The centurions then appoint an equal number of rearguard officers (*optiones*). Next, in conjunction with the centurions, they divide each class into ten companies, except the *velites*, and assign to each company two centurions and two *optiones* from among the elected officers. The *velites* are divided equally among all the companies; these companies are called *ordines* or *manipuli* or *vexilla*, and their officers are called centurions or *ordinum ductores*. Finally these officers appoint from the ranks two of the finest and

bravest men to be standard-bearers (*vexillarii*) in each maniple. It is natural that they should appoint two commanders for each maniple; for it being uncertain what may be the conduct of an officer or what may happen to him, and affairs of war not admitting of pretexts and excuses, they wish the maniple never to be without a leader and chief. When both centurions are on the spot, the first elected commands the right half of the maniple and the second the left, but if both are not present the one who is commands the whole. They wish the centurions not so much to be venturesome and daredevil as to be natural leaders, of a steady and sedate spirit. They do not desire them so much to be men who will initiate attacks and open the battle, but men who will hold their ground when worsted and hard-pressed and be ready to die at their posts.

In like manner they divide the cavalry into ten squadrons (*turmae*) and from each they select three officers (*decuriones*), who themselves appoint three rear-rank officers (*optiones*). The first commander chosen commands the whole squadron, and the two others have the rank of *decuriones*, all three bearing this title. If the first of them should not be present, the second takes command of the squadron. The cavalry are now armed like that of Greece, but in old times they had no cuirasses but fought in light undergarments, the result of which was that they were able to dismount and mount again at once with great dexterity and facility, but were exposed to great danger in close combat, as they were nearly naked. Their lances too were unserviceable in two respects. In the first place they made them so slender and pliant that it was impossible to take a steady aim, and before they could fix the head in anything, the shaking due to the mere motion of the horse caused most of them to break. Next, as they did not fit the butt-

ends with spikes, they could only deliver the first stroke with the point and after this if they broke they were of no further service. Their buckler was made of ox-hide, somewhat similar in shape to the round bossed cakes used at sacrifices. They were not of any use for attacking, as they were not firm enough; and when the leather covering peeled off and rotted owing to the rain, unserviceable as they were before, they now became entirely so. Since therefore their arms did not stand the test of experience, they soon took to making them in the Greek fashion, which ensures that the first stroke of the lance-head shall be both well aimed and telling, since the lance is so constructed as to be steady and strong, and also that it may continue to be effectively used by reversing it and striking with the spike at the butt end. And the same applies to the Greek shields, which being of solid and firm texture do good service both in defence and attack. The Romans, when they noticed this, soon learnt to copy the Greek arms; for this too is one of their virtues, that no people are so ready to adopt new fashions and imitate what they see is better in others.

The tribunes having thus organized the troops and ordered them to arm themselves in this manner, dismiss them to their homes. When the day comes on which they have all sworn to attend at the place appointed by the consuls— each consul as a rule appointing a separate rendezvous for his own troops, since each has received his share of the allies and two Roman legions— none of those on the roll ever fail to appear, no excuse at all being admitted except adverse omens or absolute impossibility. The allies having now assembled also at the same places as the Romans, their organization and command are undertaken by the officers appointed by the consuls known as *praefecti sociorum* and twelve in number. They first of all select

for the consuls for the whole force of allies assembled the horsemen and footmen most fitted for actual service, these being known as *extraordinarii*, that is "select." The total number of allied infantry is usually equal to that of the Romans, while the cavalry are three times as many. Of these they assign about a third of the cavalry and a fifth of the infantry to the picked corps; the rest they divide into two bodies, one known as the right wing and the other as the left.

When these arrangements have been made, the tribunes take both the Romans and allies and pitch their camp, one simple plan of camp being adopted at all times and in all places. I think, therefore, it will be in place here to attempt, as far as words can do so, to convey to my readers a notion of the disposition of the forces when on the march, when encamped, and when in action. For who is so averse to all noble and excellent performance as not to be inclined to take a little extra trouble to understand matters like this, of which when he has once read he will be well informed about one of those things really worth studying and worth knowing?

The manner in which they form their camp is as follows. When the site for the camp has been chosen, the position in it giving the best general view and most suitable for issuing orders is assigned to the general's tent (*praetorium*). Fixing an ensign on the spot where they are about to pitch it, they measure off round this ensign a square plot of ground each side of which is one hundred feet distant, so that the total area measure four plethra. [1] Along one side of this square in the direction which seems to give the greatest facilities for watering and foraging, the Roman legions are disposed as follows. As I have said, there are six tribunes in each legion; and since each consul has always two Roman legions with him, it is evident

that there are twelve tribunes in the army of each. They place then the tents of these all in one line parallel to the side of the square selected and fifty feet distant from it, to give room for the horses, mules, and baggage of the tribunes. These tents are pitched with their backs turned to the *praetorium* and facing the outer side of the camp, a direction of which I will always speak as "the front." The tents of the tribunes are at an equal distance from each other, and at such a distance that they extend along the whole breadth of the space occupied by the legions.

[1] A plethron is 10,000 square feet.

They now measure a hundred feet from the front of all these tents, and starting from the line drawn at this distance parallel to the tents of the tribunes they begin to encamp the legions, managing matters as follows. Bisecting the above line, they start from this spot and along a line drawn at right angles to the first, they encamp the cavalry of each legion facing each other and separated by a distance of fifty feet, the last-mentioned line being exactly half-way between them. The manner of encamping the cavalry and the infantry is very similar, the whole space occupied by the maniples and squadrons being a square. This square faces one of the streets or *viae* and is of a fixed length of one hundred feet, and they usually try to make the depth the same except in the case of the allies. When they employ the larger legions they add proportionately to the length and depth.

The cavalry camp is thus something like a street running down from the middle of the tribunes' tents and at right angles to the line along which these tents are placed and to the space in front of them, the whole system of *viae* being in fact like a number of streets, as either companies of infantry or troops of horse are encamped facing each other all along each. Behind the

cavalry, then, they place the *triarii* of both legions in a similar arrangement, a company next each troop, but with no space between, and facing in the contrary direction to the cavalry. They make the depth of each company half its length, because as a rule the *triarii* number only half the strength of the other classes. So that the maniples being often of unequal strength, the length of the encampments is always the same owing to the difference in depth. Next at a distance of 50 feet on each side they place the *principes* facing the *triarii*, and as they are turned towards the intervening space, two more streets are formed, both starting from the same base as that of the cavalry, i.e. the hundred-foot space in front of the tribunes' tents, and both issuing on the side of the camp which is opposite to the tribunes' tents and which we decided to call the front of the whole. After the *principes*, and again back to back against them, with no interval they encamp the *hastati*. As each class by virtue of the original division consists of ten maniples, the streets are all equal in length, and they all break off on the front side of the camp in a straight line, the last maniples being here so placed as to face to the front.

At a distance again of 50 feet from the *hastati*, and facing them, they encamp the allied cavalry, starting from the same line and ending on the same line. As I stated above, the number of the allied infantry is the same as that of the Roman legions, but from these the *extraordinarii* must be deducted; while that of the cavalry is double after deducting the third who serve as *extraordinarii*. In forming the camp, therefore, they proportionately increase the depth of the space assigned to the allied cavalry, in the endeavour to make their camp equal in length to that of the Romans. These five streets having been completed, they place the maniples of the allied

infantry, increasing the depth in proportion to their numbers; with their faces turned away from the cavalry and facing the agger and both the outer sides of the camp. In each maniple the first tent at either end is occupied by the centurions. In laying the whole camp out in this manner they always leave a space of 50 feet between the fifth troop and the sixth, and similarly with the companies of foot, so that another passage traversing the whole camp is formed, at right angles to the streets, and parallel to the line of the tribunes' tents. This they called *quintana*, as it runs along the fifth troops and companies.

The spaces behind the tents of the tribunes to right and left of the *praetorium*, are used in the one case for the market and in the other for the office of the quaestor and the supplies of which he is in charge. Behind the last tent of the tribunes on either side, and more or less at right angles to these tents, are the quarters of the cavalry picked out from the *extraordinarii*, and a certain number of volunteers serving to oblige the consuls. These are all encamped parallel to the two sides of the agger, and facing in the one case the quaestors' depot and in the other the market. As a rule these troops are not only thus encamped near the consuls but on the march and on other occasions are in constant attendance on the consul and quaestor. Back to back with them, and looking towards the agger are the select infantry who perform the same service as the cavalry just described. Beyond these an empty space is left a hundred feet broad, parallel to the tents of the tribunes, and stretching along the whole face of the agger on the other side of the market, *praetorium* and *quaestorium*, and on its further side the rest of the equites *extraordinarii* are encamped facing the market, *praetorium* and *quaestorium*. In the middle of this cavalry camp and exactly

opposite the *praetorium* a passage, 50 feet wide, is left leading to the rear side of the camp and running at right angles to the broad passage behind the *praetorium*. Back to back with these cavalry and fronting the agger and the rearward face of the whole camp are placed the rest of the *pedites extraordinarii*. Finally the spaces remaining empty to right and left next the agger on each side of the camp are assigned to foreign troops or to any allies who chance to come in.

The whole camp thus forms a square, and the way in which the streets are laid out and its general arrangement give it the appearance of a town. The agger is on all sides at a distance of 200 feet from the tents, and this empty space is of important service in several respects. To begin with it provides the proper facilities for marching the troops in and out, seeing that they all march out into this space by their own streets and thus do not come into one street in a mass and throw down or hustle each other. Again it is here that they collect the cattle brought into camp and all booty taken from the enemy, and keep them safe during the night. But most important thing of all is that in night attacks neither fire can reach them nor missiles except a very few, which are almost harmless owing to the distance and the space in front of the tents.

Given the numbers of cavalry and infantry, whether 4000 or 5000, in each legion, and given likewise the depth, length, and number of the troops and companies, the dimensions of the passages and open spaces and all other details, anyone who gives his mind to it can calculate the area and total circumference of the camp. If there ever happen to be an extra number of allies, either of those originally forming part of the army or of others who have joined on a special occasion, accommodation is provided for the latter

in the neighbourhood of the *praetorium*, the market and *quaestorium* being reduced to the minimum size which meets pressing requirements, while for the former, if the excess is considerable, they add two streets, one at each side of the encampment of the Roman legions.

Whenever the two consuls with all their four legions are united in one camp, we have only to imagine two camps like the above placed in juxtaposition back to back, the junction being formed at the encampments of the *extraordinarii* infantry of each camp whom we described as being stationed facing the rearward agger of the camp. The shape of the camp is now oblong, its area double what it was and its circumference half as much again. Whenever both consuls encamp together they adopt this arrangement; but when the two encamp apart the only difference is that the market, *quaestorium*, and *praetorium* are placed between the two camps.

After forming the camp the tribunes meet and administer an oath, man by man, to all in the camp, whether freemen or slaves. Each man swears to steal nothing from the camp and even if he finds anything to bring it to the tribunes. They next issue their orders to the maniples of the *hastati* and *principes* of each legion, entrusting to two maniples the care of the ground in front of the tents of the tribunes; for this ground is the general resort of the soldiers in the daytime, and so they see to its being swept and watered with great care. Three of the remaining eighteen maniples are now assigned by lot to each tribune, this being the number of maniples of *principes* and *hastati* in each legion, and there being six tribunes. Each of these maniples in turn attends on the tribune, the services they render him being such as the following. When they encamp they pitch his tent for him and level the ground round it; and it is their duty to fence round any of his baggage that

may require protection. They also supply two guards for him (a guard consists of four men), of which the one is stationed in front of the tent and the other behind it next the horses. As each tribune has three maniples at his service, and there are more than a hundred men in each maniple, not counting the *triarii* and *velites* who are not liable to this service, the task is a light one, as each maniple has to serve only every third day; and when the necessary comfort of the tribune is well attended to by this means, the dignity due to his rank is also amply maintained. The maniples of *triarii* are exempt from this attendance on the tribune; but each maniple supplies a guard every day to the squadron of horse close behind it. This guard, besides keeping a general look out, watches especially over the horses to prevent them from getting entangled in their tethers and suffering injuries that would incapacitate them, or from getting loose and causing confusion and disturbance in the camp by running against other horses. Finally each maniple in its turn mounts guard round the consul's tent to protect him from plots and at the same time to add splendour to the dignity of his office.

As regards the entrenchment and stockading of the camp, the task falls upon the allies concerning those two sides along which their two wings are quartered, the other two sides being assigned to the Romans, one to each legion. Each side having been divided into sections, one for each maniple, the centurions stand by and superintend the details, while two of the tribunes exercise a general supervision over the work on each side; and it is these latter officers who superintend all other work connected with the camp. They divide themselves into pairs, and each pair is on duty in turn for two months out of six, supervising all field operations. The prefects of the allies divide their duties on the same system. Every day at dawn the cavalry

officers and centurions attend at the tents of the tribunes, and the tribunes proceed to that of the consul. He gives the necessary orders to the tribunes, and they pass them on to the cavalry officers and centurions, who convey them to the soldiers when the proper time comes.

The way in which they secure the passing round of the watchword for the night is as follows: from the tenth maniple of each class of infantry and cavalry, the maniple which is encamped at the lower end of the street, a man is chosen who is relieved from guard duty, and he attends every day at sunset at the tent of the tribune, and receiving from him the watchword—that is a wooden tablet with the word inscribed on it—takes his leave, and on returning to his quarters passes on the watchword and tablet before witnesses to the commander of the next maniple, who in turn passes it to the one next him. All do the same until it reaches the first maniples, those encamped near the tents of the tribunes. These latter are obliged to deliver the tablet to the tribunes before dark. So that if all those issued are returned, the tribune knows that the watchword has been given to all the maniples, and has passed through all on its way back to him. If any one of them is missing, he makes inquiry at once, as he knows by the marks from what quarter the tablet has not returned, and whoever is responsible for the stoppage meets with the punishment he merits.

They manage the night guards thus: The maniple on duty there guards the consul and his tent, while the tents of the tribunes and the troops of horse are guarded by the men appointed from each maniple in the manner I explained above. Each separate body likewise appoints a guard of its own men for itself. The remaining guards are appointed by the Consul; and there are generally three pickets at the *quaestorium* and two at the tents of each of

the legates and members of the council. The whole outer face of the camp is guard by the *velites*, who are posted every day along the *vallum*—this being the special duty assigned to them—and ten of them are on guard at each entrance. Of those appointed to picket duty, the man in each maniple who is to take the first watch is brought to the tribune in the evening by one of the *optiones* of his company. The tribune gives them all little tablets, one for each station, quite small, with a sign written on them and on receiving this they leave for the posts assigned to them.

The duty of going the rounds is entrusted to the cavalry. The first praefect of cavalry in each legion must give orders early in the morning to one of his *optiones* to send notice before breakfast to four lads of his own squadron who will be required to go the rounds. The same man must also give notice in the evening to the praefect of the next squadron that he must make arrangements for going the rounds on the following day. This praefect, on receiving the notice, must take precisely the same steps on the next day; and so on through all the squadrons. The four men chosen by the *optiones* from the first squadron, after drawing lots for their respective watches, go to the tribune and get written orders from him stating what stations they are to visit and at what time. After that all four of them go and station themselves next the first maniple of the *triarii*, for it is the duty of the centurion of this maniple to have a bugle sounded at the beginning of each watch. When this time comes, the man to whom the first watch fell by lot makes his rounds accompanied by some friends as witnesses. He visits the posts mentioned in his orders, not only those near the *vallum* and the gates, but the pickets also of the infantry maniples and cavalry squadrons. If he finds the guards of the first watch awake he receives their *tessera*, but if

he finds that anyone is asleep or has left his post, he calls those with him to witness the fact, and proceeds on his rounds. Those who go the rounds in the succeeding watches act in a similar manner. As I said, the charge of sounding a bugle at the beginning of each watch, so that those going the rounds may visit the different stations at the right time, falls on the centurions of the first maniple of the *triarii* in each legion, who take it by turns for a day.

Each of the men who have gone the rounds brings back the *tessera*e at daybreak to the tribune. If they deliver them all they are suffered to depart without question; but if one of them delivers fewer than the number of stations visited, they find out from examining the signs on the *tessera*e which station is missing, and on ascertaining this the tribune calls the centurion of the maniple and he brings before him the men who were on picket duty, and they are confronted with the patrol. If the fault is that of the picket, the patrol makes matters clear at once by calling the men who had accompanied him, for he is bound to do this; but if nothing of the kind has happened, the fault rests on him. A court-martial composed of all the tribunes at once meets to try him, and if he is found guilty he is punished by the bastinado (*fustuarium*). This is inflicted as follows: The tribune takes a cudgel and just touches the condemned man with it, after which all in the camp beat or stone him, in most cases dispatching him in the camp itself. But even those who manage to escape are not saved thereby: impossible! for they are not allowed to return to their homes, and none of the family would dare to receive such a man in his house. So that those who have of course fallen into this misfortune are utterly ruined. The same punishment is inflicted on the *optio* and on the praefect of the squadron, if they do not give

the proper orders at the right time to the patrols and the praefect of the next squadron. Thus, owing to the extreme severity and inevitableness of the penalty, the night watches of the Roman army are most scrupulously kept.

While the soldiers are subject to the tribune, the latter are subject to the consuls. A tribune, and in the case of the allies a praefect, has the right of inflicting fines, of demanding sureties, and of punishing by flogging. The bastinado is also inflicted on those who steal anything from the camp; on those who give false evidence; on young men who have abused their persons; and finally on anyone who has been punished thrice for the same fault. Those are the offences which are punished as crimes, the following being treated as unmanly acts and disgraceful in a soldier—when a man boasts falsely to the tribune of his valour in the field in order to gain distinction; when any men who have been placed in a covering force leave the station assigned to them from fear; likewise when anyone throws away from fear any of his arms in the actual battle. Therefore the men in covering forces often face certain death, refusing to leave their ranks even when vastly outnumbered, owing to dread of the punishment they would meet with; and again in the battle men who have lost a shield or sword or any other arm often throw themselves into the midst of the enemy, hoping either to recover the lost object or to escape by death from inevitable disgrace and the taunts of their relations.

If the same thing ever happens to large bodies, and if entire maniples desert their posts when exceedingly hard pressed, the officers refrain from inflicting the bastinado or the death penalty on all, but find a solution of the difficulty which is both salutary and terror-striking. The tribune assembles the legion, and brings up those guilty of leaving the ranks, reproaches them

sharply, and finally chooses by lots sometimes five, sometimes eight, sometimes twenty of the offenders, so adjusting the number thus chosen that they form as near as possible the tenth part of those guilty of cowardice. Those on whom the lot falls are bastinadoed mercilessly in the manner above described; the rest receive rations of barley instead of wheat and are ordered to encamp outside the camp on an unprotected spot. As therefore the danger and dread of drawing the fatal lot affects all equally, as it is uncertain on whom it will fall; and as the public disgrace of receiving barley rations falls on all alike, this practice is that best calculated both the inspire fear and to correct the mischief.

They also have an admirable method of encouraging the young soldiers to face danger. After a battle in which some of them have distinguished themselves, the general calls an assembly of the troops, and bringing forward those whom he considers to have displayed conspicuous valour, first of all speaks in laudatory terms of the courageous deeds of each and of anything else in their previous conduct which deserves commendation, and afterwards distributes the following rewards. To the man who has wounded an enemy, a spear; to him who has slain and stripped an enemy, a cup if he be in the infantry and horse trappings if in the cavalry, although the gift here was originally only a spear. These gifts are not made to men who have wounded or stripped an enemy in a regular battle or at the storming of a city, but to those who during skirmishes or in similar circumstances, where there is no necessity for engaging in single combat, have voluntarily and deliberately thrown themselves into the danger. To the first man to mount the wall at the assault on a city, he gives a crown of gold. So also those who have shielded and saved any of the citizens or allies receive honorary gifts

from the consul, and the men they saved crown their preservers, if not under their own free will under compulsion from the tribunes who judge the case. The man thus preserved also reverences his preserver as a father all through his life, and must treat him in every way like a parent. By such incentives they excite to emulation and rivalry in the field not only the men who are present and listen to their words, but those who remain at home also. For the recipients of such gifts, quite apart from becoming famous in the army and famous too for the time at their homes, are especially distinguished in religious processions after their return, as no one is allowed to wear decorations except those on whom these honours for bravery have been conferred by the consul; and in their houses they hand up the spoils they won in the most conspicuous places, looking upon them as tokens and evidences of their valour. Considering all this attention given to the matter of punishments and rewards in the army and the importance attached to both, no wonder that the wars in which the Romans engage end so successfully and brilliantly.

As pay the foot-soldier receives two obols a day, a centurion twice as much, and a cavalry-soldier a drachma. The allowance of corn to a foot-soldier is about two-thirds of an Attic medimnus a month, a cavalry-soldier receives seven medimni of barley and two of wheat. Of the allies the infantry receive the same, the cavalry one and one-third medimnus of wheat and five of barley, these rations being a free gift to the allies; but in the case of the Romans the quaestor deducts from their pay the price fixed for their corn and clothes and any additional arm they require.

The following is their manner of breaking up camp. Immediately upon the signal being given they take down the tents and every one packs up. No

tent, however, may be either taken down or set up before those of the tribunes and consul. On the second signal they load the pack animals, and on the third the leaders of the column must advance and set the whole camp in movement. They usually place the *extraordinarii* at the head of the column. Next comes the right wing of the allies and behind them their pack animals. The first Roman legion marches next with its baggage behind it and it is followed by the second legion, which has behind it both its own pack animals and also the baggage of the allies who bring up the rear; for the left wing of the allies forms the extreme rear of the column on the march. The cavalry sometimes marches in the rear of the respective bodies to which it belongs and sometimes on the flanks of the pack train, keeping the animals together and affording them protection. When an attack is expected from the rear, the same order is maintained, but the allied *extraordinarii*, not any other portion of the allies, march in the rear instead of the van. Of the two legions and wings each takes the front or rear position on alternate days, so that by this change of order all may equally share the advantage of a fresh water supply and fresh foraging ground. They have also another kind of marching order at times of danger when they have open ground enough. For in this case the *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii* form three parallel columns, the pack trains of the leading maniples being placed in front of all, those of the second maniples behind the leading maniples, those of the third behind the second and so on, with the baggage trains always interspersed between the bodies of troops. With this order of march when the column is threatened, they face now to the left now to the right, and getting clear of the baggage confront the enemy from whatever side he appears. So that very rapidly, and by one movement the infantry is placed in

order of battle (except perhaps that the *hastati* may have to wheel round the others), and the crowd of baggage animals and their attendants are in their proper place in the battle, being covered by the line of troops.

When the army on the march is near the place of encampment, one of the tribunes and those centurions who are specially charged with this duty go out in advance, and after surveying the whole ground on which the camp is to be formed, first of all determine from the considerations I mentioned above where the consul's tent should be placed and on which front of the space round this tent the legions should encamp. When they have decided on this, they measure out first the area of the *praetorium*, next the straight line along which the tents of the tribunes are erected and next the line parallel to this, starting from which the troops form their encampment. In the same way they draw lines on the other side of the *praetorium*, the arrangement of which I described above in detail and at some length. All this is done in a very short time, as the marking out is a quite easy matter, all the distances being fixed and familiar; and they now plant flags, one on the spot intended for the consul's tent, another on that side of it they have chosen for the camp, a third in the middle of the line on which the tribune's tents will stand, and a fourth on the other parallel line along which the legions will encamp. These latter flags are crimson, but the consul's is white. On the ground on the other side of the *praetorium* they plant either simple spears or flags of other colours. After this they go on to lay out the streets and plant spears in each street. Consequently it is obvious that when the legions march up and get a good view of the site for the camp, all the parts of it are known at once to everyone, as they have only to reckon from the position of the consul's flag. So that, as everyone knows exactly in

which street and in what part of the street his tent will be, since all invariably occupy the same place in the camp, the encamping somewhat resembles the return of an army to its native city. For then they break up at the gate and everyone goes straight on from there and reaches his own house without fail, as he knows both the quarter and the exact spot where his residence is situated. It is very much the same thing in a Roman camp.

The Romans by thus studying convenience in this matter pursue, it seems to me, a course diametrically opposite to that usual among the Greeks. The Greeks in encamping think it of primary importance to adapt the camp to the natural advantages of the ground, first because they shirk the labour of entrenching, and next because they think artificial defences are not equal in value to the fortifications which nature provides unaided on the spot. So that as regards the plan of the camp as a whole they are obliged to adopt all kinds of shapes to suit the nature of the ground, and they often have to shift the parts of the army to unsuitable situations, the consequence being that everyone is quite uncertain whereabouts in the camp his own place or the place of his corps is. The Romans on the contrary prefer to submit to the fatigue of entrenching and other defensive work for the sake of the convenience of having a single type of camp which never varies and is familiar to all.

Such are the most important facts about the Roman armies and especially about the method of encampment. . . .

VII. The Roman Republic Compared with others

One may say that nearly all authors have handed down to us the reputation for excellence enjoyed by the constitutions of Sparta, Crete, Mantinea, and Carthage. Some make mention also of those of Athens and

Thebes. I leave these last two aside; for I am myself convinced that the constitutions of Athens and Thebes need not be dealt with at length, considering that these states neither grew by a normal process, nor did they remain for long in their most flourishing state, nor were the changes they underwent immaterial; but after a sudden effulgence so to speak, the work of chance and circumstance, while still apparently prosperous and with every prospect of a bright future, they experienced a complete reverse of fortune. For the Thebans, striking at the Lacedaemonians through their mistaken policy and the hatred their allies bore them, owing to the admirable qualities of one or at most two men, who had detected these weaknesses, gained in Greece a reputation for superiority. Indeed, that the successes of the Thebans at that time were due not to the form of their constitution, but to the high qualities of their leading men, was made manifest to all by Fortune immediately afterwards. For the success of Thebes grew, attained its height, and ceased with the lives of Epaminondas and Pelopidas; and therefore we must regard the temporary splendour of that state as due not to its constitution, but to its men. We must hold very much the same opinion about the Athenian constitution. For Athens also, though she perhaps enjoyed more frequent periods of success, after her most glorious one of all which was coeval with the excellent administration of Themistocles, rapidly experienced a complete reverse of fortune owing to the inconstancy of her nature. For the Athenian populace always more or less resembles a ship without a commander. In such a ship when fear of the billows or the danger of a storm induces the mariners to be sensible and attend to the orders of the skipper, they do their duty admirably. But when they grow over-confident and begin to entertain contempt for their superiors

and to quarrel with each other, as they are no longer all of the same way of thinking, then with some of them determined to continue the voyage, and others putting pressure on the skipper to anchor, with some letting out the sheets and others preventing them and ordering the sails to be taken it, not only does the spectacle strike anyone who watches it as disgraceful owing to their disagreement and contention, but the position of affairs is a source of actual danger to the rest of those on board; so that often after escaping from the perils of the widest seas and fiercest storms they are shipwrecked in harbour and when close to the shore. This is what has more than once befallen the Athenian state. After having averted the greatest and most terrible dangers owing to the high qualities of the people and their leaders, it has come to grief at times by sheer heedlessness and unreasonableness in seasons of unclouded tranquillity. Therefore I need say no more about this constitution or that of Thebes, states in which everything is managed by the uncurbed impulse of a mob in the one case exceptionally headstrong and ill-tempered and in the other brought up in an atmosphere of violence and passion.

To pass to the constitution of Crete, two points here demand our attention. How was it that the most learned of the ancient writers—Ephorus, Xenophon, Callisthenes, and Plato—state in the first place that it is one and the same with that of Lacedaemon and in the second place pronounce it worthy of commendation? In my own opinion neither of these assertions is true. Whether or not I am right the following observations will show. And first as to its dissimilarity with the constitution of Sparta. The peculiar features of the Spartan state are said to be first the land laws by which no citizen may own more than another, but all must possess an equal share of

the public land; secondly their view of money-making; for, money being esteemed of no value at all among them, the jealous contention due to the possession of more or less is utterly done away with; and thirdly the fact that of the magistrates by whom or by whose co-operation the whole administration is conducted, the kings hold a hereditary office and the members of the Gerousia are elected for life. In all these respects the Cretan practice is exactly the opposite. Their laws go as far as possible in letting them acquire land to the extent of their power, as the saying is, and money is held in such high honour among them that its acquisition is not only regarded as necessary, but as most honourable. So much in fact do sordid love of gain and lust for wealth prevail among them, that the Cretans are the only people in the world in whose eyes no gain is disgraceful. Again their magistracies are annual and elected on a democratic system. So that it often causes surprise how these authors proclaim to us, that two political systems the nature of which is so opposed, are allied and akin to each other. Besides overlooking such differences, these writers go out of their way to give us their general views, saying that Lycurgus was the only man who ever saw the points of vital importance for good government. For, there being two things to which a state owes its preservation, bravery against the enemy and concord among the citizens, Lycurgus by doing away with the lust for wealth did away also with all civil discord and broils. In consequence of which the Lacedaemonians, being free from these evils, excel all the Greeks in the conduct of their internal affairs and in their spirit of union. After asserting this, although they witness that the Cretans, on the other hand, owing to their ingrained lust of wealth are involved in constant broils both public and private, and in murders and civil wars, they regard this as

immaterial, and have the audacity to say that the two political systems are similar. Ephorus actually, apart from the names, uses the same phrases in explaining the nature of the two states; so that if one did not attend to the proper names it would be impossible to tell of which he is speaking.

Such are the points in which I consider these two political systems to differ, and I will now give my reasons for not regarding that of Crete as worthy of praise or imitation. In my opinion there are two fundamental things in every state, by virtue of which its principle and constitution is either desirable or the reverse. I mean customs and laws. What is desirable in these makes men's private lives righteous and well ordered and the general character of the state gentle and just, while what is to be avoided has the opposite effect. So just as when we observe the laws and customs of a people to be good, we have no hesitation in pronouncing that the citizens and the state will consequently be good also, thus when we notice that men are covetous in their private lives and that their public actions are unjust, we are plainly justified in saying that their laws, their particular customs, and the state as a whole are bad. Now it would be impossible to find except in some rare instances personal conduct more treacherous or a public policy more unjust than in Crete. Holding then the Cretan constitution to be neither similar to that of Sparta nor in any way deserving of praise and imitation, I dismiss it from the comparison which I have proposed to make.

Nor again is it fair to introduce Plato's republic which also is much belauded by some philosophers. For just as we do not admit to athletic contests artists or athletes who are not duly entered and have not been in training, so we have no right to admit this constitution to the competition for the prize of merit, unless it first give an exhibition of its actual working.

Up to the present it would be just the same thing to discuss it with a view to comparison with the constitutions of Sparta, Rome, and Carthage, as to take some statue and compare it with living and breathing men. For even if the workmanship of the statue were altogether praiseworthy, the comparison of a lifeless thing with a living being would strike spectators as entirely imperfect and incongruous.

Dismissing, therefore, these constitutions, we will return to that of Sparta. To me it seems as far as regards the maintenance of concord among the citizens, the security of the Laconian territory and the preservation of the freedom of Sparta, the legislation of Lycurgus and the foresight he exhibited were so admirable that one is forced to regard his institutions as of divine rather than human origin. For the equal division of landed property and the simple and common diet were calculated to produce temperance in the private lives of the citizens and to secure the commonwealth as a whole from civil strife, as was the training in the endurance of hardships and dangers to form brave and valorous men. Now when both these virtues, fortitude and temperance, are combined in one soul or in one city, evil will not readily originate within such men or such peoples, nor will they be easily overmastered by their neighbours. By constructing, therefore, his constitution in this manner and out of these elements, Lycurgus secured the absolute safety of the whole territory of Laconia, and left to the Spartans themselves a lasting heritage of freedom. But as regards the annexation of neighbouring territories, supremacy in Greece, and, generally speaking, an ambitious policy, he seems to me to have made absolutely no provision for such contingencies, either in particular enactments or in the general constitution of the state. What he left

undone, therefore, was to bring to bear on the citizens some force or principle, by which, just as he had made them simple and contented in their private lives, he might make the spirit of the city as a whole likewise contented and moderate. But now, while he made them most unambitious and sensible people as regards their private lives and the institutions of their city, he left them most ambitious, domineering, and aggressive towards the rest of the Greeks.

For who is not aware that they were almost the first of the Greeks to cast longing eyes on the territory of their neighbours, making war on the Messenians out of covetousness and for the purpose of enslaving them? And is it not narrated by all historians how out of sheer obstinacy they bound themselves by an oath not to desist from the siege before they had taken Messene? It is no less universally known that owing to their desire of domination in Greece they were obliged to execute the behests of the very people they had conquered in battle. For they conquered the Persians when they invaded Greece, fighting for her freedom; but when the invaders had withdrawn and fled they betrayed the Greek cities to them by the peace of Antalcidas, in order to procure money for establishing their sovereignty over the Greeks; and here a conspicuous defect in their constitution revealed itself. For as long as they aspired to rule over their neighbours or over the Peloponnesians alone, they found the supplies and resources furnished by Laconia itself adequate, as they had all they required ready to hand, and quickly returned home whether by land or sea. But once they began to undertake naval expeditions and to make military campaigns outside the Peloponnese, it was evident that neither their iron currency nor the exchange of their crops for commodities which they lacked, as

permitted by the legislation of Lycurgus, would suffice for their needs, since these enterprises demanded a currency in universal circulation and supplies drawn from abroad; and so they were compelled to be beggars from the Persians, to impose tribute on the islanders, and exact contributions from all the Greeks, as they recognized that under the legislation of Lycurgus it was impossible to aspire, I will not say to supremacy in Greece, but to any position of influence.

But what is the purpose of this digression? It is to show from the actual evidence of facts, that for the purpose of remaining in secure possession of their own territory and maintaining their freedom the legislation of Lycurgus is amply sufficient, and to those who maintain this to be the object of political constitutions we must admit that there is not and never was any system or constitution superior to that of Lycurgus. But if anyone is ambitious of greater things, and esteems it finer and more glorious than that to be the leader of many men and to rule and lord it over many and have the eyes of all the world turned to him, it must be admitted that from this point of view the Laconian constitution is defective, while that of Rome is superior and better framed for the attainment of power, as is indeed evident from the actual course of events. For when the Lacedaemonians endeavoured to obtain supremacy in Greece, they very soon ran the risk of losing their own liberty; whereas the Romans, who had aimed merely at the subjection of Italy, in a short time brought the whole world under their sway, the abundant of supplies they had at their command conducing in no small measure to this result.

The constitution of Carthage seems to me to have been originally well contrived as regards its most distinctive points. For there were kings, and

the house of Elders was an aristocratical force, and the people were supreme in matters proper to them, the entire frame of the state much resembling that of Rome and Sparta. But at the time when they entered on the Hannibalic War, the Carthaginian constitution had degenerated, and that of Rome was better. For as every body or state or action has its natural periods first of growth, then of prime, and finally of decay, and as everything in them is at its best when they are in their prime, it was for this reason that the difference between the two states manifested itself at this time. For by as much as the power and prosperity of Carthage had been earlier than that of Rome, by so much had Carthage already begun to decline; while Rome was exactly at her prime, as far as at least as her system of government was concerned. Consequently the multitude at Carthage had already acquired the chief voice in deliberations; while at Rome the senate still retained this; and hence, as in one case the masses deliberated and in the other the most eminent men, the Roman decisions on public affairs were superior, so that although they met with complete disaster, they were finally by the wisdom of their counsels victorious over the Carthaginians in the war.

But to pass to differences of detail, such as, to begin with, the conduct of war, the Carthaginians naturally are superior at sea both in efficiency and equipment, because seamanship has long been their national craft, and they busy themselves with the sea more than any other people; but as regards military service on land the Romans are much more efficient. They indeed devote their whole energies to this matter, whereas the Carthaginians entirely neglect their infantry, though they do pay some slight attention to their cavalry. The reason of this is that the troops they employ are foreign

and mercenary, whereas those of the Romans are natives of the soil and citizens. So that in this respect also we must pronounce the political system of Rome to be superior to that of Carthage, the Carthaginians continuing to depend for the maintenance of their freedom on the courage of a mercenary force but the Romans on their own valour and on the aid of their allies. Consequently even if they happen to be worsted at the outset, the Romans redeem defeat by final success, while it is the contrary with the Carthaginians. For the Romans, fighting as they are for their country and their children, never can abate their fury but continue to throw their whole hearts into the struggle until they get the better of their enemies. It follows that though the Romans are, as I said, much less skilled in naval matters, they are on the whole successful at sea owing to the gallantry of their men; for although skill in seamanship is of no small importance in naval battles, it is chiefly the courage of the marines that turns the scale in favour of victory. Now not only do Italians in general naturally excel Phoenicians and Africans in bodily strength and personal courage, but by their institutions also they do much to foster a spirit of bravery in the young men. A single instance will suffice to indicate the pains taken by the state to turn out men who will be ready to endure everything in order to gain a reputation in their country for valour.

Whenever any illustrious man dies, he is carried at his funeral into the forum to the so-called rostra, sometimes conspicuous in an upright posture and more rarely reclined. Here with all the people standing round, a grown-up son, if he has left one who happens to be present, or if not some other relative mounts the rostra and discourses on the virtues and successful achievements of the dead. As a consequence the multitude and not only

those who had a part in these achievements, but those also who had none, when the facts are recalled to their minds and brought before their eyes, are moved to such sympathy that the loss seems to be not confined to the mourners, but a public one affecting the whole people. Next after the interment and the performance of the usual ceremonies, they place the image of the departed in the most conspicuous position in the house, enclosed in a wooden shrine. This image is a mask reproducing with remarkable fidelity both the features and complexion of the deceased. On the occasion of public sacrifices they display these images, and decorate them with much care, and when any distinguished member of the family dies they take them to the funeral, putting them on men who seem to them to bear the closest resemblance to the original in stature and carriage. These representatives wear togas, with a purple border if the deceased was a consul or praetor, whole purple if he was a censor, and embroidered with gold if he had celebrated a triumph or achieved anything similar. They all ride in chariots preceded by the fasces, axes, and other insignia by which the different magistrates are wont to be accompanied according to the respective dignity of the offices of state held by each during his life; and when they arrive at the rostra they all seat themselves in a row on ivory chairs. There could not easily be a more ennobling spectacle for a young man who aspires to fame and virtue. For who would not be inspired by the sight of the images of men renowned for their excellence, all together and as if alive and breathing? What spectacle could be more glorious than this? Besides, he who makes the oration over the man about to be buried, when he has finished speaking of him recounts the successes and exploits of the rest whose images are present, beginning with the most ancient. By this

means, by this constant renewal of the good report of brave men, the celebrity of those who performed noble deeds is rendered immortal, while at the same time the fame of those who did good service to their country becomes known to the people and a heritage for future generations. But the most important result is that young men are thus inspired to endure every suffering for public welfare in the hope of winning the glory that attends on brave men. What I say is confirmed by the facts. For many Romans have voluntarily engaged in single combat in order to decide a battle, not a few have faced certain death, some in war to save the lives of the rest, and others in peace to save the republic. Some even when in office have put their own sons to death contrary to every law or custom, setting a higher value on the interest of their country than on the ties of nature that bound them to their nearest and dearest.

Many such stories about many men are related in Roman history, but one told of a certain person will suffice for the present as an example and as a confirmation of what I say. It is narrated that when Horatius Cocles was engaged in combat with two of the enemy at the far end of the bridge over the Tiber that lies in the front of the town, he saw large reinforcements coming up to help the enemy, and fearing lest they should force the passage and get into town, he turned round and called to those behind him to retire and cut the bridge with all speed. His order was obeyed, and while they were cutting the bridge, he stood to his ground receiving many wounds, and arrested the attack of the enemy who were less astonished at his physical strength than at his endurance and courage. The bridge once cut, the enemy were prevented from attacking; and Cocles, plunging into the river in full armour as he was, deliberately sacrificed his life, [2] regarding the safety of

his country and the glory which in future would attach to his name as of more importance than his present existence and the years of life which remained to him. Such, if I am not wrong, is the eager emulation of achieving noble deeds engendered in the Roman youth by their institutions.

[2] According to Livy (whom Macaulay follows) Horatius swam across and was saved.

Again, the laws and customs relating to the acquisition of wealth are better in Rome than at Carthage. At Carthage nothing which results in profit is regarded as disgraceful; at Rome nothing is considered more so than to accept bribes and seek gain from improper channels. For no less strong than their approval of money-making is their condemnation of unscrupulous gain from forbidden sources. A proof of this is that at Carthage candidates for office practise open bribery, whereas at Rome death is the penalty for it. Therefore as the rewards offered to merit are the opposite in the two cases, it is natural that the steps taken to gain them should also be dissimilar.

But the quality in which the Roman commonwealth is most distinctly superior is in my opinion the nature of their religious convictions. I believe that it is the very thing which among other peoples is an object of reproach, I mean superstition, which maintains the cohesion of the Roman State. These matters are clothed in such pomp and introduced to such an extent into their public and private life that nothing could exceed it, a fact which will surprise many. My own opinion at least is that they have adopted this course for the sake of the common people. It is a course which perhaps would not have been necessary had it been possible to form a state composed of wise men, but as every multitude is fickle, full of lawless desires, unreasoned passion, and violent anger, the multitude must be held

in by invisible terrors and suchlike pageantry. For this reason I think, not that the ancients acted rashly and at haphazard in introducing among the people notions concerning the gods and beliefs in the terrors of hell, but that the moderns are most rash and foolish in banishing such beliefs. The consequence is that among the Greeks, apart from other things, members of the government, if they are entrusted with no more than a talent, though they have ten copyists and as many seals and twice as many witnesses, cannot keep their faith; whereas among the Romans those who as magistrates and legates are dealing with large sums of money maintain correct conduct just because they have pledged their faith by oath. Whereas elsewhere it is a rare thing to find a man who keeps his hands off public money, and whose record is clean in this respect, among the Romans one rarely comes across a man who has been detected in such conduct. . . .

VIII. Conclusion of the Treatise on the Roman Republic

That all existing things are subject to decay and change is a truth that scarcely needs proof; for the course of nature is sufficient to force this conviction on us. There being two agencies by which every kind of state is liable to decay, the one external and the other a growth of the state itself, we can lay down no fixed rule about the former, but the latter is a regular process. I have already stated what kind of state is the first to come into being, and what the next, and how the one is transformed into the other; so that those who are capable of connecting the opening propositions of this inquiry with its conclusion will now be able to foretell the future unaided. And what will happen is, I think, evident. When a state has weathered many great perils and subsequently attains to supremacy and uncontested sovereignty, it is evident that under the influence of long established

prosperity, life will become more extravagant and the citizens more fierce in their rivalry regarding office and other objects than they ought to be. As these defects go on increasing, the beginning of the change for the worse will be due to love of office and the disgrace entailed by obscurity, as well as to extravagance and purse-proud display; and for this change the populace will be responsible when on the one hand they think they have a grievance against certain people who have shown themselves grasping, and when, on the other hand, they are puffed up by the flattery of others who aspire to office. For now, stirred to fury and swayed by passion in all their counsels, they will no longer consent to obey or even to be the equals of the ruling caste, but will demand the lion's share for themselves. When this happens, the state will change its name to the finest sounding of all, freedom and democracy, but will change its nature to the worst thing of all, mob-rule.

Having dealt with the origin and growth of the Roman republic, and with its prime and its present condition, and also with the differences for better or worse between it and others, I may now close this discourse more or less so.

But, drawing now upon the period immediately subsequent to the date at which I abandoned my narrative to enter on this digression, I will make brief and summary mention of one occurrence; so that, as if exhibiting a single specimen of a good artist's work, I may make manifest not by words only but by actual fact the perfection and strength of principle of the Republic such as it then was. Hannibal, when, after his victory over the Romans at Cannae, the eight thousand who garrisoned the camp fell into his hands, after making them all prisoners, allowed them to send a deputation to

those at home on the subject of their ransom and release. Upon their naming ten of their most distinguished members, he sent them off after making them swear that they would return to him. One of those nominated just as he was going out of the camp said he had forgotten something and went back, and after recovering the thing he had left behind again took his departure, thinking that by his return he had kept his faith and absolved himself of his oath. Upon their arrival in Rome they begged and entreated the senate not to grudge the prisoners their release, but to allow each of them to pay three minae and return to his people; for Hannibal, they said, had made this concession. The men deserved to be released, for they had neither been guilty of cowardice in the battle nor had they done anything unworthy of Rome; but having been left behind to guard the camp, they had, when all the rest had perished in the battle, been forced to yield to circumstances and surrender to the enemy. But the Romans, though they had met with severe reverses in the war, and had now, roughly speaking, lost all their allies and were in momentary expectation of Rome itself being placed in peril, after listening to this plea, neither disregarded their dignity under the pressure of calamity, nor neglected to take into consideration every proper step; but seeing that Hannibal's object in acting thus was both to obtain funds and to deprive the troops opposed to him of their high spirit, by showing that, even if defeated, they might hope for safety, they were so far from acceding to this request, that they did not allow their pity for their kinsmen, or the consideration of the service the men would render them, to prevail, but defeated Hannibal's calculation and the hopes he had based on them by refusing to ransom the men, and at the same time imposed by law on their own troops the duty of either conquering or dying in the field, as

there was no hope of safety for them if defeated. Therefore after coming to this decision they dismissed the nine delegates who returned of their own free will, as bound by their oath, while as for the man who had thought to free himself from the oath by a ruse they put him in irons and returned him to the enemy; so that Hannibal's joy at his victory in the battle was not so great as his dejection, when he saw with amazement how steadfast and high-spirited were the Romans in their deliberations.

THE END OF BOOK VI

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK VII

I. AFFAIRS OF ITALY

Capua and Petelia

Polybius in his seventh Book says that the people of Capua in Campania, having acquired great wealth owing to the fertility of the soil, fell into habits of luxury and extravagance surpassing even the reports handed down to us concerning Croton and Sybaris. Being unable, then, to support the burden of their prosperity they called in Hannibal, and for this received from the Romans a chastisement which utterly ruined them. But the people of Petelia who remained loyal to Rome suffered such privation, when besieged by Hannibal, that after eating all the leather in the city and consuming the bark and tender shoots of all the trees in it, having now endured the siege for eleven months without being relieved, they surrendered with the approval of the Romans. [1]

[1] From Athenaeus xii. 528 a.

II. Affairs of Sicily

Hieronymus of Syracuse

After the plot against King Hieronymus of Syracuse, Thraso having withdrawn, Zoïppus and Adranodorus persuaded Hieronymus to send an embassy at once to Hannibal. Appointing Polycleitus of Cyrene and Philodemus of Argos he dispatched them to Italy with orders to discuss a joint plan of action with the Carthaginians. At the same time he sent his brothers to Alexandria. Hannibal gave a courteous reception to Polycleitus

and Philodemus, held out many hopes to the youthful king, and sent the ambassadors back without delay accompanied by the Carthaginian Hannibal, who was then commander of the triremes, and the Syracusans, Hippocrates and his brother the younger Epicydes. These two brothers had been serving for some time under Hannibal, having adopted Carthage as their country, since their grandfather had been exiled because he was thought to have assassinated Agatharchus, one of the sons of Agathocles. On their arrival at Syracuse Polycleitus and his colleague having presented their report, and the Carthaginian having spoken as Hannibal had directed, the king at once showed a disposition to side with the Carthaginians. He said that this Hannibal who had come to him must proceed at once to Carthage, and he promised to send envoys himself to discuss matters with the Carthaginians.

At the same time the Roman praetor in command at Lilybaeum, on learning of these proceedings, sent envoys to Hieronymus to renew the treaty made with his ancestors. Hieronymus, in the presence of this embassy, said he sympathized with the Romans for having been wiped out by the Carthaginians in the battles in Italy, and when the ambassadors, though amazed at his tactlessness, nevertheless inquired who said this about them, he pointed to the Carthaginians there present and bade them refute them if the story was false. When they said that it was not the habit of their countrymen to accept the word of their enemies, and begged him not to do anything contrary to the treaty—for that would be both just and the best thing for himself—he said he would consider the question and inform them later; but he asked them why before his grandfather's death they had sailed as far as Pachynum with fifty ships and then gone back again. For as a fact

the Romans, a short time before this, hearing that Hiero had died, and fearful lest people in Syracuse, despising the tender years of the heir he had left, should change the government, had made this cruise, but on hearing that Hiero was still alive had returned to Lilybaeum. Now, therefore, they confessed that they had made the cruise wishing to protect him owing to his youth and assist him in maintaining his rule, but on receiving news that his grandfather was alive had sailed away again. Upon their saying this, the young man answered: "Allow me too, Romans, to maintain my rule by turning round and steering for the expectations I have from Carthage." The Romans, understanding what his bias was, held their peace for the time, and returning reported what had been said to the praetor who had sent them. Henceforth they continued to keep an eye on the king and to be on their guard against him as an enemy.

Hieronymus, appointing Agatharchus, Onesigenes, and Hipposthenes, sent them to Carthage with Hannibal, their orders being to make a treaty on the following terms: the Carthaginians were to assist him with land and sea forces, and after expelling the Romans from Sicily they were to divide the island so that the frontier of their respective provinces should be the river Himeras, which very nearly bisects Sicily. On their arrival in Carthage they discussed this matter and pursued the negotiations, the Carthaginians showing on all points a most accommodating spirit. But Hippocrates and his brother, in confidential intercourse with Hieronymus, at first captivated him by giving him glowing accounts of Hannibal's marches, tactics, and battles, and then went on to tell him that no one had a better right than himself to rule over the whole of Sicily, in the first place because he was the son of Nereis, the daughter of Pyrrhus, the only man whom all the Sicilians had

accepted as their leader and king deliberately out of affection, and secondly, as the heir of the sovereignty of his grandfather Hiero. Finally, they so far talked over the young man that he paid no heed at all to anyone else, being naturally of an unstable character and being now rendered much more feather-brained by their influence. So while Agatharchus and his colleagues were still negotiating at Carthage in the above sense, he sent off other envoys, affirming that the sovereignty of the whole of Sicily was his by right, demanding that the Carthaginians should help him to recover Sicily and promising to assist them in their Italian campaign. The Carthaginians, though they now clearly perceived in its full extent the fickleness and mental derangement of the young man, still thought it was in many ways against their interests to abandon Sicilian affairs, and therefore agreed to everything he asked, and having previously got ready ships and troops they prepared to send their forces across to Sicily. The Romans, on learning of this, sent envoys again to him protesting against his violating their treaty with his forefathers Hieronymus summoning his council consulted them as to what he was to do. The native members kept silent, as they were afraid of the prince's lack of self-control; but Aristomachus of Corinth, Damippus of Lacedaemon, and Autonous of Thessaly expressed themselves in favour of abiding by the treaty with Rome. Adranodorus was alone in saying that the opportunity should not be let slip, as this was the only chance of acquiring the sovereignty of Sicily. Upon his saying this the king asked Hippocrates and his brother what their opinion was, and when they said "the same as Adranodorus" the council came to a close. Such was the way in which the war against Rome was decided on. But wishing not to appear to give a maladroit reply to the envoys, he blundered so fatally, that he made it

certain that he would not only forfeit the good graces of the Romans but would give them the most serious offence. He said he would adhere to the treaty if they repaid him all the gold they had received from his grandfather Hiero; next if they returned the corn and other gifts they had had from him during the whole of his reign; and thirdly, if they would acknowledge that all the country and towns east of the river Himeras belonged to Syracuse. It was on these terms that the envoys and the council parted. Hieronymus from this time onward made active preparations for war, collecting and arming his forces and getting his other supplies ready. . . .

The city of Leontini as regards its general position is turned to the north. Through the middle of it runs a level valley in which stand the government offices, the law courts, and the agora in general. On each side of this valley runs a ridge precipitous from end to end, the flat ground above the brows of these ridges being covered with houses and temples. The town has two gates, one at the southern end of the above-mentioned valley leading towards Syracuse, and the other at its northern end leading to the so-called Leontine plain and the arable land. Under the one ridge, that on the western side, runs a river called the Lissus, and parallel to it just under the cliff stands a row of houses between which and the river is the road I mentioned. . . .

Some of the historians who have described the fall of Hieronymus have done so at great length and introduced much of the marvellous, telling of the prodigies that occurred before his reign and the misfortunes of the Syracusans, and describing in tragic colours the cruelty of his character and the impiety of his actions, and finally the strange and terrible nature of the circumstances attending his death, so that neither Phalaris nor Apollodorus

nor any other tyrant would seem to have been more savage than he. And yet he was a boy when he succeeded to power, and lived only thirteen months after. In this space of time it is possible that one or two men may have been tortured, and some of his friends and of the other Syracusans put to death, but it is hardly probable that there was any excess of unlawful violence or any extraordinary impiety. One must admit that his character was exceedingly capricious and violent; but he is not at least to be compared with either of these tyrants. The fact, as it seems to me, is that those who write narratives of particular events, when they have to deal with a subject which is circumscribed and narrow, are compelled for lack of facts to make small things great and to devote much space to matters really not worthy of record. There are some also who fall into a similar error through lack of judgement. How much more justifiable indeed it would be for a writer to devote those pages of narrative which serve to fill up his book to overflowing to Hiero and Gelo, making no mention at all of Hieronymus? This would be both more agreeable to the curious reader and more useful to the student.

For Hiero in the first place acquired the sovereignty of Syracuse and her allies by his own merit, having found ready provided for him by fortune neither wealth, fame, nor anything else. And, what is more, he made himself king of Syracuse unaided, without killing, exiling, or injuring a single citizen, which indeed is the most remarkable thing of all; and not only did he acquire his sovereignty so, but maintained it in the same manner. For during a reign of fifty-four years he kept his country at peace and his own power undisturbed by plots, and he kept clear of that envy which is wont to wait on superiority. Actually on several occasions when he

wished to lay down his authority, he was prevented from doing so by the common action of the citizens. And having conferred great benefits on the Greeks, and studied to win their high opinion, he left behind him a great personal reputation and a legacy of universal goodwill to the Syracusans. Further, although he lived constantly in the midst of affluence, luxury, and most lavish expenditure, he survived till over ninety, and retained all his faculties, as well as keeping every part of his body sound, which seems to me to testify in no slight measure, indeed very strongly, to his having led a temperate life.

Gelo, who lived till over fifty, set before himself in his life the most admirable object, that is to obey his father, and not to esteem either wealth or royal power or anything else as of higher value than affection and loyalty to his parents.

III. Affairs of Greece

Treaty between Hannibal and King Philip of Macedon

This is a sworn treaty between us, Hannibal the general, Mago, Myrcan, Barmocar, and all other Carthaginian senators present with him, and all Carthaginians serving under him, on the one side, and Xenophanes the Athenian, son of Cleomachus, the envoy whom King Philip, son of Demetrius, sent to us on behalf of himself, the Macedonians and allies, on the other side.

In the presence of Zeus, Hera, and Apollo: in the presence of the Genius of Carthage, of Heracles, and Iolaus: in the presence of Ares, Triton, and Poseidon: in the presence of the gods who battle for us and the Sun, Moon, and Earth; in the presence of Rivers, Lakes, and Waters: in the presence of all the gods who possess Macedonia and the rest of Greece: in the presence

of all the gods of the army who preside over this oath. Thus saith Hannibal the general, and all the Carthaginian senators with him, and all Carthaginians serving with him, that as seemeth good to you and to us, so should we bind ourselves by oath to be even as friends, kinsmen, and brothers, on these conditions. (1) That King Philip and the Macedonians and the rest of the Greeks who are their allies shall protect the Carthaginians, the supreme lords, and Hannibal their general, and those with him, and all under the dominion of Carthage who live under the same laws; likewise the people of Utica and all cities and peoples that are subject to Carthage, and our soldiers and allies and cities and peoples in Italy, Gaul, and Liguria, with whom we are in alliance or with whomsoever in this country we may hereafter enter into alliance. (2) King Philip and the Macedonians and such of the Greeks as are the allies shall be protected and guarded by the Carthaginians who are serving with us, by the people of Utica and by all cities and peoples that are subject to Carthage, by our allies and soldiers and all peoples and cities in Italy, Gaul, and Liguria, who are our allies, and by such others as may hereafter become our allies in Italy and the adjacent regions. (3) We will enter into no plot against each other, nor lie in ambush for each other, but with all zeal and good fellowship, without deceit or secret design, we will be enemies of such as war against the Carthaginians, always excepting the kings, cities, and ports with which we have sworn treaties of alliance. (4) And we, too, will be the enemies of such as war against King Philip, always excepting the Greeks, cities, and people with which we have sworn treaties of alliance. (5) You will be our allies in the war in which we are engaged with the Romans until the gods vouchsafe the victory to us and to you, and you will give us such help as we

have need of or as we agree upon. (6) As soon as the gods have given us the victory in the war against the Romans and their allies, if the Romans ask us to come to terms of peace, we will make such a peace as will comprise you too, and on the following conditions: that the Romans may never make war upon you; that the Romans shall no longer be masters of Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos, Dimale, Parthini, or Atitania: and that they shall return to Demetrius of Pharos all his friends who are in the dominions of Rome. (7) If ever the Romans make war on you or on us, we will help each other in the war as may be required on either side. (8) In like manner if any others do so, excepting always kings, cities, and peoples with whom we have sworn treaties of alliance. (9) If we decide to withdraw any clauses from this treaty or to add any we will withdraw such clauses or add them as we both may agree. . . .

Messene and Philip V

Democracy being established at Messene, the principal men having been banished and the government being in the hands of those to whom their property had been allotted, those of the old citizens who remained found it difficult to brook the equality which these men had assumed. . . .

Gorgus of Messene was second to none at Messene in wealth and birth, and by his athletic achievements in the season of his prime had become the most famous of all competitors in gymnastic contests. Indeed in personal beauty, in general dignity of bearing, and in the number of the prizes he had won he was inferior to none of his contemporaries. And when he had given up athletics and taken to politics and the service of his country, he gained in this sphere a reputation in no way beneath his former one, being very far

removed from that boorishness which is apt to characterize athletes and being looked upon as a most able and level-headed politician. . . .

Interrupting my narrative here, I wish to say a few words about Philip, because this was the beginning of the revolution in his character and his notable change for the worse. For this seems to me a very striking camp for such men of action as wish in how small a measure to correct their standard of conduct by the study of history. For both owing to the splendour of his position and the brilliancy of his genius the good and evil impulses of this prince were very conspicuous and very widely known throughout Greece; and so were the practical consequences of his good and evil impulses as compared with each other. That after he succeeded to the throne, Thessaly, Macedonia, and all his hereditary dominions were more submissive and more attached to him than to any king before him, although he had come to the throne at such an early age, it is easy to see from the following facts. Although he was frequently called away from Macedonia owing to the war against the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians, not only did none of these peoples revolt, but none of the barbarous tribes on his frontier ventured to touch Macedonia. Again it would be impossible to speak in adequate terms of the affection and devotion to him of Alexander, Chrysogonus and his other friends. Nor can one overstate the benefits he conferred in a short space of time on the Peloponnesians, Boeotians, Epirots, and Acarnanians. In fact, as a whole, if one may use a somewhat extravagant phrase, one might say most aptly of Philip that he was the darling of the whole of Greece owing to his beneficent policy. A most conspicuous and striking proof of the value of honourable principles and good faith is that all the Cretans united and entering into one confederacy elected Philip president of

the whole island, this being accomplished without any appeal to arms or violence, a thing of which it would be difficult to find a previous instance. For as he totally changed his principles, it was inevitable that he should totally reverse also other men's opinion of him, and that he should meet with totally different results in his undertakings. This indeed was the fact; and events I am now about to relate will render it quite evident to those who follow them with care. . . .

When Philip, king of Macedon, wished to seize on the cardinal of Messene, he told the magistrates of that city that he wished to visit the citadel and sacrifice to Zeus. He went up with his suite and sacrificed, and when, as is the custom, the entrails of the slaughtered victim were offered him he received them in his hands and stepping a little aside, held them out to Aratus and those with him and asked, "What does the sacrifice signify? To withdraw from the citadel or remain in possession of it?" Demetrius said on the spur of the moment "If you have the mind of a diviner, it bids you withdraw at once, but if you have the mind of a vigorous king it tells you to keep it, so that you may not after losing this opportunity see hand in vain for another more favourable one. For it is only by holding both his horns that you can keep the ox under," meaning by the horns Mount Ithome and the Acrocorinthus and by the ox the Peloponnese. Philip then turned to Aratus and said, "Is your advice the same?" When Aratus made no answer, he asked him to say exactly what he thought. After some hesitation he spoke as follows. "If without breaking faith with the Messenians you can keep this place, I advise you to keep it. But if by seizing and garrisoning it you are sure to lose all other citadels and the garrison by which you found the allies guarded when Antigonus handed them down to you"—meaning

by this good faith—"consider if it will not be better now to withdraw your men and leave good faith here guarding with it the Messenians as well as the other allies." Philip's personal inclination was to play false, as he showed by his subsequent conduct; but as he had been severely censured a short time previously by the younger Aratus for killing the men, and as the elder Aratus spoke now with freedom and authority, and begged him not to turn a deaf ear to his advice, he felt ashamed, and taking him by the hand said, "Let us go back by the way we came . . ."

Aratus seeing that Philip was avowedly entering into hostilities with Rome and had entirely changed his sentiment towards the allies, with difficulty persuaded him by urging on him a number of difficulties and pleas. Now that actual facts have confirmed a statement I made in my fifth Book, which was there a mere unsupported pronouncement, I wish to recall it to the memory of those who have followed this history, so as to leave none of my statements without proof or disputable. When in describing the Aetolian war I reached that part of my narrative in which I said that Philip was too savage in his destruction of the porticoes and other votive offerings at Thermus, and that we should not owing to his youth at the time lay the blame so much on the king himself as on the friends he associated with, I then stated that Aratus' conduct throughout his life vindicated him from the suspicion of having acted so wickedly, but that such conduct savoured of Demetrius of Pharos. I then promised to make this clear from what I would afterwards relate, and I reserved the proof of the above assertion for this occasion, when, as I just stated in my account of his treatment of the Messenians, all owing to a difference of one day—Demetrius having arrived and Aratus being too late—Philip committed the first of his great

crimes. Henceforth, as if he had had a taste of human blood and of the slaughter and betrayal of his allies, he did not change from a man into a wolf, as in the Arcadian tale cited by Plato, but he changed from a king into a cruel tyrant. And a still more striking proof of the sentiment of each is this advice that they respectively gave about the citadel of Messene; so that there is not a shadow of doubt left about the Aetolian matter. If we once accept this, it is easy to make up our minds about the extent to which their principles differed. For just as Philip on this occasion took the advice of Aratus and kept his faith to the Messenians regarding their citadel, and as the saying is, did a little to heal the terrible wound inflicted by his massacres, so in Aetolia by following the advice of Demetrius he was not only guilty of impiety to the gods by destroying the offerings consecrated to them, but he sinned against men by transgressing the laws of war, and spoilt his own projects by showing himself the implacable and cruel foe of his adversaries. The same holds for his conduct in Crete. There, too, as long as he was guided by Aratus in his general policy, not only was he not guilty of injustice to any of the islanders, but he did not give the least offence to any; so that he had all the Cretans at his service, and by the strictness of his principles attracted the affection of all the Greeks. Again by letting himself be guided by Demetrius and inflicting on the Messenians the disasters I described above, he lost both the affection of his allies and the confidence of the other Greeks. Of such decisive importance for young kings, as leading either to misfortune or to the firm establishment of their kingdom, is the judicious choice of the friends who attend on them, a matter to which most of them, with a sort of indifference, devote no care at all. . . .

IV. Affairs of Asia

Antiochus and Achaeus

Round Sardis there was a constant succession of skirmishes and battles both by night and day, the soldiers devising against each other every species of ambush, counter-ambush, and attack: to describe which in detail would not only be useless, but would be altogether tedious. At least after the siege had lasted more than one year, Lagoras the Cretan intervened. He had considerable military experience, and had observed that as a rule the strongest cities are those which most easily fall into the hands of the enemy owing to the negligence of their inhabitants when, relying on the natural and artificial strength of a place, they omit to keep guard and become generally remiss. He had also noticed that these very cities are usually captured at their very strongest points where the enemy are supposed to regard attack as hopeless. At present he saw that owing to the prevailing notion of the extreme strength of Sardis, every one despaired of taking it by any such *coup de main*, and that their only hope was to subdue it by famine; and this made him pay all the more attention to the matter and seek out every possible means in his eagerness to get hold of some such favourable opportunity. Observing that the wall along the so-called Saw—which connects the citadel with the town—was unguarded, he began to entertain schemes and hopes of availing himself of this. He had discovered the remissness of the guard here from the following circumstance. The place is exceedingly precipitous and beneath it there is a ravine into which they used to throw the corpses from the city and the entrails of the horses and mules that died, so that a quantity of vultures and other birds used to collect here. Lagoras, then, seeing that when the birds had eaten their fill they used constantly to rest on the cliffs and on the wall, knew for a certainty that the

wall was not guarded and was usually deserted. He now proceeded to visit the ground at night and note carefully at what places ladders could be brought up and placed against the wall. Having found that this was possible at a certain part of the cliff, he approached the king on the subject. The king welcomed the proposal, and begged Lagoras to put his design in execution, upon which the latter promised to do the best he could himself, but begged the king to appeal for him to Theodotus the Aetolian and Dionysius the captain of the bodyguard and beg them to be his associates and take part in the enterprise, both of them being in his opinion men of such ability and courage as the undertaking required. The king at once did as he was requested, and these three officers having come to an agreement and discussed all the details, waited for a night in which there would be no moon towards morning. When such a night came, late in the evening of the day before that on which they were to take action they chose from the whole army fifteen men distinguished by their physical strength and courage, whose duty it would be to bring up the ladders and afterwards mount the wall together with themselves and take part in the hazardous attempt. They next chose thirty others who were to lie in ambush at a certain distance, so that when they themselves had crossed the wall and reached the nearest gate, these men should fall upon the gate from outside and attempt to cut through the hinges and bar of the gate, while they themselves cut from within the bar on that side and the bolt-pins. These were to be followed by a select force of two thousand men, who were to march in through the gate and occupy the upper edge of the theatre, a position favourably situated for attacking the garrisons both of the citadel and city. In order that no suspicion of the truth should arise from the

selection of these men, he had caused it to be reported that the Aetolians were about to throw themselves into the city through a certain ravine, and that, acting on this information, energetic measures had to be taken to prevent them.

Every preparation having been made, as soon as the moon set, Lagoras and his party came stealthily up to the foot of the cliff with their scaling ladders and concealed themselves under a projecting rock. At daybreak, as the watch was withdrawing from this spot, and the king, as was his custom, was engaged in sending some troops to the outposts and in marching the main body out to the hippodrome and there drawing them up in battle order, at first no one had any inkling of what was occurring. But when two ladders were set up and Dionysius was the first to mount the one and Lagoras the other, there was a great excitement and commotion in the army. It so happened that the assailants could not be seen by those in the town or from the citadel by Achaeus owing to the projecting brow of the rock; but the venturesome and perilous ascent was made in full view of Antiochus' army; so that either from astonishment and surprise or from apprehension and fear of the result all stood breathless but at the same time overjoyed. The king, therefore, noticing this excitement in the camp and wishing to divert the attention both of his own forces and of the besieged from his attempt, advanced his army and made an attack on the gate at the other side of the town, known as the Persian gate. Achaeus, observing from the citadel the unusual movement of the enemy, was for long quite at a loss, being entirely puzzled and unable to understand what was going on. However, he sent off to meet them at the gate a force which was too late to assist, as they had to descend by a narrow and precipitous path. Aribazus, the commander of the

town, advanced unsuspectingly to the gate which he saw Antiochus was attacking, and making some of his men mount the wall sent the rest out through the gate, with orders to engage the enemy and check his advance.

Simultaneously Lagoras, Theodotus, and Dionysius had crossed the precipitous ridge and reached the gate beneath it. While some of them engaged the enemy they encountered, the rest were cutting the bar, while those outside to whom this task had been assigned had come up to the gate and were similarly employed. The gate was soon opened and the two thousand entered and occupied the upper edge of the theatre, upon which all the men hurried back from the walls and from the Persian gate, where Aribazus had previously sent them to resist the enemy, all eager to pass the word to fall upon those who had entered the city. But, upon this taking place, the gate was opened for their retreat, some of the king's men who were following close upon the retiring force got in together with them, and as soon as they had made themselves masters of the gate, others from behind continued to pour in, while others again were breaking open the neighbouring gates. Aribazus and all the garrison of the town, after a short struggle with the invaders, fled in haste to the citadel, and upon this, while Theodotus and Lagoras remained in the neighbourhood of the theatre, showing sound practical sense in thus holding themselves in reserve during the whole operation, the rest of the army pouring in from all sides took possession of the city. Henceforth some of them massacring all they met, others setting fire to the houses and others dispersing themselves to pillage and loot, the destruction and sack of Sardis was complete. It was in this manner that Antiochus made himself master of Sardis. . . .

THE END OF BOOK VII

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK VIII

I. FROM THE PREFACE

It appears to me not to be foreign to my general purpose and original plan to call the attention of my readers to the vast scope of operations of the two states Rome and Carthage, and the diligence with which they pursued their purposes. For who can help admiring the way in which, although they had on their hands such a serious war for the possession of Italy, and another no less serious for the possession of Spain, and though they were in each case both of them quite uncertain as to their prospects of success and in an equally perilous position, they were yet by no means content with the undertakings on which they were thus engaged, but disputed likewise the possession of Sardinia and Sicily, not only entertaining hopes of conquest all the world over, but laying in supplies and making preparations for the purpose? It is indeed when we come to look into the details that our admiration is fully aroused". The Romans had two complete armies for the defence of Italy under the two consuls and two others in Spain, the land forces there being commanded by Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio and the fleet by Publius Cornelius Scipio; and of course the same was the case with the Carthaginians. But besides this a Roman fleet lay off the coast of Greece to observe the movements of Philip, commanded first by Marcus Valerius and later by Publius Sulpicius, while at the same time Appius with a hundred quinqueremes and Marcus Claudius Marcellus with a land force protected

their interests in Sicily, Hamilcar doing the same on the part of the Carthaginians.

I consider that a statement I often made at the outset of this work thus receives confirmation from actual facts, I mean my assertion that it is impossible to get from writers who deal in particular episodes a general view of the whole process of history. For how by the bare reading of events in Sicily or in Spain can we hope to learn and understand either the magnitude of the occurrences or the thing of greatest moment, what means and what form of government Fortune has employed to accomplish the most surprising feat she has performed in our times, that is, to bring all the known parts of the world under one rule and dominion, a thing absolutely without precedent? For how the Romans took Syracuse and how they occupied Spain may possibly be learnt from the perusal of such particular histories; but how they attained to universal empire and what particular circumstances obstructed their grand design, or again how and at what time circumstances contributed to its execution is difficult to discern without a general history. Nor for the same reason is it easy otherwise to perceive the greatness of their achievements and the value of their system of polity. It would not be surprising in itself that the Romans had designs on Spain and Sicily and made military and naval expeditions to these two countries; but when we realize how at the same time that these projects and countless others were being carried out by the government of a single state, this same people who had all this on their hands were exposed in their own country to wars and other perils, then only will the events appear in their just light and really call forth admiration, and only thus are they likely to obtain the attention they deserve. So much for those who suppose that by a study of

separate histories they will become familiar with the general history of the world as a whole.

II. Affairs of Sicily

The Siege of Syracuse

At the time that Epicydes and Hippocrates [1] seized on Syracuse, alienating themselves and the rest of the citizens from the friendship of Rome, the Romans, who had already heard of the fate of Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, appointed Appius Claudius as propraetor, entrusting him with the command of the land forces, while they put their fleet under that of Marcus Claudius Marcellus. These commanders took up a position not far from the city, and decided to attack it with their land forces in the neighbourhood of the Hexapyli, and with their fleet at the Stoa Scytice in Achradina, where the wall reaches down to the very edge of the sea. Having got ready their blindages, missiles, and other siege material, they were in high hopes owing to their large numbers that in five days their works would be much more advanced than those of the enemy, but instead they did not reckon with the ability of Archimedes, or foresee that in some cases the genius of one man accomplishes much more than any number of hands. However, now they learnt the truth of this saying by experience. The strength of Syracuse lies in the fact that the wall extends in a circle along a chain of hills with overhanging brows, which are, except in a limited number of places, by no means easy of approach even with no one to hinder it. Archimedes now made such extensive preparations, both within the city and also to guard again an attack from the sea, that there would be no chance of the defenders being employed in meeting emergencies, but that every move of the enemy could be replied to instantly by a counter move.

Appius, however, with his blindages, and ladders attempted to use these for attacking the portion of the wall which abuts on the Hexapylus to the east.

[1] Leading Syracusan politicians after the assassination of Hieronymus.

Meanwhile Marcellus was attacking Achradina from the sea with sixty quinqueremes, each of which was full of men armed with bows, slings, and javelins, meant to repulse those fighting from the battlements. He had also eight quinqueremes from which the oars had been removed, the starboard oars from some and the larboard ones from others. These were lashed together two and two, on their dismantled sides, and pulling with the oars on their outer sides they brought up to the wall the so-called "sambucae" [2] These engines are constructed as follows. A ladder was made four feet broad and of a height equal to that of the wall when planted at the proper distance. Each side was furnished with a breastwork, and it was covered in by a screen at a considerable height. It was then laid flat upon those sides of the ships which were in contact and protruding a considerable distance beyond the prow. At the top of the masts there are pulleys with ropes, and when they are about to use it, they attach the ropes to the top of the ladder, and men standing at the stern pull them by means of the pulleys, while others stand on the prow, and supporting the engine with props, assure its being safely raised. After this the towers on both the outer sides of the ships bring them close to shore, and they now endeavour to set the engine I have described up against the wall. At the summit of the ladder there is a platform protected on three sides by wicker screens, on which four men mount and face the enemy resisting the efforts of those who from the battlements try to prevent the sambuca from being set up against the wall.

As soon as they have set it up and are on a higher level than the wall, these men pull down the wicker screens on each side of the platform and mount the battlements or towers, while the rest follow them through the sambuca which is held firm by the ropes attached to both ships. The construction was appropriately called a sambuca, for when it is raised the shape of the ship and ladder together is just like the musical instrument.

[2] A sambuca was a musical instrument somewhat resembling a harp.

Such were the contrivances with which the Romans intended to attack the towers. But Archimedes, who had prepared engines constructed to carry to any distance, so damaged the assailants at long range, as they sailed up, with his more powerful mangonels and heavier missiles as to throw them into much difficulty and distress; and as soon as these engines shot too high he continued using smaller and smaller ones as the range became shorter, and, finally, so thoroughly shook their courage that he put a complete stop to their advance, until Marcellus was so hard put to it that he was compelled to bring up his ships secretly while it was still night. But when they were close in shore and too near to be struck by the mangonels Archimedes had hit upon another contrivance for attacking the men who were fighting from the decks. He had pierced in the wall at short distances a series of loopholes of the height of a man and of about a palm's breadth on the outer side. Stationing archers and "small scorpions" [3] opposite these inside the wall and shooting through them, he disabled the soldiers. So that he not only made the efforts of the enemy ineffective whether they were at a distance or close at hand, but destroyed the greater number of them. And when they tried to raise the sambucae he had engines ready all along the wall, which

while invisible at other times, reared themselves when required from inside above the wall, their beams projecting far beyond the battlements, some of them carrying stones weighing as much as ten talents and others large lumps of lead. Whenever the sambucae approached these beams were swung round on their axis, and by means of a rope running through a pulley dropped the stones on the sambuca, the consequence being that not only was the engine smashed, but the ship and those on board were in the utmost peril. There were some machines again which were directed against parties advancing under the cover of blinds and thus protected from injury by missiles shot through the wall. These machines, on the one hand, discharged stones large enough to chase the assailants from the prow, and at the same time let down an iron hand attached to a chain with which the man who piloted the beam would clutch at the ship, and when he had got hold of her by the prow, would press down the opposite end of the machine which was inside the wall. Then when he had thus by lifting up the ship's prow made her stand upright on her stern, he made fast the opposite end of the machine, and by means of a rope and pulley let the chain and hand suddenly drop from it. The result was that some of the vessels fell on their sides, some entirely capsized, while the greater number, when their prows were thus dropped from a height, went under water and filled, throwing all into confusion. Marcellus was hard put to it by the resourcefulness of Archimedes, and seeing that the garrison thus baffled his attacks not only with much loss to himself but with derision he was deeply vexed, but still made fun of his own performances, saying "Archimedes uses my ships to ladle sea-water into his wine cups, but my sambuca band is flogged out of the banquet in disgrace."

[3] A certain kind of engine for the discharge of missiles was so named.

Such was the result of the siege from the sea. And Appius, too, found himself in similar difficulties and abandoned his attempt. For his men while at a distance were mowed down by the shots from the mangonels and catapults, the supply of artillery and ammunition being admirable both as regards quantity and force, as indeed was to be expected where Hiero had furnished the means and Archimedes had designed and constructed the various contrivances. And when they did get near the wall they were so severely punished by the continuous volleys of arrows from the loopholes of which I spoke above that their advance was checked or, if they attacked under the cover of mantelets, they were destroyed by the stones and beams dropt upon their heads. The besieged also inflicted no little damage by the above-mentioned hands hanging from cranes, for they lifted up men, armour, and all, and then let them drop. At last Appius retired to his camp and called a council of his military tribunes, at which it was unanimously decided to resort to any means rather than attempt to take Syracuse by storm. And to this resolution they adhered; for during their eight months' investment of the city, while leaving no stratagem or daring design untried, they never once ventured again upon an assault. Such a great and marvellous thing does the genius of one man show itself to be when properly applied to certain matters. The Romans at least, strong as they were both by sea and land, had every hope of capturing the town at once if one old man of Syracuse were removed; but as long as he was present, they did not venture even to attempt to attack in that fashion in which the ability of Archimedes could be used in the defense. On the contrary, thinking that

owing to the large population of the town the best way to reduce it was by famine, they placed their hope in this, cutting off supplies from the sea by their fleet and those from the land by their army. Wishing not to spend in idleness the time during which they besieged Syracuse, but to attain some useful results outside, the commanders divided themselves and their forces, so that Appius with two-thirds of their army invested the town while Marcus took the other third and made raids on the parts of Sicily which favoured the Carthaginians.

III. Affairs of Greece, Philip, and Messenia

Upon arriving at Messene Philip proceeded to devastate the country like an enemy acting from passion rather than from reason. For he expected, apparently, that while he continued to inflict injuries, the sufferers would never feel any resentment or hatred towards him.

What induced me to give a more explicit account of these matters in this and the previous Book, was, in addition to the reasons I above stated, the fact that while some authors have left the occurrences in Messenia unnoticed others, owing either to their regard for the kings or their fear of them, have explained to us unreservedly, that not only did the outrages committed by Philip against the Messenians in defiance of divine or human law deserve no censure, but that on the contrary all his acts were to be regarded as praiseworthy achievements. It is not only with regard to the Messenians that we find the historians of Philip's life to be thus biased but in other cases, the result being that their works much more resemble panegyrics than histories. My own opinion is that we should neither revile nor extol kings falsely, as has so often been done, but always give an account of them consistent with our previous statements and in accord with

the character of each. It may be said that it is easy enough to say this but exceedingly difficult to do it, because there are so many and various conditions and circumstances in life, yielding to which men are prevented from uttering or writing their real opinions. Bearing this in mind we must pardon these writers in some cases, but in others we should not.

In this respect Theopompus is one of the writers who is most to blame. At the outset of his history of Philip, son of Amyntas, he states that what chiefly induced him to undertake this work was that Europe had never produced such a man before as this Philip; and yet immediately afterwards in his preface and throughout the book he shows him to have been first so incontinent about women, that as far as in him lay he ruined his own home by his passionate and ostentatious addiction to this kind of thing; next a most wicked and mischievous man in his schemes for forming friendships and alliances; thirdly, one who had enslaved and betrayed a large number of cities by force or fraud; and lastly, one so addicted to strong drink that he was frequently seen by his friends manifestly drunk in broad daylight. Anyone who chooses to read the beginning of his forty-ninth Book will be amazed at the extravagance of this writer. Apart from other things, he has ventured to write as follows. I set down the passage in his own words: "Philip's court in Macedonia was the gathering-place of all the most debauched and brazen-faced characters in Greece or abroad, who were there styled the king's companions. For Philip in general showed no favour to men of good repute who were careful of their property, but those he honoured and promoted were spendthrifts who passed their time drinking and gambling. In consequence he not only encouraged them in their vices, but made them past masters in every kind of wickedness and lewdness. Was

there anything indeed disgraceful and shocking that they did not practise, and was there anything good and creditable that they did not leave undone? Some of them used to shave their bodies and make them smooth although they were men, and others actually practised lewdness with each other though bearded. While carrying about two or three minions with them they served others in the same capacity, so that we would be justified in calling them not courtiers but courtesans and not soldiers but strumpets. For being by nature man-slayers they became by their practices man-whores. In a word," he continues, "not to be prolix, and especially as I am beset by such a deluge of other matters, my opinion is that those who were called Philip's friends and companions were worse brutes and of a more beastly disposition than the Centaurs who established themselves on Pelion, or those Laestrygones who dwelt in the plain of Leontini, or any other monsters."

Everyone must disapprove of such bitter feeling and lack of restraint on the part of this writer. For not only does he deserve blame for using language which contradicts his statement of the object he had in writing, but for falsely accusing the king and his friends, and especially for making this false accusation in coarse and unbecoming terms. If he had been writing of Sardanapalus or one of his companions he would hardly have dared to use such foul language; and we all know the principles and the debauched character of that king from the epigram on his tomb:

Mine are they yet
the meats I ate,
my wanton sport above,
the joy of love.

But in speaking of Philip and his friends not only would one hesitate to accuse them of cowardice, effeminacy, and shamelessness to boot, but on the contrary if one set oneself the task of singing their praises one could scarcely find terms adequate to characterize their bravery, industry, and in general the virtue of these men who indisputably by their energy and daring raised Macedonia from the rank of a petty kingdom to that of the greatest and most glorious monarchy in the world. Quite apart from what was accomplished during Philip's lifetime, the success achieved after Philip's death by the aid of Alexander indisputably established in the eyes of all their reputations for valour. While we should perhaps give Alexander, as commander-in-chief, the credit for much, notwithstanding his extreme youth, we should assign no less to his co-operators and friends, who defeated the enemy in many marvellous battles, exposed themselves often to extraordinary toil, danger, and hardship, and after possessing themselves of vast wealth and unbounded resources for satisfying every desire, neither suffered in a single case any impairment of their physical powers, nor even to gratify their passion were guilty of malpractices and licentiousness; but all of them, one may say, proved themselves indeed to be kingly men by virtue of their magnanimity, self-restraint, and courage, as long as they lived with Philip and afterwards with Alexander. It is unnecessary to mention anyone by name. And after the death of Alexander, when they disputed the empire of the greater part of the world, they left a record so glorious in numerous memoirs that while we may allow that Timaeus' bitter invective against Agathocles, the ruler of Sicily, however unmeasured it may seem, is justified—for he is accusing him as an enemy, a bad man, and a tyrant—that of Theopompus does not deserve serious consideration. For after

announcing that he was going to write about a king richly endowed by nature with every quality that makes for virtue, he charges him with everything that is shameful and atrocious. So that either this author must be a liar and a flatterer in the prefatory remarks at the outset of his history, or he is entirely foolish and childish in his assertions about particulars, imagining that by senseless and far-fetched abuse he will insure his own credit and gain acceptance for his laudatory estimate of Philip.

Again, no one could approve of the general scheme of this writer. Having set himself the task of writing the history of Greece from the point at which Thucydides leaves off, just when he was approaching the battle of Leuctra and the most brilliant period of Greek history, he abandoned Greece and her efforts, and changing his plan decided to write the history of Philip. Surely it would have been much more dignified and fairer to include Philip's achievements in the history of Greece than to include the history of Greece in that of Philip. For not even a man preoccupied by his devotion to royalty would, if he had the power and had found a suitable occasion, have hesitated to transfer the leading part and title of his work to Greece; and no one in his sound senses who had begun to write the history of Greece and had made some progress in it would have exchanged this for the more pompous biography of a king. What can it have been which forced Theopompus to overlook such flagrant inconsistencies, if it were not that in writing the one history his motive was to do good, in writing that of Philip to further his own interests? Possibly indeed as regards this error in changing the scheme of the work he might have found something to say for himself, if anyone had questioned him, but as for the foul language he uses about Philip's friends I think he would hardly have been able to defend

himself, but would have admitted that he sinned gravely against propriety. . . .

The Messenians had now become Philip's enemies, but he was unable to inflict any serious damage on them, although he made an attempt to devastate their territory. Towards his most intimate friends, however, he was guilty of the greatest brutality. It was not long before through the agency of Taurion, his commissioner in the Peloponnese, he poisoned the elder Aratus who had disapproved of his treatment of Messene. The fact was not generally known at the time, the drug not being one of those which kill at once, but one which takes time and produces a sickly condition of the body; but Aratus himself was aware of the criminal attempt, as the following circumstance shows. While keeping it secret from everybody else, he could not refrain from revealing it to Cephalon, an old servant with whom he was very familiar. This servant waited on him during his illness with great assiduity, and on one occasion when he called attention to some spittle on the wall being tinged with blood, Aratus said "That, Cephalon, is the reward I have got from Philip for my friendship." Such a great and fine quality is moderation that the sufferer was more ashamed than the doer of the deed to feel that after acting in union with Philip in so many great enterprises and after such devotion to his interests he had met with so base a reward for his loyalty. This man then, because he had so often held the chief office in Achaea, and owing to the number and importance of the benefits he had conferred on the nation, had fitting honours paid him on his death both by his own city and by the Achaean League. They voted him sacrifices and honours such as are paid to heroes, and everything in short which contributes to immortalize a man's memory, so that, if the dead have any

feeling, he must take pleasure in the gratitude of the Achaeans and in the recollection of the hardships and perils he suffered in his life. . . .

Philip's capture of Lissus in Illyria

Philip's attention had long been fixed on Lissus and Acrolissus, and being most anxious to possess himself of these places he started for them with his army. After two days' march he traversed the defiles and encamped by the river Ardaxanus not far from the town. Observing that the defences of Lissus, both natural and artificial, were admirable from land as well as sea, and that Acrolissus which was close to it owing to its height and its general strength looked as if there would be no hope of taking it by storm, he entirely renounced this latter hope, but did not quite despair of taking the town. Noticing that the ground between Lissus and the foot of Acrolissus was convenient for directing an attack from it on the town he decided to open hostilities on this side, and employ a stratagem suitable to the circumstances. After giving his Macedonians a day's rest and addressing them in such terms as the occasion demanded, he concealed during the night the largest and most efficient portion of his light-armed troops in some thickly-wooded ravines above the aforesaid ground on the side farthest from the sea, and next day with his peltasts and the rest of the light-armed infantry marched along the sea on the other side of the city. After thus passing round the city and reaching the place I mentioned, he gave the impression of being about to ascend towards the town on this side. The arrival of Philip was no secret, and considerable forces from all the neighbouring parts of Illyria had collected in Lissus; but as for Acrolissus they had such confidence in its natural strength that they had assigned quite a small garrison to it. Consequently, on the approach of the Macedonians

those in the town began pouring out of it confident in their numbers and in the advantage of the ground. The king halted his peltasts on the level ground, and ordered his light infantry to advance on the hills and deliver a vigorous attack on the enemy. His orders being obeyed, the combat was for some time an even one; but afterwards Philip's troops, yielding to the difficulties of the ground and to superior numbers, were put to flight. When they took refuge with the peltasts, the Illyrians from the town in their contempt for them followed them down the hill and engaged the peltasts on the level ground. At the same time the garrison of Acrolissus, seeing that Philip was slowly withdrawing his divisions one after the other, and thinking that he was abandoning the field, imperceptibly let themselves be enticed out owing to their confidence in the strength of the place, and then abandoning Acrolissus in small bodies poured down by bye-paths to the level ground, thinking there would be a thorough rout of the enemy and a chance of some booty. But at this juncture the troops which had been posted in ambush on the land side rose unobserved and delivered a brisk attack, the peltasts at the same time turning and falling upon the enemy. Upon this the force from Lissus was thrown into disorder and retreating in scattered groups gained the shelter of the city, while those who had abandoned Acrolissus were cut off from it by the troops which had issued from the ambuscade. So that both Acrolissus was taken beyond all expectation at once and without striking a blow, and Lissus surrendered on the next day after a desperate struggle, the Macedonians having delivered several energetic and terrific assaults. Philip having thus, to the general surprise, made himself master of these two places assured by this achievement the submission of all the district round, most of the Illyrians placing their towns

in his hands of their own accord. For after the fall of these fortresses those who resisted could look forward to no shelter in strongholds or other hope of safety. . . .

IV. Affairs of Asia

Capture of Achaeus

There was a certain Cretan named Bolis who had long occupied a high position at the court of Ptolemy, being regarded as a man possessed of superior intelligence, exceptional courage, and much military experience. Sosibius, who had by continued intercourse with this man secured his confidence and rendered him favourably disposed to himself and ready to oblige him, put the matter in his hands, telling him that under present circumstances there was no more acceptable service he could render the king than to contrive a plan to save Achaeus. Bolis after listening to him, said he would think the matter over, and left him. After taking counsel with himself he came to Sosibius two or three days afterwards and agreed to undertake the business, adding that he had spent some time in Sardis and knew its topography, and the Cambylus the commander of the Cretans in Antiochus' army was not only his fellow-citizen, but his relative and friend. It happened that Cambylus and his force of Cretans had charge of one of the outposts behind the citadel where the ground did not admit of siege-works, but was guarded simply by the continuous line of these troops of Cambylus. Sosibius received this suggestion with joy, and since he was firmly convinced either that it was impossible to rescue Achaeus from his dangerous situation, or that once one regarded it as possible, no one could do it better than Bolis, since, moreover, Bolis himself helped matters on by displaying such zeal, the project rapidly began to move. Sosibius both

advanced funds to meet all the expenses of the undertaking and promised a large sum in the event of its success, then by dwelling in the most exaggerated terms on the rewards to be expected from the king and from Achaeus himself whom they were rescuing raised the hopes of Bolis to the utmost.

Bolis, who was quite ready for the enterprise, set sail without the least delay carrying dispatches in cypher and credentials first to Nicomachus at Rhodes, whose affection for Achaeus and fidelity towards him were regarded as being like those of a father to a son, and next to Melancomas at Ephesus. For these were the two men who in former times had acted as the agents of Achaeus in his negotiations with Ptolemy and all his other foreign schemes.

On reaching Rhodes and subsequently Ephesus, Bolis communicated with these men, and finding them disposed to accede to his requests next sent one of his officers named Arianus to Cambylus, saying that he had been dispatched from Alexandria to raise troops, and wished to meet Cambylus to consult him about some matters of urgency. He therefore thought it best to fix a date and place at which they could meet without anyone knowing of it. Arianus made haste to meet Cambylus and deliver his message, upon which the latter readily complied with the request, and having fixed a day and a place known to both, at which they could meet by night, sent Arianus back. Now, Bolis being a Cretan and naturally astute, had been weighing every circumstance and testing the soundness of every plan; but finally met Cambylus as Arianus had arranged, and gave him the letter. With this before them they discussed the matter from a thoroughly Cretan point of view. For they did not take into consideration either the

rescue of the man in danger or their loyalty to those who had charged them with the task, but only their personal security and advantage. Both of them, then, Cretans as they were, soon arrived at the same decision, which was to divide between them in equal shares the ten talents advanced by Sosibius and then to reveal the project to Antiochus and undertake, if assisted by him, to deliver Achaeus into his hands on receiving a sum of money down and the promise of a reward in the future adequate to the importance of the enterprise. Upon this Cambylus undertook to manage matters with Antiochus, while Bolis agreed to send Arianus to Achaeus in a few days with letters in cypher from Nicomachus and Melancomas bidding Cambylus see to it that he got into the citadel and out again in safety. Should Achaeaus agree to make the attempt and answer Nicomachus and Melancomas, Bolis engaged to devote his energies to the matter and communicate with Cambylus. With this understanding they took leave and each continued to act as they had agreed.

First of all Cambylus, as soon as he had an opportunity, laid the matter before Antiochus. The king, who was both delighted and surprised at the offer, was ready on the one hand in his extreme joy to promise anything and on the other hand was so distrustful that he demanded a detailed account of their project and the means they were to employ. Hereupon, being now convinced, and almost regarding the plan as directly inspired by Providence, he continued to urge upon Cambylus to put it into execution. Bolis meanwhile had likewise communicated with Nicomachus and Melancomas, who, believing that the attempt was being made in all good faith, at once drew up for Arianus letters to Achaeus written in the cypher they used to employ, so that no one into whose hands a letter fell could read

a word of it, and sent him off with them, begging Achaeus to place confidence in Bolis and Cambylus. Arianus, gaining admission to the citadel by the aid of Cambylus, handed the letters to Achaeus, and as he had been initiated into the plot from the outset gave a most accurate and detailed account of everything in answer to the numerous and varied questions that were asked him concerning Sosibius and Bolis, concerning Nicomachus and Melancomas and chiefly concerning Cambylus. He was able to support this cross-questioning with confidence and candour chiefly because he had no knowledge of the really important part of the agreement between Cambylus and Bolis. Achaeus, convinced by the examination of Arianus and chiefly by the letters in cypher from Nicomachus and Melancomas, at once dispatched Arianus with a reply. After some continuance of the correspondence Achaeus finally entrusted his fortunes to Nicomachus, there being now no other hope of safety left to him, and directed him to send Bolis with Arianus on a moonless night when he would deliver himself into their hands. It should be known that the notion of Achaeus was, when once he had escaped from his present perilous position, to hasten without any escort to Syria, for he had the greatest hope, that by suddenly and unexpectedly appearing to the people in Syria while Antiochus was still occupied in the siege of Sardis, he would create a great movement in his favour and meet with a good reception at Antioch and throughout Coele-Syria and Phoenicia.

Achaeus, then, his mind full of such hopes and calculations, was waiting for the appearance of Bolis. Melancomas, when on the arrival of Arianus he read the letter, sent Bolis off after exhorting him at length and holding out great hopes to him in the event of his succeeding in the enterprise. Sending

on Arianus in advance and acquainting Cambylus with his arrival, he came by night to the appointed spot. After spending a day together, and settling exactly how the matter should be managed, they entered the camp after nightfall. They had regulated their plan as follows. Should Achaeus come down from the acropolis alone or accompanied only by Bolis and Arianus, he need not give them the least concern, and would easily fall into the trap. But if he were accompanied it would be more difficult for those to whom he should entrust his person to carry out his plan, especially as they were anxious to capture him alive, this being what would most gratify Antiochus. It was therefore indispensable that Arianus, in conducting Achaeus out of the citadel, should lead the way, as he was acquainted with the path, having frequently passed in and out of it, while Bolis would have to be last of all, in order that on arriving at the place where Cambylus was to have his man ready in ambush, he could catch hold of Achaeus and hold him fast, so that he would neither escape in the confusion of the night across the wooded country, nor in his despair cast himself from some precipice, but should as they designed fall into his enemies' hands alive. Such being the arrangement, Cambylus, on the same night that Bolis arrived, took him to speak with Antiochus in private. The king received him graciously, assured him of the promised reward, and after warmly exhorting both of them to put the plan in execution without further delay left for his own camp, while Bolis a little before daybreak went up with Arianus and entered the citadel while it was yet dark.

Achaeus, receiving Bolis with singular cordiality, questioned him at length about all the details of the scheme, and judging both from his appearance and his manner of talking that he was a man equal to the gravity

of the occasion, while he was on the one hand overjoyed at the hope of delivery, he was yet in a state of the utmost excitement and anxiety owing to the magnitude of the consequences. As, however, he was second to none in intelligence, and had had considerable experience of affairs, he judged it best not to repose entire confidence in Bolis. He therefore informed him that it was impossible for him to come out of the citadel at the present moment, but that he would send three or four of his friends, and after they had joined Melancomas, he would himself get ready to leave. Achaeus indeed was doing his best, but he did not consider that, as the saying is, he was trying to play the Cretan with a Cretan; for there was no probable precaution of this kind that Bolis had not minutely examined. However, when the night came in which Achaeus had said he would send out his friends with them, he sent on Arianus and Bolis to the entrance of the citadel, ordering them to await there the arrival of those who were about to go out with them. When they had done as he requested, he revealed at the last moment the project to his wife Laodice, who was so much taken by surprise that she almost lost her wits, so that he had to spend some time in beseeching her to be calm and in soothing her by dwelling on the brightness of the prospect before him. After that, taking four companions with him, whom he dressed in fairly good clothes while he himself wore a plain and ordinary dress and made himself appear to be of mean condition, he set forth, ordering one of his friends to answer all Arianus' questions and to address any necessary inquiries to him stating that the others did not know Greek.

Upon their meeting Arianus, the latter placed himself in front of owing to his acquaintance with the path, while Bolis, as he had originally

designed, brought up the rear, finding himself, however, in no little doubt and perplexity as to the facts. For although a Cretan and ready to entertain every kind of suspicion regarding others, he could not owing to the darkness make out which was Achaeus, or even if he were present or not. But most of the way down being very difficult and precipitous, at certain places with slippery and positively dangerous descents, whenever they came to one of these places some of them would take hold of Achaeus and others give him a hand down, as they were unable to put aside for the time their habitual attitude of respect to him, and Bolis very soon understood which of them was Achaeus. When they reached the spot where they had agreed to meet Cambylus, and Bolis gave the preconcerted signal by a whistle, the men from the ambush rushed out and seized the others while Bolis himself caught hold of Achaeus, clasping him along with his clothes so that his hands were inside, as he was afraid lest on perceiving that he was betrayed he might attempt his life, for he had provided himself with a sword. He was very soon surrounded on all sides and found himself in the hands of his enemies, who at once led him and his friends off to Antiochus. The king, who had long been waiting the issue in a fever of excitement, had dismissed his usual suite and remained awake in his tent attended only by two or three of his bodyguard. When Cambylus and his men entered and set down Achaeus on the ground bound hand and foot, Antiochus was so dumbstruck with astonishment that for a long time he remained speechless and at last was deeply affected and burst into tears, feeling thus, as I suppose, because he actually saw how hard to guard against and how contrary to all expectation are events due to Fortune. For Achaeus was the son of Andromachus the brother of Laodice the wife of Seleucus; he had

married Laodice the daughter of King Mithridates, and had been sovereign of all Asia on this side of the Taurus; and now when he was supposed by his own forces and those of the enemy to be dwelling secure in the strongest fortress in the world, he was actually sitting on the ground bound hand and foot and at the mercy of his enemies, not a soul being aware of what had happened except the actual perpetrators of the deed.

But when at dawn the king's friends flocked to his tent, as was the custom, and saw the thing with their own eyes, they were in the same case as the king himself had been; for they were so astonished that they could not credit their sense. At the subsequent sitting of the Council, there were many proposals as to the proper punishment to inflict on Achaeus, and it was decided to lop off in the first place the unhappy prince's extremities, and then, after cutting off his head and sewing it up in an ass's skin, to crucify his body. When this had been done, and the army was informed of what had happened, there was such enthusiasm and wild excitement throughout the whole camp, that Laodice, who was alone aware of her husband's departure from the citadel, when she witnessed the commotion and disturbance in the camp, divined the truth. And when soon afterwards the herald reached her, announcing the fate of Achaeus and bidding her come to an arrangement and withdraw from the citadel, there was at first no answer from those in the citadel but loud wailing and extravagant lamentation, not so much owing to the affection they bore Achaeus as because the event struck everyone as so strange and entirely unexpected. After this outburst the garrison continued in great perplexity and hesitation. Antiochus having dispatched Achaeus continued to press hard upon those in the citadel, feeling convinced that some means of taking the place would be

furnished him by the garrison itself and more especially by the rank and file. And this actually took place. For they quarrelled among themselves and divided into two factions, the one placing itself under Aribazus and the other under Laodice; upon which as they had no confidence in each other, they both of them very soon surrendered themselves and the place.

Thus did Achaeus perish, after taking every reasonable precaution and defeated only by the perfidy of those whom he had trusted, leaving two useful lessons to posterity, firstly to trust no one too easily, and secondly not to be boastful in the season of prosperity, but being men to be prepared for anything.

Discussion of some similar Instances

Tiberius, the Roman pro-consul, fell into an ambush and after a gallant resistance perished with all who accompanied him. Regarding such accidents it is by no means safe to pronounce whether the sufferers are to be blamed or pardoned, because many who have taken all reasonable precautions have notwithstanding fallen victims to enemies who did not scruple to violate the established laws of mankind. Nevertheless we should not out of indolence at once abandon the attempt to reach a decision of this point, but keeping in view the times and circumstances of each case censure certain generals and acquit others. What I mean will be clear from the following instances.

Archidamus, the king of Sparta, fearful of the ambition of Cleomenes, went into exile; but a short time afterwards was induced to put himself into the power of Cleomenes. Consequently he lost both his throne and his life, leaving nothing to be said in his defence to posterity. For the situation being still the same and Cleomenes having become even more ambitious and

powerful, we cannot but confess that in surrendering to the very man from whom he had formerly saved himself almost miraculously by flight, he deserved the fate he met with. Again, Pelopidas of Thebes, though acquainted with the unprincipled character of Alexander, tyrant of Pherae, and well aware that every tyrant regards as his chief enemies the champions of liberty, after prevailing on Epaminondas to espouse the cause of democracy not only at Thebes but throughout Greece, and after himself appearing in Thessaly with a hostile force for the purpose of overthrowing the despotism of Alexander, actually ventured a second time to go on a mission to this very tyrant. The consequence was that by falling into the hands of his enemies he both inflicted great damage on Thebes and destroyed his previous reputation by rashly and ill-advisedly reposing confidence where it was utterly misplaced.

A similar misfortune befell the Roman consul Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio in the first Punic War, when he ill-advisedly surrendered to the enemy. I could mention more than one other case.

While, therefore, we must censure those who incautiously put themselves in the power of the enemy, we should not blame those who take all possible precautions. For it is absolutely impracticable to place trust in no one, and we cannot find fault with anyone for acting by the dictates of reason after receiving adequate pledges, such pledges being oaths, wives and children held as hostages, and above all the past life of the person in question; thus to be betrayed and ruined by such means carries no reproach to the sufferer but only to the author of the deed. The safest course of all therefore is to seek for such pledges as will render it impossible for the man in whom we trust to break his word, but as these can rarely be obtained, the

second best course is to take reasonable precautions, so that if our expectations are deceived, we may at least not fail to be condoned by public opinion. This has been the case with many victims of treachery in former times, but most conspicuous instance and that nearest in date to the time of which I am now speaking will be that of Achaeus, who though he had taken every possible step to guard against treachery and ensure his safety, foreseeing and providing against every contingency as far as it was possible for human intelligence to do so, yet fell into the power of his enemy. The event created a general feeling of pity and pardon for the victim, while his betrayers were universally condemned and detested.

The Gothic King Cavarus [4]

[4] See Bk. iv. 46 and 52.

Cavarus, king of the Thracian Gauls, being naturally kingly and high-minded, afforded great security to traders sailing to the Pontus, and rendered great services to the Byzantines in their wars with the Thracians and Bithynians. This Cavarus, so excellent in other respects, was corrupted by the flatterer Sostratus a native of Chalcedon. . . .

Antiochus at Armosata

(circa 212 B.C.)

When Xerxes was king of the city of Armosata, which lies near the "Fair Plain" between the Euphrates and Tigris, Antiochus, encamping before this city, undertook its siege. Xerxes, when he saw the king's strength, at first conveyed himself away, but after a short time fearing lest, if his palace were occupied by the enemy, the rest of his dominions would be thrown into a state of disturbance, he regretted this step and sent a message to Antiochus proposing a conference. The most trusty of Antiochus' friends advised him

not to let him go, but to make himself master of the city and bestow the sovereignty on Mithridates his own sister's son. The king, however, paid no attention to them, but sent for the young man and composed their differences, remitting the greater part of the sum which his father had still owed for tribute. Receiving from him a present payment of three hundred talents, a thousand horses, and a thousand mules with their trappings, he restored all his dominions to him and by giving his daughter Antiochis in marriage conciliated and attached to himself all the inhabitants of the district, who considered that he had acted in a truly royal and magnanimous manner. . . .

V. Affairs of Italy

Tarentum

It was the pride engendered by prosperity which made the Tarentines call in Pyrrhus of Epirus. For in every case where a democracy has for long enjoyed power, it naturally begins to be sick of present conditions and next looks out for a master, and having found one very soon hates him again, as the change is manifestly much for the worse. And this was what happened then to the Tarentines. . . .

They started from the city at first as if for an expedition, and on approaching the camp of the Carthaginians at night, the rest concealed themselves in a wood by the roadside while Philemenus and Nicon went up to the camp. There they were arrested by the guards and brought before Hannibal; for they had not said a word as to who they were or whence they came, but had simply stated that they wished to meet the general. They were at once taken before Hannibal and said that they desired to speak with him in private. When he most readily granted them the interview, they gave

him an account of their own situation and that of their country, bringing many different accusations against the Romans so as not to seem to have entered on their present design without valid reasons. Hannibal having thanked them and received their advances in the kindest manner, sent them back for the time after arranging that they should come and meet him again very soon. For the present he bade them as soon as they were at a certain distance from his camp surround and drive off the first herds of cattle that had been driven out to pasture and the men in charge of them and pursue their way without fear, for he would see to their safety. This he did with the object first of giving himself time to inquire into the proposal made by the young men and next of gaining for them the confidence of the townsmen, who would believe that it was really on forays that they left the town. Nicon and his friends did as they were bidden, and Hannibal was now delighted in having at length succeeded in finding a means of executing his design, while Philemenus and the rest were much encouraged in their project now that the interview had safely taken place, and they had found Hannibal so willing, and the quantity of booty had established their credit sufficiently with their countrymen. Selling some of the captured cattle and feasting on others they not only gained the confidence of the Tarentines, but had many emulators.

After this they made a second expedition, managed in a similar manner, and this time they pledged their word to Hannibal and received in return his pledge that he would set Tarentum free and that the Carthaginians would neither exact any kind of tribute from the Tarentines nor impose any other burdens on them; but they were to be allowed, after capturing the city, to plunder the houses and residences of the Romans. They also agreed on a

watchword by which the sentries were to admit them to the camp without any hesitation each time they came. They thus were enabled to meet Hannibal more than once, sometimes pretending to be going out of the town on a foray, sometimes again on a hunting-party. Having made their arrangements to serve their purpose in the future, the majority of them awaited the time for action, the part of huntsman being assigned to Philemenus, as owing to his excessive passion for the chase it was generally thought that he considered it the most important thing in life. He was therefore directed to ingratiate himself by presents of the game he killed first of all with Gaius Livius the commandant of the town, and then with the guards of the towers behind the Temenid gate. Having been entrusted with this matter, he managed, either by catching game himself or by getting it provided by Hannibal, to keep constantly bringing some in, giving part of it to Gaius and some to the men of the tower to make them always ready to open the postern to him; for he usually went out and came in by night, on the pretence that he was afraid of the enemy, but as a fact to lay the way for the contemplated attempt. When Philemenus had once got the guard at the gate into the habit of not making any trouble about it but of opening the postern gate to him at once by night, whenever he whistled on approaching the wall, the conspirators having learnt that on a certain day the Roman commandant of the place was going to be present at a large and early party in the building called the Museum near the market-place, agreed with Hannibal to make the attempt on that day.

Hannibal had for some time past pretended to be sick, to prevent the Romans from being surprised when they heard that he had spent such a long time in the same neighbourhood, and he now pretended that his sickness

was worse. His camp was distant three day's journey from Tarentum, and when the time came he got ready a force of about ten thousand men selected from his infantry and cavalry for their activity and courage, ordering them to take provisions for four days; and starting at dawn marched at full speed. Choosing about eighty of his Numidian horse he ordered them to advance in front of the force at a distance of about thirty stades and to spread themselves over the ground on each side of the road, so that no one should get a view of the main body, but that of those whom they encountered, some should be made prisoners by them while those who escaped should announce in the town that a raid by Numidian horse was in progress. When the Numidians were about a hundred and twenty stades away from the town, Hannibal halted for supper on the bank of a river which runs through a gorge and is not easily visible. Here he called a meeting of his officers, at which he did not inform them exactly what his plan was, but simply exhorted them first to bear themselves like brave men, as the prize of success had never been greater, secondly to keep each of them the men under his command in close order on the march and severely punish all who left the ranks on no matter what pretext, and lastly to attend strictly to orders and to do nothing on their own initiative, but only what should be commanded. After thus addressing and dismissing the officers, he started on his march just after dusk, intending to reach the walls of the town about midnight. He had Philemenus with him for a guide and had procured for him a wild boar to use in a manner that had been arranged.

As the young men had foreseen, Gaius Livius had been feasting since early in the day with his friends in the Museum, and about sunset, when the drinking was at its height, news was brought to him that the Numidians

were overrunning the country. He took measures simply to meet this raid, by summoning some of his officers and ordering half his cavalry to sally out in the early morning and prevent the enemy from damaging the country; but just because of this he was less inclined to be suspicious of the plot as a whole. Meanwhile Nicon and Tragiscus and the rest, as soon as it was dark, all collected in the town to await the return home of Livius. The banquet broke up somewhat early, as the drinking had begun in the afternoon, and, while the other conspirators withdrew to a certain place to await events, some of the young men went to meet Livius and his company, making merry and creating by their mutual jests the impression that they too were on the way back from a carouse. As Livius and his company were still more intoxicated, when the two parties met they all readily joined in laughter and banter. The young men turned around and escorted Livius to his house, where he lay down to rest overcome by wine, as people naturally are who begin drinking early in the day, and with no apprehension of anything unusual or alarming, but full of cheerfulness and quite at his ease. Meanwhile, when Nicon and Tragiscus had rejoined the young men they had left behind, they divided themselves into three bodies and kept watch, occupying the streets that gave most convenient access to the market-place, in order that no intelligence from outside and nothing that happened inside the town should escape their notice. Some of them posted themselves near Livius' house, as they knew that if there were any suspicion of what was about to happen it would be communicated to him and that any measures taken would be due to his initiative. When diners-out had all returned to their homes, and all such disturbance in general had ceased, the majority of the townsmen having gone to bed, night now wearing on apace and nothing

having occurred to shake their hopes of success, they all collected together and proceeded to get about their business.

The agreement between the young Tarentines and Hannibal was as follows: Hannibal on approaching the city on it eastern side, which lies towards the interior, was to advance towards the Temenid gate and light a fire on the tomb, called by some that of Hyacinthus, by others that of Apollo Hyacinthus. Tragiscus, when he saw this signal, was to signal back by fire from within the town. This having been done, Hannibal was to put out the fire and march only slowly in the direction of the gate. Agreeably to these arrangements, the young men having traversed the inhabited portion of the city reached the cemetery. For all the eastern part of the Tarentum is full of tombs, since their dead are still buried within the walls owing to a certain ancient oracle, the god, it is said, gate responded to the Tarentines that they would fare better and more prosperously if they made their dwelling-place with the majority. Thinking, then, that according to the oracle they would be best off if they had the departed also inside the wall, the Tarentines up to this day bury their dead within the gates. The young men on reaching the tomb of Pythionicus stopped and awaited the event. When Hannibal drew near and did as agreed, Nicon, Tragiscus, and their companions as soon as they saw the fire felt their courage refreshed, and when they had exhibited their own torch and saw that of Hannibal go out again, they ran at full speed to the gate wishing to arrive in time to surprise and kill the guards of the gate-tower, it having been agreed that the Carthaginians were to advance at an easy pace. All went well, and on the guards being surprised, some of the conspirators busied themselves with putting them to the sword, while others were cutting through the bolts. Very

soon the gates were thrown open, and at the proper time Hannibal and his force arrived, having marched at such a pace as ensured that no attention was called to his advance until he reached the city.

His entrance having been thus effected, as pre-arranged, in security and absolutely without noise, Hannibal thought that the most important part of his enterprise had been successfully accomplished, and now advanced confidently towards the market-place, by the broad street that leads up from what is called the Deep Road. He left his cavalry, however, not less than two thousand in number, outside the wall as a reserve force to secure him against any foe that might appear from outside and against such untoward accidents as are apt to happen in enterprises of this kind. When he was in the neighbourhood of the market-place he halted his force in marching order and himself awaited the appearance of Philemenus also, being anxious to see how this part of his design would succeed. For at the time that he lit the fire signal and was about to advance to the gate he had sent off Philemenus with the boar on a stretcher and about a thousand Libyans to the gate, wishing, as he had originally planned, not to let the success of the enterprise depend simply on a single chance but on several. Philemenus, on approaching the wall, whistled as was his custom, and the sentry at once came down from the tower to the postern gate. When Philemenus from outside told him to open quickly as they were fatigued for they were carrying a wild boar, the guard was very pleased and made haste to open, hoping for some benefit to himself also from Philemenus' good luck, as he had always had his share of the game that was brought in. Philemenus then passed in supporting the stretcher in front and with him a man dressed like a shepherd, as if he were one of the country-folk, and after them came two

other men supporting the dead beast from behind. When all four were within the postern gate they first of all cut down the guard on the spot, as, unsuspicious of any harm, he was viewing and handling the boar, and then quietly and at their leisure let in through the little gate the Libyans, about thirty in number, who were immediately behind them and in advance of the others. After this they at once proceeded some of them to cut the bolts, others to kill the guardians of the gate-tower, and others to summon the Libyans outside by a preconcerted signal. When the latter also had got in safely, they all, as had been arranged, advanced towards the market-place. Upon being joined by this force also Hannibal, much pleased that matters were proceeding just as he had wished, proceeded to put his project in execution. Separating about two thousand Celts from the others and dividing them into three bodies, he put each under the charge of two of the young men who were managing the affair, sending also some of his own officers to accompany them with orders to occupy the most convenient approaches to the market; and when they had done this he ordered the Tarentine young men to set apart and save any of the citizens they met and to shout from a distance advising all Tarentines to stay where they were, as their safety was assured. At the same time he ordered the Carthaginian and Celtic officers to put all Romans they met to the sword. The different bodies hereupon separated and began to execute his orders.

As soon as it was evident to the Tarentines that the enemy were within the walls, the city was filled with clamour and extraordinary confusion. When Gaius heard of the entrance of the enemy, recognizing that his drunken condition rendered him incapable, he issued from his house with his servants and made for the gate that leads to the harbour, where as soon

as the guard there had opened the postern for him, he escaped through it, and getting hold of one of the boats at anchor there embarked on it with his household and crossed to the citadel. Meanwhile Philemenus and his companions, who had provided themselves with some Roman bugles and some men who had learnt to sound them, stood in the theatre and gave the call to arms. The Romans responding in arms to the summons and running, as was their custom, towards the citadel, things fell out as the Carthaginians designed. For reaching the thoroughfares in disorder and in scattered groups, some of them fell among the Carthaginians and some among the Celts, and in this way large numbers of them were slain.

When day broke the Tarentines kept quietly at home unable as they were yet to understand definitely what was happening. For owing to the bugle call and the fact that no acts of violence or pillage were being committed in the town they thought that the commotion was due to the Romans; but when they saw many Romans lying dead in the streets and some of the Gauls despoiling Roman corpses, a suspicion entered their minds that the Carthaginians were in the town.

Hannibal having by this time encamped his force in the market-place, and the Romans having retired to the citadel where they had always had a garrison, it being now bright daylight, he summoned all the Tarentines by herald to assemble unarmed in the market-place. The conspirators also went round the town calling on the people to help the cause of freedom and exhorting them to be of good courage, as it was for their sake that the Carthaginians had come. Those Tarentines who were favourably disposed to the Romans retired to the citadel when they knew what had happened, and the rest assembled in response to the summons without their arms and were

addressed by Hannibal in conciliatory terms. The Tarentines loudly cheered every sentence, delighted as they were at the unexpected prospect, and Hannibal on dismissing the meeting ordered everyone to return as quickly as possible to his own house and write on the door "Tarentine," decreeing the penalty of death against anyone who should write this on the house of a Roman. He then selected the most suitable of his officers and sent them off to conduct the pillage of the houses belonging to Romans, ordering them to regard as enemy property all houses which were uninscribed, and meanwhile he kept the rest of his forces drawn up in order to act as a support for the pillagers.

A quantity of objects of various kinds were collected by the spoilers, the booty coming quite up to the expectation of the Carthaginians. They spent that night under arms, and on the next day Hannibal calling a general meeting which included the Tarentines, decided to shut off the town from the citadel, so that the Tarentines should have no further fear of the Romans who held that fortress. His first measure was to construct a palisade parallel to the wall of the citadel and the moat in front of it. As he knew very well that the enemy would not submit to this, but would make some kind of armed demonstration against it, he held in readiness some of his best troops, thinking that nothing was most necessary with respect to the future than to strike terror into the Romans and give confidence to the Tarentines. When accordingly upon their planting the first palisade the Romans made a most bold and daring attack on the enemy, Hannibal after a short resistance retired in order to tempt the assailants on, and when most of them advanced beyond the moat, ordered up his men and fell upon them. A stubborn engagement followed, as the fighting took place in a narrow space between

two walls, but in the end the Romans were forced back and put to flight. Many of them fell in the action, but the largest number perished by being hurled back and precipitated into the moat.

For the time Hannibal, when he had safely constructed his palisade, remained quiet, his plan having had the intended effect. For he had shut up the enemy and compelled them to remain within the wall in terror for themselves as well as for the citadel, whereas he had given such confidence to the townsmen that they considered themselves a match for the Romans even without the aid of the Carthaginians. But later, at a slight distance behind the palisade in the direction of the town he made a trench parallel to the palisade and to the wall of the citadel. The earth from the trench was in turn thrown up along it on the side next the town and a second palisade erected on the top, so that the protection afforded was little less effective than that of a wall. He next prepared to construct a wall at an appropriate distance from this defence and still nearer the town reaching from the street called Saviour to the Deep Street, so that even without being manned the fortifications in themselves were sufficient to afford security to the Tarentines. Leaving an adequate and competent garrison for guarding the town and the wall and quartering in the neighbourhood a force of cavalry to protect them, he encamped at about forty stades from the city on the banks of the river called by some Galaesus, but most generally Eurotas, after the Eurotas which runs past Lacedaemon. The Tarentines have many such names in their town and the neighbouring country, as they are acknowledged to be colonists of the Lacedaemonians and connected with them by blood. The wall was soon completed of the zeal and energy of the

Tarentines and the assistance rendered by the Carthaginians, and Hannibal next began to contemplate the captured of the citadel.

When he had completed his preparations for the siege, some succour having reached the citadel by sea from Metapontum, the Romans recovered their courage in a measure and attacking the works at night destroyed all the machines and other constructions. Upon this Hannibal abandoned the project of taking the citadel by storm, but as his wall was now complete he called a meeting of the Tarentines and pointed out to them that the most essential thing under present circumstances was to get command of the sea. For since, as I have already stated, the Tarentines were entirely unable to use their ships or sail out of the harbour, whereas the Romans got all they required conveyed to them safely by sea; and under these conditions it was impossible that the city should ever be in secure possession of its liberty. Hannibal perceived this, and explained to the Tarentines, that if the garrison of the citadel were cut off from the hope of succour by sea they would in a very short time give in of their own accord and abandoning the fortress would surrender the whole place. The Tarentines gave ear to him and were quite convinced by what he said, but they could think of no plan for attaining this at present, unless a fleet appeared from Carthage, which at the time was impossible. They were, therefore, unable to conceive what Hannibal was leading up to in speaking to them on this subject, and when he went on to say that it was obvious that they themselves without the aid of the Carthaginians were very nearly in command of the sea at this moment, they were still more astonished, being quite unable to fathom his meaning. He had noticed that the street just within the cross wall, and leading parallel to this wall from the harbour to the outer sea, could easily be adapted to his

purpose, and he designed to convey the ships across by this street from the harbour to the southern side. So the moment he revealed his plan to the Tarentines they not only entirely agreed with what he said, but conceived an extraordinary admiration for him, being convinced that nothing could get the better of his cleverness and courage. They very soon constructed carriages on wheels, and the thing was no sooner said than done, as there was no lack of zeal and no lack of hands to help the project on. Having thus conveyed their ships across to the outer sea the Tarentines effectively besieged the Romans in the citadel, cutting off their supplies from outside. Hannibal now leaving a garrison in the town withdrew his army, and after three days' march got back to his old camp, where he remained fixed for the rest of the winter.

VI. Affairs of Sicily

Capture of Syracuse

He counted the courses. For the masonry of the tower was even, so that it was very easy to reckon the distance of the battlements from the ground. . . .

A few days afterwards a deserter reported that for three days they had been celebrating in the town a general festival in honour of Artemis, and that while they ate very sparingly of bread owing to its scarcity, they took plenty of wine, as both Epicydes and the Syracusans in general had supplied it in abundance; and Marcellus now recollected his estimate of the height of the wall at its lowest point, and thinking it most likely that the men would be drunk owing to their indulgence in wine and the want of solid food, determined to try his chance. Two ladders high enough for the wall were soon constructed, and he now pushed on his design, communicating the project to those whom he regarded as fittest to undertake the first ascent and

bear the brunt of the danger, with promises of great rewards. He next selected other men who would assist them and bring up the ladders; simply instructing these latter to hold themselves in readiness to obey the word of command. His orders having been complied with he woke up the first batch of men at the proper hour of the night. Having sent the ladder-bearers on in front escorted by a maniple and a tribune, and having reminded the scaling party of the rewards that awaited them if they behaved with gallantry, he subsequently woke up all his army and sent the first batches off at intervals maniple by maniple. When these amounted to about a thousand, he waited for a short time and followed with the rest of his army. When the ladder-bearers had succeeded in planting them against the wall unobserved, the scaling party at once mounted without hesitation, and when they also got a firm footing on the wall, without being observed, all the rest ran up the ladders, in no fixed order as at first but everyone as best he could. At first as they proceeded along the wall they found no sentries at their posts, the men having assembled in the several towers owing to the sacrifice, some of them still drinking and others drunk and asleep. Suddenly and silently falling on those in the first tower and in the one next to it they killed most of them without being noticed, and when they reached Hexapyli they descended, and bursting open the first postern-door that is built into the wall there, admitted through it the general and the rest of the army. This was how the Romans took Syracuse. . . .

None of the citizens knew what was happening owing to the distance, the city being large. . . .

The Romans were rendered very confident by their conquest of Epipolae. . . .

VII. Spanish Affairs

(Cp. Livy XXV. 36.)

He gave orders to the infantry to take the beasts of burden with their packs on from the rear and place them in the front, and when this was done the protection afforded was more effective than any stockade.

THE END OF BOOK VIII

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK IX

I. FROM THE PREFACE

These are the principal events included in the above-mentioned Olympiad, that is in the space of four years which we term an Olympiad, and I shall attempt to narrate them in two Books. I am not unaware that my work owing to the uniformity of its composition has a certain severity, and will suit the taste and gain the approval of only one class of reader. For nearly all other writers, or at least most of them, by dealing with every branch of history, attract many kinds of people to the perusal of their works. The genealogical side appeals to those who are fond of a story, and the account of colonies, the foundation of cities, and their ties of kindred, such as we find, for instance, in Ephorus, attracts the curious and lovers of recondite longer, while the student of politics is interested in the doings of nations, cities, and monarchs. As I have confined my attention strictly to these last matters and as my whole work treats of nothing else, it is, as I say, adapted only to one sort of reader, and its perusal will have no attractions for the larger number. I have stated elsewhere at some length my reason for choosing to exclude other branches of history and chronicle actions alone, but there is no harm in briefly reminding my readers of it here in order to impress it on them.

Since genealogies, myths, the planting of colonies, the foundations of cities and their ties of kinship have been recounted by many writers and in many different styles, an author who undertakes at the present day to deal

with these matters must either represent the work of others as being his own, a most disgraceful proceeding, or if he refuses to do this, must manifestly toil to no purpose, being constrained to avow that the matters on which he writes and to which he devotes his attention have been adequately narrated and handed down to posterity by previous authors. So omitting these things for the above and various other reasons, I decided on writing a history of actual events; firstly, because there is always some novelty to them which demands novel treatment—since it was not in the power of the ancients to narrate events subsequent to their own time—and secondly, owing to the great practical utility of such a history, both formerly and especially at the present day, when the progress of the arts and sciences has been so rapid, that those who study history are, we may almost say, provided with a method for dealing with any contingency that may arise. My aim, therefore, being not so much to entertain readers as to benefit those who pay careful attention, I disregarded other matters and was led to write this kind of history. The best testimony to the truth of what I say will be that of those who study this work with due application.

II. Affairs of Italy

Siege of Capua

Hannibal surrounding the camp of Appius Claudius at first harassed him by skirmishing with the object of provoking him to come out and give battle. But as none paid any attention, his attack finally became very much like an attempt to storm the camp, the cavalry advancing in squadrons, and with loud cries hurling their javelins into the camp, while the infantry attacked in maniples and attempted to tear down the palisade. But even thus he was unable to move the Romans from their purpose; they used their

light-armed forces to repel the assault on the palisade, and kept their heavy-armed troops in their ranks under their standards protecting themselves from the shower of missiles. Hannibal was dissatisfied in general at being unable either to penetrate into the town or to provoke the Romans to battle, and began to consider what it was best to do under the circumstances. It seems to me indeed that the state of matters was such as might puzzle not only the Carthaginians, but anyone who heard of it. For who could believe that the Romans, who had been beaten in so many battles by the Carthaginians, and did not yet even dare to face the enemy in the field, nevertheless refused to retire or to abandon the open country? While up to now they had contented themselves with following the enemy's movements upon the hills, they had now established themselves in the plain in the finest district of Italy, and were besieging the strongest city of all, with that very enemy surrounding and attacking them whom they could not even bear the thought of confronting; while the Carthaginians who had won an unbroken series of victories were at times in equal difficulties with the losers. In my opinion the reason of this conduct on the part of both, was that both had perceived that it was to Hannibal's force of cavalry that the Carthaginians owed their victories and the Romans their defeats. Consequently both the former tactics of the beaten armies after the battles in moving along parallel to their adversaries were justified, since they were marching through country where the enemy's cavalry could not hurt them, and the present conduct of both before Capua was only what was to be expected.

As a fact the Roman army had not the courage to go out and give battle since they were afraid of the enemy's cavalry, but they remained in their camp with complete confidence since they well knew that the cavalry to

which they had owed their defeat in the battles could do them no harm there. The Carthaginians again obviously could not remain there longer encamped together with their cavalry, since the Romans had with this very object destroyed all the forage in the neighbourhood, and it was impossible to get carried up from such a long distance enough hay and barley for so many horses and mules; nor again if they remained in their position without their cavalry were they bold enough to assault an enemy having the advantage of protection by a trench and palisade, an engagement with whom on equal terms would be attended with doubtful success now they were deprived of their cavalry. Besides this they were in dread of the consuls designate appearing and establishing themselves in their rear, and thus placing them in great difficulties by cutting off their supplies. For these reasons Hannibal thought it would be impossible to raise the siege by force of arms and changed his plan. For he thought that if by a secret march he could appear suddenly before Rome, he might possibly by the surprise and dismay he would cause among the inhabitants manage to gain some advantage against that city itself; or if not would at least compel Appius either to raise the siege and hasten to the help of his native town, or to break up his army, so that both the force that went to relieve Rome and that which was left behind would be easy to overcome.

With this project in his mind he sent a letter-bearer to Capua, inducing one of the Libyans to desert to the Roman camp and thence to the city, taking every precaution for the security of the letter. For he was in great dread lest the Capuans on witnessing his departure should think he despaired of saving them and in their consternation surrender to the Romans. He therefore wrote explaining his purpose in leaving, and sent off

the Libyan, so that when they heard of his purpose and learnt why he had left they might continue to sustain the siege courageously. Now when the news from Capua first reached Rome that Hannibal had encamped parallel to their lines and was besieging them, it caused universal excitement and dismay, as they felt that the impending decision would influence the whole war. Consequently the whole attention of everyone was at present directed to the preparation and dispatch of succour to that quarter. The Capuans on receiving the letter from the Libyan, and on understanding the Carthaginian plan, continued to maintain their resistance, being resolved to try the chance of this expedient. Hannibal on the fifth day from his arrival, after giving his men their supper, left his fires burning and retreated in such a manner that none of the enemy had any notion of what was happening. By a series of rapid marches through Samnium, and by sending his outposts on each day to reconnoitre and occupy the district near the road, he succeeded, while the minds of the Romans were still occupied with Capua and what was happening there, in crossing the Anio unperceived and getting so near to Rome that he established his camp at a distance of not more than forty stades from the walls.

When the news reached Rome it caused universal panic and consternation among the inhabitants, the thing being so sudden and so entirely unexpected, as Hannibal had never before been so close to the city. Besides this, a suspicion prevailed that the enemy would never have approached so near and displayed such audacity if the legions before Capua had not been destroyed. The men, therefore, occupied the walls and the most advantageous positions outside the town, while the women made the round of the temples and implored the help of the gods, sweeping the

pavements of the holy places with their hair— for such is their custom when their country is in extreme peril. But just after Hannibal had established his camp, and while he was contemplating an attempt on the city itself for the following day, an unexpected stroke of luck intervened to save Rome. Gnaeus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius had completed the enrolment of one legion, and had engaged the soldiers on their oath to present themselves in arms at Rome exactly on this day, and they were now engaged in enrolling and testing the men for a second legion; and the consequence was that a large number of men were spontaneously collected in Rome just when they were required. The consuls led them out confidently, and drawing them up in front of the city put a check on Hannibal's ardour. For the Carthaginians had at first eagerly advanced not without hope of taking Rome itself by assault, but when they saw the enemy drawn up in battle order, and when very soon afterwards they learnt the truth from a prisoner, they abandoned the project of attacking the city and took to overrunning and plundering the country and burning the houses. At first they drove into their camp a vast collection of captured animals, as they were in a country which no one ever expected would be entered by an enemy; but afterwards, when the consuls had the extreme boldness to encamp opposite them at a distance of ten stades, Hannibal retired. He had now collected a large quantity of booty, but he had given up his hope of taking Rome, and most important of all he reckoned that the time now had elapsed in which he expected, according to his original calculation, that Appius on learning of the danger that threatened Rome would either raise the siege and come with his whole force to save the city, or, leaving a part of it behind, would hasten to the rescue with the greater portion. In either

event he considered that his purpose would have been attained, and he therefore moved his army out of the camp at daybreak. Publius, who had destroyed the bridges on the Anio and compelled Hannibal to take his army across by fording the stream, attacked the Carthaginians as they were crossing and caused them no little distress. He could strike no decisive blow owing to the numbers of the enemy's cavalry and the ease with which the Numidians rode over any kind of ground; but after recovering a considerable part of the booty and killing about three hundred of the enemy he retired to his camp, and afterwards thinking that the Carthaginians were retreating so precipitately, he followed them, keeping to the hills. Hannibal at first marched with great speed, being anxious to attain his object, but when in five days he received the news that Appius was continuing the siege he halted until the part of his army which was following him came up and then attacked the enemy's army by night, killing a considerable number and driving the rest out of their camp. When, however, day dawned and he saw that the Romans had retired to a strong position on a hill, he gave up any thought of further molesting them, and marching through Daunia and Bruttium descended on Rhegium so suddenly that he came very near taking the town itself, and did cut off from it all the inhabitants who had gone out to the country, making a number of Rhegians prisoners by this sudden appearance.

We are fully justified, I think, on this occasion in noting with admiration the high courage and determined spirit which both Romans and Carthaginians displayed in the war. To take a somewhat similar instance, Epaminondas of Thebes is universally admired for his conduct in the following circumstances. On reaching Tegea with the allies, and discovering

that the Lacedaemonians had arrived at Mantinea in full strength and had collected their allies there with the object of giving battle to the Thebans, he ordered his troops to take their supper at an early hour, and a little after nightfall led them out as if he was anxious to occupy in time some favourable ground for the battle. Having conveyed this impression to people in general he advanced and marched straight on Sparta, and reaching that city in about the third hour of the day took it by surprise, and finding no one there to defend it forced his way as far as the market-place, occupying all that part of the town which faces the river. A mischance however occurred, a deserter having escaped in the night to Mantinea and informed King Agesilaus of the facts, so that upon the Spartans coming up to help just as the city was being occupied, Epaminondas was disappointed of his hope, but after breakfasting on the banks of the Eurotas, and refreshing his troops after their hard march, he marched back again by the same road, reckoning that since the Lacedaemonians and their allies had come to the help of Sparta, Mantinea would now be left without defenders, as indeed was the case. Exhorting the Thebans, therefore, to exert themselves, and marching rapidly all night, he reached Mantinea about midday, finding it with scarcely a soul to defend it. But just at this time the Athenians, who were anxious to take part in the battle against the Thebans, arrived to help the Lacedaemonians, as stipulated in their treaty of alliance. So at the very time that the leading column of the Thebans had reached the temple of Poseidon, which is at seven stades distance from the town, the Athenians happened as if by design to appear on the hill above Mantinea. When the few Mantineans who were left in the town saw the Athenians, they just managed to pluck up enough courage to man the wall and keep off the assault of the

Thebans. Writers, therefore, very properly apportion the blame for the ill-success of these operations, when they tell us that the commander did all that behoved a good general, and that Epaminondas here overcame his enemies but was worsted by Fortune.

Very much the same may be said of Hannibal. Who can refuse admiration to this general, who considers how he first fell on the enemy and attempted to raise the siege by a series of combats, how failing in his attack he marched on Rome itself, and then when his design on the city was frustrated by the merest accident, how he turned round and not only broke up the enemy, but waited a reasonable time to see if the force besieging Capua had made any movement, and how finally, still holding to his purpose, he swept down to damage his enemies, and all but destroyed Rhegium? As for the Romans, we must pronounce that they behaved better on this occasion than the Lacedaemonians. For the latter, flocking off to the rescue when the news first reached them, saved Sparta indeed, but as for as it depended on them lost Mantinea, while the Romans not only preserved their native town, but far from raising the siege remained firm and unshaken in their purpose, and henceforth pressed the Capuans with greater confidence. It is not for the purpose of extolling the Romans or the Carthaginians that I have offered these remarks—I have often had occasion to bestow praise on both peoples—but rather for the sake of the leaders of both these states, and of all, no matter where, who shall be charged with the conduct of public affairs, so that by memory or actual sight of such actions as these, they be moved to emulation, and not shrink from undertaking designs, which may seem indeed to be fraught with risk and peril, but on the contrary are courageous without being hazardous, are admirable in their

conception, and their excellence, whether the result be success or failure alike, will deserve to live in men's memories for ever, always provided that all that is done is the result of sound reasoning. . . .

Tarentum

When the Romans were besieging Tarentum Bomilcar, the Carthaginian admiral, came with a very large force to its help, and finding himself unable to render any assistance to those in the town, as the Roman camp was so securely defended, he used up his supplies before he was well aware of it. He had been forced to come by urgent entreaties and large promises, and he was now compelled to sail off at the earnest request of the inhabitants.

III. Affairs of Sicily

The Spoils of Syracuse

A city is not adorned by external splendours, but by the virtue of its inhabitants. . . .

The Romans, then, decided for this reason to transfer all these objects to their own city and leave nothing behind. As to whether in doing so they acted rightly and in their own interest or the reverse, there is much to be said on both sides, but the more weighty arguments are in favour of their conduct having been wrong then and still being wrong. For if they had originally relied on such things for the advancement of their country, they would evidently have been right in bringing to their home the kind of things which had contributed to their aggrandizement. But if, on the contrary, while leading the simplest of lives, very far removed from all such superfluous magnificence, they were constantly victorious over those who possessed the greatest number and finest examples of such works, must we not consider that they committed a mistake? To abandon the habits of the

victors and to imitate those of the conquered, not only appropriating the objects, but at the same time attracting that envy which is inseparable from their possession, which is the one thing most to be dreaded by superiors in power, is surely an incontestable error. For in no case is one who contemplates such works of art moved so much by admiration of the good fortune of those who have possessed themselves of the property of others, as by pity as well as envy for the original owners. And when opportunities become ever more frequent, and the victor collects around him all the treasures of other peoples, and these treasures may be almost said to invite those who were robbed of them to come and inspect them, things are twice as bad. For now spectators no longer pity their neighbours, but themselves, as they recall to mind their own calamities. And hence not only envy, but a sort of passionate hatred for the favourites of fortune flares up, for the memories awakened of their own disaster move them to abhor the authors of it. There were indeed perhaps good reasons for appropriating all the gold and silver: for it was impossible for them to aim at a world empire without weakening the resources of other peoples and strengthening their own. But it was possible for them to leave everything which did not contribute to such strength, together with the envy attached to its possession, in its original place, and to add to the glory of their native city by adorning it not with paintings and reliefs but with dignity and magnanimity. At any rate these remarks will serve to teach all those who succeed to empire, that they should not strip cities under the idea that the misfortunes of others are an ornament to their own country. The Romans on the present occasion, after transferring all these objects to Rome, used such as came from private

houses to embellish their own homes, and those that were state property for their public buildings.

IV. Affairs of Spain

The Carthaginian commanders had mastered the enemy, but were unable to master themselves, and while thinking they had put an end to the war against the Romans began quarrelling with each other, constant friction being caused by that covetousness and love of domination which is innate in Phoenicians. Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, was one of them, and his abuse of the authority he wielded went so far that he attempted to extract a large sum of money from Andobales, the most faithful friend the Carthaginians had in Spain, who had formerly been deprived of his principality owing to his attachment to them and had recently been restored to it for the same reason. When he now refused to pay, relying on his loyalty in the past to Carthage, Hasdrubal brought a false accusation against him and compelled him to give his daughters as hostages.

V. Affairs of Italy

Roman Embassy to Ptolemy

The Romans sent envoys to Ptolemy wishing to procure a supply of corn, as they were suffering from a great scarcity of it, all the crops in Italy up to the gates of Rome having been destroyed by the armies, and no help from abroad having been forthcoming, since all over the world except in Egypt there were wars in progress and hostile forces in the field. The scarcity at Rome had reached such a pitch that the Sicilian medimnus [1] cost fifteen drachmae. But in spite of this distress the Romans did not neglect their military preparations. . .

[1] About ten gallons.

On the Art of a Commander

The accidents attendant on military projects require much circumspection, but success is in every case possible if the steps we take to carry out our plan are soundly reasoned out. That in military operations what is achieved openly and by force is much less than what is done by stratagem and the use of opportunity, can easily be learnt from the history of former wars. And it is no less easy to be convinced by facts that in those actions depending on the choice of opportunity failure is far more frequent than success. Nor can anyone doubt that most of the failures are due either to error or to negligence on the part of the commander. We must therefore inquire in what such faults consist.

It is by no means proper to describe as actions, things in war which occur undesignedly, but such events should be rather styled accidents or coincidences. As therefore they fall under no systematic or fixed rules, I may neglect them, and deal only, as I will now proceed to do, with such things as are accomplished by design. Since every such action requires a fixed time for its commencement, and a fixed period, and an appointed place, and also requires secrecy, definite signals, proper persons through whom and with whom to act and the proper means, it is evident that the commander who is happy in his choice of each and all of these will not meet with failure, but the neglect of anyone of them will ruin the whole design; so true is it that nature makes a single trivial error sufficient to cause failure in a design, but correctness in every detail barely enough for success. Therefore in such enterprises commanders must be careful about every detail. The first and foremost requisite is to keep silence, and never either from joy if some unexpected hope shall present itself, or from fear, or from

familiarity with or affection for certain persons, to reveal one's design to anyone unconcerned in it, but to communicate it only to those without whom it cannot be put in execution, and even to these not earlier than when the need of their services renders it imperative. And we must keep not only our tongues tied but even more so our minds. For many who have kept their own counsel have revealed their projects either by the expression of their faces or by their actions. The second requisite is to be well versed in the question of night and day movements and voyages, knowing exactly how far they will bring us, not only by land but also by sea. The third and most important is to have a notion of time and season and to be able to hit on the right ones for our design. Nor is the place fixed for the intended coup de main a matter of small importance; for often this shows seemingly possible ones to be impossible. Finally, we must pay due attention to signals and counter signals, and to the choice of those by whose agency and in whose company our project is to be executed.

These things are learnt either by experience or by inquiry or by scientific investigation. It is of course far best for a general to be himself acquainted with the roads, the spot he is bound for and the nature of the ground, as well as with the people by whose agency and in concert with whom he is going to act. But the next best thing is to make careful inquiries and not to rely on chance informants. The pledges of good faith given by those who act as guides in such a case must be in the hands of those who follow their guidance. Skill, therefore, in these and similar matters can perhaps be acquired by a general just through military experience, partly by practice, and partly by inquiry; but what depends on scientific principles requires a theoretical knowledge more especially of astronomy and geometry, which,

while no very deep study of them is required for this purpose at least, are exceedingly important and capable of rendering the greatest services in projects such as we are speaking of. The most necessary part of astronomy is that dealing with the variations day and night. If day and night were always of equal length, the matter would give us no trouble and the knowledge of it would be common property; since, however, days and nights differ not only from each other, but also from themselves it is evidently necessary to be acquainted with the increase and decrease of both. For how can one rightly calculate the distance traversed in a day's march or in a night's march without knowing the different lengths of day and night Indeed it is impossible for anything to come off at the proper time without such knowledge; it is sure to be either too late or too soon. And in such matters alone it is a worse fault to be in advance than behind hand. For he who arrives later than the hour decided upon is disappointed merely in his hope—since he becomes aware of the fact while still at a distance and can get away in security— but he who arrives too soon, approaching the enemy and being discovered by him, not only fails in his attempt, but runs the risk of total destruction. It is time, indeed, which rules all human action and especially the affairs of war. So that a general must be familiar with the dates of the summer and winter solstices, and the equinoxes, and with the rate of increase and decrease of days and nights between these; for by no other means can he compute correctly the distances he will be able to traverse either by sea or land. He must also be acquainted with the subdivisions of day and night so as to know when to sound the revally and to be on the march; for it is impossible to obtain a happy end unless the beginning is happily timed. Now for the time of day there is nothing to

hinder our observing it either by the shadow or by the sun's course or by his position and height in the heavens, but it is difficult to tell the hour of the night, unless one is familiar with the system and order of the twelve signs of the Zodiac in the starry sky, knowledge of which it is quite easy to gain by studying the constellations. For since, though nights are of unequal length, yet during the course of every night six out of the twelve signs of the Zodiac must appear above the horizon, it follows of necessity that equal parts of the twelve signs must appear at the same times of the night. As the position each day of the sun in the Zodiac is known, it is evident that at his setting the part diametrically opposite must rise. So that the portion of the night which is past is to be judged by the portion of the Zodiac which has risen after this; and the number and size of the signs of the Zodiac being known, the subsequent subdivisions of the night correspond to them. On cloudy nights, however, we must observe the moon, because as a rule, owing to her size, her light is visible in whatever part of the heaven she may be situated. We can guess the hour at times from the time and place of her rising and at times again from those of her setting, if here too we have sufficient previous knowledge to be familiar with the daily difference in the hour of her rising. Here also there is an easy method of reckoning, for the period of her revolution is generally speaking one month, and all the months are similar as far as we can perceive. Homer is therefore deserving of praise in representing Odysseus, the most capable of commanders, as observing the stars to direct not only his course at sea, but his operations on land. For those accidents which take us by surprise and cannot be accurately foreseen are quite sufficiently numerous to expose us to great and frequent difficulties, I mean sudden rains and floods, exceeding great frosts and

snowfalls, a foggy and clouded state of the atmosphere and the like, and if we pay no attention even to such things as can be foreseen, we are sure to fail in most enterprises by our own fault. So that none of the above-mentioned matters must be neglected, if we are not to commit such blunders as many other generals are said to have committed besides those I am about to cite as examples.

Aratus, the Achaean strategus, having formed the project of getting Cynaetha betrayed to him, came to an agreement with those in the city who were working for him, fixing a day on which he himself was to march by night to the river that runs down from Cynaetha towards the east and remain there quietly with his forces. Those in the city about midday, whenever they had the opportunity, were to send out quietly through the gate one of their number dressed in a mantle with orders to advance as far as a certain tomb outside the city and take up his post on it. Meanwhile the rest of them were to attack the officers who used to keep the gate, while they were taking their midday sleep. Upon this the Achaeans were to issue from their ambush and make for the gate at full speed. Such being the arrangement, when the day came Aratus arrived and hid in the river-bed waiting for the signal. But at about the fifth hour of the day the owner of some of those delicate sheep which are in the habit of grazing near the town, having some urgent private business with his shepherd, came out of the gate dressed in a mantle and went and stood on the identical tomb looking round for the shepherd. Aratus and his troops, thinking that the signal had been given them, made a rush for the town, but the gate was at once closed in their faces by its keepers, as their friends inside the town had as yet taken no measures, and the consequence was that not only did the coup that Aratus had planned fail,

but they brought destruction on those of the citizens who were acting with him, for they were at once detected, put on their trial, and executed. If we ask what was the cause of the disaster, the answer must be that it was the use of a single signal by the commander, who was still young and ignorant of the accuracy secured by double signals and counter signals. On such small matters does success or failure depend in military operations.

Again Cleomenes of Sparta, having formed a plan for taking Megalopolis by treachery, agreed with those of the defenders who guarded the wall near what is called the Den to come there with his army at the third watch of the night, for it was at this hour that his partisans were on guard. But not reflecting that towards the rising of the Pleiads the nights are already quite short, he marched out of Lacedaemon about sunset. So that he was unable to arrive in time, but being overtaken by daylight was rash and imprudent enough to attempt to force his way into the town and was driven out with disgrace and considerable loss, very narrowly escaping complete disaster. Had he succeeded in arriving at the time agreed upon and led his troops in while his partisans were masters of the entrance, he would not have met with failure.

King Philip, to take another instance, having, as I stated above, [2] a proposal from Melitaea to betray the town to him, made two mistakes. Firstly he came there with ladders too short for the purpose, and secondly he did not arrive at the right time. He had arranged to arrive about midnight when everyone was asleep, but he started from Larisa before the proper hour, and on entering the territory of Melitaea, neither could remain there, as he feared that news of his arrival would reach the city, nor could he get back without being noticed. Being compelled, therefore, to advance he

reached the city while people were still awake. So that he could neither take the place by escalade, owing to the defective size of his ladders, nor could he get in through the gate, as owing to the earliness of the hour his partisans within could not co-operate with him. Finally, after merely provoking the garrison and losing many of his own men he made a shameful retreat with his purpose unaccomplished, having thus given public notice to everyone else to mistrust him and be on their guard.

[2] See Bk. v. 97.

Nicias, again, the Athenian general, could have saved the army before Syracuse, and had fixed on the proper hour of the night to withdraw into a position of safety unobserved by the enemy; but on an eclipse of the moon taking place he was struck with terror as if it foreboded some calamity, and deferred his departure. The consequence of this was that when he abandoned his camp on the following night, the enemy had divined his intention, and both the army and the generals were made prisoners by the Syracusans. Yet had he only inquired from men acquainted with astronomy so far from throwing away his opportunity owing to such an occurrence, he could have utilized the ignorance of the enemy. For nothing contributes more to the success of well-informed men than the lack of instruction in their neighbours.

So far as the points I have mentioned are concerned it is to astronomy that we should address our inquiries, but the method of discovering right length for ladders is as follows. If any of our partisans can give us the height of the wall the required length of the ladders is evident. For if the height of the wall be, let us say, ten of a given measure, the length of the ladders must be a good twelve. The distance from the wall at which the

ladder is planted must, in order to suit the convenience of those mounting, be half the length of the ladder, for if they are placed farther off they are apt to break when crowded and if set up nearer to the perpendicular are very insecure for the scalers. If how it is impossible to measure the wall or approach it, the height of any object which stand perpendicular on a plane surface can be taken from a distance, the method of determining it being practicable and easy for anyone who chooses to study mathematics.

So here again it is evident that those who aim at success in military plans and surprises of towns must have studied geometry, if not thoroughly at least enough to have a notion of proportion and the principles of equations; for this kind of knowledge indeed is necessary not only for the above purpose but for making changes in the plan of camps, so as to enable us either in changing the whole plan of the camp to keep up the same proportion between the different parts enclosed in it, or at other times while adhering to the same plan to increase or diminish the space included in the camp proportionately to the number of fresh arrivals or departures. About this matter I have entered into greater detail in my notes on tactics. I do not think anyone can fairly maintain that I attach too many qualifications to the art of generalship, by thus urging those who aim at mastering it to study astronomy and geometry. On the contrary I strongly disapprove of all such superfluous acquirements in a profession as serve but for ostentation and fine talk, but while also disinclined to insist on any studies beyond those that are of actual use, in the case of necessary knowledge I am most exacting and earnest. It is indeed strange that those who wish to learn the arts of dancing and flute-playing should consent to study as a preliminary the theory of rhythm and music and even to acquire some gymnastic

training, because it is thought that perfection in either cannot be attained without such aid, while those who aspire to the command of armies regard it as a grievance if we demand of them a certain slight acquaintance with other sciences. This would mean that those who practise illiberal arts show greater diligence and emulation than those whose aim is to excel in the most honourable and serious of all employments—a proposition to which no sensible man would give his assent. But these remarks must suffice on this subject. . . .

Such being the respective positions of the Romans and Carthaginians, experiencing in turn the opposite extremes of fortune, it was natural that, as Homer says, pain and joy at once should possess the minds of each. . . .

The Character of Hannibal

Of all that befel both nations, Romans and Carthaginians, the cause was one man and one mind—Hannibal. It was he indisputably who had the management of the Italian campaign, and he also directed that in Spain through his elder brother Hasdrubal and afterwards through Mago, these being the generals who killed the two Roman commanders in that country. Besides this he managed affairs in Sicily, first of all through Hippocrates and subsequently through Myttonus the African, and he was likewise active in Greece and Illyria, threatening the Romans from these parts and keeping them alarmed and distracted by his understanding with Philip. Such a great and wonderful product of nature is a man with a mind properly fitted by its original constitution to execute any project within human power.

But since the course of affairs has called our attention to the character of Hannibal, I think I am called upon at present to state my opinion regarding those peculiar traits in it which are the subject of most dispute. For some

accuse him of excessive cruelty and others of avarice. Now it is no easy thing to state the truth about him or in general about men who are engaged in public affairs. For some say that men's real natures are revealed by circumstances, the truth being in the case of some brought to light by possession of power, even if they have hitherto managed to disguise it entirely, and in that of others by misfortune. But I cannot myself regard this view as sound. For it appears to me that not in a few cases only but in most cases men are compelled to act and speak contrary to their real principles by the complexity of facts and by the suggestions of their friends. There are many previous instances a consideration of which will show that this is so. Take Agathocles the tyrant of Sicily. Do not all historians tell us that after showing himself exceedingly cruel in his first enterprises and in the establishment of his power, afterwards, when once he thought that he had securely attached the Sicilians to his rule, he became to all appearance the gentlest and mildest of men? Again, was not Cleomenes of Sparta at once a most excellent king and a most cruel tyrant, and then again in private intercourse most urbane and courteous? Now we can hardly suppose that dispositions so diametrically opposite existed in the same natures. The fact is rather that some princes are compelled to change with the change of circumstances and often exhibit to others a disposition which is quite the opposite of their real nature, so that so far from men's natures being revealed by such means they are rather obscured. And a like effect is usually produced by the suggestions of friends not only on generals, princes, and kings but on cities. At Athens at least we find that during the government of Aristides and Pericles the state was the author of few cruel actions, but of many kind and praiseworthy ones, while under Cleon and

Chares it was quite the reverse; and again when the Lacedaemonians were supreme in Greece, all that King Cleombrotus did was done in the spirit of friendly alliance, but it was the reverse with Agesilaus; so that the character of cities also changes with that of those who govern them. And so with King Philip, when he had Taurion and Demetrius to act with him he was most wicked, but when he had Aratus and Chrysogonus he was most gentle.

It was very much the same, I think, with Hannibal. He had to deal with circumstances of such an exceptional and complex nature, and his nearest friends differed so widely in character, that from his actions when in Italy it is very difficult to discover the man's real nature. As for what was due to the promptings of circumstance, that can easily be learnt from my preceding narrative and that which is to follow, but we must not ignore what he owed to the suggestions of his friends, especially as it is possible to get a very adequate notion of their nature from one single piece of advice. At the time when Hannibal contemplated marching on Italy from Spain with his army, it was foreseen that he would be very hard put to it to feed the troops and keep them constantly provided with supplies, the difficulties of the march seeming almost insuperable both owing to the distance and to the numbers and savage character of the barbarous inhabitants of the intervening countries. It seems that the difficulty was more than once discussed in the Council, and that one of Hannibal's friends, Hannibal surnamed Monomachus (*gladiator*), stated that he foresaw only one way by which it would be possible to reach Italy. When Hannibal asked him to explain himself, he said he must teach his troops to eat human flesh and accustom them to this. . . Hannibal had nothing to say against the boldness and usefulness of this suggestion, but he could persuade neither himself nor his

friends actually to entertain it. They say that the acts of cruelty in Italy of which Hannibal is accused were the work of this man, but in no less degree that of circumstances.

He does indeed seem to have been exceedingly fond of money, and so was his friend Mago who commanded in Bruttium. I have been told about this matter both by Carthaginians themselves—for the natives of a place do not only know best, as the saying is, the direction of the wind, but the character of their compatriots—and more in detail by Massanissa, when he discoursed on the love of money displayed by Carthaginians in general and especially by Hannibal and by this Mago who was known as the Samnite. Among other things he told me that while these two men had from their earliest youth most generously shared all kinds of enterprises with each other and had each taken many cities both in Spain and Italy by force or by betrayal, on no single occasion had they both participated in the same enterprise, but had always manoeuvred more carefully against each other than against the enemy, so that the one should not be present when the other took a city, to avoid any differences arising between them from such causes and any sharing in the profits as they were of equal rank.

But that it was not only the suggestions of friends that changed and did violence to Hannibal's real nature but also the force of circumstances clearly appears from my narrative, both that which precedes and that which is to follow. On Capua falling into the hands of the Romans all the other cities naturally began to waver in their allegiance, and were on the look-out for pretexts and occasions for going over to Rome. Hannibal seems at this crisis to have been in great difficulty and doubt as to how to deal with the situation. For he was neither able to keep watch over all the cities, far

distant as they were from each other, if he started himself at one spot, with several hostile armies ready to intercept his movements, nor was he able to subdivide his force much, as he would then be easily overcome by the enemy owing to numerical inferiority and the impossibility of his being personally present everywhere. He was therefore obliged to abandon openly some of the cities and to withdraw his garrisons from others, from fear lest if they transferred their allegiance he should lose his own soldiers as well. In some cases he even allowed himself to violate the treaties he had made, transferring the inhabitants to other towns and giving up their property to plunder, thereby causing such offence that he was accused both of impiety and cruelty. For as a fact these measures were accompanied by robbery of money, murders, and violence on no matter what pretext at the hands both of the departing and the incoming troops, everybody acting on the supposition that the citizens who were left behind were just on the point of joining the enemy. All this makes it very difficult of pronounce an opinion on the real nature of Hannibal, as we have to allow for the influence of his friends and the force of circumstances. But at any rate among the Carthaginians he was notorious for his love of money and among the Romans for his cruelty.

VI. Sicilian Affairs

Computation of the sizes of Cities

Most people judge of the size of cities simply from their circumference. So that when one says that Megalopolis is fifty stades in circumference and Sparta forty-eight, but that Sparta is twice as large as Megalopolis, the statement seems incredible to me. And when in order to puzzle them still most, one tells them that a city or camp with a circumference of forty stades

may be twice as large as one the circumference of which is one hundred stades, this statement seems to them absolutely astounding. The reason of this is that we have forgotten the lessons in geometry we learnt as children. I was led to make these remarks by the fact that not only ordinary men but even some statesmen and commanders of armies are thus astounded, and wonder how it is possible for Sparta to be larger and even much larger than Megalopolis, although its circumference is smaller; or at other times attempt to estimate the number of men in a camp by taking into consideration its circumference alone. Another very similar error is due to the appearance of cities. Most people suppose that cities set upon broken and hilly ground can contain more houses than those set upon flat ground. This is not so, as the walls of the houses are not built at right angles to the slope, but to the flat ground at the foot on which the hill itself rests. The truth of this can be made manifest to the intelligence of a child. For if one supposes the houses on a slope to be raised to such a height that their roofs are all level with each other, it is evident that the flat space thus formed by the roofs will be equal in area and parallel to the flat space in which the hill and the foundations of the houses rest. So much for those who aspire to political power and the command of armies but are ignorant of such things and surprised by them.

Agrigentum

The city of Agrigentum is superior to most cities not only in the ways I have mentioned but in strength and especially in the beauty of its site and buildings. It stands at a distance of eighteen stades from the sea, so that it enjoys all the advantages of a sea-coast town. It is encircled by natural and artificial defences of unusual strength, the wall being built on a ridge of

rock either naturally steep and precipitous or artificially rendered so. It is also surrounded by rivers, that which has the same name as the town running along the southern side and the Hypsas along the west and south-west sides. The citadel overlooking the town is due south-east from it, being surrounded on its outer side by an impassable ravine and having on its inner side but one approach from the town. On its summit stand the temples of Athena and Zeus Atabyrius as in Rhodes; for since Agrigentum was founded by the Rhodians this god naturally bears the same title as in Rhodes. The other temples and porticoes which adorn the city are of great magnificence, the temple of Olympian Zeus being unfinished but second it seems to none in Greece in design and dimensions.

Transfer of the People of Agathyrna

Marcus Valerius persuaded the fugitives to retire to Italy, giving them pledges for the security of their persons, on condition that they should receive pay from the people of Rhegium and plunder Bruttium, retaining whatever booty they carried off from the enemy's country.

VII. Affairs of Greece

Speeches of Chlaeneas the Aetolian and Lyciscus the Acarnanian at Sparta

"Men of Lacedaemon, I am convinced indeed that no one would venture to deny that the slavery of Greece owes its origin to the kings of Macedon, but the matter may be looked at thus. There was once a group of Greek cities in Thrace founded by the Athenian and Chalcidians, of which Olynthus was the most eminent and powerful. Philip, by selling its inhabitants into slavery and making an example of it, not only obtained possession of the Thracian cities, but intimidated the Thessalians into submission When, shortly afterwards, he had defeated the Athenians in a

battle he made a generous use of his success, not with the object of benefiting the Athenians, far from it, but in order that his kindness to them might induce others to obey his orders without resistance. The prestige of your city still survived then and it seemed as if in time you would be the leading power in Greece. Consequently, alleging as sufficient any pretext that offered itself, he came here with his army and inflicted great damage, cutting the crops and trees and burning the homesteads, and finally partitioning your cities and your territory, he signed part of it to the Argives, part to the Tegeans and Megalopolitans, and part to the Messenians, wishing to confer ill-merited benefits on all of them if by doing so he could only damage you. He was succeeded by Alexander. That king again, because he thought there was left in Thebes a little spark of the Greece that once was, destroyed that city in the manner that you all, I take it, know.

"And as for the successors of Alexander, need I tell you in detail how they have they treated the Greeks? For no one is so indifferent to facts as not to have heard how Antipater after his victory over the Greeks at Lamia treated the unhappy Athenians as well as the other Greeks in the harshest manner, going so far in his wanton and lawless violence as to appoint and send round to the different cities exile-hunters to catch those who had opposed or in any way offended the royal house of Macedon. Some forcibly driven out of the temples and others dragged from the altars perished by torture, while those who escaped were expelled from the whole of Greece, having no single place of refuge except the territory of the Aetolian League. And who is ignorant of the actions of Cassander, Demetrius, and Antigonus Gonatas, all so recent that the memory of them is quite vivid? Some of them by introducing garrisons to cities and others by planting tyrannies left no

city with the right to call itself unenslaved. Leaving them aside, I will now pass to the last Antigonus, in case any of you, regarding his action without suspicion, consider themselves under a debt of gratitude to the Macedonians. It was not for the purpose of saving the Achaeans that Antigonus undertook the war against you, nor because he disapproved of the tyranny of Cleomenes and desired to save Sparta. If anyone entertains such a notion he must be very simple-minded. But seeing that his own power would not be safe if you acquired the supremacy in the Peloponnesus, that Cleomenes was just the man to effect this and that Fortune was working for you splendidly, he came here actuated both by fear and envy, not to have the Peloponnesians but to cut short your hopes and humiliate your prestige. So instead of affection for the Macedonians because they did not plunder your city when masters of it, you should consider them your enemies and hate them for preventing you more than once when you had the power of attaining supremacy in Greece.

"And regarding Philip's offences why need I speak more? As for his impiety to heaven it is sufficient to cite his outrages on the temples at Thermi, and as for his cruelty to men I need but mention his perfidy and treachery to the Messenians. . . . For the Aetolians alone among the Greeks dared to face Antipater and demand security for the unfortunate victims of his injustice, they alone withstood the attack of Brennus and his barbarians, and they alone when called upon came to fight by your side and help you recover your hereditary position of supremacy.

"I have spoken at some length on this subject, but as regards the present deliberation one may say that while it is necessary to draw up your decree and to vote as if you were deciding on war, as a matter of fact you need not

look on this as war. So far from the Achaeans being able to inflict any damage on your territory, I fancy they will be only too grateful to the gods if they can protect their own when encircled by foes, the Eleans and Messenians attacking them on one side owing to their alliance with us, and ourselves on the other. As for Philip, I feel sure that his aggressiveness will soon cease with the Aetolians fighting him on land and the Romans and King Attalus at sea. It is indeed very easy to conjecture what will happen from the past. For if when he was at war with the Aetolians alone he was never able to subdue them, how with this combination against him will he be able to support the present war?

"I have spoken so in order that, as was my purpose from the outset, you should all recognize that even if you did not stand in any way committed but were considering the question for the first time, you ought rather to ally yourselves with the Aetolians than the Macedonians. But if as is the fact you stand engaged and have made up your minds about the matter, what remains to be said? If indeed you had formed your present alliance with us previous to the favours conferred on you by Antigonus, it might perhaps have been an open question for you whether you should not as a concession to subsequent circumstances neglect earlier obligations. But since it was after the establishment by Antigonus of this much vaunted liberty and security that they are constantly throwing in your teeth, since it was after frequently discussing among yourselves whether you should enter into alliance with the Aetolians or the Macedonians that you decided to join the Aetolians, with whom you have interchanged pledges, side by side also with whom you fought against Macedonia in the late war, what justifiable room for discussion is left? For by your action then your friendly relations

with Antigonus and Philip were cancelled. So you must either be able to point to some act of injustice to you committed subsequently by the Aetolians or some benefit conferred on you by Macedonia, or if neither one nor the other exists, how can you, ceding to the instances of the very people whose advances you before rightly decided to reject when your hands were free, contemplate the violation of treaties, oaths, and the most solemn pledges known to men?"

Chlaeneas after speaking in these terms which seemed difficult to refute, here ended his harangue. After this Lyciscus, the Acarnanian envoy, coming forward at first refrained from addressing the assembly, as he saw that they were nearly all engaged in discussing the space with each other, but when silence was restored he began to speak somewhat as follows: "We, men of Lacedaemon, have been sent to you by the Acarnanian League; and as we have nearly always made common cause with Macedonia we consider that this embassy represents Macedonia as well as our own country. And just as in battles owing to the superiority and strength of the Macedonian force their valour involves our safety, so in diplomatic contests the interests of Acarnania are involved in the rights of Macedonia. You must not therefore be surprised if the greater part of my speech refers to Philip and the Macedonians. Now Chlaeneas at the close of his speech summed up very abruptly the nature of the Aetolian claims on you. He said that if subsequently to your entering into alliance with the Aetolians, you had suffered any injury or offence from them, or had even met with any kindness from the Macedonians, the present meeting would be justified in considering the question afresh, but if nothing of the kind had happened, and if we Acarnanians now believe that by alleging what occurred and met

with your approbation in the time of Antigonus we shall succeed in overthrowing oaths and treaties, we are the greatest simpletons in the world. Well, I allow that I am the greatest simpleton in the world and that the words I am about to address to you are idle, if, as he says, nothing has taken place subsequently, but the state of Greece is precisely the same as it was when you made the alliance with the Aetolians alone. But if the exact reverse is the case, as I shall clearly show in the course of this speech, I think you will be convinced that my advice is highly to your advantage and that Chlaeneas is wrong. We have come here then convinced that we ought to address you on this very matter and demonstrate to you that it will be both to your credit and to your interest to adopt if possible, once you have heard how serious is the danger that threatens Greece, a policy both honourable and worthy of yourselves, by joining our cause; or if that may not be so, by taking at least no active part in this dispute. But since our opponents have ventured to bring against the house of Macedon accusations dating from early times, I think it incumbent on me to begin by addressing to you a few words on these matters, in order to correct the error of those who put faith in the statements made.

"Chlaeneas, then, said that it was by means of the calamity of Olynthus that Philip, son of Amyntas, made himself master of Thessaly, whereas what I assert is that not only the Thessalians, but the rest of the Greeks owed their safety to Philip. For at the time when Onomarchus and Philomenus seized on Delphi and impiously and illegally possessed themselves of the god's treasure, who among you is not aware that they established a force of such strength that none of the Greeks dared to face it; indeed, while acting thus impiously they very nearly made themselves at the

same time masters of the whole of Greece. It was then that Philip voluntarily proffered his services, destroyed the tyrants, secured the temple and was the author of liberty in Greece, as actual facts have testified to posterity also. For it was not because he had injured the Thessalians, as Chlaeneas had the audacity to say, but because he was the benefactor of Greece, that they all chose him commander-in-chief both on sea and land, an honour previously conferred on no one. But we are told that he entered Laconia with his army. True, but, as you know it was not of his own choice, but it was after being frequently entreated and appealed to by his friends and allies in the Peloponnese that he reluctantly gave way. And when he arrived, pray consider, Chlaeneas, how he behaved. It was in his power to avail himself of the animosity of the neighbouring peoples to devastate the territory of Sparta and humiliate the city, winning thereby profound thanks, but instead of adopting such a course he struck equal terror into the Spartans and their enemies and compelled them to their common good to settle their differences by a congress, not assuming himself the right of judging their disputes, but appointing a court of arbitration selected from all the Greek states. How proper a subject for reproach and censure!

"Again, you have bitterly reproached Alexander for punishing Thebes when he believed that city had wronged him, but you never mentioned how he inflicted punishment on the Persians for their outrages on all the Greeks, and how he delivered us all from the greatest evils by enslaving the barbarians and depriving them of the resources they used for the destruction of the Greeks, pitting now the Athenians and now the Thebans against the ancestors of these Spartans, how in a word he made Asia subject to Greece. And as for his successors, how have you the assurance to mention them?

They did indeed often, under changing circumstances, bestow benefits and inflict injuries on different people, and others might be justified in feeling resentment against them, but you Aetolians have not the least right to do so, you who have never done any good to a soul, but have done evil to many and at many times. Who, tell me, invited Antigonus the son of Demetrius to assist in dissolving the Achaean League? Who made a sworn treaty with Alexander of Epirus for the enslavement and partition of Acarnania? Was it not you? Who elected and sent out such commanders as you did, men who even ventured to lay hands on inviolable sanctuaries, Timaeus having plundered those of Poseidon on Taenarus and of Artemis at Lusi, while Pharycus pillaged the holy place of Hera at Argos and Polycritus that of Poseidon in Mantinea? And what shall we say of Lattabus and Nicostratus? Did they not violate in time of peace the sanctity of the Pamboeotian festival—conduct worthy of Scythians or Gauls. No such crimes were ever perpetrated by Alexander's successors.

"While you have no defence to offer for any of these acts you pride yourselves on having resisted the attack of the barbarians on Delphi, and say that the Greeks ought to be grateful to you for this. But if thanks are due to the Aetolians for this single service, how highly should we honour the Macedonians, who for the greater part of their lives never cease from fighting with the barbarians for the sake of the security of Greece? For who is not aware that Greece would have constantly stood in the greatest danger, had we not been fenced by the Macedonians and the honourable ambition of their kings? The best proof is this. The moment that the Gauls after defeating Ptolemy Ceraunus conceived a contempt for the Macedonians, Brennus making light of all other opponents marched into the middle of

Greece with his army, a thing that would often have happened if our frontiers were not protected by the Macedonians.

"I have much more to say about the past, but have said, I think, enough. Among Philip's actions they cite his destruction of the temple as an instance of impiety, but they do not add a word about the criminal outrages they committed at the temples of Dium and Dodona and the precincts of the gods there. They should have mentioned these first. But you Aetolians while you tell this meeting of the evils you suffered, greatly exaggerating their gravity, are silent regarding the far more numerous evils you did to others unprovoked, well knowing that all impute the blame for injustice and injuries to those who first resort to such violence.

"As for the conduct of Antigonus, I will only mention it so far as to avoid seeming to make light of what happened or to regard as of minor importance such a performance as his. I do not for my part think there is an example in history of such benevolence as Antigonus showed to you. It seems to me in fact that it could not be surpassed. For what were the facts? Antigonus went to war with you and beat you in a pitched battle, and by force of arms took possession of your territory and town. Strictly, he should have exercised the rights of war. But he was so far from treating you with any severity, that besides all the rest he did for you he expelled your tyrant and re-established the reign of law and your ancient constitution. And in return for this you proclaimed Antigonus at public festivals in the hearing of all Greece to be your saviour and benefactor. Now what course should you have taken afterwards? I will tell you my opinion, sirs, and you must not take it ill; for I will do so not with any wish to heap pointless reproaches on you, but under the pressure of circumstances and for the general good. This

is what I have to say. Both in the former war you should have taken the side not of the Aetolians but of Macedonia and now that these advances are made to you you should rather join Philip than the Aetolians. But I shall be told that you will be breaking a treaty. Now which is the most serious offence, to disregard the private convention you made with the Aetolians or the treaty made in the sight of all the Greeks and inscribed on a column and consecrated? Why should you have compunction about throwing over those from whom you never received any favour, but show no respect to Philip and the Macedonians to whom you owe even your power of deliberating on this occasion? Do you think it necessary to keep faith with your friends. . . [3] But the piety of observing a written treaty is less than the impiety of fighting against your preservers, as the Aetolians now come and ask you to do.

[3] Something, such as "and not with your benefactors," is missing.

"Let what I have said on this head suffice, and let those who are disposed to be cautious pronounce my words to have no bearing on the present situation. I will now revert to what my adversaries themselves speak of as the main question. And this is that if matters are now in the same state as when you made an alliance with them, you should decide to maintain your original attitude, for that is a matter of principle, but if the situation has radically changed, you are justified now in discussing the requests made to you afresh. I ask you, therefore, Cleonicus and Chlaeneas, what allies had you when you first invited the Spartans to act with you? Had you not the whole of Greece? But who make common cause with you at present or what kind of alliance do you invite them to enter? Far from being similar, the circumstances are now the reverse of what they formerly were. Then your

rivals in the struggle for supremacy and renown were the Achaeans and Macedonians, peoples of your own race, and Philip was their commander. But now Greece is threatened with a war against men of a foreign race who intend to enslave her, men whom you fancy you are calling in against Philip, but are calling in really against yourselves and the whole of Greece. For just as those who when imperilled by war introduce into their cities garrisons stronger than their own forces for the sake of safety, repel indeed all danger from the enemy but at the same time subject themselves to the authority of their friends, so do the Aetolians contemplate doing. For in their anxiety to get the better of Philip and humiliate the Macedonians, they have without knowing it invoked such a cloud from the west as may, perhaps, at first only cast its shadow on Macedonia, but in time will be the cause of great evil to all Greece.

"All Greeks, therefore, should foresee the approaching storm and especially the Lacedaemonians. For why do you think it was, men of Sparta, that your ancestors, at the time when Xerxes sent you an envoy demanding water and earth, thrust the stranger into the well and heaped earth upon him, and bade him to announce to Xerxes that he had received what was demanded, water and earth? Or why did Leonidas and his men march forth of their own will to meet certain death? Surely it was to show that they were risking their lives not for their own freedom alone, but for that of the other Greeks. It very well becomes you", the descendants of such men, to make an alliance now with barbarians, to take the field with them and make war on the Epirots, Achaeans, Acarnanians, Boeotians, and Thessalians, in fact with almost all the Greeks except the Aetolians! They indeed are accustomed to act so and to think nothing disgraceful if only

something is to be gained by it, but it is not so with you. And what feats do you expect they will accomplish when they have gained the alliance of Rome, the people who, when you were reinforced by the help of the Illyrians, attempted by sea to surprise and treacherously take Pylus and on land laid siege to Cleitor and sold the citizens of Cynaetha into slavery? Formerly, as I already said, they made a treaty with Antigonus for the destruction of the Achaean and Acarnanian Leagues, and now they have made one with the Romans against the whole of Greece.

"How, when one knows of this, can one help viewing with suspicion the advance of the Romans and with detestation the unprincipled conduct of the Aetolians in venturing to make such treaties? Already they have robbed the Acarnanians of Oeniadae and Nasus, and it is but the other day that they together with the Romans seized on the unhappy city of Anticyra, selling its inhabitants into slavery. So the Romans are carrying off the women and children to suffer, of course, what those must suffer who fall into the hands of aliens, while the Aetolians divide the houses of the unfortunate people among themselves by lot. A fine alliance this for anyone to determine to join and specially for you Lacedaemonians, who, when you conquered the barbarians, decreed that the Thebans were to pay a tithe to the gods for having decided under compulsion, but alone among the Greeks, to remain neutral during the Persian invasion.

"Your honour then and your dignity, men of Lacedaemon, require that you should remember who were your ancestors, that you should place yourselves on your guard against the aggression of Rome, and view with suspicion the evil designs of the Aetolians, but above all that you should bear in mind the favours conferred on you by Antigonus and still continue

to be haters of wickedness, refusing the friendship of the Aetolians and throwing in your lot with the Achaeans and Macedonians. But if some of your most powerful citizens are opposed to this policy at least do all in your power to remain neutral and not participate in the iniquity of the Aetolians."

In 211 *B.C. the Acarnanians were threatened with invasion by the Aetolians and resorted to the desperate resolution to which these fragments relate*. *See Livy*, xxvi.*25*.

The Acarnanians, on learning of the Aetolian invasion, partly from despondency and partly from fury came to a desperate resolution. . . .

If anyone survived and escaped from the battle no one might receive him in a city or give him fire. They delivered a solemn curse on all and especially on the Epirots who should receive any fugitive in their country. . . .

Siege of Echinus by Philip

Having decided to make his approaches to the city opposite the two towers, he constructed in front of each of them a shelter for sappers and a ram, and in the space between the towers a gallery from one ram to the other running parallel to the wall. When the design was carried out the appearance of the work was very similar in style to the wall. For the superstructures on the shelters were in appearance and arrangement like towers of the fashion of the wickerwork, while the space between them was like a wall, the upper row of wickerwork being divided into battlements by the way it was woven. From the ground floor of the towers the men employed in levelling the surface to enable the rollers to advance threw up earth, and the ram was then propelled. On the second story there were water-jars and other appliances for putting out fires, and also the catapults,

while on the third, level with the towers of the then, stood a number of men ready to engage those who attempted to damage the ram. From the gallery between the towers two trenches were opened and carried towards the wall of the city. There were also three batteries of ballistae of which one threw stones of a talent's weight, and the other two stones of half that weight. From the camp to the shelters for sappers roofed underground passages had been constructed, so that neither those coming from the camp nor those leaving the works should be wounded by missiles from the town. These works were entirely completed in the course of a few days, as the country round has abundance of the materials required. For Echinus is situated on the Malian Gulf, facing south, opposite the territory of Thronium, and the land is rich in every kind of produce, so that nothing was lacking for Philip's purpose. But, as I said, when the work was complete both the saps and the siege machines began to advance.

While Philip was besieging Echinus, and had both well secured his position on the side of the town and fortified his camp on the outer side with a trench and a wall, Publius Sulpicius, the Roman proconsul, and Dorimachus, the strategus of the Achaeans, appeared in person, Publius with a fleet and Dorimachus with a force of infantry and cavalry. When they attacked the entrenched camp and were repulsed, Philip having fought more vigorously, the Echinaeans surrendered to Philip. For Dorimachus was unable to compel Philip to raise the siege by cutting off his supplies, as he got them by sea.

Aegina occupied by the Romans

When Aegina was taken by the Romans, such of the inhabitants as did not escape collected on the ships and begged the proconsul to allow them to

send convoys to cities of kindred race to obtain ransom. Publius at first refused very sharply, saying that they ought to have sent envoys to their betters to come and save them while they were still their own masters not now they were slaves. That they who a short time ago had not even deigned to reply to his envoys, now when they had fallen into his power should request leave to send envoys to their kinsmen was most foolish. So at the time he dismissed those who had approached him with these words, but next day summoning all the prisoners of war, he said he was under no obligation to be lenient to the Aeginetans, but for the sake of the rest of the Greeks he would allow them to send envoys to get ransom, as such was their custom.

VIII. Affairs of Asia

The Euphrates

The Euphrates commences its course in Armenia and flows through Syria and the adjacent countries in the direction of Babylonia. It is supposed to fall into the Persian Gulf, but this is not the case; for the canals which are carried over the country exhaust the water of the river before it can fall into the sea. So that its nature is the reverse of that of most rivers. In the case of other rivers the stream increases the most country they traverse, they are largest in winter and lowest in the height of summer, but the Euphrates is in highest flood at the rising of the Dog-star, and the stream is largest in Syria and gets smaller as it advances. The reason of this is that its rise is not due to the conflux of winter rains but to the melting of the snow, while its decrease is due to the diversion of the stream into the land and its subdivision for purposes of irrigation. So that on this occasion the conveyance of the troops was very slow, the boats being over full, while the

river was at its lowest, and the force of its current only helped their progress to a very slight extent.

THE END OF BOOK IX

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK X

I. AFFAIRS OF ITALY

The Recovery of Tarentum

The distance from the Sicilian strait and Rhegium to Tarentum is more than two thousand stades, but all this side of Italy has not a single harbour except those of Tarentum. This part of Italy faces the Sicilian Sea and verges towards Greece, and it contains the most populous barbarian tribes and the most famous Greek cities, being inhabited by the Bruttians, Lucanians, a portion of the Daunians, the Calabrians, and several other tribes, while on its coast lie Rhegium, Caulonia, Locri, Croton, Metapontum, and Thurii, so that those travelling either from Greece or from Sicily to any of the aforesaid places must of necessity anchor in the harbours of Tarentum, and make that city the seat of the exchange and traffic with all the inhabitants of this side of Italy. One can form some idea of the advantages of its situation from the prosperity of the people of Croton; for they, although they have but roadsteads suitable for the summer and though quite few ships put in there, have, it would seem, attained great wealth simply owing to the favourable situation of the place, which is in no way to be compared with the harbours and district of Tarentum. Tarentum is also very favourably situated with respect to the harbours of the Adriatic even at the present day, and was still more so formerly. For from the extremity of Iapygia, as far as Sipontum, everyone coming from the opposite coast to put in to an Italian harbour crossed to Tarentum and used

that as an emporium for the exchange and sale of merchandise, the town of Brundisium having not yet been founded. So that Fabius, regarding this enterprise as of great moment, neglected other matters and turned his whole attention to this. . . .

II. Affairs of Spain

Character of Scipio

Now that I am about to recount Scipio's exploits in Spain, and in short everything that he achieved in his life, I think it necessary to convey to my readers, in the first place, a notion of his character and natural parts. For the fact that he was almost the most famous man of all time makes everyone desirous to know what sort of man he was, and were the natural gifts and the training which enabled him to accomplish so many great actions. But none can help falling into error and acquiring a mistaken impression of him, as the estimate of those who have given us their views about him is very wide of the truth. That what I myself state here is sound will be evident to all who by means of my narrative are able to appreciate the most glorious and hazardous of his exploits. As for all other writers, they represent him as a man favoured by fortune, who always owed the most part of his success to the unexpected and to mere chance, such men being, in their opinion, more divine and more worthy of admiration than those who always act by calculation. They are not aware that one of the two things deserves praise and the other only congratulation, the latter being common to ordinary men, whereas what is praiseworthy belongs alone to men of sound judgement and mental ability, whom we should consider to be the most divine and most beloved by the gods. To me it seems that the character and principles of Scipio much resembled those of Lycurgus, the Lacedaemonian legislator.

For neither must we suppose that Lycurgus drew up the constitution of Sparta under the influence of superstition and solely prompted by the Pythia, nor that Scipio won such an empire for his country by following the suggestion of dreams and omens. But since both of them saw that most men neither readily accept anything unfamiliar to them, nor venture on great risks without the hope of divine help, Lycurgus made his own scheme more acceptable and more easily believed in by invoking the oracles of the Pythia in support of projects due to himself, while Scipio similarly made the men under his command more sanguine and more ready to face perilous enterprises by instilling into them the belief that his projects were divinely inspired. That everything he did was done with calculation and foresight, and that all his enterprises fell out as he had reckoned, will be clear from what I am about to say.

It is generally agreed that Scipio was beneficent and magnanimous, but that he was also shrewd and discreet with a mind always concentrated on the object he had in view would be conceded by none except those who associated with him and to whom his character stood clearly revealed. One of these was Gaius Laelius, who from his youth up to the end had participated in his every word and deed, and who has produced the above impression upon myself, as his account seems both probable on the face of it and in accordance with the actual performances of Scipio. For he tells us that Scipio first distinguished himself on the occasion of the cavalry engagement between his father and Hannibal in the neighbourhood of the Po. [1] He was at the time seventeen years of age, this being his first campaign, and his father had placed him in command of a picked troop of horse in order to ensure his safety, but when he caught sight of his father in

the battle, surrounded by the enemy and escorted only by two or three horsemen and dangerously wounded, he at first endeavoured to urge those with him to go to the rescue, but when they hung back for a time owing to the large numbers of the enemy round them, he is said with reckless daring to have charged the encircling force alone. Upon the rest being now forced to attack, the enemy were terror-struck and broke up, and Publius Scipio, thus unexpectedly delivered, was the first to salute his son in the hearing of all as his preserver. Having by this service gained a universally acknowledged reputation for bravery, he in subsequent times refrained from exposing his person without sufficient reason, [2] when his country reposed her hopes of success on him—conduct characteristic not of a commander who relies on luck, but on one gifted with intelligence.

[1] Battle of the Ticino.

[2] I have left Mr. Paton's translation as it was, and since he gives no indication what reading he proposed to adopt, I alter À¬½ÄÉÂ to ÃÀ±½¯ÉÂ.—Ed.

After this his elder brother Lucius was a candidate for the aedileship, which is almost the highest office at Rome open to young men, it being the custom to elect two patricians; but there being on this occasion several patrician candidates, Publius Scipio for long did not venture to stand for the same office as his brother. But on the approach of the election, judging from the disposition of the people that his brother had a poor chance of being elected, and seeing that he himself was exceedingly popular, he came to the conclusion that the only means by which his brother would attain his object would be by their coming to an agreement and both of them making the attempt, and so he hit on the following plan. Seeing that his mother was

visiting the different temples and sacrificing to the gods on behalf of his brother and generally exhibiting great concern about the result—he had only to concern himself with her, his father having left for Spain, where he had been appointed to the command in the campaign I have described—he, as a fact, told her that he had twice had the same dream. He had dreamt that both he and his brother had been elected to the aedileship and were going up from the forum to their house, when she met him at the door and fell on their necks and kissed them. She was affected by this, as a woman would be, and exclaimed, "Would I might see that day" or something similar. "Then would you like us to try, mother?" he said. Upon her consenting, as she never dreamt he would venture on it, but thought it was merely a casual joke—for he was exceedingly young—he begged her to get a white toga ready for him at once, this being the dress that candidates are in the habit of wearing. What she had said had entirely gone out of her head, and Scipio waiting until he received the white toga appeared in the forum while his mother was still asleep. The people, owing to the unexpectedness of the sight and owing to his previous popularity, received him with enthusiastic surprise, and afterwards when he went on to the station appointed for candidates and stood by his brother they not only conferred the office on Publius but on his brother too for his sake, and both appeared at their house elected aediles. When the news suddenly reached his mother's ears, she met them overjoyed at the door and embraced the young men with deep emotion, so that from this circumstance all who had heard of the dreams believed that Publius communed with the gods not only in his sleep, but still more in reality and by day. Now it was not a matter of a dream at all, but as he was kind and munificent and agreeable in his address he reckoned on his

popularity with the people, and so by cleverly adapting his action to the actual sentiment of the people and of his mother he not only attained his object but was believed to have acted under a sort of divine inspiration. For those who are incapable of taking an accurate view of operations, causes, and dispositions, either from lack of natural ability or from inexperience and indolence, attribute to the gods and to fortune the causes of what is accomplished by shrewdness and with calculation and foresight.

I have made these observations for the sake of my readers, that they may not by falsely accepting the generally received opinion of Scipio neglect to notice his finest qualities and those most worthy of respect, I mean his cleverness and laboriousness. This will be still more evident from my account of his actual exploits.

To resume my narrative—on this occasion he assembled his soldiers and exhorted them not to be cast down by their recent reverse. The Romans, he said, were never beaten by the Carthaginians owing to the superior courage of the latter, but it was all due to the treachery of the Celtiberians and to rashness, the generals having been cut off from each other owing to their trust in the alliance of that people. "Both of these disadvantages," he said, "now affect the enemy; for they are encamped at a long distance apart, and by their tyrannical treatment of their allies they have estranged them all and made them their enemies. So that some of them are already negotiating with us, while the rest, as soon as they have the courage to do it and see that we have crossed the river, will be glad to come in not so much out of affection for us as from eagerness to be avenged on the Carthaginians for their brutal conduct. But the chief point is that the enemy's commanders are on ill terms with each other and will not readily engage us with their united forces,

while if they attack us separately it will be easy to overcome them." He therefore begged his soldiers to take all this into consideration and cross the river confidently. After that it would be the business of himself and the other commanders to decide what was next to be done. Having made this speech he left his colleague Marcus Silanus with three thousand foot and five hundred horse at the ford to watch over the allies on the near side of the river, and himself began to cross with the rest of his forces, revealing his plan to no one. The fact was, he had decided not to do any of the things he had publicly announced, but to invest suddenly the town in Spain to which they had given the name of Carthage. This we take as the first and strongest confirmation of the view I have just expressed. He was now but twenty-seven years of age, and yet he in the first place took in hand a situation pronounced by most people as desperate owing to the serious nature of the recent reverses, and secondly in dealing with it he put aside the measures obvious to anyone and planned out and decided on a course which neither his enemies nor his friends expected. There was nothing in all this that was not due to most close calculation.

For from the very outset, having learnt by careful inquiries at Rome the facts about the treachery of the Celtiberians and the separation of the Roman armies, and reaching the conclusion that his father's defeat was due to these causes, he was not in terror of the Carthaginians nor broken in spirit like most people. When subsequently he heard that the allies on the Roman side of the Ebro remained friendly, and that the Carthaginian commanders had fallen out with each other and were treating their subjects tyrannically, he felt full confidence in the result of his expedition, relying not on chance but on inference from the facts. For on his arrival in Spain he set everyone

on the alert and inquired from everyone about the circumstances of the enemy, and thus learnt that the Carthaginian forces were divided into three bodies. Mago, he heard, was posted on this side of the pillars of Hercules in the country of the people called Conii; Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, was in Lusitania near the mouth of the Tagus; and the other Hasdrubal was besieging a city in the territory of the Carpetani: none of them being within less than ten days' march from New Carthage. He thought, then, that if he decided to engage the enemy it would be extremely dangerous to risk a battle with all the three at once, both because his predecessors had been defeated and because the enemy were greatly superior in numbers, while if he made a dash at one of the three and upon his declining an engagement found himself shut in somewhere by the other hostile forces coming up to help, he feared that he might meet with a disaster such as befel his uncle and father. He therefore rejected any such course; and on learning that the above city, New Carthage, was of very great service to the enemy, and a cause of great damage to himself in the present war, he made detailed inquiries about it during the winter from people acquainted with it. He learnt in the first place that it stood almost alone among Spanish cities in possessing harbours fit for a fleet and for naval forces, and that it was at the same time very favourably situated for the Carthaginians to make the direct sea crossing from Africa. Next he heard that the Carthaginians kept the bulk of their money and their war material in this city, as well as their hostages from the whole of Spain, and, what was of most importance, that the trained soldiers who garrisoned the citadel were only about a thousand in number, because no one dreamt that while the Carthaginians were masters of nearly the whole of Spain it would enter anyone's head to besiege the city, while

the remaining population was exceedingly large but composed of artisans, tradesmen, and sailors, men very far from having any military experience. This he considered to be a thing that would tell against the city, if he appeared suddenly before it. Nor was he ignorant of the position and plan of New Carthage and of the nature of the lagoon which surrounded it, but had learnt from some fishermen who plied their craft there that the whole lagoon was shallow and in most parts fordable, and that usually the water in it receded every day towards evening. Taking all these facts into consideration he came to the conclusion that if he succeeded in his enterprise he would not only damage the enemy, but would much advance the Roman cause, while in the event of failure he could, since he was master of the sea, place his troops in a position of safety, once he had secured his camp—an easy matter as the forces of the enemy were at so great a distance. Abandoning, therefore, all other projects he spent his time while in winter quarters in preparing for this, and though he had formed such a great project and was only of the age I just stated he concealed the plan from everyone except Gaius Laelius, until the time when he judged it proper to make it public.

Although authors agree that he made these calculations, yet when they come to the accomplishment of his plan, they attribute for some unknown reason the success not to the man and his foresight, but to the gods and to chance, and that in spite of all probability and in spite of the testimony of those who lived with him, and of the fact that Scipio himself in his letter to Philip explained clearly that it was after making the calculations with I have just recited that he undertook all his operations in Spain and particularly the siege of New Carthage.

Be that as it may, he now gave secret orders to Gaius Laelius, who commanded the fleet, to sail to that city—it was Laelius alone, as I above stated, who was aware of the project—while he himself with his land forces marched rapidly against it. He had about twenty-five thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred horse. Arriving on the seventh day he encamped to the north of the city, defending the outer side of his camp by a palisade and double trench reaching from sea to sea, but erecting no defences at all on the side facing the town, where the nature of the ground sufficiently secured his position.

Now that I am about to narrate the siege and capture of the place, I think it behoves me to make my readers acquainted to some extent with its surroundings and actual position. New Carthage lies half way down the coast of Spain, in a gulf which faces south-west and is about twenty stades long and ten stades broad at the entered. This gulf serves as a harbour for the following reason. At its mouth lies an island which leaves only a narrow passage on either side, and as this breaks the waves of the sea, the whole gulf is perfectly calm, except that the south-west wind sometimes blows in through both the channels and raises some sea. No other wind, however, disturbs it as it is quite land-locked. In the innermost nook of the gulf a hill in the form of a peninsula juts out, and on this stands the city, surrounded by the sea on the east and south and on the west by a lagoon which extends so far to the north that the remaining space, reaching as far as the sea on the other side and connecting the sea with the mainland, is not more than two stades in breadth. The town itself is low in the centre, and on its southern side the approach to it from the sea is level. On the other sides it is surrounded by hills, two of them lofty and rugged, and the other three,

though much lower, yet craggy and difficult of access. The biggest of these hills lies on the east side of the town and juts out into the sea, and on it is built a temple of Aesculapius. The second is opposite it on the western side in a similar position, and on it stands a magnificent palace said to have been built by Hasdrubal when he aspired to royal power. The three other smaller eminences are to the north of the city, the most easterly being called the hill of Vulcan, the next one the hill of Aletes, who is said to have received divine honours for his discovery of the silver mines, while the third is known as the hill of Saturn. An artificial communication has been opened between the lagoon and the neighbouring sea for the convenience of shipping, and over the channel thus cut through the tongue of land that separates lagoon and sea a bridge has been built for the passage of beasts of burden and carts bringing in supplies from the country.

Such being the situation of the place, the Roman camp was protected on its inner side without any fortification by the lagoon and by the outer sea. The intervening space, which connects the city with the mainland and which lay in the middle of his camp, was also left unintrenched by Scipio, either to intimidate the enemy or to adapt it to his own particular purpose, so that there should be no impediment to sorties from his camp and subsequent retirement into it. The circumference of the city was formerly not more than twenty stades—I am quite aware that many state it to be forty, but this is not true, as I speak not from report but from my own careful observation—and at the present day it has still further shrunk.

Scipio, then, when the fleet arrived in due time, decided to call a meeting of his troops and address them, using no other arguments than those which had carried conviction to himself and which I have above stated in detail.

After proving to them that the project was feasible, and pointing out briefly what loss its success would entail on the enemy and what an advantage it would be to themselves, he went on to promise gold crowns to those who should be the first to mount the wall and the usual rewards to such as displayed conspicuous courage. Finally he told them that it was Neptune who had first suggested this plan to him, appearing to him in his sleep, and promising that when the time for the action came he would render such conspicuous aid that his intervention would be manifest to the whole army. The combination in this speech of accurate calculation, of the promise of gold crowns, and therewithal of confidence in the help of Providence created great enthusiasm and ardour among the lads.

Next day, encircling the city from the sea by ships furnished with all kinds of missiles under the command of Laelius, and sending forward on the land side two thousand of his strongest men together with the ladder-bearers, he began the assault at about the third hour. Mago, who was in command of the place, divided his regiment of a thousand men into two, leaving half of them on the citadel and stationing the others on the eastern hill. After the rest, he armed two thousand of the strongest with such arms as were to be found in the town, and posted them near the gate leading to the isthmus and the enemy's camp: the others he ordered to do their best to defend the whole of the wall. As soon as Scipio had given the signal for the assault by bugle, Mago sent the armed citizens out through the gate, feeling sure of striking terror into the enemy and entirely defeating their design. They delivered a vigorous assault on the Romans who had issued from the camp and were now drawn up on the isthmus, and a sharp engagement ensued, accompanied by vehement shouts of encouragement from both

sides, those in the camp and those in the town respectively cheering on their own men. But as the assistance sent to either side was not equal, the Carthaginians arriving through a single gate and from a distance of nearly two stades and the Romans from close by and from several points, the battle for this reason was an unequal one. For Scipio had purposely posted his men close to the camp itself in order to entice the enemy as far out as possible, well knowing that if he destroyed those who were so to speak the steel edge of the population of the town he would cause universal dejection, and none of those inside would venture out of the gate. However, for some time the battle was hotly contested, as both sides had picked out their best men. But finally, as reinforcements continued to come up from the camp, the Carthaginians were forced back, by sheer weight, and took to flight, many of them falling in the actual battle or in the retreat but the greater number being trodden down by each other in entering the gate. When this took place the city people were thrown into such panic that even the defenders of the walls fled. The Romans very nearly succeeded in entering together with the fugitives, and at any rate set up their scaling ladders in full security.

Scipio took part in the battle, but consulted his safety as far as possible; for he had with him three men carrying large shields, who holding these close covered the surface exposed to the wall and thus afforded him protection. So that passing along the side of his line on higher ground he contributed greatly to the success of the day; for he could both see what was going on and being seen by all his men he inspired the combatants with great spirit. The consequence was that nothing was omitted which was

necessary in the engagement, but the moment that circumstances suggested any step to him he set to work at once to do what was necessary.

When the front rank advanced confidently to mount the ladders, it was not so much the numbers of the defenders which made the assault hazardous as the great height of the wall. Those on the wall consequently plucked up courage when they saw the difficulties of the assailant. For some of the ladders broke, as owing to their height so many mounted them at the same time, while on others those who led the way grew dizzy owing to their elevated position, and a very slight resistance on the part of the besieged sufficed to make them throw themselves off the ladders. Also whenever the defers adopted the expedient of throwing beams or suchlike things from the battlements the whole of those on the ladders would be swept off and fall to the ground. Yet in spite of all these difficulties nothing could restrain the dash and fury of the Romans, but while the first scalers were still falling the vacant places were instantly taken by the next in order. The hour, however, was now advanced, and as the soldiers were worn out by fatigue, Scipio recalled the assailants by bugle.

The garrison were now overjoyed at having, as they thought, repelled the danger, but Scipio, who was now waiting for the fall of the tide, got ready five hundred men with ladders on the shore of the lagoon and recruited his force at the isthmus and by the gate. Then after addressing his soldiers he gave them still more ladders than before so that the whole extent of the wall was covered with escaladers. When the signal for attack was sounded and the assailants setting up the ladders against the wall mounted it everywhere in the most daring manner, the defenders were thrown into great confusion and became very despondent. They had thought they were delivered from

peril, and now they saw they were menaced again by a new assault. As at the same time they had run out of ammunition and their losses were without severe as to dispirit them, they supported the assault with difficulty, but nevertheless offered a stubborn resistance. Just when the escalading attack was at its height the tide began to ebb and the water gradually receded from the edge of the lagoon, a strong and deep current setting in through the channel to the neighbouring sea, so that to those who were not prepared for the sight the thing appeared incredible. But Scipio had his guides ready and bade all the men he had told off for this service enter the water and have no fear. He indeed possessed a particular talent for inspiring confidence and sympathy in his troops when he called upon them. Now when they obeyed and raced through the shallow water, it struck the whole army that it was the work of some god. So that now remembering Scipio's reference to Neptune and the promise he made in his speech their courage was redoubled, and under cover of their shields they forced their way in dense order to the gate and began to try to cut down the doors with axes and hatchets. Meanwhile those who reached the wall through the lagoon finding the battlements deserted not only set up their ladders unmolested, but ascended them and occupied the wall without striking a blow, the defenders having been diverted to other quarters, especially to the isthmus and gate there, and having never conceived it possible that the enemy would reach the wall from the lagoon, while above all there was such disorderly shouting and such crowding and confusion that they could neither hear nor see to any effect.

The Romans, having once taken the wall, at first marched along it sweeping the enemy off it, the nature of their arms being very well adapted

for such a service. Upon reaching the gate some of them descended and began to cut through the bolts, upon which those outside began to force their way in, while the escaladers at the isthmus had now overpowered the defence and established themselves on the battlements. Finally, when the walls had been taken in this manner, those who entered through the gate occupied the hill on the east after dislodging its defenders. When Scipio thought that a sufficient number of troops had entered he sent most of them, as is the Roman custom, against the inhabitants of the city with orders to kill all they encountered, sparing none, and not to start pillaging until the signal was given. They do this, I think, to inspire terror, so that when towns are taken by the Romans one may often see not only the corpses of human beings, but dogs cut in half, and the dismembered limbs of other animals, and on this occasion such scenes were very many owing to the numbers of those in the place. Scipio himself, with about a thousand men, proceeded to the citadel. On his approach Mago at first attempted to resist, but afterwards, when he saw that the city had undoubtedly been captured, he sent a message begging for his life and surrendered the citadel. After this, upon the signal being given, the massacre ceased and they began pillaging. At nightfall such of the Romans as had received orders to that effect, remained in the camp, while Scipio with his thousand men bivouacked in the citadel, and recalling the rest from the houses ordered them, through the tribunes, to collect the booty in the market, each maniple separately, and sleep there, keeping guard over it. Summoning also the light-armed troops from the camp he stationed them on the easternmost hill.

Such was the manner in which the Romans gained possession of Spanish Carthage. Next day the booty, both the baggage of the troops in the

Carthaginian service and the household stuff of the townsmen and working classes, having been collected in the market, was divided by the tribunes among the legions on the usual system. The Romans after the capture of a city manage matters more or less as follows: according to the size of the town sometimes a certain number of men from each maniple, at other times certain whole maniples are told off to collect booty, but they never thus employ more than half their total force, the rest remaining in their ranks at times outside and at times inside the city, ready for the occasion. As their armies are usually composed of two Roman legions and two legions of allies, the whole four legions being rarely massed, all those who are told off to spoil bring the booty back each man to his own legion, and after it has been sold the tribunes distribute the profits equally among all, including not only those who were left behind in the protecting force, but the men who are guarding the tents, the sick, and those absent on any special service. I have already stated at some length in my chapters on the Roman state how it is that no one appropriates any part of the loot, but that all keep the oath they make when first assembled in camp on setting out for a campaign. So that when half of the army disperse to pillage and the other half keep their ranks and afford them protection, there is never any chance of the Romans suffering disaster owing to individual covetousness. For as all, both the spoilers and those who remain to safeguard them, have equal confidence that they will get their share of the booty, no one leaves the ranks, a thing which usually does injury to other armies. For since most men endure hardship and risk their lives for the sake of gain, it is evident that whenever the chance presents itself it is not likely that those left in the protecting force or in the camp will refrain, since the general rule among us is that any

man keeps whatever comes into his hands. And even if any careful king or general orders the booty to be brought in to form a common fund, yet everyone regards as his own whatever he can conceal. So that, as most of the men start pillaging, commanders cannot maintain any control and run the risk of disaster, and indeed many who have been successful in their object have, after capturing the enemy's camp or a town, not only been driven out but have met with complete disaster simply for the above reason. Commanders should therefore exercise the utmost care and foresight about this matter, so that as far as is possible the hope of equal participation in the booty when such a chance presents itself may be common to all.

The tribunes, then, were now dealing with the booty, but the Roman commander, when the whole of the prisoners, numbering little less than ten thousand, had been collected, ordered first the citizens with their wives and children, and next the working men, to be set apart. Upon this being done, after exhorting the citizens to be well disposed to the Romans and to be mindful of the kindness shown to them, he dismissed them all to their houses Weeping and rejoicing at one and the same time, owing to their unexpected delivery, they made obeisance to Scipio and dispersed. He told the working men that for the time being they were public slaves of Rome, but if they showed goodwill and industry in their several crafts he promised them freedom upon the war against Carthage terminating successfully. He ordered them to enrol themselves in the quaestor's office, appointing a Roman superintendent over every thirty, the whole number being about two thousand. Selecting from the other prisoners those who were strongest, finest looking, and in the prime of youth, he incorporated them with the crews of his ships, and having thus got half as many sailors as before, he

manned the captured vessels also, and made the complement of each ship nearly double what it had been, the captured vessels numbering eighteen sail and his original fleet thirty-five. He promised these men also their liberty after the final defeat of Carthage if they displayed good will and zeal. By this treatment of the prisoners he produced in the citizens great affection and loyalty to himself and to the common cause, while the workmen were most zealous owing to their hope of being set free. Having thus by his foresight seized the opportunity of making his fleet half as large again. . . .

After this he set apart Mago and the Carthaginians who were with him, two of them being members of the council of elders and fifteen members of the senate. He committed these to the custody of Laelius, ordering him to pay them due attention. Next he invited the hostages, over three hundred in number, to visit him, and calling the children to him one by one and caressing them bade them be of good cheer, as in a few days they would see their parents. He also bade the rest take heart and asked them all to write to their relations at home, firstly, that they were safe and well, and secondly, that the Romans were willing to restore them all in safety to their homes if their relatives chose to become allies of Rome. After speaking thus, having reserved from the booty the most suitable objects for this purpose, he gave them such gifts as became their sex and age, presenting the girls with earrings and bracelets and the young men with poniards and swords. When one of the captive women, the wife of Mandonius, who was the brother of Andobales, [3] king of the Ilergetes, fell at his feet and entreated him with tears to treat them with more proper consideration than the Carthaginians had done, he was touched and asked her what they stood in need of. The

lady was indeed of advanced age, and bore herself with a certain majestic dignity. Upon her making no reply he sent for the officials appointed to attend on the women. When they presented themselves and informed him that they kept the women generously supplied with all they required, the lady again clasped his knees and addressed him in the same words, upon which Scipio was still more puzzled, and conceiving the idea that the officials who attended on the women were neglecting them and had now made a false statement, he bade the ladies be of good cheer, for he said he would himself appoint other attendants who would see to it that they were in want of nothing. The old lady after some hesitation said, "General, you do not take me rightly if you think that our present situation is about our food." Scipio then understood what the lady meant, and noticing the youth and beauty of the daughters of Andobales and other princes he was forced to tears, recognizing in how few words she had pointed out to him the danger to which they were exposed. So now he made it clear to her that he had taken her meaning, and grasping her by the right hand bade her and the rest be of good cheer, for he would look after them as if they were his own sisters and children and would accordingly appoint trustworthy men to attend on them.

[3] *Indibilis* in Livy.

After this he handed over to the quaestors all the public funds of the Carthaginians which had been captured. There were more than six hundred talents, so that when these were added to the four hundred he had brought from Rome, the total sum at his disposal was more than a thousand talents.

It was at this time that some young Romans came across a girl of surpassing bloom and beauty, and being aware that Scipio was fond of

women brought her to him and introduced her, saying that they wished to make a present of the damsel to him. He was overcome and astonished by her beauty, but he told them that had he been in a private position, no present would have been more welcome to him, but as he was the General it would be the least welcome of any, giving them to understand, I suppose, by this answer that sometimes, during seasons of repose and leisure in our life, such things afford young men most delightful enjoyment and entertainment, but that in times of activity they are most prejudicial to the body and the mind alike of those who indulge in them. So he expressed his gratitude to the young men, but called the girl's father and delivering her over to him at once bade him give her in marriage to whomever of the citizens he preferred. The self-restraint and moderation he displayed on this occasion secured him the warm approbation of his troops.

Having arranged these matters and handed over the rest of the prisoners to the tribunes, he dispatched Laelius on a quinquereme to Rome, to convey the news, placing under his charge the Carthaginians and the most distinguished among the other prisoners. For as the Romans had for the most part regarded the situation in Spain as desperate he knew that this intelligence would revive their spirits and that they would redouble their efforts to support him.

He himself remaining for some time in New Carthage constantly exercised his navy and instructed the tribunes to train the land forces in the following manner. He ordered the soldiers on the first day to go at the double for thirty stades in their armour. On the second day they were all to polish up, repair, and examine their arms in full view, and the third day to rest and remain idle. On the following day they were to practise, some of

them sword-fighting with wooden swords covered with leather and with a button on the point, while others practised casting with javelins also having a button at the point. On the fifth day they were to begin the same course of exercise again. In order that there should be no lack of weapons for practice and for real warfare he paid particular attention to the artificers. As I before stated, he had appointed skilled supervisors of the different sections of this branch, and he used himself to visit the workshops daily and personally distribute the materials required. So with the infantry exercising and drilling on the ground outside the town, with the fleet at sea practising manoeuvres and rowing, and with the men in the town sharpening weapons, forging brass or carpentering, in a word, with everyone busily engaged upon the preparation of weapons, no one could have helped when he saw that town saying, in the words of Xenophon, that it was "a workshop of war." As soon as he considered that all the requirements of the service had been properly met, he secured the town by placing guards and repairing the wall, and setting forth with his army and navy began to advance towards Tarraco, taking the hostages with him.

III. Affairs of Greece

Philopoemen

Euryleon, the strategus of the Achaeans, was a timid man, without any military capacity. Now that the course of my narrative has brought me to the beginning of the achievements of Philopoemen, I think it is incumbent on me, just as in the case of other eminent men I have attempted to sketch their training and character, to do now the like for him. It is indeed a strange thing that authors should narrate circumstantially the foundations of cities, telling us when, how, and by whom they were founded, and detailing the

precise conditions and difficulties of the undertaking, while they pass over in silence the previous training and the objects of the men who directed the whole matter, though such information is more profitable. For inasmuch as it is more possible to emulate and to imitate living men than lifeless buildings, so much more important for the improvement of a reader is it to learn about the former. Now had I not dealt with Philopoemen in a special work in which I explain who he and his family were, and the nature of his training when young, I should be compelled to give an account of all these matters here. Since, however, I have formerly in three books, which do not form part of the present work, treated of him, stating which was his training as a boy and enumerating his most famous actions, it is event that in the present narrative my proper course is to omit details concerning his early training and the ambitions of his youth, but to add detail to the summary account I there gave of the achievements of his riper years, in order that the proper character of each work may be preserved. For just as the former work, being in the form of an encomium, demanded a summary and somewhat exaggerated account of his achievements, so the present history, which distributes praise and blame impartially, demands a strictly true account and one which states the ground on which either praise or blame is based.

Philopoemen, then, came of a good stock, his family being one of the noblest in Arcadia. He was brought up and educated under the charge of Cleander of Mantinea, an old family friend and the most distinguished of the Mantineans, but living at the time in exile. When he grew up he became an admirer of Ecdemus and Demophanes, who were natives of Megalopolis, but had escaped from the oppression of the tyrants, and after being with

Arcesilaus the philosopher during their exile liberated their country by organizing a plot against the tyrant Aristodemus, and also took part in the overthrow of Nicocles, the tyrant of Sicyon, joining Aratus in that enterprise. In addition to this, when the people of Cyrene sent for them they had championed their cause in a brilliant manner and preserved their liberty. Spending much of his time with these two men in his early youth he soon came to excel all his contemporaries in endurance and courage both in the chase and in war. He was also strict in his way of living and simple in dress and other such matters, for these men had instilled into him such convictions as that it was impossible for a man who was careless about the conduct of his own life to administer public affairs well, and that it was impossible for a man who lived more extravagantly than his own resources allowed to keep his hands off public money.

Being appointed by the Achaeans to the command of the cavalry at this time and finding the regiments in every way disorganized and the men dispirited, he made them in a short time not only superior to what they had been but superior to the enemy by submitting them to a course of real training and inspiring them with such zeal as could not fail to ensure success. For, as for most of the others who are appointed to this office, some of them owing to their own incapacity in horse exercise do not even dare to give any proper orders to the men they have under them, while others who treat this office as a step to that of strategus, canvass the soldiers and secure their future support, never rebuking a man who deserves it, which is the way to safeguard public interests, but screening all faults and by conferring a small favour doing infinite harm to those who trust them. And if at any time some commanders are personally efficient and are also

anxious to keep their hands off public money, they manage by their unhappy ambition to do more harm to the infantry than the negligent ones, and they do still more mischief to the cavalry.

The movements in which he thought the cavalry should be trained, as being applicable to all circumstances, were as follows. Each separate horseman must learn to wheel his horse to the left or to the right and also to wheel round and again return. In sections and double sections they were to wheel so as to describe either a quarter, a half, or three-quarters of a circle and next to dash out at full speed from either of the wings or from the centre in single or double companies and then reining in to resume their formation in troops, squadrons, or regiments. Besides this they must be able to extend their line on either wing either by filling up intervals or by bringing up men from the rear. He considered that deployment by wheeling required no practice, as it was much the same thing as falling into marching order. After this they were to practise charging and retiring in every kind of formation until they could advance at a tremendous pace but without falling out of line or column, keeping at the same time the proper distances between the squadrons, as he considered that nothing was more dangerous or ineffectual than cavalry which have broken their order in squadrons and choose to engage the enemy while in this state.

When he had given these instructions to the people and the municipal magistrates, he paid a second visit to the towns to inquire in the first place if the soldiers were obeying orders, and next if the municipal magistrates were thoroughly capable of giving the words of command clearly and properly, as he considered that for actual warfare nothing was more essential than the efficiency of particular officers. After thus making his preliminary

preparations, he collected the cavalry from the different towns at one spot, where he personally supervised their evolutions and directed the whole of their drill, not riding at the head of them as is done by the generals of our day, who fancy that the foremost place is the proper one for a commander. What, I should like to know, can be less practical or more dangerous than a commander's being seen by all his troops, but seeing none of them? A leader of cavalry should during exercise not make a display of his military rank but of his capability and power as a commander, placing himself now in front, now in the rear, and now in the centre. This was what Philopoemen did, riding alongside and personally inspecting all his men, making matters clear to those who were in doubt and correcting all mistakes at the outset. Such mistakes, however, were quite trivial and rare owing to the care which had been taken previously in exercising each part in particular. Demetrius of Phaleron pointed this out, if not in practice in a phrase at least, when he said that just as a building will be solid if each brick is placed rightly and every course laid with care, so in an army it is the careful instruction of each man and each company which makes the whole force strong.

Fragment of the Speech of a Macedonian Orator

What is happening now is exceedingly like the disposition and management of an army for battle. For in that case also the first to be exposed to danger and to suffer loss are the light and most active part of the force, whereas the phalanx and the heavy-armed troops get the credit for the result. Similarly at present those who bear the brunt of the danger are the Aetolians and those Peloponnesians who are in alliance with them, while the Romans, like a phalanx, hold themselves in reserve. If the former are beaten and destroyed, the Romans will get away unharmed from the

struggle, but should the Aetolians be victorious, which Heaven forbid, the Romans will subjugate them as well as all the other Greeks. . . .

Philip V

Philip, king of Macedon, after celebrating the Nemean games, returned to Argos and laid aside his diadem and purple robe, wishing to produce the impression that he was on a level with the others and a lenient and popular prince. But the more democratic the clothes he wore, the greater and more absolute was the power he assumed. For he no longer confined himself to attempting to seduce widows or to corrupting married women, but used to send and order any woman he chose to come to him, and insulted those who did not at once obey his behests, making noisy processions to their houses. Summoning their sons or husbands on absurd pretexts he intimidated them, and on the whole behaved in a most outrageous and lawless manner. Consequently by this excessive exercise of arbitrary power during his stay in the country he vexed many of the Achaeans and especially the most respectable men, but pressed as they were on all sides by war they had perforce to put up with which was naturally offensive to them. . . .

None of the former kings possessed more of the qualities which make a good or bad ruler than Philip, and in my opinion his good qualities were natural to him, but his defects were acquired as he advanced in age, as is the case with some horses when they grow old. I, however, do not, like other writers, deliver such judgements in the preface of my work, but always in dealing with actual facts employ terms suited to the situation to convey my opinion of kings and other prominent men, thinking that this method of indicating it is most proper for writers and most agreeable to readers.

IV. Affairs of Asia

Expedition of Antiochus against Arsaces

Media is the most notable principality in Asia, both in the extent of its territory and the number and excellence of the men and also of the horses it produces. It supplies nearly the whole of Asia with these animals, the royal stud farms being entrusted to the Medes owing to the excellence of the pastures. On its borders a ring of Greek cities was founded by Alexander to protect it from the neighbouring barbarians. Ecbatana is an exception. This city is situated in the northern part of Media and commands that portion of Asia which borders on the Maeotis and Euxine. It had always been the royal residence of the Medes and is said to have greatly exceeded all the other cities in wealth and the magnificence of its buildings. It lies on the skirts of Mount Orontes and has no wall, but possesses an artificial citadel the fortifications of which are of wonderful strength. Beneath this stands the palace, regarding which I am in doubt whether I should go into details or keep silence. For to those who are disposed to recount marvellous tales and are in the habit of giving exaggerated and rhetorical reports of certain matters this city affords an admirable theme, but to such as approach with caution all statement which are contrary to ordinary conceptions it is a source of doubt and difficulty. The palace, however, is about seven stades in circumference, and by the magnificence of the separate structures in it conveys a high idea of the wealth of its original founders. For the woodwork was all of cedar and cypress, but no part of it was left exposed, and the rafters, the compartments of the ceiling, and the columns in the porticoes and colonnades were plated with either silver or gold, and all the tiles were silver. Most of the precious metals were stripped off in the invasion of Alexander and his Macedonians, and the rest during the reigns

of Antigonus and Seleucus the son of Nicanor, but still, when Antiochus reached the place, the temple of Aene alone had the columns round it still gilded and a number of silver tiles were piled up in it, while a few gold bricks and a considerable quantity of silver ones remained. From all the objects I have mentioned sufficient was collected to coin money with the king's effigy amounting to very nearly four thousand talents.

Arsaces had expected Antiochus to advance as far as this region, but he did not think he would venture with such a large force to cross the adjacent desert, chiefly owing to the scarcity of water. For in the region I speak of there is no water visible on the surface, but even in the desert there are a number of underground channels communicating with wells unknown to those not acquainted with the country. About these a true story is told by the inhabitants. They say that at the time when the Persians were the rulers of Asia they gave to those who conveyed a supply of water to places previously unirrigated the right of cultivating the land for five generations, and consequently as the Taurus has many large streams descending from it, people incurred great expense and trouble in making underground channels reaching a long distance, so that at the present day those who make use of the water do not know whence the channels derive their supply. Arsaces, however, when he saw that Antiochus was attempting to march across the desert, endeavoured instantly to fill up and destroy the wells. The king when this news reached him sent off Nicomedes with a thousand horse, who, finding that Arsaces had retired with his army, but that some of his cavalry were engaged in destroying the mouths of the channels, attacked and routed these, forcing them to fly, and then returned to Antiochus. The king having traversed the desert came to the city called Hecatompylus,

which lies in the centre of Parthia. This city derives its name from the fact that it is the meeting-place of all the roads leading to the surrounding districts.

Here he gave his army a rest, and now came to the conclusion that had Arsaces been able to risk a battle he would not have withdrawn from his own country and could not have chosen a place more favourable to his army for the struggle than the neighbourhood of Hecatompylus. It was evident then to anyone who gave proper consideration to the matter that as he was retreating he had other intentions. Antiochus therefore decided to advance into Hyrcania. Upon reach Tagae and learning from the inhabitants what a difficult country he would have to pass through before reaching the pass over Mount Labus, which leads down to Hyrcania, and how great numbers of barbarians were posted at different spots where his march would be particularly hard, he decided to break up his light-armed troops into several bodies and divide their officers among them, with instructions as to the route they should take. He also resolved to break up the pioneers whose duty it was to march together with the light-armed troops and make the ground occupied by these passable for the phalanx and the pack-train. Having made this plan he gave the command of the first division to Diogenes, entrusting him with archers and slingers and those of the mountaineers who were expert in throwing javelins and stones, who also, whenever time and place called for it, fought singly and rendered most useful service on difficult ground. After these he placed about two thousand Cretans armed with bucklers under the command of Polyxenidas of Rhodes, and lastly the light troops armed with breastplate and shield under Nicomedes of Cos and Nicolaus the Aetolian.

As these separate bodies advanced they found the road much rougher and narrower than the king had expected. For the total length of the ascent was about three hundred stades, and for the greater part of this distance it was through a deep torrent bed, in which progress was rendered difficult by quantities of rock and trees that had fallen of their own accord from the precipices above, while numerous other obstacles placed there by the barbarians contributed to the result. For they had constructed a series of barricades of felled trees and had collected a quantity of huge rocks, while they themselves along the whole defile had occupied favourable positions on the heights where they fancied themselves in security. So that Antiochus would have found it perfectly impossible to execute his project had they not miscalculated: for these preparations had been made and these positions occupied under the idea that the whole enemy army must necessarily ascend through the defile itself; but they never saw that though the phalanx and pack-train could not march by any other route than the one they supposed, since it was impossible for that part of the army to attack the mountain slopes, yet it was by no means beyond the power of unburdened and light-armed troops to ascend over the bare rocks. So that as soon as Diogenes, advancing outside the defile, came in contact with the first barbarian post the face of things was entirely changed. For at once upon encountering the enemy he acted as circumstances suggested and making a further flank movement up hill got on higher ground, and by throwing showers of javelins and stones from the hand inflicted severe punishment on them, the greatest damage being done by the stones slung from a distance. As soon as they had forced this first post to withdraw and occupied their position the pioneers had time to clear and level the ground in front of them at their

ease, a task soon accomplished owing to their large numbers. In fact, by this means, with the slingers, archers and javelineers marching along the high ground in loose order, but closing up and occupying favourable positions, and with the Cretans covering their movements and marching parallel to them close to the defile slowly and in good order, the barbarians no longer stood their ground, but abandoning their positions collected on the actual summit of the pass.

Antiochus traversed the worst part of the road in the manner I have described, safely but very slowly and with difficulty, only just reaching the pass of Mount Labus on the eighth day. The barbarians were collected there, convinced that they would prevent the enemy from crossing, and a fierce struggle now took place, in which the barbarians were forced back for the following reason. Formed in a dense mass they fought desperately against the phalanx face to face, but while it was still night the light-armed troops had made a wide detour and occupied the heights in their rear, and the barbarians, the moment they noticed this, were panic-stricken and took to flight. The king made every effort to restrain his men from continuing the pursuit, summoning them back by bugle-call, as he wanted his army to descend into Hyrcania unbroken and in good order. Having regulated his march in the manner he wished he reached Tambrax, an unwalled city, but of large size and continuing a large royal palace, and encamped there. Most of the enemy, both from the scene of the battle and from the surrounding country, had retreated to a town called Sirynx, which was at no great distance from Tambrax, and was as it were the capital of Hyrcania owing to its strength and favourable situation, and he decided to take this city by storm. He advanced therefore with his army and encamping round it began

the siege. The chief means he employed was the use of mantelets for sappers. There were three moats, each not less than thirty cubits broad and fifteen deep, and each defended at its edge by a double row of palisades, and behind all there was strong wall. There were constant combats at the works, in which neither side could bring off their dead and wounded, as the hand-to-hand fighting took place not only on the surface of the ground but beneath it in the mines. But in spite of all, owing to the superiority of numbers and the personal activity of the king, the moats were very soon filled up and the wall was undermined and fell, upon which the barbarians were thoroughly discouraged, and after killing all the Greeks in the town and pillaging all the finest things they made off by night. When the king became aware of this he sent Hyperbas after them with the mercenaries, and the barbarians when overtaken by him threw away their encumbrances and fled again into the town. When the peltasts now vigorously forced their way through the breach, they surrendered in despair.

V. Affairs of Italy

Death of the Consul Claudius Marcellus

The consuls, wishing to survey accurately the side of the hill which was turned towards the enemy's camp, ordered the rest of their forces to remain in the entrenched camp, and themselves taking two troops of cavalry and about thirty velites together with their lictors advanced to reconnoitre the ground. Certain Numidians, who were in the habit of lying in ambush for skirmishers and in general for any of the enemy who advanced out of their camp, were by hazard hidden at the foot of the hill. Upon their look-out signalling to them that some of the enemy had appeared on the crest of the hill just above them, they rose, and marching up the slope obliquely, cut off

the consuls and prevented their return to their camp. Marcellus and some others with him were cut down at the first onset, and the others were wounded and compelled to take to flight down the cliffs in different directions. The Romans in the camp, though they were spectators of what was happening, had no means of coming to the help of their comrades who were in danger. For while they were still shouting out in a state of great consternation, some of them bridling their horses and others putting on their armour, the whole affair was over. The son of Marcellus was wounded, and with great difficulty and beyond expectation escaped.

Marcellus, it must be confessed, brought this misfortune on himself by behaving not so much like a general as like a simpleton. Throughout this work I am often compelled to call the attention of my readers to such occurrences, as I observe that generals are more liable to make mistakes in this matter than in any other parts of their duty as commanders, although the error is such an obvious one. For what is the use of a general or commander who does not comprehend that he must keep himself as far away as possible from all partial encounters in which the fate of the whole army is not involved? Of what use is he if he does not know that, if circumstances at times compel commanders to undertake in person such partial encounters, they must sacrifice many of their men before the danger is suffered to approach the supreme commander of the whole? Let the risk be for the Carian, as the proverb has it, and not for the general. [4] And as for saying "I should never have thought it" or "Who would have expected it to happen?" that in a general is a most manifest sign of incompetence and dullness.

[4] µ½ š±Á¹ º1´Å½µÍµ11½, *periculum facere in corpora vili*, the Carian being, according to the current explanation, a slave of little value.

For this reason while we regard Hannibal as being a good general in very many ways, we should lay especial stress on the fact that after spending many years in a hostile country and meeting with great variety of fortune he frequently by his cleverness worsted the enemy in partial engagements, whereas he never met with disaster to himself in spite of the numerous and severe battles in which he engaged, so great was the care he took of his own safety. And very properly too; for when the commander is safe and sound, even if a total defeat takes place, Fortune furnishes many means for retrieving the loss, but if he falls, just as in the case of the pilot of a ship, even if Fortune give victory to the soldiers, it is of no service to them, as all their hopes depend upon their leaders. So much for those who fall into such errors from ostentation and childish vanity or from inexperience or contempt of the enemy. One or other of these is always the cause of such accidents. . . .

Incident in Hannibal's attempt to capture Salapia after the above event

Suddenly letting down the portcullis which they had raised somewhat higher by mechanical means, they attacked the intruders and capturing them crucified them before the wall.

VI. Affairs of Spain

In Spain Publius Scipio, the Roman commander, who, as I above stated, was wintering at Tarraco, first of all secured the confidence and friendship of the Iberians by the restoration of the hostages to their respective homes, availing himself in the matter of the assistance voluntarily proffered by

Edeco the prince of the Edetani, who on receiving the news of the capture of New Carthage and learning that his wife and sons were in Scipio's power, at once anticipated the change that would take place in the attitude of the Iberians and desired to be leader of this movement, chiefly owing to his conviction that by this reason he would recover the part of the Romans not under compulsion but deliberately. And this proved to be so. For just after the troops had been dispersed to their winter quarters he appeared at Tarraco with his relatives and friends. Seeking an interview with Scipio he said he gave thanks to Heaven that he was the first of the Spanish princes to come to him. The others, he said, were still communicating with Carthage and looking to that quarter, while at the same time stretching out their hands to the Romans, but he himself had come in and put not only his own person but his friends and relatives at the mercy of the Romans. So, if Scipio would regard him as a friend and ally, he would be of the greatest service to him both at present and in the future. For the Iberians at once, upon seeing that he had been received into Scipio's friendship and that his requests had been granted, would all come with the same object, desirous of recovering their relatives and securing the alliance of Rome, and their affections would be so much engaged for the future by such honour and kindness that they would unreservedly co-operate with Scipio in the rest of his operations. He therefore begged that his wife and children might be restored to him and that before returning to his home he should be pronounced to be a friend, so that he might have a plausible pretext for displaying by every means in his power the goodwill that he himself and his friends bore to Scipio and the Roman cause. Edeco after speaking somewhat in these terms ended his discourse, and Scipio, who had been previously disposed to take such a

course, and whose views corresponded with those expressed by Edeco, returned his wife and children and made him his friend. And not only this, but he captivated the Spaniard by diverse means during the time they spent together, and holding out high hopes of future advantage to all those with him, he sent them back to their home. The matter was soon bruited abroad, and all the Iberians on the side of the Ebro who had not previously been friendly to the Romans now as with one consent embraced their cause.

These matters, then, were proceeding as well as Scipio could wish, and after the departure of the Iberians he broke up his navy, as no enemy was visible at sea, and selecting the most capable men from the crews distributed them among the maniples and thus increased his land forces.

Andobales and Mandonius were at this time two of the greatest princes in Spain and were supposed to be the most trusty adherents of Carthage, but they had long been disaffected and were watching for an opportunity of revolt, ever since Hasdrubal, as I above stated, on the pretext that he mistrusted them, had demanded from them the payment of a large sum of money and the surrender of their wives and daughters as hostages. Thinking that the present time was favourable, they left the Carthaginian camp with all their forces by night and withdrew to a strong position where they would be in safety. Upon this most of the other Iberians also deserted Hasdrubal. They had long been offended by the arrogance of the Carthaginians, but this was the first opportunity they had of manifesting their inclinations.

The same thing has happened before to many people. For, as I have often said, while success in policy and victory in the field are great things, it requires much more skill and caution to make a good use of such success. So that you will find that those who have won victories are far more

numerous than those who have used them to advantage. This is exactly what happened to the Carthaginians at this period. For after having defeated the Roman forces and killed the two commanders Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, they regarded their position in Spain as undisputed and treated the natives in an overbearing manner. In consequence their subjects, instead of being their allies and friends, were their enemies. And quite naturally; for they fancied that there is one method by which power should be acquired and another by which it should be maintained; they had not learnt that those who preserve their supremacy best are those who adhere to the same principles by which they originally established it, and this although it is evident and has been observed by many that it is by kind treatment of their neighbours and by holding out the prospect of further benefits that men acquire power, but when having attained their wish they treat their subjects ill and rule over them tyrannically it is only natural that with the change of character in the rulers the disposition of their subjects should change likewise, as actually happened now to the Carthaginians.

As for Hasdrubal, beset by these difficulties, he was disturbed by many and various apprehensions regarding the dangers that menaced him. To begin with he was troubled by the revolt of Andobales and next by the opposition and estrangement of the other commanders. The prospect of Scipio's arrival also caused him much anxiety. Expecting him as he did to be soon on the spot with his army, and seeing himself deserted by the Iberians, who all with one accord were joining the Romans, he more or less decided on the following course. He proposed to make all possible preparations and meet the enemy in battle. Should Fortune give him victory, he would afterwards deliberate in security as to his future action, but if he

met with a reverse in the battle he would retreat from the field with the survivors to Gaul and getting as many of the natives as he could to join him would pass into Italy and throw in his fortunes with his brother Hannibal.

Hasdrubal, then, having resolved on this course was making his preparations. Meanwhile Scipio, having received Gaius Laelius and heard from him the senate's orders, withdrew his troops from their winter quarters and advanced, being met on his march by the Iberians who joined him with hearty alacrity. Andobales had been for long communicating with Scipio, and now that he was in the neighbourhood came to him from his camp together with his friends, and when they met, justified his former friendship with the Carthaginians and likewise pointed out all the services he had rendered them and how loyal he had been to their cause. He next gave an account of the injuries and insults he had met with at their hands. He therefore begged Scipio to judge for himself as to his statements, and if it appeared to him that he was accusing the Carthaginians unjustly, he might be perfectly sure that he was not capable of remaining loyal to Rome. But if, taking into consideration their many acts of injustice, Scipio might feel confident that now he had chosen the cause of Rome he would be firm in his affection.

Andobales spoke still further on the subject, and when he had finished Scipio in reply said that he perfectly believed his statements and himself had the clearest evidence of the tyrannical conduct of the Carthaginians in their licentious treatment of the wives and daughters of the speaker and his friends, whom he himself had found in the position not so much of hostages as of prisoners and slaves, adding that he had kept faith to them with a loyalty that not even they, their fathers, could have displayed. When they

acknowledged that they agreed and did obeisance and all saluted him as king, those present applauded, and Scipio, who was much touched, exhorted them to be of good cheer, for they would meet with all kindness at the hands of the Romans. He at once handed over their daughters to them, and next day made a treaty with them, the essential part of the agreement being that they should follow the Roman commanders and obey their orders. After this they retired to their own camps, and taking their forces came back to Scipio, and now joining the Roman camp advanced against Hasdrubal.

The Carthaginian general was then quartered in the district of Castalon near the town of Baecula not far from the silver mines. On hearing of the arrival of the Romans, he shifted his camp to a position where he had in his rear the effective protection of a river and in his front a stretch of level ground defended by a ridge and of sufficient depth for safety and sufficient width for deploying his troops. Here he remained, stationing all the time his covering force on the ridge in front of him. Scipio on approaching was eager to risk a battle, but was somewhat at a loss, as he saw how advantageous and safe the enemy's position was. But after waiting for two days he became apprehensive lest Mago and Gesco should come up and he should find himself surrounded by the enemy on all sides, and he therefore decided to take his chance and make an attempt on the enemy.

Getting the rest of his forces ready for battle he kept them inside the camp, and sending off the velites and a picked force of foot he ordered them to throw themselves on the ridge and attack the enemy's covering force. They executed his order with great gallantry, and at first the Carthaginian commander remained waiting for the result. But when he saw that, owing to the dashing courage of the Romans, his men were hard pressed and in an

evil plight, he led out his forces and drew them up near the ridge, relying on the strength of the position. Scipio at once dispatched the whole of his light-armed troops with orders to support the force which had commenced the attack, and having the rest of his army ready, he himself took one half of it and skirting the ridge to the left of the enemy fell upon the Carthaginians; the other half he gave to Laelius with orders to attack the enemy on their right in a similar manner. While this was happening Hasdrubal was still engaged in leading his forces out of the camp. For up to now he had waited there relying on the strength of the position and convinced that the enemy would never venture to attack him: thus, owing to the unexpectedness of the assault, he was too late in deploying his troops. The Romans fighting on the wings, since the enemy had not yet occupied the ground on their wings, not only succeeded in safely mounting the ridge, but as the enemy were still forming up and in motion when they attacked, slaughtered some of them by falling on their flank and compelled those who were getting into formation to turn and fly. Hasdrubal, as had been his original intention, when he saw his troops giving way and in disorder, declined to fight it out to the death, but taking his money and his elephants and drawing off after him as many of the fugitives as he could, retreated along the River Tagus in the direction of the pass over the Pyrenees and of the Gauls who inhabited that part of the country. Scipio did not think it advisable to follow Hasdrubal, as he was afraid of being attacked by the other generals, but gave the enemy's camp up to his soldiers to plunder.

Next day collecting the prisoners, of whom there were about ten thousand foot and more than two thousand horse, he occupied himself with their disposal. The Iberians in the districts I spoke of who were still allies of

the Carthaginians now came in to submit to the Romans, and on meeting Scipio saluted him as king. Edeco was the first who had done this and made obeisance to him, and he had been followed by Andobales. On that occasion Scipio had paid no great attention and did not particularly notice the appellation, but when after the battle all addressed him as king, the matter gave him pause. He therefore assembled the Iberians and told them that he wished to be called kingly by them and actually to be kingly, but that he did not wish to be king or to be called so by any one. After saying this he ordered him to call him general. Perhaps even on this occasion one would be justified in noting with admiration Scipio's greatness of mind, in view of the fact that though he was still quite young and fortune had favoured him so highly that all who were subject to him were prompted to form this estimate of him and bestow on him the name of king of their own accord, he still kept his head and declined to profit by their enthusiasm and accept this splendid title. But much more must we admire this exceptional greatness of mind when we look at the close of his life, at the period when in addition to his exploits in Spain he had destroyed the power of Carthage and subjected to the dominion of his country the largest and finest part Libya from the altars of Philaenus to the pillars of Heracles, when he had reduced Asia and overthrown the kings of Syria and had made the greatest and richest part of the world subject to Rome, and had the opportunity of attaining royal power in whatever part of the world he chose to attempt it. Such success indeed might have made not only a man, but if it is permitted to say so, even a god overweening. And yet Scipio so far excelled all other men in greatness of mind, that when kingship, the greatest blessing for which any man would dare to pray to the gods, was often offered to him by fortune, he refused it,

and valued more highly his country and his own loyalty to her than the thing which is the object of universal admiration and envy. To resume my narrative, on the present occasion he picked out the Iberians from the prisoners and left them all free to return to their own countries without ransom, and ordering Andobales to choose for himself three hundred of the horses, he distributed the rest among those who had none. After this he transferred his army to the Carthaginian camp owing to its favourable position, and dispatched a force to the pass over the Pyrenees to observe the movements of Hasdrubal. Subsequently, as the season was now advanced, he retired with his army to Tarraco to pass the winter in that district.

VII. Affairs of Greece

Action of Philip

The Aetolians, whose hopes had recently risen high owing to the arrival of the Romans and King Attalus, were terrorizing and threatening everyone by land while the Romans and Attalus were doing the same by sea. The Achaeans therefore came to Philip to beg for his help, for they were not only in dread of the Aetolians but of Machanidas, as he was hovering with his army on the Argive frontier. The Boeotians, who were afraid of the enemy's fleet, begged for a commander and for succour, but the inhabitants of Euboea were the most energetic of all in their instances to Philip to take precautions against the enemy. The Acarnanians made the same request, and there was also an ambassador from Epirus. Information had been received that Scerdilaïdas and Pleuratus were setting their forces in motion, and also that the Thracians on the Macedonian frontier, and especially the Maedi, intended to invade Macedonia if the king were drawn away however so little from his native country. The Aetolians also had occupied the pass

of Thermopylae, fortifying it with a palisade and trench and strongly garrisoning it, feeling sure that they thus shut out Philip and prevented him from coming to help his allies beyond the pass. It seems to me that it is only reasonable to bring into relief and prominently before the eyes of my readers those occasions on which the mental and physical capacities of commanders are really tried and put to the test. For just as in the chase the courage and power of wild beasts is then fully revealed, when they are exposed to danger on all sides, so is it with commanders, as was manifest then from Philip's action. He dismissed all the embassies after promising each to do what was in his power and devoted his whole attention to the war, waiting to see in what direction and against whom in the first place he should act. Upon news reaching him at this time that Attalus had crossed and anchored off Peparethus and occupied its country districts, he dispatched a force to protect the town against them; to Phocis and Boeotia and that neighbourhood he sent Polyphantus with an adequate number of troops, and to Calchis and the rest of Euboea Menippus with thousand peltasts and five hundred Agrianians; he himself marched upon Scotusa, and ordered the Macedonians also to meet him at that town. Hearing now that Attalus had sailed back to Nicaea and that the Aetolian magistrates were about to meet at Heraclea to discuss the situation, he took the force he had with him from Scotusa and made for Heraclea with the object of arriving in time to frighten and disperse their meeting. He arrived too late for the meeting, but after destroying or carrying off the crops of the inhabitants round the Gulf of Aenus, he returned. Leaving his main force again in Scotusa he halted and remained at Demetrias with the royal troop of horse and his light-armed troops, waiting for the enemy to reveal their

plans. So that nothing that was going on should escape his notice he sent to the Peparethians, and to his commanders in Phocis and Boeotia, ordering them to inform him of everything by fire-signals direct to Mount Tisaeus, a mountain in Thessaly favourably situated for commanding a view of the above places.

Fire-Signalling

I think that as regards the system of signalling by fire, which is now of the greatest possible service in war but was formerly undeveloped, it will be of use not to pass it over but to give it a proper discussion. It is evident to all that in every matter, and especially in warfare, the power of acting at the right time contributes very much to the success of enterprises, and fire-signals are the most efficient of all the devices which aid us to do this. For they show what has recently occurred and what is still in the course of being done, and by means of them anyone who cares to do so even if he is at a distance of three, four, or even more days' journey can be informed. So it is always surprising how help can be brought by means of fire messages when the situation requires it. Now in former times, as fire-signals were simple beacons, they were for the most part of little use to those who used them. For the service should have been performed by signals previously determined upon, and as facts are indefinite, most of them defied communication by fire-signals. To take the case I just mentioned, it was possible for those who had agreed on this to convey information that a fleet had arrived at Oreus, Peparethus, or Chalcis, but when it came to some of the citizens having been guilty of treachery or a massacre having taken place in the town, or anything of the kind, things that often happen, but cannot all be foreseen—and it is chiefly unexpected occurrences which

require instant consideration and help—all such matters defied communication by fire-signal. For it was quite impossible to have a preconcerted code for things which there was no means of foretelling.

Aeneas, the author of the work on strategy, wishing to find a remedy for the difficulty, advanced matters a little, but his device still fell far short of our requirements, as can be seen from this description of it. He says that those who are about to communicate urgent news to each other by fire-signal should procure two earthenware vessels of exactly the same width and depth, the depth being some three cubits and the width one. Then they should have corks made a little narrower than the mouths of the vessels and through the middle of each cork should pass a rod graduated in equal sections of three fingerbreadths, each clearly marked off from the next. In each section should be written the most evident and ordinary events that occur in war, *e.g.* on the first "Cavalry arrived in the country," on the second "Heavy infantry," on the third "Light-armed infantry," next "Infantry and cavalry," next "Ships," next "Corn," and so on until we have entered in all the sections the chief contingencies of which, at the present time, there is a reasonable probability in war time. Next he tells us to bore holes in both vessels of exactly the same size, so that they allow exactly the same escape. Then we are to fill the vessels with water and put on the corks with the rods in them and allow the water to flow through the two apertures. When this is done it is evident that, the conditions being precisely similar, in proportion as the water escapes the two corks will sink and the rods will disappear into the vessels. When by experiment it is seen that the rapidity of escape is in both cases exactly the same, the vessels are to be conveyed to the places in which both parties are to locality after the signals and deposited there. Now

whenever any of the contingencies written on the rods occurs he tells us to rise a torch and to wait until the corresponding party raise another. When both the torches are clearly visible the signaller is to lower his torch and at once allow the water to escape through the aperture. Whenever, as the corks sink, the contingency you wish to communicate reaches the mouth of the vessel he tells the signaller to raise his torch and the receivers of the signal are to stop the aperture at once and to note which of the messages written on the rods is at the mouth of the vessel. This will be the message delivered, if the apparatus works at the same pace in both cases.

This is a slight advance on beacons with a preconcerted code, but it is still quite indefinite. For it is evident that it is neither possible to foresee all contingencies, or even if one did to write them all on the rod. So that when circumstances produce some unexpected event, it is evident that it cannot be conveyed by this plan. Again none of the things written on the rod are defined statements, for it is impossible to indicate how many infantry are coming and to what part of the country, or how many ships or how much corn. For it is impossible to agree beforehand about things of which one cannot be aware before they happen. And this is the vital matter; for how can anyone consider how to render assistance if he does not know how many of the enemy have arrived, or where? And how can anyone be of good cheer or the reverse, or in fact think of anything at all, if he does not understand how many ships or how much corn has arrived from the allies?

The most recent method, devised by Cleoxenus and Democleitus and perfected by myself, is quite definite and capable of dispatching with accuracy every kind of urgent messages, but in practice it requires care and exact attention. It is as follows: We take the alphabet and divide it into five

parts, each consisting of five letters. There is one letter less in the last division, but this makes no practical difference. Each of the two parties who are about signal to each other must now get ready five tablets and write one division of the alphabet on each tablet, and then come to an agreement that the man who is going to signal is in the first place to raise two torches and wait until the other replies by doing the same. This is for the purpose of conveying to each other that they are both at attention. These torches having been lowered the dispatcher of the message will now raise the first set of torches on the left side indicating which tablet is to be consulted, i.e. one torch if it is the first, two if it is the second, and so on. Next he will raise the second set on the right on the same principle to indicate what letter of the tablet the receiver should write down.

Upon their separating after coming to this understanding each of them must first have on the spot a telescope [5] with two tubes, so that with the one he can observe the space on the right of the man who is going to signal back and with the other that on the left. The tablets must be set straight up in order next the telescope, and there must be a screen before both spaces, as well the right as the left, ten feet in length and of the height of a man so that by this means the torches may be seen distinctly when raised and disappear when lowered. When all has been thus got ready on both sides, if the signaller wants to convey, for instance, that about a hundred of the soldiers have deserted to the enemy, he must first of all choose words which will convey what he means in the smallest number of letters, *e.g.* instead of the above "Cretans a hundred deserted us," for thus the letters are less than one half in number, but the same sense is conveyed. Having jotted this down on a writing-tablet he will communicate it by the torches as follows:

The first letter is *kappa*. This being in the second division is on tablet number two, and, therefore, he must raise two torches on the left, so that the receiver may know that he had to consult the second tablet. He will now raise five torches on the right, to indicate that it is *kappa*, this being the fifth letter in the second division, and the receiver of the signal will note this down on his writing tablet. The dispatcher will then raise four torches on the left as *rho* belongs to the fourth division, and then two on the right, *rho* being the second letter in this division. The receiver writes down *rho* and so forth. This device enables any news to be definitely conveyed. Many torches, of course, are required, as the signal for each letter is a double one. But if all is properly prepared for the purpose, what is required can be done whichever system we follow, Those engaged in the work must have had proper practice, so that when it comes to putting it in action they may communicate with each other without the possibility of a mistake. From many instances it is easy for all who wish it to learn how great the difference is between the same thing when it is first heard and when it has become a matter of habit. For many things which appear at the beginning to be not only difficult but impossible are performed quite easily after time and practice. There are many other examples which confirm this, but the clearest of all is the case of reading. Here if we put side by side a man who is ignorant and unpractised in letters, but generally intelligent, and a boy who is accustomed to read, give the boy a book and order him to read it, the man will plainly not be able to believe that a reader must first of all pay attention to the form of each letter, then to its sound-value, next to the combinations of the different letters, each of which things requires a considerable amount of time. So when he sees that the boy without

hesitation reels off five or seven lines in a breath he will not find it easy to believe that he never read the book before, and he will absolutely refuse to believe this if the reader should be able to observe the action, the pauses, and the rough and smooth breathings. We should not, therefore, abandon, anything useful owing to the difficulties which show themselves at the outset, but we must call in the aid of habit, through which all good things fall into the hands of men, and more specially when the matter is one on which our preservation mainly depends.

[5] The instrument did not, of course, magnify but merely limited the area of vision.

In offering these observations I am acting up to the promise I originally made at the outset of this work. For I stated that in our time all arts and sciences have so much advanced the knowledge of most of them may be said to have been reduced to a system. This is, then, one of the most useful parts of a history properly written.

VIII. Affairs of Asia

The River Oxus

The Apasiacae inhabit the district between the Oxus and Tanaïs, the former of which rivers falls into the Hyrcanian Sea, while the Tanaïs falls into the Palus Maeotis. Both are large enough to be navigable, and it is considered marvellous how the nomads passing the Oxus on foot with their horses reach Hyrcania. There are two stories regarding this, one reasonably probable and the other very surprising, but yet not impossible. The Oxus, I should say, rises in the Caucasus, but in traversing Bactria greatly increases in volume owing to the number of tributaries it receives, and henceforth runs through the plain with a strong and turbid current. Reaching in the

desert a certain precipice it projects its stream, owing to the volume of the current and the height of the fall, so far from the crest of the cataract that in falling it leaps to a distance of more than a stade from the bottom of the precipice. It is in this place that they say the Apasiacae pass dry-shod with their horses to Hyrcania, skirting the precipice under the waterfall. There is more reasonable probability in the second account than in the first. They say there are at the foot of the cataract large slabs of rock on which the river falls, and by the force of the current hollows out and pierces these rocks for some depth and flows underground for a short distance, after which it comes to the surface again. The barbarians are acquainted with this and cross to Hyrcania with their horses at the place where the river thus interrupts its course.

Campaign of Antiochus in Bactria

When the news came that Euthydemus with his army was before Tapuria, and that ten thousand cavalry were in his front guarding the ford of the river Arius, Antiochus decided to abandon the siege and deal with the situation. The river being at a distance of three days' march, he marched at a moderate pace for two days, but on the third day he order the rest of his army to break up their camp at daylight while he himself with his cavalry, his light-armed infantry, and ten thousand peltasts advanced during the night marching quickly. For he had heard that the enemy's horse kept guard during the day on the river bank, but retired at night to a town as much as twenty stades away. Having completed the remainder of the distance during the night, as the plain is easy to ride over, he succeeded in getting the greater part of his forces across the river by daylight. The Bactrian cavalry, when their scouts had reported this, came up to attack and engaged the

enemy while still on the march. The king, seeing that it was necessary to stand the first charge of the enemy, called on one thousand of his cavalry who were accustomed to fight round him and ordered the rest to form up on the spot in squadrons and troops and all place themselves in their usual order, while he himself with the force I spoke of met and engaged the Bactrians who were the first to charge. In this affair it seems that Antiochus himself fought more brilliantly than any of those with him. There were severe losses on both sides, but the king's cavalry repulsed the first Bactrian regiment. When, however, the second and third came up they were in difficulties and had the worst of it. It was now that Panaetolus ordered his men to advance, and joining the king and those who were fighting round him, compelled those Bactrians who were pursuing in disorder to turn rein and take to headlong flight. The Bactrians, now hard pressed by Panaetolus, never stopped until they joined Euthydemus after losing most of their men. The royal cavalry, after killing many of the enemy and making many prisoners, withdrew, and at first encamped on the spot near the river. In this battle Antiochus's horse was transfixed and killed, and he himself received a wound in the mouth and lost several of his teeth, having in general gained a greater reputation for courage on this occasion than on any other. After the battle Euthydemus was terror-stricken and retired with his army to a city in Bactria called Zariaspa.

THE END OF BOOK X

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XI

I. FROM THE PREFACE

Some will perhaps inquire why in this work I do not, like former authors, write prologues but give a summary of the events in each Olympiad. I indeed regard a prologue as a useful kind of thing, since it fixes the attention of those who wish to read the work and stimulates and encourages readers in their task, besides which by this means any matter that we are in search of can be easily found. But as I saw that for various fortuitous reasons prologues were now neglected and had degenerated in style, I was led to adopt the other alternative. For an introductory summary is not only of equal value to a prologue but even of somewhat greater, while at the same time it occupies a surer position, as it forms an integral part of the work. I, therefore, decided to employ this method throughout except in the first six books to which I wrote prologues, because in their case previous summaries are not very suitable.

II. Affairs of Italy

Hasdrubal's Expedition

Hasdrubal's arrival in Italy was much easier and more rapid than Hannibal's had been.

Rome had never been in such a state of excitement and dismay, awaiting the result. . . .

None of these things were agreeable to Hasdrubal, but as circumstances did not admit of delay, for he saw the Romans already in battle order and

advantage, he was obliged to draw up his Iberians and the Gauls who were with him. Stationing his elephants, ten in number, in front, he increased the depth of his line, making the front of his whole army very narrow, and then taking up his position in the centre behind the elephants fell upon the enemy's left, having determined either to conquer or die in this battle. Livius advanced to meet the enemy's attack in an imposing fashion, and on encountering them with his army fought gallantly. Marcellus, who was stationed on the right wing, could not advance and outflank the enemy owing to the difficult character of the ground in front of him, relying on which Hasdrubal had attacked the Roman left, but when he found himself thus at a loss owing to his forced inaction, circumstances suggested to him what ought to be done. Having therefore collected his men from the right wing in the rear of the field he passed round the left of the Roman camp and attacked the Carthaginians in flank where the elephants were. Up to now the victory had been disputed, for the men fought on both sides with equal bravery, as there was no hope of safety either for the Romans if defeated or for the Spaniards and Carthaginians. The elephants too had been of equal service to both sides in the battle; for as they were shut in between the two armies and tormented by missiles, they threw both the Roman and the Spanish ranks into confusion. But as soon as Marcellus fell on the enemy from behind, the battle became unequal, as the Spaniards were now attacked both in front and rear. In consequence they were most of them cut to pieces on the battle-field. Of the elephants six were killed with their drivers and the other four having forced two way through the ranks were captured afterwards alone and abandoned by their Indians.

Hasdrubal, who was always a brave man both in former times and at this last hour, fell in the thick of the fight, and it would not be just to take leave of this commander without a word of praise. I have already stated that he was Hannibal's own brother, and that Hannibal on quitting Spain entrusted him with the management of affairs there, and I also told in a previous Book how in his many encounters with the Romans and in his frequent struggles with adverse circumstances, owing to the character of the commanders who were sent to co-operate with him in Spain from Carthage, he constantly bore disaster and defeat with spirit and courage and in a man worthy of his father Barcas. I will now say for what reason in this his final struggle he seems to me to have been worthy of our respect and emulation. For we see that most generals and kings, when they undertake a critical struggle, constantly keep before their eyes the glory and profit that will accrue from success, and while they devote their attention and consideration to the manner in which they will manage everything if all goes in their favour, do not envisage the consequences of mischance or consider at all how they should behave and what they should do in the event of disaster, although the one thing is simple enough and the other requires great foresight. Consequently most of them, owing to their lack of spirit and their helplessness in such a case, make defeat shameful, and although their soldiers have often fought bravely, cast disgrace on their former exploits and make the rest of their life a reproach to them. Anyone who wishes can easily see that many commanders err in this respect and that there is here the greatest difference between one man and another, as past history affords so many examples of the fact. But Hasdrubal, as long as there was a reasonable hope of his being able to accomplish something worthy of his

past, was more careful of nothing in action than of his own safety, but when fortune had robbed him of the last shred of hope and forced him to face the last extremity, though he neglected nothing in his preparations for the struggle or in the battle itself that might contribute to victory, nevertheless he took thought how if he met with total defeat he might confront that contingency and suffer nothing unworthy of his past. What I have said here may serve to warn all who direct public affairs neither by rashly exposing themselves to cheat the hopes of those who trust in them nor by clinging to life when duty forbids it to add to their own disasters disgrace and reproach.

The Romans now, having won the battle, at once pillaged the enemy's camp, and butchered many of the Gauls whom they found drunk and asleep on their litter beds. They then collected the rest of the prisoners and from this part of the booty more than three hundred talents were realized for the treasury. Not fewer than ten thousand Carthaginians and Gauls fell in the battle, while the Roman loss amounted to two thousand. Some of the Carthaginians of distinction were captured and the rest were slain. When the news arrived in Rome they at first refused to believe it, just because they had been so very eager to see this happen, but when more messengers arrived not only announcing the fact, but adding details, then indeed the city was full of exceeding great joy, every holy place was decorated, and every temple was filled with offerings and victims. In a word they became so sanguine and confident that it seemed to everyone that Hannibal whom they had formerly so much dreaded was not now even in Italy.

III. Affairs of Greece

He said that the speech was full of imagination, but that the truth was not this but rather the reverse. . . .

Speech of an Ambassador

"I consider, men of Aetolia, that the facts themselves demonstrate that neither King Ptolemy nor Rhodes nor Byzantium nor Chios nor Mytilene make light of coming to terms with you. For this is not the first or the second time that we make proposals to you for peace, but from the date at which you opened hostilities we have never ceased to mention the matter to you, entreating you to entertain it and availing ourselves gladly of every occasion, having before our eyes the ruin brought by the war on yourselves and the Macedonians, and taking thought for the future safety of our own countries and the rest of Greece. For, as with fire, once we have set the fuel alight the consequences are not at our discretion, but it spreads wherever chance directs it, guided chiefly by the wind and by the rapidity with which the fuel it feeds on is consumed, often strangely enough turning on very man who lit it, so it is with war. Once it has been kindled by anyone, at times it destroys in the first place its authors and at times advances blindly, bringing unmerited destruction on everything it meets with, ever revived and ever blown anew into a blaze, as if by winds, by the folly of those who come near it. Therefore, men of Aetolia, we beg you, as if the whole of the islanders and all the Greeks who inhabit Asia Minor were present here and were entreating you to put a stop to the war and decide for peace—for the matter concerns them as much as ourselves—to come to your senses and relent and agree to our request. Now if it so chanced that you were engaged in a war, unprofitable indeed, as every war for the most part is, but glorious in the motive of its inception and in the splendour of its us, you might perhaps be pardoned for acting for ambitious motives. But if it is a war most shameful and full of dishonour and reproach, does not the situation

call for much hesitation? We will state our opinion frankly, and you, if you are wise, will listen to it calmly. For it is far better to be reproached and saved in time, than to listen to pleasant words and a little after be ruined yourselves and to ruin the rest of the Greeks.

"Consider, then, the errors you have committed. You say that you are fighting with Philip for the sake of the Greeks, that they may be delivered and may refuse to obey his commands; but as a fact you are fighting for the enslavement and ruin of Greece. This is the story your treaty with the Romans tells, a treaty formerly existing merely in writing, but now seen to be carried out in actual fact. Previously the words of the treaty alone involved you in disgrace, but now when it is put to action this becomes evident to the eyes of all. Philip, then, is but the nominal pretext of the war; he is in no kind of danger; but as he has for allies most of the Peloponnesians, the Boeotians, the Euboeans, the Phocians, the Locrians, the Thessalians, and Epirots, you made the treaty against them all, the terms being that their persons and personal property should belong to the Romans and their cities and lands to the Aetolians. Did you capture a city yourselves you would not allow yourselves to outrage freemen or to burn their towns, which you regard as a cruel proceeding and barbarous; but have made a treaty by which you have given up to the barbarians the rest of the Greeks to be exposed to atrocious outrage and violence. This was not formerly understood, but now the case of the people of Oreum and that of the unhappy Aeginetans have exposed you to all, Fortune having of set purpose as it were mounted your infatuation on the stage. Such was the beginning of this war, such are already its consequences, and what must we expect its end to be, if all falls out entirely as you wish? Surely the beginning of

terrible disaster to all the Greeks. For it is only too evident, I think, that the Romans if they get the war in Italy off their hands—and this will be very shortly, as Hannibal is now confined in quite a small district of Bruttium—will next throw themselves with their whole strength on Grecian lands on the pretext that they are helping the Aetolians against Philip, but really with the intention of conquering the whole country. Should the Romans, when they have subjected us, determine to treat us kindly, the credit and thanks will be theirs; but if they treat us ill it is they who will acquire the spoil of those they destroy and sovereignty over the survivors, and you will then call the gods to witness when neither any god will be still willing, nor any man still able to help you.

"Possibly you should have foreseen all the consequences from the beginning, but as much of the future escapes human foresight, it should be your duty now at last, when these occurrences have opened your eyes to facts, to take better counsel for the future. As for ourselves we protest that on the present occasion we have neglected nothing which it is proper for true friends to say or do, and we have frankly stated our opinion about the future. To conclude we beg and entreat you not to grudge to yourselves and to the rest of the Greeks the blessings of liberty and security."

This speech appears to have made a considerable impression on the people, and after the speaker the ambassadors from Philip entered. Leaving the discussion of details over for the present they said they had come with two imperative messages. If the Aetolians elected for peace the king readily consented, but if not, the ambassadors were bidden of take their leave after calling to witness the gods and the embassies from the rest of Greece that

the Aetolians and not Philip must be considered responsible for what might happen afterwards to the Greeks. . . .

He bewailed his ill-luck in having narrowly missed taking Attalus prisoner. . . .

Philip at Thermus

Philip, after marching on Lake Trichonis, reached Thermus where there was a temple of Apollo and now mutilated all the statues which he had spared on the former occasion, acting wrongly both then and now in giving way to his passion. For it is the height unreasonableness to be guilty of impiety to the gods because one is angry with men. . . .

The Achaean Strategi and Philopoemen

There are three ways in which those who aim at acquiring the art of generalship may reasonably hope to do so, first by studying military memoirs and availing themselves of the lessons contained in them, secondly by feeling the systematic instruction of experienced men, and thirdly by the habit and experience acquired in actual practice, and in all three the present Achaean strategi were absolutely unversed. . . .

Most of them displayed an unhappy emulation of the inopportune pretentiousness of others. They were particularly careful about their retinues and their dress, generally exhibiting a dandyism much in excess of what their fortunes permitted, while as to their arms they paid not the least attention to them. . . .

Most men do not even attempt of imitate the essential characteristics of those who are favoured by fortune, but by striving to copy them in unessentials make a display of their own want of judgement. . . .

Philopoemen told them that the brightness of their arms and armour would contribute much to intimidate the enemy, and that it was also of great importance that arms above so constructed as to be adapted to the purpose they were to serve. What was required could be best done by bestowing on their arms the care they now devote to their dress, and transferring to the latter the lack of attention they formerly exhibited to their arms. For by this means they would both benefit their private fortunes, and as all would acknowledge, enable themselves to save the state. Therefore he said that a man on starting for a review or a campaign should in putting on his greaves take more care to see that they fit well and look shiny than he does about his shoes and boots, and again, when he handles his shield, breastplate, and helmet, see to it that they are cleaner and smarter than his chlamys and chiton. For when a man gives the preference over serviceable things to superficial things it is on the face of it evident what will happen to him in a battle. He begged them to regard general daintiness in dress as being fit for a woman and not for a very modest woman, while the richness and distinction of armour is suited to brave men who are determined to save gloriously both themselves and their country. All present applauded his speech so much and so admired the spirit of his advice, that at once on issuing from the senate-house they pointed to such as were dressed like dandies, and compelled some of them to retire from the market-place, and henceforth in their military exercises campaigns they paid much more attention to these matters.

So true is it that a single word spoken in season by a man of authority not only deters his hearers from what is worst, but urges them on to what is best. And when the speaker can reinforce his advice by the example of a life

which follows it, it is impossible not to give the fullest credit to his words. And this, we see, was especially true of Philopoemen. For in his dress and living he was plain and simple, and alike in the care he bestowed on his person and in his conversation he was marked by fine restraint and quite unassuming. Through his whole life he was most scrupulous in always speaking the truth, and therefore a few ordinary words from his lips inspired complete trust in the hearers; for since in everything the example of his own life supported his advice, they did not require many words from him. Consequently on many occasions by his credit and his insight into affairs he completely overthrew in a few sentences long speeches of his adversaries which had appeared to be very plausible.

To resume—after the close of the council all returned to their cities completely approving of the speech and the speaker, and convinced that with him as a leader no calamity could overtake them. Philopoemen now at once went the round of the cities, visiting and inspecting each with the great diligence and care. Afterwards collecting their forces he trained and drilled them, and finally after spending less than eight months on these preparations he collected his army at Mantinea, to enter on the struggle against the tyrant for the liberty of the whole Peloponnese.

The Defeat and Death of Machanidas

Machanidas, filled with confidence and regarding the attack of the Achaeans almost as a godsend, as soon as he heard that they were concentrated at Mantinea, addressed the Lacedaemonians at Tegea in terms suitable to the occasion, and at once on the next day shortly after daybreak began to advance on Mantinea. He himself led the right wing of the phalanx, and placed the mercenaries in parallel columns on each side of the

van with wagons behind them charged with a quantity of engines and missiles for catapults. At the same time Philopoemen, dividing his army into three parts, led it out of Mantinea, taking by the road that starts from the temple of Poseidon the Illyrians and heavy-armed cavalry, together with all his mercenaries and light-armed troops, by the next road to the west the phalanx, and by the next the Achaean cavalry. He first of all occupied with his light-armed troops the hill in front of the city which rises at a considerable height above the road called Xenis and the above temple, and next to them on the south he placed the heavy-armed cavalry, with the Illyrians adjacent to them. Next to these on the same straight line he stationed the phalanx in several divisions at a certain distance from each other along the ditch that runs from the temple of Poseidon through the plain of Mantinea and terminates at a range of hills forming the boundary of the territory of Elisphasia. Then next the phalanx on his right wing he posted the Achaean cavalry under the command of Aristaenetus of Dyme. On the left wing under his own command was the mercenary cavalry in close order.

As soon as the enemy were well in view he rode along the divisions of the phalanx and addressed them in a few brief words, pointing out the importance of the coming battle. Most of what he said was not distinctly heard, because, owing to the soldiers' affection for him and reliance on him, such was their ardour and zeal that they responded to his address by what was almost a transport of enthusiasm, exhorting him to lead them on be of good heart. The general tenor, however, of what he attempted to point out to them whenever he got the chance, was that in the present battle the enemy

were fighting for shameful and ignominious slavery and they themselves for imperishable and glorious liberty.

Machanidas at first looked as if he were about to charge the enemy's right with his phalanx in column, but on approaching, when he found himself at the proper distance he wheeled to the right, and deploying into line made his own right wing equal in extent to the Achaean left, placing his catapults at certain intervals in front of his whole army. Philopoemen, seeing that Machanidas' plan was by shooting at the divisions of the phalanx to wound the men and throw the whole force into disorder, gave him not a moment's leisure, but vigorously opened the attack with his Tarentines in the neighbourhood of the temple of Poseidon where the ground was flat and suitable for cavalry. Machanidas, when he saw this, was obliged to likewise and order his own Tarentines to charge at the same time.

At first the Tarentines alone were engaged, fighting gallantly, but as the light-armed infantry gradually came up to the support of those who were hard pressed, in quite a short time the mercenaries on both sides were mixed up. They were fighting all over the field, in a confused crowd and man to man. For long the struggle was so equally balanced that the rest of the army, who were waiting to see to which side the cloud of dust was carried, could not make this out, since both long remained occupying their original positions. But after some time the tyrant's mercenaries prevailed by their superior numbers and skill, for they were well trained. This is generally what is liable to happen, since by as much as the civic force of a democracy is more courageous in action than the subjects of a tyrant, by so much will a despot's mercenaries in all probability excel those who serve for hire in a

democracy. For as in the former case one side is fighting for freedom and the other for slavery, so in the case of the mercenaries the one force is fighting for manifest improvement in their situation and the other for evident damage to their own; since a democracy when it has destroyed those who conspire against it no longer requires mercenaries to protect its freedom, but a tyranny, the more ambitious its aims, requires all the more mercenaries. For since it injures more people it has the more conspiring against it, and in general it may be said that the safety of despots depends on the affection and strength of their foreign soldiers.

So it was at present also. The mercenaries of Machanidas fought with such desperate courage and force that the Illyrians and cuirassed troops who supported the mercenaries could not resist the attack, but all gave way and fled in disorder towards Mantinea, which was seven stades distant. This occasion afforded evidence sufficient to convince all of what some have doubted, the fact that most results in war are due to the skill or the reverse of the commanders. It is perhaps a great feat to follow up initial success, but it is a much greater one upon meeting with reverse at the outset to keep cool-headed, to be able to detect any lack of judgement on the part of the victors and take advantage of their errors. Indeed we often see those who already seem to have gained the day totally worsted shortly afterwards, and those who at first seemed to have lost it unexpectedly turn the tables and restore the situation by their dexterity. This was very clearly illustrated by the conduct of both the two commanders on the present occasion. For when the whole Achaean mercenary force gave way and their left wing was broken, Machanidas, instead of remaining on the field to outflank the enemy on one side and by a direct attack on the other to strike a decisive

blow, did neither, but with childish lack of self-control rushed forward to join his own mercenaries and fall upon the fugitives, as if terror alone were not sufficient to drive them as far as the gate once they had given way.

The Achaean commander did his best to rally the mercenaries, calling on their leaders by name and encouraging them, but when he saw that they were forced back he neither fled in dismay, nor lost heart and gave up hope, but posting himself on the wing of his phalanx, and waiting till the pursuers had passed by and left the ground on which the action had taken place clear, he at once wheeled the first section of the phalanx to the left and advanced at the double but without breaking his ranks, and rapidly occupying the ground which the enemy had abandoned, both cut off the pursuers and at the same time outflanked the Spartan wing. He exhorted the men of his phalanx to be of good heart and wait until he gave the order for a general charge. He commanded Polyaenus of Megalopolis to collect rapidly all those of the Illyrians, cuirassed infantry, and mercenaries who were left behind or had evaded the pursuit, and to support the wing of the phalanx and wait for the return of the pursuers. The Lacedaemonian phalanx now, without orders but elated by the success of the light-armed troops, levelled their spears and charged the enemy. When in charging they reached the edge of the ditch, partly because they had no longer time to change their minds and retrace their steps as they were at close quarters with the enemy, and partly since they made light of the ditch as its descent was gentle and it had neither water nor bushes at the bottom, they dashed through it without hesitating.

When he saw that the chance of smiting the enemy that had so long been present to his mind had at length arrived, Philopoemen ordered the whole

phalanx to level their spears and charge. When the Achaeans, like one man and with a loud cheer that cast terror into their foes, rushed on them, those of the Lacedaemonians who had broken their ranks and descended into the ditch, lost courage as they mounted the bank to meet the enemy above their heads and took to flight. The greater number of them perished in the ditch itself, killed either by the Achaeans or by each other. And this result was not due to chance or to momentary luck, but to the sagacity of the commander in at once protecting his men by the ditch. This he did not with the desire to avoid an encounter as was supposed by some, but calculating everything accurately like the expert general he was and foreseeing that if Machanidas, when he came up, led his force forward without reckoning on the ditch, the phalanx would suffer what I have just described as actually happening to it, whereas if the tyrant took into consideration the difficulty presented by the ditch, and changing his mind, seemed to shirk an encounter, breaking up his formation and exposing himself in long marching order, he would then without a general engagement himself secure victory while Machanidas would suffer defeat. This has already happened to many, who after drawing up in order of battle, being under the impression that they were not equal to engaging the enemy, either owing to their position or owing to their inferiority in numbers or for any other reason, have exposed themselves in a long marching column, hoping as they retired to succeed, by the sole aid of their rearguard, either in great the better of the enemy or in making further their escape. This is a most frequent cause of error on the part of commanders.

But Philopoemen was by no means deceived in his anticipation of what the result would be; for the Lacedaemonians were completely routed. When

he saw his phalanx victorious and everything going on splendidly for himself he turned his mind to the remainder of his project, which was to prevent the escape of Machanidas. Knowing that in his unwise pursuit he had been cut off together with his mercenaries on the side of the ditch lying nearest the town, he was waiting for his reappearance. Machanidas on observing when he had desisted from the pursuit that his troops were in flight, and on realizing that he had blundered and thereby lost the day, at once attempted to make the mercenaries he had round him close up and force their way in a compact body through the scattered ranks of the pursuers. Some of them with this end in view remained with him at first, hoping thus to get off safe, but when they got up to the ditch and saw that the Achaeans were holding the bridge over it, they all lost heart and dropped off from him, each attempting to save himself as best he could. Meanwhile the tyrant, despairing of making his way across the bridge, rode along the ditch trying with all his might to find a crossing.

Recognizing Machanidas by his purple cloak and the trappings of his horse, Philopoemen left Alexidamus with orders to guard the passage carefully and spare none of the mercenaries, as they were the men who had always maintained the power of the Spartan tyrants. Taking with him Polyaenus of Cyparissia and Simias, who acted at the time as his aides-de-camp, he followed the tyrant and those with him—there were two who had joined him, Arexidamus and one of the mercenaries—along the opposite side of the ditch. When Machanidas, on reaching a place where the ditch was easily passable, set spurs to his horse and forced it across, Philopoemen turned to meet him. Giving him a mortal wound with his spear and adding yet another thrust with the lower end of it, he slew the tyrant hand to hand.

Arexidamus suffered the same fate at the hands of the two officers who rode with Philopoemen, and after the death of the two the third man, despairing of crossing, sought safety in flight. When both had fallen Simias and his companion stripped the bodies and taking the armour and the head of the tyrant hastened back to the pursuers, eager to show to their men those proofs of the death of the enemy's commander, so that believing the evidence of their eyes they might with increased confidence and fearlessness continue the pursuit of the enemy as far as Tegea. And the sight did as a fact much contribute to the spirit of the soldiers; for it was chiefly owing to this that they captured Tegea by storm, and a few days after were encamped on the banks of the Eurotas, already in undisputed command of the country. For many years they had been unable to repulse the enemy from their own land, and now they themselves fearlessly pillaged Laconia, having suffered little loss in the battle, but having not only slain as many as four thousand Lacedaemonians but captured a still greater number and made themselves masters of all the baggage and arms.

IV. Affairs of Italy

What is the use of recounting to our readers wars and battles and the sieges and captures of cities, if they are not likewise informed of the causes to which in each case success or failure was due? For the results of actions merely interest readers, but anticipation of what is to follow, when the inquiry is properly conducted, is of benefit to students. Most salutary of all to those who give due attention to it is an exposition of the detailed management of each particular question.

Hannibal

No one can withhold admiration for Hannibal's generalship, courage, and power in the field, who considers the length of this period, and carefully reflects on the major and minor battles, on the sieges he undertook, on his movements from city to city, on the difficulties that at times faced him, and in a word on the whole scope of his design and its execution, a design in the pursuit of which, having constantly fought the Romans for sixteen years, he never broke up his forces and dismissed them from the field, but holding them together under his personal command, like a good ship's captain, kept such a large army free from sedition towards him or among themselves, and this although his regiments were not only of different nationalities but of different races. For he had with him Africans, Spaniards, Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, and Greeks, peoples who neither in their laws, customs, or language, nor in any other respect had anything naturally in common. But, nevertheless, the ability of their commander forced men so radically different to give ear to a single word of command and yield obedience to a single will. And this he did not under simple conditions but under very complicated ones, the gale of fortune blowing often strongly in their favour and at other times against them. Therefore we cannot but justly admire Hannibal in these respects and pronounce with confidence that had he begun with the other parts of the world and finished with the Romans none of his plans would have failed to succeed. But as it was, commencing with those whom he should have left to the last, his career began and finished in this field.

V. Affairs of Spain

The Defeat of Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, by Publius Scipio

Hasdrubal, collecting his forces from the towns in which they had passed the winter, advanced and encamped not far from the town called Ilipa, entrenching himself just under the hills with a level space in front favourably situated for giving battle. He had about seventy thousand infantry, four thousand horse, and thirty-two elephants. Scipio sent off Marcus Junius to Colichas to take over the forces that the latter had got ready for him, which consisted of three thousand foot and five hundred horse. The rest of the allies he took with himself and advanced marching to encounter the enemy. When he drew near Castalon and the neighbourhood of Baecula and there joined Marcus and the troops sent by Colichas, he found the situation a very embarrassing one. For without the allies the Roman troops at his disposal were not sufficient for him to risk a battle, while it seemed to him dangerous, and far too risky, to rely on the support of the allies in what promised to be a decisive engagement. However, though he hesitated, he found himself forced by circumstances and was reduced to employing the Spaniards, using them for the purpose of impressing the enemy by an imposing show but leaving the actual fighting to his own legions. With this purpose he left with his whole army, consisting of about forty-five thousand foot and three thousand horse. When he got near the Carthaginians and was in full sight of them he encamped on certain low hills opposite to the enemy.

Mago, thinking it a favourable occasion to attack the Romans as they were forming their camp, took most of his own cavalry and Massanissa with his Numidians and charged the camp, being convinced that he would find Scipio off his guard. Scipio, however, had long foreseen what would happen, and had stationed his cavalry, who were equal in number to those

of the Carthaginians, under a hill. Surprised by this unexpected attack many of the Carthaginians as they wheeled sharply round at the unexpected sight, lost their seats, but the rest met the enemy and fought bravely. Thrown, however, into difficulties by the dexterity with which the Roman horsemen dismounted, and losing many of their numbers, the Carthaginians gave way after a short resistance. At first they retired in good order, but when the Romans pressed them hard, the squadrons broke up and they took refuge under their own camp. After this the Romans displayed greater eagerness to engage and the Carthaginians less. However, for several days following they drew up their forces on the level ground between them, and after trying their strength by skirmishing with their cavalry and left infantry, finally resolved on a decisive action.

On this occasion we see Scipio employing two different stratagems. Observing that Hasdrubal always brought his troops out of camp at a late hour and drew them up with the Libyans in the centre and the elephants in front of the two wings, and having himself been in the habit of delaying until a later hour and of opposing the Romans to the Libyans in the centre and stationing the Spaniards on his wings, he acted on the day on which he had decided to deliver the decisive battle in a precisely opposite manner, and thus much contributed to the victory of his own army and the discomfiture of the enemy. For as soon as it was light he sent a message by his aides-de-camp to all the tribunes and soldiers to take their morning meal and arm themselves and march out of the camp. When this was done, all showing great zeal in carrying out the order, as they suspected what was in the wind, he sent on the cavalry and light infantry with orders to get close up to the enemy's camp and shoot at him boldly, while he himself with his

infantry advanced just as the sun was rising, and when he reached the middle of the plain, formed in order of battle, disposing his troops in an order contrary to that which he had previously used, as he placed the Spaniards in the centre and the Romans on the wings. The Carthaginians, upon the enemy's cavalry coming suddenly up to their camp and the rest of his army forming up in full view, scarcely had time to arm themselves. So that Hasdrubal, with his men still fasting, was obliged on the spur of the moment and without any preparation to send off his own cavalry and light infantry to engage those of the enemy on the plain and to draw up his heavy infantry on the level ground at no great distance from the foot of the hill, as was his usual practice. For a certain time the Romans remained inactive, but when, as the day advanced, there was no decisive advantage on either side in the engagement of the light-armed troops, those who were hard pressed always retreating to the shelter of their respective phalanxes and then issuing forth again to resume the combat, Scipio receiving the skirmishers through the intervals between his cohorts distributed them on his wings behind his infantry, placing the velites in front with the horse behind them. At first he made a direct frontal advance, but when at a distance of four stades from the enemy he ordered the Spaniards to continue advancing in the same order but the infantry and cavalry on the right wing to wheel to the right and those of the left wing to wheel to the left. Then taking, himself from the right wing and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius from the left, the leading three troops of horse and placing in front of them the usual number of velites and three maniples (this body of infantry the Romans call a cohort), he advanced straight on the enemy at a rapid pace, wheeling in the one case to the left and in the other to the right, the rear ranks always

following the direction of the front ones. When they were not far away from the enemy, while the Spaniards, who continued their direct advance, were still at some distance, as they were marching slowly, he fell, as he had originally intended, directly on both wings of the enemy with the Roman forces. The subsequent movements, which enabled the rear ranks to get into the same line as the leading ones and place themselves in a position to attack the enemy, were in contrary directions both as regards the right and left wings and as regards the infantry and cavalry. For the cavalry and light infantry on the right wing wheeling to the right attempted to outflank the enemy, while the heavy infantry wheeled to the left. On the left wing the maniples wheeled to the right and the cavalry and velites to the left. The consequence of this was that the right of the cavalry and light-armed troops on both wings had become their left. But the general, regarding this as of small importance, devoted his intention to the really important object—outflanking the enemy—and he estimated rightly, for a general should, of course, know the actual course of events, but employ those movements which are suited to an emergency.

In consequence of this attack the elephants, assailed by the missiles of the cavalry and velites and harassed on every side, were suffering much, and doing as much damage to their own side as to the enemy. For in their wild rush they destroyed all, friend or foe, who came in their way. As for the infantry the wings of the Carthaginians were broken, and the centre, where stood the Libyans, the flower of the army, was of no service, as they could neither leave their original position to help those on the wings, for fear of attack by the Spaniards, nor, remaining where they were, could they operate effectively, as the enemy in front of them would not come to blows.

The wings, however, kept up a gallant struggle for some time, as each side was aware that all depended on the result of this battle. But when the heat of the day was at its height, the Carthaginians grew faint, as they had not left their camp on their own initiative and had been prevented from preparing themselves properly, while the Romans began to exhibit superior strength and spirit, chiefly because, owing to the foresight of their commander, their choicest troops encountered here the least efficient of the enemy. At first Hasdrubal's men, yielding to the pressure, retired step by step, but later they gave way in a body and retreated to the foot of the hill, and when the Romans pushed their attack home with more violence they fled in rout to their camp. Had not some deity interposed to save them they would have been at once driven out of their entrenchments, but now arose an unprecedented disturbance in the heavens, and such heavy and continuous torrents of rain fell, that the Romans with difficulty made their way back to their own camp. . . .

Many of the Romans perished by fire in their search for the molten masses of silver and gold. . . .

When everyone congratulated Scipio on having driven the Carthaginians out of Spain and entreated him to rest and take his ease, as he had put an end to the war, he said he considered them happy in having such hopes, but that for his own part now especially the time had come when he had to consider how he should begin the war against Carthage; for up to now the Carthaginians had been making war on the Romans, but now chance had given the Romans the opportunity of making war on the Carthaginians. . . .

Scipio, who was highly gifted in this respect, spoke to Syphax with such urbanity and adroitness that Hasdrubal afterwards said to Syphax that

Scipio had seemed to him to be more formidable in his conversation than on the field of battle. . . .

Mutiny in the Roman Army

When a sedition broke out among some of the soldiers in the Roman camp, Scipio, though he had by this time gained considerable practical experience, never found himself in such difficulty and perplexity. And this was only to be expected. For just as in the case of our bodies external causes of injury, such as cold, extreme heat, fatigue, and wounds, can be guarded against before they happen and easily remedied when they do happen, but growths and abscesses which originate in the body itself can with difficulty be foreseen and with difficulty be cured when they happen, we should assume the same to be true of a state or an army. As for plots and wars from outside, it is easy, if we are on the watch, to prepare to meet them and to find a remedy, but in the case of intestine opposition, sedition, and disturbance it is a difficult task to hit on a remedy, a task requiring great adroitness and exceptional sagacity. There is one rule, however, which in my opinion is equally applicable to armies, cities, and to the body, and that is never to allow any of them to remain long indolent and inactive and especially when they enjoy prosperity and plenty. Scipio, as I have said, was exceptionally painstaking and at the same time very sagacious and practical, and he now summoned the tribunes and laid before them the following plan for relieving the present situation. He said they should undertake to pay the men their arrears, and in order to secure credence for this promise, collect at once publicly and energetically the contributions formerly imposed on the cities for the maintenance of the whole army, making it evident that the measure was taken to adjust the irregularity of

payment. He begged the same officers to return to their troops and urge them to retrieve their error and present themselves before him to receive their pay either singly or in a body. When this had been done he said it would be time to consult what further action the circumstances demanded.

The officers with this object in view applied themselves to collecting the money. [1] . . . When the tribunes communicated the decision to Scipio he, on hearing of it, laid before the council his views as to what should be done. It was decided to fix a day for the soldiers to present themselves and then come to terms with the rank and file, but to punish severely the authors of the mutiny, who numbered about five and thirty. When the day arrived and the mutineers came to make terms and receive their pay, Scipio gave secret instructions to the tribunes who had been deputed to him to meet the mutineers and each attaching to himself five of the ringleaders, at once upon meeting them make professions of friendship and invite them to their quarters, if possible to lodge there, but if that were impossible to take supper and carouse afterwards. Three days previously he had ordered the legion he had with him to furnish themselves with provisions for a considerable time on the pretext that they were marching under Marcus against Andobales. This, when it reached their ears, gave the mutineers increased confidence, as they thought that they themselves would be masters of the situation when they met their general after the other legions had taken their departure.

[1] It is evident from Livy XXVIII. 25. 15 that a good deal is missing.

When they were approaching the town he ordered the other soldiers to march out at day-break next day with all their baggage. The tribunes and

prefects upon their issuing from the city were to make the soldiers deposit their baggage and halt them under arms at the gate, afterwards distributing them to guard all the gates and to see that none of the mutineers got out. Those tribunes who had been told off to meet the mutineers, when they encountered them as they advanced towards them, cordially received the most culpable of them, as had been arranged, and led them off. Orders had been given to them to arrest at once after supper the thirty-five and secure them bound, not allowing any of those inside to go out except the messenger sent by each to inform the general that the thing had been done. The tribunes acted on these orders, and next morning Scipio, seeing that the newly arrived soldiers were collected in the market-place, summoned an assembly. When they all, as they were in the habit of doing, ran to obey the summons with their curiosity fully aroused as to how the general would look, and what they would be told about the present situation, Scipio sent to the tribunes at the gates ordering them to bring their men under arms and surround the assembly. When he advanced and presented himself his appearance at once struck them all with amazement. For most of them still supposed him to be in feeble health, and now when contrary to their expectation they suddenly saw him looking very well they were dumbfounded by the apparition.

He began to speak somewhat as follows. He said he wondered what grievance or what expectations had induced them to make this revolt. For there were three reasons which make men venture to revolt against their country and their officers. Either they find fault and are displeased with those in command, or they are dissatisfied with their actual situation, or indeed they entertain hopes of some improvement in their fortunes. "Which

of these, I ask you," he said, "existed in your case? Evidently you were displeased with me because I did not pay what was due to you. But that was no fault of mine, for since I myself have been in command, you have been always paid in full. But if you have a grievance against Rome because your old arrears were not made good, was it the proper method of complaint to revolt against your country and take up arms against her who nourished you? Should you not rather have come and spoken to me about the matter, and begged your friends to take up your cause and help you? Yes, that, I think, would have been far better. Mercenary troops may indeed sometimes be pardoned for revolting against their employers, but no pardon can be extended to those who are fighting for themselves and their wives and children. For that is just as if a man who said he had been wronged by his own father in money matters were to take up arms to kill him who was the author of his life. Great Heavens! can you say that I imposed more hardship and danger on you than on others but bestowed on others a larger share of profit and booty? Neither will you dare to say so, nor could you prove it if you did. What is it then with which you are so dissatisfied at present as to revolt against me? I should very much like to know; for my opinion is that there is not one of you who will be able to tell me any grievance or think of any. Nor is it that you are discontented with your present situation. When was everything so abundant, when had Rome enjoyed more success, when had her soldiers brighter hopes than now? But perhaps one of the more despondent among you will tell me that with the enemy there would be more profit for you and greater and more certain expectations! Who are these enemies? Are they Andobales and Mandonius? Who among you is not aware that, to begin with, they revolted to us after betraying Carthage and

now again, breaking their oaths and pledges to us, have proclaimed themselves our enemies? A fine thing truly to rely on these men and become enemies of your own country! Again you could not hope to conquer Spain by your own arms, for you were not a match for me even if you joined Andobales' army, much less by yourselves. What then was in your minds I should very much like to learn that from you. Unless indeed the fact was that you relied on the skill and valour of the leaders you have just appointed or on the fasces and axes that are carried before them, about which it is disgraceful even to speak further. No, my men, it was nothing of the sort, and you could not give the slightest reason to justify yourselves in my eyes or in those of your country. I, therefore, will plead for you to Rome and to myself, using a plea universally acknowledged among men: and that is that all multitudes are easily misled and easily impelled to every excess, so that a multitude is ever liable to the same vicissitudes as the sea. For as the sea is by its own nature harmless to those who voyage on it and quiet, but when winds fall violently upon it seems to those who have dealings with it to be of the same character as the winds that happen to stir it, so a multitude ever appears to be and actually is to those who deal with it of the same character as the leaders and counsellors it happens to have. Therefore I, too, on the present occasion and all the superior officers of the army consent to be reconciled with you and engage to grant you amnesty. But with the guilty parties we refuse to be reconciled and have decided to punish them for their offences against their country and ourselves."

Hardly had he finished speaking when the men who stood round him in arms upon a signal given clashed their swords against their bucklers, and at the same time the authors of the mutiny were brought in bound and naked.

The multitude of mutineers were so thoroughly cowed by fear of the surrounding force and the terror that looked them in the face, that while some of their leaders were being scourged and others beheaded none of them either changed his countenance or uttered a word, but all remained dumbfounded, smitten with astonishment and dread. After the authors of the evil had thus been put to death with contumely, their bodies were dragged through the troops, and the rest of the mutineers received from the general and other officers a common assurance that no one would remember their past faults. Advancing singly, they took their oath to the tribunes that they would obey the orders of their officers and be guilty of no disloyalty to Rome.

Scipio then by successfully nipping in the bud what might have proved a great danger restored his forces to their original discipline.

The Revolt of Andobales and its Suppression

Scipio, calling a meeting of his troops in New Carthage itself, addressed them on the subject of the daring design of Andobales and his perfidy towards them. Dealing at length with this topic he thoroughly aroused the passions of the soldiers against that prince. Enumerating in the next place all the battles in which they had previously encountered the Spaniards and Carthaginians together under the command of the Carthaginians he told them that as they had in all cases won the day, they should not now have a shadow of apprehension lest they should be beaten by the Spaniards alone under Andobales. He had therefore not consented to call in the aid of a single Spaniard, but was going to give battle with his Romans alone, that it might be evident to all that it was not due to the help of the Spaniards that they had crushed the Carthaginians and driven them out of Spain, but that

they had conquered both the Carthaginians and Celtiberians by Roman valour and their own brave effort. Having said this he exhorted them to be of one mind, and if ever they marched to a battle in a spirit of confidence, to do so now. As for victory he himself with the aid of the gods would take the proper steps to secure it. His words produced such zeal and confidence in the troops, that in appearance they grew all of them like men who had the enemy before their eyes and were about to do battle with them at that instant.

After making this speech he dismissed the meeting. Next day he set out on the march. He reached the Ebro on the tenth day and crossing it took up on the fourth day after this a position in front of the enemy, leaving a valley between his own camp and theirs. On the following day he drove into this valley some of the cattle that followed the army, ordering Laelius to hold his cavalry in readiness and some of the tribunes to prepare the velites for action. Very soon, upon the Spaniards throwing themselves on the cattle, he sent some of the velites against them, and the engagement which ensued developed, as reinforcements came up from each side, into a sharp infantry skirmish round the valley. The opportunity was now an excellent one for attacking, and Laelius, who, as he had been ordered, was holding his cavalry in readiness, charged the enemy's skirmishers, cutting them off from the hillside, so that most of them scattered about the valley and were cut down by the horsemen. Upon this the barbarians were irritated and being in extreme anxiety lest it should be thought that this reverse at the outset had created general terror among them, they marched out in full force as soon as day dawned and drew up in order of battle. Scipio was ready for the emergency, but noticing that the Spaniards had the imprudence to descend

en masse into the valley and to draw up not only their cavalry but their infantry on the level ground, he bided his time wishing that as many as possible of them should take up this position. He had great confidence in his own horse and still greater in his infantry, because in a pitched battle hand-to-hand they were much superior to the Spaniards both as regards their armament and as regards the quality of their men.

When he thought that conditions were as he desired he opposed his velites to the enemy who were drawn up at the foot of the hill, and himself advancing from his camp with four cohorts in close order against those who had come down into the valley fell upon the enemy's infantry. Simultaneously Gaius Laelius with the cavalry advanced along the ridges which descended from the camp to the valley and took the Spanish cavalry in the rear, keeping them confined to defending themselves from him. In the long run the enemy's infantry, thus deprived of the services of the cavalry, relying on whose support they had come down into the valley, found themselves hard pressed and in difficulties. The cavalry suffered no less; for confined as they were in a narrow space and incapacitated from action, more of them destroyed each other than were destroyed by the enemy, their own infantry pressing on their flank, the enemy's infantry on their front and his cavalry hovering round their rear. Such being the conditions of the battle nearly all those who had come down into the valley were cut to pieces, those on the hill escaping. The latter were light-armed infantry forming the third part of the whole army, and Andobales in their company succeeded in saving his life and escaping to a strong place.

Having thus completely executed his task in Spain Scipio reached Tarraco full of joy, taking home as a gift to his country a splendid triumph

and a glorious victory. He was anxious not to arrive in Rome too late for the consular elections, and after regulating everything in Spain and handing over his army to Junius Silanus and Marcius he sailed to Rome with Laelius and his other friends.

VI. Affairs of Asia

The Situation in Bactria

For Euthydemus himself was a native of Magnesia, and he now, in defending himself to Teleas, said that Antiochus was not justified in attempting to deprive him of his kingdom, as he himself had never revolted against the king, but after others had revolted he had possessed himself of the throne of Bactria by destroying their descendants. After speaking at some length in the same sense he begged Teleas to mediate between them in a friendly manner and bring about a reconciliation, entreating Antiochus not to grudge him the name and state of king, as if he did not yield to this request, neither of them would be safe; for considerable hordes of Nomads were approaching, and this was not only a grave danger to both of them, but if they consented to admit them, the country would certainly relapse into barbarism. After speaking thus he dispatched Teleas to Antiochus. The king, who had long been on the look-out for a solution of the question when he received Teleas' report, gladly consented to an accommodation owing to the reasons above stated. Teleas went backwards and forwards more than once to both kings, and finally Euthydemus sent off his son Demetrius to ratify the agreement. Antiochus, on receiving the young man and judging him from his appearance, conversation, and dignity of bearing to be worthy of royal rank, in the first place promised to give him one of his daughters in marriage and next gave permission to his father to style himself king. After

making a written treaty concerning other points and entering into a sworn alliance, Antiochus took his departure, serving out generous rations of corn to his troops and adding to his own the elephants belonging to Euthydemus. Crossing the Caucasus he descended into India and renewed his alliance with Sophagasenus the Indian king. Here he procured more elephants, so that his total force of them amounted now to a hundred and fifty, and after a further distribution of corn to his troops, set out himself with his army, leaving Androsthenes of Cyzicus to collect the treasure which the king had agreed to pay. Having traversed Arachosia and crossed the river Erymanthus he reached Carmania through Drangene, where, as winter was now at hand, he took up his quarters. Such was the final result of Antiochus's expedition into the interior, an expedition by which he not only brought the upper satraps under his rule, but also the maritime cities and the princes this side of Taurus. In a word he put his kingdom in a position of safety, overawing all subject to him by his courage and industry. It was this expedition, in fact, which made him appear worthy of his throne not only to the inhabitants of Asia, but those of Europe likewise.

THE END OF BOOK XI

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XII

I. THE LOTUS [1]

[1] From Athenaeus xiv. 651 d.

Polybius in the twelfth book of his histories gives from personal observation the same account as Herodotus of the so-called lotus of Africa. He says: "The lotus is not a large tree, but it is rough and thorny. Its leaf resembles that of the blackthorn, but is rather wider and flatter. The fruit at first both in colour and size resembles the white myrtle berry when fully grown, but as it grows it becomes purple in colour and about the size of a round olive. The stone is quite small. They gather it when ripe, and after pounding what is meant for the slaves pack it with salt in jars. They remove the stones from the portion meant for freemen and store it in the same way and on this they feed. The food rather resembles figs or dates, but has a better aroma. Wine is also made from it by moistening it and crushing it in water. This wine is sweet and of an agreeable flavour, resembling very good metheglin, and drink it unwatered. It does not, however, keep for more than ten days, so that they make it in small quantities when required. They also make vinegar from it."

II. Mistakes of Timaeus concerning Africa and Corsica

No one can help admiring the richness of the country, and one is inclined to say that Timaeus was not only unacquainted with Africa but that he was childish and entirely deficient in judgement, and was still fettered by the ancient report handed down to us that the whole of Africa is sandy, dry, and

unproductive. The same holds good regarding the animals. For the number of horses, oxen, sheep, and goats in the country is so large that I doubt if so many could be found in the rest of the world, because many of the African tribes make no use of cereals but live on the flesh of their cattle and among their cattle. Again, all are aware of the numbers and strength of the elephants, lions, and panthers in Africa, of the beauty of its buffaloes, and the size of its ostriches, creatures that do not exist at all in Europe while Africa is full of them. Timaeus has no information on this subject and seems of set purpose to tell the exact opposite of the actual facts.

Regarding Corsica, too, he makes the same kind of random statements as in the case of Africa. In the account he gives of it in his second Book he tells us that there are many wild goats, sheep and cattle in it, as well as deer, hares, wolves and certain other animals, and that the inhabitants spend their time in hunting those animals, this being their sole occupation. The fact is that in this island not only is there not a single wild goat or wild ox, but there are not even any hares, wolves, deer, or similar animals, with the exception of foxes, rabbits, and wild sheep. The rabbit when seen from a distance looks like a small hare, but when captured it differs much from a hare both in appearance and taste. It lives for the most part under the ground. All the animals in the island, however, seem to be wild for the following reason. The shepherds are not able to follow their cattle as they graze, owing to the island being thickly wooded, rough, and precipitous, but when they want to collect the herds they take up their position on suitable spots and call them in by trumpet, all the animal without fail responding to their own trumpet. So that when people touching at the island see goats and oxen grazing by themselves and then attempt to catch them, the animals

will not approach them, being unused to them, but take to flight. When the shepherd sees the strangers disembarking and sounds his trumpet the herd starts off at full speed to respond to the call. For this reason the animals give one the impression of being wild, and Timaeus, after inadequate and casual inquiry, made this random statement. It is by no means surprising that the animals should obey the call of the trumpet; for in Italy those in care of swine manage matters in the same way in pasturing them. The swineherd does not follow behind the animals as in Greece but goes in front and sounds a horn at intervals, the animals following him and responding to the call. They have learnt so well to answer to their own horn that those who hear of this for the first time are astonished and loth to believe it. For owing to the large labouring population and the general abundance of food the herds swine in Italy are very large, especially among the Etruscans and Gauls, so that a thousand pigs and sometimes even more are reared from one sow. They, therefore, drive them out from their night quarters in different troops according to their breed and age. Thus when they cannot keep the different classes apart, but they get mixed either when they are being driven out, or when they are feeding, or when they are on the way home. They, therefore, invented the horn-call to separate them when they get mixed without trouble or fuss. For when one of the swineherds advances in one direction sounding the horn and another turns off in another direction, the animals separate of their own accord and follow the sound of their own horn with such alacrity that it is impossible by any means to force them back or arrest their course. In Greece, on the contrary, when different herds meet each other in the thickets in their search for acorns, whoever has more hands with him and has the opportunity includes his neighbour's

swine with his own and carries them off, or at times a robber will lie in wait and drive some off without the man in charge of them knowing how he has lost them, as the swine become widely separated from their conductors in their race for the acorn when the fruit just begins to fall. But this is enough on this subject.

III. Other Errors made by Timaeus

Who could continue to pardon such faults, especially when committed by Timaeus who is so fond of cavilling at similar blemishes in others? For instance, he accuses Theopompus of stating that Dionysius was conveyed from Sicily to Corinth in a merchant ship, whereas he really travelled in a warship, and again he falsely accuses Ephorus of making a blunder because he tells us that the elder Dionysius began to reign at the age of twenty-three, reigned for forty-two years, and died at the age of sixty-three. For surely no one could say that the mistake here was the author's, but it is obviously the scribe's. Either Ephorus must have surpassed Coroebus and Margites [2] in stupidity if he could not reckon that forty-two added to twenty-three make sixty-five, or as nobody would believe this of Ephorus, the mistake is evidently due to the scribe. No one, however, could approve of Timaeus' love of cavilling and fault-finding.

[2] The foolish and ignorant hero of the comic epic poem so entitled.

Again in his account of Pyrrhus he tells us that the Romans still commemorate the disaster at Troy by shooting on a certain day a war-horse before the city in the Campus Martius, because the capture of Troy was due to the wooden horse—a most childish statement. For at that rate we should have to say that all barbarian tribes were descendants of the Trojans, since nearly all of them, or at least the majority, when they are entering on a war

or on the eve of a decisive battle sacrifice a horse, divining the issue from the manner in which it falls. Timaeus in dealing with the foolish practice seems to me to exhibit not only ignorance but pedantry in supposing that in sacrificing a horse they do so because Troy was said to have been taken by means of a horse.

But from all this it is evident that the account he gives of Africa, of Sardinia, and especially of Italy, is inaccurate, and we see that generally the task of investigation has been entirely scamped by him, and this is the most important part of history. For since many events occur at the same time in different places, and one man cannot be in several places at one time, nor is it possible for a single man to have seen with his own eyes every place in the world and all the peculiar features of different places, the only thing left for an historian is to inquire from as many people as possible, to believe those worthy of belief and to be an adequate critic of the reports that reach him.

In this respect Timaeus, while making a great parade of accuracy, is, in my opinion, wont to be very short of the truth. So far is he from accurate investigation of the truth by questioning others that not even about matters he has even with his own eyes and places he has actually visited does he tell us anything trustworthy. This will become evident if we can show that in talking of Sicily he makes mistaken statements. For we may almost say that no further evidence of his inaccuracy is required, if as regards the country where he was born and bred and the most celebrated spots in it we find him mistaken and widely diverging from the truth. He tells us, then, that the fountain of Arethusa in Syracuse derives its source from the river Alpheius in the Peloponnese which runs through Arcadia and past Olympia. This

river, he says, diving into the earth and travelling four thousand stades under the Sicilian Sea reappears in Syracuse. This, he adds, is proved by the fact that once upon a time after heavy rains at the season of the Olympian festival, when the river had flooded the sanctuary, Arethusa threw up a quantity of dung from the beasts sacrificed at the festival and even a gold bowl which they recognized as coming from the festival and made away with.

IV. Errors of Timaeus about Locri

I happen to have paid several visits to Locri and to have rendered the Locrians important services. It was indeed through me that they were excused from serving in the Spanish and Dalmatian campaigns, in both of which they were required by the terms of their treaty to send aid to the Romans by sea. In consequence they were relieved from considerable hardship, danger, and expense, and in return conferred on me all kinds of honours and favours; so that I ought rather to speak well of the Locrians than the reverse. But nevertheless I have not hesitated to affirm both in speech and writing that account we have received from Aristotle about the foundation of the colony is truer than that given by Timaeus. For I know that the Locrians themselves confess that the tradition handed down to them by their fathers concerning the colony is that given by Aristotle and not that of Timaeus. And of this they adduce the following proofs. First of all that at Locri all ancestral nobility is derived from women, not from men, as, for example, those are considered noble among them who are said to be of the "hundred houses." These "hundred houses" were those distinguished by the Locrians as the leading families before the colony was sent out, the families from which the Locrians, as the oracle ordered, were to select by lot the

virgins they had to send to Troy. Some women belonging to these families left with the colony, and it is their descendants who are still considered noble and called "of the hundred houses." Again, as regards the virgin ministrant they call the Phialephorus the tradition is much as follows. At the time they expelled the Sicels who had occupied this site in Italy, at whose sacrifices the procession was led by a boy of one of the most celebrated and noble families, the Locrians adopted several of the Sicelian rites, as they had no inherited ritual, retaining among others this particular one, but making merely this change in it that they did not appoint one of their boys to be Phialephorus, but one of their virgins, because nobility among them was derived from women.

As for treaties with the Locrians of Greece proper there were none, and none were ever said to have existed, but all knew of the tradition of one with the Sicels. About this they said that when on their first arrival they found the Sicels in occupation of the place they now dwell in, and the Sicels being terror-struck at their arrival received them out of fear, they made a solemn compact to the effect that they would be their friends and share the country with them as long as they trod on this earth and wore heads on their shoulders. When they were taking the oath they say that the Locrians had put some earth into the soles of their shoes and had concealed on their shoulders under their dress some heads of garlic: in this state they took the oath, but subsequently emptying their shoes of the earth and throwing away the heads of garlic, they very shortly afterwards, when the occasion presented itself, expelled the Sicels from the country. Such is the account given by the Locrians. [3] . . . .

[3] From Athenaeus vi. 272 a.

(1)Timaeus of Tauromenium in the ninth Book of his *Histories*, says: "It was not the Greek custom to be served by purchased slaves," adding "They accused Aristotle in general of having misunderstood the Locrian customs, for (they said) the law did not permit the Locrians even to possess them."

(2)Timaeus of Tauromenium forgetting himself—he is confuted by Polybius in the twelfth Book of his Histories—says it was once not even the custom for the Greeks to possess slaves.

The inference from all this is that we should rely on Aristotle rather than on Timaeus. And what follows in the latter is quite peculiar. For it is foolish to suppose, as he hints, that it was improbable that the slaves of those who had been the allies of the Lacedaemonians should adopt the friendly feelings of their masters for the friends of those masters. Men, indeed, who have once been slaves when they meet with unexpected good fortune attempt to affect and reproduce not only the likings but the friendships and relationships of their masters, taking more pains to do so than those actually connected by blood, and hope to wipe out their former inferiority and disrepute by this very effort to appear rather as descendants than as freedmen of their late masters. And in the case of the Locrians this is especially likely to have happened. For as they had removed to a great distance from those acquainted with their past and had lapse of time on their side, they would not have been so foolish as to behave in a manner likely to revive the memory of their defects, but would have conducted themselves as to cover these defects. They, therefore, naturally named their city after the women and pretended to be related to other Locrians on the female side, renewing also those ancestral friendships and alliances which were derived from women. For this reason too the fact that the Athenians ravaged their

country is no proof that Aristotle's statements are not correct. For, as it was to be expected from what I have said, that even had they been slaves ten times over these men who set sail from Locri and landed in Italy would have affected to be friends of the Lacedaemonians, it was only to be expected also that the Athenians would be hostile to the whole pack of these Locrians, not so much from consideration of their ancestry as in view of their sympathies. How again, I ask, could the Spartans who had once sent home those in the prime of life to beget children have refused permission to the Locrians to do the same thing" Not only the probabilities, however, in each case but the facts differ considerably. For neither were the Spartans likely to prevent the Locrians from acting as they had acted themselves—this would have been strange indeed—nor were the Locrians likely at the bidding of the Spartans to act in precisely the same manner as the latter had acted. For among the Lacedaemonians it was a hereditary custom and quite usual for three or four men to have one wife or even more if they were brothers, the offspring being the common property of all, and when a man had begotten enough children, it was honourable and quite usual for him to give his wife to one of his friends. Therefore the Locrians, who were not subject to the same curse as the Spartans, nor bound by an oath such as the Spartans had taken that they would not return home before storming Messene, did not, as readily as can be explained, imitate the Spartans in a general dispatch of men to their wives, but returning home singly and at rare intervals allowed their wives to become more familiar with their slaves than with their original husbands, and allowed their maidens still greater latitude, which was the cause of emigration.

Timaeus frequently makes false statements. He appears to me not to be in general uninformed about such matters, but his judgement to be darkened by prejudice; and when he once sets himself to blame or praise anyone he forgets everything and departs very widely from his duty as a historian. Let it suffice, however, on behalf of Aristotle that I have shown how and relying on what authority he composed his account of Locri. But what I am now about to say concerning Timaeus and his work as a whole, and in general about the duty incumbent on those who occupy themselves with history, will meet objections more or less as follows. That both authors have aimed at reaching probability, but that there is more probability in Aristotle's account, I think everyone will avow after what I have said. It is not however, I shall be told, possible to pronounce absolutely about the truth of anything in this matter. Well! I am even ready to concede that Timaeus's account is more probable. But is this a reason why a historical writer whose statements seem lacking in probability must submit to listen to every term of contumely and almost to be put on trial for his life? Surely not. For those, as I said, who make false statements owing to error should meet with kind correction and forgiveness, but those who lie deliberately deserve an implacable accuser.

We have, then, either to show that Aristotle, in making the statements I have just reproduced about Locri, did so for the sake of currying favour or for gain or from some self-interested motive, or if we do not venture to maintain this we must confess that those are wrong and at fault who exhibit to others such animosity and bitterness as Timaeus does to Aristotle. He calls him arrogant, reckless, and headstrong, and adds that he had the effrontery to attack the city of Locri by stating that the colony consisted of

runaway slaves, lackeys, adulterers, and kidnappers. And all this, he says, is told with such an assumption of trustworthiness that one would take him for one of those back from the campaign who had just by his own power defeated the Persians in a pitched battle at the Cilician gates, and not for a pedantic and detestable sophist who had just locked up his precious surgeon's shop. Besides this he says he had forced his way into every court and on to every stage and was a glutton and epicure catering for his mouth in everything. I think that surely such language could scarcely be tolerated even from the lips of some unscrupulous knave making random accusations in a law court; for we must avow that he goes beyond all bounds. But no chronicler of public affairs, no really leading historian, would ever dare to entertain such thoughts, much less to put them in writing.

Let us now look at Timaeus's own deliberate statement, and compare with Aristotle's the account he himself gives of this identical colony, so that we may discover which of the two deserves such an accusation. He tells us, then, in the same Book, that he investigated the history of the colony, no longer applying the test of mere probability, but personally visiting the Locrians in Greece proper. He states that in the first place they showed him a written treaty, still preserved between them and the emigrants, with the following phrase at the outset, "As parents to children." In addition there were decrees that citizens of either town were citizens of the other. When they heard Aristotle's account of the colony they expressed astonishment at that author's recklessness. Proceeding afterwards to the Italian Locri he says he found their laws and customs also were such as beseemed not a pack of rascally slaves but a colony of freemen. For certainly there were penalties fixed in their code for kidnappers as well as for adulterers and runaway

slaves, which would not have been the case had they been aware that they themselves sprang from such men.

In the first place we are in doubt as to which of the Greek Locrians he visited for the purpose of inquiry. For if the Greek Locrians, like the Italian, were confined to one city we should perhaps not entertain any doubt, but the matter would be perspicuous. But since there are two sets of Locrians in Greece proper, we ask to which he went and to which of their cities and in whose possession he found the inscribed treaty; for he gives us no information on the subject. And yet Timaeus's special boast, the thing in which he outvies other authors and which is the main cause of the reputation he enjoys, is, as I suppose we all know, his display of accuracy in the matter of dates and public records, and the care he devotes to such matters. So it is most surprising that he has not informed us of the name of the city where he found the treaty or the exact spot in which it is inscribed, or who were the magistrates who showed him this document and with whom he spoke, so that no cause of perplexity would be left, but the place and the city being identified, those in doubt would have the means of discovering the exact truth. The fact that he neglects to inform us on all these points is a clear proof that he knew he was deliberately lying. For that, had Timaeus got hold of such information, he would not have let a word of it escape, but, as the phrase is, would have held on to it tight with both hands, is evident from the following consideration. Would the writer who mentions Echecrates by name as the man on whom he depends, having consulted him about the Italian Locrians and obtained this information, the writer who, not to appear to have heard all this from a person of no importance, takes the pains to tell us that the father of this Echecrates had

formerly been deemed worthy of employment as envoy by Dionysius—would such a writer, I ask, if he had got hold of a public record or a commemorative inscription, have held his tongue about it? For this is the author who compares the dates of the ephors with those of the kings in Lacedaemon from the earliest times, and the lists of Athenian archons and priestesses of Hera at Argos with those of the victors at Olympia, and who convicts cities of inaccuracy in these records, there being a difference of three months. Yes, and it is Timaeus who discovered the inscriptions at the back of buildings and lists of proxeni on the jambs of temples. We cannot then believe that he would have missed any such thing had it existed, or omitted to mention it had he found it, nor can we in any way excuse his mendacity. Himself a most bitter and implacable critic of others he can but expect to meet with implacable criticism at the hands of others. Next, having been obviously guilty of untruth in regard to this matter, he passes to the Italian Locrians and tells us in the first place that he found the constitution and general culture of both these Locrians and those in Greece to be the same, but that Aristotle and Theophrastus had falsely accused the Italian town. I am quite aware that here too I shall be compelled to digress from my main subject, in order to put my case more directly and further fortify it, but as a fact I deferred to one place my discussion of Timaeus just because I do not wish to be obliged frequently to neglect my main task. . . .

Timaeus says that the worst vice of history is falsehood. So he advises those whom he convicts of falsehood in their works to find another name for their book and call it anything but history. . . .

Timaeus says, that as a rule which is defective in length and breadth but possesses the essential quality of a rule must still be called a rule, but when

it has no approach to straightness or any quality akin to straightness, must be called anything rather than a rule, so in the case of historical works, when they are defective in style, treatment, or any other particular quality but still strive to ascertain the truth they may claim to be styled histories, but when they fall away from truth have no longer any claim to this name. I quite agree with him that truth is the leading quality in such books, and somewhere in the course of this work I made the same statement, writing as follows, that in the case of a living body if the eyes are put out the whole becomes useless, so if you take away truth from history what remains is but an unprofitable fable.

I said, however, that there are two kinds of falsehood, one the consequence of ignorance and the other deliberate, and that we should accord pardon to those who fall away from the truth owing to ignorance, but should refuse to forgive deliberate lying.

This point being settled I affirm that the difference is very wide between such falsehood as is the result of ignorance and such as is deliberate, the one admitting of pardon and kindly correction but the other deserving implacable condemnation. And one finds that Timaeus himself is a chief sinner in this respect, as I will now prove.

We use this proverb about those who violate treaties, "The Locrians and the pact," [4] and the origin of this is that, as both authors and other people agree, on the occasion of the invasion of the Heracleidae the Locrians had promised the Peloponnesians to raise war signals in case it happened that the Heracleidae tried to cross by Rhion and not to pass the Isthmus, so that due warning might be given and measures taken to prevent their invasion. The Locrians, however, did not do this, but on the contrary raised friendly

signals when the Heracleidae arrived, so that they made the crossing in safety, and the Peloponnesians, thus betrayed by the Locrians and neglecting to take any precautions, before they were aware of it had permitted their foes to enter their country.

[4] That is, À±Á²·Ã±½ "violated," the verb being omitted as often in proverbs. See *Corp. Paroemiogr*.

We should indeed reprove and ridicule the frenzy of those authors who dream dreams and write like men possessed. But those who indulge freely themselves in this kind of foolery should, far from accusing others, be only too glad if they escape blame themselves. Such is the case with Timaeus. He calls Callisthenes a flatterer for writing in the manner he does, and says he is very far from being a philosopher, paying attention as he does to crows and frenzied women. He adds that Alexander was very right in punishing him, as he had corrupted his mind as far as he could. He praises Demosthenes and the other orators who flourished at the time and says they were worthy of Greece because they opposed the conferment of divine honours on Alexander, while the philosopher who invested a mortal with aegis and thunderbolt was justly visited by heaven with the fate that befel him.

Timaeus tells us that Democharès had been guilty of such impurity that he was not a fit person to blow the sacrificial flame, and that in his practices he had been more shameless than the works of Botrys, Philaenis, and other obscene writers. Scurrilous assertions of this kind are such as not only no man of culture, but not even any of the inmates of a brothel would make. But Timaeus, in order that he may gain credit for his filthy accusations and his utter lack of decency, has made a further false charge against

Democharès, dragging in the evidence of a comic poet of no repute. You will ask on what grounds I infer that Timaeus is guilty of falsehood? First and foremost because Democharès was of good birth and breeding, being the nephew of Demosthenes, and secondly because the Athenians deemed him worthy not only of the office of strategus, but of other distinctions, to none of which could he have successfully aspired had he had such disadvantages to combat. Timaeus, therefore, seems to me to accuse not so much Democharès as the Athenians for advancing such a man and entrusting their country and their lives and properties to him. But not a word of all this can be true. For in that case not only Archedicus, the comic poet, would, as Timaeus asserts, have said this about Democharès, but many of the friends of Antipater also, against whom Democharès had ventured to say much calculated to vex not only Antipater himself but his successors and former friends. The same accusations would have been brought also by many of Democharès' political adversaries, among whom was Demetrius of Phaleron. Democharès in his history brings accusations by no means trivial against Demetrius, telling us that the statesmanship on which he prided himself was such as a vulgar farmer of taxes would pride himself on, his boast having been that the market in the town was plentifully supplied and cheap, and that there was abundance of all the necessities of life for everybody. He tells us that a snail moved by machinery went in front of his procession, spitting out saliva, and that donkeys were marched through the theatre, to show, forsooth, that the country had yielded up to others all the glory of Greece and obeyed the behests of Cassander. Of all this he says he was in no wise ashamed. But yet neither Demetrius nor anyone else said anything of the sort about Democharès. From which, regarding the

testimony of his country as more trustworthy than Timaeus's spite, I pronounce with confidence that the life of Democharesa was guiltless of all such offences. And even if, as a fact, Democharesa had the misfortune to be guilty of any such thing, what circumstance or what event compelled Timaeus to record it in his history? For just as men of sense when they meditate revenge on their enemies do not examine in the first place what others deserve to suffer, but rather how it becomes themselves to act, so when we bring reproaches we must not in the first place consider what is fitting for our enemies to hear, but regard it as of the greatest importance to determine what is proper for ourselves to speak. In the case, therefore, of writers who measure everything by the standard of their own passions and jealousies, we must suspect all their statements and refuse credit to them when extravagant. So that in the present case I may claim to be justified in rejecting the slanders of Timaeus concerning Democharesa, whereas this author can claim neither pardon nor credit from anyone, as he has in his reproaches so obviously let himself be carried beyond the bounds of decency by the spitefulness which was engrained in him.

Nor can I approve the terms in which he speaks of Agathocles, even if that prince were the most impious of men. I allude to the passage at the end of his story in which he says that Agathocles in his early youth was a common prostitute, ready to yield himself to the most debauched, a jackdaw, a buzzard, [5] who would right about face to anyone wished it. And in addition to this he says that on his death his wife lamenting him called out in her wail, "What did I not do to you? What did you not do to me?" In this instance we are not only inclined to repeat the protest we made in the case of Democharesa, but we are positively astonished by the excess of

rancour displayed. For that Agathocles had great natural advantages is evident from Timaeus's own account of him. For if at the age of eighteen he reached Syracuse, escaping from the wheel, the kiln, and the clay, and in a short time, starting from such small beginnings, became master of the whole of Sicily, exposed the Carthaginians to extreme peril, and having grown old in his sovereign position, died with the title of king, must not Agathocles have had something great and wonderful in him, and must he not have been qualified for the conduct of affairs by peculiar mental force and power? Regarding all this a historian should lay before posterity not only such matters as tend to confirm slanderous accusations, but also what redounds to the credit of his prince; for such is the proper function of history. But Timaeus, blinded by his own malice, has chronicled with hostility and exaggeration the defects of Agathocles and has entirely omitted to mention his shining qualities, being unaware that it is just as mendacious for a writer to conceal what did occur as to report what did not occur. I myself, while refraining in order to spare him from giving full expression to my hostility to Timaeus, have omitted nothing less to the object I had in view. [6] . . . .

[5] *ÄÁ¹ÌÁÇ·Â* lit. = "very lecherous."

[6] The last sentence seems to be defective. Shuckburgh translates: "The part of the history therefore which was added by him for the gratification of his personal spite I have passed over, but not what was really germane to his subject." Neither version corresponds exactly to the Greek.—Ed.

There was a dispute at Locri between two young men about a slave. The slave had been with one of them for a considerable time, and the other, two

days before, had come in the absence of the master to the latter's country house and had forcibly carried off the slave to his own house. The other young man, when he heard of it, came to the house, seized on the slave, and led him before the magistrates, to whom he maintained that upon his giving proper sureties, the boy ought to remain in his possession. For he said the law of Zaleucus enjoins that in cases of disputed ownership the party from whom the property had been taken away or abducted should remain in possession until the trial. The other claimant contended that according to the same law the abduction had been from him; for it was from his house that the slave had been taken and carried before the court. The presiding magistrates were in doubt about the point and calling in the cosmopolis submitted it to him. The cosmopolis defined the law as meaning that the abduction always was from the party who had last been in undisputed possession of the property for a certain time. If anyone forcibly deprives another of property and carries it off to his own house, and if then the former owner comes and takes it away from him, this is not abduction within the meaning of the law. When the young man upon this felt aggrieved and asserted that such was not the intention of the law-giver, they say that the cosmopolis invited him to state his case according to the law of Zaleucus. This is that the two disputants should speak before the "thousand" on the subject of the law-giver's meaning, each with a halter round his neck, and whichever of them appeared to interpret the law worst, should be hanged in the presence of the thousand. Upon the cosmopolis making this offer, the young man said that the bargain was not a fair one. For the one of them had only two or three years left to live, the cosmopolis being very nearly ninety years of age, whereas he himself in all likelihood had the most

of his life still before him. Thus the young man's ready wit relaxed the gravity of the court, but the magistrates followed the opinion of the cosmopolis in defining abduction.

V. Incapacity of Callisthenes in writing of Military Matters

In order that I may not seem to insist arbitrarily on the acceptance of my criticism of such famous writers, I will take one battle and a very celebrated one, a battle which took place at no very distant date and, what is most important, one at which Callisthenes himself was present. I mean Alexander's battle with Darius in Cilicia. Callisthenes tells us that Alexander had already passed the narrows and the so-called Cilician gates, while Darius had marched through the pass known as the Gates of Amanus and had descended with his army into Cilicia. On learning from the natives that Alexander was advancing in the direction of Syria he followed him up, and when he approached the pass, encamped on the banks of the river Pinarus. The distance, he says, from the sea to the foot of the hills is not more than fourteen stades, the river running obliquely across this space, with gaps in its banks just where it issues from the mountains, but in its whole course through the plain as far as the sea passing between steep hills difficult to climb. Having given this sketch of the country, he tells us that Darius and his generals, when Alexander turned and marched back to meet them, decided to draw up the whole phalanx in the camp itself in its original position, the river affording protection, as it ran close past the camp. After this he says they drew up the cavalry along the sea-shore, the mercenaries next them at the brink of the river, and the peltasts next the mercenaries in a line reaching as far as the mountains. It is difficult to understand how they posted all these troops in front of the phalanx, considering that the river ran

close past the camp, especially in view of their numbers, for, as Callisthenes himself says, there were thirty thousand cavalry and thirty thousand mercenaries, and it is easy to calculate how much space was required to hold them. For to be really useful cavalry should not be drawn up more than eight deep, and between each troop there must be a space equal in length to the front of a troop so that there may be no difficulty in wheeling and facing round. Thus a stade will hold eight hundred horse, ten stades eight thousand, and four stades three thousand two hundred, so that eleven thousand two hundred horse would fill a space of fourteen stades. If the whole force of thirty thousand were drawn up the cavalry alone would very nearly suffice to form three such bodies, one placed close behind the other. Where, then, were the mercenaries posted, unless indeed they were drawn up behind the cavalry? This he tells us was not so, as they were the first to meet the Macedonian attack. We must, then, of necessity, understand that the cavalry occupied that half of the space which was nearest the sea and the mercenaries the half nearest the hills, and from this it is easy to reckon which was the depth of the cavalry and how far away from the camp the river must have been. After this he tells us that on the approach of the enemy, Darius, who was half way down the line, called the mercenaries himself from the wing to come to him. It is difficult to see what he means by this. For the mercenaries and cavalry must have been in touch just in the middle of the field, so that how, why, and where could Darius, who was actually among the mercenaries, call them to come to him? Lastly, he says that the cavalry from the right wing advanced and attacked Alexander's cavalry, who received their charge bravely and delivering a counter charge

fought stubbornly. He forgets that there was a river between them and such a river as he has just described.

Very similar are his statements about Alexander. He says that when he crossed to Asia he had forty thousand foot and four thousand five hundred horse, and that when he was on the point of invading Cilicia he was joined by a further force of five thousand foot and eight hundred horse. Suppose we deduct from this total three thousand foot and three hundred horse, a liberal allowance for those absent on special service, there still remain forty-two thousand foot and five thousand horse. Assuming these numbers, he tells us that when Alexander heard the news of Darius's arrival in Cilicia he was a hundred stades away and had already traversed the pass. In consequence he turned and marched back through the pass with the phalanx in front, followed by the cavalry, and last of all the baggage-train. Immediately on issuing into the open country he re-formed his order, passing to all the word of command to form into phalanx, making it at first thirty-two deep, changing this subsequently to sixteen deep, and finally as he approach the enemy to eight deep. These statements are even more absurd than his former ones. For with the proper intervals for marching order a stade, when the men are sixteen deep, will hold sixteen hundred, each man being at a distance of six feet from the next. It is evident, then, that ten stades will hold sixteen thousand men and twenty stades twice as many. From all this it is quite plain that when Alexander made his army sixteen deep the line necessarily extended for twenty stades, and this left all the cavalry and ten thousand of the infantry over.

After this he says that Alexander led on his army in an extended line, being then at a distance of about forty stades from the enemy. It is difficult

to conceive anything more absurd than this. Where, especially in Cilicia, could one find an extent of ground where a phalanx with its long spears could advance for forty stades in a line twenty stades long? The obstacles indeed to such a formation and such a movement are so many that it would be difficult to enumerate them all, a single one mentioned by Callisthenes himself being sufficient to convince us of its impossibility. For he tells us that the torrents descending the mountains have formed so many clefts in the plain that most of the Persians in their flight perished in such fissures. But, it may be said, Alexander wished to be prepared for the appearance of the enemy. And what can be less prepared than a phalanx advancing in line but broken and disunited? How much easier indeed it would have been to develop from proper marching-order into order of battle than to straighten out and prepare for action on thickly wooded and fissured ground a broken line with numerous gaps in it. It would, therefore, have been considerably better to form a proper double or quadruple phalanx, for which it was not impossible to find marching room and which it would have been quite easy to get into order of battle expeditiously enough, as he was enabled through his scouts to receive in good time warning of the approach of the enemy. But, other things apart, Alexander did not even, according to Callisthenes, send his cavalry on in front when advancing in line over flat ground, but apparently placed them alongside the infantry.

But here is the greatest of all his mistakes. He tells us that Alexander, on approaching the enemy, made his line eight deep. It is evident then that now the total length of the line must have been forty stades. And even if they closed up so that, as described by Homer, they actually jostled each other, still the front must have extended over twenty stades. But he tells us that

there was only a space of less than fourteen stades, and as half of the cavalry were on the left near the sea and half on the right, the room available for the infantry is still further reduced. Add to this that the whole line must have kept at a considerable distance from the mountains so as not to be exposed to attack by those of the enemy who held the foot-hills. We know that he did as a fact draw up part of his force in a crescent formation to oppose this latter.

I omit to reckon here also [7] the ten thousand infantry more than his purpose required. So the consequence is that the length of the line must have been, according to Callisthenes himself, eleven stades at the most, and in this space thirty-two thousand men must have stood closely packed and thirty deep, whereas he tells us that in the battle they were eight deep. Now for such mistakes we can admit no excuse. For when the actual facts show a thing to be impossible we are instantly convinced that it is so. Thus when a writer gives definitely, as in this case, the distance from man to man, the total area of the ground, and the number of men, he is perfectly inexcusable in making false statements.

[7] The reference here is to p. 357, but either the omissions by the epitomator of faults in the text make the passage very obscure.

It would be too long a story to mention all the other absurdities of his narrative, and it will suffice to point out a few. He tells us that Alexander in drawing up his army was most anxious to be opposed to Darius in person, and that Darius also at first entertained the same wish, but afterwards changed his mind. But he tells us absolutely nothing as to how they intimated to each other at what point in their own line they were stationed, or where Darius finally went on changing his position. And how, we ask,

did a phalanx of heavy-armed men manage to mount the bank of the river which was steep and overgrown with brambles? This, too, is inexplicable. Such an absurdity cannot be attributed to Alexander, as it is universally acknowledged that from his childhood he was well versed and trained in the art of war. We should rather attribute it to the writer, who is so ignorant as to be unable to distinguish the possible from the impossible in such matters. Let this suffice for Ephorus and Callisthenes.

VI. The Faults of Timaeus

Timaeus, while vehemently attacking Ephorus, is himself guilty of two grave faults, the first being that he thus bitterly accuses others of the sins he himself is guilty of, and the second that he shows an utterly depraved mind in publishing such statements in his works and engendering such notions in his readers. If, indeed, we must admit that Callisthenes deserved to perish as he did under torture, what fate did Timaeus merit? For the wrath of the gods would have fallen on him with much more justice than on Callisthenes. Callisthenes wished to deify Alexander, but Timaeus makes Timoleon greater than the most illustrious gods; Callisthenes spoke of a man whose soul, as all admit, had something in it greater than human, Timaeus of Timoleon who not only never seems to have achieved anything great, but never even to have attempted to do so, and in his whole life accomplished but one move and that by no means important considering the greatness of the world, the move from his country to Syracuse. The fact, in my opinion, is that Timaeus was sure that if Timoleon, who had sought fame in a mere tea-cup, as it were, Sicily, could be shown to be worthy of comparison with the most illustrious heroes, he himself, who treated only of Italy and Sicily, could claim comparison with writers whose works dealt with the whole

world and with universal history. I have now said enough to defend Aristotle, Theophrastus, Callisthenes, Ephorus, and Democharesfrom the attacks of Timaeus, and the convince those who not having the spirit to challenge the statements of this author place implicit reliance on all he says.

We must entertain considerable doubt about the proclivities of Timaeus. For he tells us that poets and authors reveal their real natures in their works by dwelling excessively on certain matters. Homer, he says, is constantly feasting his heroes, and this indicates that he was more or less of a glutton. Aristotle frequently gives recipes for cookery in his works, so he must have been an epicure and a lover of dainties. In the same way Dionysius the tyrant revealed his effeminate tastes by his interest in bed-hangings and the constant study he devoted to varieties and peculiarities of different woven work. We are driven then to form our opinion of Timaeus on the same principle and to take and unfavourable view of his own tendencies. For while he exhibits great severity and audacity in accusing others, his own pronouncements are full of dreams, prodigies, incredible tales, and to put it shortly, craven superstition and womanish love of the marvellous. Be that as it may, it is made evident from what I have just said and from this case of Timaeus that owing to ignorance and a defect of judgement many men are at times as it were absent when present and blind with their eyes open.

There was a brazen bull which Phalaris made in Agrigentum, and in it he shut up men and afterwards lighting fire beneath it used to take such dreadful revenge on his subjects that as the brass grew red and the man inside perished roasted and scorched, when he screamed in the extremity of his agony, the sound when it reached the ears of those present resembled, owing to the way the thing was constructed, the lowing of a bull. This bull

during the Carthaginian domination was taken from Agrigentum to Carthage, and though the door at the joint of its shoulder-blades through which the victims were lowered into it, was still preserved, and though no reason at all can be found why such a bull should have been made in Carthage, yet Timaeus attempts to demolish the common story and to give the lie to the statements of poets and authors, asserting that neither the bull that was in Carthage came from Agrigentum, nor had there ever been one in Agrigentum, and entering into quite a long disquisition on this subject.

What terms are we to use in speaking of Timaeus? For to me it seems that all the most bitter phrases of the kind he applies to others are appropriate to himself. That he was quarrelsome, mendacious, and headstrong has been, I trust, sufficiently proved by what I have already said, but what I am about to add will make it evident that he was no philosopher and in general a man of no education. For in his twenty-first book, near the end, he says, in the course of Timoleon's address to his troops, "The earth lying under the universe being divided into three parts named Asia, Africa, and Europe." [8] No one would credit that, I will not say Timaeus but, even the celebrated Margites had said such a thing. For who is such an ignoramus, I do not speak of those who undertake to write history but. . . .

[8] Exception seems to be taken to the phrase "lying under the universe."

As the proverb tells us that a single drop from the largest vessel suffices to tell us the nature of the whole contents, so we should regard the subject now under discussion. When we find one or two false statements in a book and they prove to be deliberate ones, it is evident that not a word written by such an author is any longer certain and reliable. But to convince those also

who are disposed to champion him I must speak of the principle on which he composes public speeches, harangues to soldiers, the discourses of ambassadors, and, in a word, all utterances of the kind, which, as it were, sum up events and hold the whole history together. Can anyone who reads these help noticing that Timaeus had untruthfully reported them in his work, and has done so of set purpose? For he has not set down the words spoken nor the sense of what was really said, but having made up his mind as to what ought to have been said, he recounts all these speeches and all else that follows upon events like a man in a school of rhetoric attempting to speak on a given subject, and shows off his oratorical power, but gives no report of which was actually spoken.

The peculiar function of history is to discover, in the first place, the words actually spoken, whatever they were, and next to ascertain the reason why what was done or spoken led to failure or success. For the mere statement of a fact may interest us but is of no benefit to us: but when we add the cause of it, study of history becomes fruitful. For it is the mental transference of similar circumstances to our own times that gives us the means of forming presentiments of what is about to happen, and enables us at certain times to take precautions and at others by reproducing former conditions to face with more confidence the difficulties that menace us. But a writer who passes over in silence the speeches made and the causes of events and in their place introduces false rhetorical exercises and discursive speeches, destroys the peculiar virtue of history. And of this Timaeus especially is guilty, and we all know that his work is full of blemishes of the kind.

Perhaps, therefore, some might wonder how, being such as I have proved him to be, he meets with such acceptance and credit from certain people. The reason of this is that, as throughout his whole work he is so lavish of fault-finding and abuse, they do not form their estimate of him from his own treatment of history and his own statements, but from the accusations he brings against others, for which kind of thing he seems to me to have possessed remarkable industry and a peculiar talent. It was much the same with Strato, the writer on physical science. He also, when he undertakes to set forth and refute the views of the others, is admirable, but when he produces anything original and explains his own notions, he seems to men of science much more simple-minded and dull than they took him to be. I think that the same is the case with literature as with our life in general; for here too it is very easy to find fault with others, and one notices as a rule that those who are readiest to blame others err most in the conduct of their own life.

Besides the above-mentioned faults another thing remains to be noticed about Timaeus. Having lived for nearly fifty years in Athens with access to the works of previous writers, he considered himself peculiarly qualified to write history, making herein, I think, a great mistake. For as medicine and history have this point of resemblance, that each of them may be roughly said to consist of three parts, so there is the same difference in the dispositions those who enter on these callings. To begin with, as there are three parts of medicine, first the theory of disease, next dietetics, and thirdly surgery and pharmaceutics [*a sentence only partially legible in the MS.*], the study of the theory of disease, which is derived chiefly from the schools of Herophilus and Callimachus at Alexandria, is indeed an integral part of

medicine, but as regards the ostentation and pretensions of its professors they give themselves such an air of superiority that one would think no one else was master of the subject. Yet when you make them confront reality by entrusting a patient to them you find them just as incapable of being of any service as those who have never read a single medical treatise. Not a few invalids indeed who had nothing serious the matter with them have before now come very near losing their lives by entrusting themselves to these physicians, impressed by their rhetorical powers. For really they are just like pilots who steer by book. But nevertheless these men visit different towns with great parade, and when they manage to collect a crowd, throw into the greatest confusion and expose to the contempt of their audience men who in actual practice have given real proof of their skill, the persuasiveness of their eloquence often prevailing against the testimony of practical experience. The third quality, [9] which in every profession gives the true habit of mind, is not only rare but is often cast into the shade by gabble and audacity owing to people's general lack of judgement. In the same fashion systematic history too consists of three parts, the first being the industrious study of memoirs and other documents and a comparison of their contents, the second the survey of cities, places, rivers, lakes, and in general all the peculiar features of land and sea and the distances of one place from another, and the third being the review of political events; and just as in the case of medicine, many aspire to write history owing to the high opinion in which the science is held, but most of them bring to the task absolutely no proper qualification except recklessness, audacity, and roguery, courting popularity like apothecaries, and always saying whatever they regard as opportune in order to curry favour for the same of getting a

living by this means. About them it is not worth saying more. Some of those again who appear to be justified in undertaking the composition of history, just like the theoretical doctors, after spending a long time in libraries and becoming deeply learned in memoirs and records, persuade themselves that they are adequately qualified for the task, seeming indeed to outsiders to contribute sufficient for the requirements of systematic history, but, in my own opinion, contributing only a part. For it is true that looking through old memoirs is of service for knowledge of the views of the ancients and the notions people formerly had about conditions, places, nations, states, and events, and also for understanding the circumstances and chances which beset each nation in former times. For past events make us pay particular attention to the future, that is to say if we really make thorough inquiry in each case into the past. But to believe, as Timaeus did, that relying upon the mastery of material alone one can write well the history of subsequent events is absolutely foolish, and is much as if a man who had seen the works of ancient painters fancied himself to be a capable painter and a master of that art.

[9] Something has obviously been omitted by the epitomator.

What I say will be made plainer by the instance I am about to adduce, as, for example, in the first place, from what happened to Ephorus in certain parts of his history. Ephorus seems to me in dealing with war to have a certain notion of naval warfare, but he is entirely in the dark about battles on land. When, therefore, we study attentively his accounts of the naval battles near Cyprus and Cnidus in which the Persian king's commanders were engaged with Euagoras of Salamis, and on the second occasion with the Lacedaemonians, we are compelled to admire this writer for his

descriptive power and knowledge of tactics, and we carry away much information useful for similar circumstances. But when he describes the battle of Leuctra between the Thebans and Lacedaemonians, or that at Mantinea between the same peoples, the battle in which Epaminondas lost his life, if we pay attention to every detail and look at the former and reformation of the armies during the actual battle, he provokes out laughter and seems perfectly inexperienced in such things and never to have seen a battle. It is true that the battle of Leuctra, a special affair in which only one part of the army was engaged, does not make the writer's ignorance very conspicuous, but while the battle of Mantinea has the appearance of being described with much detail and military science, the description is quite imaginary, and the battle was not in the least understood by the writer. This becomes evident if we get a correct idea of the ground and then number the movements he describes as being carried out on it. The same is the case with Theopompus, and more especially with Timaeus of whom we are now speaking. For where they give a summary account of such matters, their errors escape notice, but when they wish to describe and point out the nature of any detailed movement they are both seen to be exactly like Ephorus.

It is neither possible for a man with no experience of warlike operations to write well about what happens in war, nor for one unversed in the practice and circumstances of politics to write well on that subject. So that as nothing written by mere students of books is written with experience or vividness, their works are of no practical utility to readers. For if we take from history all that can benefit us, what is left is quite contemptible and useless. Again, when they attempt to write in detail about cities and places

the result must be very similar, many things worthy of mention being omitted and many things not worth speaking of being treated at great length. This is often the case with Timaeus owing to the fact that he does not write from the evidence of his eyes.

In his thirty-fourth book Timaeus says, "Living away from home at Athens for fifty years continuously, and having, as I confess, no experience of active service in war or any personal acquaintance with places." So that, when he meets with such matters in his history, he is guilty of many errors and misstatements, and if he ever comes near the truth he resembles those painters who make their sketches from stuffed bags. For in their case the outlines are sometimes preserved but we miss that vividness and animation of the real figures which the graphic art is especially capable of rendering. The same is the case with Timaeus and in general with all who approach the work in this bookish mood. We miss in them the vividness of facts, as this impression can only be produced by the personal experience of the author. Those, therefore, who have not been through the events themselves do not succeed in arousing the interest of their readers. Hence our predecessors considered that historical memoirs should possess such vividness as to make one exclaim when the author deals with political affairs that he necessarily had taken part in politics and had experience of what is wont to happen in the political world, when he deals with war that he had been in the field and risked his life, and when he deals with private life that he had reared children and lived with a wife, and so regarding the other parts of life. This quality can naturally only be found in those who have been through affairs themselves and have acquired this sort of historical knowledge. It is difficult, perhaps, to have taken a personal part and been

one of the performers in every kind of event, but it is necessary to have had experience of the most important and those of commonest occurrence. That what I say is not unattainable is sufficiently evidenced by Homer, in whose works we find much of this kind of vividness. From these considerations I suppose everyone would now agree that industry in the study of documents is only a third part of history and only stands in the third place. How true what I have just said is will be most clear from the speeches, political, exhortatory, and ambassadorial, introduced by Timaeus. There are few occasions which admit of setting forth all possible arguments, most admitting only of those few brief arguments which occur to one, and even of these there are certain which are appropriate to contemporaries, others to men of former times, others again to Aetolians, others to Peloponnesians and others to Athenians. But, without point or occasion, to recite all possible arguments for everything, as Timaeus, with his talent for invention, does on every subject, is perfectly untrue to facts, and a mere childish sport —to do it has even in many cases been the cause of actual failure and exposed many to contempt—the necessary thing being to choose on every occasion suitable and opportune arguments. But since the needs of the case vary, we have need of special practice and principle in judging how many and which of the possible arguments we should employ, that is to say if we mean to do good rather than harm to our readers. Now it is difficult to convey by precept what is opportune or not in all instances, but it is not impossible to be led to a notion of it by reasoning from our personal experience in the past. For the present the best way of conveying my meaning is as follows. If writers, after indicating to us the situation and the motives and inclinations of the people who are discussing it report in the

next place what was actually said and then make clear to us the reasons why the speakers either succeeded or failed, we shall arrive at some true notion of the actual facts, and we shall be able, both by distinguishing which was successful from which was not and by transferring our impression to similar circumstances, to treat any situation that faces us with hope of success. But, I fear, it is difficult to assign causes, and very easy to invent phrases by the aid of books, and while it is given only to a few to say a few words at the right time it is a common accomplishment and open to anyone to compose long speeches to no purpose.

In confirmation of my charge against Timaeus on this count also, besides that of his mistakes and his deliberate falsification of the truth, I shall give some short extracts from speeches acknowledged to be his, giving names and dates. Of those who were in power in Sicily after the elder Gelo, we have always accepted as a fact that the most capable rulers were Hermocrates, Timoleon, and Pyrrhus of Epirus, and these are the last to whom one should attribute childish and idle speeches. But Timaeus in his twenty-first book says that at the time when Eurymedon came to Sicily and was urging the towns to pursue the war against Syracuse, the Geleans, who were suffering by the war, sent to Camarina begging for a truce. The people of Camarina gladly consented, and upon this both cities sent embassies to their allies begging them to dispatch trustworthy commissioners to Gela to discuss terms of peace and the general interests of all concerned. When, on the arrival of these commissioners, a resolution was proposed in council he represents Hermocrates as speaking somewhat as follows. This statesman, after praising the people of Gela and Camarina first of all for having themselves made the truce, secondly for being the originators of the

negotiations, and thirdly for seeing to it that the terms of peace were not discussed by the multitude but by the leading citizens who knew well the difference between war and peace, after this introduces one or two practical reflexions and then says that they themselves must now give ear to him and learn how much war differs from peace, and this after having just said that he was thankful to the Geleans for this very thing that the discussion was not held by the multitude but in a council well acquainted with such changes. From this it appears that Timaeus was not only deficient in practical sense, but does not even attain the level of the themes we hear in schools of rhetoric. For there all, I suppose, think they ought to give their hearers proofs of things wow they are ignorant or which they disbelieve, but that to exercise our wits in speaking of what our hearers already know is most foolish and childish . . . Apart from his general mistake in devoting the greater part of the speech to a matter that does not require a single word, he employs such arguments as none could believe to have been used by, I will not say that Hermocrates who took part with the Lacedaemonians in the battle of Aegospotami and captured the whole Athenian army with its generals in Sicily but, by any ordinary schoolboy. In the first place he thinks it proper to remind the council that men are aroused in the morning in war time by the trumpet and in peace by the crowing of cocks. After this he tells them that Heracles founded the Olympian games and truce as a proof of his real preference, and that he had injured all those he fought with under compulsion and by order, but that he had done no evil to any man of his own free will. Next he says that Homer represents Zeus as displeased with Ares and saying

Of all the gods who tread the spangled skies,

Thou most unjust, most odious in our eyes!
Inhuman discord is thy dire delight,
The waste of slaughter, and the rage of fight; [10]

that similarly the wisest of his heroes says

Cursed is the man, and void of law and right,
Unworthy property, unworthy light,
Unfit for public rule, or private care,
That wretch, that monster, who delights in war; [11]

and that Euripides expresses the same opinion as Homer in this verses:

O Peace, loaded with riches, of the blest
Gods thou art far the loveliest,
So long thou tarriest, I am fain,
And fear lest age o'ertake me ere
I look upon thy features fair
Once again,
See them dancing in a ring,
As they sing,
See the wreaths upon their brows,
As they troop from the carouse. [12]

[10] Homer, *Iliad*, v. 890. These translations are Pope's.

[11] Homer, *Iliad*, ix. 63.

[12] Eurip. frag. 453.

In addition to this Hermocrates is made to say that war very much resembles sickness and peace is very like health, for peace restores even the sick and in war even the healthy perish. In peace again we are told that the old are buried by the young as is natural, while in war it is the reverse, and

that above all in war there is no safety even up to the walls, but in peace there is safety as far as the boundaries of the land, and a number of similar things. I wonder what other words or expressions would be used by a boy fresh from the schools and the curious study of memoirs who wished to compose a declamatory essay made up all that was consonant with the character of certain historical personages. The style of it would probably be no other than that of the speech Timaeus puts into the mouth of Hermocrates.

And what shall we say again when Timoleon in the same book exhorting the Greeks to do battle with the Carthaginians, almost at the moment that they are about to encounter an enemy largely outnumbering them, first bids them not to consider the numbers of their foes but their cowardice. For, he says, although the whole of Libya is thickly populated and full of men, yet when we wish to convey an impression of solitude we use the proverbial phrase "more desert than Libya," not referring to its solitude but to the cowardice of the inhabitants. "In general," he says, "how can we be afraid of men who having received from nature in distinction from other animals the gift of hands, hold them for the whole of their life idle inside their tunics, and above all wear drawers under their tunics that they may not even when killed in battle be exposed to the view of their enemies? [13] . . . .

[13] Campe proposes to add ¬ ½´µÂ Ì ½ÄµÂ which gives a better sense: "that it may not be evident to their enemies that they are men."

When Gelo promised to send to the assistance of the Greeks twenty thousand infantry and two hundred warships, if they would grant him the command either on land or at sea, they say that the representatives of

Greece sitting in council at Corinth gave a reply to Gelo's envoys which was much to the point. They bade Gelo with his forces come as an auxiliary, but as for the command actual circumstances would of necessity invest the most capable men with it. These are by no means the words of men resting their whole hope on Syracuse, but of men relying on themselves and inviting anyone who wished to do so to join in the contest and win the prize of valour. But Timaeus, in commenting on all this, is so long-winded and so obviously anxious to manifest that Sicily was more important than all the rest of Greece—the events occurring in Sicily being so much more magnificent and more noble than those anywhere else in the world, the sagest of men distinguished for wisdom coming from Sicily and the most capable and wonderful leaders being those from Syracuse—that no boy in a school of rhetoric who is set to write a eulogy of Thersites or a censure of Penelope or anything else of the sort could surpass him in the paradoxes he ventures on.

The consequence of this is that, owing to this excessive addiction to paradox, he does not induce us to consider and compare, but exposes to ridicule the men and the actions he is championing, and comes very near falling into the same vicious habit as those who in the discussions of the Academy have trained themselves in extreme readiness of speech. For some of these philosophers, too, in their effort to puzzle the minds of those with whom they are arguing about the comprehensible and incomprehensible, resort to such paradoxes and are so fertile in inventing plausibilities that they wonder whether or not it is possible for those in Athens to smell eggs being roasted in Ephesus, and are in doubt as to whether all the time they are discussing the matter in the Academy they are not lying in their beds at

home and composing this discourse in a dream and not in reality. Consequently from this excessive love of paradox they have brought the whole sect into disrepute, so that people have come to disbelieve in the existence of legitimate subjects of doubt. And apart from their own purposelessness they have implanted such a passion in the minds of our young men, that they never give even a thought to ethical and political questions which really benefit students of philosophy, but spend their lives in the vain effort to invent useless paradoxes.

Timaeus and his admirers are in the same case as regards history. For being given to paradox and contentiously defending every statement, he overawes most people by his language, compelling them to belief by the superficial appearance of veracity, while in other cases he invites discussion and seems likely to carry conviction by the proofs he produces. He is most successful in creating the impression when he makes statements about colonies, the foundation of towns and family history. For here he makes such a fine show owing to his accuracy of statement and the bitter tone in which he confutes others that one would think all writers except himself had dozed over events made mere random shots at what was befalling the world, while he alone had tested the accuracy of everything and submitted to careful scrutiny the various stories in which there is much that is genuine and much that is false. But, as a fact, when those who have made themselves by long study familiar with the earlier part of the work, in which he treats of the subjects I mentioned, have come to rely fully on his excessive professions of accuracy, and when after this someone proves to them that Timaeus is himself guilty of the very faults he bitterly reproaches in others, committing errors such as I have just above exhibited in the cases

of the Locrians and others; then, I say, they become the most captious of critics, disposed to contest every statement, difficult to shake; and it is chiefly those who have devoted most labour to the study of his works who profit thus by their reading. Those on the other hand who model themselves on his speeches and in general on his more verbose passages become for the reasons I give above childish, scholastic, and quite unveracious.

The systematic part of his history, then, is a tissue of all the faults, most of which I have described. I will now deal with the prime cause of his errors, a cause which most people will not be inclined to admit, but it will be found to be the truest accusation to be brought against him. He seems to me to have acquired both practical experience and the habit of industrious study of documents, and in fact generally speaking to have approached the task of writing history in a painstaking spirit, but in some matters we know of no author of repute who seems to have been less experienced and less painstaking. What I am saying will be clearer from the following considerations. Nature has given us two instruments, as it were, [14] by the aid of which we inform ourselves and inquire about everything. These are hearing and sight, and of the two sight is much more veracious according to Heracleitus. "The eyes are more accurate witnesses than that ears," he says. Now, Timaeus enters on his inquiries by the pleasanter of the two roads, but the inferior one. For he entirely avoids employing his eyes and prefers to employ his ears. Now the knowledge derived from hearing being of two sorts, Timaeus diligently pursued the one, the reading of books, as I have above pointed out, but was very remiss in his use of the other, the interrogation of living witnesses. It is easy enough to perceive what caused him to make this choice. Inquiries from books may be made without any

danger or hardship, provided only that one takes care to have access to a town rich in documents or to have a library near at hand. After that one has only to pursue one's researches in perfect repose and compare the accounts of different writers without exposing oneself to any hardship. Personal inquiry, on the contrary, requires severe labour and great expense, but is exceedingly valuable and is the most important part of history. This is evident from expressions used by historians themselves. Ephorus, for example, says that if we could be personally present at all transactions such knowledge would be far superior to any other. Theopompus says that the man who has the best knowledge of war is he who has been present at the most battles, that most capable speaker is he who has taken part in the greatest number of debates, and that the same holds good about medicine and navigation. Homer has been still more emphatic on this subject than these writers. Wishing to show us what qualities one should possess in order to be a man of action he says:

[14] I render Ì Á³±½± "instruments" not "organs" as Polybius justifies his use of the word, which is, however, quite commonly used of the bodily organs by Aristotle.

The man for wisdom's various arts renowned,
Long exercised in woes, O muse, resound,
Wandering from clime to clime; [15]

and further on

Observant strayed,
Their manners noted, and their states surveyed:
On stormy seas unnumbered toils he bore; [15]

and again—

In scenes of death by tempest and by war. [16]

[15] Homer, *Od.* i. 1-3. The translations are Pope's.

[16] Homer, *Od.* viii. 183.

It appears to me that the dignity of history also demands such a man. Plato, [17] as we know, tells us that human affairs will then go well when either philosophers become kings or kings study philosophy, and I would say that it will be well with history either when men of action undertake to write history, not as now happens in a perfunctory manner, but when in the belief that this is a most necessary and most noble thing they apply themselves all through their life to it with undivided attention, or again when would-be authors regard a training in actual affairs as necessary for writing history. Before this be so the errors of historians will never cease. Timaeus never gave a moment's thought to this, but though he spent all his life in exile in one single place, though he almost seems to have deliberately denied himself any active part in war or politics or any personal experience gained by travel and observation, yet, for some unknown reason, he has acquired the reputation of being a leading author. That such is the character of Timaeus can easily be shown from his own avowal. For in the preface to the sixth book he says that some suppose that greater talent, more industry, and more previous training are required for declamatory than for historical writing. Such opinions, he says, formerly incurred Ephorus's disapproval, but as that writer could give no satisfactory answer to those who held them, he himself attempts to institute a comparison between history and declamatory writing, a most surprising thing to do, firstly in that his statement about Ephorus is false. For Ephorus, while throughout his whole work he is admirable in his phraseology, method, and the originality of his

thought, is most eloquent in his digressions and in the expression of his personal judgement, whenever, in fact, he allows himself to enlarge on any subject, and it so happens that his remarks on the difference between historians and speech-writers are peculiarly charming and convincing. But Timaeus, in order not to seem to be copying Ephorus, besides making a false statement about him has at the same time condemned all other historians. For dealing with matters, treated by others correctly, at inordinate length, in a confused manner, and in every respect worse, he thinks that not a living soul will notice this.

[17] Plato, *Rep.* v. 473 c.

Actually in order to glorify history he says that the difference between it and declamatory writing is as great as that between real buildings or furniture and the views and compositions we see in scene-paintings. In the second place he says that the mere collection of the material required for a history is a more serious task than complete course of study of the art of declamatory speaking. He himself, he tells us, had incurred such expense and been put to so much trouble in collecting his notes from Assyria [?] and inquiring into the manners and customs of the Ligurians, Celts, and Iberians that he could not hope that either his own testimony or that of others to this would be believed. One would like to ask this writer whether he thinks that to sit in town collecting notes and inquiring into the manners and customs of the Ligurians and Celts involves more trouble and expense than an attempt to see the majority of places and peoples with one's own eyes. Which again is most troublesome, to inquire from those present at the engagements the details of battles by land and sea and of sieges, or to be present at the actual scene and experience oneself the dangers and

vicissitudes of battle? In my opinion the difference between real buildings and scene-paintings or between history and declamatory speech-making is not so great as is, in the case of all works, the difference between an account founded on participation, active or passive, in the occurrences one composed from report and the narratives of others. But Timaeus, having no experience of the former proceeding, naturally thinks that what is really of smallest importance and easiest is most important and difficult, I mean the collection of documents and inquiry from those personally acquainted with the facts. And even in this task men of no experience are sure to be frequently deceived. For how is it possible to examine a person properly about a battle, a siege, or a sea-fight, or to understand the details of his narrative, if one has no clear ideas about these matters? For the inquirer contributes to the narrative as much as his informant, since the suggestions of the person who follows the narrative guide the memory of the narrator to each incident, and these are matters in which a man of no experience is neither competent to question those who were present at an action, nor when present himself to understand what is going on, but even if present he is in a sense not present.

THE END OF BOOK XII

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XIII

I. AFFAIRS OF GREECE

The Aetolians

The Aetolians, owing to the long continuance of hostilities and owing to their extravagant way of living, became deeply in debt before anyone else or even they themselves were aware of it. Being therefore naturally fond of making innovations in their own constitution they chose Dorimachus and Scopas to draw up laws, as they saw that both of these men had revolutionary tendencies and that their fortunes were compromised in many financial transactions. Having been invested with this authority they drafted laws. . . .

Alexander of Aetolia, during the legislation of Dorimachus and Scopas, opposed their proposal, showing from many instances that where this weed [1] once took root it never stopped its growth until it had inflicted the greatest disaster on those who had once introduced it. He begged them therefore not to keep their eyes only on their present relief from the obligations they had incurred but to look to the future too. For it was, he says, strange indeed that on the battle-field they should give even their lives for the sake of their children's safety, but in the council chamber should take no thought for future times. . . .

[1] We must understand ÇÁµÉ½ ± À¿º¿Á±¯, the cancelling of debts.

Scopas, the strategus of the Aetolians, when he fell from the office by power of which he ventured to draft these laws, turned eagerly towards

Alexandria for help, convinced that if his expectations in that quarter were realized he would repair his damaged fortunes and satisfy his soul's longing for gain. He was unaware that as in the case of a dropsy the thirst of the sufferer never ceases and is never allayed by the administration of liquids from without, unless we cure the morbid condition of the body itself, so it is impossible to satiate the greed for gain, unless we correct by reasoning the vice inherent in the soul. The most conspicuous case of this was that of the very man of whom we are now speaking. For when he reached Alexandria, in addition to the profit he drew from the force in the field which had been placed absolutely at his disposal, the king assigned him personally a daily pay of ten minae, while those serving under him in any command received one mina each. Still he was not satisfied with this, but from the very first was so devoted to gain that at the end, arousing by his insatiate greed the aversion of those even who ministered to it, he delivered his soul over to money.

Philip's treacherous Policy

Philip became addicted to that kind of treacherous dealings which no one indeed would say in any way became a king but which some maintain to be necessary in practical politics, owing to the present prevalence of treachery. The ancients, as we know, were far removed from such malpractices. For so far were they from plotting mischief against their friends with the purpose of aggrandizing their own power, that they would not even consent to get the better of their enemies by fraud, regarding no success as brilliant or secure unless they crushed the spirit of their adversaries in open battle. For this reason they entered into a convention among themselves to use against each other neither secret missiles nor those discharged from a distance, and

considered that it was only a hand-to-hand battle at close quarters which was truly decisive. Hence they preceded war by a declaration, and when they intended to do battle gave notice of the fact and of the spot to which they would proceed and array their army. But at the present they say it is a sign of poor generalship to do anything openly in war. Some slight traces, however, of the ancient principles of warfare survive among the Romans. For they make declaration of war, they very seldom use ambuscades, and they fight hand-to-hand at close quarters. These reflections are occasioned by the excessive prevalence among our present leaders both in the conduct of public affairs and in that of war of a keenness for double dealing.

Philip, as if giving Heracleides a proper subject for the exercise of his talents, ordered him to think of the best means of damaging and destroying the navy of Rhodes, and at the same time sent envoys to Crete to provoke the Cretans and incite them to make war on Rhodes. Heracleides, a born mischief-maker, thinking this commission a godsend and forming some kind of scheme in his mind, waited a little and then set out on his voyage and appeared at Rhodes. This Heracleides was of Tarentine origin, his parents were vulgar mechanics and he possessed advantages admirably qualifying him to be a daredevil and arrant knave. For he, to begin with, in his early years he had openly prostituted his person, but later he showed great sharpness and an excellent memory, and while he was a terrible bully and most bold-faced in dealing with his inferiors he was most obsequious to his superiors. He was originally expelled from his native town as he was suspected of a design of betraying Tarentum to the Romans, not that he had any political power, but because he was an architect and owing to some repairs they were making in the wall had been entrusted with the keys of the

gate leading to the interior. He then took refuge with the Romans, but later when he was detected in sending letters and messages from the Roman camp to Tarentum and to Hannibal, he foresaw what would be the result and this time sought safety with Philip, at whose court he acquired such credit and power that he was almost the chief instrument of the ruin of that mighty kingdom. . . .

The prytaneis of Rhodes, who already distrusted Philip owing to his treacherous conduct in the Cretan question, suspected that Heracleides also was involved. . . .

He appeared before them and offered an explanation of the reasons why he had deserted Philip.

"Philip," he says, "would put up with anything rather than that his design in this matter should be revealed to the Rhodians." By this means he also freed Heracleides from suspicion. . . .

In my opinion Nature has proclaimed to men that Truth is the greatest of gods and has invested her with the greatest power. At least when all are trying to suppress her and all probabilities are on the side of falsehood, she somehow finds her own means of penetrating into the hearts of men and sometimes shows her power at once, sometimes after being darkened for years at last by her own force prevails and crushes falsehood, as happened in the case of Heracleides, King Philip's messenger to Rhodes. . . .

Damocles, who was sent with Pythion as a spy to Rome, was a handy tool, full of resources in the management of affairs.

Nabis, Tyrant of Sparta

Nabis, tyrant of the Lacedaemonians, who had now been in power for over two years, had not yet ventured to attempt any important enterprise,

the defeat of Machanidas by the Aetolians being so recent, but was occupied in laying the foundations of a lasting and oppressive tyranny. For he utterly exterminated those of the royal houses [2] who survived in Sparta, and banishing those citizens who were distinguished for their wealth and illustrious ancestry, gave their property and wives to the chief of his own supporters and to his mercenaries, who were for the most part murderers, rippers, highwaymen, and burglars. For such kind of people flocked sedulously to his court from all over the world, people who dared not set foot in their own countries owing to their crimes against God and man. As he constituted himself their protector and employed these men as satellites and members of his bodyguard, it was evident that his rule would long be memorable for its wickedness. Besides the abuses I have mentioned, not content with banishing the citizens, he left no place safe for them in their exile and no refuge secure. For he sent men after some to slay them on their journey and killed others as they were returning from their country seats. Finally, in the towns, renting through unsuspected agents the houses next door to those in which the exiles resided, he introduced Cretans into them, who breaking down the walls and shooting through the existing windows slew the exiles in their own houses either when standing or reposing, so that for the unhappy Spartans there was no place to fly to and no moment at which their lives were safe. It was by these means that he destroyed the greater number of them. He had also constructed a machine, if one can call such a thing a machine. It was in fact an image of a woman richly dressed and was a very good likeness of the wife of Nabis. Whenever he summoned any of the citizens before him with the design of extracting money from him he would begin by addressing him in kind terms, pointing

out the danger to which the city and country were exposed from the Achaeans and calling attention to the number of the mercenaries he was obliged to maintain to ensure the safety of his subjects, as well as to the amount spent on religious ceremonies and the public outlay of the city. If they yielded to these arguments it was sufficient for his purpose. But if anyone refused and objected to pay the sum imposed, he would continue somewhat as follows: "Very possibly I shall not be able to persuade you, but I think this Apega of mine may do so"—this being his wife's name—and even as he spoke in came the image I have described. When the man offered her his hand he made the woman rise from her chair and taking her in his arms drew her gradually to his bosom. [3] Both her arms and hands as well as her breasts were covered with iron nails concealed under her dress. So that when Nabis rested his hands on her back and then by means of certain springs drew his victim towards her and increasing the pressure brought him at all in contact with her breasts he made the man thus embraced say anything and everything. Indeed by this means he killed a considerable number of those who denied him money.

[2] Some definition of »¿¹À¿ÍÂ has obviously dropped out.

[3] The description of this "Maiden" has evidently been shortened by the epitomator, thus confusing the persons.

The rest of his conduct during his rule was similar and on a level with this. For he participated in the acts of piracy of the Cretans, and through the whole of the Peloponnese he had plunderers of temples, highwaymen, and assassins, the profits of whose misdeeds he shared and allowed them to make Sparta their base of operations and their refuge. But in one case some foreign soldiers from Boeotia who were paying a visit to Sparta tried to

induce one of Nabis's grooms to leave with them, bringing away a white horse supposed to be the best bred animal in the tyrant's stables. Upon the groom consenting and doing as they wished, Nabis's men pursued them as far as Megalopolis and catching them there at once took away the horse and the groom, no one offering any objection. When, in the next place, they tried to lay hands on the foreigners, the Boeotians at first demanded to be brought before the magistrates, and when no one paid any attention to their request, one of them called out "Help." Upon this the populace collected and protested that the men should be brought before the magistrates, and now Nabis's men were compelled to release their prisoners and take their departure. Nabis had been long on the look-out for some pretended grievance and a specious pretext for a rupture, and taking hold of this at once raided the cattle of Protagoras and some others. This was the origin of the war.

II. Affairs of Asia

Chattenia and the Gerraeans

Chattenia in the Persian Gulf is the third district belonging to the Gerraeans. It is a poor district in other respects, but villages and towers have been established in it for the convenience of the Gerraeans who cultivate it. . . .

The Gerraeans begged the king not to abolish the gifts the gods had bestowed on them, perpetual peace and freedom. The king, when the letter had been interpreted to him, said that he granted their request. . . .

When their freedom had been established, the Gerraeans passed a decree honouring Antiochus with the gift of five hundred talents of silver, a thousand talents of frankincense, and two hundred talents of the so-called

"stacte". [4] He then sailed to the island of Tylus and left for Seleucia. The spices were from the Persian Gulf.

[4] Oil of myrrh or cinnamon.

[From the place-names quoted from this book it seems that it dealt chiefly with the war in Bruttium against Hannibal just before he left Italy, with Cretan affairs, and with a war waged by Philip in Thrace.]

THE END OF BOOK XIII

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XIV

I. AFFAIRS OF GREECE

Perhaps it is true that in all Olympiads the syllabus of events arrests the attention of the reader, owing to their number and importance, the actions of the whole world being brought under one point of view. But I think the events of this Olympiad (CXLIV) will have a peculiar power of doing this. For in the first place it was during this Olympiad that the wars in Italy and Africa were brought to an end, wars the final outcome of which who will not be curious to learn? For everyone naturally, although he may completely accept our account of particular action and speeches, still always longs to know the end. Besides this, the political tendencies of the kings were clearly revealed during these years. For all that had been hitherto a matter of gossip about them now became clearly known to everyone, even to those who were not at all disposed to be curious. For this reason, as I wish to give such an account of the facts as their importance deserves, I have not comprised the events of two years in one Book as was my practice in previous cases.

II. Scipio in Africa

The consuls, then, were engaged in these matters, but Publius Scipio, who was in winter quarters in Africa, hearing that the Carthaginians were getting a fleet ready, occupied himself in making his own naval preparations, but continued to prosecute none the less the siege of Utica. Nor did he entirely abandon his hope of winning over Syphax, but sent frequent messages to him their armies being at no great distance from each

other, feeling sure of inducing him to abandon the Carthaginian alliance. He thought it indeed not at all unlikely that he had already grown tired of the girl [1] for whose sake he had chosen the cause of the Carthaginians, and tired generally of his friendship for Phoenicians, as Scipio well knew the natural tendency of the Numidians to grow disgusted with what pleased them and how lightly they always break their faith to gods and men alike. At present his mind was much distracted and agitated by various apprehensions, as he feared an attack owing to the enemy's superiority in numbers, and he gladly availed himself of the following occasion when it offered itself. Some of his messengers to Syphax reported that the Carthaginians in their winter camp had made their huts from all kinds of wood and branches without any mixture of earth, that the first Numidians to arrive had constructed theirs with reeds, while the others who kept joining the army from the cities had used nothing but branches for the present, some of them being encamped inside but most outside the trench and palisade. Scipio, therefore, thinking that an attempt to fire the camp would be a complete surprise for the enemy and very serviceable to himself, began to take the necessary measures. Syphax in his communications with Scipio always kept harking back to the opinion that the Carthaginians ought to evacuate Italy and the Romans do the same as regards Africa, each nation continuing to occupy the points they held between these two countries. Scipio had previously refused entirely to listen to this proposal, but he now ordered his messengers to throw out slight hints to the Numidian prince that the attainment of this end was not beyond the bounds of possibility. Syphax was very much relieved in consequence and became much more disposed than he had been to engage in parleys, the consequence being that the

messengers became more numerous and their visits more frequent, some of them at times spending several days in the hostile camp without any objection being made. Scipio on such occasions used to send in the company of his envoys certain expert observers and certain of his officers, looking mean and dirty fellows, disguised as they were in the habit of slaves, with the object of exploring and inspecting undisturbed the approaches and the entrances of both camps. For there were two of them, one occupied by Hasdrubal with thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, and another at a distance of ten stades belonging to the Numidians and containing about ten thousand horse and fifty thousand foot. The latter was the easiest to attack and the huts very suitable for setting on fire, since the Numidians, as I just said, used neither wood nor earth for their huts, but only reeds and matting.

[1] Sophonisba, daughter of Hasdrubal and granddaughter of Gesco.

As soon as there were signs of the approach of spring, Scipio having now completed all the inquiries necessary for the above design against the enemy, launched his ships and constructed siege-machines to place on them as if he were about to blockade Utica from the sea. With his infantry, who numbered about two thousand, he again occupied the hill situated above the town and spared no expense in fortifying this hill and digging a moat round it, giving the enemy the idea that he did so for the purpose of the siege, but in reality desiring to secure himself from possible danger on the day of his enterprise; for he feared lest when his legions had left their camp the garrison of Utica might venture on a sortie, and falling on the camp, which was close by, besiege the force left to defend it. While making these preparations he sent a message to Syphax to inquire, on the supposition that

the proposed terms met with his own approval, if they would also be agreeable to the Carthaginians and if they could be trusted not to say again that they would further consider before accepting what he was ready to concede. He also instructed his envoys not to return to him before receiving an answer to this question. When they arrived and Syphax had received the message, he felt convinced that Scipio was determined to conclude the treaty, both because the envoys had told him they would not return without an answer and because of the anxiety shown to make sure of the consent of the Carthaginians. So he sent off at once to Hasdrubal informing him of what had occurred and begging him to accept peace, while he himself passed his time at his ease and allowed the Numidians who kept on joining him to encamp outside his fortified camp. Scipio pretended to do the same, but as a fact was making every possible preparation for his attack. When Syphax had once been instructed by the Carthaginians to conclude the peace, and overjoyed at this, spoke to the envoys on the matter, they at once left for their own camp to tell Scipio the result of the king's action. The Roman commander, on hearing of it, lost no time in sending other envoys to announce to Syphax that Scipio approved of peace and was earnestly working for it, but that members of the council were of a different opinion, maintaining that matters should rest as they were. The envoys went to Syphax and informed him to this effect. Scipio dispatched this embassy in order not to appear to have broken the true if, while formal negotiations for peace were still in progress, he committed any hostile act. But after having made this declaration he considered that whatever happened no one could find fault with his conduct.

Syphax, on hearing this, was no little vexed as he had made up his mind that peace was assured, but he now met Hasdrubal and communicated to him the message he had received from the Romans. After much discussion of it they fell to considering how they should now deal with the situation, being very far both in their apprehensions and designs from any suspicion of which was actually about to happen. For they never had the least thought of taking any precaution for their security or of the likelihood of any disaster, but they were very eager and anxious to take some active steps and to challenge the enemy to battle on level ground. Scipio, in the meanwhile, by his preparations and the orders he issued gave his soldiery to understand that he was about to make an attempt to seize Utica by surprise, but summoning the ablest and most trusty of his tribunes about midday, and disclosing his plan ordered them to get their supper early and then lead the legions out of the camp, after the trumpeters had all sounded the retreat as usual. For it is the custom among the Romans at supper-time for the trumpeters and buglers to sound their instruments outside the general's tent as a signal that it is time to set the night-watches at their several stations. After this, calling the spies whom he used to send to the enemy's camps, he questioned them closely and compared the accounts they gave of the approaches and entrances of the camps, letting Massanissa decide, and following his advice owing to his personal knowledge of the ground.

When all was in readiness for his present enterprise, he left a sufficient body of troops suitable for the purpose to guard the camp and advanced with the rest of his army just at the end of the first watch, the enemy being at a distance of sixty stades. When towards the end of the third watch he approached them he placed half of his legionaries and all the Numidians

under the command of Gaius Laelius and Massanissa with orders to attack the camp of Syphax, exhorting them to behave like brave men and to do nothing rashly, as they well knew that the more the darkness in night attacks hinders and impedes the sight, the more must one supply the place of actual vision by skill and daring. He himself, with the rest of his army, advanced to attack Hasdrubal. He had made up his mind not to deliver his attack before Laelius had set fire to the other hostile camp, and, therefore, this being his purpose, marched at a slow pace. Laelius and Massanissa dividing their forces into two attacked the enemy simultaneously. The huts having been, as I stated above, almost specially constructed for the purpose of catching fire, once the front ranks of the Romans had set the fire alight it spread at once over the first row, and made the evil irremediable owing to the closeness of the huts to each other and the quantity of the fuel it fed on. Laelius remained to cover the operation, and Massanissa, knowing the places by which those who were trying to escape from the flames would have to pass, stationed his own men at those posts. Absolutely none of the Numidians had any suspicion of the actual fact, not even Syphax, but they all supposed that the camp had caught fire by accident. So that suspecting nothing, some of them aroused from sleep and others surprised while still drinking and carousing, they rushed out of their huts. Many were trampled to death in the passages that led out of the camp, and many others were caught by the flames and consumed, while all those who escaped from the fire fell into the midst of the enemy and perished without knowing what was happening to them or what they were doing.

Meanwhile the Carthaginians, when they saw the strength of the fire and the volume of flame that rose to the sky, thinking that the Numidian camp

had caught fire by accident, rushed some of them to give assistance, while all the rest, flocking out of their camp unarmed, stood in front of it in a state of terror at what was taking place. Scipio, now that all had gone as well as he could have wished, fell upon those who had come out. Killing some and pursuing others he set their huts also on fire, with the result that the scene of conflagration and general destruction I have just described in the case of Numidian camp was reproduced in that of the Phoenicians. Hasdrubal at once entirely desisted from any attempt to extinguish the fire, as he knew now from what had befallen him that the calamity that had befallen the Numidians also was not, as they had supposed, the result of chance but was due to the initiative and daring of the enemy. He now thought but of saving himself, and there was very little hope left of even doing this. For the fire spread with great rapidity, and soon covered the whole area of the camp, the passages of which were full of horses, mules, and men, some half-dead and consumed by the flames, and some frenzied and beside themselves, so that even those ready to make a bold effort were prevented by these obstacles, and owing to the confusion and disturbance there was no hope of safety. Syphax, too, and the other officers were in the same plight. The two generals, however, managed to escape with a small body of horse, but of the rest those thousands and thousands of men, horses, and mules met with an unhappy and miserable end in the flames, while some of the men trying to escape the fury of the fire died a disgraceful and dishonourable death at the hands of the enemy, cut down as they were naked, not only without their arms but without their clothes. In a word the whole place was filled with wailing and confused cries, panic fear, strange noises, and above all raging fire and flames that overbore all resistance, things any one of which would

be sufficient to strike terror into a human heart, and how much more this extraordinary combination of them all. So it is not possible to find any other disaster which even if exaggerated could be compared with this, so much did it exceed in horror all previous events. Therefore of all the brilliant exploits performed by Scipio this seems to me the most splendid and most adventurous. . . .

But when day dawned, and the enemy had all either perished or were in headlong flight, Scipio exhorted his officers and at once started in pursuit. The Carthaginian commander at first remained where he was, although he had received notice of the approach of the Romans; it was his confidence in the strength of the town in which he was that made him act thus. But afterwards, when he saw that the inhabitants of the place were disaffected, the prospect of being attacked by Scipio dismayed him and he continued his flight with all those who had escaped, and who consisted of not less than five hundred horse and about two thousand foot. Upon this the inhabitants with one accord surrendered at discretion to the Romans. Scipio spared them, but gave up two of the neighbouring towns to his soldiers to pillage and after this returned to his original camp.

The Carthaginians, now that the prospect of success in their original design had been reversed, were deeply dejected. For they had hoped to shut in the Romans on the cape adjacent to Utica, which they made their winter quarters, besieging them by land with their armies and by sea with their navy and had made all preparations for this purpose; so that now when by a strange and unexpected disaster they had not only been obliged to abandon to the enemy the command of the open country but expected that at any moment they themselves and their city would be in imminent peril, they

became thoroughly dismayed and faint-hearted. The situation, however, demanded that they should take precautions and deliberate as to the future, and when the senate assembled it was full of perplexity and the most divergent and tumultuary suggestions abounded. Some held that they should send to Hannibal and recall him from Italy, their only remaining hope being in that general and his army, others proposed sending an embassy to Scipio to ask for a truce and speak to him about terms of peace, while others said they should pluck up courage and communicate with Syphax, who had retired to Abba quite near by, and collect the troops who had escaped from the disaster. This was the counsel which finally prevailed.

The Carthaginians, then, began to assemble their forces, dispatching Hasdrubal to do so, and at the same time sent to Syphax entreating him to help them and to remain firm to his first engagements, assuring him that Hasdrubal would at once join him with his army. The Roman general both occupied himself with preparations for the siege of Utica and now, on hearing that Syphax remained faithful and that the Carthaginians were again collecting an army, led out his own forces and encamped before that city. He also at the same time distributed the booty, but sent about their business the merchants who were making too good an affair of it; for as their recent success had made them form a rosy picture of the future, the soldiers attached no value to their actual booty and were very ready to dispose of it to the merchants for a song.

The Numidian prince and his friends had at first decided to continue their retreat and seek their homes, but when they were met near Abba by the Celtiberians who had been hired by the Carthaginians and who numbered over four thousand, the reliance they placed on this additional force made

them halt and pluck up a little courage. And when at the same time the young girl, who was, as I have said, the daughter of the general, Hasdrubal, and wife of Syphax, begged and entreated him to remain and not desert the Carthaginians at such a critical time, the Numidian prince suffered himself to be persuaded and yielded to her prayers. The Celtiberians contributed also not a little to inspire the Carthaginians with hope. For instead of four thousand it was announced that they were ten thousand, and that their personal courage and their armament rendered them invincible in the field. These reports and the vulgar gossip of the rabble raised so much the spirits of the Carthaginians that their confidence in being able to take the field once more against the enemy was redoubled. Finally in thirty days they encamped and entrenched themselves on the so-called Great Plain together with the Numidians and Celtiberians, the whole force numbering not less than thirty thousand.

When the news reached the Roman camp, Scipio at once prepared to advance against them, and after giving the necessary orders to the land and sea forces besieging Utica, he set out on his march, his whole force being in light marching order. On the fifth day he reached the Great Plain, and on approaching the enemy encamped for the first day on a hill at a distance of thirty stades from them, but on the next day came down from the hill, and placing his cavalry in front drew up his army at a distance of seven stades from the Carthaginians. After remaining where they were for the two subsequent days and making trial of their strength by some slight skirmishing, on the fourth day both generals deliberately advanced their forces and arrayed them for battle. Scipio simply followed the usual Roman practice of placing the maniples of *hastati* in front, behind them the

principes, and hindmost of all the *triarii*. He stationed his Italian cavalry on his right and the Numidians with Massanissa on the left. Syphax and Hasdrubal placed the Celtiberians in the centre opposite the Roman maniples, the Numidians on the left, and the Carthaginians on the right. At the first encounter the Numidians gave way before the Italian horse and the Carthaginians before Massanissa, their courage having been broken by previous defeats, but the Celtiberians fought bravely holding out against the Romans. For they neither had any hope of safety in flight owing to their ignorance of the country, nor could they expect to be spared if made prisoners, owing to their treachery to Scipio in thus coming to fight in the service of Carthage against the Romans in spite of his never having been guilty of any acts of hostility to them during his Spanish campaigns. But when the wings gave way they were soon surrounded by the *principes* and *triarii* and cut to pieces where they stood except quite a few. Thus perished the Celtiberians after proving of the greatest service to the Carthaginians not only in the battle but in the flight. For if the Romans had not met with this obstacle, but had directly pursued the fugitives, very few of the enemy would have escaped. But as it was, owing to this stand made by the Celtiberians, Syphax with his cavalry made his way safely back home and Hasdrubal also with the survivors of his force reached Carthage.

The Roman general, as soon as he had arranged about the disposal of the booty and prisoners, summoned the council to deliberate as to what should be done next. It was decided that Scipio with a part of his army should remain and go round to the several cities, while Laelius and Massanissa with the Numidians and a portion of the Roman legions should follow up Syphax and not give him time to stop and prepare for resistance. Having

come to this decision they separated, these two going after Syphax with the troops I mentioned and the general visiting the towns, some of which surrendered voluntarily to the Romans out of fear, while he besieged and stormed others. The whole country indeed was inclined for a change, as the people had been constantly exposed to hardship and excessive taxation owing to the long duration of the war in Spain.

In Carthage itself the disorder had been serious enough previously, but now the city was still more deeply disturbed, and it seemed that after this second heavy blow they had lost all confidence in themselves. But nevertheless the advice of those who were thought to be the boldest spirits in the senate was to sail with the fleet against the besiegers of Utica and attempt to raise the siege and engage the enemy's fleet, which was unprepared for an encounter. They also demanded that Hannibal should be summoned to return and that resource put to the test without any delay. Both these measures, they said, offered, as far as could be reasonably judged, great chances of saving the country. But others maintained that the time for these steps was past, and that they must now strengthen the city and prepare for a siege. For if they only preserved concord, chance would afford many opportunities. They also advised them to take the question of peace into consideration, and to decide on what terms and by what means they could be delivered from the present evils. There were several debates on these proposals and finally they adopted them all. As soon as the vote had been taken, those senators who were to sail for Italy proceeded directly from the senate-house to sea, and the admiral went straight on board his ship. The remainder made it their business to see to the defences of the city and met frequently to discuss points of detail.

Scipio's camp was now full of booty, as he met with no resistance but all gave way to him no matter what he attempted, and he decided to send off the great part of the booty to his original camp, and taking with him his army thus lightened to seize on the entrenched position before Tunis and to encamp in full view of Carthage. For this he thought would be the most effective means of striking the Carthaginians with terror and dismay. The Carthaginians had got ready in a few days the crews and stores for their ships and were about to put to sea to execute their purpose, when Scipio arrived at Tunis and upon its garrison taking to flight occupied the place. Tunis is situated at a distance of about 120 stades from Carthage, and is visible from nearly the whole town. As I have previously stated, both nature and art have contributed to render it a very strong place. Just as the Romans had encamped there the Carthaginian fleet was putting to sea on its way to Utica. Scipio when he saw the enemy under way was much disturbed, as he feared that something untoward might happen to his own fleet, since no one expected to be attacked or had made any preparations for such a contingency. He, therefore, at once broke up his camp and marched hastily to the help of his own people. Finding that his warships were well provided with facilities for supporting moving forward siege-machines, and in general for all siege operations, but were quite unprepared for a naval action, while the enemy's fleet had during the whole winter been equipping for this very purpose, he abandoned any idea of advancing and offering battle, but anchoring his warships in a line placed round them the transports three or four deep, and then taking down the masts and yards lashed the transports securely to each other with these, leaving a small interval for dispatch-boats to pass in and out.

III. Affairs of Egypt since B.C. 213 [2]

[2] From Athen. vi. 251 c.

Polybius in his fourteenth book says that Philo was the flatterer of Agathocles, the son of Oenanthe and the companion of Ptolemy Philopator. . . .

Polybius in his fourteenth book [3] tells us that there were many portraits in Alexandrian temples of Cleino, the cupbearer of Ptolemy Philadelphus, representing her clothed only in a chiton and holding a rhyton. "And are not some of the finest houses," he says, called Myrtion's, Mnesis's, and Potheine's? But what were Mnesis and Potheine but flute-players and Myrtio one of the professional and vulgar mimae? And was not Ptolemy Philopator the slave of the courtesan Agathocleia, who overturned the whole kingdom?". . . .

[3] From Athen. xiii. 756 c.

Perhaps some of my readers will wonder why while elsewhere I dealt with the successive events of each year separately, in the case of Egypt alone I give on the present occasion a narrative of occurrences there extending over a considerable period. The reason of this I may state as follows. Ptolemy Philopator, of whom I am now talking, after the termination of the war for Coele-Syria abandoned entirely the path of virtue and took to a life of dissipation such as I have just described. Late in his reign he was forced by circumstances into the war I have mentioned, a war which, apart from the mutual savagery and lawlessness of the combatants, contained nothing worthy of note, no pitched battle, no sea-fight, no siege. It, therefore, struck me that my narrative would be easier both for me to write and for my readers to follow if I performed this part of my task not by

merely alluding every year to small events not worth serious attention, but by giving once for all a life-like picture so to speak of this king's character.

THE END OF BOOK XIV

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XV

I. AFFAIRS OF ITALY AND AFRICA

The Carthaginians having captured the Roman transports and a vast quantity of supplies, Scipio was much disturbed, as not only had he been deprived of his own supplies, but the enemy had thus procured for themselves abundance of provisions. What aggrieved him still more was that the Carthaginians had violated the late solemn agreement and that the war had thus been rekindled from a fresh source. He, therefore, at once appointed as legates Lucius Sergius, Lucius Baebius, and Lucius Fabius, and dispatched them to confer with the Carthaginians about what had occurred and at the same time to inform them that the Roman people had ratified the treaty: for dispatches had just arrived for Scipio informing him of this fact. On arriving at Carthage they first of all addressed the senate, and afterwards being brought before the popular assembly, spoke with great freedom about the situation. In the first place they reminded the assembly that when the Carthaginian envoys came to Tunis to the Romans and presented themselves before the council, they not only saluted the gods and did obeisance to Earth, as is the custom with other men, but that they debased themselves by falling prostrate on the ground and kissing the feet of the members of the council; and that afterwards when they got up again they accused themselves of having been alone guilty of breaking the original treaty between the Romans and the Carthaginians. Therefore, they said, they were well justified in any punishment they inflicted on them, but

in the name of the common fortune of mankind they had entreated them not to proceed to extremities, but rather let their folly afford a proof of the generosity of the Romans. The general himself, they said, and those what had been present then at the council, when they called this to mind, were amazed and asked themselves whence the Carthaginians had the assurance now to ignore what they said on that occasion and to venture on breaking this last solemn treaty. It seemed almost evident that they ventured to act thus relying on Hannibal and the forces with him. In this confidence they were most ill-advised; for everyone knew quite well, that for the last two years Hannibal and his troops, after abandoning every part of Italy, had fled to the Lacinian promontory, and that, shut in there and almost besieged, they only just succeeded in saving themselves and leaving for Africa. "And even," they said, "if they had been coming after a victory in Italy and were about to give battle to us, who have beaten you in two successive battles, your expectation of success should be quite uncertain and you should not only contemplate the prospect of victory but that of a further defeat. And then what gods will you have to invoke, and on what plea will you be able to supplicate the victors to take pity on your calamity? Will not your faithlessness and folly exclude you for almost all hope for the mercy of gods and men?"

The ambassadors after making this speech took their departure. There were but few among the Carthaginians who approved of adhering to the treaty. The majority both of their leading politicians and of those who took part in the deliberation objected to its harsh conditions, and with difficulty tolerated the bold language of the ambassadors. Besides this, they were not disposed to give up the ships they had brought into port and the supplies

they contained. But above all they had no slight hopes of conquering with the assistance of Hannibal, but were on the contrary most sanguine. The popular assembly decided simply to dismiss the ambassadors without a reply, but those of the politicians who had determined by any and every means to stir up the war again held a meeting and contrived the following plan. They declared that all due care should be taken to ensure the safe arrival of the ambassadors at their own camp and at once prepared two triremes to escort them. Then they sent to the admiral, Hasdrubal, begging him to have some ships ready not far from the Roman camp, so that when the Romans were left by the ships that escorted them they might bear down upon them and sink them. For the Carthaginian fleet was now anchored off the coast close to Utica. Having given these instructions to Hasdrubal they sent off the Romans. They had ordered the commanders of the triremes, as soon as they passed the river Macar, to leave the ambassadors in the strait and return, this being a spot from which the enemy's camp could already be seen. The escort acting on their orders, as soon as they had passed the river-mouth saluted the Romans and sailed back. Lucius and his colleagues were unsuspicious of any danger but were somewhat put out, thinking it was due to negligence that the escort had left them too soon. But as they were continuing their voyage alone three Carthaginian triremes bore down on them as they had been directed to do. When they came up to the Roman quinquereme they could not ram her as she avoided the strokes, nor could they board her as her crew made a gallant resistance. But running alongside of her and circling round her they kept on shooting the men on board and killing a number of them, until the Romans, seeing that the men from their own camp who were foraging on the coast were running down to the beach

to assist them, managed to run their ship ashore. Most of the men on board had been killed in the action, but the ambassadors, wonderful to say, escaped.

The consequence of this was that the war began afresh, the cause of its renewal being more serious and more productive of bitter feeling than the original one. For the Romans, thinking that they had been treacherously attacked, set their hearts on getting the better of the Carthaginians, and the latter, conscious of their guilt, were ready to suffer anything rather than fall into the power of the Romans. Both sides being animated by such fury, it was evident that the issue must be decided by a battle. Consequently not only all the inhabitants of Italy and Africa, but those of Spain, Sicily and Sardinia likewise were held in suspense and distracted, awaiting the result.

Hannibal at this time was very poorly off for cavalry and sent to a certain Numidian called Tychaeus, who was a relative of Syphax, and was thought to have the best cavalry in Africa, begging him to help him and join in saving the situation, as he knew well that, if the Carthaginians won, he could retain his principality, but if the Romans were victors, he would risk losing his life too, owing to Massanissa's greed of power. Accordingly, Tychaeus was prevailed on by this appeal and came to Hannibal with a body of two thousand horse.

Scipio, having taken measures for the security of his fleet, deputed the command to Baebius and himself went round the towns, no longer receiving the submission of those which offered to surrender, but taking them all by assault and selling the inhabitants as slaves, to manifest the anger he felt against the enemy owing to the treacherous behaviour of the Carthaginians. He was constantly sending to Massanissa, pointing out to him how the

Carthaginians had violated the treaty, and begging him to raise as strong a force as possible and to make haste to join him. For Massanissa, as I above stated, immediately on the conclusion of the treaty left with his own forces, taking with him besides ten cohorts of Roman cavalry and infantry, and legates on the part of Scipio, in order not only to recover his paternal kingdom, but with the assistance of the Romans to add that of Syphax to it, which he ultimately succeeded in doing.

It happened that at about the same time the envoys from Rome reached the Roman naval camp. So Baebius at once dispatched the Roman envoys to Scipio, but detained the Carthaginians, who were generally dispirited and considered themselves in great danger. For when they heard of the flagitious treatment of the Roman envoys by the Carthaginians, they thought that vengeance for it would assuredly be taken on themselves. But Scipio, on hearing from the Roman legates that both the senate and the people had readily accepted the treaty he had made with the Carthaginians and were ready to comply with all his requests, was highly gratified by this, and ordered Baebius to treat the Carthaginian envoys with all courtesy and send them home, acting, as I think, very rightly and wisely. For aware as he was of the high value attached by his own nation to keeping faith to ambassadors, he took into consideration not so much the deserts of the Carthaginians as the duty of the Romans. Therefore restraining his own anger and the bitter resentment he felt owing to the late occurrence, he did his best to preserve "the glorious record of our sires," as the saying is. The consequence was that he humiliated the people of Carthage and Hannibal himself by thus requiting in ampler measure their baseness by his generosity.

The Carthaginians, when they saw their towns being sacked, sent to Hannibal begging him not to delay, but to approach the enemy and decide matters by a battle. After listening to the messengers he bade them in reply pay attention to other matters and be at their ease about this; for he himself would judge when it was time. After a few days he shifted his camp from the neighbourhood of Adrumetum and advancing encamped near Zama. This is a town lying five days' journey to the west of Carthage. From here he sent out three spies, wishing to find out where the Romans were encamped, and what disposition their general had made in his camp. When these men were caught and brought before him Scipio was so far from punishing them, as is the usual practice, that on the contrary he ordered a tribune to attend them and point out clearly the exact arrangement of the camp. After this had been done he asked them if the officer had explained everything to them with due diligence. When they answered that he had done so, he furnished them with provisions and an escort, and told them to report carefully to Hannibal what had happened to them. On their return Hannibal was so much struck with admiration of Scipio's magnanimity and daring, that he conceived, curiously enough, a strong desire to meet him and converse with him. Having decided on this he sent a herald saying that he desired to discuss the whole situation with him, and Scipio, on receiving the herald's message, assented to the request and said he would send to Hannibal fixing a place and hour for the interview. Upon this the herald returned to his own camp. Next day Massanissa arrived with six thousand foot and four thousand horse. Scipio received him kindly, congratulating him on having brought under his dominion all the former subjects of Syphax. He then broke up his camp and on reaching a town called Naragara

encamped there, selecting a spot which was favourably situated in other respects and had water within the throw of a javelin. From here he sent to the Carthaginian general saying that he was now ready for the meeting. When Hannibal heard this he broke up his camp and on getting within a distance of not more than thirty stades of the Romans encamped on a hill which appeared to be convenient for his present design, but was rather too far away from water, and indeed his men suffered considerable hardship owing to this. On the following day both generals came out of their camps accompanied by a few horsemen, and then, leaving their escorts behind, met each other alone, having an interpreter with them. Hannibal first saluted Scipio and began to speak as follows:

"Would that neither the Romans had ever coveted any possessions outside Italy, nor the Carthaginians any outside Africa; for both these were very fine empires and empires of which it might be said on the whole that Nature herself had fixed their limits. But now that in the first place we went to war with each other for the possession of Sicily and next for that of Spain, now that, finally refusing to listen to the admonition of Fortune, we have gone so far that your native soil was once in imminent danger and our own still is, what remains but to consider by what means we can avert the anger of the gods and compose our present contention? I myself am ready to do so as I learnt by actual experience how fickle Fortune is, and how by a slight turn of the scale either way she brings about changes of the greatest moment, as if she were sporting with little children. But I fear that you, Publius, both because you are very young and because success has constantly attended you both in Spain and in Africa, and you have never up to now at least fallen into the counter-current of Fortune, will not be

convinced by my words, however worthy of credit they may be. Consider things by the light of one example, an example not drawn from remote times, but from our own. I, then, am that Hannibal who after the battle of Cannae became master of almost the whole of Italy, who not long afterwards advanced even up to Rome, and encamping at forty stades from the walls deliberated with myself how I should treat you and your native soil. And now here am I in Africa on the point of negotiating with you, a Roman, for the safety of myself and my country. Consider this, I beg you, and be not overproud, but take such counsel at the present juncture as a mere man can take, and that is ever to choose the most good and the least evil. What man of sense, I ask, would rush into such danger as that which confronts you now? If you conquer you will add but little to the fame of your country and your own, but if you suffer defeat you will utterly efface the memory of all that was grand and glorious in your past. What then is the end I would gain by this interview? I propose that all the countries that were formerly a subject of dispute between us, that is Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, shall belong to Rome and that Carthage shall never make war upon Rome on account of them. Likewise that the other islands lying between Italy and Africa shall belong to Rome. Such terms of peace would, I am convinced, be most secure for the Carthaginians and most honourable to you and to all the Romans."

Hannibal having spoken so, Scipio replied. He said that neither for the war about Sicily, nor for that about Spain, were the Romans responsible, but the Carthaginians were evidently the authors of both, as Hannibal himself was well aware. The gods, too, had testified to this by bestowing victory not on the unjust aggressors but on those who had taken up arms to defend

themselves. No one, he said, was more awake than himself to the fickleness of Fortune and as far as it was in his power he took into consideration the uncertainty of human affairs. "But as for the conditions you propose," he continued, "if before the Romans had crossed to Africa you had retired from Italy and then proposed them, I think your expectations would not have been disappointed. But now that you have been forced reluctantly to leave Italy, and that we, having crossed into Africa, are in command of the open country, the situation is manifestly much changed. And — for this is the most important question — what is the position we have now reached? When your countrymen were beaten and begged for peace we framed a treaty in writing in which it was stipulated, in addition to your present proposals, that Carthaginians should give up their prisoners without ransom, that they should surrender their ships of war, and that they should pay us five thousand talents, and finally that they should give hostages for the performance of those conditions. We jointly sent envoys to Rome to submit them to the senate and the people, we Romans stating that we agreed to the terms offered and you Carthaginians entreating that they might be accepted. The senate agreed and the people also gave their consent. The Carthaginians, after their request had been granted, most treacherously violated the peace. What remains to be done? Put yourself in my place and tell me. Shall we withdraw the most onerous of the conditions imposed? That would be to reward your countrymen for their treachery and teach them to continue to betray their benefactors. Or shall we grant their present request in the hope of earning their gratitude? But now after obtaining their request by earnest supplication, the moment they conceived the slightest hope from your return, they at once treated us as enemies and foes. If we

added some conditions even more onerous we might in that case refer the treaty to our popular assembly, but if we withdraw some of the conditions it would be useless even to make mention of this conference at Rome. Of what further use then is our interview? Either put yourselves and your country at our mercy or fight and conquer us."

After this conversation, which held out no hopes of reconciliation, the two generals parted from each other. On the following morning at daybreak they led out their armies and opened the battle, the Carthaginians fighting for their own safety and the dominion of Africa, and the Romans for the empire of the world. Is there anyone who can remain unmoved in reading the narrative of such an encounter? For it would be impossible to find more valiant soldiers, or generals who had been more successful and were more thoroughly exercised in the art of war, nor indeed had Fortune ever offered to contending armies a more splendid prize of victory, since the conquerors would not be masters of Africa and Europe alone, but of all those parts of the world which now hold a place in history; as indeed they very shortly were. Scipio drew up his army in the following fashion. In front he placed the *hastati* with certain intervals between the maniples and behind them the *principes*, not placing their maniples, as is the usual Roman custom, opposite to the intervals separating those of the first line, but directly behind these latter at a certain distance owing to the large number of the enemy's elephants. Last of all he placed the *triarii*. On his left wing he posted Gaius Laelius with the Italian horse, and on the right wing Massanissa with the whole of his Numidians. The intervals of the first maniples he filled up with the cohorts of *velites*, ordering them to open the action, and if they were forced back by the charge of the elephants to retire, those who had time to

do so by the straight passages as far as the rear of the whole army, and those who were overtaken to right or left along the intervals between the lines.

Having made these preparations he rode along the lines and addressed his troops in a few words suitable to the occasion. "Bear in mind," he said, "your past battles and fight like brave men worthy of yourselves and your country. Keep it before your eyes that if you overcome your enemies not only will you be unquestioned masters of Africa, but you will gain for yourselves and your country the undisputed command and sovereignty of the rest of the world. But if the result of the battle be otherwise, those of you who have fallen bravely in the fight will lie for ever shrouded in the glory of dying thus for their country, while those who save themselves by flight will spend the remainder of their lives in misery and disgrace. For no place in Africa will be able to afford you safety, and if you fall into the hands of the Carthaginians it is plain enough to anyone who gives due thought to it what fate awaits you. May none of you, I pray, live to experience that fate. Now that Fortune offers us a choice of the most glorious of prizes, how utterly craven, in short how foolish shall we be, if we reject the greatest of goods and choose the greatest of evils from mere love of life. Go, therefore, to meet the foe with two objects before you, emperor victory or death. For men animated by such a spirit must always overcome their adversaries, since they go into battle ready to throw their lives away."

Such was the substance of Scipio's harangue. Hannibal placed in front of his whole force his elephants, of which he had over eighty, and behind them the mercenaries numbering about twelve thousand. They were composed of Ligurians, Celts, Balearic Islanders, and Moors. Behind these he placed the

native Libyans and Carthaginians, and last of all the troops he had brought over from Italy at a distance of more than a stade from the front lines. He secured his wings by cavalry, placing the Numidian allies on the left and the Carthaginian horse on the right. He ordered each commanding officer of the mercenaries to address his own men, bidding them be sure of victory as they could rely on his own presence and that of the forces that he had brought back with him. As for the Carthaginians, he ordered their commanders to set before their eyes all the sufferings that would befall their wives and children if the result of the battle were adverse. They did as they were ordered, and Hannibal himself went the round of his own troops, begging and imploring them to remember their comradeship of seventeen years and the number of the battles they had previously fought against the Romans. "In all these battles," he said, "you proved so invincible that you have not left the Romans the smallest hope of ever being able to defeat you. Above all the rest, and apart from your success in innumerable smaller engagements, keep before your eyes the battle of the Trebia fought against the father of the present Roman general, bear in mind the battle of the Trasimene against Flaminius, and that of Cannae against Aemilius, battles with which the action in which we are about to engage is not worthy of comparison either in respect to the numbers of the forces engaged or the courage of the soldiers." He bade them, as he spoke thus, to cast their eyes on the ranks of the enemy. Not only were they fewer, but they were scarcely a fraction of the forces that had formerly faced them, and for courage they were not to be compared with those. For then their adversaries were men whose strength was unbroken and who had never suffered defeat, but those of to-day were some of them the children of the former and some the

wretched remnant of the legions he had so often vanquished and put to flight in Italy. Therefore he urged them not to destroy the glorious record of themselves and their general, but, fighting bravely, to confirm their reputation for invincibility.

Such was the substance of the harangues of the two generals. When all was ready for battle on both sides, the Numidian horse having been skirmishing with each other for some time, Hannibal ordered the drivers of the elephants to charge the enemy. When the trumpets and bugles sounded shrilly from all sides, some of the animals took fright and at once turned tail and rushed back upon the Numidians who had come up to help the Carthaginians, and Massanissa attacking simultaneously, the Carthaginian left wing was soon left exposed. The rest of the elephants falling on the Roman *velites* in the space between the two main armies, both inflicted and suffered much loss, until finally in their terror some of them escaped through the gaps in the Roman line with Scipio's foresight had provided, so that the Romans suffered no injury, while others fled towards the right and, received by the cavalry with showers of javelins, at length escaped out of the field. It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to headlong flight. He pressed the pursuit closely, as likewise did Massanissa. In the meanwhile both phalanxes slowly and in imposing array advanced on each other, except the troops which Hannibal had brought back from Italy, who remained in their original position. When the phalanxes were close to each other, Romans fell upon their foes, raising their war-cry and clashing their shields with their spears as is their practice,

while there was a strange confusion of shouts raised by the Carthaginian mercenaries, for, as Homer says, their voice was not one, but

Mixed was the murmur, and confused the sound,

Their names all various, [1]

as appears from the list of them I gave above.

[1] Homer, *Il.* IV.437, II.809.

As the whole battle was a hand-to-hand affair [the men using neither spears nor swords], [2] the mercenaries at first prevailed by their courage and skill, wounding many of the Romans, but the latter still continued to advance, relying on their admirable order and on the superiority of their arms. The rear ranks of the Romans followed close on their comrades, cheering them on, but the Carthaginians behaved like cowards, never coming near their mercenaries nor attempting to back them up, so that finally the barbarians gave way, and thinking that they had evidently been left in the lurch by their own side, fell upon those they encountered in their retreat and began to kill them. This actually compelled many of the Carthaginians to die like men; for as they were being butchered by their own mercenaries they were obliged against their will to fight both against these and against the Romans, and as when at bay they showed frantic and extraordinary courage, they killed a considerable number both of their mercenaries and of the enemy. In this way they even threw the cohorts of the *hastati* into confusion, but the officers of the *principes*, seeing what was happening, brought up their ranks to assist, and now the greater number of the Carthaginians and their mercenaries were cut to pieces where they stood, either by themselves or by the *hastati*. Hannibal did not allow the survivors in their flight to mix with his own men but, ordering the foremost

ranks to level their spears against them, prevented them from being received into his force. They were therefore obliged to retreat towards the wings and the open ground beyond. The space which separated the two armies still on the field was now covered with blood, slaughter, and dead bodies, and the Roman general was placed in great difficulty by this obstacle to his completing the rout of the enemy. For he saw that it would be very difficult to pass over the ground without breaking his ranks owing to the quantity of slippery corpses which were still soaked in blood and had fallen in heaps and the number of arms thrown away at haphazard. However, after conveying the wounded to the rear and recalling by bugle those of the *hastati* who were still pursuing the enemy, he stationed the latter in the fore part of the field of battle, opposite the enemy's centre, and making the *principes* and *triarii* close up on both wings ordered them to advance over the dead. When these troops had surmounted the obstacles and found themselves in a line with the *hastati* the two phalanxes closed with the greatest eagerness and ardour. As they were nearly equal in numbers as well as in spirit and bravery, and were equally well armed, the contest was for long doubtful, the men falling where they stood out of determination, and Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the pursuit of the cavalry, arrived providentially at the proper moment. When they fell on Hannibal's army from the rear, most of the men were cut down in their ranks, while of those who took to flight only quite a few escaped, as the cavalry were close on them and the country was level. More than fifteen hundred Romans fell, the Carthaginian loss amounting to twenty thousand killed and nearly the same number of prisoners.

[2] I have bracketed this phrase in the English, as in the Greek, with the Teubner edition. I do not like to suppress it.

Such was the result of the final battle between Scipio and Hannibal, the battle which decided the war in favour of Rome. The action over, Scipio after following up the enemy and plundering their camp returned to his own. Hannibal accompanied by a few horsemen never stopped until he was in safety in Adrumetum. He had done in the battle and before it all that could be done by a good general of long experience. For, in the first place, he had by his conference with Scipio attempted to terminate the dispute by himself alone; showing thus that while conscious of his former successes he mistrusted Fortune and was fully aware of the part that the unexpected plays in war. In the next place, when he offered battle he so managed matters that it was impossible for any commander with the same arms at his disposal to make better dispositions for a contest against the Romans than Hannibal did on that occasion. The order of a Roman force in battle makes it very difficult to break through, for without any change it enables every man individually and in common with his fellows to present a front in any direction, the maniples which are nearest to the danger turning themselves by a single movement to face it. Their arms also give the men both protection and confidence owing to the size of the shield and owing to the sword being strong enough to endure repeated blows. So that for these reasons they are formidable antagonists very difficult to overcome. But nevertheless to meet each of these advantages Hannibal had shown incomparable skill in adopting at the critical moment all such measures as were in his power and could reasonably be expected to succeed. For he had hastily collected that large number of elephants and had placed them in

front on the day of battle in order to throw the enemy into confusion and break his ranks. He had placed the mercenaries in advance with the Carthaginians behind them in order that the Romans before the final engagement might be fatigued by their exertions and that their swords might lose their edge owing to the great slaughter, and also in order to compel the Carthaginians thus hemmed in on both sides to stand fast and fight, in the words of Homer

That e'en the unwilling might be forced to fight. [3]

[3] Homer, *Il.* iv. 300.

The most efficient and steadiest of his troops he had placed behind at a certain distance in order that, anticipating and witnessing from afar what took place, they might with undiminished strength and spirit make use of their qualities at the proper time. If he, who had never as yet suffered defeat, after taking every possible step to insure victory, yet failed to do so, we must pardon him. For there are times when Fortune counteracts the plans of valiant men, and again at times, as the proverb says, "A brave man meets another braver yet," as we may say happened in the case of Hannibal.

When men give expression to their feelings more violently than is the general custom of their nation, if this excess seems to spring from genuine emotion due to the magnitude of their calamities, it arouses the pity of those who see and hear it, and its very strangeness touches all our hearts; but when such extravagance seems to be a mere piece of charlatanry and acting, it gives rise not to pity but to indignation and disgust. Such was the case on the present occasion with regard to the Carthaginian ambassadors.

Scipio began by stating briefly to them that the Romans were not bound to treat them with leniency for their own sakes, as they confessed that they

had begun the war with Rome by taking Saguntum contrary to their treaty and enslaving its inhabitants, and that they had quite recently been guilty of treachery by violating a written agreement they had sworn to observe. "But for our own sake," he said, "and in consideration of the fortune of war and of the common condition of man we have decided to be clement and magnanimous. This will be evident to you also, if you estimate the situation rightly. For you should not regard it as strange if we impose sufferings and obligations on you or if we demand sacrifices from you, but rather it should surprise you if we grant you any favours, since Fortune owing to your own misconduct has deprived you of any right to pity or pardon and placed you at the mercy of your enemies." After speaking in this sense he informed them first of the indulgences granted to them and afterwards of the severe conditions to which they would have to submit.

The principal points of the condition proposed were as follows. Carthage was to retain all the cities she formerly possessed in Africa before entering on the last war with Rome, all her former territory, all flocks, herds, slaves, and other property: from that day onward the Carthaginians were to suffer no injury, they were to be governed by their own laws and customs and to receive no garrison. These were the lenient conditions; the others of a contrary kind were as follows: Reparation was to be made to the Romans for all acts of injustice committed by the Carthaginians during the truce: prisoners of war and deserters who had fallen into their hands at any date were to be delivered up: they were to surrender their ships of war with the exception of ten triremes, and all their elephants: they were not to make war at all on any nation outside Africa and on no nation in Africa without consulting Rome: they were to restore to King Massanissa, within the

boundaries that should subsequently be assigned, all houses, lands, and cities, and other property which had belonged to him or to his ancestors: they were to contribute ten thousand talents in fifty years, paying two hundred Euboic talents each year: finally they were to give as surety a hundred hostages chosen by the Roman general from among their young men between the age of fourteen and thirty.

This was the communication that Scipio made to the ambassadors, and after listening to him they lost no time in conveying it to their countrymen in Carthage. On this occasion it is said that when one of the senators was about to oppose the acceptance of the terms and was beginning to speak Hannibal came forward and pulled him down from the tribune. The other members were indignant with him for such a violation of the usage of the house, and Hannibal then rose again and said that he confessed he had been in error, but they must pardon him if he acted contrary to their usage, as they knew that he had left Carthage at the age of nine, and was, now that he had returned, over five and forty. He, therefore, begged them not to consider whether he had transgressed parliamentary custom, but rather to ask this whether or not he really felt for his country; for this was the sentiment which had now made him guilty of this offence. "It seems to me," he said, "astounding and quite incomprehensible, that any man who is a citizen of Carthage and is conscious of the designs that we all individually and as a body have entertained against Rome does not bless his stars that now that he is at the mercy of the Romans he has obtained such lenient terms. If you had been asked but a few days ago what you expected your country to suffer in the event of the victory of the Romans, you would not have been able even to give utterance to your fears, so great and excessive were the

calamities then in prospect. So now I beg you not even to discuss the matter, but to agree with one accord to the proposals, to sacrifice to the gods, and to pray all of you that the Roman people may ratify the treaty." As it seemed to all that his advice was wise and opportune, they voted to make the treaty on the above conditions, and the senate at once dispatched envoys with orders to agree to it.

II. Affairs of Macedonia and Greece

Conduct of Philip and Antiochus regarding Egypt

It is very surprising that as long as Ptolemy in his lifetime could dispense with the help of Philip and Antiochus, they were very ready to assist him, but when he died leaving an infant son whom it was their natural duty to maintain in possession of his realm, then encouraging each other they hastened to divide the child's kingdom between themselves and be the ruin of the unhappy orphan. Nor did they, as tyrants do, take the pains to provide themselves with some paltry pretext for the shameful deed, but at once acted in a fashion so unscrupulous and brutal that they well deserved to have applied to them the saying about the food of fishes, that though they are all of the same tribe the destruction of the smaller ones is food and life to the larger. Who fancying that he sees reflected in it the image of all impiety towards God and all savagery towards men, as well as of the unbounded covetousness of these two kings? But at the same time who among those who reasonably find fault with Fortune for her conduct of affairs, will not be reconciled to her when he learns how she afterwards made them pay the due penalty, and how she exhibited to their successors as a warning for their edification the exemplary chastisement she inflicted on these princes? For even while they were still breaking their faith to each

other and tearing to shreds the boy's kingdom she raised up against them the Romans, and very justly and properly visited them with the very evils which they had been contrary to all law designing to bring upon others. For both of these were very soon vanquished in battle, and they were not only prevented from lusting after the property of others but were compelled to submit and to pay tribute and obey the behests of Rome. And, finally, in a very short time Fortune re-established the kingdom of Ptolemy, while as for their dynasties and successors she in one case brought utter destruction upon them and in the other calamities very nearly as grave.

Philip and the People of Cius

There was certain Molpagoras at Cius, a capable speaker and politician, but in character a demagogue, greedy of power. This man, by flattering the populace, by inciting the rabble against men of means, by finally killing some of the latter and banishing others whose property he confiscated and distributed among the people, soon attained by these means to supreme power . . . .

Now the people of Cius met with such disasters not so much owing to chance or to the injustice of their neighbours, but chiefly owing to their own stupidity and misgovernment. For by advancing ever the worst men to power and punishing those who opposed them in order to plunder the fortunes of their fellow-citizens, they fell as of their own free will into those misfortunes of which we may say that men in general, after being caught in them with their eyes open, not only cannot cure themselves of their folly, but cannot conceive the least suspicion, as even some of the brutes do. For the latter not only when they have got into trouble themselves from snares and nets, but if they see another animal in danger will not readily approach

such engines again, but are even suspicious of the place and mistrust everything they see. Men on the other hand, though they have heard that some cities have been utterly destroyed by the means I have described, and though they see ruin overtaking others, nevertheless, whenever anyone courts favour with them and holds out to them the hope of repairing their fortunes by laying hands on those of their neighbours, approach the snare without a moment's reflection, though quite aware that of those who have swallowed such baits not a single one has ever been saved, but that measures like the above are well known to have brought destruction on all governments which adopted them . . . .

Philip having made himself master of the city was highly elated, just as if he had performed a good and noble action in coming readily to the help of his son-in-law, and overawing the revolutionary party, and then justifiably enriching himself with the prisoners and money he laid hands on. He did not see that in the first place the son-in-law whom he came to help was not wronged, but was wronging others by his treachery, next that by thus without any justification bringing the greatest of calamities on a Hellenic city he would set the seal on the reputation he enjoyed for cruelty to his friends, and the both these crimes would justly leave him a legacy of infamy throughout the whole of Greece as a violator of all that was sacred; thirdly, that he had treated with contumely the ambassadors who came from the cities I mentioned to deliver the Cianians from the perils that menaced them, but who day after day yielding to his entreaties and deluded by him were compelled to be witnesses of things they were far from wishing to see; and finally, that in addition to all he had aroused such savage hate in the Rhodians against him that they would not listen to a word in his favour.

Indeed, chance had very conspicuously intervened to help this matter on. For just when his envoy was speaking in defence of Philip in the theatre at Rhodes and laying stress on his magnanimity, asserting that, though the city of Cius was now more or less at his mercy, he granted this favour to its people and acted so with the object of confuting the slander of his adversaries and clearly revealing what his true sentiments were; at this very time, I say, a man who had just landed entered the Prytaneum and announced the enslavement of the people of Cius and all Philip's cruelty on that occasion. When, therefore, while Philip's ambassador was still speaking the *prytanis* came forward and communicated the news, the people could not believe it, so black was the treachery. Philip, therefore, who had rather betrayed himself than the people of Cius, had become so wrong-headed or rather so lost to all sense of decency that he gave himself credit and boasted of conduct of which he should have been most deeply ashamed, as though it were a fine deed. From this day forth the Rhodians considered him to be their enemy and made their preparations accordingly, and by this action he made himself equally hated by the Aetolians. For though he had but recently made his peace with that nation and was extending the hand of fellowship to them, now without the shadow of a pretext, at a time when the Aetolians had at no distant date entered into friendship and alliance with Lysimachia, Chalcedon, and Cius, he first of all forced the two former cities to withdraw from this alliance and submit to him, and he now took Cius and enslaved its inhabitants, although an Aetolian strategus was present in the place and at the head of affairs. Prusias, in so far as his purpose had been accomplished, was gratified, but inasmuch as the prize of the enterprise was carried off by another and he received as his share nothing but the desert

site of a city, was much disaffected. He was however, unable to take any action.

Conduct of Philip

Philip on his return voyage, committing one act of treachery after another, put in at about midday to Thasos, and though that city was friendly took it and enslaved the inhabitants . . . .

The Thasians told Metrodorus, Philip's general, that they would surrender the city if he would let them remain without a garrison, exempt from tribute, with no soldiers quartered on them and governed by their own laws . . . .

The reply was that Philip accede to this request upon which all present applauded and admitted Philip into the city . . . .

Perhaps it may be said of all kings that at the beginnings of their reigns they talk of freedom as of a gift they offer to all and style all those who are thus loyal adherents their friends and allies, but as soon as they have established their authority they at once begin to treat those who placed trust in them not as allies but as servants. Therefore they are disappointed of any credit for noble conduct, though as a rule they do not miss their immediate interest. But who would not qualify as perfectly irrational and insane the conduct of a prince, who, engaging in vast enterprises and aspiring to universal dominion, with his chances of success in all his projects still unimpaired, yet in matters of no moment, in the very first matters he was called upon to deal with, proclaimed to all his fickleness and faithlessness?

III. Affairs of Egypt

As I give a narrative of the successive events that happened in each part of the world in each year, it is evident that in some cases the end must be

told before the beginning, in those cases I mean where according to the general scheme of my work and the order imposed on my narrative the locality which was the scene of the final catastrophe occupies an earlier place than that which witnessed the initial stages . . . .

Sosibius, the pretended guardian of Ptolemy, appears to have been a dexterous instrument of evil who remained long in power and did much mischief in the kingdom. He first of all compassed the death of Lysimachus, who was Ptolemy's son by Arsinoë the daughter of Lysimachus, next that of Magas, son of Ptolemy and Berenice, daughter of Magas, thirdly that of Berenice, mother of Ptolemy Philopator, fourthly that of Cleomenes of Sparta, and fifthly that of Arsinoë, the daughter of Berenice.

Ambition and Fate of Agathocles

After four or five days, erecting a tribune in the largest colonnade of the palace, they summoned a meeting of the bodyguard and household troops as well as of the officers of the infantry and cavalry. When all these had collected, Agathocles and Sosibius mounted the tribune, and in the first place acknowledged the death of the king and queen and enjoined the populace to go into mourning as was their usual practice. After this they crowned the boy and proclaimed him king, [4] and then read a forged will, in which it was written that the king appointed Agathocles and Sosibius guardians of his son. They begged the officers to remain well disposed and maintain the boy on his throne; and afterwards brought in two silver urns, the one said to contain the bones of the king and the other those of Arsinoë. As a fact, the one did contain the king's bones, but the other was full of spices. Hereupon they at once celebrated the funeral, and now the real circumstances of Arsinoë's fate became manifest to all. For on her death

being made known, everyone began to inquire how she had perished. As there was no other cause assigned when the true report began to reach people's ears, though doubt still subsisted, the truth was impressed on the minds of all, and the people were much stirred in consequence. As for the king, no one cared, but concerning Arsinoë, when some recalled her orphanhood and others the insults and outrages inflicted on her during her whole life, and finally her unhappy death, the people fell into such a state of distraction and affliction that town was full of groans, tears, and ceaseless lamentation, a testimony, in the opinion of those who judged correctly, not so much of affection for Arsinoë as of hatred of Agathocles. The latter, after depositing the urns in the royal vaults, ordered the public mourning to cease, and as a first step granted two months' pay to the troops, feeling sure of taking the edge off their hatred by appealing to the soldiers' spirit of avarice, and in the next place imposed on them the oath they were accustomed to take on the proclamation of a new king. He also sent away Philammon who had carried out the murder of Arsinoë, making him libyarch in the Cyrenaica, and he placed the child in the care of Oenanthe and Agathoclea. After this he dispatched Pelops, son of Pelops, to Asia, to King Antiochus to beg him to remain on friendly terms and not to transgress his treaty with the young king's father, and sent Ptolemy, son of Sosibius, to Philip to arrange for the proposed match and to beg for his help if Antiochus attempted any serious violation of his obligations. He also appointed Ptolemy, the son of Agesarchus, ambassador to Rome, with the idea not of his hurrying to his post, but of his remaining in Greece when he reached that country and met his friends and relatives there, the object of Agathocles being to remove all men of distinction from Egypt. He also sent

Scopas, the Aetolian, to Greece to hire mercenaries, providing him with a large sum of money to advance to them. Two reasons underlay this plan; for in the first place, he wished to use the troops he hired for the war against Antiochus, and next to send away the existing force of mercenaries to the country forts in Egypt and to the foreign settlements, and then with these new arrivals to fill up and remodel the household troops and the guards of the court, and of the rest of the city, thinking that the men he himself had enlisted and whom he paid, as they had no political sympathies regarding past events of which they were ignorant, as they reposed their hopes of preservation and advancement on himself, would readily support him and join heartily in executing all his behests. All this happened before the negotiations with Philip, as I have stated, but as the negotiations fell to be dealt with first owing to the order of my narrative, it was necessary for me to manage matters so as to give an consequent of the interviews and speeches of the ambassadors before mentioning their appointment and dispatch.

[4] It will be seen in the sequel that the solemn festival of his Proclamation (Anacleteria) was only celebrated in 196 B.C.

Agathocles, as soon as he had removed all the most notable men and checked to a great extent by the advance of pay the disaffection among the troops, turned to his old courses. He filled up the vacant places of the royal "friends" by appointing from the body servants and other attendants those most remarkable for their effrontery and recklessness. He himself spent the greater part of the day and night in drinking and the debauchery which commonly accompanies it, sparing neither women in the flower of their age nor brides nor virgins, and all this he did with the most odious ostentation.

So that as strong dislike against him was aroused on all sides, as no attempt was made to conciliate or help those aggrieved, but on the contrary there was a constant repetition of outrage, arrogance, and neglect, the former hatred of the populace for him began to fume again, and all recalled the calamities that these men had brought on the kingdom. But since they had no leader of any weight, through whom to vent their anger on Agathocles and Agathoclea, they kept quiet, their only remaining hope, to which they eagerly clung, being in Tlepolemus. While the king lived, Tlepolemus attended to his own affairs, but on the death of Ptolemy, after quieting the populace, he became again military governor of the district round Pelusium; and at first he consulted the king's interest in all he did, believing that there would be some council charged with the guardianship of the child and the general control of affairs. But when he saw that all the men worthy of this office had been got rid of, and that Agathocles ventured to assume the reins of government, he very soon changed his attitude, as he was conscious of the danger that menaced him owing to their long-standing enmity, and collecting his forces around him took measures for providing himself with money in order that he might not fall an easy prey to any of his foes. At the same time he did not despair of himself obtaining the guardianship of the child and the direction of affairs, thinking that he was, if his own judgement did not deceive him, more capable because he heard that both the troops under his own command and those in Alexandria placed in him their hopes of overthrowing the insolent domination of Agathocles. Such being his opinion of himself, the difference between them became speedily more acute, since both of them contributed to this end. For Tlepolemus, as he was desirous of attaching to himself the commanders, taxiarchs, and inferior

officers, entertained them sedulously at banquets; and on those occasions, either flattered by those who wished to make themselves agreeable to him or on his own impulse, since he was young and they were talking over their wine, he would make remarks about the family of Agathocles, at first enigmatical, then of doubtful import, but finally quite outspoken and conveying the most venomous insults. For he used to toast the wall-dauber and the sackbut-girl and the lady-barber, and the young boy who was so complaisant at the drinking-bouts when he was cupbearer to the king in his childhood's days. As his guests always laughed with him and contributed something of their own to his jests, the matter soon reached the ears of Agathocles. Their enmity was now avowed, and Agathocles lost no time in bringing an accusation against Tlepolemus, changing him with disaffection to the king and stating that he was inviting Antiochus to assume the government. He was in no lack of specious grounds for this accusation, some resting on reports of actual facts which he distorted and some being pure inventions of his own. All this he did with the object of working up the populace against Tlepolemus, but it had the contrary result. For as they had for long rested their hopes on Tlepolemus, they were exceedingly glad to see the quarrel becoming more inflamed. The popular movement originated in the following manner. Nicon, who was a relative of Agathocles, had been appointed director of naval affairs during the lifetime of Ptolemy, and he now. . . .

Agathocles also killed Deinon, son of Deinon, and this was, as the saying is, "the justest of his many iniquities." For at the time when dispatches reached Deinon proposing the murder of Arsinoë, it was perfectly in his power to report the criminal project and save the kingdom, but he chose to

take the part of Philammon and became thus the cause of all the evils which followed. However, after the murder had been committed, Agathocles found out that he was always recalling his conduct, lamenting it to many people and expressing regret for the chance he had let slip. Therefore he at once met with the punishment he merited and lost his life . . . .

Agathocles in the first place summoned a meeting of the Macedonians and appeared together with Agathoclea and the young king. At first he pretended that he could not say what he wished owing to the abundance of the tears that choked him, but after wiping his eyes many times with his chlamys and subduing the outburst, he took the child in his arms and exclaimed, "Take the child whom his father on his death-bed placed in the arms of this woman," pointing to his sister, "and confided to your faith, you soldiers of Macedon. Her affection indeed is of but little moment to ensure his safety, but his fate depends on you and your valour. For it has long been evident to those who judge correctly that Tlepolemus aspires to a position higher than it behoves him to covet, and now he has actually fixed the day and the hour at which he will assume the diadem." And as to this he told them not to rely on his own word but on that of those who knew the truth and had just come from the very scene of action. After speaking thus he brought forward Critolaus, who told them that he had himself seen the altars being erected and the victims being prepared in presence of the populace for the ceremony of proclaiming the coronation. When the Macedonians heard this, not only did they feel no pity for Agathocles but paid absolutely no attention to his words, and showed such levity by hooting and murmuring to each other that he did not know himself how he got away from the meeting. The same kind of thing took place at the meetings of the other regiments.

Meanwhile numbers of men kept on arriving by boat from the garrisons in upper Egypt, and all begged their relatives or friends to help them at the present crisis and not allow them to be thus outrageously tyrannized over by such unworthy persons. The chief incentive to the soldiery to wreak their vengeance on those in power was their knowledge that any delay was prejudicial to themselves, as Tlepolemus controlled the entire supply of provisions reaching Alexandria. There was also one thing done by Agathocles and his party which contributed to exasperate the populace and Tlepolemus. For they took Danaë, who was the latter's mother-in-law, from the temple of Demeter, and dragged her unveiled through the middle of the town and committed her to prison, with the express object of exhibiting their hostility to him. This so irritated the people that they no longer spoke of the matter in private and secretly, but while some expressed their detestation of those in power by scribbling it all over the town at night, others even began to meet openly in groups in the day-time for this purpose.

Agathocles, seeing what was happening and entertaining poor hopes of his own security, began to contemplate flight; but as owing to his own imprudence he had made no preparations for this purpose he desisted from the project, and his next step was to enrol conspirators ready to join in the venture, with a view to putting to death some of his enemies at once and arresting others, after which he could possess himself of tyrannical power. While he was engaged in this project an accusation was brought against a certain Moeragenes, one of the bodyguards, to the effect that he informed Tlepolemus of everything and worked for his cause owing to his relationship with Adaeus, then governor of Bubastus. Agathocles at once gave orders to Nicostratus, his secretary of state, to arrest Moeragenes and

examine him diligently, menacing him with every kind of torture. Moeragenes was instantly arrested and conducted to a remote part of the palace, where he was at first questioned directly concerning these rumours, and on his denying every one of the charges was stripped. Some began to get the instruments of torture ready and others with the scourges in their hands were taking off their cloaks, when one of the servants ran up to Nicostratus and after whispering something into his ear made off in haste. Nicostratus immediately followed him without saying a word, but striking his thigh with his hand repeatedly. It is difficult to describe the strange situation in which Moeragenes found himself. For some of the executioners stood there with the scourges almost raised to strike him and others were getting the instruments of torture ready before his eyes; but when Nicostratus departed all remained in mute astonishment, looking at each other, and each moment expecting Nicostratus to return; but after a little time had elapsed they gradually dispersed, and Moeragenes was left by himself. After that he was able, much to his surprise, to traverse the palace, and naked as he was rushed into a tent belonging to the Macedonian troops not far from the palace. Finding them by chance assembled there at breakfast he told his story and the extraordinary manner in which he had been delivered. They were disposed to discredit it, but afterwards seeing him naked they were compelled to believe him. Availing himself of this complete change of circumstances, Moeragenes begged the Macedonians with tears not only to help him to save himself, but to save the king also and chiefly themselves. He urged upon them that their destruction was inevitable if they did not avail themselves of the present opportunity, when the hatred of the populace was at its height and everyone was ready to take

vengeance on Agathocles. This was just the time, he said, when the feeling was most thoroughly aroused and it only wanted someone to begin. The Macedonians on hearing this were stimulated to action and finally took the advice of Moeragenes, first without delay visiting the Macedonian tents and then those of the other soldiers, which are all close together, and turned towards a single part of the city. As the people had long been disposed to revolt and required only some man of courage to appeal to them, once the movement began it spread like wildfire. Four hours had scarcely elapsed when men of all nationalities, both soldiers and civilians, had agreed to attack the government. Chance too co-operated much at this time to the accomplishment of their aim. For Agathocles, when a letter reached his hands, and some spies were brought before him, and when the letter proved to be the one addressed by Tlepolemus to the troops announcing that he was on the point of coming, and the spies reported that he had actually arrived, so entirely lost his head that, neglecting to take any action or to consider the news he had received, he went to carouse at his usual hour and conducted himself at the banquet in his usual manner. Oenanthe, who was in great distress, betook herself to the Thesmophoreum, that temple being open for an annual sacrifice. She first of all fell on her knees and with many gestures prayed fervently to the goddesses, and afterwards seated herself by the altar and held her peace. Most of the women, pleased to see her so dejected and distressed, remained silent, but the relatives of Polycrates and some other noble ladies, who were not yet aware of the danger, came up to her to console her. "Come not near me, you beasts," she cried aloud to them, "I know well that you bear us ill-will and that you pray to the goddesses that the worst may befall us, but yet I trust that, if it be the will of heaven, I shall

yet make you taste the flesh of your own children." After sayings she bade her lictors drive them away from her and strike those who refused to leave. Availing themselves of this pretext all the ladies withdrew, holding up their hands to the goddesses and praying that she might be cursed with the fate that she threatened to bring on others.

The men had already decided on a revolution, but now that in each house the rage of the women was added to their own, the hatred of the usurper blazed up twice as violent. When day again gave place to night, the whole town was full of disturbance and torches and movement. For some collected in the stadium shouting, some were encouraging each other, others running in different directions took refuge in houses and places not likely to be suspected. The open spaces round the palace, the stadium, and the great square were now filled with a mixed multitude, including all the crowd of supernumerary performers in the theatre of Dionysus, [5] and Agathocles, when he heard what was occurring, aroused himself from his drunken slumber, having broken up the banquet a short time previously, and taking all his relatives except Philo went to the king. After lamenting his ill-fortune to the boy in a few words he took him by the hand and went up to the gallery between the Maeander and the palaestra leading to the entrance to the theatre. After this, having made fast the first two doors, he retired to the third with a few of the bodyguard, the king, and his own relatives. The doors were of pen lattice-work and one could see through them, and they were each secured by two bolts. Meanwhile the populace were assembling from every part of the city, so that not only level spaces but the roofs and steps were full of people, and there was a confused hubbub and clamour,

women and children being mixed with the men. For in Carthage and also in Alexandria the children play no less a part in such tumults than the men.

[5] This I believe to be the meaning of ÀÁ¿ÃÄ±Ã¯±. It has been rendered precincts, but owing to the position of the clause it cannot be local.

When the day began to break it was difficult to distinguish the various cries, but that of "Bring the king" predominated. At first the Macedonians got up and seized the gate of audience of the palace, but shortly after, when they discovered in what part of the building the king was, they went round and after taking the first door of the gallery off its hinges approached the second and clamoured loudly for the king. Agathocles was looking now to his own safety and begged the bodyguards to convey a message on his behalf to the Macedonians, stating that he abandoned the office of regent and all his powers and dignities as well as all his revenue, and begged simply for his poor life and a sufficient supply of food, so that retiring into his original obscurity he could not in future, even if he wished it, hurt anyone. None of the other bodyguards consented, but Aristomenes alone, who afterwards became minister, undertook this service. He was by birth an Acarnanian, and the adulation he had paid to Agathocles in the season of his prosperity was no less conspicuous than his admirable and scrupulous fidelity to the interests of the king and his kingdom when in later life he was at the head of affairs. For he was the first who having invited Agathocles to dinner presented to him alone among the guests a crown of gold, an honour which is customarily paid only to the king, and he was the first who ventured to wear a ring with Agathocles' portrait engraved on it, and when a daughter was born to him he actually called her Agathoclea. Perhaps

regarding his character I have said enough; but now when he had received Agathocles' commission he went out by a wicket-gate to the Macedonians. After he had said a few words to them and explained the proposal, the Macedonians at once attempted to run him through, but when some few persons held their hands over him and begged them to spare him, he went back with orders either to return to them bringing the king or not to come out at all. Aristomenes, then, was sent back by the Macedonians with this message, and they themselves came up to the second door and broke it in also. Agathocles and his people, seeing the violence of the Macedonians both by their actions and their determined demand, at first attempted to entreat the soldiers, leaving no word unspoken that might move them to spare their lives at least, Agathocles putting out his hands through the door and Agathoclea her breasts with which she said she had suckled the king. When bitterly bewailing their evil fate they found all was useless, they sent out the boy with the bodyguard. The Macedonians then took the king and at once setting him on a horse conducted him to the stadium. His appearance was greeted with loud cheers and clapping of hands, and they now stopped the horse, took him off, and leading him forward placed him in the royal seat. The joy of the crowd was mingled with regret, for on the one hand they were delighted at having the boy in their hands, but on the other they were displeased that the guilty persons had not been arrested and punished as they deserved. So that they continued to shout, demanding that those who had caused all the evil should be taken into custody and made an example. The day had now advanced, and as the people after all could find no one on whom to vent their resentment, Sosibius, who was the son of Sosibius and at the present time, being a member of the bodyguard, particularly devoted

his attention to the king and to affairs of state, seeing that there was no hope of appeasing the fury of the populace and that the boy was ill at ease, finding himself among strangers and amidst all the commotion of the mob, asked the king if he would give up to the people those who were in any way guilty of offences to himself or his mother. When the boy nodded his head in assent Sosibius bade some of the bodyguard communicate the royal decision, and making the boy get up led him away to join his household at his own house which was quite near. When the king's consent was announced, there was a deafening outburst of cheering and applause all through the stadium. Meanwhile Agathocleas and Agathoclea had separated and each retired to their own residence, and very soon a certain number of soldiers, some on their own initiative and others forced to go by the crowd, set off in search of both.

The bloodshed and murders which followed were due to the following incident. Philo, one of Agathocles' attendants and parasites, came out into the stadium suffering from the effects of drink. When he observed the popular excitement, he said to those next him, that if Agathocles came out they would have cause to repent again as they had done some days before. Upon hearing this they began some of them to revile and others to hustle him, and when he attempted to defend himself some very soon tore off his cloak and others levelling their spears at him transpierced him. Then as soon as he was ignominiously dragged still breathing into the middle of the stadium and the people had tasted blood, they all eagerly waited the arrival of the others. It was not long before Agathocles was led in in fetters, and as soon as he entered some people ran up and at once stabbed him, an act of benevolence rather than enmity, for they thus saved him from suffering the

fate he deserved. Next Nicon was brought there and after him Agathoclea stripped naked with her sisters and then all her relatives. Last of all they dragged Oenanthe from the Thesmophorium and led her to the stadium naked on horseback. All of them were delivered into the hands of the mob, and now some began to bite them with their teeth, some to stab them and others to dig out their eyes. Whenever one of them fell they tore the body from limb to limb until they had thus mutilated them all. For terrible is the cruelty of the Egyptians when their anger is aroused. At the same time some young girls who had been Arsinoë's close companions, hearing that Philammon, who had directed the queen's murder, had arrived from Cyrene three days before, rushed to his house and forcing an entrance killed Philammon with clubs and stones; strangled his son who was no longer a child, and dragging out his wife naked into the square slew her.

Such was the end of Agathocles, Agathoclea, and their kindred. I am not unaware that some authors in describing these events have introduced the sensational element and worked up their material with the object of making the whole more striking to their readers, largely transgressing the bounds of what is essential to give coherence to their narrative. Some of them attribute all to Fortune, and lay stress on her instability and on men's incapacity of evading her, while others take count of the strangeness of all that happened, attempting to assign reasons or probable causes to everything. It was, however, not my own object to treat these matters in that manner, inasmuch as Agathocles displayed neither courage in war nor conspicuous ability, nor was he fortunate and exemplary in his management of affairs, nor, finally, had he that acuteness and mischievous address which serve a courtier's ends and which made Sosibius and several others so successful until the end of

their lives in their management of king after king. On the contrary it was quite different with Agathocles. Owing to Philopator's incapacity as a ruler he attained an exceptionally high position; and in this position finding himself after that king's death most favourably circumstanced to maintain his power, he lost both his control and his life through his own cowardice and indolence, becoming an object of universal reprobation in quite a short time.

It is not therefore advisable, as I said, to deal at excessive length with the fate of such a man, but it is otherwise with the Sicilian Agathocles and Dionysius and certain other rulers of renown. Of these two, the latter started from an obscure and humble position, and Agathocles, as Timaeus ridiculing him tells us, was a potter and leaving the wheel and the clay and the smoke came to Syracuse as a young man. In the first place they both of them became in their time tyrants of Syracuse, a city which then ranked highest in opulence and dignity, and they were afterwards recognized as kings of the whole of Sicily and had made themselves masters even of some parts of Italy. And Agathocles not only made an attempt to conquer Africa but retained his exalted position until his death. So that they say that Publius Scipio, who was the first to bring Carthage to her knees, when some one asked him whom he thought the greatest statesmen combining courage and wisdom, replied "Agathocles and Dionysius the Sicilians." To the careers of such men indeed it is proper for us to direct the attention of our readers, touching a little on the vicissitudes of fortune and the uncertainty of human affairs, and in general adding to our bare narrative some instructive reflections, but we are by no means called on to do so in the case of the Egyptian Agathocles.

For these reasons I refrained from enlarging on the story of this man, and no less because all sensational occurrences are worthy of attention only when first presented to our view, but afterwards it is not only unprofitable to read about them and keep our eyes on them but such an exercise of our faculties produces a certain disgust. For since there are two objects, improvement and pleasure, which those who wish to study any subject either by the use of their ears or of their eyes, should keep before them, and since this is especially true of the study of history, a too generous treatment of sensational events contributes to neither. For not only do abnormal reversals of fortune arouse no emulation, but no one has any permanent pleasure in seeing or reading of things which are contrary to nature and contrary to the general sentiment of mankind. It is true we are interested in seeing or hearing of them once for all and at first, just for the sake of observing that what seemed to be impossible is possible, but once we are convinced of this no one takes any pleasure in dwelling on the unnatural, and there is none who would have the least wish to meet with frequent references to the same event of this class. Therefore what is told us should either excite admiration or cause pleasure, and the elaborate treatment of an event which does neither is suitable rather to tragedy than to history. Possibly we must excuse writers who do not draw their readers' attention to such matters as are natural or generally happen in the world. For they think that among past events the greatest and most wonderful are those which they have met in their personal experience or which particularly arrested their attention when they heard of them from witnesses. So that unconsciously they devote too much space to matters which neither are

novel, others having spoken of them before, nor are able to benefit or to please us. I have now said enough on this subject.

IV. Affairs of Asia

Character of Antiochus

King Antiochus seems to have been at first a man who both conceived great projects and possessed courage and the capability of executing his designs, but as he advanced in life he showed himself much inferior to his former self and disappointed general expectation.

THE END OF BOOK XV

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XVI

I. AFFAIRS OF MACEDONIA

Philip's Operations in Asia Minor

King Philip, on reaching Pergamon and thinking he had almost given a death-blow to Attalus, showed himself capable of every kind of outrage". For yielding to anger little less than insane he spent most of his fury not on men but on the gods. In the skirmishes which took place the garrison of Pergamon easily kept him at a distance owing to the strength of the town. But as he got little booty from the country owing to the care Attalus had taken to prevent this, he henceforth wreaked his fury on the statues and sanctuaries of the gods, outraging, in my opinion, not Attalus but rather himself. For he not only burnt and pulled down temples and altars, but even broke up the stones so that none of the things he destroyed could ever be repaired. After he had laid waste the Nicephorium where he cut down the holy grove, pulled down the wall enclosing it and dug up the temples, which were numerous and splendid, from their foundations, he first proceeded to Thyatira, and upon leaving that city invaded the plain of Thebe, thinking that that district would afford him plenty of booty. When he was foiled in this expectation also and reached Hiera Come, he sent a message to Zeuxis, begging him to supply him with corn and to support him according to the terms of their agreement. Zeuxis pretended to do this, but had no intention of giving Philip any real and substantial support of the kind.

Battle of Chios

Philip, as his siege proved unsuccessful and as the enemy were blockading him with a considerable number of warships, found difficulty in deciding what to do. But as the situation did not admit of much choice he put to sea contrary to the expectation of his adversaries; for Attalus had expected that he would continue his mining operations. His great object was to get out to sea suddenly as he believed he would be able to outstrip the enemy and afterwards proceed in safety along the coast to Samos. But his calculations proved entirely fallacious. For Attalus and Theophiliscus, as soon as they saw him putting to sea, at once took the requisite steps. They were sailing loose order, since they believed, as I said, that Philip still adhered to his original intention, but nevertheless they attacked him, rowing their hardest, Attalus engaging the right and leading wing of the enemy's fleet and Theophiliscus his left. Philip, thus anticipated, after signalling to those on his right orders to turn their ships directly towards the enemy and engage him vigorously, retired himself with a few light vessels to the islands in the middle of the strait and awaited the result of the battle. Philip's fleet which took part in the battle consisted of fifty-three decked, warships, . . . undecked ones, and a hundred and fifty galleys and beaked ships, for he had not been able to fit out all the ships which were at Samos. The enemy had sixty-five decked warships, including those of the Byzantines, nine trihemioliae, [1] and three triremes.

[1] Long, undecked vessels.

The ship of Attalus began the battle, and all those near it at once charged without orders. Attalus engaged an octoreme and ramming her first and inflicting on her a fatal blow under water, after considerable resistance on

the part of the troops on her deck finally sank the ship. Philip's galley with ten banks of oars, which was the flag-ship, fell by a strange chance into the hands of the enemy. Charging a trihemiolia which was in her path and ramming her with great force in the middle of her hull she stuck fast under the enemy's top bench of oars, the captain being unable to arrest the way she had on her. So that as the ship was thus hanging on to the trihemiolia she was in a most difficult position and entirely incapable of moving. Two triremes seized the opportunity to attack her, and striking her on both sides destroyed the ship and all the men on board her, among whom was Democrates, Philip's admiral. Just at the same time Dionysodorus and Deinocrates, who were brothers and both of them admirals of Attalus, met with equally strange experiences in the battle. Deinocrates engaged an octoreme and himself received his adversary's blow above water, as she was very high in the prow, but striking the enemy under her . . . could not at first get free of her although he repeatedly tried to back out. So that, as the Macedonians also displayed gallantry, he was in the utmost peril. But when Attalus came up to rescue him and by ramming the enemy set the two ships free, Deinocrates was unexpectedly saved, and when the troops on the enemy's ship after a gallant resistance had all perished, she herself with no one left on board her was captured by Attalus. Dionysodorus charging a ship at full speed, missed her, but in passing close alongside her lost all his right banks of oars, his turrets also being carried away. Upon this the enemy completely surrounded her, and amidst loud and excited cheers, the rest the crew and the ship itself were destroyed, but Dionysodorus and two others swam away to a trihemiolia which was coming up to help him.

Among the other ordinary ships of the fleet the contest was equal; for the advantage that Philip had in the number of his galleys was balanced by Attalus' superiority in decked ships. The position of affairs on Philip's right wing was such that the result was still doubtful; but Attalus was by far the most sanguine of success. The Rhodians, as I just said, were at first from the moment that they put out to sea very widely separated from the enemy, but as they sailed a great deal faster they caught up[the rear of the Macedonian fleet. At first they attacked the ships which were retreating before them from the stern, breaking their banks of oars. But as soon as the rest of Philip's fleet began to put about and come to the assistance of their comrades in peril and those of the Rhodians who had been the last to put to sea joined Theophiliscus, then both fleets directing their prows against each other engaged gallantly, cheering each other on with loud cries and the peal of trumpets. Now had not the Macedonians interspersed their galleys among their decked ships the battle would have been quickly and easily decided, but as it was these galleys impeded the action of the Rhodian ships in many ways. For, once the original order of battle had been disturbed in their first charge, they were utterly mixed up, so that they could not readily sail through the enemy's line nor turn their ships round, in fact could not employ at all the tactics in which they excelled, as the galleys were either falling foul of their oars and making it difficult for them to row, or else attacking them in the prow and sometimes in the stern, so that neither the pilots nor the oarsmen could serve efficiently. But in the direct charges prow to prow they employed a certain artifice. For dipping their prows themselves they received the enemy's blow above water, but piercing him below water produced breaches which could not be repaired. It was but seldom,

however, that they resorted to this mode of attack; for as a rule they avoided closing with the enemy, as the Macedonian soldiers offered a valiant resistance from the deck in such close combats. For the most part they cut the enemy's line and put his banks of oars out of action, afterwards turning and sailing round again and charging him sometimes in the stern and sometimes in flank while he was still turning; thus they made breaches in some of the ships and in others damaged some part of the necessary gear. Indeed by this mode of fighting they destroyed quite a number of the enemy's ships.

The most brilliant part in the battle was taken by three Rhodian quinqueremes, the flagship on board of which was Theophiliscus, that commanded by Philostratus, and lastly that of which Autolycus was pilot, but on board of it was Nicostratus. The latter had charged an enemy ship and left her ram in it: the ship that had been struck sank with all on board, while Autolycus and his men, the sea now pouring into the ship from the prow, were surrounded by the enemy and at first fought bravely, but finally Autolycus himself was wounded and fell into the sea in his armour, and the rest of the soldiers perished after a gallant struggle. At this moment Theophiliscus came up to help with three quinqueremes, and though he could not save the ship as she was full of water, rammed two of the enemy's ships and forced the troops on board to take to the water. He was rapidly surrounded by a number of galleys and decked ships, and after losing most of his soldiers, who fought splendidly, and receiving himself three wounds and displaying extraordinary courage, just managed to save his own ship, Philostratus coming up to his succour and taking a gallant part in the struggle. Theophiliscus now joined his other ships and again fell upon the

enemy, weak in body from his wounds, but more magnificent and desperate than ever in bravery of spirit. There were now two distinct battles in progress at a considerable distance from each other. For Philip's right wing, following out his original plan, continued to make for the shore and were not far away from the continent, while his left as it had put about to assist the rear was fighting with the Rhodians at a short distance from the island of Chios.

Attalus, however, by this time had a distinct advantage over the Macedonian right wing and had approached the islands under which Philip lay awaiting the result of the battle. He had observed one of his own quinqueremes rammed by an enemy ship and lying in a sinking condition out of the general action, and he hastened to her assistance with two quadriremes. When the enemy vessel gave way and retired towards the land he followed her up with more energy, hoping to capture her. Philip now, seeing that Attalus was widely separated from his own fleet, took four quinqueremes and three hemioliae and such galleys as were near him and, intercepting the return of Attalus to his own fleet, compelled him in great disquietude to run his ships ashore. After this the king and the crews escaped to Erythrae, but first gained possession of the ships and the royal furniture. Attalus indeed resorted to an artifice on this occasion by causing the most splendid articles of his royal furniture to be exposed on the deck of his ship, so that the Macedonians who were the first to reach it in their galleys, when they saw such a quantity of cups, purple cloaks, and other objects to match, instead of continuing the pursue turned aside to secure this booty, so that Attalus made good his retreat to Erythrae. Philip had been on the whole decidedly worsted in the battle, but elated by the misfortune that

had befallen Attalus, he put to sea again and set busily about collecting his ships and bade his men be of good cheer as the victory was theirs. In fact a sort of notion or half belief spread among them that Attalus had perished, as Philip was returning with the royal ship in tow. Dionysodorus, however, guessing what had happened to his sovereign, began to collect his own vessels by hoisting a signal, and when they had rapidly assembled round him sailed safely away to the harbour on the mainland. At the same time the Macedonians, who were engaged with the Rhodians and had long been in distress, abandoned the scene of battle, retreating in groups on the pretence that they were hastening to the assistance of their own ships. The Rhodians, taking some of the enemy's ships in tow and sinking others with their rams before their departure, sailed off to Chios.

Of Philip's ships there were sunk in the battle with Attalus one ship of ten banks of oars, one of nine, one of seven, and one of six, and of the rest of his fleet ten decked ships, three trihemioliae, and twenty-five galleys with their crews. In his battle with the Rhodians he lost ten decked ships and about forty galleys sunk and two quadriremes and seven galleys with their crews captured. Out of Attalus's fleet one trihemiolia and two quinqueremes were sunk, two quadriremes and the royal ship were taken. Of the Rhodian fleet two quinqueremes and a trireme were sunk, but not a single ship captured. The loss of life among the Rhodians amounted to about sixty men and in Attalus's fleet to about seventy, while Philip lost about three thousand Macedonian soldiers and six thousand sailors. About two thousand of the allies and Macedonians and about seven hundred of their adversaries were taken prisoners.

Such was the result of the battle of Chios. Philip claimed the victory on two pretences, the first being that he had driven Attalus ashore and captured his ships, and the second that by anchoring off the place called Argennus he had to all appearance anchored among the wreckage. Next day also he pursued the same line of conduct, collecting the wreckage and picking up the dead bodies that were recognizable, in order to give force to his imaginary claim; but that he did not himself believe in his victory was clearly proved by the Rhodians and Dionysodorus in a very short time. For on the following day, while the king was still thus occupied, they communicated with each other and sailing against him drew up their ships facing him, and upon no one responding to their challenge, sailed back again to Chios. Philip, who had never lost so many men in a single battle by land or by sea, felt the loss deeply, and his inclination for the war was much diminished, but he did his best to conceal his view of the situation from others, although the facts themselves did not admit of this. For, other things apart, the state of things after the battle could not fail to strike all who witnessed it with horror. There had been such a destruction of life that during the actual battle the whole strait was filled with corpses, blood, arms, and wreckage, and on the days which followed quantities of all were to be seen lying in confused heaps on the neighbouring beaches. This created a spirit of no ordinary dejection not only in Philip, but in all the Macedonians.

Theophiliscus survived for one day, and after writing a dispatch to his country about the battle and appointing Cleonaeus to replace him in command, died of his wounds. He had proved himself a man of great bravery in the fight and a man worthy of remembrance for his resolution. For had he not ventured to assail Philip in time all the others would have

thrown the opportunity away, intimidated by that king's audacity. But as it was, Theophiliscus by beginning hostilities obliged his own countrymen to rise to the occasion and obliged Attalus not to delay until he had made preparations for war, but to make war vigorously and give battle. Therefore very justly the Rhodians paid such honours to him after his death as served to arouse not only in those then alive but in their posterity a spirit of devotion to their country's interests.

After the sea-fight at Lade was over, the Rhodians being out of the way and Attalus not yet having joined, it was evidently quite possible for Philip to sail to Alexandria. This is the best proof that Philip had become like a madman when he acted thus.

What was it then that arrested his impulse? Simply the nature of things. For at a distance many men at times strive after impossibilities owing to the magnitude of the hopes before their eyes, their desires getting the better of their reason: but when the hour of action approaches they abandon their projects again without any exercise of reason, their faculty of thought being confused and upset by the insuperable difficulties they encounter.

Capture of Prinassus

After this Philip, having delivered several assaults which proved futile owing to the strength of the place, again withdrew, sacking the small forts and country residences, and when he had desisted from this, sat down before Prinassus. Having soon prepared pent-houses and other materials he began to besiege it by mining. But when this project proved impracticable owing to the rocky nature of the ground he hit on the following device. During the day he produced a noise underground as if the mines were going ahead, and at night he brought soil from elsewhere and heaped it round the

mounds of the excavations, so that those in the town judging from the quantity of soil piled up might be alarmed. At first the Prinassians held out valiantly, but when Philip sent to inform them that about two hundred feet of their wall had been underpinned and inquired whether they wished to withdraw under promise of safety or to perish all of them with their town after the underpinning had been fired, they believed what he said and surrendered the town.

The city of Iasus lies on the coast of Asia on the gulf situated between the Milesian Poseidon and Myndus, called by some the gulf of Iasus, but usually known as the gulf of Bargylia after the names of the cities at the head of it. It claims to have been originally a colony of Argos recolonized from Miletus, the son of Neleus the founder of Miletus having been invited there by the ancient inhabitants owing to the losses they had suffered in their war with the Carians. The town has a circumference of ten stades. It is reported and believed that at Bargylia no snow nor rain ever falls on the statue of Artemis Kindyas, although it stands in the open air, and the same story is told of that of Artemis Astias at Iasus. But I myself throughout my whole work have consistently viewed such statements by historians with a certain opposition and repugnance. For I think that to believe things which are not only beyond the limits of probability but beyond those of possibility shows quite a childish simplicity. For instance it is a sign of a blunted intelligence to say that some solid bodies when placed in the light cast no shadow, as Theopompus does when he tells us that those who enter the holy of holies of Zeus in Arcadia become shadowless. The statement about these statues is very much of the same nature. In cases indeed where such statements contribute to maintain a feeling of piety to the gods among the

common people we must excuse certain writers for reporting marvels and tales of the kind, but we should not tolerate what goes too far. Perhaps in all matters it is difficult to draw a limit, but a limit must be drawn. Therefore, in my opinion at least, while we should pardon slight errors and slight falsity of opinion, every statement that shows excess in this respect should be uncompromisingly rejected.

II. Affairs of Greece

Attempt of Nabis on Messene

I have already narrated which was the policy initiated in the Peloponnesus by Nabis the tyrant of Sparta, how he sent the citizens into exile and freeing the slaves married them to their masters' wives and daughters, how again by advertising his powerful own protection as a kind of inviolable sanctuary to those who had been forced to quit their own countries owing to their impiety and wickedness he gathered round him at Sparta a host of infamous men. I will now describe how being at the time I mention the ally of the Aetolians, Eleans, and Messenians, bound by oath and treaty to come to the help of them if they were attacked, he paid no respect to these solemn obligations, but attempted to betray Messene.

Criticism of the historians Zeno and Antisthenes

Since some authors of special histories have dealt with this period comprising the attempt on Messene and the sea battles I have described, I should like to offer a brief criticism of them. I shall not criticize the whole class, but those only whom I regard as worthy of mention and detailed examination. These are Zeno and Antisthenes of Rhodes, whom for several reasons I consider worthy of notice. For not only were they contemporary with the events they described, but they also took part in politics, and

generally speaking they did not compose their works for the sake of gain but to win fame and do their duty as statesmen. Since they treated of the same events as I myself I must not pass them over in silence, lest owing to their being Rhodians and to the reputation the Rhodians have for great familiarity with naval matters, in cases where I differ from them students may be inclined to follow them rather than myself. Both of them, then, declare that the battle of Lade was not less important than that of Chios, but more severe and terrible, and that both as regards the issue of the separate contests that occurred in the fight and its general result the victory lay with the Rhodians. Now I would admit that authors should have a partiality for their own country but they should not make statements about it that are contrary to facts. Surely the mistakes of which we writers are guilty and which it is difficult for us, being but human, to avoid are quite sufficient; but if we make deliberate misstatements in the interest of our country or of friends or for favour, what difference is there between us and those who gain their living by their pens? For just as the latter, weighing everything by the standard of profit, make their works unreliable, so politicians, biased by their dislikes and affections, often achieve the same result. Therefore I would add that readers should carefully look out for this fault and authors themselves be on their guard against it.

What I say will be made clear by the present case. The above authors confess that among the results of the separate actions in the battle of Lade were the following. Two Rhodian quinqueremes with their complements fell into the hands of the enemy, and when one ship after the battle raised her jury mast as she had been rammed and was going down, many of those near her followed her example and retreated to the open sea, upon which the

admiral, now left with only a few ships, was compelled to do likewise. The fleet, favoured by the wind, reached the coast of Myndus and anchored there, and next day put to sea again and crossed to Cos. Meanwhile the enemy took the quinqueremes in town and anchoring off Lade, spent night near their own camp. They say also that the Milesians, in great alarm at what had happened, not only voted a crown to Philip for his brilliant attack, but another to Heracleides. After telling us all these things, which obviously are symptoms of defeat, they nevertheless declare that the Rhodians were victorious both in the particular engagements and generally, and this in spite of the fact that the dispatch sent home by the admiral at the very time to the Rhodian senate and prytaneis, which is still preserved in the prytaneum at Rhodes, does not confirm the pronouncements of Antisthenes and Zeno, but my own.

In the next place they speak of the treacherous attempt on Messene. Here Zeno tells us that Nabis, setting out from Lacedaemon and crossing the Eurotas near the so-called Hoplites, marched by the narrow road skirting Poliasion until he arrived at the district of Sellasia and thence passing Thalamae reached the river Pamisus at Pharae. I really am at a loss what to say about all this: for the character of the description taken as a whole is exactly as if one were to say that a man setting out from Corinth and crossing the Isthmus and reaching the Scironic rocks at once entered the Contoporia and passing Mycenae proceeded towards Argos. For this is no slight error, but the places in question are in quite opposite quarters, the Isthmus and Scirades being to the east of Corinth while the Contoporia and Mycenae Messene are very nearly south-west, so that it is absolutely impossible to reach the latter locality by the former. The same is the case

with regard to the topography of Laconia. The Eurotas and Sellasia are south-east of Sparta, while Thalamae, Pharae, and the Pamisus are south-west. So that one who intends to march past Thalamae to Messenia not only need not go to Sellasia, but need not cross the Eurotas at all.

In addition to this he says that Nabis on returning from Messene quitted it by the gate leading to Tegea. This is absurd, for between Messene and Tegea lies Megalopolis, so that none of the gates can possibly be called the gate leading to Tegea by the Messenians. There is, however, a gate they call the Tegean gate, by which Nabis did actually retire, and Zeno, deceived by this name, supposed that Tegea was in the neighbourhood of Messene. This is not the case, but between Messenia and the territory of Tegea lie Laconia and the territory of Megalopolis. And last of all we are told that the Alpheius immediately below its source disappears and runs for a considerable distance under ground, coming to the surface again near Lycoa in Arcadia. The fact is that the river at no great distance from its source passes underground for about ten stades and afterwards on emerging runs through the territory of Megalopolis, being at first of small volume but gradually increasing, and after traversing a that territory in full view for two hundred stades reaches Lycoa, having now been joined by the Lusius and become quite impassable, and rapid . . .

I think, however, that all the instances I have mentioned are errors indeed but admit of some explanation and excuse. Some of them are due to ignorance, and those concerning the sea battle are due to patriotic sentiment. Have we then any more valid reason for finding fault with Zeno? Yes: because he is not for the most part so much concerned with inquiry into the facts and proper treatment of his material, as with elegance of style,

a quality on which he, like several other famous authors, often shows that he prides himself. My own opinion is that we should indeed bestow care and concern on the proper manner of reporting events—for it is evident that this is no small thing but greatly contributes to the value of history—but we should not regard this as the first and leading object to be aimed at by sober-minded men. Not at all: there are, I think, other excellences on which an historian who has been a practical statesman should rather pride himself.

I will attempt to make my meaning clear by the following instance. The above-mentioned author in narrating the siege of Gaza and the engagement between Antiochus and Scopas at the Panium in Coele-Syria has evidently taken so much pains about his style that the extravagance of his language is not excelled by any of those declamatory works written to produce a sensation among the vulgar. He has, however, paid so little attention to facts that his recklessness and lack of experience are again unsurpassed. Undertaking in the first place to describe Scopas's order of battle he tells us that the phalanx with a few horsemen rested its right wing on the hills, while the left wing and all the cavalry set apart for this purpose stood on the level ground. Antiochus, he says, had at early dawn sent off his elder son, Antiochus, with a portion of his forces to occupy the parts of the hill which commanded the enemy, and when it was daylight he took the rest of his army across the river which separated the two camps and drew it up on the plain, placing the phalanx in one line opposite the enemy's centre and stationing some of his cavalry to the left of the phalanx and some to the right, among the latter being the troop of mailed horsemen which was all under the command of his younger son, Antiochus. Next he tells us that the king posted the elephants at some distance in advance of the phalanx

together with Antipater's Tarantines, the spaces between the elephants being filled with bowmen and slingers, while he himself with his horse and foot guards took up a position behind the elephants. Such being their positions as laid down by him, he tells us that the younger Antiochus, whom he stationed in command of the mailed cavalry on the plain opposite the enemy's left, charged from the hill, routed and pursued the cavalry under Ptolemy, son of Aeropus, who commanded the Aetolians in the plain and on the left, and that the two phalanxes met and fought stubbornly, forgetting that it was impossible for them to meet as the elephants, cavalry, and light-armed troops were stationed in front of them.

Next he states that the phalanx, proving inferior in fighting power and pressed hard by the Aetolians, retreated slowly, but that the elephants were of great service in receiving them in their retreat and engaging the enemy. It is not easy to see how this could happen in the rear of the phalanx, or how if it did happen great service was rendered. For once the two phalanxes had met it was not possible for the elephants to distinguish friend from foe among those they encountered. In addition to this he says the Aetolian cavalry were put out of action in the battle because they were unaccustomed to the sight of the elephants. But the cavalry posted on the right remained unbroken from the beginning as he says himself, while the rest of the cavalry, which had been assigned to the left wing, had been vanquished and put to flight by Antiochus. What part of the cavalry, then, was it that was terrified by the elephants in the centre of the phalanx, and where was the king all this time and what service did he render in the action with the horse and foot he had about him, the finest in the army? We are not told a single word about this. Where again was the king's elder son, Antiochus, who had

occupied positions overlooking the enemy with a part of the army? Why! according to Zeno this young man did not even take part in the return to the camp after the battle; naturally not, for he supposes there were two Antiochi there, sons of the king, whereas there was only one with him in this campaign. And can he explain how Scopas was both the first and the last to leave the field? For he tells us that when he saw the younger Antiochus returning from the pursue and threatening the phalanx from the rear he despaired of victory and retreated; but after this the hottest part of the battle began, upon the phalanx being surrounded by the elephants and cavalry, and now Scopas was the last to leave the field.

Writers it seems to me should be thoroughly ashamed of nonsensical errors like the above. They should therefore strive above all to become masters of the whole craft of history, for to do so is good; but if this be out of their own power, they should give the closest attention to what is most necessary and important.

I was led to make these observations, because I observe that at the present day, as in the case of other arts and professions, what is true and really useful is always treated with neglect, while what is pretentious and showy is praised and coveted as if it were something great and wonderful, whereas it is both easier to produce and wins applause more cheaply, as is the case with all other written matter. As for Zeno's errors about the topography of Laconia, the faults were so glaring that I had no hesitation in writing to him personally also, as I do not think it right to look upon the faults of others as virtues of one's own, as is the practice of some, but it appears to me we should as far as we can look after and correct not only our own works but those of others for the sake of the general advantage. Zeno

received my letter, and knowing that it was impossible to make the change, as he had already published the work, was very much troubled, but could do nothing, while most courteously accepting my own criticism. And I too will beg both my contemporaries and future generations in pronouncing on my work, if they ever find me making misstatements or neglecting the truth intentionally to censure me relentlessly, but if I merely err owing to ignorance to pardon me, especially in view of the magnitude of the work and its comprehensive treatment of events.

III. Affairs of Egypt

Character of Tlepolemus

Tlepolemus, who was at the head of the government of Egypt, was still young and had constantly lived the life of a soldier addicted to display. He was also by nature too buoyant and fond of fame, and generally speaking many of the qualities he brought to bear on the management of affairs were good but many also were bad. As regards campaigning and the conduct of war he was capable, and he was also naturally courageous and happy in his intercourse with soldiers; but as for dealing with complicated questions of policy—a thing which requires application and sobriety—and as for the charge of money and in general all that concerned financial profit no one was more poorly endowed; so that speedily he not only came to grief but diminished the power of the kingdom. For when he assumed the financial control, he spent the most part of the day in sparring and fencing bouts with the young men, and when he had finished this exercise, at once invited them to drink with him, spending the greater part of his life in this manner and with these associates. During that portion of the day that he set apart for audiences he used to distribute, or rather, if one must speak the truth, scatter

the royal funds among the envoys who had come from Greece and the actors of the theatre of Dionysus and chiefly among the generals and soldiers present at court. For he was quite incapable of refusing and gave at once to anyone who made himself pleasant to him any sum he thought fit. So the evil went on growing and propagating itself. For every one who had received an unexpected favour was for the sake both of the past and of the future profuse in his expressions of thanks. Tlepolemus, when he heard these universal eulogies of himself and the toasts drunk to him at table, when he read the inscriptions in his honour and heard of the playful verses sung about him to popular audiences all through the town, became at length very vainglorious, and every day his self-conceit increased and he grew more lavish of gifts to foreigners and soldiers. All this gave the courtiers much cause for complaint. They noted all his acts with disapproval, and found his arrogance hard to put up with, while Sosibius when compared with him aroused their admiration. The latter, they thought, had shown a wisdom beyond his years in his guardianship of the king, and in his communications with foreign representatives had conducted himself in a manner worthy of the charge committed to him, the seal that is to say and the person of the king. At this time Ptolemaeus, the son of Sosibius, arrived on his way back from the court of Philip. Even before leaving Alexandria he had been full of conceit owing to his own nature and owing to the affluence he owed to his father. But when on arriving in Macedonia he met the young men at that court, conceiving that Macedonian manhood consisted in the superior elegance of their dress and footgear, he returned to Egypt full of admiration for all such things, and convinced that he alone was a man owing to his having travelled and come in contact with the

Macedonians, while all the Alexandrians were still slaves and blockheads. In consequence he at once grew jealous of Tlepolemus and acted so as to cause friction between them; and as all the courtiers took his part, because Tlepolemus administered public affairs and finances more like an heir than like a trustee, the difference soon became more acute. And now Tlepolemus, when hostile utterances due to the captiousness and malignancy of the courtiers reached his ears, at first refused to listen to these and treated him with contempt; but when on some occasions they even held public meetings and ventured to blame him for his maladministration of the affairs of the kingdom and this in his absence, he became really incensed, and calling a meeting of the Council, appeared in person and said that they brought false accusations against him secretly and in private, but that he thought proper to accuse them in public and to their faces.

After his speech he took the seal from Sosibius, and having taken possession of it continued henceforth to act in all matters exactly as he chose.

IV. Affairs of Syria

After King Antiochus had taken and sacked the city of Gaza Polybius writes as follows.

It seems to me both just and proper here to testify, as they merit, to the character of the people of Gaza. Although in war they display no more valour than the people of Coele-Syria in general, they are far superior as regards acting in unison and keeping their faith; and to put it shortly show a courage which is irresistible. For instance in the Persian invasion, when all other towns were terrified by the vast power of the invaders and surrendered

themselves and their homes to the Medes, they alone faced the danger as one man and submitted to a siege. Again on the arrival of Alexander, when not only had other cities surrendered, but when Tyre had been stormed and her population enslaved; when there seemed to be scarcely any hope of safety for those who opposed the impetuous force of Alexander's attack, they were the only people in Syria who dared to withstand him and exhausted every resource in doing so. At the present time they acted similarly; for they left no possible means of resistance untried in their effort to keep their faith to Ptolemy. Therefore, just as it is our duty to make separate mention of brave men in writing history, so we should give due credit to such whole cities as are wont to act nobly by tradition and principle.

V. Affairs of Italy

Scipio returns to Rome. His Triumph.

Publius Scipio arrived from Africa not long after the above date. As the eagerness with which he was awaited by the people corresponded to the greatness of his achievements, the splendour of his reception and his popularity with the commons were both very great. And this was quite natural, reasonable, and proper. For while they had never hoped to expel Hannibal from Italy and be quit of the danger which menaced themselves and those dearest to them, the thought that now they were assuredly not only free from all fear and peril but that they had overcome their foes caused a joy that knew no bounds. And when he entered Rome in triumph, they were reminded more vividly of their former peril by the actual spectacle of the contents of the procession, and expressed with passionate fervour their thanks to the gods and their love for him who had brought

about so great a change. For among the prisoners led through the town in the triumph was Syphax, king of the Masaesylii, who shortly afterwards died in prison. After the termination of the triumph the Roman populace continued for many days to celebrate games and hold festival, the funds for the purpose being provided by the bounty of Scipio.

VI. Affairs of Macedonia and Greece

Philip in Caria

At the beginning of the winter in which Publius Sulpicius was appointed consul in Rome, King Philip, who remained at Bargylia, when he saw that the Rhodians and Attalus were not only not dissolving their fleet but were manning other ships and paying more earnest attention to the maintenance of their garrisons, was much embarrassed and felt for many reasons serious disquietude as to the future. For one thing he dreaded setting sail from Bargylia as he foresaw the dangers of the sea, and in the next place as he was not confident about the position of affairs in Macedonia he did not at all wish to pass the winter in Asia, being afraid both of the Aetolians and of the Romans. For he was not ignorant of the embassies which had been sent to Rome to act against him, and he had learnt that the campaign in Africa was over. All these things caused him exceeding great disquietude, and for the present he was compelled to remain where he was, leading the life of a wolf as the saying is. By preying on some and robbing them, by putting pressure on others and by cringing to others contrary to his nature, as his army was starving, he sometimes managed to get a supply of meat, sometimes of figs and sometimes a quite insignificant quantity of corn. Zeuxis provided him with some of these things and others he got from the people of Mylasa, Alabanda, and Magnesia, whom he used to caress

whenever they gave him anything, but if they did not he used to growl at them and make plots against them. Finally he arranged for Mylasa to be betrayed to him by Philocles, but failed owing to the stupid way in which the design was managed. As for the territory of Alabanda he devastated it as if it were enemy soil, alleging that it was necessary for him to procure food for his army.

(From Athenaeus III. 78C)

King Philip, the father of Perseus, as Polybius tells us in his 16th Book, when he overran Asia, being in want of food for his soldiers, obtained figs from the Magnesians as they had no corn, and on taking Myus presented it to the Magnesians in return for the figs.

Attalus at Athens

The people of Athens sent an embassy to King Attalus to congratulate him on what had happened and to invite him to come to Athens to discuss the situation. The king, learning a few days afterwards that a legation from Rome had arrived at Piraeus, and thinking it necessary to meet them, sailed off in haste. The Athenians, hearing of his approaching arrival, made a most generous grant for the reception and the entertainment in general of the king. Attalus, on the first day after his arrival at Piraeus, had an interview with the Roman legates, and was highly gratified to find that they were both mindful of his joint action with Rome in the past, and ready to engage in war with Philip. Next day he went up to Athens in great state accompanied by the Romans and the Athenian archons. For not only all the magistrates and the knights, but all the citizens with their wives and children went out to meet them, and when they joined them there was such a demonstration on the part of the people of their affection for the Romans and still more for

Attalus that nothing could have exceeded it in heartiness. As he entered the Dipylon, they drew up the priests and priestesses on either side of the road; after this they threw all the temples open and bringing victims up to all the altars begged him to perform sacrifice. Lastly they voted him such honours as they had never readily paid to any former benefactors. For in addition to other distinctions they named one of the tribes Attalis after him and they added his name to the list of the heroes who gave their names to these tribes.

In the next place they summoned an assembly and invited the king to attend. But when he begged to be excused, saying that it would be in bad taste on his part to appear in person and recite to the recipients all the benefits he had conferred, they did not insist on his presence, but begged him to write a public statement of what he thought advisable under present circumstances. He agreed to this, and when he had written the letter the presidents laid it before the assembly. The chief points in the letter were as follows. He first reminded them of the benefits he had formerly conferred on the people of Athens, in the next place he gave an account of his action against Philip at the present crisis, and finally he adjured them to take part in the war against Philip, giving them his sworn assurance that if they did not decide now upon nobly declaring that they shared the hostile sentiments of the Romans, the Rhodians and himself, but later, after neglecting this chance, wished to share in a peace due to the efforts of others, they would fail to obtain what lay in the interest of their country. After this letter had been read the people were ready to vote for war, both owing to the tenour of what the king said and owing to their affection for him. And, in fact, when the Rhodians came forward and spoke at length in the same sense, the

Athenians decided to make war on Philip. They gave the Rhodians also a magnificent reception, bestowing on the people a Rhodes a crown for conspicuous valour and on all citizens of Rhodes equal political rights at Athens with her own citizens, in reward for their having in addition to other services returned to them the Athenian ships that had been captured and the prisoners of war. The Rhodian ambassadors having accompanied this sailed back to Ceos with their fleet to look after the islands.

Rome and Philip

At the time that the Roman legates were present in Athens Nicanor, Philip's general, overran Attica up to the Academy, upon which the Romans, after sending a herald to him in the first place, met him and asked him to inform Philip that the Romans requested that king to make war on no Grecian state and also to give such compensation to Attalus for the injuries he had inflicted on him as a fair tribunal should pronounce to be just. If he acted so, they added, he might consider himself at peace with Rome, but if he refused to accede the consequences would be the reverse. Nicanor on hearing this departed. The Romans conveyed the contents of this communication to the Epirots at Phoenice in sailing along that coast and to Amynander, going up to Athamania for that purpose. They also apprised the Aetolians at Naupactus and the Achaeans at Aegium. After having made this statement to Philip through Nicanor they sailed away to meet Antiochus and Ptolemy for the purpose of coming to terms.

But it seems to me that while there are many cases in which men have begun well and in which their spirit of enterprise has kept pace with the width of the matter in hand, those who have succeeded in bringing their designs to a conclusion, and even when fortune has been adverse to them,

have compensated for deficiency in ardour by the exercise of reason, are few. Therefore we should be right on this occasion in finding fault with the remissness of Attalus and the Rhodians and in approving Philip's truly kingly conduct, his magnanimity and fixity of purpose, not indeed praising his character as a whole, but noting with admiration his readiness to meet present circumstances. I make this express statement lest anyone should think I contradict myself, as but lately I praised Attalus and the Rhodians and blamed Philip, and now I do the reverse. For it was for this very reason that at the outset of this work I stated as a principle that it was necessary at times to praise and at times to blame the same person, since often the shifts and turns of circumstances for the worse or for the better change the resolves of men, and at times by their very nature men are impelled to act either as they should or as they should not. One or other of these things happened then to Philip. For in his vexation at his recent losses and prompted chiefly by anger and indignation, he adapted himself to the situation with frenzied and almost inspired vigour, and by this means was able to resume the struggle against the Rhodians and King Attalus and achieve the success which ensued. I was induced, then, to say this because some people, like bad racers, give up their determination near the end of the course while it is just then that others overcome their adversaries.

Philip wished to cut off the resources and stepping-stones of the Romans in those parts.

So that if he meant to cross again to Asia, he might have Abydus as a stepping-stone.

Siege of Abydus

To describe at length the position of Abydus and Sestus and the peculiar advantages of those cities seems to me useless, as every one who has the least claim to intelligence has acquired some knowledge of them owing to the singularity of their position, but I think it of some use for my present purpose to recall it summarily to the minds of my readers so as to fix their attention on it. One can form an idea of the facts about these cities not so much from a study of their actual topography as from dwelling on the comparison I am about to adduce. For just as it is impossible to sail from the sea called by some the Ocean and by others the Atlantic Sea into our own sea except by passing through the mouth of it at the Pillars of Heracles, so no one can reach the Euxine and Propontis from our sea except by sailing through the passage between Sestus and Abydus. Now, just as if chance in forming these two straits had exercised a certain proportion, the passage at the Pillars of Heracles is far wider than the Hellespont, being sixty stades in width while the width of the latter at Abydus is two stades, just as if this distance had been designed owing to the Ocean being many times the size of this sea of ours. The natural advantages, however, of the entrance at Abydus far excel those of that at the Pillars of Heracles. For the former, lying as it does between two inhabited districts, somewhat resembles a gate owing to the free intercourse it affords, being sometimes bridged over by those who intend to pass on foot from one continent to the other and at other times constantly traversed by boats, while the latter is used by few and rarely for passage either from sea to sea or from land to land, owing to the lack of intercourse between the peoples inhabiting the extremities of Africa and Europe and owing to our ignorance of the outer sea. The city of Abydus itself lies between two capes on the European shore and has a harbour

which affords protection from all winds. Without putting in to the harbour it is absolutely impossible to anchor off the city owing to the swiftness and strength of the current in the straits.

Philip, however, now began the siege of Abydus by sea and land, planting piles at the entrance to the harbour and making an entrenchment all round the town. The siege was not so remarkable for the greatness of the preparations and the variety of the devices of the preparations and the variety of the devices employed in the works—those artifices and contrivances by which besieged and besiegers usually try to defeat each other's aims—as for the bravery and exceptional spirit displayed by the besieged, which rendered it especially worthy of being remembered and described to posterity. For at first the inhabitants of the town with the utmost self-confident valiantly withstood all Philip's elaborate forces, smashing by catapults some of the machines he brought to bear by sea and destroying others by fire, so that the enemy with difficulty withdrew their ships from the danger zone. As for the besiegers' works on land, up to a certain point the Abydenes offered a gallant resistance there, not without hope of getting the better of their adversaries; but when the outer wall was undermined and fell, and when the Macedonian mines approached the wall they had built from inside to replace the fallen one, they at last sent Iphiades and Pantagnotus as commissioners, inviting Philip to take possession of the town, if he should allow the soldiers sent by Attalus and the Rhodians to depart under flag of truce, and all free inhabitants to escape with the clothes on their backs to whatever place they severally chose. But when Philip ordered them either to surrender at discretion or to fight bravely the commissioners returned, and the people of Abydus, when they heard the

answer, summoned a public assembly and discussed the situation in a despairing mood. They decided first of all to liberate the slaves, that they might have no pretext for refusing to assist them in the defence, in the next place to assemble all the women in the temple of Artemis and the children with their nurses in the gymnasium, and finally to collect all their gold and silver in the market-place and place all valuable articles of dress in the Rhodian quadrireme and the trireme of the Cyzicenians. Having resolved on this they unanimously put their decree into execution, and then calling another assembly they nominated fifty of the older and most trusted citizens, men who possessed sufficient bodily strength to carry out their decision, and made them swear in the presence of all the citizens that whenever they saw the inner wall in the possession of the enemy they would kill all the women and children, set fire to the ships I mentioned, and throw the gold and silver into the sea with curses. [2] After this, calling the priests before them they all swore either to conquer the foe or die fighting for their country. Last of all they slew some victims and obliged the priests and priestesses to pronounce over the burning entrails curses on those who neglected to perform" what they had sworn. Having thus made sure of everything they stopped countermining against the enemy and came to the decision that as soon as the cross wall fell they would fight on its ruins and resist the assailants to the death.

[2] Curses, that is to say, on anyone who recovered it.

All this would induce one to say that the daring courage of the Abydenes surpassed even the famous desperation of the Phocians and the courageous resolve of the Acarnanians. For the Phocians are said to have decided on the same course regarding their families at a time when they had by no means

entirely given up the hope of victory, as they were about to engage the Thessalians in a set battle in the open, and very similar measures were resolved on by the Acarnanian nation when they foresaw that they were to be attacked by the Aetolians. I have told both the stories in a previous part of this work. But the people of Abydus, when thus completely surrounded and with no hope of safety left, resolved to meet their fate and perish to a man together with their wives and children rather than to live under the apprehension that their families would fall into the power of their enemies. Therefore one feels strongly inclined in the case of the Abydenes to find fault with Fortune for having, as if in pity, set right at once the misfortunes of those other peoples by granting them the victory and safety they despaired of, but for choosing to do the opposite to the Abydenes. For the men perished, the city was taken and the children and their mothers fell into the hands of the enemy.

For after the fall of the cross wall, its defenders, mounting the ruins as they had sworn, continued to fight with such courage that Philip, though he had thrown his Macedonians on them corps after corps until nightfall, finally abandoned the struggle, having even almost given up hope of success in the siege as a whole. For the foremost of the Abydenes not only mounted the bodies of their dead enemies and kept up the struggle thence with the utmost desperation, not only did they fight most fiercely with sword and spear alone, but whenever any of these weapons became unserviceable and powerless to inflict injury, or when they were forced to drop it, they took hold of the Macedonians with their hands and threw them down in their armour, or breaking their pikes, stabbed them repeatedly on the face or the exposed parts of the body with the points threw them into

utter confusion. When night came on and the battle was suspended, as most of the defenders were lying dead on the ruins and the remainder were exhausted by wounds and toil, Glaucides and Theognetus, calling a meeting of a few of the elder citizens, sacrificed in hope of personal advantage all that was splendid and admirable in the resolution of the citizens by deciding to save the women and children alive and to send out as soon as it was light the priests and priestesses with supplicatory boughs to Philip to beg for mercy and surrender the city to him.

At this time King Attalus, on hearing that Abydus was being besieged, sailed through the Aegean to Tenedos, and on the part of the Romans the younger Marcus Aemilius came likewise by sea to Abydus itself. For the Romans had heard the truth in Rhodes about the siege of Abydus, and wishing to address Philip personally, as they had been instructed, deferred their project of going to see the other kings and sent off the above Marcus Aemilius on this mission. Meeting the king near Abydus he informed him that the Senate had passed a decree, begging him neither to make war on any other Greeks, nor to lay hands on any of Ptolemy's possessions. He was also to submit to a tribunal the question of compensation for the damage he had done to Attalus and the Rhodians. If he acted so he would be allowed to remain at peace, but if he did not at once accept these terms he would find himself at war with Rome. When Philip wished to prove that the Rhodians were the aggressors, Marcus interrupted him and asked, "And what about the Athenians? What about the Cianians, and what about the Abydenes now? Did any of these attack you first?" The king was much taken aback and said that he pardoned him for speaking so haughtily for three reasons, first because he was young and inexperienced in affairs, next because he

was the handsomest man of his time—and this was a fact—and chiefly because he was a Roman. "My principal request," he said, "to the Romans is not to violate our treaty or to make war on me; but if nevertheless they do so, we will defend ourselves bravely, supplicating the gods to help us."

After exchanging these words they separated, and Philip on gaining possession of the city found all their valuables collected in a heap by the Abydenes ready for him to seize. But when he saw the number and the fury of those who destroyed themselves and their women and children, either by cutting their throats, or by burning or by hanging or by throwing themselves into wells or off the roofs, he was amazed, and grieving much thereat announced that he granted a respite of three days to those who wished to hang themselves and cut their throats. The Abydenes, maintaining the resolve they had originally formed concerning themselves, and regarding themselves as almost traitors to those who had fought and died for their country, by no means consented to live except those of them whose hands had been stayed by fetters or such forcible means, all the rest of them rushing without hesitation in whole families to their death.

After the fall of Abydus an embassy from the Achaean League reached Rhodes begging that people to come to terms with Philip. But when the legates from Rome presented themselves after the Achaeans and request the Rhodians not to make peace with Philip apart from the Romans, it was resolved to stand by the Roman people and aim at maintaining friendship with them.

Expedition of Philopoemen against Nabis

Philopoemen, after calculating the distances of all the Achaean cities and from which of them troops could reach Tegea by the same road, proceeded

to write letters to all of them and distributed these among the most distant cities, arranging so that each city received not only its own letter but those of the other cities on the same line of road. In the first letters he wrote to the commanding officers [3] as follows: "On receiving this you will make all of military age assemble at once in the market-place for five days. As soon as all those present in the town are collected you will march them to the next city, and on arrival there you will hand the letter addressed to it to their commanding officer and obey the instructions contained in it." The contents in this letter were the same as those of the former one except that the name of the city to which they were to advance was different. This proceeding being repeated in city after city, it resulted in the first place that none knew for what action or what purpose the preparations were being made, and next that absolutely no one was aware where he was marching to but simply the name of the next city on the list, so that all advanced picking each other up and wondering what it was all about. As the distances of Tegea from the most remote cities differ, the letters were not delivered to them simultaneously but at a date in proportion to the distance. The consequence was that without either the people at Tegea or those who arrived there knowing when was contemplated, all the Achaean forces with their arms marched into Tegea by all the gates simultaneously. He contrived matter so and made this comprehensive plan owing to the number of eavesdroppers and spies employed by the tyrant.

[3] There were two Apoteleioi in each city, commanding the cavalry and infantry respectively.

On the day on which the main body of the Achaeans would arrive in Tegea he dispatched his picked troops to pass the night at Sellasia and next

day at daybreak to commence a raid on Laconia. If the mercenaries came to protect the country and gave them trouble, he ordered them to retire on Scotitas and afterwards to place themselves under the orders of Didascalondas the Cretan, who had been taken into his confidence and had received full instructions about the whole enterprise. These picked troops, then, advanced confidently to carry out their orders. Philopoemen, ordering the Achaeans to take an early supper, led the army out of Tegea, and making a rapid night march, halted his forces at early dawn in the district called the country round Scotitas, a place which lies between Tegea and Sparta. The mercenaries at Pellene, when their scouts reported the invasion of the enemy, at once, as is their custom, advanced and fell upon the latter. When the Achaeans, as they had been ordered, retreated, they followed them up, attacking them with great daring and confidence. But when they reached the place where the ambuscade had been placed and the Achaeans rose from it, some of them were cut to pieces and others made prisoners.

Philip, when he saw that the Achaeans were chary of going to war with Rome, tried by every means to create animosity between the two peoples.

VII. Affairs of Asia

(From Josephus, *Ant. Jud.* XII. 3. 3.)

Polybius of Megalopolis testifies to this. For he says in the 16th Book of his Histories, "Scopas, Ptolemy's general, set out into the upper country and destroyed the Jewish nation in this winter."

"The siege having been negligently conducted, Scopas fell into disrepute and was violently assailed."

He says in the same book, "When Scopas was conquered by Antiochus, that king occupied Samaria, Abila, and Gadara, and after a short time those

Jews who inhabited the holy place called Jerusalem, surrendered to him. Of this place and the splendour of the temple I have more to tell, but defer my narrative for the present."

THE END OF BOOK XVI

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XVIII

I. AFFAIRS OF MACEDONIA AND GREECE

Flamininus and Philip

When the time fixed for the conference came, Philip arrived, having sailed from Demetrias to the Melian gulf with five galleys and a beaked ship in which he travelled himself. He was accompanied by the Macedonians Apollodorus and Demosthenes, his secretaries, by Brachylles from Boeotia, and by Cycliadas the Achaean, who had had to leave the Peloponnesus for the reasons stated above. Flamininus had with him King Amynander and the representative of Attalus Dionysodorus, and on the part of cities and nations Aristaenus and Xenophon from Achaea, Acesimbrotus, the admiral, from Rhodes, and from Aetolia the strategus Phaeneas and several other politicians. Flamininus and those with him reached the sea at Nicaea and waited standing on the beach, but Philip on approaching land remained afloat. When Flamininus asked him to come ashore he rose from his place on the ship and said he would not disembark. Upon Flamininus again asking him of whom he was afraid Philip said he was afraid of no one but the gods, but he was suspicious of most of those present and especially of the Aetolians. When the Roman general expressed his surprise and said that the danger was the same for all and the chances equal, Philip said he was not right; for if anything happened to Phaeneas, there were many who could be strategi of the Aetolians, but if Philip perished there was no one at present to occupy the throne of Macedon. He seemed to them to have

opened the conference with little dignity, but Flamininus, however, begged him to state his reasons for attending it. Philip said it was not his own business to speak first, but that of Flamininus, and he therefore asked him to explain what he should do to keep the peace. The Roman general said that what it was his duty to say was simple and obvious. He demanded that Philip should withdraw from the whole of Greece after giving up to each power the prisoners and deserters in his hands; that he should surrender to the Romans the district of Illyria that had fallen into his power after the treaty made in Epirus, and likewise restore to Ptolemy all the towns that he had taken from him after the death of Ptolemy Philopator.

Flamininus after speaking thus stopped, and turning to the others bade them each speak as they had been instructed by those who had commissioned them. Dionysodorus, the representative of Attalus, was the first to speak. He said that Philip must give up those of the king's ships he had taken in the battle of Chios, together with the men captured in them, and that he must restore to their original condition the temple of Aphrodite and the Nicephorium which he had destroyed. Next Acesimbrotus, the Rhodian admiral, demanded that Philip should evacuate the Peraea which he had taken from the Rhodians, withdraw his garrisons from Iasus, Bargylia, and Euromus, permit the Perinthians to resume their confederacy with Byzantium, and retire from Sestus and Abydus and all commercial depots and harbours in Asia. After the Rhodians the Achaeans demanded Corinth and Argos undamaged, and next the Aetolians first of all, as the Romans had done, bade him withdraw from the whole of Greece, and next asked him to restore to them undamaged the cities which were formerly members of the Aetolian League.

After Phaeneas, the strategus of the Aetolians, had spoken thus, Alexander called the Isian, a man considered to be a practical statesman and an able speaker, took part in the debate and said that Philip neither sincerely desired peace at present nor did he make war bravely when he had to do so, but that in assemblies and conferences he laid traps and watched for opportunities and behaved as if he were at war, but in war itself adopted an unfair and very ungenerous course. For instead of meeting his enemies face to face he used to flee before them, burning and sacking cities, and by this course of conduct though beaten he spoilt the prizes of the victors. Not this but quite the reverse had been the object of the former kings of Macedon; for they used to fight constantly with each other in the field but very seldom destroyed or ruined cities. This was evident to everybody from the war that Alexander waged against Darius in Asia, and from that long dispute of his successors in which they all took up arms against Antigonus for the mastery of Asia; and their successors again down to Pyrrhus had acted on the same principle; they had always been ready to give battle to each other in the open field and had done all in their power to overcome each other by force of arms, but they had spared cities, so that whoever conquered might be supreme in them and be honoured by his subjects. But while destroying the objects of war, to leave war itself untouched was madness and very strong madness. And this was just what Philip was now doing. For when he was hurrying back from the pass in Epirus he destroyed more cities in Thessaly, though he was the friend and ally of the Thessalians, than any of their enemies had ever destroyed. After adding much more to the same effect, he finally argued as follows. He asked Philip why, when Lysimachia was a member of the Aetolian League and was in charge of a military governor

sent by them, he had expelled the latter and placed a garrison of his own in the city; and why had he sold into slavery the people of Cius, also a member of the Aetolian League, when he himself was on friendly terms with the Aetolians? On what pretext did he now retain possession of Echinus, Phthian Thebes, Pharsalus, and Larisa?

When Alexander had ended this harangue, Philip brought his ship nearer to the shore than it had been, and standing up on the deck, said that Alexander's speech had been truly Aetolian and theatrical. Everyone, he said, was aware that no one ever of his own free will ruins his own allies, but that by changes of circumstance commanders are forced to do many things that they would have preferred not to do. The king had not finished speaking when Phaeneas, whose sight was badly impaired, interrupted him rudely, saying that he was talking nonsense, he must either fight and conquer or do the bidding of his betters. Philip, though in an evil case, could not refrain from his peculiar gift of raillery, but turning to him said, "Even a blind man, Phaeneas, can see that"; for he was ready and had a natural talent for scoffing at people. Then, turning again to Alexander, "You ask me," he said, "Alexander, why I annexed Lysimachia. It was in order that it should not, owing to your neglect, be depopulated by the Thracians, as has actually happened since I withdrew to serve in this war those of my troops who were acting not as you say as its garrison, but as its guardians. As for the people of Cius, it was not I who made war on them, but when Prusias did so I helped him to exterminate them, and all through your fault. For on many occasions when I and the other Greeks sent embassies to you begging you to remove from your statutes the law empowering you to get booty from booty, you replied that you would rather remove Aetolia from

Aetolia than that law. When Flamininus said he wondered what that was, the king tried to explain to him, saying that the Aetolians have a custom not only to make booty of the persons and territory of those with whom they are themselves at war, but if any other peoples are at war with each other who are friends and allies of theirs, it is permissible nevertheless to the Aetolian without any public decree to help both belligerents and pillage the territory of both; so that with the Aetolians there is no precise definition of friendship and enmity, but they promptly treat as enemies and make war on all between whom there is a dispute about anything. "So what right have they," he continued, "to accuse me now, because, being a friend of the Aetolians and the ally of Prusias, I acted against the people of Cius in coming to the aid of my ally?" But what is most insufferable of all is that they assume they are the equals of the Romans in demanding that the Macedonians should withdraw from the whole of Greece. To employ such language at all is indeed a sign of haughtiness, but while we may put up with it from the lips of the Romans we cannot when the speakers are Aetolians. And what," he said, "is that Greece from which you order me to withdraw, and how do you define Greece? For most of the Aetolians themselves are not Greeks. No! the countries of the Agraae, the Apodotae, and the Amphilochians are not Greece. Do you give me permission to remain in those countries?"

Upon Flamininus smiling, "That is all I have to say to the Aetolians," he said, "but my answer to the Romans and Attalus is that a fair judge would pronounce that it would be more just for them to give up the captured ships and men to me than for me to give them up to them. For it was not I who first took up arms against Attalus and the Rhodians, but they cannot deny

that they were the aggressors. However, at your bidding I cede the Peraea to the Rhodians and the men and ships that still survive to Attalus. As for the damage done to the Nicephorium and the sanctuary of Aphrodite, it is not in my power to repair it otherwise, but I will send plants and gardeners to cultivate the place and see to the growth of the trees that were cut down." Flamininus again smiled at the jest, and Philip now passed to the Achaeans. He first enumerated all the favours they had received from Antigonus and those he himself had done them, next he recited the high honours they had conferred on the Macedonian monarchs, and finally he read the decree in which they decided to abandon him and go over to the Romans, taking occasion thereby to dwell at length on their inconsistency and ingratitude. Still, he said, he would restore Argos to them, but would consult with Flamininus as to Corinth.

After speaking to the others in these terms he asked Flamininus, saying that he was now addressing himself and the Romans, whether he demanded his withdrawal from those towns and places in Greece which he had himself conquered or from those also which he had inherited from his forbears. Flamininus remained silent, but Aristaenus on the part of the Achaeans and Phaeneas on that of the Aetolians were at once ready with a reply. However, as the day was now drawing to a close, they were prevented from speaking owing to the hour, and Philip demanded that they should all furnish him with their terms for peace in writing; for he was alone and had no one to consult, so he wished to think over their demands. Flamininus was by no means displeased by Philip's jests, and not wishing the others to think he was so, rallied Philip in turn by saying, "Naturally you are alone now, Philip, for you have killed all those of your friends who would give you the

best advice." The Macedonian monarch smiled sardonically and made no reply.

They all now, after handing to Philip their decisions in writing—decisions similar to those I have stated—separated, making an appointment to meet next day again at Nicaea. On the morrow Flamininus and all the others arrived punctually at the appointed place, but Philip did not put in an appearance.

When it was getting quite late in the day and Flamininus had nearly given up all hope, Philip appeared at dusk accompanied by the same people, having, as he himself asserted, spent the day in puzzling over the conditions and dealing with the difficult points, but in opinion of others his object was to prevent, by cutting down the time, the accusations of the Achaeans and Aetolians. For on the previous day at the moment of his departure he saw they were both ready to join issue with him and load him with reproach. So that now, approaching nearer, he asked the Roman general to converse with him in private about the situation, so that there should not be a mere skirmishing with words on both sides but that an end of some kind should be put to the dispute. When he begged and demanded this repeatedly, Flamininus asked those present what he ought to do. Upon their bidding him meet Philip and hear what he had to say, Flamininus taking with him Appius Claudius, then military tribune, told the rest, who had retired a short distance from the seashore, to remain where they were and asked Philip to come ashore. The king left the ship accompanied by Apollodorus and Demosthenes, and meeting Flamininus conversed with him for a considerable time. It is difficult to tell what each of them said on that occasion, but Flamininus, after Philip had left, in explaining to the rest the

king's proposals, said that he would restore Pharsalus and Larisa to the Aetolians, but not Thebes, he would give up the Peraea to the Rhodians, but would not withdraw from Iasus and Bargylia, but to the Achaeans he would surrender Corinth and Argos. He would give up to Rome his possessions in Illyria and would restore all prisoners of war, and restore also to Attalus his ships and all who survived of the men captured in the naval engagements.

When all present expressed their dissatisfaction with these terms and maintained that Philip should in the first place execute their common demand—that is withdraw from the whole of Greece, apart from which the different concessions were absurd and worthless— Philip, noticing the discussion that was going on and fearing the complaints they would bring against him, proposed to Flamininus to adjourn the conference till next day because, apart from other things, it was getting late: then he said he would either convince them or be convinced of the justice of their demands. Flamininus yielded to this request and after agreeing to meet on the beach at Thronion they separated, and all next day arrived in time at the appointed place. Philip now in a short speech begged them all and especially Flamininus not to break off negotiations now that they were on the verge of a settlement of most questions, but if possible to come to an agreement among themselves about the disputed points. If not, however, he said he would send an embassy to the senate and either persuade that body about these points or do whatever it ordered him. On his making this proposal all the others said they ought to continue the war and not accede to the request; but the Roman general said that while he too was quite aware that there was no probability of Philip's really doing anything they demanded, yet as the king's request in no way interfered with their own action, it perfectly suited

them to grant it. For as things stood, nothing they now said could be made valid without consulting the senate, and besides the general advantage of arriving at a knowledge of the will of the senate, the immediate future was a favourable time for taking this course. The armies, in fact, could do nothing owing to the winter, and therefore to devote this time to referring the matter to the senate was by no means useless, but in the interest of them all. They all soon gave their consent as they saw that Flamininus was evidently not averse from referring things to the senate, and it was decided to allow Philip to send an embassy to Rome, and that they also should each send ambassadors to speak before the senate and accuse Philip.

The conference having led to a result agreeable to Flamininus and in accordance with his original calculations, he at once set to work to complete the texture of his design, securing his own position and giving Philip no advantage. For granting him an armistice of two months he ordered him to finish with his embassy to Rome within that time and to withdraw at once his garrisons from Phocis and Locris. He also took energetic steps on behalf of his own allies to guard against their suffering any wrong from the Macedonians during this period. Having communicated with Philip to this effect by writing, he henceforth went on carrying out his purpose without consulting anyone. He at once dispatched Amynander to Rome, as he knew that he was of a pliable disposition and would be ready to follow the lead of his own friends there in whichever direction they chose to move, and that his regal title would add splendour to the proceedings and make people eager to see him. After him he sent his own legates, Quintus Fabius, the nephew of his wife, Quintus Fulvius and Appius Claudius Nero. The ambassadors from Aetolia were Alexander the Isian, Damocritus of

Calydon, Dicaearchus of Trichonium, Polemarchus of Arsinoë, Lamius of Ambracia, Nicomachus, one of the Acarnanians who had been exiled from Thurium and resided in Ambracia, and Theodotus of Pherae, who was exiled from Thessaly and lived in Stratus; the envoy of the Achaeans was Xenophon of Aegae; Attalus sent Alexander alone, and the Athenian people Cephisodorus.

The envoys arrived in Rome before the senate had decided whether the consuls of the year should be both sent to Gaul or one of them against Philip. But when the friends of Flamininus were assured that both consuls were to remain in Italy owing to the fear of the Celts, all the envoys entered the senate-house and roundly denounced Philip. Their accusations were in general similar to those they had brought against the king in person, but the point which they all took pains to impress upon the senate was that as long as Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias remained in Macedonian hands it was impossible for the Greeks to have any thought of liberty. Philip's own expression when he pronounced these places to be the fetters of Greece, was, they said, only too true, since neither could the Peloponnesians breathe freely with a royal garrison established in Corinth, nor could the Locrians, Boeotians, and Phocians have any confidence while Philip occupied Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, nor again could the Thessalians and Magnesians ever enjoy liberty while the Macedonians held Demetrias. Therefore his withdrawal from the other places was a mere show of concession on the part of Philip in order to get out of his present difficulty, and if he commanded the above places he could easily bring the Greeks under subjection any day he wished. They therefore demanded that the senate should either compel Philip to withdraw from these towns or abide by the

agreement and fight against him with all their strength. For the hardest task of the war had been accomplished, as the Macedonians had now been twice beaten and had expended most of their resources on land. After speaking thus they entreated the senate neither to cheat the Greeks out of their hope of liberty nor to deprive themselves of the noblest title to fame. Such or very nearly such were the words of the ambassadors. Philip's envoys had prepared a lengthy argument in reply, but were at once silenced; for when asked if they would give up Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias they replied that they had no instructions on the subject.

Thus cut short they stopped speaking, and the senate now, as I above stated, dispatched both consuls to Gaul and voted to continue the war against Philip, appointing Flamininus their commissioner in the affairs of Greece. This information was rapidly conveyed to Greece, and now all had fallen out as Flamininus wished, chance having contributed little to help him, but nearly all being due to his own prudent management. For this general had shown a sagacity equal to that of any Roman, having managed both public enterprises and his own private dealings with consummate skill and good sense, and this although he was yet quite young, not being over thirty. He was the first Roman who had crossed to Greece in command of an army.

Definition of Treachery

I have often had occasion to wonder where the truth lies about many human affairs and especially about the question of traitors. I therefore wish to say a few words on the subject appropriate to the times I am dealing with, although I am quite aware that it is one which is difficult to survey and define; it being by no means easy to decide whom we should really style a

traitor. It is evident that we cannot pronounce offhand to be traitors men who take the initiative in engaging in common action against certain kings and princes, nor again those who at the bidding of circumstances induce their countries to exchange their established relations for other friendships and alliances. Far from it; in view of the fact that such men have often conferred the greatest benefit on their country. Not to draw examples from far-off times, what I say can easily be observed from the very circumstances we are dealing with. For if Aristaenus had not then in good time made the Achaeans throw off their alliance with Philip and change it for that with Rome, the whole nation would evidently have suffered utter destruction. But now, apart from the temporary safety gained for all the members of the League, this man and that council were regarded as having beyond doubt contributed to the increase of the Achaean power; so that all agreed in honouring him not as a traitor, but as the benefactor and preserver of the land. And the same is the case with others who according to change of circumstances adopt a similar policy of action.

It is for this reason that while we must praise Demosthenes for so many things, we must blame him for one, for having recklessly and injudiciously cast bitter reproach on the most distinguished men in Greece by saying that Cercidas, Hieronymus, and Eucampidas in Arcadia were betrayers of Greece because they joined Philip, and for saying the same of Neon and Thrasylochus, the sons of Philiadas in Messene, Myrtis, Teledamus and Mnaseas in Argos, Daochus and Cineas in Thessaly, Theogeiton and Timolas in Boeotia, and several others in different cities. But in fact all the above men were perfectly and clearly justified in thus defending their own rights, and more especially those from Arcadia and Messene. For the latter,

by inducing Philip to enter the Peloponnesus and humbling the Lacedaemonians, in the first place allowed all the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus to breathe freely and to entertain the thought of liberty, and next recovering the territory and cities of which the Lacedaemonians in their prosperity had deprived the Messenians, Megalopolitans, Tegeans, and Argives, unquestionably increased the power of their native towns. With such an object in view it was not their duty to fight against Philip, but to take every step for their own honour and glory. Had they in acting thus either submitted to have their towns garrisoned by Philip, or abolished their laws and deprived the citizens of freedom of action and speech to serve their own ambition and place themselves in power, they would have deserved the name of traitor. But if preserving the rights of their respective countries, they simply differed in their judgement of facts, thinking that the interests of Athens were not identical with those of their countries, they should, I maintain, not have been dubbed traitors for this reason by Demosthenes. Measuring everything by the interests of his own city, thinking that the whole of Greece should have its eyes turned on Athens, and if people did not do so, calling them traitors, Demosthenes seems to me to have been very much mistaken and very far wide of the truth, especially as what actually befel the Greeks then does not testify to his own admirable foresight but rather to that of Eucampidas, Hieronymus, Cercidas, and the sons of Philiadas. For the opposition offered to Philip by the Athenians resulted in their being overtaken by the gravest disasters, defeated as they were at the battle of Chaeronea. And had it not been for the king's magnanimity and love of glory, their misfortune would have been even more terrible and all due to the policy of Demosthenes. But it was owing to

the men whose names I mentioned that two states of Arcadia and Messene obtained public security and rest from Lacedaemonian aggression, and that so many private advantages to their citizens resulted.

It is, then, difficult to define who are the men to whom we may legitimately give this name, but one would most nearly approach the truth by applying it to those who in a season of imminent danger, either for their own safety or advantage or owing to their differences with the opposite party, put their cities into the hands of the enemy, or still more justifiably to those who, admitting a garrison and employing external assistance to further their own inclinations and aims, submit their countries to the domination of a superior power. It would be quite fair to class all the above as traitors. The treachery of these men never resulted in any real advantage or good to themselves, but in every case, as no one can deny, just the reverse. And this makes us wonder what their original motives are; with what aim and reckoning on what they rush headlong into such misfortune. For not a single man ever betrays a town or army or fort without being found out, but even if any be not detected at the actual moment, the progress of time discovers them all at the end. Nor did any one of them who had once been recognized ever lead a happy life, but in most instances they meet with the punishment they deserve at the hands of the very men with whom they tried to ingratiate themselves. For generals and princes often employ traitors to further their interest, but when they have no further use for them they afterwards, as Demosthenes says, treat them as traitors, very naturally thinking that a man who has betrayed his country and his original friends to the enemy could never become really well disposed to themselves or keep faith with them. And if they should happen to escape punishment at

the hands of their employers, it is by no means easy for them to escape it at the hands of those they betrayed. Should they, however, give the slip to the retribution of both, their evil name among other men clings to them for their whole life, producing many false apprehensions and many real ones by night and by day, aiding and abetting all who have evil designs against them, and finally not allowing them even in sleep to forget their offence, but compelling them to dream of every kind of plot and peril, conscious as they are of the estrangement of everybody and of men's universal hatred of them. But in spite of all this being so, no one ever, when he had need of one, failed to find a traitor, except in a very few cases. All this would justify us in saying that man, who is supposed to be the cleverest of the animals, may with good reason be called the least intelligent. For the other animals are the slaves of their bodily wants alone and only get into trouble owing to these, but man, for all the high opinion that has been formed of him, makes mistakes just as much owing to want of thought as owing to his physical impulses. I have now said enough on this subject.

Attalus at Sicyon

King Attalus had received exceptional honours on a former occasion also from the Sicyonians after he had ransomed for them at considerable expense the land consecrated to Apollo, in return for which they set up a colossal statue of him ten cubits high, next that of Apollo in their market-place. And now again, upon his giving them ten talents and ten thousand medimni of wheat, his popularity increased fourfold, and they voted his portrait in gold and passed a law enjoining the performance of an annual sacrifice to him. Attalus, then, having received these honours left for Cenchreae.

Cruelty of the Wife of Nabis at Argos

Nabis the tyrant, leaving Timocrates of Pellen in command of Argos, as he placed the greatest reliance on him and employed him in the most ambitious of his enterprises, returned to Sparta and after some days sent off his own wife, ordering her upon reaching Argos to set about raising money. Upon her arrival she greatly surpassed Nabis in cruelty. For summoning the women, some of them singly and others with their families, she subjected them to every kind of outrage and violence until she had stripped them nearly all not only of their gold ornaments, but of their most precious clothing. . . .

Attalus, discoursing at some length, reminded them of the valour their ancestors had always displayed.

Campaign of Flamininus in Thessaly and Battle of Cynoscephalae

Flamininus, not being able to discover where the enemy were encamped, but knowing for a certainty that they were in Thessaly, ordered all his soldiers to cut stakes for a palisade to carry with them for use when required. This appears to be impossible when the Greek usage is followed, but on the Roman system it is easy to cut them. For the Greeks have difficulty in holding only their pikes when on the march and in supporting the fatigue caused by their weight, but the Romans, hanging their long shields from their shoulders by leather straps and only holding their javelins in their hands, can manage to carry the stakes besides. Also the stakes are quite different. For the Greeks consider that stake the best which has the most and the stoutest offshoots all round the main stem, while the stakes of the Romans have but two or three, or at the most four strange lateral prongs, and these all on one side and not alternating. The result of this is that they

are quite easy to carry—for one man can carry three or four, making a bundle of them, and when put to use they are much more secure. For the Greek stakes, when planted round the camp, are in the first place easily pulled up; since when the portion of a stake that holds fast closely pressed by the earth is only one, and the offshoots from it are many and large, and when two or three men catch hold of the same stake by its lateral branches, it is easily pulled up. Upon this an entrance is at once created owing to its size, and the ones next to it are loosened, because in such a palisade the stakes are intertwined and criss-crossed in few places. With the Romans it is the reverse; for in planting them they so intertwine them that it is not easy to see to which of the branches, the lower ends of which are driven into the ground, the lateral prongs belong, nor to which prongs the branches belong. So, as these prongs are close together and adhere to each other, and as their points are carefully sharpened, it is not easy to pass one's hand through and grasp the stake, nor if one does get hold of it, is it easy to pull it up, as in the first place the power of resistance derived from the earth by all the portions open to attack is almost absolute, and next because a man who pulls at one prong is obliged to lift up numerous other stakes which give simultaneously under the strain owing to the way they are intertwined, and it is not at all probable that two or three men will get hold of the same stake. But if by main force a man succeeds in pulling up one or two, the gap is scarcely observable. Therefore, as the advantages of this kind of palisade are very great, the stakes being easy to find and easy to carry and the whole being more secure and more durable when constructed, it is evident that if any Roman military contrivance is worthy of our imitation and adoption this one certainly is, in my own humble opinion at least.

To resume—Flamininus, having prepared these stakes to be used when required, advanced slowly with his whole force and established his camp at a distance of about fifty stades from Pherae. Next day at daybreak he sent out scouts to see if by observation and inquiry they could find any means of discovering where the enemy were and what they were about. Philip, at nearly the same time, on hearing that the Romans were encamped near Thebes, left Larisa with his entire army and advanced marching in the direction of Pherae. When at a distance of thirty stades from that town he encamped there while it was still early and ordered all his men to occupy themselves with the care of their persons. Next day at early dawn he aroused his men, and sending on in advance those accustomed to precede the main body with orders to cross the ridge above Pherae, he himself, when day began to break, moved the rest of his forces out of the camp. The advanced sections of both armies very nearly came into contact at the pass over the hills; for when in the early dusk they caught sight of each other, they halted when already quite close and sent at once to inform their respective commanders of the fact and inquire what they should do. It was decided to remain for that day in their actual camp and to recall the advanced forces. Next day both commanders sent out some horse and light-armed infantry—about three hundred of either arm to reconnoitre. Among these Flamininus included two squadrons of Aetolians owing to their acquaintance with the country. The respective forces met on the near side of Pherae, in the direction of Larisa, and a desperate struggle ensued. As the force under Eupolemus the Aetolian fought with great vigour and called up the Italians to take part in the action, the Macedonians found themselves hard pressed. For the present, after prolonged skirmishing, both forces

separated and retired to their camps. Next day both armies, dissatisfied with the ground near Pherae, as it was all under cultivation and covered with walls and small gardens, retired from it. Philip for his part began to march towards Scotussa, hoping to procure supplies from that town and afterwards when fully furnished to find ground suitable for his own army. But Flamininus, suspecting his purpose, put his army in motion at the same time as Philip with the object of destroying the corn in the territory of Scotussa before his adversary could get there. As there were high hills between the two armies in their march neither did the Romans perceive where the Macedonians were marching to nor the Macedonians the Romans. After marching all that day, Flamininus having reached the place called Eretria in Phthiotis and Philip the river Onchestus, they both encamped at those spots, each ignorant of the position of the other's camp. Next day they again advanced and encamped, Philip at the place called Melambium in the territory of Scotussa and Flamininus at the sanctuary of Thetis in that of Pharsalus, being still in ignorance of each others' whereabouts. In the night there was a violent thunderstorm accompanied by rain, and next morning at early dawn all the mist from the clouds descended on the earth, so that owing to the darkness that prevailed one could not see even people who were close at hand. Philip, however, who was in a hurry to effect his purpose, broke up his camp and advanced with his whole army, but finding it difficult to march owing to the mist, after having made but little progress, he intrenched his army and sent off his covering force with orders to occupy the summits of the hills which lay between him and the enemy.

Flamininus lay still encamped near the sanctuary of Thetis and, being in doubt as to where the enemy were, he pushed forward ten squadrons of

horse and about a thousand light-armed infantry, sending them out with orders to go over the ground reconnoitring cautiously. In proceeding towards the pass over the hills they encountered the Macedonian covering force quite unexpectedly owing to the obscurity of the army. Both forces were thrown somewhat into disorder for a short time but soon began to take the offensive, sending to their respective commanders messengers to inform them of what had happened. When in the combat that ensued the Romans began to be overpowered and to suffer loss at the hands of the Macedonian covering force they sent to their camp begging for help, and Flamininus, calling upon Archedamus and Eupolemus the Aetolians and two of his military tribunes, sent them off with five hundred horse and two thousand foot. For the Romans, encouraged by the arrival of the reinforcements, fought with redoubled vigour, and the Macedonians, though defending themselves gallantly, were in their turn pressed hard, and upon being completely overmastered, fled to the summits and sent to the king for help.

Philip, who had never expected, for the reasons I have stated, that a general engagement would take place on that day, had even sent out a fair number of men from his camp to forage, and now when he heard of the turn affairs were taking from the messengers, and as the mist was beginning to clear, he called upon Heraclides of Gyrton, the commander of the Thessalian horse, and Leo, who was in command of the Macedonian horse, and dispatched them, together with all the mercenaries except those from Thrace, under the command of Athenagoras. Upon their joining the covering force the Macedonians, having received such a large reinforcement, pressed hard on the enemy and in their turn began to drive the Romans from their heights. But the chief obstacle to their putting the

enemy entirely to rout was the high spirit of the Aetolian cavalry who fought with desperate gallantry. For as much as the Aetolian infantry is inferior in the equipment and discipline required for a general engagement, by so much is their cavalry superior to that of other Greeks in detached and single combats. Thus on the present occasion they so far checked the spirit of the enemy's advance that the Romans were not as before driven down to the level ground, but when they were at a short distance from it turned and steadied themselves. Flamininus, upon seeing that not only had his light infantry and cavalry given way, but that his whole army was flustered owing to this, led out all his forces and drew them up in order of battle close to the hills. At the same time one messenger after another from the covering force came running to Philip shouting, "Sire, the enemy are flying: do not lose the opportunity: the barbarians cannot stand before us: the day is yours now: this is your time"; so that Philip, though he was not satisfied with the ground, still allowed himself to be provoked to do battle. The above-mentioned hills are, I should say, called "The Dog's Heads" (Cynoscephalae): they are very rough and broken and attain a considerable height. Philip, therefore, foreseeing what difficulties the ground would present, was at first by no means disposed to fight, but now urged on by these excessively sanguine reports he ordered his army to be led out of the entrenched camp.

Flamininus, having drawn up his whole army in line, both took steps to cover the retreat of his advanced force and walking along the ranks addressed his men. His address was brief, but vivid and easily understood by his hearers. For pointing to the enemy, who were now in full view, he said to his men, "Are these not the Macedonians whom, when they held the

pass leading to Eordaea, you under Sulpicius attacked in the open and forced to retreat to the higher ground after slaying many of them? Are these not the same Macedonians who when they held that desperately difficult position in Epirus you compelled by your valour to throw away their shields and take to flight, never stopping until they got home to Macedonia? What reason, then, have you to be timid now when you are about to do battle with the same men on equal terms? What need for you to dread a recurrence of former danger, when you should rather on the contrary derive confidence from memory of the past! And so, my men, encouraging each other dash onto the fray and put forth all your strength. For if it be the will of Heaven, I feel sure that this battle will end like the former ones." After speaking thus he ordered those on the right to remain where they were with the elephants in front of them, and taking with him the left half of the army, advanced to meet the enemy in imposing style. The advanced force of the Romans thus supported by the infantry of the legions now turned and fell upon their foes.

Philip at this time, now that he saw the greater part of his army drawn up outside the entrenchment, advanced with the peltasts and the right wing of phalanx, ascending energetically the slope that led to the hills and giving orders to Nicanor, who was nicknamed the elephant, to see that the rest of his army followed him at once. When the leading ranks reached the top of the pass, he wheeled to the left, and occupied the summits above it; for, as the Macedonian advanced force had pressed the Romans for a considerable distance down the opposite side of the hills, he found these summits abandoned. While he was still deploying his force on the right his mercenaries appeared hotly pursued by the Romans. For when the heavy-armed Roman infantry had joined the light infantry, as I said, and gave them

their support in the battle, they availed themselves of the additional weight thus thrown into the scale, and pressing heavily on the enemy killed many of them. When the king, just after his arrival, saw that the light infantry were engaged not far from the hostile camp he was overjoyed, but now on seeing his own men giving way in their turn and in urgent need of support, he was compelled to go to their assistance and thus decide the whole fate of the army on the spur of the moment, although the greater portion of the phalanx was still on the march and approaching the hills. Receiving those who were engaged with the enemy, he placed them all, both foot and horse, on his right wing and ordered the peltasts and that part of the phalanx he had with him to double their depth and close up towards the right. Upon this being done, the enemy being now close upon them, orders were sent out to the men of the phalanx to lower their spears and charge, while the light infantry were ordered to place themselves on the flank. At the same moment Flamininus, having received his advanced force into the gaps between the maniples, fell upon the enemy.

As the encounter of the two armies was accompanied by deafening shouts and cries, both of them uttering their war-cry and those outside the battle also cheering the combatants, the spectacle was such as to inspire terror and acute anxiety. Philip's right wing acquitted themselves splendidly in the battle, as they were charging from higher ground and were superior in the weight of their formation, the nature of their arms also giving them a decided advantage on the present occasion. But as for the rest of his army, those next to the force actually engaged were still at a distance from the enemy and those on the left had only just surmounted the ridge and come into view of the summits. Flamininus, seeing that his men could not sustain

the charge of the phalanx, but that since his left was being forced back, some of them having already perished and others retreating slowly, his only hope of safety lay in his right, hastened to place himself in command there, and observing that those of the enemy who were next the actual combatants were idle, and that some of the rest were still descending to meet him from the summits and others had halted on the heights, placed his elephants in front and led on his legions to the attack. The Macedonians now, having no one to give them orders and being unable to adopt the formation proper to the phalanx, in part owing to the difficulty of the ground and in part because they were trying to reach the combatants and were still in marching order and not in line, did not even wait until they were at close quarters with the Romans, but gave way thrown into confusion and broken up by the elephants alone.

Most of the Romans followed up these fugitives and continued to put them to the sword: but one of the tribunes with them, taking not more than twenty maniples and judging on the spur of the moment what ought to be done, contributed much to the total victory. For noticing that the Macedonians under Philip had advanced a long way in front of the rest, and were by their weight forcing back the Roman left, he quitted those on the right, who were now clearly victorious, and wheeling his force in the direction of the scene of combat and thus getting behind the Macedonians, he fell upon them in the rear. As it is impossible for the phalanx to turn right about face or to fight man to man, he now pressed his attack home, killing those he found in his way, who were incapable of protecting themselves, until the whole Macedonian force were compelled to throw away their shields and take to flight, attacked now also by the troops who had yielded

before their frontal charge and who now turned and faced them. Philip at first, as I said, judging from the success of those under his own leadership, was convinced that his victory was complete, but now on suddenly seeing that the Macedonians were throwing away their shields and that the enemy had attacked them in the rear, retired with a small number of horse and foot to a short distance from the scene of action and remained to observe the whole scene. When he noticed that the Romans in pursuit of his left wing had already reached the summits, he decided to fly, collecting hastily as many Thracians and Macedonians as he could. Flamininus, pursuing the fugitives and finding when he reached the crest of the ridge that the ranks of the Macedonian left were just attaining the summits, at first halted. The enemy were now holding up their spears, as is the Macedonian custom when they either surrender or go over to the enemy, and on learning the significance of this he kept back his men, thinking to spare the beaten force. But while he was still making up his mind some of the Romans who had advanced further fell on them from above and began to cut them down. Most of them perished, a very few escaping after throwing away their shields.

The battle being now over and the Romans everywhere victorious, Philip retreated towards Tempe. He spent the following night under canvas at a place called "Alexander's Tower" and next day went on to Gonni at the entrance of Tempe, and remained there wishing to pick up the survivors of the rout. The Romans, after following up the fugitives for a certain distance, began, some of them, to strip the dead and others to collect prisoners, but most of them ran to plunder the enemy's camp. Finding, however, that the Aetolians had anticipated them there and considering themselves defrauded

of the booty that was rightfully theirs, they began to find fault with the Aetolians and told their general that he imposed the risk on them and gave up the booty to others. For the present they returned to their own camp and retired to rest, and spent the next day in collecting prisoners and what was left of the spoil and also in advancing in the direction of Larisa. Of the Romans about seven hundred fell and the total Macedonian loss amounted to about eight thousand killed and not fewer than five thousand captured.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Phalanx

Such was the result of the battle at Cynoscephalae between the Romans and Philip. In my sixth Book I promised that when a suitable occasion presented itself I would institute a comparison between the Roman and Macedonian equipment and formation, showing how they differ for the better or worse, and I will, now that we see them both in actual practice, endeavour to fulfil this promise. For since the Macedonian formation in former times was proved by the experience of facts to be superior to other formations in use in Asia and Greece and that of the Romans likewise showed itself superior to those in use in Africa and among all the peoples of western Europe, and since now in our own times not once, but frequently, these two formations and the soldiers of both nations have been matched against each other, it will prove useful and beneficial to inquire into the difference, and into the reason why on the battle-field the Romans have always had the upper hand and carried off the palm, so that we may not, like foolish men, talk simply of chance and felicitate the victors without giving any reason for it, but may, knowing the true causes of their success, give them a reasoned tribute of praise and admiration.

It will not be necessary to dilate upon the battles of the Romans with Hannibal and their defeats therein; for there they met with defeat not owing to their equipment and formation but owing to Hannibal's skill and cleverness. This I made sufficiently clear in dealing with battles in question, and the best testimony to the justice of what I said was, first of all, the actual end of the war. For very soon when the Romans had the advantage of the services of a general of like capacity with Hannibal then victory was an immediate consequence of this. And secondly, Hannibal himself, discarding his original armament at once on winning the first battle, armed his own forces with the Roman weapons and continued to employ these up to the end. As for Pyrrhus he employed not only Italian arms but Italian forces, placing cohorts of these and cohorts composed of men from the phalanx in alternate order in his battles with the Romans. But still even by this means he could not gain a victory, but the result of all their battles was always more or less doubtful.

It was necessary for me to preface my comparison by these few words in order that my statements may meet with no contradiction. I will now proceed to the comparison itself.

That when the phalanx has its characteristic virtue and strength nothing can sustain its frontal attack or withstand the charge can easily be understood for many reasons. For since, when it has closed up for action, each man, with his arms, occupies a space of three feet in breadth, and the length of the pikes is according to the original design sixteen cubits, but as adapted to actual need fourteen cubits, from which we must subtract the distance between the bearer's two hands and the length of the weighted portion of the pike behind which serves to keep it couched—four cubits in

all—it is evident that it must extend ten cubits beyond the body of each hoplite when he charges the enemy grasping it with both hands. The consequence is that while the pikes of the second, third, and fourth ranks extend farther than those of the fifth rank, those of that rank extend two cubits beyond the bodies of the men in the first rank, when the phalanx has its characteristic close order as regards both depth and breadth, as Homer expresses it in these verses:

Spear crowded spear,
Shield, helmet, man press'd helmet, man, and shield;
The hairy crests of their resplendent casques
Kiss'd close at every nod, so wedged they stood. [1]

[1] Homer, *Iliad*, XIII.131, Cowper's translation.

This description is both true and fine, and it is evident that each man of the first rank must have the points of five pikes extending beyond him, each at a distance of two cubits from the next.

From this we can easily conceive what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is sixteen deep. In this case those further back and the fifth rank cannot use their pikes so as to take any active part in the battle. They therefore do not severally level their pikes, but hold them slanting up in the air over the shoulders of those in front of them, so as to protect the whole formation from above, keeping off by this serried mass of pikes all missiles which, passing over the heads of the first ranks, might fall on those immediately in front of and behind them. But these men by the sheer pressure of their bodily weight in the charge add to its force, and it is quite impossible for the first ranks to face about.

Such being in general and in detail the disposition of the phalanx, I have now, for purposes of comparison, to speak of the peculiarities of the Roman equipment and system of formation and the points of difference in both. Now in the case of the Romans also each soldier with his arms occupies a space of three feet in breadth, but as in their mode of fighting each man must move separately, as he has to cover his person with his long shield, turning to meet each expected blow, and as he uses his sword both for cutting and thrusting it is obvious that a looser order is required, and each man must be at a distance of at least three feet from the man next him in the same rank and those in front of and behind him, if they are to be of proper use. The consequence will be that one Roman must stand opposite two men in the first rank of the phalanx, so that he has to face and encounter ten pikes, and it is both impossible for a single man to cut through them all in time once they are at close quarters and by no means easy to force their points away, as the rear ranks can be of no help to the front rank either in thus forcing the pikes away or in the use of the sword. So it is easy to see that, as I said at the beginning, nothing can withstand the charge of the phalanx as long as it preserves its characteristic formation and force.

What then is the reason of the Roman success, and what is it that defeats the purpose of those who use the phalanx? It is because in war the time and place of action is uncertain and the phalanx has only one time and one place in which it can perform its peculiar service. Now, if the enemy were obliged to adapt themselves to the times and places required by the phalanx when a decisive battle was impending, those who use the phalanx would in all probability, for the reasons I stated above, always get the better of their enemies; but if it is not only possible but easy to avoid its onset why should

one any longer dread an attack of a body so constituted? Again, it is acknowledged that the phalanx requires level and clear ground with no obstacles such as ditches, clefts, clumps of trees, ridges and water courses, all of which are sufficient to impede and break up such a formation. Every one would also acknowledge that it is almost impossible except in very rare cases to find spaces of say twenty stades or even more in length with no such obstacles. But even if we assume it to be possible, supposing those who are fighting against us refuse to meet us on such ground, but force round sacking the cities and devastating the territory of our allies, what is the use of such a formation? For by remaining on the ground that suits it, not only is it incapable of helping its friends but cannot even ensure its own safety. For the arrival of supplies will easily be prevented by the enemy, when they have undisturbed command of the open country. But if the phalanx leaves the ground proper to it and attempts any action, it will be easily overcome by the enemy. And again, if it is decided to engage the enemy on level ground, but instead of availing ourselves of our total force when the phalanx has its one opportunity for charging, we keep out of action even a small portion of it at the moment of the shock, it is easy to tell what will happen from what the Romans always do at present, the likelihood of the result I now indicate requiring no argument but only the evidence of actual facts. For the Romans do not make their line equal in force to the enemy and expose all the legions to a frontal attack by the phalanx, but part of their forces remain in reserve and the rest engage the enemy. Afterwards whether the phalanx drives back by its charge the force opposed to it or is repulsed by this force, its own peculiar formation is broken up. For either in following up a retreating foe or in flying before an

attacking foe, they leave behind the other parts of their own army, upon which the enemy's reserve have room enough in the space formerly held by the phalanx to attack no longer in front but appearing by a lateral movement on the flank and rear of the phalanx. When it is thus easy to guard against the opportunities and advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of the proper moment to act against it, the one kind of formation naturally proves in reality superior to the other. Again, those who employ the phalanx have to march through and encamp in every variety of country; they are compelled to occupy favourable positions in advance, to besiege certain positions and to be besieged in others, and to meet attacks from quarters the least expected. For all such contingencies are parts of war, and victory sometimes wholly and sometimes very largely depends on them. Now in all these matters the Macedonian formation is at times of little use and at times of no use at all, because the phalanx soldier can be of service neither in detachments nor singly, while the Roman formation is efficient. For every Roman soldier, once he is armed and sets about his business, can adapt himself equally well to every place and time and can meet attack from every quarter. He is likewise equally prepared and equally in condition whether he has to fight together with the whole army or with a part of it or in maniples or singly. So since in all particulars the Romans are much more serviceable, Roman plans are much more apt to result in success than those of others. I thought it necessary to speak on this subject at some length because many Greeks on the actual occasions when the Macedonians suffered defeat considered the event as almost incredible, and many will still continue to wonder why and how the phalanx comes to be conquered by troops armed in the Roman fashion.

Philip had done his best in the battle, but on being thus thoroughly defeated, after first picking up as many as he could of the survivors from the battle himself hastily retired through Tempe to Macedonia. He had sent one of his aides-de-camp on the previous night to Larisa, with orders to destroy and burn the royal correspondence, acting like a true king in not forgetting his duty even in the hour of disaster: for he well knew that if the documents fell into the hands of the Romans he would be giving them much material to use against himself and his friends. Perhaps in the case of others also it has happened that in seasons of prosperity they have not been able to wear their authority with the moderation that befits a man, yet in the hour of danger have exercised due caution and kept their heads, but this was particularly so with Philip, as will be evident from what I am about to say. For just as I have clearly pointed out his early impulse to do what was right, and again the time, reasons, and circumstances of the change for the worse in him, narrating with documentary proofs his actions after this change, so must I in the same manner point out his new change of mind and the ability with which, adapting himself to the reverses of fortune, he faced the situation in which he found himself until his death with exceptional prudence.

After the battle Flamininus took the requisite steps regarding the prisoners and other booty and then advanced towards Larisa . . . He was generally displeased with the overreaching conduct of the Aetolians about the booty, and did not wish, now he had expelled Philip, to leave them masters of Greece. Also he could ill brook their bragging, when he saw them claiming equal credit with the Romans for the victory and filling the whole of Greece with the story of their prowess. In consequence he was

somewhat brusque in his replies when he had interviews with them and kept silent about public affairs, carrying out his projects himself or with the aid of his friends. While these stiff relations on both sides still continued there came a few days after the battle a legation from Philip composed of Demosthenes, Cycliades, and Limnaeus. Flamininus, after conferring with them at some length in the presence of his military tribunes, granted Philip an armistice of fifteen days at once, and arranged to return with them to confer with Philip about the situation during the armistice. As the interview had been conducted with perfect courtesy, the suspicions of Flamininus entertained by the Aetolians became twice as vehement. For since by this time bribery and the notion that no one should do anything gratis were very prevalent in Greece, and so to speak quite current coin among the Aetolians, they could not believe that Flamininus's complete change of attitude towards Philip could have been brought about without a bribe, since they were ignorant of the Roman principles and practice in this matter, but judged from their own, and calculated that it was probable that Philip would offer a very large sum owing to his actual situation and Flamininus would not be able to resist the temptation.

If I were dealing with earlier times, I would have confidently asserted about all the Romans in general, that no one of them would do such a thing; I speak of the years before they undertook wars across the sea and during which they preserved their own principles and practices. At the present time, however, I would not venture to assert this of all, but I could with perfect confidence say of many particular men in Rome that in this matter they can maintain their faith. That I may not appear to be stating what is impossible, I will cite as evidence the names of two men regarding whom

none will dispute my assertion. The first is Lucius Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Perseus. For when he became master of the palace of the Macedonian kings, in which, apart from the splendid furniture and other riches, more than six thousand talents of gold and silver were fortified in the treasury alone, not only did he not covet any of his treasure, but did not even wish to look upon it, and disposed of it all by the hands of others, and this although his private fortune was by no means ample, but on the contrary rather meagre. At least when he died not long after the war, and his sons by birth, Publius Scipio and Quintus Fabius Maximus, wished to give back to his wife her dowry of twenty-five talents they found such difficulty in raising the sum that they could not possibly have done it had they not sold the household goods, the slaves, and some real property in addition. If what I say seems incredible to anyone he can easily assure himself of its truth. For though many facts and especially those concerning this matter are subjects of dispute at Rome owing to their political dissensions, still on inquiry you will find that the statement I have just made is acknowledged to be true by all. Again, take the case of Publius Scipio, known as the great. When he became master of Carthage, which was considered the wealthiest city in the world, he took absolutely nothing from it to add to his own fortune, either by purchase or by any other means of acquisition, and this although he was not particularly well off, but only moderately so for a Roman. And not only did he keep his hands off the treasure in Carthage itself, but in general allow any of that from Africa to be mixed up with his private fortune. In the case of this man again anyone who really inquires will find that no one disputes the reputation he enjoyed at Rome in this respect.

But regarding these men, when I find a more suitable opportunity I will speak more at large. Flamininus in the meanwhile, after fixing on a day to meet Philip, at once wrote to the allies instructing them at what date they should be present for the conference, and then a few days afterwards came to the entrance of Tempe at the time determined on. When the allies had assembled, and while the council was exclusively composed of them, the Roman proconsul got up and asked them to state severally on what terms peace should be made with Philip. King Amynander resumed his seat after speaking briefly and with moderation. For he begged them all to take steps for his protection, in case, when the Romans had left Greece, Philip might vent his anger on him. For, he said, the Athamanians were also easy victims of the Macedonians owing to their weakness and the closeness of the two countries. After him Alexander the Aetolian got up. He praised Flamininus for having called the allies to take part in the Peace Conference and for inviting them now to give their several opinions, but he said he was much mistaken and wide of the mark if he believed that by coming to terms with Philip he would ensure either peace for the Romans or liberty for the Greeks. For neither of these results was possible; but if he wished to carry out completely the policy of his country and fulfil the promises he had given to all the Greeks, there was but one way of making peace with Macedonia and that was to depose Philip. To do so, he said, was really quite easy, if he did not let the present opportunity slip. After speaking at some length in the same sense he resumed his seat.

Flamininus spoke next. He said that Alexander was mistaken not only as to the policy of Rome, but as to his own particular design, and especially as to the interests of Greece. For neither did the Romans ever after a single

war at once exterminate their adversaries, as was proved by their conduct towards Hannibal and the Carthaginians, at whose hands they had suffered injuries so grievous, but yet afterwards, when it was in their power to treat them exactly as they chose, they had not resolved on any extreme measures. Nor, he said, had he himself ever entertained the idea that they should wage war on Philip without any hope of reconciliation; but if the king had consented to the conditions imposed on him before the battle, he would gladly have made peace with him. "Therefore it indeed surprises me," he said, "that after taking part in the conferences for peace you are now all irreconcilable. Is it, as seems evident, because we won the battle? But nothing can be more unfeeling. Brave men should be hard on their foes and wroth with them in battle, when conquered they should be courageous and high-minded, but when they conquer, gentle and humane. What you exhort me to do now is exactly the reverse. Again it is in the interest of the Greeks that the Macedonian dominion should be humbled for long, but by no means that it should be destroyed." For in that case, he said, they would very soon experience the lawless violence of the Thracians and Gauls, as they had on more than one occasion. On the whole, he continued, he and the other Romans present judged it proper, if Philip agreed to do everything that the allies had previously demanded, to grant him peace after first consulting the Senate. As for the Aetolians, they were at liberty to take their own counsel. When Phaeneas after this attempted to say that all that had happened was of no use, for Philip, if he could wriggle out of the present crisis, would at once begin to re-establish his power, Flamininus interrupted him angrily and without rising from his seat, exclaiming, "Stop talking

nonsense, Phaeneas; for I will so manage the peace that Philip will not, even if he wishes it, be able to wrong the Greeks."

On that day they broke up on these terms. Next day the king arrived, and on the following day, when all had assembled at the conference, Philip entered and with great skill and sound sense cut away the ground on which they all based their violent demands by saying that he yielded to and would execute all the former demands of the Romans and the allies, and that he submitted all other questions to the decision of the Senate. After he had said this, all the others remained silent, but Phaeneas the Aetolian representative said, "Why then, Philip, do you not give up to us Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Phthiotic Thebes, and Echinus?" Philip told him to take them, but Flamininus said that they ought not to take any of the other towns, but only Phthiotic Thebes. For the Thebans, when on approaching the town with his army he demanded that they should submit to Rome, had refused. So that, now that they had been reduced by force of arms, he had a right to decide as he chose about them. When, upon this, Phaeneas grew indignant and said that in the first place the Aetolians should, as they had fought side by side with the Romans, receive back the towns which had formerly been members of their League, and next that the same resulted from the terms of their original alliance, by the way the possessions of those captured in war were to go to the Romans and the towns to the Aetolians, Flamininus said they were mistaken on both points. For the alliance had been dissolved, when, deserting the Romans, they made terms with Philip, and even if it still subsisted, they should receive back and occupy not the towns which had surrendered to the Romans of their own free will, as all the Thessalian cities had now done, but any that had fallen by force of arms.

Flamininus, in speaking thus, pleased the others, but the Aetolians listened to him sullenly, and we may say that the prelude of great evils began to come into being. For it was the spark of this quarrel that set alight the war with the Aetolians and that with Antiochus. What chiefly urged Flamininus to hasten to make peace, was the news that had reached him of Antiochus' having put to sea in Syria with an army directed against Europe. This made him fearful lest Philip, catching at this hope of support, might shut himself up in his towns and drag on the war, and that on the arrival of another consul, the principal glory of his achievement would be lost to him and reflected on his successor. He therefore yielded to the king's request and allowed him an armistice of four months. He was at once to pay Flamininus the two hundred talents and give his son Demetrius with some other of his friends as hostages, sending to Rome to submit the whole question to the Senate. They now separated after exchanging mutual pledges about the whole question, Flamininus engaging, if the peace were not finally made, to return the two hundred talents and the hostages. After this all the parties sent to Rome, some working for the peace and others against it. . . .

What can the reason be that we all, though deceived by the same means and through the same persons, cannot yet give over folly? For this sort of fraud had been practised often and by many. It is perhaps not surprising that it succeeds with others, but it is indeed astonishing that it does so with those who are the very fount of such trickery. The reason however is that we do not bear in mind Epicharmus's excellent advice, "Be sober and mindful to mistrust; these are the thews of the mind."

II. Affairs of Asia

Advantageous Site of Ephesus

King Antiochus was very anxious to get possession of Ephesus because of its favourable site, as it may be said to stand in the position of a citadel both by land and sea for anyone with designs on Ionia and the cities of the Hellespont, and is always a most favourable point of defence against Europe for the kings of Asia.

Character of Attalus

So died Attalus, and justice demands, as is my practice in the case of others, I should pronounce a few befitting words over his grave. He possessed at the outset no other quality fitting him to rule over those outside his own household but wealth, a thing that when used with intelligence and daring is of real service in all enterprises but, when these virtues are absent, proves in most cases the cause of disaster and in fact of utter ruin. For it is the source of jealousy and plotting, and contributes more than anything else to the corruption of body and soul. Those souls indeed are few who can arrest these consequences by the mere power that riches give. We should therefore reverence this king's loftiness of mind, in that he did not attempt to use his great possessions for any other purpose than the attainment of sovereignty, a thing than which nothing greater or more splendid can be named. He laid the foundation of his design not only by the largesses and favours he conferred on his friends, but by his success in war. For having conquered the Gauls, then the most formidable and warlike nation in Asia Minor, he built upon this foundation, and then first showed he was really a king. And after he had received this honourable title, he lived until the age of seventy-two and reigned for forty-four years, ever most virtuous and austere as husband and father, never breaking his faith to his friends and allies, and finally dying when engaged on his best work, fighting for the

liberties of Greece. Add to this what is most remarkable of all, that having four grown-up sons, he so disposed of his kingdom that he handed on the crown in undisputed succession to his children's children.

III. Affairs of Italy

The Embassies to the Senate

After Claudius Marcellus, the consul, had entered upon office there arrived in Rome the ambassadors from Philip and also the legates sent by Flamininus and the allies on the subject of the peace with Philip. After considerable discussion in the Senate that body resolved to confirm the peace. But when the senatus-consultum was brought before the people, Marcus, who himself was desirous of crossing to Greece, spoke against it and did all in his power to break off the negotiation. But in spite of this the people yielded to the wishes of Flamininus and ratified the peace. Upon the conclusion of peace the Senate at once nominated ten of its most distinguished members and sent them to manage Grecian affairs in conjunction with Flamininus, and to assure the liberties of the Greeks. The Achaean legate Damoxenus of Aegae also spoke in the Senate on the subject of the alliance. But since some opposition was raised for the time being, because the Eleans made a claim against the Achaeans for Triphylia, the Messenians (who were then the allies of Rome) for Asine and Pylus, the decision was referred to the ten commissioners. Such was the result of the proceedings in the Senate.

IV. Affairs of Greece

Conduct of the Boeotians

While Flamininus was wintering in Elatea after the battle, the Boeotians, anxious to recover the men they had sent to serve under Philip in the

campaign, sent an embassy to Flamininus begging him to provide for their safety, and he gladly consented as, foreseeing the arrival of Antiochus, he wished to conciliate the Boeotians. Upon all the men being very soon sent back from Macedonia, among them Brachylles, they at once appointed the latter boeotarch, and continued, no less than formerly, to advance and honour the others who were considered to be friends of the house of Macedon. They also sent an embassy to Philip thanking him for the return of the soldiers, thus depreciating the grace of Flamininus's act. When Zeuxippus, Pisistratus and all who were considered the friends of Rome saw this, they were much displeased, as they foresaw what might happen and feared for themselves and their relatives. For they well knew that if the Romans quitted Greece and Philip remained on their flanks, his strength continuing to increase together with that of their political opponents, it would by no means be safe for them to take part in public life in Boeotia. They therefore clubbed together and sent envoys to Flamininus at Elatea. On meeting him they used a great variety of arguments, pointing out the violent feeling against them at present existing among the people and the noted ingratitude of a multitude, and finally they made bold to say that unless they struck terror into the populace by killing Brachylles there would be no security for the friends of the Romans once the legions had left. Flamininus, after listening to this, said that he himself would take no part in this deed, but would put no obstacles in the way of anyone who wished to do so. He advised them on the whole to speak to Alexamenus, the Aetolian strategus. When Zeuxippus and the others acted on this advice and spoke about the matter, Alexamenus was soon persuaded and agreeing to what

they said, arranged for three Aetolians and three Italian soldiers to assassinate Brachylles. . . .

For no one is such a terrible witness or such a dread accuser as the conscience that dwells in all our hearts.

Flamininus and the Roman Commissioners in Greece

At this time the ten commissioners who were to control the affairs of Greece arrived from Rome bringing the senatus-consultum about the peace with Philip. Its principal contents were as follows: All the rest of the Greeks in Asia and Europe were to be free and subject to their own laws; Philip was to surrender to the Romans before the Isthmian games those Greeks subject to his rule and the cities in which he had garrisons; he was to leave free, withdrawing his garrisons from them, the towns of Euromus, Pedasa, Bargylia, and Iasus, as well as Abydus, Thasos, Myrina, and Perinthus; Flamininus was to write to Prusias in the terms of the senatus-consultum about restoring the freedom of Cius; Philip was to restore to the Romans all prisoners of war and deserters before the same date, and to surrender to them all his warships with the exception of five light vessels and his great ship of sixteen banks of oars; he was to pay them a thousand talents, half at once and the other half by instalments extending over ten years.

When the report of this senatus-consultum was spread in Greece, all except the Aetolians were of good heart and overjoyed. The latter alone, disappointed at not obtaining what they had hoped for, spoke ill of the decree, saying that it contained an arrangement of words and not an arrangement of things. Even from the actual terms of the document they drew certain probable conclusions calculated to confuse the minds of those who listened to them. For they said there were two decisions in it about the

cities garrisoned by Philip, one ordering him to withdraw his garrisons and surrender the cities to the Romans and the other to withdraw his garrisons and set the cities free. The towns to be set free were named and they were those in Asia, while evidently those to be surrendered to the Romans were those in Europe, that is to say Oreum, Eretria, Chalcis, Demetrias, and Corinth. From this anyone could easily see that the Romans were taking over from Philip the fetters of Greece, and that what was happening was a readjustment of masters and not the delivery of Greece out of gratitude.

Such things were being said by the Aetolians *ad nauseam*. But Flamininus, moving from Elatea with the ten commissioners, came down to Anticyra and at once sailed across to Corinth. On arriving there he sat in conference with the commissioners, deciding about the whole situation. As the slanderous reflections of the Aetolians were becoming more current and were credited by some, he was obliged to address his colleagues at length and in somewhat elaborate terms, pointing out to them that if they wished to gain universal renown in Greece and in general convince all that the Romans had originally crossed the sea not in their own interest but in that of the liberty of Greece, they must withdraw from every place and set free all the cities now garrisoned by Philip. The hesitation felt in the conference was due to the fact that, while a decision had been reached in Rome about all other questions, and the commissioners had definite instructions from the Senate on all other matters, the question of Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias had been left to their discretion owing to the fear of Antiochus, in order that with an eye to circumstances they should take any course on which they determined. For it was evident that Antiochus had been for some time awaiting his opportunity to interfere in the affairs of Greece.

However, Flamininus persuaded his colleagues to set Corinth free at once, handing it over to the Achaeans, as had originally been agreed, while he remained in occupation of the Acrocorinth, Demetrias, and Chalcis.

This having been decided and the Isthmian games being now close at hand, the most distinguished men from almost the whole world having assembled there owing to their expectation of what would take place, many and various were the reports prevalent during the whole festival, some saying that it was impossible for the Romans to abandon certain places and cities, and others declaring that they would abandon the places which were considered famous, but would retain those, which while less illustrious, would serve their purpose equally well, even at once naming these latter out of their own heads, each more ingenious than the other. Such was the doubt in men's minds when, the crowd being now collected in the stadium to witness the games, the herald came forward and, having imposed universal silence by his bugler, read this proclamation: "The senate order and Titus Quintius the proconsul having overcome King Philip and the Macedonians, leave the following peoples free, without garrisons and subject to no tribute and governed by their countries' laws—the Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Phthiotic Achaeans, Magnesians, Thessalians, and Perrhaebians." At once at the very commencement a tremendous shout arose, and some did not even hear the proclamation, while others wanted to hear it again. But the greater part of the crowd, unable to believe their ears and thinking that they were listening to the words as if in a dream owing to the event being so unexpected, demanded loudly, each prompted by a different impulse, that the herald and bugler should advance into the middle of the stadium and repeat the announcement, wishing, as I suppose, not only

to hear the speaker, but to see him owing to the incredible character of his proclamation. But when the herald, coming forward to the middle of the stadium and again silencing the noise by his bugler, made the same identical proclamation, such a mighty burst of cheering arose that those who listen to the tale to-day cannot easily conceive what it was. When at length the noise had subsided, not a soul took any further interest in the athletes, but all, talking either to their neighbours or to themselves, were almost like men beside themselves. So much so indeed that after the games were over they very nearly put an end to Flamininus by their expressions of thanks. For some of them, longing to look him in the face and call him their saviour, others in their anxiety to grasp his hand, and the greater number throwing crowns and fillets on him, they all but tore the man in pieces. But however excessive their gratitude may seem to have been, one may confidently say that it was far inferior to the greatness of the event. For it was a wonderful thing, to begin with, that the Romans and their general Flamininus should entertain this purpose incurring every expense and facing every danger for the freedom of Greece; it was a great thing that they brought into action a force adequate to the execution of their purpose; and greatest of all was the fact that no mischance of any kind counteracted their design, but everything without exception conduced to this one crowning moment, when by a single proclamation all the Greeks inhabiting Asia and Europe became free, ungarrisoned, subject to no tribute and governed by their own laws.

When the festival was over, the commissioners first gave audience to the ambassadors of Antiochus. They ordered him, as regards the Asiatic cities, to keep his hands off those which were autonomous and make war on none of them and to withdraw from those previous subject to Ptolemy and Philip

which he had recently taken. At the same time they enjoined him not to cross to Europe with an army, for none of the Greeks were any longer being attacked by anyone or the subjects of anyone, and they announced in general terms that some of their own body would come to see Antiochus. Hegesianax and Lysias returned on receiving this answer, and after them the commissioners called before them all the representatives of different nations cities, and explained to them the decisions of the board. As for Macedonia they gave autonomy to the tribe called Orestae for having joined them during the war, and freed the Perrhaebians, Dolopes, and Magnesians. Besides giving the Thessalians their freedom they assigned to Thessaly the Phthiotic Achaeans, taking away from it Phthiotic Thebes and Pharsalus; for the Aetolians had claimed Pharsalus with great vehemence, saying that it ought to be theirs according to the terms of the original treaty and Leucas as well. The members of the board deferred their decision until the Aetolians could lay the matter before the senate, but allowed them to include the Phocians and Locrians in their League, as had formerly been the case. They gave Corinth, Triphylia, and Heraea to the Achaeans, and most members were in favour of giving Oreum and Eretria to Eumenes. But Flamininus having addressed the board on that subject, the proposal was not ratified, so that after a short time these towns were set free by the senate as well as Carystus. To Pleuratus they gave Lychnis and Parthus, which were Illyrian but subject to Philip, and they allowed Amynander all the forts he had wrested from Philip in war.

After making this arrangements they separated. Publius Lentulus sailed to Bargylia and set it free, and Lucius Stertinius proceeded to Hephaestia, Thasos and the Thracian cities for the same purpose. Publius Villius and

Lucius Terentius went to King Antiochus and Gnaeus Cornelius to King Philip. Encountering him near Tempe he conveyed his other instructions to him and advised him to send an embassy to Rome to ask for an alliance, that they might not think he was watching for his opportunity and looking forward to the arrival of Antiochus. Upon the king's accepting this suggestion, Lentulus at once took leave of him and proceeded to Thermae, where the general assembly of the Aetolians was in session. Appearing before the people he exhorted them, speaking at some length, to maintain their original attitude and keep up their friendliness to Rome. Upon many speakers presenting themselves, some gently and diplomatically rebuking the Romans for not having used their success in a spirit of partnership or observed the terms of the original treaty, while others spoke abusively saying that the Romans could never have landed in Greece or conquered Philip except through the Aetolians, he refrained from replying to these different accusations, but begged them to send an embassy, as they would obtain complete justice from the senate. This he persuaded them to do. Such was the situation at the end of the war against Philip.

V. Affairs of Asia

If, as the phrase is, they are at their last gasp, they will take refuge with the Romans and put themselves and the city in their hands.

Antiochus and the Roman Envoys

Antiochus's project was going on as well as he could wish, and while he was in Thrace, Lucius Cornelius arrived by sea at Selymbria. He was the ambassador sent by the Senate to establish peace between Antiochus and Ptolemy. At the same time arrived three of the ten commissioners, Publius Lentulus from Bargylia and Lucius Terentius and Publius Villius from

Thasos. Their arrival was at once reported to the king and a few days afterwards they all assembled at Lysimachia. Hegesianax and Lysias, the envoys who had been sent to Flamininus, arrived there at the same time. In the unofficial interviews of the king and the Romans the conversation was simple and friendly, but afterwards when an official conference about that situation in general was held, things assumed another aspect. For Lucius Cornelius asked Antiochus to retire from the cities previously subject to Ptolemy which he had taken possession of in Asia, while as to those previously subject to Philip he demanded with urgency that he should evacuate them. For it was a ridiculous thing, he said, that Antiochus should come in when all was over and take the prizes they had gained in their war with Philip. He also advised him to keep his hands off the autonomous cities. And generally speaking he said he wondered on what pretext the king had crossed to Europe with such large military and naval forces. For anyone who judged correctly could not suppose that the reason was any other than that he was trying to put himself in the way of the Romans. The Roman envoy having concluded his speech thus, the king replied that in the first place he was at a loss to know by what right they disputed his possession of the Asiatic towns; they were the last people who had any title to do so. Next he requested them not to trouble themselves at all about Asiatic affairs; for he himself did not in the least go out of his way to concern himself with the affairs of Italy. He said that he had crossed to Europe with his army for the purpose of recovering the Chersonese and the cities in Thrace, for he had a better title to the sovereignty of these places than anyone else. They originally formed part of Lysimachus's kingdom, but when Seleucus went to war with that prince and conquered him in the war, the whole of

Lysimachus's kingdom came to Seleucus by right of conquest. But during the years that followed, when his ancestors had their attention deflected elsewhere, first of all Ptolemy and then Philip had robbed them of those places and appropriated them. At present he was not possessing himself of them by taking advantage of Philip's difficulties, but he was repossessing himself of them by his right as well as by his might. As for the Lysimachians, who had been unexpectedly expelled from their homes by the Thracians, he was doing no injury to Rome in bringing them back and resettling them; for he did this not with the intention of doing violence to the Romans, but of providing a residence for Seleucus. And regarding the autonomous cities of Asia it was not proper for them to receive their liberty by order of the Romans, but by his own act of grace. As for his relations with Ptolemy, he would himself settle everything in a manner agreeable to that king, for he had decided not only to establish friendship with him but to unite him to himself by a family alliance.

Upon Lucius and his colleagues deciding to summon the representatives of Smyrna and Lampsacus and give them a hearing, this was done. The Lampsacenes sent Parmenion and Pythodorus and the Smyrnaeans Coeranus. When these envoys spoke with some freedom, the king, taking it amiss that he should seem to be submitting their dispute against him to a Roman tribunal, interrupted Parmenion, saying, "Enough of that long harangue: for it is my pleasure that our differences should be submitted to the Rhodians and not to the Romans." Hereupon they broke up the conference, by no means pleased with each other.

VI. Affairs of Egypt

Scopas and other Aetolians at Alexandria

There are many who crave after deeds of daring and renown, but few venture to set their hand to them. And yet Scopas had better resources at his command for facing peril and acting boldly than Cleomenes. For the latter, anticipated in his design, could hope for no support except from his own servants and friends, but yet instead of abandoning this slender hope, put it as far as it was in his power to the touch, valuing more highly a glorious death than a life of ignominy. Scopas, on the contrary, while he had a numerous band of supporters and a fine opportunity, as the king was still a child, was forestalled while still deferring and planning. For Aristomenes, having discovered that he used to collect his friends in his own house and hold conferences there with them, sent some officers to summon him before the royal council. But he had so far lost his head that he neither dared to carry on his project, nor, worst of all, even felt himself capable of obeying when summoned by the king, until Aristomenes recognizing his confusion surrounded his house with soldiers and elephants. When Ptolemy made his way into the house and announced that the king summoned Scopas, at first he paid no attention to what was said, but simply stared at Ptolemy for a considerable time, as if inclined to threaten him and astonished at his audacity. But when Ptolemy came up to him and boldly took hold of his cloak, he then called on those present to assist him. But as the number of soldiers who had entered the house was considerable, and as some one informed him that it was surrounded outside, he yielded to circumstances and followed Ptolemy accompanied by his friends.

When he entered the council-chamber, the king first accused him in a few words and was followed by Polycrates who had lately arrived from Cyprus, and last by Aristomenes. The accusations brought by all were

similar to those I have just stated, but in addition they mentioned his conferences with his friends and his refusal to obey the royal summons. He was condemned for these various reasons not only by the council but by those foreign ambassadors who were present. Aristomenes also, when about to impeach him, brought with him besides many other men of distinction from Greece, the Aetolian envoys also who had come to make peace, one of whom was Dorimachus, son of Nicostratus. The speeches of the accusers over, Scopas, speaking in his turn, attempted to offer some defence, but as no one paid any heed to him owing to the confusion of the circumstances he was at once led of to prison with his friends. Aristomenes after nightfall killed Scopas and all his friends by poison, but before killing Dicaearchus he had him racked and scourged, thus punishing him as he deserved and on behalf of all the Greeks. For this Dicaearchus was the man whom Philip, when he decided on treacherously attacking the Cyclades and the cities on the Hellespont, appointed to take command of all his flight and direct the whole operation. Being thus sent forth on an evidently impious mission, he not only did not consider himself to be guilty of any exceptional wickedness, but by the excess of his insolence thought to terrify both gods and men: for wherever he anchored his ships he constructed two altars, one of Impiety and the other of Lawlessness, and on these he sacrificed and worshipped these powers as if they were divine. He therefore must be pronounced to have suffered the punishment he deserved at the hands of gods and men alike; for having regulated his life by unnatural principles he met likewise with no natural death. The other Aetolians who wished to leave for home, were all allowed by the king to depart with their property.

The avarice of Scopas had been notorious even when he was alive—for his rapacity much excelled that of any other man—but by his death it became more so owing to the quantity of money and precious objects found in his house. For, aided by the savagery and drunken violence of Charimortus he had utterly stripped the palace like a burglar.

After the officials of the court had set to rights the matter of the Aetolians, they at once began to occupy themselves with the celebration of the king's Proclamation (Anacleteria). Although his age was not such as to make it pressing, they thought that it would contribute to the settlement of affairs and be the beginning of a change for the better if the king were thought to be now invested with full authority. Having made preparations on a generous scale they carried out the ceremony in a manner worthy of His Majesty's dignity, Polycrates, as it appears, having taken the greatest share in furthering this scheme of theirs. This man had while still young, during the reign of the king's father, been considered second to none at court in loyalty and energy, and so he continued to be under the present king. For, being entrusted with the government of Cyprus and its revenue in hazardous and complicated circumstances, he had not only preserved the island for the boy but had collected a considerable sum of money, and had now come to Alexandria to bring this money to the king, having handed over the government of Cyprus to Ptolemaeus of Megalopolis. Having, owing to this, been very well received and having amassed a large fortune in the years which followed, he afterwards, as he grew older, entirely wrecked his good name by the licentiousness and depravity of his life. A very similar reputation was acquired in his old age by Ptolemy, son of

Agesarchus. When I reach that period I will have no hesitation in exposing the disgraceful circumstances attendant on their power.

THE END OF BOOK XVIII

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XX

I. AFFAIRS OF GREECE

(Suid.; cp. Livy XXXV. 48. 2.)

"The Aetolians appointed thirty of the Apocleti [1] to sit with King Antiochus," and again, "He summoned the Apocleti to meet and submitted the situation to them."

[1] The Apocleti were a select council. See Livy XXXV.34.2.

Antiochus and Boeotia

(Cp. Livy XXXV. 50. 5.)

When Antiochus [2] sent an embassy to the Boeotians, they replied to the envoys that on the king presenting himself in person, they would take his demands into consideration.

[2] The excerptor by mistake has substituted Philip for Antiochus.

Embassies to Antiochus from Epirus and Elis

(Cp. Livy XXXVI. 5. 1-8.)

While Antiochus was at Chalcis at the beginning of the winter, Charops came to him as envoy on the part of the whole nation of Epirus, and Callistratus on that of the city of Elis. The Epirots begged him not to involve them in the first place in a war with Rome, exposed as they were to Italy in front of all Greece. If indeed he was capable of protecting Epirus and assuring their safety, they said they would be glad to receive him in their cities and harbours, but if he did not decide to do this at present they asked him to pardon them if they were afraid of war with Rome. The Eleans

begged him to send succour to their city, for as the Achaeans had voted for war, they were apprehensive of being attacked by them. The king replied to the Epirots that he would send envoys to speak to them on the subject of their joint interests, and to Elis he dispatched a force of a thousand infantry under the command of the Cretan Euphanes.

Decadence of Boeotia

(Cp. Livy XXXVI. 6.)

For many years Boeotia had been in a morbid condition very different from the former sound health and renown of that state. After the battle of Leuctra the Boeotians had attained great celebrity and power, but by some means or other during the period which followed they continued constantly to lose both the one and the other under the leadership of the strategus Abaeocritus, and in subsequent years not only did this diminishment go on, but there was an absolute change for the contrary, and they did all they could to obscure their ancient fame as well. For when the Achaeans had succeeded in making them go to war with the Aetolians, they took the side of the former and made an alliance with them, after which they continued to make war on the Aetolians. On one occasion when the latter had invaded Boeotia, they marched out in full force, and the Achaeans having collected their forces and being about to come to their help, without waiting for their arrival they engaged the Aetolians. When defeated in the battle they so much lost their spirit, that they never after that affair ventured to pretend to any honourable distinction, nor did they ever by public decree take part with the other Greeks in any action or in any struggle, but abandoning themselves to good cheer and strong drink sapped the energy not only of their bodies but of their minds.

The chief errors into which they fell, leading to many minor ones, were the following. After the defeat I mentioned they at once abandoned the Achaeans and attached their own League to that of the Aetolians. Shortly afterwards, when the Aetolians undertook a war against Demetrius, the father of Philip, the Boeotians again deserted them and on the arrival of Demetrius with his army in Boeotia would not face any danger whatever but completely submitted to Macedonia. But as there were some slight sparks left of their ancestral glory, there were some who were by no means pleased with the present situation and this implicit obedience to the Macedonians. There was in consequence a violent opposition on the part of these to Ascondas and Neon, the grandfather and father of Brachylles, who were then the warmest partisans of Macedonia. However, in the end, Ascondas and Neon got the upper hand owing to the following accident. Antigonus, who after the death of Demetrius had become Philip's guardian, was sailing on some business to Larymna at the extremity of Boeotia, when owing to an extraordinary low ebb tide his vessels settled on the land. It had just been reported that Antigonus was about to raid the country, and Neon, who was then hipparch and was on the move with the whole of the Boeotian cavalry with the object of protecting the country, lighted upon Antigonus, who was in a state of dismay and in a difficult position owing to the accident; and though it was in his power to inflict much damage on the Macedonians, decided, contrary to their expectation, to spare them. The other Boeotians approved of his conduct, but the Thebans were not entirely pleased with it. Antigonus, when the flood tide very shortly came in and his ships having been lightened, was very thankful to Neon for not having availed himself of the accident to attack him, and now continued the voyage

to Asia, upon which he had set out. In consequence of this, when, at a later period, he had conquered Cleomenes of Sparta and become master of Lacedaemon, he left Brachylles in that town as his commissioner, bestowing this post on him out of gratitude for the kind of service that Neon, the father of Brachylles had rendered him. This contributed no little to the fortunes of Brachylles and his house; and not only did Antigonus show him this mark of his regard, but ever afterwards both he and Philip continued to furnish him with money and strengthen his position, and thus they soon crushed those opposed to them at Thebes and compelled all, with quite a few exceptions, to take the part of Macedon.

It was thus that the attachment of the house of Neon to Macedonia and the increase in its fortunes originated. But public affairs in Boeotia had fallen into such a state of disorder that for nearly twenty-five years justice, both civil and criminal, had ceased to be administered there, the magistrates by issuing orders, some of them for the dispatch of garrisons and others for general campaigns, always contriving to abolish legal proceedings. Certain strategi even provided pay out of the public funds for the indigent, the populace thus learning to court and invest with power those men who would help them to escape the legal consequences of their crimes and debts and even in addition to get something out of the public funds as a favour from the magistrates. The chief abettor of these abuses was Opheltas, who was constantly contriving some scheme apparently calculated to benefit the populace for the moment, but perfectly sure to ruin everyone at the end. Incident upon all this was another most unfortunate mania. For childless men, when they died, did not leave their property to their nearest heirs, as had formerly been the custom there, but disposed of it for purposes of

junketing and banqueting and made it the common property of their friends. Even many who had families distributed the greater part of their fortune among their clubs, so that there were many Boeotians who had each month more dinners than there were days in the calendar.

Defection of Megara from the Boeotian League

One consequence of this was that the Megarians, detesting this state of affairs and mindful of their former confederacy with the Achaean League, once more inclined towards the Achaeans and their policy. For the Megarians had originally, from the days of Antigonus Gonatas, formed part of the Achaean League, but when Cleomenes intercepted them by occupying the Isthmus, they were cut off, and with the consent of the Achaeans, joined the Boeotian League. But shortly before the time I am speaking of, they became displeased with the conduct of affairs in Boeotia, and again turned to the Achaeans. Hereupon the Boeotians, indignant at seeming to be flouted, marched out with all their forces against Megara, and when the Megarians treated their arrival as of no importance, they began in their anger to besiege Megara and make assaults on it. But, being seized by panic owing to a report that Philopoemen with the Achaeans had arrived, they left their ladders against the wall and fled in utter rout to their own country.

Such being the condition of public affairs in Boeotia, they were lucky enough to scrape through by some means or other the critical period of Philip and Antiochus. Subsequently, however, they did not escape, but Fortune, it seems as if purposely requiting them, fell heavily upon them, as I shall tell in due course.

(Cp. Livy XXXVI. 6.)

Most of the Boeotian people assigned as a reason for their hostility to Rome the assassination of Brachylles [3] and the expedition made by Flamininus against Coronea owing to the frequent murders of Romans on the roads; but the real reason was that morbid condition of their minds due to the causes I have mentioned. For when King Antiochus was near at hand, those who had held office in Boeotia went out to meet him, and on joining him addressed him in courteous terms and brought him into Thebes.

[3] Cp. xviii.43.

Wedding of Antiochus

(From Athen. X. 439c, f.)

Antiochus, surnamed the Great, he whom the Romans overthrew, upon reaching Chalcis, as Polybius tells us in his 20th Book, celebrated his wedding. He was then fifty years old, and had undertaken two very serious tasks, one being the liberation of Greece, as he himself gave out, the other a war with Rome. He fell in love, then, with a maiden of Chalcis at the time of the war, and was most eager to make her his wife, being himself a wine-bibber and fond of getting drunk. She was the daughter of Cleoptolemus, a noble Chalcidian, and of surpassing beauty. So celebrating his wedding at Chalcis, he spent the whole winter there not giving a moment's thought to the situation of affairs. He gave the girl the name Euboea, and when defeated in the war fled to Ephesus with his bride.

Battle of Thermopylae

(Livy XXXVI. 19. 11.)

Not a soul escaped from the whole army except the five hundred who were round the king, and a very small number of the ten thousand soldiers whom Polybius tells us he had brought over with him to Greece.

The Aetolians make Peace

(Cp. Livy XXXVI. 27.)

After Heraclea had fallen into the hands of the Romans, Phaeneas, the strategus of the Aetolians, seeing Aetolia threatened with peril on all sides and realizing what was likely to happen to the other towns, decided to send an embassy to Manius Acilius Glabrio to beg for an armistice and peace. Having resolved on this he dispatched Archedamus, Pantaleon, and Chalepus. They had intended on meeting the Roman general to address him at length, but at the interview they were cut short and prevented from doing so. For Glabrio told them that for the present he had no time as he was occupied by the disposal of the booty from Heraclea, but granting them a ten days' armistice, he said he would send back with them Lucius Valerius Flaccus, to whom he begged them to submit their request. The armistice having been made, and Flaccus having met them at Hypata, there was considerable discussion of the situation. The Aetolians, in making out their case, went back to the very beginning, reciting all their former deeds of kindness to the Romans, but Flaccus cut the flood of their eloquence short by saying that this sort of pleading did not suit present circumstances. For as it was they who had broken off their originally kind relations, and as their present enmity was entirely their own fault, former deeds of kindness no longer counted as an asset. Therefore he advised them to leave off trying to justify themselves and resort rather to deprecatory language, begging the consul to grant them pardon for their offences. The Aetolians, after some further observations about the actual situation, decided to refer the whole matter to Glabrio, committing themselves "to the faith" [4] of the Romans, not knowing the exact meaning of the phrase, but deceived by the word

"faith" as if they would thus obtain more complete pardon. But with the Romans to commit oneself to the faith of a victor is equivalent to surrendering at discretion.

[4] fides.

However, having reached this decision they sent off Phaeneas and others to accompany Flaccus and convey it at once to Glabrio. On meeting the general, after again pleading in justification of their conduct, they wound up by saying that the Aetolians had decided to commit themselves to the faith of the Romans. Upon this Glabrio, taking them up, said, "So that is so, is it, ye men of Aetolia?" and when they assented, "Very well," he said, "then in the first place none of you must cross to Asia, either on his own account or by public decree; next you must surrender Dicaearchus and Menestratus of Epirus (the latter had recently come to their assistance at Naupactus) "and at the same time King Amynander and all the Athamanians who went off to join you together with him." Phaeneas now interrupted him and said, "But what you demand, O General, is neither just nor Greek." Glabrio, not so much incensed, as wishing to make them conscious of the real situation they were in and thoroughly intimidate them, said: "So you still give yourselves Grecian airs and speak of what is meet and proper after surrendering unconditionally? I will have you all put in chains if I think fit." Saying this he ordered a chain to be brought and an iron collar to be put round the neck of each. Phaeneas and the rest were thunderstruck, and all stood there speechless as if paralysed in body and mind by this extraordinary experience. But Flaccus and some of the other military tribunes who were present entreated Glabrio not to treat the men with excessive harshness, in view of the fact that they were ambassadors. Upon

his consenting, Phaeneas began to speak. He said that he and the Apocleti would do what Glabrio ordered, but that the consent of the people was required if the orders were to be enforced. Glabrio now said that he was right, upon which he called for a renewal of the armistice for ten days more. This request also was granted, and they parted on this understanding. On reaching Hypata the envoys informed the Apocleti of what had taken place and what had been said, and it was only now, on hearing all, that the Aetolians became conscious of their mistake and of the constraint now brought to bear on them. It was therefore decided to write to the towns and call an assembly of the nation to take the demands into consideration. When the report of the Roman answer was spread abroad, the people became so savage, that no one even would attend the meeting to discuss matters. As sheer impossibility thus prevented any discussion of the demands, and as at the same time Nicander arrived from Asia Minor at Phalara [5] in the Melian gulf, from which he had set forth, and informed them of King Antiochus's cordial reception of him and his promises of future assistance, they neglected the matter more and more; so that no steps tending to the conclusion of peace were taken. In consequence, after the termination of the armistice, the Aetolians remained as before *in statu belli*.

[5] The harbour of Lamia in Thessaly.

The dangerous experience that had befallen Nicander must not be passed over in silence. For starting from Ephesus he reached Phalara on the twelfth day after he had set sail from it. Finding that the Romans were still near Heraclea and that the Macedonians had retired from Lamia, but were encamped not far from the town, he managed by a wonder to convey the money to Lamia, and himself attempted at night to escape between the two

armies to Hypata. Falling into the hands of the Macedonian sentries, he was being brought before Philip while the banquet was still at its height, quite expecting to suffer the worst at the hands of the enraged king, or to be given up to the Romans. But when the matter was reported to Philip, he at once ordered those whose business this was, to attend to Nicander's personal wants and treat him kindly in every respect. After a little he himself rose from table and came to visit Nicander. He severely blamed the errors into which the Aetolian state had fallen, by calling in first of all the Romans and subsequently Antiochus to attack the Greeks, but nevertheless he still implored them to forget the past, and to cultivate their friendship with himself, and not be ever disposed to take advantage of circumstances adverse to either. This message he begged him to convey to the leading Aetolian statesmen, and after exhorting Nicander himself to be ever mindful of the kindness he had shown him, sent him off with an adequate escort, ordering the officers whose duty it was to bring him back to Hypata in safety. Nicander, finding himself thus met by Philip in a spirit which he never dared to hope for or expect, was now restored to his relatives, and after this friendly approach remained well inclined to the house of Macedon. Thus even later in the time of Perseus still feeling the obligation he was under for this favour and ill disposed to oppose the projects of Perseus, he exposed himself to suspicion and obloquy, and finally was summoned to Rome and ended his days there.

Philopoemen at Sparta

(Cp. Plutarch, Philop. xv.)

The Spartans wished to find one of their own citizens to speak to Philopoemen about this. But while in most cases there are many

enterprising schemers ready to offer such favours and thus take the first steps to recommend and establish friendship, in the case of Philopoemen they could not find a single man willing to offer him this favour, until at last being hard put to it they appointed by vote Timolaus, who though he was a family friend of Philopoemen and had been intimate with him for long, had visited Megalopolis twice for this very purpose without being able to summon up courage to mention the matter to him, until spurring himself on and going there a third time he ventured to address him on the subject of the gift. When Philopoemen, as he never had expected, received the proposal quite courteously, he was delighted, as he thought he had attained his object, and Philopoemen said he would come to Sparta in a few days, as he wished to thank all the magistrates for this favour. Upon his going there later and being invited to attend the Council, he said that he had long recognized the kind feelings the Spartan entertained for him and now did so more than ever from the crown and very high honour that they offered him. So, he said, he perfectly appreciated their intentions, but was a little abashed by the manner in which they proceeded. For such honours and such crowns, the rust of which he who once put them on would never wash off his head, should never be given to friends, but much rather to enemies, in order that their friends, retaining the right to speak their minds, might be trusted by the Achaeans when they proposed to help Sparta, while their enemies, who had swallowed the bait, might either be compelled to support the proposal or have to hold their tongues and be incapacitated from doing any harm.

II. A Fragment, the Place of which is uncertain

It is not at all the same to judge of things from hearsay and from having actually witnessed them, but there is a great difference. In all matters a certainty founded on the evidence of one's eyes is of the greatest value.

THE END OF BOOK XX

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXI

I. AFFAIRS OF ITALY

Embassy of the Lacedaemonians to Rome

At this time the embassy which the Lacedaemonians had sent to Rome arrived disappointed in their hopes. For they had been sent on the subject of the hostages and villages, but regarding the villages the senate replied that they would give orders to the legates they were sending, and as for the hostages they must consult further about the matter. As to the old exiles they said they wondered why the Spartans did not call them home, now that Sparta was free.

Embassy of the Aetolians

Immediately upon the announcement of the naval victory, [1] the Romans ordered the people to observe nine days of rest, [2] i.e. to keep a general holiday and sacrifice to the gods in thanks for their success. After this they introduced into the Senate the Aetolian embassy and the legates from Glabrio. After both had addressed them at some length, the senate decided to give the Aetolians the choice of two courses, either to submit all matters to the decision of the senate or to pay at once a thousand talents and enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with Rome. When they demanded a definite statement of what matters were to be submitted to the senate's decision, that body refused to admit any distinction, and therefore the Aetolians remained *in statu belli*.

[1] That of the Roman fleet over that of Antiochus, off Phocaea. See Livy XXXVI.43.

[2] A *supplicatio*.

Embassy from Philip

At about the same time the senate gave a hearing to the envoys of Philip; for he had sent this embassy to call attention in his favour to the goodwill and readiness to help he had shown in the war with Antiochus. After listening to him the senate at once set free his son Demetrius, who was their hostage, and also promised to relieve him of some of the payments due, if he kept his faith with them under present circumstances. They also set free the Lacedaemonian hostages except Armenas, the son of Nabis, who soon after this sickened and died.

II. Affairs of Greece

Eumenes and Achaea

In Greece, too, when an embassy reached Achaea from King Eumenes proposing an alliance, the Achaean people meeting in a general assembly voted the alliance and sent off soldiers—a thousand foot and a hundred horse under the command of Diophanes of Megalopolis.

The Aetolians and the Roman Governors

While Glabrio, the Roman general, was besieging Amphissa, the Athenian people, hearing of the distress of the Amphissians and the arrival of Publius Scipio, sent an embassy at the head of which was Echedemus, with instructions to salute Lucius and Publius Scipio and to attempt to procure terms of peace for the Aetolians. Publius was very glad of their arrival and paid much attention to them, as he saw they would be of service to him in the projects he entertained. For the general wished to settle the

Aetolian matter, and even if the Aetolians did not submit, had in any case resolved to neglect them and cross to Asia, as he well knew that the object of the war and the whole expedition was not to subdue the Aetolian League but to conquer Antiochus and become masters of Asia. Therefore as soon as the Athenians mentioned peace, he readily accepted the proposal, and told them to sound the Aetolians also. Echedemus, having sent a message in advance, proceeded himself to Hypata, and spoke about the question of peace to the Aetolian authorities. They also readily lent an ear, and delegates were appointed to meet the Romans. Upon reaching Publius, whom they found encamped at a distance of sixty stades from Amphissa, they made a long speech reminding him of all the kindness they had shown the Romans. When Scipio addressed them in a still milder and kinder tone, recounting his action in Spain and Africa, and explaining how he had dealt with people in those countries who had relied on him, and when he finally expressed his opinion that they ought to place themselves in his hands and rely on him, all those present at first became most sanguine, thinking that peace would be at once concluded. But when, upon the Aetolians inquiring on what conditions they should make peace, Lucius Scipio informed them that there were two alternatives open to them, either to submit entirely to Rome or to pay a thousand talents at once and make a defensive and offensive alliance, the Aetolians present were exceedingly distressed to find that this decision was not conformable to their previous conversation. They, however, said they would submit the conditions to the people of Aetolia.

These delegates, then, returned home to discuss the matter, and Echedemus meeting the Apocleti also talked it over. One of the alternative conditions was impossible owing to the magnitude of the sum demanded,

and the other frightened them owing to what had taken place on the occasion of their former mistake, when after having assented to absolute submission they came very near being placed in chains. Consequently, in their difficulty and distress, they sent off the same envoys again to beg either that the sum might be reduced so that they would be able to pay it, or that their politicians and their women should be excluded from the total submission. Meeting Publius and his brother they communicated the decree of the Aetolians on the subject, but when Lucius said that he was only empowered by the senate to propose the conditions he had stated, they again returned to Aetolia, and Echedemus following them to Hypata, advised the Aetolians, since there was this obstacle at present to the conclusion of peace, to ask for an armistice and gaining thus a temporary relief from present ills, to send an embassy to the senate, when if they were successful in obtaining their request well and good, but if not they might watch for a change of circumstances. For it was impossible for their situation to be worse than it actually was, but there were many reasons why it might improve. Echedemus's advice seemed to them to be good, and it was decided to send envoys asking for a truce. So coming to Lucius they begged him to grant them for the present a truce for six months, in order to send an embassy to the Senate. Publius, who had for long been eager to play a part in Asiatic affairs, soon persuaded his brother to accede to the request. Upon the signature of the agreement, Glabrio, after raising the siege and handing over his whole army and his stores to Lucius, at once left for Rome with his military tribunes.

III. Affairs of Asia

State of Phocaea

(Suid.; cp. Livy XXXVII. 9. 1.)

The Phocaeans, partly because the Romans left in the ships were quartered upon them and partly because they objected to the enforced contributions, became disaffected.

At the same date the magistrates of Phocaea, afraid both of the excited state the people were in owing to the dearth of corn and of the active propaganda of the partisans of Antiochus, sent envoys to Seleucus, [3] who was on the borders of their territory, begging him not to approach the town, as it was their intention to keep quiet and await the issue of events, after which they would yield obedience to orders given them. Of these envoys Aristarchus, Cassander and Rhodon were attached to Seleucus and his cause, while Hegias and Gelias were opposed to him and inclined to favour the Romans. Upon their meeting him, Seleucus at once admitted the three first into his intimacy, neglecting Hegias and Gelias. But when he heard of the excitement of the populace and the dearth of corn he advanced to the town without giving the envoys a formal audience.

[3] Son of Antiochus the Great, afterwards King Seleucus IV.

(Suid.; cp. Livy XXXVII. 11. 7.)

Two Galli or priests of Cybele with images and pectorals came out of the town, and besought them not to resort to extreme measures against the city.

Naval Matters

(Suid.)

The engine for throwing fire used by Pausistratus, the Rhodian admiral, was funnel-shaped. On each side of the ship's prow noosed ropes were run along the inner side of the hull, into which were fitted poles stretching out seawards. From the extremity of each hung by an iron chain the funnel-

shaped vessel full of fire, so that, in charging or passing, the fire was shot out of it into the enemy's ship, but was a long way from one's own ship owing to the inclination.

(Cp. Suid.)

Pamphilidas, the Rhodian admiral, was considered more adequate to any occasion than Pausistratus because he was by nature rather wise and steadfast than venturesome. For most men are good at judging of a situation rather from what happens to occur than by reasoning things out. They had appointed Pausistratus for this very reason, that he was energetic and daring, but all of a sudden they entirely changed their minds owing to his disaster.

(Cp. Livy XXXVII. 18. 10.)

At this time letters reached Samos addressed to Lucius Aemilius Regulus and Eumenes from Lucius Scipio the consul and from Publius Scipio informing them of the truce made with the Aetolians and of the march of the Roman army towards the Hellespont. The Aetolians had also informed Antiochus and Seleucus of this.

Diophanes of Megalopolis

Diophanes of Megalopolis had had great practice in war, because during the long war against Nabis, which was waged in the immediate vicinity of Megalopolis, he had constantly served under Philopoemen and thus acquired actual experience in the methods of warfare. Add to this that the man I am speaking of was both in personal appearance and in personal combat very powerful and redoubtable. And, most importantly of all, he was a gallant man-at-arms and exceptionally skilled in their use.

Antiochus negotiates

(Cp. Livy XXXVII. 18. 6.)

King Antiochus had entered the territory of Pergamus, where hearing of the arrival of King Eumenes, and seeing that both the naval and military forces were coming up to the assistance of that prince, was desirous of making proposals for peace simultaneously to the Romans, to Eumenes and to the Rhodians. Setting out, then, with his whole army he came to Elaea, and seizing on an eminence opposite the town, established his infantry there, encamping his cavalry, more than six thousand in number, under the walls of the town. He accompanied the latter force, and sent a messenger to Lucius Aemilius, who was within the town, on the subject of peace. The Roman general, summoning Eumenes and the Rhodians to meet him, begged them to give him their view of the situation. Eudamus and Pamphilidas were not opposed to peace, but the king said that for the present peace neither befitted their dignity nor was possible. "For how," he said, "can the result fail to be undignified if we make peace while we are shut up within the walls? And indeed how is it even possible for the present? For how can we, unless we await the arrival of a general of consular rank, confirm any agreement we arrive at without his consent? And, apart from this, if we managed at all to come to some semblance of an agreement with Antiochus, I scarcely suppose that your naval and military forces can return home, unless the Senate and People ratify your decision. All that will be left for you to do, then, is to spend the winter here awaiting their pronouncement, perfectly inactive, but exhausting the stores and material of your allies; and afterwards, if the Senate does not approve of your making peace, you will have to begin the war afresh from the beginning, after having thrown away the present opportunity we have of

putting an end by the grace of God to the whole business." Eumenes spoke so, and Aemilius, approving his advice, replied to Antiochus that it was impossible for peace to be made before the arrival of the proconsul. Antiochus, on hearing this, at once began to lay waste the territory of Elaea. After this, while Seleucus remained in this neighbourhood, Antiochus made constant incursions into the so-called plain of Thebe, and lighting upon this most fertile district, abounding in produce, plentifully supplied his army with every variety of booty.

Antiochus approaches Prusias

(Cp. Livy XXXVII. 37. 25.)

King Antiochus, on returning to Sardis from the expedition I have described, sent frequent messages to Prusias inviting him to enter into alliance with him. Prusias previously had not been disinclined to join Antiochus, for he was very much afraid of the Romans crossing to Asia with the object of deposing all the princes there. But on a letter reaching him from the brothers Publius and Lucius Scipio, after having received and read it, he hesitated considerably and foresaw tolerably well what would happen, as the Scipios in their communication employed many clear arguments in confirmation of their assertions. For they not only pleaded their own policy but the universal policy of Rome, pointing out that not only had the Romans deprived no former prince of his kingdom, but had even themselves created some new kingdoms, and had augmented the power of other princes, making their dominion many times more extensive than formerly. In Spain they cited the cases of Andobales and Colichas, in Africa that of Massanissa, and that of Pleuratus in Illyria; all of whom they said they had made real and acknowledged kings out of petty and

insignificant princelets. In Greece itself they adduced the cases of Philip and Nabis. As for Philip, after they had crushed him in war and tied his hands by imposing hostages and tribute on him, no sooner had they received from him a slight proof of his goodwill than they had restored to him his son and the other young men who were held as hostages together with Demetrius; they had remitted the tribute and given him back many of the cities taken in the war. And while they could have utterly annihilated Nabis, they had not done so, but spare him, although he was a tyrant, on receipt of the usual pledges. They wrote begging Prusias, in view of this, not to be afraid about his kingdom, but confidently to take the side of the Romans, for he would never repent of his decision. Prusias, then, after reading the letter, changed his mind, and when Gaius Livius also arrived on an embassy to him, after meeting that legate he entirely relinquished all hope in Antiochus. Antiochus thus disappointed, proceeded to Ephesus, and calculating that the only way to prevent the enemy's army from crossing and generally avert the war from Asia was to obtain definite command of the sea, determined to give battle by sea and thus decide matters.

Flight of the Pirates

(Suid.; cp. Livy XXXVII. 27. 5.)

The pirates, when they saw the Roman fleet advancing on them, turned and fled.

Attempt of Antiochus to make peace

(Livy XXXVII. 34-36.)

Antiochus, who, after his defeat in the naval engagement, [4] remained in Sardis neglecting his opportunities and generally deferring action of any kind, on learning that the enemy had crossed to Asia, was crushed in spirit

and, abandoning all hope, decided to send to the Scipios to beg for peace. He therefore appointed and dispatched Heracleides of Byzantium, instructing him to say that he gave up Lampsacus, Smyrna, and Alexandria Troas, the towns which were the cause of the war, as well as such other places in Aeolis and Ionia as they chose to take among those which had sided with Rome in the present war. He also engaged to pay half the expenses which their quarrel with him had caused them. These were the instructions that his envoy was to deliver in his public audience, and there were other private ones he was to convey to Scipio of which I will give a detailed account further on. Heracleides, on reaching the Hellespont and finding the Romans still encamped on the place where they had pitched their tents immediately after crossing, was at first glad of this, thinking that the fact that the enemy remained stationary and had as yet not attempted to make any progress would tell in his favour at the audience; but on learning that Publius Scipio still remained on the further side, he was distressed, as the result very largely depended on the intentions of that commander. The real reason why both the army remained in its first camp and Scipio was apart from it was that the latter was one of the Salii. These are, as I said in my book on the Roman constitution, one of the three colleges whose duty it is to perform the principal sacrifices, and, no matter where they happen to be, it is forbidden for them to change their residence for thirty days during the celebration of the sacrifices. This was now the case with Scipio; for just as his army was crossing, he was caught by this period, so that he could not change his residence. The consequence was that he was separated from his army and stopped behind in Europe, while the legions after crossing

remained inactive, and were unable to make any progress as they were awaiting his arrival.

[4] In the bay of Teos. See Livy XXXVII.30.

When Scipio arrived a few days afterwards, Heracleides was summoned for an audience to the Army Council and addressed them on the subject of his instructions, saying that Antiochus offered to retire from Lampsacus, Smyrna, and Alexandria, and such other cities of Aeolis and Ionia as had made common cause with Rome, and that he also offered to pay half the expenses they had incurred in the present war. He spoke at considerable length on the subject, exhorting the Romans first to remember that they were but men and not to test fortune too severely, and next to impose some limit on the extent of their empire, confining it if possible to Europe, for even so it was vast and unexampled, no people in the past having attained to this. But if they must at all hazards grasp for themselves some portions of Asia in addition, let them definitely state which, for the king would accede to anything that was in his power. After this speech the council decided that the consul should answer that in justice Antiochus should pay not half the expense but the whole, for the war was originally due to him and not to them. He must also not only set free the cities of Aeolis and Ionia, but retire from all the country subject to him on this side Taurus. Upon hearing this from the Council the envoy, as these demands far exceeded the conditions he had asked for, did not give them consideration, but withdrawing from the public audience devoted himself to cultivating relations with Publius Scipio.

As soon as he had a fitting opportunity, he spoke to Scipio according to his instructions. These were to tell him that in the first place the king would restore his son to him without ransom—for at the beginning of the war

Scipio's son had happened to fall into the hands of Antiochus; secondly that he was ready to give to Scipio at present any sum he named and afterwards to share the revenue of his kingdom with him, if he helped him now to obtain the terms of peace he proposed. Scipio answered that he accepted the promise about his son, and would be most grateful to Antiochus if he fulfilled it; but as to the rest he made a great mistake and had entirely failed to recognize the king's own true interest not only in this private interview with himself, but at his audience before the Council. For had he made these proposals while he was still master of Lysimachia and the approach to the Chersonese, he would soon have obtained his terms. Or again, even after retiring from those positions, had he proceeded to the Hellespont with his army, and showing that he would prevent our crossing, had sent to propose the same terms, it would still have been possible for him to obtain them. "But now," he said, "that he has allowed our army to land in Asia, when after letting himself not only be bitted but mounted he comes to us asking for peace on equal terms he naturally fails to get it and is foiled in his hopes." He advised him, therefore, to take better counsel in his present situation and look facts in the face. In return for his promise about his son, he would give him a piece of advice equal in value to the favour he offered, and that was to consent to everything and avoid at all cost a battle with the Romans. Heracleides, after listening to this, returned, and on joining the king, gave him a detailed report. But Antiochus, thinking that no more severe demands than the present could be imposed on him even if he were worsted in a battle, ceased to occupy himself with peace, and began to make every preparation and avail himself of every resource for the struggle.

Conditions imposed by Scipio after the Battle of Magnesia

(Cp. Livy XXXVII. 45. 3.)

After the victory gained by the Romans over Antiochus they occupied Sardis and its citadels, . . . and Musaeus came from Antiochus under flag of truce. Upon Scipio receiving him courteously, he said that Antiochus wished to send envoys to discuss the whole situation. He therefore desired that a safe conduct should be given to this mission. Upon Scipio's consenting, he returned, and after a few days the king's envoys arrived. They were Zeuxis, the former governor of Lydia, and Antipater the king's nephew. They were anxious first of all to meet King Eumenes, as they were alarmed lest owing to previous friction he might be somewhat disposed to do them injury. But on finding him, contrary to their expectation, quite reasonable and gentle, they at once took steps to obtain a public audience. Upon being summoned to the Army Council, they first of all made a general appeal of some length to the Romans, exhorting them to use their success mildly and magnanimously, and saying that this would not so much further the interest of Antiochus as that of the Romans themselves, now that Fortune had made them rulers and masters of the whole world. But their main object was to ask what they must do in order to secure peace and alliance with Rome. The members of the Council had previously sat to consider this, and they now asked Scipio to communicate their decision.

Scipio said that victory had never made the Romans more exacting nor defeat less so: therefore they would now give them the same answer as they had formerly received, when before the battle they came to the Hellespont. They must retire from Europe and from all Asia on this side Taurus: Antiochus must pay to the Romans for the expenses of the war 15,000 Euboean talents, 500 at once, 2500 upon the peace being ratified by the

People, and the remainder in twelve yearly instalments of 1000 talents each: he must also pay to Eumenes the 400 talents he still owed him and the corn he had not yet delivered according to the terms of his agreement with his father Attalus. In addition he was to give up Hannibal the Carthaginian, Thoas the Aetolian, Mnasilochus the Acarnanian, and Philo and Eubulidas of Chalcis. As security Antiochus was to give at once the twenty hostages whose names were appended. Such was the decision which Scipio pronounced in the name of the whole Council. Upon Antipater and Zeuxis accepting the terms, it was universally decided to send envoys to Rome to beg the Senate and People to ratify the peace, and on this understanding the envoys took leave. On the following days the Romans divided their forces . . . and a few days afterwards, when the hostages arrived at Ephesus, Eumenes and the envoys of Antiochus prepared to sail for Rome, as well as embassies from Rhodes, Smyrna, and almost all peoples and cities on this side Taurus.

IV. Affairs of Italy

The Embassies at Rome

(Cp. Livy XXXVII. 52-56.)

At the beginning of the summer following the victory of the Romans over Antiochus, King Eumenes, the envoys of Antiochus, and those from Rhodes and elsewhere arrived at Rome: for nearly all the communities of Asia Minor sent envoys to Rome immediately after the battle, as the whole future of all of them depended on the senate. The senate received all the arrivals courteously, but treated with especial splendour, both in the mode of their reception and the richness of the gifts they bestowed on them, King Eumenes, and after him the Rhodians. When the date fixed for the audience

arrived, they called in first the king and begged him to speak frankly stating what he wished the senate to do for him. Eumenes said that had he wished to ask a kindness of any other people, he would have taken the advice of the Romans so that he might neither nourish any immoderate desire nor make any exorbitant demand, but now that he appeared as a suppliant before the Romans he thought it best to commit to them the decision about himself and his brothers. Here one of the senators interrupted him and bade him not to be afraid, but say what he thought, as the senate were resolved to grant him anything that was in their power, but Eumenes held to his opinion. After some time had elapsed, the king took his departure, and the senate considered what they should do. It was resolved to beg Eumenes to appear alone and indicate to them frankly the object of his visit. For he knew more accurately than anyone which was in his own interest so far as Asia was concerned. After this decision he was again called in; and, upon one of the senators showing him the decree, he was compelled to speak about the matter at issue. He said, then, that he had nothing further to say about what concerned him personally but adhered to his resolution, giving the senate complete authority to decide. But there was one point on which he was anxious, and that was the action of the Rhodians; and for this reason he had now been induced to speak about the situation. "For the Rhodians," he said, "have come to promote the interests of their country, with just as much warmth as we at the present crisis plead for our dominions. But at the present crisis, whatever they say is meant to give an impression quite contrary to their real purpose, and this you will easily discover. For when they enter this house they will say that they have come neither to beg for anything at all from you nor with the wish to harm myself in any way, but

that they send this embassy to plead for the freedom of the Greek inhabitants of Asia Minor. They will say that this is not so much a favour to themselves as your duty, and the natural consequence of what you have already achieved. Such will be the false impression their words will be meant to produce on you, but you will find that their actual intentions are of quite a different character. When the towns for which they plead are set at liberty their own power in Asia will be immensely increased, and mine will be more or less destroyed. For this fine name of freedom and autonomy will, the moment it becomes evident that you have decided to ask so, entirely detach from me not only the cities now about to be liberated, but those previously subject to me, and add them all to the Rhodian dominion. For such is the nature of things: thinking that they owe their freedom to Rhodes, they will be nominally the allies of the Rhodians, but in reality ready to obey all their orders, feeling indebted to them for the greatest of services. Therefore, I beg you, sirs, to be suspicious on this point, in case unawares you strengthen some of your friends more than is meet and unwisely weaken others, at the same time conferring favours on your enemies and neglecting and making light of those who are truly your friends. As for myself I would, as regards other matters, make any necessary concession to my neighbours without disputing it, but I would never, as long as I could help, yield to any men alive in my friendship with you and the goodwill I bear you. And I think my father, were he still alive, would give utterance to the same words. For he, who was, I think, the first of the inhabitants Asia and Greece to gain your friendship and alliance, most nobly maintained these until the day of his death, and not only in principle, but by actual deeds, taking part in all your wars in Greece and

furnishing for these wars larger military and naval forces than any other of your allies; contributing the greatest quantity of supplies and incurring the greatest danger; and finally ending his days in the field of action during the war with Philip, while he was actually exhorting the Boeotians to become your friends and allies. On succeeding to the throne I adhered to my father's principles—those indeed it was impossible to surpass; but I surpassed him in putting them into practice; because the times were such as to try me as by fire in a way he never had been tried. For when Antiochus was anxious to give me his daughter in marriage, and to cement our union in every respect, giving me back at once the cities he had formerly alienated from me, and next promising to do everything for me if I would take part in the war against you, I was so far from accepting any of these offers that I fought at your side against Antiochus with larger naval and military forces than any other of your allies, and contributed the greatest quantity of supplies to meet your needs when they were most urgent: I shared unhesitatingly with your generals the danger of all the battles that were fought, and finally suffered myself to be besieged in Pergamus itself and risk my life as well as my kingdom, all for the sake of the goodwill I bore to your people. Therefore, ye men of Rome, many of whom saw with your own eyes and all of whom know that what I say is true, it is but just for you to take fitting thought for my welfare. For of all things it would be most shameful if after making Massanissa, who was once your enemy and finally sought safety with your accompanied by only a few horsemen, king of the greater part of Africa, simply because he kept faith with you in one war against Carthage: if after making Pleuratus, who did absolutely nothing except maintain his faith to you, the greatest prince in Illyria, you now ignore myself, who from my

father's days onwards have taken part in your greatest and most splendid achievements What is it then that I beg of you and what do I think you ought to do for me? I will speak quite frankly, as you begged me to state my real opinion. If you decide to remain in occupation of certain parts of Asia on this side Taurus which were formerly subject to Antiochus, I should be exceedingly gratified to see that happen. For I think that my kingdom would be more secure with you on my frontiers, and a portion of your power falling to my share. But if you decide not to do this, but entirely to evacuate Asia, I think there is no one to whom you could cede the prizes of the war with more justice than to myself. But surely, you will be told, it is a finer thing to set free those in servitude. Well perhaps, if they had not ventured to fight against you with Antiochus. But since they suffered themselves to do so it is far finer to give your true friends a fitting token of your gratitude than to confer favours on those who were your enemies."

Eumenes, after having spoken in this capable manner, withdrew. The senate gave a kind reception to the king himself and to his speech, and they were ready to grant him any favour in their power. After him they wished to call in the Rhodians; but as one of the envoys was late in appearing, they summoned those of Smyrna. The latter pleaded at length the goodwill and promptness they had shown in helping the Romans in the late war. As they had the undisputed approbation of the house, since of all the autonomous states of Asia they had been far the most energetic supporters of Rome, I do not think it necessary to report their speech in detail. Next them came the Rhodians, who after a brief reference to their particular services to Rome soon brought their speech round to the question of their country. Here, they said, their chief misfortune on the occasion of this embassy was that the

very nature of things placed them in opposition to a prince with whom their relations both in public and in private were most close and cordial. To their country it seemed most noble and most worthy of Rome that the Greeks in Asia should be freed and obtain that autonomy which is nearest to the hearts of all men. But this was not at all in the interest of Eumenes and his brothers; for every monarchy by its nature hated equality and strove to make all men or at least as many as possible subject and obedient to it. But although the facts were so, still, they said, they were confident that they would attain their purpose, not because they had more influence with the Romans than Eumenes, but because their plea must appear indisputably the more just and more advantageous to every one concerned. For if the only way in which the Romans could show their gratitude to Eumenes was by giving up to him the autonomous cities, the question at issue admitted of some doubt; since they would have either to overlook a true friend, or else pay no heed to the call of honour and discovery and tarnish and degrade the aim and purpose of these achievements. "But if," they said, "it is possible to provide satisfactorily for these two objects, why show any further hesitation? Nay, just as at a sumptuous banquet, there is surely enough and more than enough of everything for all. For Lycaonia, Hellespontic Phrygia, Pisidia, the Chersonese, and the parts of Europe adjacent thereto are at your disposal to give to whom you will. Any one of these, if added to the kingdom of Eumenes, would make it ten times as big as it is now, and if all or most of them were assigned to him, he would not be inferior to any other king. So it is in your power, ye men of Rome, to give a magnificent accretion of strength to your friends, and yet not diminish the splendour of your own rôle. For the ends you propose to achieve are not the same as

those of other people. Other men are impelled to armed action by the prospect of getting into their power and annexing cities, stores, or ships. But the gods have made all these things superfluous to you, by subjecting the whole world to your dominion. What is it, then, that you really are in want of, and what should you most intently study to obtain? Obviously praise and glory among men, things difficult indeed to acquire and still more difficult to keep when you have them. What we mean we will try to make plainer. You went to war with Philip and made every sacrifice for the sake of the liberty of Greece. For such was your purpose and this alone—absolutely nothing else—was the prize you won by that war. But yet you gained more glory by that than by the tribute you imposed on Carthage. For money is a possession common to all men, but what is good, glorious, and praiseworthy belongs only to the gods and those men who are by nature nearest to them. Therefore, as the noblest of the tasks you accomplished was the liberation of the Greeks, if you now thus supplement it, your glorious record will be complete; but if you neglect to do so, the glory you have already gained will obviously be diminished. We then, ye men of Rome, who have been the devoted supporters of your purpose, and who have taken a real part in your gravest struggles and dangers, do not now abandon our post in the ranks of your friends, but have not hesitated to remind you frankly of what we at least think to be your honour and advantage, aiming at nothing else and estimating nothing higher than our duty."

The Rhodians in this speech seemed to all the house to have expressed themselves modestly and well about the situation, and they next called in Antipater and Zeuxis, the envoys of Antiochus. Upon their having spoken

in a tone of supplication and entreaty, the senate voted its approval of the terms made with Scipio in Asia and when, a few days afterwards, the People also ratified the treaty, the oaths of adherence to it were exchanged with Antipater and his colleague. After this the other envoys from Asia were introduced, and the Senate, having given them a short hearing, returned to all the same answer. This was that they would send ten legates to pronounce on all disputes between the towns. After giving this answer they appointed the ten legates, leaving matters of detail to their discretion, but themselves deciding on the following general scheme. Of the inhabitants of Asia on this side Taurus those provinces formerly subject to Antiochus were to be given to Eumenes, with the exception of Lycia and the part of Caria south of the Meander, which were to go to Rhodes: of the Greek cities those which formerly paid tribute to Attalus were to pay the same to Eumenes, and only in the case of those which were tributary to Antiochus was the tribute to be remitted. Having laid down these general principles for the government of Asia, they dispatched the ten legates there to join Gnaeus Manlius Vulso, the proconsul. But after all had been thus arranged the Rhodians came before the Senate again on behalf of the people of Soli in Cilicia; for they said that owing to their tie of kinship with this city it was their duty to espouse its cause, the people of Soli being colonists of Argos, like the Rhodians themselves; so that the two were in the position of sisters, which made it only just that the Solians should receive their freedom from Rome through the good graces of the Rhodians. The senate after listening to them summoned the envoys of Antiochus, and at first ordered him to withdraw from the whole of Cilicia; but when the envoys refused to assent to this, as it was contrary to the treaty, they renewed the

demand confining it to Soli alone. But upon the envoys stubbornly resisting it, they dismissed them, and calling in the Rhodians informed them of the reply they had received from Antipater and his colleague, adding that they would go to any extremity, if the Rhodians absolutely insisted on this. The Rhodian envoys however were pleased with the cordial attention of the senate and said that they would make no further demand, so that this matter remained as it was.

The ten legates and the other envoys were preparing to depart, when Publius and Lucius Scipio, who had defeated Antiochus in the sea battle, arrived at Brundisium and after a few days entered Rome and celebrated their triumph.

V. Affairs of Greece

The Situation in Aetolia and Western Greece

(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 3.)

Amynander, the king of Athamania, thinking now that he had for certainty recovered his kingdom, sent envoys to Rome and to the Scipios in Asia—they were still in the neighbourhood of Ephesus— excusing himself for having to all appearance returned to Athamania with the help of the Aetolians, and also bringing accusations against Philip, but chiefly begging them to receive them once more into their alliance. The Aetolians, thinking this a favourable opportunity for annexing Amphilochia and Aperantia, decided on an expedition to the above districts and, Nicander their strategus having assembled their total forces, they invaded Amphilochia. Upon most of the inhabitants joining them of their own accord, they went on to Aperantia, and when the people there also voluntarily joined them, they invaded Dolopia. The Dolopians made a show of resistance for a short time;

but, with the fate of Athamania and the flight of Philip before their eyes, they soon changed their minds and also joined the Aetolians. After this unbroken series of successes Nicander took his army back to their own country, thinking that by the annexation of the above countries and peoples Aetolia was secured against damage from any quarter. But just after these occurrences, and while the Aetolians were still elated by their success, came the news of the battle in Asia, and when they learnt that Antiochus had been utterly defeated, their spirits were again dashed. And when now Damoteles arrived from Rome and announce that the state of war still subsisted, and that Marcus Fulvius Nobilior with his army was crossing to attack them, they fell into a state of utter helplessness, and were at their wits' end as to how they should meet the danger which threatened them. They decided, then, to send to Athens and Rhodes begging and imploring those states to send embassies to Rome to deprecate the anger of the Romans, and to avert by some means the evils that encompassed Aetolia. At the same time they dispatched to Rome two envoys of their own, Alexander the Isian and Phaeneas accompanied by Chalepus, Alypus of Ambracia and Lycopus.

(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 3. 9.)

Upon envoys from Epirus reaching the Roman consul he took their advice about his expedition to Aetolia. These envoys recommended him to march on Ambracia—for at the time the Ambracians were members of the Aetolian League— alleging that if the Aetolians were disposed to meet his legions in the field, the country round that city was the best for the purpose; but that if they declined to give battle, the situation of the town itself made it easy to besiege it, since the country afforded abundant material for the construction of siege-works and the river Aratthus, which ran under its

walls, would be of help to him both as a source of water supply to his army, it being now summer, and a defence of their works. The advice they gave was considered good, and the consul led his army through Epirus to Ambracia. On arriving there and on the Aetolians not venturing to meet him, he went round the city to survey it and made energetic preparations for its siege.

Meanwhile the envoys sent by the Aetolians to Rome were observed and caught by Syburtes of Petra off Cephallenia and were brought in to Charadrus. The Epirots at first decided to lodge them in Buchetus and keep careful guard over them, but after some days they demanded ransom for them, as they were at war with the Aetolians. Alexander happened to be the richest man in Greece and the others were not badly off, but far poorer than he was. At first the Epirots demanded five talents from each, which the others were not entirely disposed to pay, but rather wished to do so, as they valued their safety above all things. Alexander, however, said he would not yield to the demand, as the sum was too large, and spent sleepless nights bewailing his mischance if he had to pay five talents. The Epirots, foreseeing what was, as a fact, about to happen, and fearing much lest the Romans, on learning that they had arrested envoys on their way to Rome, might write and demand their release, reduced their demand to three talents for each envoy. The others were only too glad to accept, and were allowed to depart after giving surety, but Alexander said he would not pay more than a talent, and even that was too much. Finally he gave up all hope, and remained in prison, being then advanced in years and possessing a fortune of more than two hundred talents. And, I think, he would have perished rather than pay the three talents: so strong is the impulse and so great the

eagerness of some people to make money. In this case, however, chance furthered his cupidity, so that, owing to the outcome, this foolish avarice met with universal praise and approval; for a few days afterwards a letter arrived from Rome ordering the envoys to be liberated, and he alone escaped without paying ransom. The Aetolians when they heard of the misfortune that had befallen him appointed Damoteles again ambassador to Rome; but having sailed as far as Leucas he heard that Marcus Fulvius was advancing through Epirus with his army on Ambracia, and abandoning his mission returned to Aetolia.

Siege of Ambracia

(Hero's Treatise on Sieges; cp. Livy XXXVIII. 5.)

The Aetolians, besieged in Ambracia by the Roman consul Marcus Fulvius, gallantly resisted the assaults of rams and other machines. For the consul, after securing his camp, had begun siege operations on an extensive scale. He brought up three machines through the level country near the Pyrrheium at some distance from each other but advancing on parallel lines, a fourth at the Aesculapium and a fifth at the acropolis. As the assault was vigorously conducted at one and the same time in all these places, the besieged were terrified by the prospect of what awaited them. While the rams continued to batter the walls and the long sickle-shaped grapplers to drag down the battlements, the defenders of the city made efforts to counter-engineer them, dropping by means of cranes leaden weights, stones, and stumps of trees on to the rams and after catching the sickles with iron anchors dragging them inside the wall, so that the pole of the apparatus was smashed against the battlement and the sickle itself remained in their hands. They also made frequent sallies, sometimes attacking by night those who

slept on the machines, and sometimes openly attempting in daylight to dislodge the day shift, thus impeding the progress of the siege.

(From Hero; cp. Livy XXXVIII. 5-6.)

Nicander, who was hovering round outside the Roman lines, had sent five hundred horse to the town, who forced an entrance by breaking through the entrenchments of the enemy. He had ordered them on a day agreed upon to make a sortie and attack the Roman works, engaging to come to their assistance . . . But although they made a gallant dash out of the city and fought bravely, the plan failed because Nicander failed to appear, either because he was afraid of the risk, or because he thought the task on which he was actually occupied more urgent.

(From Hero; cp. Livy XXXVIII. 7. 4.)

The Romans, working constantly with their rams, continued to break down portions of the wall, but they were not able to force their way in through the breach, as the defenders worked hard at counter-walling, and fought gallantly on the ruins. So, as a last resource, they took to mining and digging underground. Having secured the middle one of the three machines they previously had on this site and covered it carefully with wattle screens, they constructed in front of it a covered gallery running parallel to the wall for about a hundred yards, from which they dug continuously by day and night, employing relays. For a good many days they carried out the earth by the underground passage without being noticed by the defenders, but when the heap of earth became considerable and visible to those in the city, the leaders of the besieged set vigorously to work to dig a trench inside the wall parallel to the wall itself and to the gallery in front of the towers. When it was sufficiently deep, they lined the side of the trench next the wall with

exceedingly thin plates of brass, and advancing along the trench with their ears close to these, listened for the noise made the miners outside. When they had noted the spot indicated by the reverberation of some of the brass plates, they began to dig from within another underground passage at right angles to the trench and passing under the wall, their object being to encounter the enemy. This they soon succeeded in doing, as the Roman miners had not only reached the wall but had underpinned a considerable part of it on both sides of their gallery of approach. On meeting, they first of all fought underground with their pikes, but when they found that they could not effect much by this, as on both sides they used bucklers and wattles to protect themselves, some one suggested to the besieged to put in front of them a large corn-jar exactly broad enough to fit into the trench. They were to bore a hole in the bottom of it, and insert into this an iron tube as long as the jar: next they were to fill the whole jar with fine feathers and place quite a few pieces of burning charcoal round its extreme edge: they were now to fit on the mouth of the jar an iron lid full of holes and introduce the whole carefully into the mine with its mouth turned towards the enemy. When they reached the latter they were to stop up completely the space round the rim of the jar, leaving two holes, one on either side, through which they could push their pikes and prevent the enemy from approaching it. They were then to take a blacksmith's bellows and fitting it into the iron tube blow hard on the lighted charcoal that was near the mouth of the vessel among the feathers, gradually, as the feathers caught fire, withdrawing the tube. Upon all those instructions being followed, a quantity of smoke, especially pungent owing to its being produced by feathers, was all carried up the enemy's mine, so that the Romans suffered much and were

in an evil case, as they could neither prevent nor support the smoke in their diggings. While the siege thus continued to be prolonged, the strategus of the Aetolians decided to send envoys to the Roman consul.

Peace made with Aetolia

(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 9.)

At this time the envoys from Athens and Rhodes arrived at the Roman camp to assist in making peace. Amynander, the king of Athamania, also came to attempt to deliver the Ambraciots from their dangerous situation, having received a safe-conduct from Marcus Fulvius, who availed himself of the opportunity; for this king was on very good terms with the Ambraciots, having lived in the town for a considerable time during his exile. Some representatives of Acarnania also arrived a few days afterwards bringing Damoteles and those with him; for Fulvius, on learning of their unfortunate situation, had written to the people of Thyrrheium to send the men to him. All the above bodies having thus met, negotiations for peace proceeded energetically. Amynander, in pursuance of his purpose, approached the Ambraciots begging them to save themselves and not to run into the extremity of danger, which was not far off, unless they were better advised in their proceedings. After he had more than once ridden up to the wall and spoken to them, the Ambraciots decided to invite him to enter the city. Having received permission from the consul to do so, he went in and conversed with the Ambraciots about the situation. Meanwhile the envoys of Athens and Rhodes, approaching the Roman consul privately, attempted by various arguments to mitigate his anger. Some one also suggested to Damoteles and Phaeneas to address themselves to Gaius Valerius and cultivate relations with him. He was the son Marcus Valerius Laevinus, who

had been the first to make an alliance with the Aetolians, and was brother by the mother's side of Marcus Fulvius the present consul, besides which, as he was young and active, he especially enjoyed the consul's confidence. Upon Damoteles and his colleague soliciting his good offices, thinking that it was his own business and his duty of act as protector of the Aetolians, he exerted himself in every way, labouring to rescue that nation from the dangers that beset them. So that, as the matter was pushed forward energetically from all quarters, it was brought to a conclusion. For the Ambraciots, yielding to the advice of the contract, placed themselves at the mercy of the Roman consul, and surrendered their city on condition that the Aetolians were allowed to depart under flag of truce. For this was the first condition they wrested from him, keeping their faith to their allies. Fulvius next agreed with the Aetolians to make peace on the following conditions. They were to pay two hundred Euboic talents at once and three hundred more in six years in yearly instalments of fifty; they were to restore to the Romans in six months without ransom the prisoners and deserters who were in their hands; they were neither to retain in their League nor to receive into it in future any of the cities which after the crossing of Lucius Cornelius Scipio had been taken by the Romans or had entered into alliance with them; the whole of Cephallenia was to be excluded from this treaty.

Such were the general conditions of peace then roughly sketched. They had first of all to be accepted by the Aetolians and then submitted to Rome. The Athenians and Rhodians remained on the spot awaiting the decision of the Aetolians, while Damoteles and Phaeneas returned home and explained the conditions. On the whole the people were satisfied with them, for they were all such as they had not hoped to obtain. For a certain time they

hesitated about the cities belonging to their League; but finally agreed to the proposal. Fulvius, having entered Ambracia, allowed the Aetolians to depart under flag of truce; but carried away all the decorative objects, statues, and pictures, of which there were a considerable number, as the town had once been the royal seat of Pyrrhus. A crown [5] of a hundred and fifty talents was also presented to him. Having settled everything there, he marched into the interior of Aetolia, being surprised at receiving no answer from the Aetolians. On arriving at Amphilochian Argos, which is a hundred and eighty stades distance from Ambracia, he encamped there. Here he was met by Damoteles, who informed him that the Aetolians had passed a decree ratifying the conditions he had agreed to; and they then separated, the Aetolians returning home and Fulvius proceeding to Ambracia. He there occupied himself with preparations for taking his army across to Cephallenia; and the Aetolians appointed and dispatched Phaeneas and Nicander as envoys to Rome about the peace; for nothing at all in it was valid without the consent of the Roman People.

[5] No doubt "crown" is used in the sense of a customary gift.

These envoys, then, taking with them those of Athens and Rhodes, sailed on their mission; and Fulvius also sent Gaius Valerius Laevinus and some others to further the peace. But when they reached Rome the anger of the People against Aetolia had been revived by King Philip, who, thinking that the Aetolians had unjustly deprived him of Athamania and Dolopia, sent messages to his friends at Rome begging them to participate in his indignation and refuse to accept the peace. In consequence when the Aetolians were admitted, the senate paid little heed to them; but when the Rhodians and Athenians spoke on their behalf, they grew more respectful

and listened to them with attention. And indeed Leon, son of Kichesias, who followed Damon, was judged to have spoken well on the whole and to have employed in his speech a similitude apt to the present case. He said that they were justified in being angry with the Aetolians; for that people after receiving many benefits from the Romans had not shown any gratitude for them but had much endangered the Roman supremacy by stirring up the war against Antiochus. In one respect, however, the senate was wrong and that was in being wroth with the populace. For what happened in states to the people was very much the same as what befalls the sea. The sea by its proper nature was always calm and at rest, and in general of such a character that it would never give trouble to any of those who approach it and make use of it; but when violent winds fall upon it and stir it up, compelling it to move contrary to its own nature, nothing was more terrible and appalling than the sea. "And this," he said, "is just what has happened to the Aetolians. As long as no one tampered with them, they were of all the Greeks your most warm and trustworthy supporters. But when Thoas and Dicaearchus, blowing from Asia, and Menestas and Damocritus from Europe stirred up the people and compelled them, contrary to their nature, to become reckless in word and deed, then of a truth in their folly the Aetolians desired to do you evil but brought evil on their own heads. Therefore, while being implacable to the men who instigated them, you should take pity on the people, and make peace with them, well knowing, that when again they have none to tamper with them and once more owe their preservation to you, they will again be the best disposed to you of all the Greeks." By this speech the Athenian envoy persuaded the Senate to make peace with the Aetolians.

When the Senate had passed a consultum, and the people also had voted it, the peace was ratified. The particular conditions were as follows: "The people of Aetolia shall preserve without fraud the empire and majesty of the Roman people: they shall not permit any armed forces proceeding against the Romans, or their allies and friends, to pass through their territory or support such forces in any way by public consent: they shall have the same enemies as the Roman people, and on whomsoever the Romans make war the people of Aetolia shall make war likewise: the Aetolians shall surrender all deserters, fugitives, and prisoners belonging to the Romans and their allies, always excepting such as after being made prisoners of war returned to their own country and were afterwards recaptured, and such as were enemies of the Romans during the time when the Aetolians were fighting in alliance with Rome; all the above to be surrendered, within a hundred days of the peace being sworn, to the chief magistrate of Corcyra; but if some are not to be found up to that date, whenever they are discovered they shall be surrendered without fraud, and such shall not be permitted to return to Aetolia after peace has been sworn: the Aetolians shall pay in silver specie, not inferior to Attic money, two hundred Euboic talents at once to the consul then in Greece, paying a third part of the sum if they wish, in gold at the rate of one gold mina for ten silver minae; and for the first six years after the final conclusion of the treaty fifty talents per annum, this sum to be delivered in Rome: the Aetolians shall give the consul forty hostages each of more than twelve and less than forty years of age at the choice of the Romans and to serve as such for six years, none of them being either a strategus, a hipparch, or a public secretary or one who has previously served as hostage; these hostages also to be delivered in Rome, and any one of

them who dies to be replaced: Cephallenia is not to be included in the treaty: of the cities, villages, and men formerly belonging to Aetolia but captured by the Romans during or subsequent to the consulship of Lucius Quintius Flamininus and Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus none are to be annexed by the Aetolians: and the city and territory of Oeniadae shall belong to Acarnania." After the oaths had been taken, peace was established on these conditions and such was the seal finally set on the affairs of Aetolia and Greece in general.

Capture of Same in Cephallenia by Fulvius

(Suid.; Livy XXXVIII. 29. 10.)

Fulvius by a secret understanding occupied part of the acropolis by night and introduced the Romans.

Wisdom of Philopoemen

(Suid.; Livy XXXVIII. 30.)

What is good very seldom coincides with what is advantageous, and few are those who can combine the two and adapt them to each other. Indeed we all know that for the most part the nature of immediate profit is repugnant to goodness and vice versa. But Philopoemen made this his purpose and attained his object. For it was a good act to restore to their country the Spartan exiles who were prisoners, and it was an advantageous one to humble the city of Sparta by destroying the satellites of the tyrants. And being by nature a man of sound sense and a real leader, he saw that money is at the root of the re-establishment of all kingly power, and did his best to prevent the receipt of the sums advanced.

VI. Affairs of Asia

Manlius and the Gallic War

(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 12. 1.)

At the same time that the embassies were negotiating at Rome concerning the peace with Antiochus and the fate of Asia Minor in general, and while the war against the Aetolian League still continued in Greece, the war against the Gauls in Asia, which I am now about to describe, was begun and ended.

(Suid; cp. Livy XXXVIII. 12. 7.)

Manlius was favourably impressed by the young man, Attalus, at this interview and at once allowed him to proceed to Pergamus.

(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 14. 3.)

Moagetes was tyrant of Cibyra. He was a cruel and treacherous man and worthy of more than a passing notice.

(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 14. 4.)

When Gnaeus Manlius Vulso, the Roman consul, approached Cibyra and sent Helvius to find out what the mind of Moagetes was, the latter sent envoys begging Helvius not to lay the country waste as he was the friend of the Romans and ready to do anything they told him. He at the same time offered a gold crown of fifteen talents. Helvius, after listening to those envoys, promised to spare the country himself, but referred them to the consul for a general settlement. Manlius, he said, was close behind him with his army. Upon this being done, Moagetes having sent his brother in addition to the other envoys, Manlius met them on his march and spoke to them in a threatening and severe manner, saying that not only had Moagetes proved more hostile to the Romans than any other Asiatic prince, but had done all in his power to subvert their rule, and therefore deserved animadversion and chastisement rather than friendship. The envoys,

alarmed by the vehemence of his anger, neglected their other instructions and begged him to grant an interview to Moagetes himself. On his agreeing to this request they returned to Cibyra; and next day the tyrant and his friends came out to meet him dressed and escorted in the simplest and most unassuming manner, and in a submissive speech, bewailing his own powerlessness and the weakness of the towns subject to him, begged Manlius to accept the fifteen talents— the places he ruled over being, besides Cibyra, Syleium and that called the town in the Lake. Manlius, amazed at his impudence, said not another word, but merely that if he did not pay five hundred talents and thank his stars, he would not only lay waste his territory, but besiege and sack the city itself. So that Moagetes, in dread of the fate that threatened him, implored him to do nothing of the kind; and, raising his offer little by little, persuaded Manlius to accept a hundred talents and ten thousand medimni of wheat and to receive him into his alliance.

(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 15. 3.)

While Manlius was crossing the river Colobatus, envoys reached him from the city of Isinda begging him to help them; for the Termessians, summoning Philomelus to their assistance, had devastated their territory and pillaged their city and were now besieging the citadel in which all the citizens with their wives and children had sought refuge. Manlius, after listening to their request, said he would be very pleased to come to their help; and, looking upon this chance as a godsend, began to march towards Pamphylia.

On approaching Termessus he received that people into his alliance on receipt of fifty talents, and likewise the people of Aspendus. After receiving

the envoys of the other Pamphylian cities, and producing on all of them on the occasion of their audience an impression similar to that I have described, he first raised the siege of Isinda and then again began to march against the Gauls.

(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 15. 7.)

Manlius, after capturing the city of Cyrmasa and a quantity of booty, continued his march. While they were advancing along the shore of the lake there came envoys for Lysinoë to announce its submission; and after receiving them he entered the territory of Sagalassus and, having carried off a large amount of booty, waited to see what the mind of those in the city would be. Upon their envoys reaching him he received them, and after accepting a crown of fifty talents, twenty thousand medimni of barley, and twenty thousand of wheat, admitted that city into his alliance.

(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 18. 1-3.)

Manlius, the Roman consul, sent legates to the Gaul Eposognatus asking him on his part to send envoys to the Galatian princes. Eposognatus thereupon sent envoys to Manlius begging him not to take the initiative in attacking the Galatian Tolistobogii, as he would communicate with their princes suggesting alliance with Rome, and was convinced that they would accept any reasonable terms.

(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 18. 7.)

Manlius, the Roman consul, on his passage through Asia, bridged the river Sangarius which here runs between deep banks and is very difficult to cross. As he was encamped close to the river, two Galli, [6] with pectorals and images, came on behalf of Attis and Battacus, the priests of the Mother

of the Gods at Pessinus, announcing that the goddess foretold his victory. Manlius gave them a courteous reception.

[6] See Chapter 6 above.

(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 18. 10.)

While Manlius was near the small town of Gordium envoys from Eposognatus reached him informing him that he had gone in person to speak with the Galatian princes, but that they simply refused to make any advances: they had collected on Mount Olympus their women and children and all their possessions, and were prepared to give battle.

(From Plutarch, *The Virtuous Deeds of Women*, XXII; cp. Livy XXXVIII. 24. 2.)

Chiomara, the wife of Ortiagon, was captured with the other women when the Asiatic Gauls were defeated by the Romans under Manlius. The centurion into whose hands she fell took advantage of his capture with a soldier's brutality and did violence to her. The man was indeed an ill-bred lout, the slave both of gain and of lust, but his love of gain prevailed; and as a considerable sum had been promised him for the woman's ransom, he brought her to a certain place to deliver her up, a river running between him and the messengers. When the Gauls crossed and after handing him the money were taking possession of Chiomara, she signed to one of them to strike the man as he was taking an affectionate leave of her. The man obeyed and cut off his head, which she took up and wrapped in the folds of her dress, and then drove off. When she came into the presence of her husband and threw the head at his feet, he was astonished and said, "Ah! my wife, it is good to keep faith." "Yes," she replied, "but it is better still that only one man who has lain with me should remain alive." Polybius tells

us that he met and conversed with the lady at Sardis and admired her high spirit and intelligence.

(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 25.)

While the Romans after their victory over the Gauls were encamped near Ancyra and Manlius the consul was about to advance, there came envoys from the Tectosages begging him to leave his army where it was and to come out himself next day to the space between the camps, where their princes also would come and communicate with him about peace. Upon Manlius agreeing to this, and keeping the appointment accompanied by five hundred horse, the princes did not come on that occasion, but after he had returned to his camp, the envoys came again offering some excuses on behalf of the princes, but begging him to come once more, as they would send out their leading men to exchange views about the whole situation. Manlius agreed to come, but himself remained in his own camp, sending out Attalus and some of the military tribunes with an escort of three hundred horse The Gaulish envoys kept their appointment and spoke about the questions at issue, but said it was impossible then to come to a final agreement about matters or ratify anything that was decided. On the following day, however, they engaged that the princes should come to arrive at an agreement and complete the negotiations, if the consul Manlius met them in person. Attalus then promised that Manlius would come, and they separated on this understanding. The object of the Gauls in making these postponements and practising these stratagems against the Romans was partly to gain time transport certain of their relations and some of their property across the river Halys; but chiefly, if they could, to capture the Roman consul, or at any rate to kill him. With this intention they awaited

next day the arrival of the Romans, keeping about a thousand horsemen in readiness. Manlius, after listening to Attalus and believing that the princes would come, went out as usual with an escort of five hundred horse. But it so happened that on previous days the Romans who left their camp to collect wood and forage went out in this direction under cover of the cavalry who were going to the conference. On this day the same thing took place, the foragers being very numerous, and the tribunes ordered the cavalry which used to protect them to go out in this direction. This was done, and thus by chance the proper step was taken to meet the danger which menaced the consul.

VII. Affairs of Asia

Further Negotiations with Manlius and the Peace with Antiochus

(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 38.)

At this period, while Gnaeus Manlius, the Roman consul, was wintering in Ephesus, in the last year of this Olympiad embassies arrived from the Greek cities in Asia and from several other quarters to confer crowns on him for his victories over the Gauls. For all the inhabitants of the country on this side Taurus were not so much pleased at the defeat of Antiochus and at the prospect of the liberation of some of them from tribute, of others from garrisons, and of all from royal domination, as at their release from the fear of the barbarians and at the thought that they were now delivered from the lawless violence of these tribes. Musaeus also came on the part of Antiochus, and some envoys from the Gauls to discover on what terms they might be reconciled with Rome, and likewise an embassy from Ariarathes, the king of Cappadocia; for he too had made common cause with Antiochus and had taken his part in the battle against the Romans, and he was now

alarmed and doubtful as to what would befall him; so that he had sent several embassies to learn by what concessions or by what course of conduct he could atone for his error. The consul after thinking and courteously entertaining all the embassies from the towns, dismissed them and replied to the Gauls that he would wait for the arrival of King Eumenes before coming to terms with them. As for Ariarathes he told him to pay six hundred talents and consider himself at peace. He arranged with the envoy of Antiochus to come with his army to the borders of Pamphylia to get the two thousand five hundred talents and the corn that Antiochus had to give to the Roman soldiers before peace was made, by the terms of his agreement with Lucius Scipio. After this he reviewed his army, and as the season admitted it, left Ephesus, taking Attalus with him, and reaching Apamea in eight days, remained there for three days and on the fourth left that town and advanced by forced marches. Reaching the place he had agreed upon with Antiochus on the third day, he encamped there. Upon Musaeus meeting him and begging him to have patience, as the carriages and animals which were bringing the corn and money were delayed on the road, he was persuaded to do so, and waited for three days. When the supplies came he divided the corn among his soldiers and handing over the money to one of his tribunes ordered him to convey it to Apamea.

Hearing now that the commander of the garrison at Perga appointed by Antiochus was neither withdrawing the garrison nor leaving the town himself, he marched against the place with his army. When he was near it the commander came out to meet him, entreating him not to condemn him unheard; for he was doing what was part of his duty. He had been entrusted by Antiochus with the city and he was holding it until he was again

informed by his master what he should do, but up to now he had received no instructions from anyone on the subject. He therefore asked for thirty days' grace in order that he might send and ask the king how to act. Manlius, as he saw that Antiochus was faithful to his obligations in all other respects, allowed him to send and inquire, and after a few days he received an answer and surrendered the town.

The ten legates and King Eumenes arrived by sea at Ephesus in early summer, and after resting there for two days after their voyage, went up the country towards Apamea. Manlius, on hearing of their arrival, dispatched his brother Lucius with four thousand men to Oroanda, the iron hand in the velvet glove, to obtain payment of the part still owing of the sum the people of that place had agreed to pay. He himself left in haste with his army, as he was anxious to meet Eumenes. Upon reaching Apamea and meeting Eumenes and the ten legates, he sat with them in council discussing the situation. It was decided in the first place to ratify the treaty with Antiochus, about the terms of which I need make no further remarks, but will quote the actual text.

The terms in detail were as follows: "There shall be friendship between Antiochus and the Romans for all time if he fulfills the conditions of the treaty: King Antiochus and his subjects shall not permit the passage through their territory of any enemy marching against the Romans and their allies or furnish such enemy with any supplies: the Romans and their allies engage to act likewise towards Antiochus and his subjects: Antiochus shall not make war on the inhabitants of the islands or of Europe: he shall evacuate all cities, lands, villages, and forts on this side of Taurus as far as the river Halys and all between the valley of Taurus and the mountain ridges that

descend to Lycaonia: [7] from all such places he is to carry away nothing except the arms borne by his soldiers, and if anything has been carried away, it is to be restored to the same city: he shall not receive either soldiers or others from the kingdom of Eumenes: if there be any men in the army of Antiochus coming from the cities which the Romans take over, he shall deliver them up at Apamea: if there be any from the kingdom of Antiochus dwelling with the Romans and their allies, they may remain or depart at their good pleasure: Antiochus and his subjects shall give up the slaves of the Romans and of their allies, and any prisoners of war they have taken, if there be such: Antiochus shall give up, if it be in his power, Hannibal son of Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, Mnasilochus the Acarnanian, Thoas the Aetolian, Eubulidas and Philo the Chalcidians, and all Aetolians who have held public office: he shall surrender all the elephants now in Apamea and not keep any in future: he shall surrender his long ships with their gear and tackle and in future he shall not possess more than ten decked ships of war, nor shall he have any galley rowed by more than thirty oars, nor a moneres [8] to serve in any war in which he is the aggressor: his ships shall not sail beyond the Calycadnus and the Sarpedonian promontory unless conveying tribute, envoys or hostages: Antiochus shall not have permission to hire mercenaries from the lands under the rule of the Romans, or to receive fugitives: all houses that belonged to the Rhodians and their allies in the dominions of Antiochus shall remain their property as they were before he made war on them; likewise if any money is owing to them they may exact payment, and if anything has been abstracted from them it shall be sought for and returned: merchandise meant for Rhodes shall be free from duties as before the war: if any of the cities which Antiochus has to give up have

been given by him to others, he shall withdraw from these also the garrisons and the men in possession of them: and if any cities afterwards wish to desert to him, he shall not receive them: Antiochus shall pay to the Romans twelve thousand talents a year, the talent not to weigh less than eighty Roman pounds, and five hundred and forty thousand modii of corn: he shall pay to King Eumenes three hundred and fifty talents in the next five years, paying seventy talents a year at the same time that is fixed for his payments to the Romans and in lieu of the corn, as Antiochus estimated it—one hundred and twenty-seven talents and twelve hundred and eight drachmas, the sum Eumenes agreed to accept as a satisfactory payment to his treasury: Antiochus shall give twenty hostages, replacing them every three years, not below eighteen years of age and not above forty: if any of the money he pays does not correspond to the above stipulations, he shall make it good in the following year: if any of the cities or peoples against which Antiochus is forbidden by this treaty to make war begin first to make war on him, he may make war on such, provided he does not exercise sovereignty over any of them or receive them into his alliance: all grievances of both parties are be submitted to a lawful tribunal: if both parties desire to add any clauses to this treaty or to remove any by common decree, they are at liberty to do so.

[7] I supply from Livy what is missing in the text of Polybius.

[8] A ship with one bank of oars.

The proconsul having sworn to this treaty he at once dispatched Quintus Minucius Thermus and his own brother Lucius Manlius, who had just returned bringing the money from Oroanda, to Syria with orders to exact the oath from Antiochus and make sure that the treaty would be carried out in detail. He then sent dispatches to Quintus Fabius Labeo, the commander

of the fleet, ordering him to sail back to Patara, and, taking possession of the ships there, to burn them.

(Suid. cp. Livy XXXVIII. 39. 6.)

Manlius the proconsul exacting three hundred talents from Ariarathes received him into the Roman alliance.

Final Settlement of Asia Minor

(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 39. 7-17.)

In Apamea the ten legates and Manlius the proconsul, after listening to all the applicants, assigned, in cases where the dispute was about land, money, or other property, cities agreed upon by both parties in which to settle their differences. The general dispositions they made were as follows. All autonomous towns which formerly paid tribute to Antiochus but had now remained faithful to Rome were freed from tribute: all which had paid contributions to Attalus were to pay the same sum as tribute to Eumenes: any which had abandoned the Roman alliance and joined Antiochus in the war were to pay to Eumenes whatever tribute Antiochus had imposed on them. They freed from tribute the Colophonians inhabiting Notium, the people of Cymae and Mylasa, and in addition to this immunity they gave to Clazomenae the island called Drymussa and restored to the Milesians the holy district, from which they had formerly retired owing to the wars. They advanced in many ways Chios, Smyrna, and Erythrae, and assigned to them the districts which they desired to acquire at the time and considered to belong to them by rights, out of regard for the goodwill and activity they had displayed during the war, and they also restored to Phocaea her ancient constitution and her former territory. In the next place they dealt with the claims of Rhodes, giving her Lycia and Caria south of the Maeander, except

Telmessus. As for King Eumenes and his brothers they had made all possible provision for them in their treaty with Antiochus, and they now added to their dominion the following: in Europe the Chersonese, Lysimachia and the adjacent forts and territory, and in Asia Hellespontic Phrygia, Greater Phrygia, that part of Mysia of which Prusias had formerly deprived Eumenes, Lycaonia, the Milyas, Lydia, Tralles, Ephesus, and Telmessus. Such were the gifts they gave to Eumenes. As for Pamphylia, since Eumenes maintained it was on this side of the Taurus, and the envoys of Antiochus said it was on the other, they were in doubt and referred the matter to the senate. Having thus settled nearly all the most important questions, they left Apamea and proceeded towards the Hellespont, intending on their way to put matters in Galatia on a safe footing.

THE END OF BOOK XXI

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXII

I. AFFAIRS OF GREECE

Philopoemen and Sparta

After the slaughter of the men at Compasium, [1] some of the Lacedaemonians, dissatisfied with what had taken place and thinking that the power and dignity of Sparta had been destroyed by Philopoemen, came to Rome and accused Philopoemen for the measures he had taken. They finally procured a letter from Marcus Lepidus, the future pontifex maximus, who was then consul, in which he wrote to the Achaeans saying that they had not acted rightly in Sparta. While this embassy was still in Rome, Philopoemen, losing no time, sent Nicodemus of Elis to represent him there.

[1] Eighty Spartans were executed by Philopoemen at Compasium in punishment for the murder of some Achaeans.

Ptolemy Epiphanes and the Achaeans

At about the same time Demetrius of Athens, the representative of Ptolemy, also came to renew that king's existing alliance with the Achaean League. They readily consented to this, and Lycortas my father, and Theodoridas and Rositeles and Sicyon were appointed envoys to Ptolemy to take the oath on behalf of the Achaeans and receive that of the king. At this time there occurred something of minor importance perhaps, but worth mentioning. For after the renewal of the alliance had been duly accomplished, Philopoemen entertained the king's envoy on behalf of the Achaeans. When mention was made of the king at the banquet the envoy

was profuse in his praises of him, and cited some instances of his skill and daring in the chase, and afterwards spoke of his expertness and training in horsemanship and the use of arms, the last proof he adduced of this being that he once in hunting hit a bull from horseback with a javelin.

Troubles in Boeotia. Action of Rome and of the Achaeans

In Boeotia, after the peace between the Romans and Antiochus had been signed, the hopes of all those who had revolutionary aims were cut short, and there was a radical change of character in the various states. The course of justice had been at a standstill there for nearly twenty-five years, and now it was common matter of talk in the different cities that a final end must be put to all the disputes between the citizens. The matter, however, continued to be keenly disputed, as the indigent were much more numerous than those in affluent circumstances, when chance intervened as follows to support the better disposed party. Flamininus had long been working in Rome to secure the return of Zeuxippus to Boeotia, as he had been of much assistance to him at the time of the wars with Philip and Antiochus, and at this juncture he managed to get the senate to write to the Boeotians that they must allow the return of Zeuxippus and the others exiled together with him. When this message reached them, the Boeotians, fearing lest the return of these exiles might lead to the rupture of their alliance with Macedonia, established a tribunal with the object of having judgement pronounced on the indictments against Zeuxippus that they had previously lodged, and in this way he was condemned on one charge of sacrilege for having stripped the holy table of Zeus of its silver plating and on another capital charge for the murder of Brachylles. Having managed matters so, they paid no further attention to the senate's letter, but sent Callicritus on an embassy to Rome to

say that they could not set aside the legal decisions of their courts. At the same time Zeuxippus himself came to lay his case before the senate, and the Romans, informing the Aetolians and Achaeans by letter what was the policy of the Boeotians, bade them restore Zeuxippus to his home. The Achaeans refrained from proceeding to do so by armed force, but decided to send envoys to exhort the Boeotians to comply with the request of the Romans, and also to beg them, as they had done in the case of their own legal proceedings, to bring to a conclusion also those to which Achaeans were parties; for a decision in suits between Boeotians and Achaeans had likewise been delayed for very long past. The Boeotians, on hearing these requests—Hippias was now their strategus—at once promised to accede to them, but in a very short time entirely neglected them; and owing to this Philopoemen, when Alcetas had succeeded Hippias in office, granted to all applicants right of seizure of Boeotian property, which produced a by no means insignificant quarrel between the two nations. For . . . seized on the cattle of Myrrichus and Simon, and this leading to an armed conflict, proved to be the beginning and prelude not of a difference between private citizens, but of hostility and hatred between nations. Had the senate at this juncture followed up its order to restore Zeuxippus, war would soon have been set alight; but now the senate kept silence, and the Megarians put a stop owing to the seizures, the Boeotians (?) having applied to them through envoys, and having met the Achaean demand about the law suits. [2]

[2] This is of course an uncertain restoration.

Dispute between Rhodes and Lycia

A difference arose between the Lycians and Rhodians owing to the following reasons. At the time when the ten commissioners were

administering the affairs of Asia, two envoys, Theaedetus and Philophron, arrived from Rhodes asking that Lycia and Caria should be given to the Rhodians in return for their goodwill and active assistance in the war with Antiochus; and at the same time two envoys from the people of Ilium, Hipparchus and Satyrus, came begging that, for the sake of the kinship between Ilium and Rome, the offences of the Lycians might be pardoned. The ten commissioners, after giving both embassies a hearing, attempted as far as possible to meet the requests of both. For to please the people of Ilium they took no very severe measures against the Lycians; but, as a favour to the Rhodians, they assigned Lycia to them as a gift. Owing to this decision a quarrel of no trivial character arose between the Lycians and the Rhodians themselves. For the representatives of Ilium, visiting the Lycian cities, announced that they had deprecated the anger of the Romans and had been instrumental in obtaining their freedom. Theaedetus, however, and his colleague published in Rhodes the message that Lycia and Caria, south of the Meander, had been given to Rhodes as a present by the Romans. After this envoys from Lycia came to Rhodes to propose an alliance, but the Rhodians appointed some of their citizens to proceed to the cities of Lycia and Caria and give general orders as to what was to be done. Though the conceptions formed on both sides were so widely divergent, yet up to a certain point the difference between them was not manifest to every one; but when the Lycians came into the Rhodian Assembly and began to talk about alliance, and when afterwards Pothion the Rhodian prytanis got up and after a clear statement of the two views rebuked the Lycians, they . . . for they said they would submit to anything rather than obey the orders of the Rhodians.

II. Affairs of Italy

Thracian affairs before the Senate

(Cp. Livy XXXIX. 24. 6.)

At the same time envoys came from King Eumenes to Rome conveying the news that Philip had appropriated the Thracian cities. The exiles from Maronea also arrived accusing Philip of having been the cause of their banishment, and together with them representatives of the Athamanians, Perrhaebians, and Thessalians claiming that they should get back the towns of which Philip had despoiled them in the war with Antiochus. Philip also sent envoys to defend himself against all these accusations. After several discussions between all the above envoys and those of Philip, the senate decided to appoint at once a commission to visit Philip's dominions and grant a safe-conduct to all who desired to state their case against Philip face to face. The commissioners appointed were Quintus Caecilius Metellus, Marcus Baebius Tamphilus, and Tiberius Claudius Nero.

(Suid.)

The people of Aenus had long been at discord with each other, the one party inclining to Eumenes and the other to Macedonia.

III. Affairs of Greece

The Achaean League and the Kings

I have already stated that while Philopoemen was still strategus, the Achaean League sent an embassy to Rome on behalf of Sparta, and other envoys to King Ptolemy to renew their existing alliance; and in the present year when Aristaenus was strategus the envoys came back from Ptolemy during the sessions of the Achaean Assembly at Megalopolis. King Eumenes had also sent envoys promising to give the Achaeans a hundred

and twenty talents, that they might lend it out and spend the interest in paying the members of the Achaean Parliament during its session. Envoys also came from King Seleucus to renew the alliance with him, promising to give the Achaeans a flotilla of ten long ships. The Assembly having set to work, Nicodemus of Elis first came forward, and after reporting the terms in which they had spoken before the senate on behalf of Sparta, read the answer of the senate, from which it was easy to infer that they were displeased at the completion of the walls and at the . . . of those executed at Compasium, but that they did not revoke their previous decisions. As there was neither any opposition or support the matter was shelved.

The envoys of Eumenes were the next to appear. They renewed the ancient alliance, informed the Assembly of the promise of money and withdrew after speaking at some length on both these subjects and expressing the great goodwill and friendly feelings of the king towards the League. After their withdrawal Apollonidas of Sicyon rose. He said that sum offered by Eumenes was a gift not unworthy of the Achaeans' acceptance, but that the intention of the giver and the purpose to which it was to be applied were as disgraceful and illegal as could be. For, as it was forbidden by law for any private person or magistrate to receive gifts, on no matter what pretext, from a king, that all should be openly bribed by accepting this money was the most illegal thing conceivable, besides being confessedly the most disgraceful. For that the parliament should be in Eumenes' pay every year, and discuss public affairs after swallowing a bait, so to speak, would evidently involve disgrace and hurt. Now it was Eumenes who was giving them money; next time it would be Prusias, and after that Seleucus. "And," he said, "as the interests of democracies and

kings are naturally opposed, and most debates and the most important deal with out differences with the kings, it is evident that perforce one or the other thing will happen: either the interests of the kings will take precedence of our own; or, if this is not so, we shall appear to every one to be ungrateful in acting against our paymasters." So he exhorted the Achaeans not only to refuse the gift, but to detest Eumenes for his purpose in offering it.

The next speaker was Cassander of Aegina, who reminded the Achaeans of the destitution which had overtaken the Aeginetans owing to their being members of the League at the time when Publius Sulpicius Galba had attacked Aegina with his fleet and sold into slavery all its unhappy inhabitants; and how, as I have narrated in a previous book, the Aetolians gained possession of the town by their treaty with Rome, and handed it over to Attalus on receipt of thirty talents. Laying this before the eyes of the Achaeans, he begged Eumenes not to fish for the good offices of the Achaeans by making advantageous offers, but by giving up the city of Aegina, to secure without a dissentient voice their complete devotion. He exhorted the Achaeans at the same time not to accept a gift which would clearly involve their depriving the Aeginetans of all hope of deliverance in the future.

In consequence of these speeches the people were so deeply moved that not a soul ventured to take the part of the king, but all with loud shouts rejected the proffered gift, although owing to the greatness of the sum the temptation seemed almost irresistible.

After the above debate the question of Ptolemy came on for discussion. The ambassadors sent by the Achaeans the Ptolemy having been

summoned, Lycortas with his colleagues came forward, and reported in the first place how they had exchanged the oaths of alliance with Ptolemy, and next stated that they were the bearers of gifts to the Achaean nation consisting of six thousand bronze shields for peltasts and two hundred talents weight of coined bronze. After expressing his thanks to the king and briefly touching on his friendly sentiments towards the League, he concluded his speech. The Achaean strategus Aristaenus now got up, and asked Ptolemy's ambassadors and those sent by the Achaeans to renew the alliance, which alliance had been renewed. When no one answered, but all the envoys began to talk between themselves, the house was at a loss to understand why. The cause of the confusion was as follows. There were several alliances between the Achaeans and Ptolemy, the terms of which varied widely with the variety of the circumstances under which they had been concluded; yet neither did Ptolemy's envoy make any distinction when the alliance was renewed but spoke in general terms on the subject, nor did the Achaean envoys do so, but exchanged oaths with the king as if there had only been one alliance. So that when the strategus produced all the alliances and explained in detail the points in which they differed, the divergences being very marked, the assembly demanded to know which alliance they were renewing. When neither Philopoemen, who had made the renewal during his year of office, nor Lycortas and his colleagues, who had been to Alexandria, could give any explanation, they were judged to have treated affairs of state in a perfunctory fashion, but Aristaenus acquired a great reputation as being the only man who knew what he was speaking about. Finally he did not allow the resolution to be ratified but adjourned the debate on it owing to the confusion I have explained. Upon the envoys from

Seleucus entering the house the Achaeans voted to renew the alliance with that king, but to refuse the fleet of ships for the present. After these subjects had been discussed the assembly dissolved, the members returning to their cities.

After this, when the Nemean festival was at its height, Quintus Caecilius Metellus came from Macedonia on his way back from his mission to Philip. Aristaenus, the strategus, having assembled the Achaean magistrates in Argos, Caecilius came in and found fault with them for having treated the Lacedaemonians with undue cruelty and severity; and, addressing them at some length, exhorted them to correct their past errors. Aristaenus, for his part, remained silent, thus indicating his tacit disapproval of the management of matters there and his agreement with the remarks of Caecilius. Diophanes of Megalopolis, who was more of a soldier than a politician, now got up, and not only did not offer any defence of the Achaeans, but, owing to his strained relations with Philopoemen, suggested to Caecilius another charge he might bring against the League. For he said that not only had matters been mismanaged at Sparta, but also at Messene, alluding to certain disputes among the Messenians themselves on the subject of the edict of Flamininus and Philopoemen's interference with it. So that Caecilius, thinking that he had some of the Achaeans themselves in agreement with him, became still more vexed because the meeting of magistrates did not readily accede to his requests. After Philopoemen, Lycortas, and Archon had spoken at some length and employed various arguments to show that the management of affairs at Sparta had been good and particularly advantageous to the Spartans themselves, and that it was impossible to change anything in the established order of things there

without violating the obligations of justice to men and piety to the gods, the meeting decided to make no change, and to convey this resolution to the legate. Caecilius, seeing how this meeting was disposed, demanded that the popular assembly should be summoned to meet him; but the magistrates asked him to show them the instructions he had from senate on the subject; and, when he made no reply, refused to summon the assembly; for their laws did not allow it unless a written request was presented from the senate stating what matters it desired to submit to the assembly. Caecilius was so indignant at none of his requests having been granted that he did not even consent to receive the answer of the magistrates, but went away without any. The Achaeans attributed but the former visit of Marcus Fulvius and the present one of Caecilius to Aristaenus and Diophanes, alleging that these two politicians had induced both to side with them owing to their political differences with Philopoemen, and they were viewed by the people with a certain suspicion. Such was the state of affairs in the Peloponnesus.

IV. Affairs of Italy

Treatment of Grecian Affairs by the Senate

(Cp. Livy XXXIX. 33.)

After Caecilius and the other commissioners had left Greece and had reported to the senate about the affairs of Macedonia and the Peloponnesus, the envoys who had come to Rome on these subjects were introduced. The first to come in were the representatives of Philip and Eumenes and the exiles from Aenus and Maronea; and, upon their speaking in the same terms as they had done at Thessalonica before Caecilius, the senate decided to send fresh legates to Philip, to see in the first place if he had evacuated the cities in Thessaly and Perrhaebia, as Caecilius had stipulated in his reply to

him, and next to order him to withdraw his garrisons from Aenus and Maronea and in general to quit all forts, places, and cities on the sea coast of Thrace. The envoys from the Peloponnesus were the next to be introduced, the Achaeans having sent Apollonidas of Sicyon to justify themselves against Caecilius, because he had received no answer from them, and to speak in general on the affairs of Sparta, and Areus and Alcibiades being the representatives of Sparta. These men both belonged to those old exiles who had recently been restored to their country by Philopoemen and the Achaeans; and it particularly excited the anger of the Achaeans that, after so great and recent a kindness as they had shown the exiles, they at once met with such flagrant ingratitude from them that they came on a mission against them to the ruling power and accused those who had so unexpectedly saved them and restored them to their homes. The two parties, with the sanction of the senate, pleaded against each other in the Curia. Apollonidas of Sicyon asserted that it was quite impossible for the affairs of Sparta to have been managed better than they had been managed by the Achaeans and Philopoemen, while Areus and his colleague attempted to prove the reverse, stating that in the first place the power of the city had been reduced by the forcible expulsion of the populace, and that then, in the state as left to those who remained, there was neither security nor liberty of speech, no security because they were few and their walls had been destroyed, and no liberty of speech because they not only had to obey the public decrees of the Achaeans but were as individuals obliged to be at the beck and call of any governors who might be appointed. The senate, after hearing both sides, decided to give the same legates instructions on

this subject, and appointed for Macedonia and Greece a commission at the head of which was Appius Claudius Pulcher.

The envoys from Achaea also spoke in the Senate defending their magistrates against Caecilius. They maintained that the magistrates had done nothing wrong and were deserving of no censure in not having summoned the assembly to meet, the Achaean law being that the popular assembly is not to be summoned unless a resolution has to be passed regarding war or peace, or unless anyone brings a letter from the senate. Their magistrates had therefore been right on that occasion; for while they had desired to summon the Achaeans to a general assembly they were prevented from doing so by the laws, as Caecilius was neither the bearer of letters from the senate nor would he show to their magistrates his written instructions. After their speech Caecilius got up, and accusing Philopoemen and Lycortas and the Achaeans in general, condemned their management of the affairs of Sparta. The senate, after listening to the speeches, gave the following answer to the Achaeans. They would send a commission to inquire into Lacedaemonian affairs, and they advised the Achaeans to pay due attention and give a proper reception to all legates dispatched by them, just as the Romans do in the case of embassies arriving in Rome.

V. Affairs of Macedonia

Massacre at Maronea

(Cp. Livy XXXIX. 34-35.)

King Philip, when his envoys sent a message to him from Rome that it would be necessary for him to evacuate the Thracian cities, upon learning this was much embittered by the thought that he was being docked of his dominions on every side, and vented his fury on the unhappy people of

Maronea. Sending for Onomastus, the governor of Thrace, he communicated his intentions to him. Onomastus upon leaving sent to Maronea Cassander, who was familiar with the people, as he usually resided there, Philip having for long been in the habit of settling members of his court in these cities and accustoming the inhabitants to their stay. After a few days, when the Thracians had been got ready and introduced into the town at night by Cassander, a great massacre took place, and many of the citizens perished. Philip, having thus chastised his opponents and satisfied his vengeance, waited for the arrival of the legates, convinced that no one would dare to accuse him owing to fear; but shortly afterwards when Appius and his colleagues arrived, and, having soon heard what had happened at Maronea, rebuked Philip severely for his conduct, he tried to excuse himself by stating that he had taken no part in the outrage, but that the people of Maronea themselves who were at discord, some of them being inclined to favour Eumenes and some himself, had brought this calamity on themselves; and he invited them to summon anyone who wished to accuse him to met him. This he did owing to his conviction that no one would venture to do so, as all would think that Philip's vengeance on his opponents would be summary, while the help of Rome was remote. But when the commissioners said that any further defence on his part was superfluous, as they quite well knew what had happened and who was the cause of it, Philip was at a loss what to reply. They broke up their first interview at this point, and on the next day the commissioners ordered Philip to send Onomastus and Cassander instantly to Rome. Philip was exceedingly taken aback by this, and after hesitating for long, said he would send Cassander, the author of the deed, as they said, in order that the senate might learn the truth from

him. Both now and at subsequent interviews with the legates he exculpated Onomastus on the pretext that not only had he not been present at Maronea on the occasion of the massacre, but had not even been in the neighbourhood; fearing in fact that on arriving at Rome this officer, who had taken part in many similar deeds, might inform the Romans not only about what had happened at Maronea, but about all the rest. Finally he got Onomastus excused; but sent off Cassander after the departure of the legates and giving him an escort as far as Epirus killed him there by poison. But Appius and the other legates, after condemning Philip for his outrage at Maronea and for his spirit of enmity to Rome, quitted him with this opinion of him.

The king, left by himself, confessed in his confidential intercourse with his friends Apelles and Philocles that he saw clearly that his difference with the Romans had become very acute and that this did not escape the eyes of others but was patent to most people. He was therefore in general quite eager to resist and attack them by any and every means. But as he had not sufficient forces to execute some of his projects, he set himself to consider how he might put off matters for a little and gain time for warlike preparations. He decided, then, to send his youngest son Demetrius to Rome, in the first place to offer a defence against the charges brought against him, and next to ask for pardon if indeed he had inadvertently erred in any respect. For he felt quite convinced that he would through him get the senate to accede to anything he proposed owing to the influence the young man had won while serving as a hostage. Having thought of this he occupied himself with the dispatch of Demetrius and the other friends he was about to send in company with him, and also promised to help the

Byzantines, not so much with the view of gratifying them, as wishing upon this pretext to strike terror into the Thracian chiefs north of the Propontis and thus further the project he meant to execute.

VI. Affairs of Greece

Quarrel of Gortyna and Cnosus

In Crete, when Cydas the son of Antalces held the office of Cosmos at Gortyna, the people of that city, exerting themselves to diminish in every way the power of the Cnosians, parcelled off from their territory the so-called Lycastium and assigned it to Rhaucus and the Diatonium to Lyttus. At this time Appius Claudius and the other commissioners arrived in Crete from Rome, for the purpose of settling the disputes existing in the island. When they had spoken on the subject in Cnosus and Gortyna, the Cretans gave ear to them and put their affairs into their hands. They restored the territory to Cnosus: they ordered the Cydoniats to take back the hostages they had formerly left in Charmion's hands, and to leave Phalasarna without taking anything away from it. As for the joint court, they allowed them, if they wished, to take part in it, and if they did not wish, to refuse on condition that they and the exiles from Phalasarna left the rest of Crete untouched. The . . . killed Menoetius and others, the most notable of their citizens.

VII. Affairs of Egypt

All admire King Philip the Second for his magnanimity, in that although the Athenians had injured him both by word and deed, when he overcame them at the battle of Chaeronea, he was so far from availing himself of his success to injure his enemies, that he buried with due rites the Athenian dead, and sent the prisoners back to their relations without ransom and clad

in new raiment. But now far from imitating such conduct men vie in anger and thirst for vengeance with those on whom they are making war to suppress these very sentiments. . . .

When Ptolemy the king of Egypt laid siege to the city of Lycopolis, the Egyptian chiefs in terror surrendered at discretion. He used them ill and incurred great danger (*sic*). Much the same thing happened when Polycrates got the rebels into his power. For Athinis, Pausiras, Chesufus and Irobastus, the surviving chieftains, forced by circumstances, came to Sais to entrust themselves to the king's good faith. But Ptolemy, violating his faith, tied the men naked to carts, and, after dragging them through the streets and torturing them, put them to death. On reaching Naucratis with his army, when Aristonicus had presented to him the mercenaries he had raised in Greece, he took them and sailed off to Alexandria, having taken no part in any action in the war owing to the unfairness of Polycrates, although he was now twenty-five years old.

VIII. Affairs of Macedonia and Greece

(Cp. Livy XXXIX. 23. 5.)

From this time forward dates the commencement of the catastrophes that were fatal to the royal house of Macedon. I am not indeed unaware that some of the authors who have written about the war of the Romans with Perseus, wishing to indicate the causes of the quarrel, attribute it first to the expulsion of Abrupolis [3] from his principality on the pretext that he had overrun the mines on Mount Pangaeus after the death of Philip, upon which Perseus, coming to protect them and having utterly routed him, expelled him, as I said, from his principality. The next cause they give is the invasion of Dolopia by Perseus and his coming to Delphi, and further the plot formed

at Delphi against King Eumenes, and the killing of the envoys from Boeotia, these latter events being asserted by some to have been the causes of the war. Now I maintain that it is most essential both for writers and for students to know the causes from which all events spring and grow. But most writers are guilty of confusion in this matter, owing to their not observing the difference between a pretext and a cause, and between the beginning of a war and pretext for it. I am therefore, as the circumstances themselves recall to my mind what I said on a previous occasion, compelled to repeat myself. For of the events I just mentioned the first are pretexts, but the last—the plot against Eumenes and the murder of the envoys and other similar things that took place at the same time—constitute indeed evidently the actual beginning of the war between the Romans and Perseus and the consequent fall of the Macedonian power, but not a single one of them was its cause. This will be evident from what I am about to say. For just as I said that Philip, son of Amyntas, conceived and meant to carry out the war against Persia, but that it was Alexander who put his decision into execution; [4] so now I maintain that Philip, son of Demetrius, first conceived the notion of entering on the last war against Rome, and had prepared everything for the purpose, but on his decease Perseus was the executor of the design. Now if one of these things is true, the other error also is evident. It is not surely possible that the causes of a war can be subsequent to the death of the man who decided on it and purposed to make it; and this is what other writers maintain; for all the things they mention are subsequent to the death of Philip.

[3] See Livy XLII. 13. 5.

[4] See Bk. III chap. 6.

Philopoemen had a verbal dispute with Archon the strategus. At the time his rejoinders were applauded, but afterwards he regretted them and praised Archon warmly for having acted under the circumstances in an adroit and smart manner. But I myself, who happened to be present, neither approved at the time of what he said, belauding a man and at the same time doing him injury, nor do I think so now when I am of riper age. For in my opinion there is a wide difference in the character of a forceful man and an unscrupulous one, almost as great as that between an adroit and a mischievous one. The one quality may be said to be the best in the world and the other just the opposite. But owing to our prevalent lack of judgement, the two, having some points in common, meet with equal approbation and admiration.

IX. Affairs of Asia

Apollonis, the wife of Attalus, father of King Eumenes, was a native of Cyzicus, and for several reasons a very remarkable and praiseworthy woman. For the fact that being a simple citizen she became a queen and preserved this dignity until the end without employing any seductive and meretricious art, but always exhibiting the gravity and excellence of a woman strict in her life and courteous in her demeanour, makes her worthy of honourable mention. Add to this that having given birth to four sons, she cherished for all of them up to her dying day and unsurpassed regard and affection, although she survived her husband for a considerable time. And the sons of Attalus on their visit to the town showed due gratitude and respect to their mother. For, placing her between them and taking both her hands, they went round the temples and the city accompanied by their suites. All who witnessed it applauded and honoured the young men for

this, and, mindful of the story of Cleobis and Biton, compared their conduct to this, additional splendour falling on this act of devotion owing to the exalted and regal station of the two princes. This all happened in Cyzicus after the peace with King Prusias.

(Suid.)

Ortiagon, one of the Galatian princes, formed the project of subjecting the whole of Galatia to his dominion; and for this purpose he possessed many advantages both natural and acquired. For he was munificent and magnanimous, his conversation was both charming and intelligent, and, what is most important among Gauls, he was brave and skilled in the art of war.

X. Affairs of Egypt

(Suid.)

Aristonicus the servant of Ptolemy, king of Egypt, was a eunuch, but had been from childhood upward the king's intimate companion. As he grew older he showed himself more of a man in courage and general character than eunuchs generally are. For he was a born soldier, and spent most of his time with military men and in the study of military matters. He was also capable in conversation and he was liberal-minded, which is rare, and in addition to this he was naturally disposed to be beneficent.

THE END OF BOOK XXII

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXIII

I. AFFAIRS OF GREECE

Embassies from Greece to Rome

(Cp. Livy XXXIX. 46. 6.)

In the 149th Olympiad so large a number of missions from Greece were assembled in Rome as had, perhaps, never been previously seen. For as Philip was now strictly confined to the jurisdiction of the courts established by treaty in disputes with his neighbours, and as it was known that the Romans were ready to listen to complaints against him, and looked after the safety of those who were at issue with him, all those on the frontiers of Macedonia had come, some individually and some representing cities or tribal groups, to accuse the king. Envoys also came from Eumenes, with Athenaeus, that king's brother, at their head, to bring charges against Philip on subject of the Thracian cities and of the help he had sent to Prusias. Demetrius, Philip's son, also appeared to defend his father against all the above, accompanied by Apelles and Philocles, who were then considered to be the chief friends of the king. There were also envoys from Lacedaemon representing all the different factions in that town. The senate summoned Athenaeus in the first place, and, having received the crown he brought of the value of fifteen thousand gold staters, thanked Eumenes and his brother profusely for their reply, and exhorted them to continued to maintain the same attitude. In the next place the consuls introduced Demetrius, and inviting all Philip's accusers to come forward, brought them in one by one.

As these embassies were so numerous that it took three days to introduce them all, the senate was at a loss how to deal with all the details. For from Thessaly there was one general embassy and particular ones from each town, and there were also embassies from Perrhaebia, Athamania, Epirus, and Illyria, some of them claiming territory, some slaves and some cattle, and others with complaints about the injustice they had suffered in their actions for the recovery of money, maintaining in some cases that they could not get justice in the authorized tribunals, as Philip quashed the proceedings, and in others finding fault with the decisions on the ground that the rulings were unfair, Philip having bribed the judges. So that on the whole the various accusations resulted in a confused and inextricable imbroglio.

This the senate, unable itself to decide about all these matters, and thinking that Demetrius should not be forced to meet all these charges, as they were well disposed towards him and saw that he was still quite young and very far from being competent to face such a whirl of complications, and wishing particularly not to hear speeches from Demetrius but to obtain some true test of Philip's views, relieved the young man from pleading in justification himself, but asked him and his friends who were with him if they had any notes on all these matters from the king. On Demetrius replying in the affirmative and presenting a little note-book, they bade him give them the general sense of the suggestions noted therein as a reply to each of the charges. Philip in each case either maintained that he had executed the orders of the Romans, or, if he had not done so, cast the blame on his accusers. He had added to most of his statements, "Although Caecilius and the other legates did not deal fairly with us in this case"; or

again, "Although we were unjustly treated in this case." Such being the tone of all Philip's statements, the senate, after listening to the envoys who had arrived, came to one decision about all the questions. Having through the praetor accorded a splendid and cordial reception to Demetrius, and addressed him at length in terms of encouragement, they gave as an answer that regarding all the matters on which he had spoken or read his father's notes they accepted his word that strict justice either had been done or would be done. And, that Philip might see that this was a favour granted by the senate to Demetrius, they said that they would dispatch a commission to see if everything was being done as the senate desired and to inform the king at the same time that he met with this indulgence owing to Demetrius. Such was the issue of this matter.

The envoys of Eumenes were the next to enter. Their accusations related to the armed support sent by Philip to Prusias and to his treatment of the places in Thrace, where they said he had not even yet withdrawn his garrisons from the towns. Upon Philocles expressing his desire to offer a defence on these subjects, as he had both been on a mission to Prusias and had now been sent to the senate by Philip expressly for this purpose, the senate, after listening for a short time to what he said, gave him the following reply. If their commissioners did not find that all their wishes had been carried out, and all the cities put into the hands of Eumenes, they would no longer be able to submit to delay or tolerate disobedience in this matter.

The friction between Philip and the senate was becoming very acute when for the present it was thus arrested by the presence in Rome of Demetrius. The young man's embassy, however, contributed in no small

measure to the ultimate misfortunes of the House of Macedon. For the senate, by transferring to Demetrius their whole claim to gratitude for the favour they had conferred, turned that young man's head and gravely offended both Perseus and Philip by the thought that Romans had shown them kindness not for their own sakes by for that of Demetrius. Flamininus also, by inviting the young man's confidences and eliciting his secrets, contributed much to the same result, as he deluded him into cherishing the idea that the Romans were about to secure the throne for him at once, at the same time irritating Philip by writing to him to send back Demetrius at once to Rome with as many of his most serviceable friends as possible. For this was the pretext that Perseus soon after used to persuade his father to consent to the death of Demetrius.

How all this was brought about I will show in detail further on. The next envoys to be introduced were those from Lacedaemon. Of these there were four sets. Lysis and others came on behalf of the old exiles, maintaining that they ought to recover all the property they had when first exiled: Areus and Alcibiades proposed that they should, upon receiving back their own property to the value of a talent, distribute the rest among those worthy of citizenship. Serippus contended that the condition of affairs should be left as it was when they were members of the Achaean League, while Chaeron and others appeared on behalf of those put to death or exiled by the decree of the Achaeans, demanding their recall and the restoration of the constitution . . . they addressed the Achaeans in terms which suited their own views. The senate, unable to examine these different proposals in detail, delegated that duty to three men who had formerly acted as commissioners in the Peloponnese, Flamininus, Quintus Caecilius, and

Appius Claudius. After listening to various arguments, they were all in agreement as to the restoration of the exiles and the remains of those put to death, and as to Sparta's remaining a member of the Achaean League: but on the question of the property—whether the talent's worth of his own property should be assigned to each exile or whether . . . they differed. But in order that the whole matter should not be rediscussed from the beginning, they drew up a written agreement about the points not in dispute to which all the parties affixed their seals. Flamininus and his colleagues, wishing to involve the Achaeans in this agreement, invited to meet them Xenarchus and the others who had been sent as envoys at the time by the Achaeans, partly to renew the alliance and partly to watch the result of the various demands made by Spartans. Contrary to his expectation, when asked if they approved of the written agreement they for some reason or other hesitated. On the one hand they were not pleased with the recall of the exiles and of those put to death, because it was contrary to the Achaean decree as inscribed on the column; but they were on the whole pleased, because it was written in the agreement that Sparta was to remain a member of the Achaean League. At length, however, partly out of inability to decide, and partly from fear of Flamininus and his colleagues, they affixed their seal. The senate now appointed Quintus Marcius Philippus their legate, and dispatched him to Macedonia and the Peloponnesus.

Deinocrates of Messene

(Cp. Livy XXXIX. 51.)

Deinocrates of Messene, on arriving at Rome on a mission from his country and learning that Flamininus had been appointed by the senate its legate to Prusias and Seleucus, was overjoyed, thinking that Flamininus,

both owing to his personal friendship with himself—for they had become well acquainted during the war with Laconia—and owing to his difference with Philopoemen, would upon arriving in Greece manage the affairs of Messene entirely as he himself desired. So neglecting to take any other steps he remained in close attendance on Flamininus and rested all his hopes on him.

Deinocrates of Messene was not only by practice but by nature a soldier and a courtier. He gave one perfectly the impression of being a capable man, but his capacity was counterfeit and pinchbeck. For in war, to begin with, he was highly distinguished by his reckless daring, and was magnificent in single combat; and similarly, as regards his other qualities, his conversation was charming and unembarrassed, and in convivial society he was versatile and urbane and also fond of love-making. But as regards public or political affairs he was perfectly incapable of concentrated attention and clear insight into the future, as well as of preparing and delivering a speech. At present, when he had just begun a series of terrible calamities for his country, he simply fancied that his action was of no importance, and went on living in his usual manner, foreseeing nothing of what would happen, but occupied with love affairs, drinking deep from an early hour, and devoted to scenic performances. Flamininus, however, compelled him to realize in a measure the danger he was in; for once when he saw him at a party dancing in a long robe, he held his peace at the time, but next day, when Deinocrates came to see him and made some request about Messene, he said, "I, Deinocrates, will do what I can; but as for you I am surprised how you can dance at parties, after having begun such troubles for Greece." He then for a time appeared to put a check on himself and

realize that he had betrayed in an improper manner his true character and nature.

However, he appeared now in Greece with Flamininus, convinced that he had only to show his face when the affairs of Messene would be arranged as he wished. But Philopoemen, well knowing that Flamininus had no instructions from the senate regarding the affairs of Greece, kept quiet awaiting his arrival, and when, on disembarking at Naupactus, he wrote to the strategus and damiurges [1] of the Achaeans, ordering them to call the general assembly of the Achaeans, they replied that they would do so upon his informing them on what subjects he wished to address the Achaeans; for that was the course imposed on the magistrates by their laws. As Flamininus did not venture to reply, the hopes of Deinocrates and of the "old exiles" as they were called, who had then quite recently been exiled from Sparta, and in general the expectations created by Flamininus's arrival came to nothing.

[1] The ten magistrates of the league who formed the council of the strategus.

II. Affairs of Greece

The Spartan Envoys

At the same time envoys were sent by the Lacedaemonian exiles to Rome, among them being Arcesilaus and Agesipolis, who as a boy had been king of Sparta. They were both caught and murdered at sea by some pirates, but their colleagues were conveyed to Rome.

III. Affairs of Macedonia

(Cp. Livy XXXIX. 53.)

When Demetrius reached Macedonia from Rome, bringing the reply in which the Romans attributed to this prince all the favour and confidence they had shown, saying that all that they had done or would do was for his sake, the Macedonians gave him a good reception, thinking that they had been thus freed from great apprehension and peril—for they had quite expected that owing to the friction between Philip and the Romans a war with Rome was immediately imminent; but Philip and Perseus viewed it all with no favourable eyes, as it did not please them to think that the Romans treated them as if of no account, but credited Demetrius with all the favour they had shown. Philip, however, continued to conceal his displeasure; but Perseus, who was much less well disposed to the Romans than his brother, and much inferior to him in all other respects both by nature and by training, was deeply aggrieved. His principal fear was for the throne, lest, although the elder son, he might be excluded from it for the above reasons. He therefore not only corrupted the friends of Demetrius . . .

(Cp. Livy XXXIX. 53.)

Upon the arrival in Macedonia of Quintus Marcius and the other Roman legates, Philip entirely evacuated the Greek towns in Thrace, withdrawing his garrisons, but he relinquished them in a sullen and grumbling spirit and with many sighs. He also set right all the other matters about which the Romans directed him, as he wished to give no sign of hostility to them and thus gain time to make his preparations for war. Adhering to his resolve he now made an expedition against the barbarians. Passing through central Thrace he invaded the country of the Odrysians, the Bessi, and the Dentheleti. On his arrival at Philippopolis, the inhabitants fled to the hills, and he took the city at once. After this he raided the whole plain, and, after

devastating the lands of some and receiving the submission of others, he returned, leaving in Philippopolis a garrison which was shortly afterwards expelled by the Odrysians, who broke their pledges to the king.

IV. Affairs of Italy

Greek Embassies in Rome. Report of Marcius

(Cp. Livy XL. 2. 6.)

In the second year of this Olympiad (149) upon the arrival in Rome of embassies from Eumenes, Pharnaces and Philip, from the Achaean League, and from both the exiled Lacedaemonians and those in possession of the city, the senate gave them all audience. Envoys also came from Rhodes on the subject of the calamity that had overtaken Sinope. To these last and the envoys of Eumenes and Pharnaces the Senate replied that they would send legates to inquire about Sinope and about the disputes between the two kings. Quintus Marcius had recently returned from Greece, and upon his presenting his report on the subject of Macedonia and the Peloponnesus, the Senate no longer required further debate, but summoning the envoys from the Peloponnesus and Macedonia, listened, it is true, to their speeches, but drew up their reply not with reference to the arguments of the envoys, but in accordance with the report of Marcius. He had reported regarding Philip that he had executed the Roman order, but he had done so grudgingly; and that as soon as he had the opportunity he would do all he could against Rome. The answer given by the senate to Philip's envoys was therefore as follows. They thanked him for what had been done, and in future they warned him to take care not to appear to be acting in any way in opposition to Rome. As regards the Peloponnesus Marcius had reported that as the Achaeans did not wish to refer anything to the senate, but had a great

opinion of themselves and were attempting to act in all matters on their own initiative, if the senate paid no attention to their request for the present, and expressed their displeasure in moderate terms, Sparta would soon be reconciled with Messene, upon which the Achaeans would be only too glad to appeal to the Romans. So they replied to Serippus, the representative of Sparta, as they wished the city to remain in suspense, that they had done all in their power for the Spartans, but at present they did not think that the matter concerned them. When the Achaeans begged them, if it were possible, to send a force in virtue of their alliance to help them against the Messenians, or if not to see to it that no one coming from Italy should import arms or food to Messene, they paid no attention to either request, and answered them that not even if the people of Sparta, Corinth or Argos deserted the League should the Achaeans be surprised if the senate did not think it concerned them. Giving full publicity to this reply, which was a sort of proclamation that the Romans would not interfere with those who wished to desert the Achaean League, they continued to detain the envoys, waiting to see how the Achaeans would get on at Messene. Such was the situation in Italy.

V. Affairs of Macedonia

(Cp. Livy XL. 3. 3.)

This year witnessed the first outbreak of terrible misfortunes for King Philip and the whole of Macedonia, an event fully worthy of attention and careful record. For it was now that Fortune, as if she meant to punish him at one and the same time for all the wicked and criminal acts he had committed in his life, sent to haunt him a host of the furies, tormentors and avenging spirits of his victims, phantoms that never leaving him by day and

by night, tortured him so terribly up to the day of his death that all men acknowledged that, as the proverb says, "Justice has an eye" and we who are but men should never scorn her. For first of all Fortune inspired him with the notion that now he was about to make war on Rome he ought to deport with their whole families from the principal cities and from those on the coast all men who took part in politics, and transfer them to the country now called Emathia and formerly Paeonia, filling the cities with Thracians and barbarians whose fidelity to him would be surer in the season of danger. While this project was being executed, and the men were being deported, there arose such mourning and such commotion that one would have said the whole country was being led into captivity. And in consequence were heard curses and imprecations against that king uttered no longer in secret but openly. In the next place, wishing to tolerate no disaffection and to leave no hostile element in his kingdom, he wrote to the officers in whose charge the cities were, to search for the sons and daughters of the Macedonians he had killed and imprison them, referring chiefly to Admetus, Pyrrhichus, Samus and the others put to death at the same time, but including all others who had suffered death by royal command, quoting, as they say, the line—

A fool is he who slays the sire and leaves the sons alive.

As most of these young people were notable owing to the high stations their fathers had held, their misfortune too became notable, and excited the pity of all. And the third tragedy which Fortune produced at the same time was that concerning his sons. The young men were plotting against each other, and as the matter was referred to him, and it fell to him to decide of which of them he had to be the murderer and which of them he had to fear most for the rest of his life, lest he in his old age should suffer the same fate,

he was disturbed night and day by this thought. Who can help thinking, that, his mind being thus afflicted and troubled, it was the wrath of heaven which had descended on his old age, owing to the crimes of his past life? And this will be still more evident from what follows.

Philip of Macedon after putting many Macedonians to death, killed their sons also, [2] quoting as they say, the verse:

[2] For the sequel see Livy XL.5-24.

A fool is he who slays the sire and leaves the sons alive.

. . . And while his mind was almost maddened by this thought, the quarrel of his sons burst into flame at the same time, Fortune as if of set purpose bringing their misfortunes on the stage at one and the same time.

(Suid.)

The Macedonians offer sacrifices to Xanthus and make a piacular offering to him with armed horses.

Fragment of a Speech of Philip to his Sons.

(Cp. Livy XL. 8.)

You should not only read tragedies, myths, and stories but know well and ponder over such things. In all of them we see that those brothers who, giving way to wrath and discord, carried their quarrel to excess, not only in every case brought destruction on themselves but utterly subverted their substance, their families and their cities; while those who studied even in moderation to love anyone and tolerate each other's errors, were the preservers of all these things, and lived in the greatest glory and honour. Have I not often called your attention to the case of the kings of Sparta, pointing out how they preserved for their country her supremacy in Greece, as long as they obeyed the ephors as if they were their fathers, and were

content to share the throne, but when once they fell out and changed the constitution to a monarchy, then they caused Sparta to experience every evil? And finally, I constantly as a cogent proof of this kept before your eyes these our contemporaries Eumenes and Attalus, telling you how, inheriting a small and insignificant kingdom, they increased it so much that it is now inferior to none, simply by their concord and agreement and their faculty of mutual respect. You listened to all this; but, far from its sinking into your minds, you, on the contrary, as it seems to me, whetted your passion against each other.

VI. Affairs of Greece

Philopoemen [3]

[3] This year witnessed the deaths of Philopoemen, of Hannibal, and according to at least to Polybius, of Scipio. Polybius pauses to compare them. Cp. Livy XXXIX.50.10.

(Suid.)

Philopoemen arose and advanced although bowed down by sickness and the weight of years, being now in his seventieth year . . . but on getting over his ailment he recovered his former activity and reached Megalopolis from Argos in one day.

Philopoemen, the strategus of the Achaeans, was captured by the Messenians and put to death by poison. He was a man second to none of his predecessors in virtue, but succumbed to Fortune, although he was thought in all his previous life to have always been favoured by her. But my opinion is that, as the vulgar proverb says, it is possible for a human being to be fortunate, but impossible for him to be constantly so. Therefore we should regard some of our predecessors as blessed, not because they enjoyed

constant good fortune—for what need is there by stating what is false to pay foolish worship to Fortune? But they are blessed to whom Fortune was kind for the greater part of their lives, and who, when she deserted them, only met with moderate misfortunes.

Philopoemen spent forty successive years in the pursue of glory in a democratic state composed of various elements, and he avoided incurring the ill-will of the people in any way or on any occasion, although in his conduct of affairs he usually did not court favour but spoke his mind: a thing we seldom find.

Hannibal

(Suid.)

It is a remarkable and very cogent proof of Hannibal's having been by nature a real leader and far superior to anyone else in statesmanship, that though he spent seventeen years in the field, passed through so many barbarous countries, and employed to aid him in desperate and extraordinary enterprises numbers of men of different nations and languages, no one ever dreamt of conspiring against him, nor was he ever deserted by those who had once joined him or submitted to him.

Scipio

(Cp. Suid.)

Publius Scipio, who pursued fame in an aristocratic state, gained so completely the affection of the people and the confidence of the senate that when some one attempted to bring him to trial before the people according to the Roman practice, making many bitter accusations, he said nothing more when he came forward to defend himself, but that it was not proper for the Roman people to listen to anyone who accused Publius Cornelius

Scipio, to whom his accusers owed it that they had the power of speech at all. All the people on hearing this at once dispersed, leaving the accuser alone.

Publius Scipio once in the senate when funds were required for an urgent outlay, and the quaestor owing to some law refused to open the treasury on that day, took the keys and said he would open it himself; saying it was owing to him that it was shut. On another occasion when some one in the senate asked him to render an account of the moneys he had received from Antiochus before the peace for the pay of his army, he said he had the account, but he was not obliged to render an account to anyone. When the senator in question pressed his demand and ordered him to bring it, he asked his brother to get it; and, when the book was brought to him, he held it out and tore it to bits in the sight of every one, telling the man who had asked for it to search among the pieces for the account. At the same time he asked the rest of the house why they demanded an account of how and by whom the three thousand talents had been spent, while they had not inquired how and by whose hands the fifteen thousand talents they were receiving from Antiochus were coming into the treasury, nor how they had become masters of Asia, Africa, and Spain. So not only were all abashed, but he who had demanded the account kept silence.

I have related these anecdotes for the sake of the good fame of the departed and to incite their successors to achieve noble deeds.

I never can share the sentiment of those who exercise their vengeance on those of their own race to such an extent that they not only deprive the enemy of the year's harvest, but destroy trees and agricultural apparatus, leaving no room for redress. On the contrary in my opinion those who act

thus make a very serious mistake. For the more they think to terrorize the enemy by spoiling their country and depriving them not only of all present but of all future hope of procuring the means of existence, the more they make the men savage, and to avenge a single offence inspire an ineradicable hatred of themselves.

Messene surrenders to the Achaeans

(Cp. Livy XXXIX. 50. 9.)

Lycortas, the strategus of the Achaeans, having cowed the Messenians by the war . . . The Messenians had long been overawed by their leaders, but now certain of them just ventured to open their mouths, relying on the protection of the enemy, and to advise sending an embassy to ask for peace. Deinocrates and the others in power, no longer daring to face the people, as they were encompassed by perils, yielded to circumstances and retired to their own dwellings. The people now, entreated by the elders and chiefly by the Boeotian envoys Epaenetus and Apollodorus, who had previously arrived to make peace, and by a happy chance were still in Messene, readily gave ear, and appointed and dispatched envoys craving pardon for the errors they had committed. The strategus of the Achaeans summoned his colleagues, and after listening to the envoys replied that the Messenians could make peace with the League on no other terms than by giving up to him now the authors of their defection and of the murder of Philopoemen, and by submitting all other matters to the discretion of the Achaeans and at once admitting a garrison into their citadel. When these terms were announced to the people, those who had been throughout hostile to the authors of the war were ready to arrest and surrender the latter, while all who were convinced that they would not be harshly treated by the Achaeans

gladly agreed to the unconditional submission; and as, above all, they had no choice in the matter, they unanimously accepted the proposal. The strategus upon this at once took over the citadel and introduced the peltasts into it, and after this, accompanied by competent members of his force, he entered the city, and summoning the populace addressed them in terms suitable to the occasion, promising that they would never repent of having entrusted their future to him. He referred the whole question to the League —it happened that at that very time the Achaeans, as if for this very purpose, were holding their second assembly at Megalopolis—ordering those among the guilty Messenians who had actually at the time participated in the death of Philopoemen, to put an end to their own lives without delay.

The Messenians, having by their own error been reduced to the worst condition, were restored to their original position in the League by the generosity of Lycortas and the Achaeans. Abia, Thurea, and Pharae at this time separated from Messene and each by a separate agreement secured their membership in the League.

The Romans, on hearing that the Messenian revolt had ended in a manner favourable to the Achaeans, entirely ignoring their former answer, gave another reply to the same envoys, informing them that they had provided that no one should import from Italy arms and corn to Messene. This made it patent to every one that so far from shirking and neglecting less important items of foreign affairs, they were on the contrary displeased if all matters were not submitted to them and if all was not done in accordance with their decision.

Admission of Sparta to the Achaean League

When the envoys returned from Rome to Sparta with the reply, the strategus of the Achaeans at once, after finally arranging the affairs of Messene, summoned the general assembly to meet at Sicyon. Upon its meeting, he proposed a resolution to receive Sparta into the League, saying that on the one hand the Romans had relieved themselves of the engagement formerly imposed on them to decide about this city, since they had answered that Spartan affairs did not concern them, and on the other that the present rulers of Sparta wished to join the League. He therefore begged them to accept the adherence of that city. It was, he said, advantageous in two ways; because they would be including in the League those who had kept their faith to it, next because those of the old exiles who had behaved with such ingratitude and impiety to them would not be members of the League, but as they had been expelled from the city by others, they would both confirm the decision of these latter and pay them by God's providence the debt of thanks they deserved. Such were the words in which Lycortas recommended the Achaeans to admit Sparta. Diophanes, however, and some others tried to take the part of the exiles, and begged the Achaeans not to join in their persecution, and for the sake of a few men to lend additional support to those who had wickedly and illegally driven them from their country. Such were the arguments on each side. The Achaeans, after listening to both, decided to admit the town, and afterwards, the inscription for a stone having been drawn up, Sparta became a member of the Achaean League, those in the town having agreed to receive such of the old exiles as had not been guilty of any ingratitude to the League.

The Achaeans having ratified this measure sent Bippus of Argus at the head of an embassy to Rome to inform the Senate about everything. The

Lacedaemonians also appointed Chaeron as their envoy and the exiles Cletis and Diactorius to represent their interests in the senate against that Achaean envoys.

THE END OF BOOK XXIII

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXIV

I. AFFAIRS OF ITALY

Various Embassies at Rome

(Cp. Livy XL. 20.)

Upon the arrival in Rome of the envoys from the Lacedaemonians and from their exiles, from the Achaeans, from Eumenes, from King Ariarathes, and from Pharnaces, the senate first gave audience to the last named. A short time previously Marcus and the other commissioners whom they had sent to inquire into the circumstances of the war between Eumenes and Pharnaces had presented their report, in which they pointed out the moderation of Eumenes in all matters, and the rapacious and generally overbearing conduct of Pharnaces. The senate, after listening to the envoys, had no need to debate the matter at length, but replied that they would send legates again to inquire with more diligence into the dispute of the two kings. The next to enter were the Spartan exiles together with those from the city; and after giving them a long hearing, the senate, without censuring the citizens at all for what had occurred, promised the exiles to write to the Achaeans begging for their return to their country. A few days afterwards when Bippus of Argos and the others sent by the Achaean League appeared before them and explained about the restoration of order at Messene, the senate gave them a courteous reception, expressing no displeasure with anyone for the conduct of the matter.

II. Affairs of Greece

In the Peloponnesus when the Lacedaemonian exiles arrived bearing a letter from the senate to the Achaeans asking them to take measures for their safe return to their country, the Achaeans decided to adjourn the debate until the arrival of their own envoys. After giving the exiles this answer, they drew up an inscription to be engraved on the stone recording their agreement with the Messenians, and granting them among other favours a three years' exemption from taxes, so that the devastation of the Messenian territory injured the Achaeans no less than Messenians. Upon Bippus and the envoys returning from Rome and reporting that the letter on the subject of the exiles had been written not owing to the senate's interest in them, but owing to their importunity, the Achaeans decided to take no step.

This year witnessed the beginning of great troubles in Crete, if indeed one can talk of a beginning of trouble in Crete. For of the constant succession of their civil wars and their excessive cruelty to each other, beginning and end mean the same thing in Crete, and what is regarded as a paradoxical utterance of some philosophers is there constantly a matter of fact.

III. Affairs of Italy

The Brothers of Eumenes in Rome

After the peace concluded between Pharnaces and Attalus and the others, they all returned home with their forces. Eumenes at this time had recovered from his sickness, and was living in Pergamus; and when his brother arrived and informed him how he had managed matters, he was pleased at what had happened, and resolved to send all his brothers to Rome, hoping by this mission to put an end to the war between himself and

Pharnaces, and at the same time wishing to recommend his brothers to the personal friends and former guests of himself and his house in Rome and to the senate in general. Attalus and the others gladly consented and prepared for the journey. Upon their arrival in Rome, all their friends gave the young men the kindest reception in their houses, as they had become intimate with them in their campaigns in Asia, and the senate greeted them upon their arrival on a magnificent scale, lavishing gifts and largesses on them, and replying most satisfactorily to them at their official audience. Attalus and his brothers on entering the Curia spoke at some length in renewal of their former amicable relations and, accusing Pharnaces, begged the senate to take measures to inflict on him the punishment he merited. The senate, after giving them a courteous hearing, replied that they would send legates who would by some means or other put an end to the war. Such was the condition of affairs in Italy.

IV. Affairs of Greece

Ptolemy and the Achaeans

At the same period King Ptolemy, wishing to ingratiate himself with the Achaean League, sent an envoy promising to give them a full squadron of quinqueremes. The Achaeans, chiefly because they thought the gift one for which real thanks were due, gladly accepted it, for the cost was not much less than ten talents. Having decided on this, they appointed as envoys Lycortas, Polybius, and Aratus, son of the great Aratus of Sicyon, to thank the king for the arms and coined money he had previously sent, and to receive the ships and look after their dispatch. They appointed Lycortas because, at the time when Ptolemy renewed the alliance, he had been strategus, and had done his best to consult the king's interests, and Polybius,

who had not attained the legal age for such a post, because his father had gone on an embassy to Ptolemy to renew the alliance, and to bring back the gift of arms and money. Aratus was chosen owing to his father's relations with the king. This embassy, however, never came off, owing to the death of Ptolemy which occurred about this time.

Chaeron of Sparta

(Cp. Suid.)

Just about the same time there was in Sparta a certain Chaeron, who had been a member of the embassy to Rome in the previous year. He was a sharp and able man, but he was young and of humble station, and had received a vulgar education. This man, courting the mob and making innovations upon which no one else ventured, soon acquired some reputation with the populace. The first thing he did was to take away from the sisters, wives, mothers, and children that the exiles had left behind them the property granted them by the tyrants, and distribute it among men of slender means at random, unfairly, and just as he chose. After this he began to use public moneys as if they were his own, and spent all the revenue without reference to laws, public decrees, or magistrates. Some citizens were indignant at this and took steps to get themselves appointed auditors of the public accounts as the law enjoined. Chaeron, seeing this and conscious that he had misused the public funds, when Apollonidas, the most notable of the auditors and most capable of exposing his rapacity, was one day in broad daylight on his way from a bath, sent some men and killed him. Upon this becoming known to the Achaeans, the people were exceedingly indignant, and the strategus started off at once for Sparta, where he put Chaeron on his trial for the murder of Apollonidas, and upon his being

found guilty, put him in prison, encouraging at the same time the other auditors to inquire seriously into the management of the public funds and to see that the relatives of the exiles recovered the property of which Chaeron had recently robbed them.

The Achaeans and Rome

In the same year when Hyperbatus the strategus submitted to the Achaeans' Assembly the question how to act upon the Roman communication regarding the return of the Spartan exiles, Lycortas advised them to take no steps, because while it was true that the Romans were doing their duty in lending an ear to reasonable requests made by persons whom they regarded as bereft of their rights, yet if it were pointed out to them that some of these requests were impossible to grant, and others would entail great injury and disgrace on their friends, it was not their habit in such matters to contend that they were right or enforce compliance. "So," he said, "at present, if it is pointed out to them that we Achaeans by acceding to their written request will violate our oaths, our laws, and the inscribed conventions that hold our League together, they will withdraw their demand and agree that we are right in hesitating and begging to be excused for non-compliance." Lycortas spoke in this sense; but Hyperbatus and Callicrates were in favour of compliance with the request, saying that neither laws nor inscribed agreements nor anything else should be considered more binding than the will of Rome. Such being the different views advanced, the Achaeans decided to send envoys to the senate to point out what Lycortas urged, and they at once appointed Callicrates of Leontium, Lydiadas of Megalopolis, and Aratus of Sicyon, and sent them off with instructions conformable to what I have stated. Upon their arrival in Rome, Callicrates

on entering the senate-house was so far from addressing that body in the terms of his instructions, that on the contrary, from the very outset of his speech, he not only attempted to bring audacious accusations against his political opponents, but to lecture the senate. For he said that it was the fault of the Romans themselves that the Greeks, instead of complying with their wishes, disobeyed their communications and orders. There were, he said, two parties at present in all democratic states, one of which maintained that the written requests of the Romans should be executed, and that neither laws, inscribed agreements, nor anything else should take precedence of the wishes of Rome, while the other appealed to laws, sworn treaties, and inscriptions, and implored the people not to violate these lightly; and this latter view, he said, was much more popular in Achaea and carried the day with the multitude, the consequence being that the partisans of Rome were constantly exposed to the contempt and slander of the mob, while it was the reverse with their opponents. If the senate now gave some token of their disapproval the political leaders would soon go over to the side of Rome, and the populace would follow them out of fear. But in the event of the senate neglecting to do so, every one would change and adopt the other attitude, which in the eyes of the mob was more dignified and honourable. "Even now," he said, "certain persons, who have no other claim to distinction, have received the highest honours in their several states simply for the reason that they are thought to oppose your injunctions for the sake of maintaining the force of their laws and decrees. If, then, it is a matter of indifference to you whether or not the Greeks obey you and comply with your instructions, continue to act as you do now; but if you wish your orders to be executed and none to treat your communications with

contempt, you should give all possible attention to this matter. For you may be quite sure that, if you do not, just the opposite will happen to what you contemplate, as has already been the case. For when quite lately in the Messenian difficulty Quintus Marcius did his best to ensure that the Achaeans should take no steps regarding Messene without the initiative of Rome, they paid no attention to him; but, after voting for war on their own accord, not only most unjustly devastated the whole of Messenia, but sent into exile some of its most distinguished citizens; and, when others were delivered up to them, put them to death after inflicting every variety of torture on them, just because they had appealed to Rome to judge the dispute. And now for some time while you have been writing to them about the return of the Spartan exiles, they are so far from complying that a solemn inscribed agreement has been made with the party that holds Sparta and oaths taken that the exiles shall never be allowed to return." So he begged them in view of all this to take precautions for the future.

Callicrates retired after speaking in these or similar terms. The exiles entered next, and, after stating their case in a few words and making a general appeal for compassion, withdrew. The senate, thinking that what Callicrates had said was in their interest, and learning from him that they should exalt those who supported their decrees and humble those who opposed them, now first began the policy of weakening those members of the several states who worked for the best, and of strengthening those, who, no matter whether rightly or wrongly, appealed to its authority. The consequence of this was that gradually, as time went on, they had plenty of flatterers but very few true friends. They actually went so far on the present occasion as to write not only to the Achaeans on the subject of the return of

the exiles, begging them to contribute to strengthening the position of these men, but to the Aetolians, Epirots, Athenians, Boeotians, and Acarnanians, calling them all as it were to witness as if for the express purpose of crushing the Achaeans. Speaking of Callicrates alone with no mention of the other envoys, they wrote in their official answer that there ought to be more men in the several states like Callicrates. He now returned to Greece with this answer in high spirits, quite unaware that he had been the initiator of great calamities for all Greece, and especially for the Achaeans. For it was still possible for the Achaeans even at this period to deal with Rome on more or less equal terms, as they had remained faithful to her ever since they had taken her part in the most important times—I mean the wars with Philip and Antiochus—but now after the Achaean League had become stronger and most prosperous than at any time recorded in history, this effrontery of Callicrates was the beginning of a change for the worse. . . . The Romans are men, and with their noble disposition and high principles pity all who are in misfortune and appeal to them; but, when anyone who has remained true to them reminds them of the claims of justice, they usually draw back and correct themselves as far as they can. On the present occasion Callicrates, who had been sent to Rome to state the just claims of Achaea, did exactly the opposite, and having dragged in the Messenian question, about which the Romans did not even raise any complaint, returned to Achaea armed with threats of Roman displeasure. By his report he overawed and crushed the spirits of the people, who were perfectly ignorant of the words he had actually used in the Senate; first of all he was elected strategus, taking bribes in addition to all his other misconduct, and

next, on entering upon office, brought back the Spartan and Messenian exiles.

Comparison between Philopoemen and Aristaenus

(Cp. Suid.)

Philopoemen and Aristaenus the Achaeans were alike neither in nature nor in their political convictions. Philopoemen indeed was exceptionally capable both physically and mentally in the field of war, Aristaenus in that of politics; and the difference in their political convictions was as follows. Now that, during the wars with Philip and Antiochus, Roman supremacy had definitely asserted itself in the affairs of Greece, Aristaenus in conducting affairs of state was ever ready to do what was agreeable to the Romans, sometimes even anticipating their orders, but yet he aimed at a seeming adherence to the law, and strove to acquire a reputation for doing so, giving way whenever any law was in evident opposition to the Roman instructions. Philopoemen, on the other hand, cordially accepted and helped to execute, without raising any objection, all requests which were in accordance with the laws and the terms of the alliance; but when the requests were not so, could never induce himself to comply with them willingly, but said that the plea of illegality should be considered before the request was renewed. If, however, they failed even by this means to convince the Romans, they should finally give way more or less under protest and execute the order.

Aristaenus offered to the Achaeans the following defence, more or less, of his policy. He said it was impossible to maintain their friendship with Rome, by holding out the sword and the olive branch [1] at one and the same time. "If," he said, "we are strong enough to face them and can really

do so, very well; but if Philopoemen does not venture to maintain this . . . why striving for the impossible do we neglect the possible? There were, he said, two aims in all policy, honour and interest. For those in whose power it lies to gain honour the right policy is to aim at this; but those who are powerless to do so must take refuge in the attainment of their interest. But to fail in both aims was the highest proof of incompetence; and this was evidently the case with those who made no objection to any demand, but complied with it against their wills and in a manner calculated to give offence. "Therefore," he said, "either it must be proved that we are capable of refusing compliance, or, if no one dares to say this, we must readily obey all orders."

[1] "The spear and the herald's staff."

The reply of Philopoemen was that they must not think he was so stupid as to be incapable of measuring the difference between the two states, Rome and Achaea, and the superiority of the Roman power. "But," he continued, "as a stronger power is always naturally disposed to press harder on those who submit to it, is it in our interest by encouraging the whims of our masters, and not opposing them in any way, to have to yield as soon as possible to the most tyrannical behests? Should we not rather, as far as it is in our power, wrestle with them, and hold out until we are completely exhausted? And should they issue illegal orders, [2] if, by pointing this out to them, we put some check on their arbitrary conduct, we shall at least in a measure curb the extreme severity of their dominion, especially since, as you yourself, Aristaenus, acknowledge, the Romans, up to now at least, set a very high value on fidelity to oaths, treaties, and contracts with allies. But if we ourselves, ignoring our own rights, instantly without protest make

ourselves subservient, like prisoners of war, to any and every order, what difference will there be between the Achaean League and the people of Sicily and Capua, who have long been the acknowledged slaves of Rome?" Therefore, he said, either they must confess that with the Romans justice is impotent, or if they did not go so far as to say this, they must stand by their rights, and not give themselves away, especially as they had very great and honourable claims on Rome. "I know too well," he said, "that the time will come when the Greeks will be forced to yield complete obedience to Rome; but do we wish this time to be as near as possible or as distant as possible? Surely as distant as possible." So in this respect, he said, the policy of Aristaenus differed from his own. Aristaenus was anxious to see their fate overtake them as soon as possible, and worked for this end with all his might; but he himself did all he could to strive against it and avert it.

[2] Heyse supplies µ ºÄ¿Â ½Ì¼É½ Ä¹.

I think it must be confessed from these speeches that the policy of Philopoemen was honourable, and that of Aristaenus plausible, but that both were safe. So that when, in the wars with Philip and Antiochus, great dangers threatened both Rome and Greece, yet the one statesman and the other equally protected the rights of Achaea against Rome. But the report gained currency that Aristaenus was more favourably disposed to the Romans than Philopoemen.

V. Affairs of Asia

War between Eumenes and Pharnaces

In Asia king Pharnaces, again defying the terms of the Roman verdict, sent Leocritus in the winter with ten thousand troops to lay Galatia waste, and himself, when spring began to set in, collected his forces with the

object of invading Cappadocia. Eumenes, on learning of this, was highly incensed, as Pharnaces was violating all the terms of their treaty, but he was forced to do the same thing himself. When he had already collected his troops, Attalus and his brother returned from Rome. After meeting and conversing the brothers at once left with their army. On arriving in Galatia they found that Leocritus was no longer there, but Cassignatus and Gaezatorix, who a year previously had taken the part of Pharnaces, sent to them asking for protection, and promising to submit to all their orders. Rejecting these overtures owing to the previous infidelity of these chiefs, they left with their whole army and advanced to meet Pharnaces. From Calpitus (?) they reached the Halys in four days, and next day left for Parnassus, where Ariarathes, the king of Cappadocia, joined them with his own forces, upon which they advanced to the territory of Mocissus. Just after they had encamped there the news reached them that the legates from Rome had arrived to arrange a peace. On hearing this King Eumenes sent off Attalus to receive them, but himself doubled his forces and energetically drilled them; both for the purpose of meeting actual exigencies and to show the Romans that he was capable without any assistance of defending himself against Pharnaces and overcoming him. When the legates arrived and begged the kings to put an end to the war, Eumenes and Ariarathes said they were quite ready to accede to this and any other request; but they asked the Romans if possible to contrive a meeting between them and Pharnaces, so that when he was brought face to face with them and they all spoke, his infidelity and cruelty might be fully revealed to them. If, however, this was beyond their power, they begged the legates themselves to act as fair and just judges in the matter. The legates consented to do all in their power that

was proper, but demanded that the army should be withdrawn from the country: for they said it was irregular that when a mission was present acting for peace there should at the same time be all the apparatus of war present, the kings inflicting damage on each other. Eumenes consented, and the very next day he and Ariarathes broke up their camp and advanced towards Galatia. The Romans in the first place met Pharnaces, and begged him to have an interview with Eumenes, for this was the surest way of arranging matters. When he objected to this and finally refused, the Romans also at once saw that he clearly condemned himself and had no confidence in his case; but as they wished by any and every means to put an end to the war, they went on insisting until he consented to send by sea to Pergamus plenipotentiaries empowered to make peace on the terms dictated by the legates. On the arrival of the envoys, the Romans and Eumenes met them. They were ready to make any concessions for peace; but, as the envoys of Pharnaces differed with them on every point, did not adhere to their agreements, continued raising fresh demands and withdrawing from their concessions, the Romans soon saw that all their efforts were in vain, as Pharnaces was not in the least inclined to make peace. So that, as the conference had no result, as the Romans quitted Pergamus, and as the envoys of Pharnaces returned to their own country, the war became permanent, and Eumenes began to continue his preparations for it. At the same time the Rhodians did their best to gain the assistance of Eumenes, and he hurriedly left to lend them a hand in Lycia. . . .

THE END OF BOOK XXIV

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXV

I. AFFAIRS OF ASIA

Conclusion of the above War

Pharnaces, when thus suddenly attacked in force, was ready to entertain any proposals, as he showed by sending envoys to Eumenes and Ariarathes. These kings, after listening to his overtures, themselves sent envoys to Pharnaces, and after this had been done several times on both sides, peace was agreed to on the following terms. "There shall be peace between Eumenes, Prusias, and Ariarathes on the one hand and Pharnaces and Mithridates on the other for all time: Pharnaces shall not invade Galatia on any pretext: all treaties previously made between Pharnaces and the Galatians are revoked: he shall likewise retire from Paphlagonia, restoring to their homes those of the inhabitants whom he had formerly deported, and restoring at the same time all weapons, missiles, and material of war: he shall give up to Ariarathes all the places of which he robbed him in the same condition as he found them, and he shall return the hostages: he shall also give up Tium on the Pontus"—this city was shortly afterwards very gladly presented by Eumenes to Prusias who begged for it: "Pharnaces shall return all prisoners of war without ransom and all deserters. Likewise out of the money and treasure he carried off from Morzius and Ariarathes, he shall repay to the above kings nine hundred talents, paying in addition to Eumenes three hundred talents towards the expenses of the war. A fine of three hundred talents was also imposed on Mithridates, satrap of Armenia,

because violating his treaty with Eumenes he had made war on Ariarathes. Of the Asiatic princelets Artaxias, the ruler of the greater part of Armenia, and Acusilochus were included in the treaty; of those in Europe Gatalus the Sarmatian; also the following free cities, Heraclia, Mesembria, Chersonese, and Cyzicus. The last claim related to the number of hostages to be given by Pharnaces. Upon the arrival of the latter, the armies at once departed. Such was the end of the war between Eumenes and Ariarathes in alliance and Pharnaces.

II. Affairs of Macedonia

Opening of the Reign of Perseus

(Cp. Suid.)

Perseus, immediately after renewing his alliance with Rome, began to aim at popularity in Greece, calling back to Macedonia fugitive debtors and those who had been banished from the country either by sentence of the courts or for offences against the king. He posted up lists of these men at Delos, Delphi, and the temple of Itonian Athena, [1] not only promising safety to such as returned, but the recovery of the property they had left behind them. In Macedonia itself he relieved all who were in debt to the crown, and released those who had been imprisoned for offences against the crown. By this action he aroused the expectation of many, as it seemed to show that for the whole of Greece much was to be hoped from him. He also showed in the rest of his behaviour true royal dignity. For in personal appearance he looked capable, and was expert in all kinds of bodily exercise which are of real service. In his demeanour too he had a gravity and composure not unsuited to his years. He also had kept clear of his father's incontinence in the matter of women and drink, and not only was he

himself moderate in his potations at table, but so were the friends who dined with him. Such was the character of the reign of Perseus at its opening.

[1] A celebrated sanctuary in Thessaly.

Philip V in misfortune

At the time when King Philip grew great and was powerful in Greece, no one had less regard for good faith and law, but when the wind of his good fortune veered, he was the most moderate of men. When finally he entirely came to grief, he attempted to adapt himself to all contingencies and by every means to build up his kingdom again.

III. Affairs of Italy

Embassy from Lycia

(Cp. Livy XLI. 6-8.)

After the dispatch of the consuls Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus and Gaius Claudius Pulcher against the Istri and Agrii, the Senate, when summer was approaching its end, gave audience to the envoys from Lycia who reached Rome after Lycia had been entirely reduced, but had been dispatched a good deal earlier. For the Xanthians, at the time they were about to embark on this war, had sent Nicostratus at the head of a mission to Achaea and Rome. He arrived at Rome only now, and appealed to the sentiments of many of the senators by bringing before their eyes the oppressiveness of the Rhodians and their own imminent danger. Finally they succeeded in persuading the senate to send legates to Rhodes, to inform that state, that after referring to the reports that the ten commissioners had drawn up in Asia when they were arranging matters with Antiochus, they found that the Lycians had not been handed over the Rhodes as a gift, but rather to be treated like friends and allies. The

imposition of these terms by no means pleased many people in Rhodes. For it was thought that the Romans were constituting themselves arbiters in the matter of Rhodes and Lycia with the object of exhausting the stores and treasure of the Rhodians, having heard of their recent home-bringing of the bride of Perseus and of the refitting of their ships.

Indeed, a short while previously the whole of the Rhodian navy had been splendidly and munificently refitted. For Perseus had presented them with a quantity of wood for shipbuilding, and had given a golden tiara to each of the sailors in the galleys that had escorted his bride Laodice on her way to him.

IV. Affairs of Rhodes

When the envoys from Rome arrived in Rhodes to announce the decision of the senate, there was a great commotion there, and much disturbance in political circles on account of their statement that the Lycians had not been given them as a gift, but as allies. For they thought they had just put things in Lycia on a satisfactory footing, and now they saw the beginning of a further crop of troubles. For the Lycians, as soon as the Romans arrived at Rhodes and made this announcement, became again disaffected, and were ready to struggle hard for their autonomy and freedom. The Rhodians, however, when they had listened to their envoys, thinking that the Romans had been taken in by the Lycians, at once appointed Lycophron their envoy to enlighten the senate on the matter. Such then was the situation, the Lycians to all appearance being about to revolt again.

V. Affairs of Italy

(Cp. Livy XLI. 19.)

The senate on the arrival of the envoys from Rhodes heard their arguments and deferred their own answer.

A mission from the Dardanians now arrived, telling of the Bastarnae, their numbers, the huge size and the valour of their warriors, and also pointing out that Perseus and the Galatians were in league with this tribe. They said they were much more afraid of him than of the Bastarnae, and they begged for aid. Envoys from Thessaly also arrived confirming the statement of the Dardanians, and begging too for help. Upon this the senate decided to send some commissioners to inquire on the spot as to the veracity of these assertions, and at once appointed Aulus Postumius and some younger men.

THE END OF BOOK XXV

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXVI

I. AFFAIRS OF ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES

(From Athen. X. 439 A; cp. Livy XLI. 20.)

Polybius in his 26th Book calls him Epimanes (the Madman) instead of Epiphanes owing to his conduct. For not only did he condescend to converse with common people, but even with the meanest of the foreigners who visited Antioch. And whenever he heard that any of the younger men were at an entertainment, no matter where, he would come in with a fife and other music so that most of the guests got up and ran off in astonishment. He would often, moreover, doff his royal robe and pick up a toga and so make the circuit of the market-place.

(*Ibid*. v. 193 d.)

Antiochus surnamed Epiphanes gained the name of Epimanes by his conduct. Polybius tells us of him that, escaping from his attendants at court, he would often be seen wandering about in all parts of the city with one or two companions. He was chiefly found at the silversmiths' and goldsmiths' workshops, holding forth at length and discussing technical matters with the moulders and other craftsmen. He used also to condescend to converse with any common people he met, and used to drink in the company of the meanest foreign visitors to Antioch. Whenever he heard that any of the young men were at an entertainment, he would come in quite unceremoniously with a fife and a procession of musicians, so that most of the guests got up and left in astonishment. He would frequently put off his

royal robes, and, assuming a white toga, go round the market-place like a candidate, and, taking some by the hand and embracing others, would beg them to give him their vote, sometimes for the office of aedile and sometimes for that of tribune. Upon being elected, he would sit upon the ivory curule chair, as the Roman custom is, listening to the lawsuits tried there, and pronouncing judgement with great pains and display of interest. In consequence all respectable men were entirely puzzled about him, some looking upon him as a plain simple man and others as a madman. His conduct too was very similar as regards the presents he made. To some people he used to give gazelles' knucklebones, to others dates, and to others money. Occasionally he used to address people he had never seen before when he met them, and make them the most unexpected kind of presents. But in the sacrifices he furnished to cities and in the honours he paid to the gods he far surpassed all his predecessors, as we can tell from the temple of Olympian Zeus at Athens and the statues round the altar at Delos. He also used to bathe in the public baths, when they were full of common people, having jars of the most precious ointments brought in for him; and on one occasion when some one said to him, "How lucky you are, you kings, to use such scents and smell so sweet!" he answered nothing at the time, but next day, when the man was having his bath, he came in after him and had a huge jar of most precious ointment called *stacte* poured over his head, so that all the bathers jumped up and rolled themselves in it, and by slipping in it created great amusement, as did the king himself.

THE END OF BOOK XXVI

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXVII

I. THE WAR WITH PERSEUS

Events in Boeotia

(Cp. Livy XLII. 43. 4.)

At this time Lases and Calleas came as envoys from Thespiae and Ismenias on the part of Neon, [1] the former to put their city in the hands of the Romans, at the discretion of the legates. This was quite the contrary of what Marcius and the other legates wished, it suiting their purpose far better to keep the Boeotian cities apart. So that while they very gladly received Lases and made much of him, as well as of the envoys from Chaeronea and Lebadea, they exposed Ismenias to contempt, fighting shy of him and treating him with neglect. On one occasion some of the exiles attacked Ismenias, and came very near stoning him, but he took refuge under the porch of the Roman mission. At the same period there were quarrels and disturbances in Thebes, where one party maintained that they ought to surrender the city at discretion to the Romans; but the people of Coronea and Haliartus flocking to Thebes, still claimed a part in the direction of affairs, and said that they ought to remain faithful to their alliance with Perseus. For a time the rival views maintained an equilibrium; but upon Olympichus of Coronea being the first to change his attitude and to advise joining the Romans, the balance of popular opinion entirely shifted. They first of all compelled Dicetas to go as their envoy to Marcius and offer his excuses for their having allied themselves with Perseus. In the next place

they expelled Neon and Hippias, going in a crown to their houses and ordering them to go and defend their conduct of affairs, since it was they who had arranged the alliance. Upon Neon and Hippias giving way, they at once assembled in a formal meeting, and after in the first place voting honours to the Romans, ordered their magistrates to take steps to form the alliance; and, last of all, they appointed envoys to put the city in the hands of the Romans and bring back their own exiles.

[1] Possibly the son of Brachylles. He was a leader of the Macedonian party in Boeotia.

While these proceedings were taking place in Thebes, the exiles in Chalcis appointed Pompides as their representative to accuse Ismenias, Neon, and Dicetas. As the offence of all three was clearly proved, and the Romans lent their support to the exiles, Hippias and his friends were in the last stage of distress, and their lives even were in danger from the violence of the populace, until the Romans took some slight thought for their safety, and put restraint on the hostility of the mob. When the Thebans appeared, bearers of the decrees I mentioned announcing the honours conferred, the reaction in all matters was swift to spread, the cities lying all quite close to each other. Marcius and his colleagues on receiving the Thebans thanked the city, and advised them to bring home the exiles, ordering all the representatives of the towns to repair at once to Rome and separately announce the submission of each several city. When all fell out as they desired—their object being to break up the Boeotian League and damage the popularity of the House of Macedon—the legates, sending for Servius Cornelius Lentulus from Argos, left him at Chalcis and went on to the Peloponnesus, but after a few days Neon left for Macedonia. Ismenias and

Dicetas were now led off to prison and shortly afterwards took their own lives. Thus the Boeotian people after remaining for many years faithful to their League and after many marvellous escapes from various perils, now by rashly and inconsiderately espousing the cause of Perseus, and giving way to insensate and childish excitement were broken up and dispersed among their several cities.

Aulus Atilius and Quintus Marcius on arriving at Argos sat in council with the magistrates of the Achaean League. They asked Archon, the strategus, to dispatch a thousand soldiers to Chalcis to guard the city until the crossing of the Romans, and on his readily complying, these legates, after making the above arrangements in Greece during the winter, joined Publius Cornelius Lentulus and took ship for Rome.

The Rhodians support Rome

(Cp. Livy XLII. 45.)

At the same time the legates, Tiberius Claudius, Aulus Postumius, and Marcus Junius, visited the islands and the Asiatic cities, exhorting the people to take the part of Rome. They spent a good part of their time at other places, but most of it at Rhodes, although the Rhodians at that period had no need of such exhortation. For Hagesilochus, their prytanis, a man of much influence, who subsequently came as their envoy to Rome, had previously, when it became evident that the Romans were about to make war on Perseus, exhorted the people in general to make common cause with the Romans, and had advised the equipment of forty ships; so that, if circumstances required their help, they might not have to make preparations to meet the demand of the Romans, but, being in a state of readiness, might be able to act instantly in any way they decided. He now, by informing the

Romans of this and actually exhibiting his preparations, sent them off highly pleased with Rhodes. Having thus gratefully accepted the kind offices of Rhodes the envoys sailed back to Rome.

Perseus and Rhodes

(Cp. Livy XLII. 45.)

Perseus, after his conference with the Romans, sent identical letters to various Greek states, in which he drew up a statement of all questions of right, and quoted the arguments used on both sides, with the double purpose of making it appear that in point of right his position was superior, and of sounding the intentions of the several states. To other peoples he sent the letters in charge of the couriers alone; but to Rhodes he sent also Antenor and Philippus as envoys. On arriving there they delivered the letter to the magistrates, and after a few days appeared before the Rhodian senate and begged the Rhodians to remain for the present quiet spectators of what would happen; but, should the Romans attack Perseus and the Macedonians in violation of the treaty, they asked them to attempt to effect a reconciliation. This they said was in the interest of all; but the Rhodians were the most proper people to undertake the task. For the more they were the champions of equality and freedom of speech, and the constant protectors not only of their own liberty, but of that of the rest of Greece, the more they should do all in their power to provide and guard against the victory of principles contrary to these. When the envoys had spoken thus and further in the same sense what they said pleased everybody; but, prepossessed as the people were by their friendly feeling for Rome, better counsels prevailed, and while they gave a kind reception to the envoys in other respects they begged Perseus in their answer to request them to do

nothing which might seem to be in opposition to the wishes of the Romans. Antenor and Philippus did not therefore receive the answer they wished, but after thanking the Rhodians for their kindness in other respects sailed back to Macedonia.

Perseus and Boeotia

(Cp. Livy XLII. 46. 7.)

Perseus, on learning that some of the Boeotian cities were still favourably disposed to him, sent on an embassy there Antigonus, the son of Alexander. On arriving in Boeotia he left the other cities alone, as he found no pretext for making approaches; but visiting Coronea, Thisbae, and Haliartus, he begged the citizens to attach themselves to the Macedonian cause. His advances were readily received, and they voted to send envoys to Macedonia; upon which the Macedonian envoy took ship, and when he met the king reported to him how things stood in Boeotia. Shortly afterwards the envoys arrived, and begged the king to send help to the towns that had taken the side of Macedonia, as the Thebans were putting powerful pressure and inflicting annoyance on them, because they would not agree with them in supporting the Romans. Perseus, after listening to them, replied that it was quite impossible for him to send armed help to anyone owing to his truce with Rome, but he gave them the general advice to defend themselves against the Thebans as well as they could, but, rather than fight with the Romans, to remain quiet.

The Romans, when their legates returned from Asia, on hearing their report about Rhodes and the other towns, summoned the envoys of Perseus, Solon and Hippias. They made some attempt to discuss the general question and conciliate the Senate, but most of their speech was a defence of their

conduct in the matter of the alleged plot against Eumenes. When their attempted justification was over, the Senate, which had already decided on war, ordered them and all other Macedonian residents to quit Rome at once and Italy within the space of thirty days. After this they summoned the consuls, and urged them to take the matter in hand at once and not to lose time.

Attitude of Rhodes

(Cp. Livy XLII. 48. 8; lvi. 6.)

Gaius Lucretius, while still anchored off Cephallenia, wrote to the Rhodians asking them to dispatch ships, entrusting the letter to a certain Socrates, a gymnastic trainer. Upon the arrival of the letter in Rhodes at the time when Stratocles was prytanis for the second half-year, and upon the resolution being proposed, Agathagetus, Rhodophon, and Astymedes, and a good many others taking part in the war from the very beginning without any hesitation. Deinon, however, and Polyaratus, who were dissatisfied with the favour already shown to Rome, now, under shelter of a grievance against Eumenes in person, began to try to shake the resolve of the majority. For in the first place there had been at Rhodes a certain suspicion of Eumenes and hostility to him, ever since the war with Pharnaces, when, Eumenes having stationed his fleet at the mouth of the Hellespont to prevent the entrance of vessels bound for the Euxine, the Rhodians checked the king's project, and prevented him; and a short time ago this sore had been reopened on the question of Lycia, owing to a dispute concerning certain forts and a strip of territory situated on the borders of the Rhodian Peraea, and subject to constant damage on the part of the lieutenants of Eumenes. All this made the Rhodians ready to lend an ear to anything that

was said against the king; and now Deinon and the others, availing themselves of this prejudice, cast aspersions on the letter, saying that it did not come from the Romans but from Eumenes, who wished by any and every means to drag them into the war, and to impose unnecessary expense and suffering on the people. As a proof of their assertion they adduced the low station of the man who had arrived bearing the letter, the Romans not being in the habit of proceeding thus, but, as regards their communications on such matters, employing excessive care and ceremony. They said this, well knowing Lucretius to be the author of the letter, but for the purpose of persuading the people never to do things readily for the Romans, but always to make difficulties and give cause for offence and dissatisfaction. For their object was to alienate the people from their attachment to Rome, and, as far as was in their power, to induce them to contract friendship with Perseus. These men were adherents of Perseus owing to the fact that Polyaratus, who was a somewhat assuming and vain fellow, had burdened his property, while Deinon, who was avaricious and unscrupulous, had always been disposed to look to kings and princes for advancement. Upon this Stratocles the prytanis got up, and after saying many things against Perseus and in favour of the Romans, exhorted the people to ratify the decree relating to the dispatch of the vessels. Having at once fitted out six quadriremes, they sent off five for Chalcis under the command of Timagoras, and one to Tenedos commanded by Nicagoras. The latter, finding in Tenedos Diophanes the envoy of Perseus to Antiochus, failed to capture him, but captured his crew. Lucretius, after giving a kind reception to all the allies who had arrived by sea, relieved them of their service, saying that as things were no naval assistance was required.

Attitude of Rhodes

(Cp. Livy XLII. 58, 62.)

After the victory of the Macedonians Perseus held a conference in which some of his friends suggested to him that he should send an embassy to the Roman general, consenting still to pay the same tribute to Rome that his father on his defeat engaged to pay, and to evacuate the same places. For, they said, if they accepted these terms, the result of the war would be in favour of the king after his success in the field; and the Romans after their experience of the bravery of the Macedonians, would be more cautious about making unjust and severe demands upon Macedonia. But if they did not accept, out of vexation for what had happened, they would increase the just wrath of Heaven; while the king by his moderation would earn the support of gods and men alike. Such was the opinion of most of his friends; and, on Perseus agreeing, Pantauchus the son of Balacrus and Midon of Beroea were at once dispatched as envoys. Upon their arrival at the camp of Licinius, he at once called a council. When the envoys had explained themselves according to their instructions, the Romans requested Pantauchus and his colleague to withdraw, and consulted about the message. It was unanimously decided to give as severe a reply as possible, it being in all cases the traditional Roman custom to show themselves most imperious and severe in the season of defeat, and most lenient after success. That this is noble conduct every one will confess, but perhaps it is open to doubt if it is possible under certain circumstances. In the present case, then, their answer was as follows. They ordered Perseus to submit absolutely, giving the senate authority to decide as they saw fit about the affairs of Macedonia. The envoys, on receiving this answer, returned and reported it

to Perseus and his friends, some of whom, astonished at the pride of the Romans, chafed at it, and advised the king to send no further embassies or any other communications about anything whatever. Perseus, however, was by no means so disposed, but sent several times to Licinius, always offering a larger sum. But as he made no progress, and most of his friends found fault with him and told him, that now he was victorious, he was acting as if he were unsuccessful and indeed utterly defeated, he was obliged to give up these embassies, and to transfer his camp again to Sycyrium. Such was the situation there.

Position of Perseus in Greece

(Cp. Livy XLII. 63. 1.)

When after the Macedonian victory the news of the cavalry engagement was spread abroad in Greece, the attachment of the people to Perseus, which had been for the most part concealed, burst forth like fire. The state of their feelings was, I think, more or less as follows. The phenomenon was very like what happens in boxing contests at the games. For there, when a humble and much inferior combatant is matched against a celebrated and seemingly invincible athlete, the sympathy of the crowd is at once given to the inferior man. They cheer him on, and back him up enthusiastically; and if he manages to touch his opponent's face, and gets in a blow that leaves any mark, there is at once again the greatest excitement among them all. They sometimes even try to make fun of the other man, not out of any dislike for him or disapproval but from a curious sort of sympathy and a natural instinct to favour the weaker. If, however, one calls their attention at the right time to their error, they very soon change their minds and correct it. This was what Clitomachus did, as is told. He was considered to be a

quite invincible boxer, and his fames had spread over the whole world, when Ptolemy, ambitious to destroy his reputation, trained with the greatest care and sent off the boxer Aristonicus, a man who seemed to have a remarkable natural gift for this sport. Upon this Aristonicus arriving in Greece and challenging Clitomachus at Olympia, the crowd, it seems, at once took the part of the former and cheered him on, delighted to see that some one, once in a way at least, ventured to pit himself against Clitomachus. And when, as the fight continued, he appeared to be his adversary's match, and once or twice landed a telling blow, two great clapping of hands, and the crowd became delirious with excitement, cheering on Aristonicus. At this time they say that Cleitomachus, after withdrawing for a few moments to recover his breath, turned to the crowd and asked them what they meant by cheering on Aristonicus and backing him up all they could. Did they think he himself was not fighting fairly, or were they not aware that Cleitomachus was now fighting for the glory of Greece and Aristonicus for that of King Ptolemy? Would they prefer to see an Egyptian conquer the Greeks and win the Olympian crown, or to hear a Theban and Boeotian proclaimed by the herald as victor in the men's boxing-match? When Cleitomachus had spoken thus, they say there was such a change in the sentiment of the crowd that now all was reversed, and Aristonicus was beaten rather by the crowd than by Cleitomachus.

Very similar to this was the present feeling of the multitude towards Perseus. For if anyone had secured their attention, and asked them frankly if they really would wish to see the supreme power in so absolute a form fall into the hands of a single man and to experience the rule of an absolutely irresponsible monarch, I fancy they would very soon have come to their

senses and, changing their tune, have undergone a complete revulsion of feeling. And if one had reminded them even briefly of all the hardships that the house of Macedon had inflicted on Greece, and of all the benefits she had derived from Roman rule, I fancy the reaction would have been most sudden and complete. But now, when they gave way to their first unreflecting impulse, the delight of the people at the news was conspicuous, hailing, as they did, owing to the very strangeness of the fact, the appearance of some one at least who had proved himself a capable adversary of Rome. I have been led to speak of this matter at such length lest anyone, in ignorance of what is inherent in human nature, may unjustly reproach the Greeks with ingratitude for being in this state of mind at the time.

The Cestrus or Cestrosphendone

(Suid.; cp. Livy XLII. 65. 9.)

The so-called cestrus was a novel invention at the time of the war with Perseus. The form of the missile was as follows. It was two cubits long, the tube being of the same length as the point. Into the former was fitted a wooden shaft a span in length and a finger's breadth in thickness, and to the middle of this were firmly attached three quite short wing-shaped sticks. The thongs of the sling from which the missile was discharged were of unequal length, and it was so inserted into the loop between them that it was easily freed. There it remained fixed while the thongs were whirled round and taut, but when at the moment of discharge one of the thongs was loosened, it left the loop and was shot like a leaden bullet from the sling, and striking with great force inflicted severe injury on those who were hit by it.

Cotys, King of the Odrysae

(Suid.; cp. Livy XLII. 67. 3.)

Cotys was a man of striking appearance and remarkably skilled in warfare, and also in character he was not at all like a Thracian; for he was sober, and one noticed in him a certain gentleness and depth of sentiment distinctive of a gentleman.

II. Affairs of Egypt

Ptolemy, the Egyptian commander in Cyprus, was not at all like an Egyptian, but gifted with good sense and capacity. For having taken charge of the island when the king was still an infant, he applied himself diligently to the collection of revenue, and never gave away a penny to anybody, although the royal governors were frequent beggars, and he was bitterly abused for never opening his purse. Upon the king attaining his majority, he put together a considerable sum of money, and sent it off, so that the king and the members of the court now approved of his former close-fistedness and refusal to part with money.

III. The War with Perseus

At the time when Perseus had retired from the war with Rome, Antenor, the envoy sent by him to ransom the prisoners who were in the same ship with Diophanes, reached Rhodes, and public men there were in great doubt as to what course to take, Philophron and Theaedetus by no means wishing to involve themselves in such a negotiation, while Deinon and Polyaratus were in favour of it. Finally they made an arrangement with Perseus about ransoming the prisoners.

Epirot Statesman to Perseus

Cephalus, who now came from Epirus, had previously had relations with the royal house of Macedon, and was now forced by circumstances to take the part of Perseus. The reason for what happened was as follows. There was a certain Epirot called Charops, a man well principled in general and a friend of the Romans. At the time when Philip held the passes to Epirus, it was by his agency that the king had to abandon Epirus, and that Flamininus became master of it and worsted the Macedonians. He had a son named Machatas who had a son also named Charops. Upon the death of his father this Charops, while still a boy, was sent by his grandfather Charops with a retinue that befitted his rank to Rome to learn to speak and write Latin. The boy made many acquaintances, and returned home after a certain time. The elder Charops soon departed this life; and the young man, who was naturally ambitious and full of all kinds of cunning, became presumptuous and tried to thwart the leading men. At first no notice was taken of him, but Antinous and the others, his superiors in age and reputation, administered public affairs as they thought best. But when the war with Perseus broke out, the young man at once began to traduce these statesmen to the Romans, taking advantage of their former relations with the house of Macedon, and now by scrutinizing all their actions, and putting the worst interpretation on all they said or did, suppressing some things and adding others, he made out a plausible case against them. Cephalus, who was in general a wise and consistent man, had now also at this crisis adopted the very best attitude. For at first he had prayed to Heaven that there should be no war and no such decision of the issues; and now, during the course of the war, he desired to act justly by Rome according to the terms of their alliance, but beyond this neither to fall foul of the Romans by any unworthy action nor to be unduly

subservient to them. When Charops continued to be active in his accusations against Cephalus, and represented everything that occurred contrary to the wish of the Romans as the result of his deliberate malice, Cephalus at first made light of it, as he was not conscious of having acted in any way in a manner inimical to Rome; but when he saw that Hippolochus, Nicander, and Lochagus the Aetolians were arrested and carried to Rome after the cavalry action for no valid reason, and that credence was given to the false accusations brought against them by Lyciscus, who was pursuing in Aetolia the same course as Charops in Epirus; then foreseeing what would happen, he took thought for his own safety. He resolved, in consequence, to take any measures rather than allow himself to be arrested and sent to Rome without trial, owing to the false accusations of Charops. This is why, against his conviction, Cephalus found himself compelled to side with Perseus.

Attempt to seize the Consul

Theodotus and Philostratus in the opinion of all were guilty of a wicked and treacherous action. For learning that Aulus Hostilius the Roman consul was present in Epirus on his way to his army in Thessaly, and thinking that if they delivered him up to Perseus they would be giving the king a signal pledge of their fidelity and would inflict great present injury on the Romans, they wrote repeatedly to Perseus to hasten his arrival. The king wished to advance at once and join them; but as the Molotti had occupied the bridge over the river Aoüs, his design was checked, and he was forced in the first place to fight with this tribe. Hostilius, as it happened, had reached Phanata, and was staying there with Nestor the Cropian, which gave an excellent opportunity to his enemies; and, had not a mere chance

determined for the better, I do not think he could have escaped. But now, in some mysterious manner, Nestor divined what was brewing, and made him at once leave for Gitana by night. Renouncing, henceforth, his design of marching through Epirus, he took ship, and sailing to Anticyra started from there for Thessaly.

IV. Affairs of Asia

Pharnaces, King of Pontus

Pharnaces surpassed all previous kings in his contempt for laws.

Attalus and Eumenes

Attalus was wintering in Elatea, and well knowing that his brother Eumenes was exceedingly hurt by all the most brilliant distinctions conferred on him having been cancelled by a public decree of the Peloponnesians, but that he concealed from every one the state of his feelings, decided on sending a message to certain Achaeans with the object of procuring by his own action the restoration not only of his brother's statues but of the inscriptions in his honour. This he did with the conviction that he would thus not only be conferring a very great favour on his brother, but would give the Greeks by this action a signal proof of his brotherly love and nobility of sentiment.

The War between Ptolemy and Antiochus

Antiochus, seeing that at Alexandria preparations were being made for the war concerning Coele-Syria, sent Meleager as his envoy to Rome with orders to inform the Senate and protest that Ptolemy was entirely unjust in attacking him.

Possibly in all human affairs we should regulate all our actions by opportunity, for opportunity is more powerful than anything else; and this is

especially true in war, for there it is that the balance shifts most abruptly from one side to the other. Not to avail oneself of this is the greatest of mistakes.

Many men, it would seem, are desirous of doing what is good, but few have the courage to attempt it, and very few indeed of these who do attempt it fully accomplish their duty in every respect.

THE END OF BOOK XXVII

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXVIII

I. AFFAIRS OF ITALY

Embassies from Antiochus and Ptolemy

After the war concerning Coele-Syria between Antiochus and Ptolemy had already begun, envoys arrived at Rome, Meleager, Sosiphanes, and Heracleides on the part of Antiochus, and Timotheus and Damon on that of Ptolemy. At this time Antiochus was in possession of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia. For ever since the father of this King Antiochus had defeated Ptolemy's generals in the battle at the Panium, [1] all the above districts yielded obedience to the kings of Syria. Therefore Antiochus, thinking that possession by force of arms was the surest and best, was struggling to defend the country as one belonging to him, while Ptolemy, conceiving that the former Antiochus had unjustly profited by the orphanhood of his father to deprive him of the cities of Coele-Syria, was not disposed to abandon these places to Antiochus. Meleager and his colleagues came therefore with instructions to protest to the senate that Ptolemy in defiance of all right had taken up arms first; while Timotheus and Damon were instructed to renew kindly relations with Rome, and to make an end to the war with Perseus, but chiefly to watch the audiences given to Meleager. About terms of peace with Antiochus they did not venture to speak, acting on the advice of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus; but, after renewing relations of friendship and receiving a favourable answer to their requests, they returned to Alexandria. The senate replied to Meleager and his colleague that they would charge

Quintus Marcius to write about the matter to Ptolemy as he thought best on his own authority. This was the way that the matter was arranged for the present.

[1] See XVI.18.

Embassy from Rhodes

At this period towards the end of summer Hagesilochus, Nicagoras, and Nicander arrived as envoys from Rhodes to renew friendly relations and obtain permission to export corn and also to defend their town from the false accusations brought against it. For there was at this time acute civil discord in Rhodes, Agathagetus, Philophron, Rhodophon, and Theaedetus resting all their hopes on Rome while Deinon and Polyaratus relied on Perseus and Macedonia. The consequence was that there were frequent debates about their affairs; and, as the discussions were so prolonged, there was plenty of material for those who wished to vamp up accusations against the town. The senate, however, pretended now to be ignorant of all this, although well knowing the condition of affairs in Rhodes; but they gave them leave to export a hundred thousand medimni of corn from Sicily. The senate, after thus dealing separately with the Rhodian embassy, replied in similar terms to all the envoys from the rest of Greece, who confined themselves to the same subject. Such was the state of affairs in Italy.

II. The War with Perseus

Action of the Romans in Achaea, Aetolia, and Acarnania

(Cp. Livy XLIII. 17.)

Aulus Hostilius Mancinus the proconsul, who was at the time wintering in Thessaly, sent as legates to Greece Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius. They first came to Thebes, where they thanked the Thebans and urged them

to maintain their loyalty to Rome. After this, visiting the Peloponnesian cities, they attempted to convince the inhabitants of the leniency and kindness of the senate, quoting the recent decrees; and they also indicated in their speeches that they knew who were those in each city who withdrew from taking part in public affairs, as well as who were the active and zealous men. It was evident to all that they were just as much displeased with the former as with their open opponents; and in consequence they created a general state of anxiety and doubt as to how one ought to act or to speak so as to make oneself agreeable under present circumstances. It was said that, upon the Achaean Assembly meeting, Popilius and his colleague had decided to accuse Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius before it and prove that they were the opponents of the Roman party and were keeping quiet at present, not because they were naturally disposed to do so, but because they were watching the progress of events and waiting for a favourable opportunity to act. They did not, however, venture to do so, as they had no plausible pretext for attacking the above statesmen. So that when the Achaean senate met at Aegium they addressed a few words of cordial greeting to them and took ship for Aetolia.

Here again, upon the Aetolian Assembly meeting at Thermum they appeared before it and spoke in an encouraging and kind manner, the most important part of their speech being a request that the Aetolians should give them hostages. When they descended from the tribune, Proandrus rose and expressed a wish to refer to certain good offices that he had done the Romans and to denounce those who traduced him. Popilius now rose again, and, though he well knew that this man was ill-disposed to the Romans, still thanked him and concurred in all he had said. The next speaker to come

forward was Lyciscus, who accused no one by name but many by implication. For he said that the Romans had acted well in deporting the ringleaders (meaning Eupolemus and Nicander) to Rome; but that their supporters and abettors still remained in Aetolia, and should all meet with the same treatment, unless they gave up their children to the Romans as hostages. He laid particular stress on the cases of Archedamus and Pantaleon, and when he had left the tribune Pantaleon got up and, after a few reproachful words concerning Lyciscus, in which he said that his flattery of the ruling power was shameless and servile, went on to speak of Thoas who he considered was a man who had secured credence for the accusations he brought against Archedamus and himself owing to the fact that there was not supposed to be any quarrel between them. Reminding them of what had occurred during the war with Antiochus, and rebuking Thoas for his ingratitude, in that when he was given up to the Romans, he had been unexpectedly saved by the intervention of himself and Nicander as envoys, he soon incited the people not only to hoot down Thoas when he wished to speak, but to cast stones at him with one accord. When this happened Popilius, after briefly rebuking the people for stoning Thoas, at once left with his colleague for Acarnania, saying nothing further about the hostages; Aetolia remaining full of mutual suspicion and utter disorder.

In Acarnania, when their Assembly met at Thyreum, Aeschrion, Glaucus, and Chremas, who were of the Roman party, begged Popilius and his colleague to establish garrisons in Acarnania; for there were those among them who were falling away towards Perseus and Macedonia. Diogenes, however, gave contrary advice. He said that no garrison should be introduced into any city for that was the procedure in the case of peoples

who had been enemies of the Romans, and who had been subdued by them; but the Acarnanians had done no wrong, they did not in any way deserve to be forced to accept garrisons. Chremas and Glaucus, he said, were desirous of establishing their own power, and therefore falsely accused their political rivals, and wished to introduce a garrison which would lend its help to the execution of their ambitious projects. After these speeches the legates, seeing that the idea of garrisons was not acceptable to the populace, and wishing to act in accordance with the purpose of the senate, accepted the advice of Diogenes, and, after an expression of thanks, left for Larisa to rejoin the proconsul.

Policy of the Achaeans

The Greeks [2] (sic) thought that this embassy was worthy of attention. Associating therefore with themselves those who were in general sympathy with their policy, these being Arcesilaus and Ariston of Megalopolis, Stratius of Tritaea, Xenon of Patrae, and Apollonidas of Sicyon, they discussed the situation. Lycortas held to his original opinion, judging that they should neither give any active aid either to Perseus or to the Romans nor offer any opposition to either side. To render help to the Romans he considered disadvantageous to all the Greeks, as he foresaw how very strong the victors in the war would be, while he thought it dangerous to act against Rome, since at a previous period they had braved many of the most distinguished Romans about affairs of state. Apollonidas and Stratius did not think they should take any special action against Rome, but he said that those Achaeans who were ready to make the plunge, trying to ingratiate themselves personally with the Romans by their public action, in defiance of law and contrary to the public interest, should be prevented and boldly

confronted. Archon advised them to act as circumstances enjoined, and neither give their enemies any pretext for accusing them nor allow themselves to be reduced to the same state as Nicander, who, even before he experienced the weight of the Roman power, found himself in the utmost distress. Polybius, Arcesilaus, Ariston, and Xenon shared this opinion. It was therefore decided that Archon should at once proceed to take up his duties as strategus and Polybius as hipparch.

[2] The epitomator should have said "Lycortas, his party."

Just after this decision had been taken, and when it was clear that Archon was determined to act with the Romans and their friends, it happened by mere chance that Attalus addressed himself to this statesman who was quite ready to listen to him, and gladly promised to help him to obtain what he requested. When the envoys he had sent appeared at the first session of the Achaeans about the restitution of the honours conferred on Eumenes, begging them to do this as a favour to Attalus, it was not clear what view the people took; but many speakers got up to oppose the motion on various grounds. First of all the original authors of the revocation of the honours were anxious to get their opinion confirmed, while others who had special grievances against the king thought this a good opportunity of expressing their resentment, and some out of a mere grudge against his supporters did all in their power to defeat the project of Attalus. Archon rose to speak on behalf of the envoys, as the situation was such as to call for an expression of opinion by the strategus; but after quite a short speech he left as he was careful not to be thought to give advice for the sake of some personal gain, having spent a considerable sum of money during his term of office. Much hesitation now prevailed; and Polybius rose and spoke at some length, for

the most part in favour of the opinion of the majority, quoting the original decree of the Achaeans about the honours, in which it was written that the improper and illegal honours should be revoked, but not by any means all honours. But Sosigenes and Diopeithes he said, who were at that time judges, and had some private differences with Eumenes, availed themselves of this pretext to subvert all the honours conferred on the king, and had done this in defiance of the decree of the Achaeans and in excess of the authority given them, and, what was most important, in violation of justice and right. For the Achaeans had not decided to cancel the honours of Eumenes because had injured them in any way but, taking offence at his having demanded higher honours than his services merited, had voted to deprive him of those which were in excess. He said, therefore, that as the judges, setting their own enmity before the dignity of the Achaeans, had subverted all the honours; so the Achaeans should now, considering their own obligation and propriety of conduct to be the most important thing, correct the error of the judges, and in general the foolish treatment that Eumenes had met with; especially as they would not in doing so be granting this as a special favour to Eumenes, but to his brother Attalus. The people approved this speech, and a decree was made enjoining that all the honours conferred on King Eumenes should be restored, except those which either contained anything that did not become the Achaean League or anything illegal. It was in this manner and at this time that Attalus set right the foolish mistake that had been made regarding the honours conferred on his brother Eumenes in the Peloponnesus.

Negotiations of Perseus with Genthius

(Cp. Livy XLIII. 19. 12-20. 4.)

Perseus sent Pleuratus the Illyrian, who had taken refuge with him, and Adaeus of Beroea, as envoys to King Genthius, with instructions to announce to him what had happened in the war he was engaged in against the Romans and Dardanians, and for the present at least with the Epirots and Illyrians; and to solicit him to enter into an alliance with himself and the Macedonians. The envoys, crossing Mount Scardus, journeyed through the so-called Desert Illyria, which not many years previously had been depopulated by the Macedonians in order to make it difficult for the Dardanians to invade Illyria and Macedonia. Traversing this district, and enduring great hardships on the journey, they reached Scodra; and, learning that Genthius was staying in Lissus, sent a message to him. Genthius at once sent for them, and they conversed with him on the matters covered by their instructions. Genthius did not seem to be averse to making friendship with Perseus; but he excused himself from complying at once with their request on the ground of his want of resources and the impossibility of undertaking a war against Rome without money. Adaeus and his colleague, on receiving this answer, returned. Perseus, on arriving at Styberra, sold the booty, and rested his army waiting for the return of the envoys. Upon their arrival, after hearing the answer of Genthius, he once more dispatched Adaeus, accompanied by Glaucias, one of his bodyguard, and again by Pleuratus owing to his knowledge of the Illyrian language, with the same instructions as before, just as if Genthius had not expressly indicated what he was in need of, and what must be done before he would consent to the request. Upon their departure the king left with his army and marched towards Hyscana.

(Cp. Livy XLIII. 23. 8.)

At this time the envoys sent to Genthius returned, having achieved nothing more than on their first visit, and having nothing further to report; as Genthius maintained the same attitude, being ready to join Perseus, but saying that he stood in need of money. Perseus, paying little heed to them, now sent Hippias to establish a definite agreement, but omitted the all-important matter, saying that if he . . . he would make Genthius well disposed. One doubts if one should attribute such conduct to mere thoughtlessness or to bewitchment. I think it appears to have been bewitchment, when men who aspire to venture much and run the risk of their lives, neglect the all-important matter in their enterprises, although they clearly see it and have the power to do it. For had Perseus at that period been willing to advance money to whole states and individually to kings and statesmen—I do not say on a lavish scale, as his resources enabled him to do, but only in moderate amounts—no intelligent man I suppose would dispute that all the Greeks and all the kings, or at least the most of them, would have failed to withstand the temptation. Instead of taking that course, by which either, if completely victorious, he would have created a splendid empire, or, if defeated, would have exposed many to the same ruin as himself, he took the opposite one, owing to which quite a few of the Greeks went wrong in their calculations when the time for action came.

Perseus blames his General

(Cp. Livy XLIV. 7.)

Perseus, on his total defeat blamed Hippias for the invasion of Macedonia by the Romans. But to me it seems to be an easy thing to blame others and detect the faults of our neighbours, but the most difficult thing in

life to do all that is possible oneself and know one's situation: and in this Perseus failed.

The Testudo

(Cp. Livy XLIV. 7.)

Heracleium was taken in a peculiar manner. The town had a low wall of no great extent on one side, and to attack this the Romans employed three picked maniples. The men of the first held their shields over their heads, and closed up, so that, owing to the density of the bucklers, it became like a tiled roof. The other two in succession . . .

III. Affairs of Greece

Embassy of Polybius to the Consul

When Perseus had made up his mind to enter Thessaly with his army, and every one expected a decisive engagement, Archon resolved to rebut the suspicions and accusations of the Romans by positive action this time. He therefore introduced in the Achaean Assembly a decree enjoining that they should march to Thessaly in full force and unreservedly join the Romans. The decree having been passed, they further decreed that Archon should occupy himself with the collection of their forces and the preparations for the expedition, and they decided to send envoys to the consul in Thessaly conveying the purpose of their decree and asking when and where their army should join him. As envoys they at once appointed Polybius and others, and strictly enjoined Polybius, if the consul approved of the advent of the army, to send back his colleagues at once to inform them, so that they should not be behindhand; and meanwhile to look to it that the army might find markets in all the towns it passed through and that the men should be in no want of provisions. The envoys hereupon left with

those instructions. They also appointed Telocritus as their envoy to Attalus bearing the decree about the restitution of the honours of Eumenes; and when it reached their ears at the same time that the *Anacleteria*, the festival usually celebrated upon kings coming of age, had been celebrated in honour of King Ptolemy, thinking that they ought to notice the event, they voted to send envoys to him to renew the friendly relations which had existed between the League and the kingdom of Egypt, and at once nominated Alcithus and Pasiadas.

Polybius and his colleagues, on finding that the Romans had moved out of Thessaly and were encamped in Perrhaebia between Azorium and Doliche, deferred the interview owing to the critical state of affairs, but shared in the danger of the invasion of Macedonia. But when the Roman army had come down to the district of Heracleium, and they deemed it time for the interview, as the general seemed to have accomplished the chief part of his task, they at once, when they had an opportunity, presented the decree to Marcius, and informed him of the determination of the Achaeans to send their total force to share with him in the struggles and dangers of the war. In addition they pointed out to him that all communications and commands which had reached the Achaeans from the Romans during the present war had been duly complied with. Marcius, while highly gratified by the proposal of the Achaeans, relieved them of the suffering and expense, as under present circumstances he was in no want of the assistance of the allies. Hereupon the other envoys returned to Achaea; but Polybius remained and assisted in the campaign, until Marcius, on hearing that Appius Cento was asking the Achaeans to send him five thousand men to Epirus, dispatched Polybius, begging him to see that the soldiers were not

given and no such useless outlay inflicted on the Achaeans, as Appius had no sound reason for such a demand. It is difficult to say whether he acted thus out of regard for the Achaeans, or from the wish to keep Appius idle. Polybius, in any case, returned to Peloponnesus, and finding that letter from Epirus had already arrived, and that shortly afterwards the Achaean Assembly had met at Sicyon, was faced by a most difficult problem. For when a resolution was moved about Cento's demand for troops, he thought it by no means proper to reveal the private instructions that Marcius had given him; while on the other hand to oppose openly the project of sending assistance was an exceedingly hazardous course to take. In this difficult and complicated situation he called to his help for the present the senatus-consultum which enjoined that no one should attend to requests made by commanders, unless they were acting by a decree of the senate, there being no addition to this effect in the letter. He managed therefore to have the matter referred to the consul, and through the intervention of the latter, to relieve the League of this expense, which amounted to more than a hundred and twenty full talents. But he furnished those who wished to accuse him to Appius with a good pretext in having thus put a stop to his plan of procuring assistance.

Affairs in Crete

The people of Cydonia at this time committed a shocking act of treachery universally condemned. For although many such things have happened in Crete, what was done then was thought to surpass all other instances of their habitual ferocity. For while they were not only friends with the Apolloniats, but united with them in one community, and shared with them in general all the rights observed by men, there being a sworn

treaty to this effect deposited in the temple of Idaean Zeus, they treacherously seized on the city, killing the men, laying violent hands on all property, and dividing among themselves and keeping the women and children, and the city with its territory.

In Crete the people of Cydonia, standing in fear of the Gortynians, because in the previous year they had very nearly run the risk of losing their city owing to the attempt on the part of Nothocrates to seize it, now sent envoys to Eumenes, asking for help according to the terms of their alliance. The king, appointing Leon to command a force of three hundred men, dispatched them at once. Upon their arrival the Cydoniats gave up the keys of the gates to Leon and placed their city entirely in his hands.

Affairs of Rhodes

In Rhodes the spirit of faction was growing ever more violent. For when they heard of the senatus-consultum, in which they were instructed to pay no further attention to the orders of Roman generals, but only to the decrees of the senate itself, and when the majority approved of this wise action of the senate, Philophron and Theaedetus seized on this pretext to pursue their policy, saying that envoys should be sent to the senate, to Quintus Marcius Philippus, the consul, and to Gaius Marcius Figulus the commander of the fleet; for by this time it was already known which of the designated magistrates in Rome would be coming to Grecian parts. The proposal was applauded, although there was some opposition; and at the beginning of summer there were sent to Rome three envoys, Hagesilochus the son of Hagesias, Nicagoras, and Nicander, and to the consul and the commander of the fleet three others, Hagepolis, Ariston, and Pasicrates, with instructions to renew kindly relations with Rome and to defend Rhodes from the charges

brought by some against her, Hagesilochus and his colleagues being also charged to obtain permission to export corn from other parts. I have already reported in the section dealing with Italian affairs their speech to the senate, and the answer they received from it; and how after the kindest possible reception they returned. As regards this matter it serves some purpose to remind my readers frequently, as indeed I attempt to do, that I am often compelled to report the interviews and proceedings of embassies before announcing the circumstances of their appointment and dispatch. For as, in narrating in their proper order the events of each year, I attempt to comprise under a separate heading the events that happened in each country in that year, it is evident that this must sometimes occur in my work.

Hagepolis and his colleagues, on reaching Quintus Marcellus, whom they found encamped in Macedonia near Heracleium, addressed him according to their instructions. After hearing what they said, he replied that not only did he not pay any attention to such accusations, but he would beg them also not to listen to anybody who ventured to speak against Rome; and in addition to this he used many kind phrases, writing in the same terms to the people of Rhodes. The whole tenor of his reply charmed and touched Hagepolis profoundly; and afterwards Marcius, taking him aside, said he wondered why the Rhodians made no attempt to put an end to the present war between Antiochus and Ptolemy, as it was their business to do so if anyone's. Now it is a question whether he did this because he was apprehensive lest Antiochus should conquer Alexandria, and they should find in him a new and formidable adversary—for the war about Coele-Syria was already in progress—supposing that the war with Perseus lasted long; or whether, seeing that this latter war was on the brink of being decided, as

the Roman legions were already encamped in Macedonia, and hoping for a favourable issue, he wished to stimulate the Rhodians to try to mediate in the war, and by this action to give the Romans a plausible pretext for treating them in any way they thought fit. It is not easy to say definitely which was his reason, but I am induced to think it was the latter, judging from what soon afterwards happened to Rhodes. But Hagepolis and his colleagues at once proceeded to meet Gaius Marcius, and, having met with a reception even more markedly kind than that given them by Quintus Marcius, delivered an account of their mission, in which it appeared that both the commanders had vied with each other in the kindness of their language and the favourableness of their replies, the expectations of all the Rhodians were raised to a high pitch; of all, I say, but not in the same manner. For those whose views were sound were highly pleased at the kindness of the Romans; but the agitators and malignants reckoned among themselves that this excessive kindness was a sign that the Romans were afraid of the dangers that encompassed them, and that things were not going with them as well as they had expected. And when Hagepolis happened to mention confidentially to some of his friends that he had received private instructions from Marcius to suggest to the Rhodian senate the wisdom of bringing the war (in Syria) to an end, then Deinon and his party definitely concluded that the Romans were in extreme danger. The Rhodians now sent an embassy to Alexandria for the purpose of putting an end to this war between Antioch and Ptolemy.

IV. The War between Antiochus IV and Ptolemy Philometor

King Antiochus was both energetic, daring in design, and worthy of the royal dignity, except as regards his management of the campaign near

Pelusium.

After Antiochus had partially occupied Egypt Comanus and Cineas sitting in council with King Ptolemy decided to draw up a list of councillors from the most distinguished captains, who should consider the situation. The first decision of this council was to send the Greek envoys then present at Alexandria to Antiochus to negotiate for peace. There were then present two missions from the Achaeans, one consisting of Alcithus of Aegium, son of Xenophon, and Pasiadas, which had come to renew friendly relations, and another on the subject of the games held in honour of Antigonus Doson. There was also an embassy from Athens headed by Demaratus about a present, and there were two sacred missions, one headed by Callias the pancratiast on the subject of the Panathenaean games, and another, the manager and spokesman of which was Cleostratus, about the mysteries. Eudemus and Hicesius had come from Miletus, and Apollonides and Apollonius from Clazomenae. King Ptolemy also sent to represent him Tlepolemus and Ptolemaeus the rhetorician. These all sailed up the river to meet Antiochus.

At the time when Antiochus occupied Egypt, those of the envoys from Greece who were sent to make peace joined him. Giving them a kind reception he entertained them splendidly on the first occasion of his meeting them, and on the second granted them an audience, and bade them tell him what their instructions were. The first to speak were the envoys from Achaea, the next was Demaratus from Athens, and after him Eudemus of Miletus. As they all spoke in allusion to the same circumstances and on the same subject, the particulars of all the speeches were very similar. They all ascribed the fault for what had happened to Eulaeus, and, pleading

Ptolemy's kinship with the king and his youth, attempted to appease the wrath of Antiochus. The king accepted all these pleas, even attaching greater weight to them than they did, but began to speak about his original rights, attempting to convince them that the district of Coele-Syria was the property of the kings of Syria, and mentioning the grant made to Seleucus by the kings of Macedonia after the death of Antigonus. Further he rested his case on the occupation of the country by his father Antiochus after a war; and finally denied the existence of the agreement stated by those in Alexandria to have been made between his father and the Ptolemy recently deceased, by which the latter should receive Coele-Syria as a dowry when he married Cleopatra, the mother of the present king. After speaking in this sense, and convincing not only himself but his auditors that he was right, he crossed to Naucratis. After showing kindness to the people there, and making a present of a gold stater to each of the Greek residents, he advanced towards Alexandria. He promised to reply to the envoys when Aristeides and Theris had returned to him. He said he had dispatched them to Ptolemy, and he wished the envoys from Greece to be cognisant and witnesses of everything.

Eulaeus the eunuch persuaded Ptolemy to take all his money with him, abandon his kingdom to the enemy, and retire to Samothrace. Who, reflecting on this, would not acknowledge that evil company does the greatest possible harm to men? For a prince, standing in no immediate danger and so far removed from his enemies, not to take any steps to fulfil his duty, especially as he commanded such great resources, and ruled over so great a country and so vast a population, but to yield up at once without a single effort such a splendid and prosperous kingdom, can only be

described as the act of one whose mind is effeminate and utterly corrupted. Had Ptolemy been such a man by nature, we should have put the blame on nature and not accused anyone but himself. But since by his subsequent actions, nature defended herself by showing Ptolemy to have been a man who was fairly steadfast and brave when in danger, it is evident that with should attribute to the eunuch and association with him his cowardice on this occasion and his haste to retire to Samothrace.

Antiochus, after abandoning the siege of Alexandria, sent envoys to Rome. Their names were Meleager, Sosiphanes, and Heraclides. He had collected a hundred and fifty talents, fifty for a present to the Romans and the rest for gifts to some of the Greek cities.

During these days Praxon and others arrived at Alexandria from Rhodes, charged to attempt to make peace, and soon after proceeded to the camp of Antiochus. At his audience he spoke at length, alleging the friendly feeling of his own country to both the kingdoms, the family ties which united both kings and the interest that both had in coming to terms. The king interrupted the envoy in his speech, telling him that there was no need of many words; for the kingdom belonged to the other Ptolemy, with whom he had long ago come to terms, and who was his friend. And, as the Alexandrians now wished to recall him, Antiochus would not prevent it. And in fact he acted so.

THE END OF BOOK XXVIII

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXIX

I. AFFAIRS OF ITALY

Speech of Aemilius Paullus

For Aemilius said that the sole occupation of some people, whether at social gatherings or in their conversation when walking, was to sit quietly at Rome while they directed the war in Macedonia, sometimes finding fault with what the commanders did and at others dilating on all they had left undone, all which was never of any benefit to the public interest, but had frequently and in many respects been most injurious to it. And the commanders too are at times much injured by inopportune prating. For as all slander has something sharp and provocative in it, when the minds of the people become prejudiced against them owing to this constant chatter, our enemies come to despise them.

Dispatch of Legates to Antiochus by the Senate

The senate, when they heard that Antiochus had become master of Egypt and very nearly of Alexandria itself, thinking that the aggrandizement of this king concerned them in a measure, dispatched Gaius Popilius as their legate to bring the war to an end, and to observe what the exact position of affairs was. Such was the situation in Italy.

II. The War with Perseus

Genthius joins Perseus

(Cp. Livy XLIV. 23.)

On the return before winter of Hippias, who had been sent by Perseus to Genthius to treat for an alliance, and on his reporting that that prince was ready to enter upon war with Rome if he received three hundred talents and proper sureties all round, Perseus, on hearing this, in the belief that the co-operation of Genthius was an urgent necessity, appointed Pantauchus, one of his "first friends," his envoy, and dispatched him with instructions to consent in the first place to give the money, and then to exchange oaths of alliance. In the next place Genthius was to send at once such hostages as Pantauchus chose, while he was to receive from Perseus such hostages as he should name in writing. Finally Pantauchus was to make arrangements for the conveyance of the three hundred talents. The envoys started at once, and, on arriving at Meteon in Labeatis where he met Genthius, very soon induced the young man to throw in his fortunes with Perseus. After the oaths of alliance had been taken and the terms put in writing, Genthius at once sent off the hostages of whom Pantauchus gave him a list, and in company with them Olympion to receive the oath and the hostages from Perseus, sending at the same time others to take charge of the money. In addition to what I have stated, Pantauchus persuaded Genthius to send back with him envoys of his own who should join the mission that Perseus was sending to Rhodes to secure the alliance of that state with both of them. For if this was done and the Rhodians too embarked on the war, he assured him it would be quite easy to overcome the Romans. Genthius was persuaded to act as requested, and, naming Parmenion and Morcus his envoys, dispatched them, instructing them, as soon as Perseus had taken the oath, and an agreement was come to about the money, to proceed to Rhodes.

All these persons now went on their way to Macedonia, while Pantauchus remaining behind beside the young man kept on reminding him and urging him not to be behindhand in his preparations, but to get all ready, and secure in due time places, towns, and allies. He particularly requested him to prepare for war by sea, since, the Romans being quite unprepared in this respect on the coasts of Epirus and Illyria, he would with very little trouble in person and through his officers be able to carry out any maritime project he wished. Genthius, then, convinced by those arguments, was occupied in preparing himself by land and sea. Perseus, on the arrival in Macedonia of the envoys Genthius and the hostages, starting from his camp near the river Elpeius with all his cavalry, went to meet them all at Dium and on doing so took the oath of alliance in the presence of all the cavalry; for have particularly wished that the Macedonians should be aware of the co-operation of Genthius, thinking that the addition of this force to the scale would increase their confidence. He next received the hostages, and handed over his own to Olympion. The most distinguished of these latter were Limnaeus the son of Polemocrates and Balacrus the son of Pantauchus. Perseus next sent those who had come to get the money to Pella where they would receive it, and the envoys for Rhodes he sent to Thessalonica to meet Metrodorus, ordering them to be in readiness to embark. He succeeded in inducing the Rhodians to join in the war. After accomplishing this he sent as envoy to Eumenes Herophon, who had already served in that capacity, urging him not to neglect this opportunity, nor think that the arrogance and oppression of the Romans were confined to himself, but to recognize clearly that if he did not at present also come to

his assistance, either, as was best, by putting an end to the war, or, if not, by helping in it, he would soon experience the same fate.

Intrigues of Perseus and Eumenes

(Cp. Livy XLIV. 24. 9.)

About this I was quite at a loss what to do. For to write in detail and with precision about matters which the kings managed between themselves and secretly, seemed to me to be open to criticism and exceedingly hazardous; but to pass over in complete silence matters which seem to have had more practical effect than any others in the war, matters which enable us to detect the causes of much that was afterwards difficult to explain, appeared to me to be decidedly indicative of indolence and entire lack of enterprise. However, I persuaded myself to state in a summary fashion my own opinion and the indications and probabilities which led me to form this opinion, living as I did at the time and having been more impressed by everything that happened than anyone else.

I have already stated that Cydas the Cretan, who was serving under Eumenes and held in especial honour by him, first of all came to Amphipolis and communicated with Cheimarus a Cretan soldier in the service of Perseus, and on a second occasion at Demetrias actually came up to the walk, and held converse first with Menecrates and afterwards with Antimachus. And again that Herophon was twice sent by Perseus on a mission to Eumenes, and that in consequence of this, most of the Romans had a not unfounded suspicion of King Eumenes, is clear from their treatment of Attalus. For they allowed the latter to come to Rome from Brundisium and address the senate on any subject he chose, and at last sent him back after replying courteously to him, although he had not given any

great assistance either previously or in the war with Perseus; but as for Eumenes, who had been of the greatest service to them and given them the greatest assistance in their wars against Antiochus and Perseus, they not only prevented him from coming up to Rome, but ordered him, though it was in the middle of winter, to leave Italy in a given number of days. From all this it is obvious that there had been some approaches made to Eumenes by Perseus, which caused this marked estrangement on the part of the Romans. As to what these were and how far they went it is open for us to inquire. It is quite easy to see that Eumenes would not have wished Perseus to win the war and become absolute master of Greece. For, apart from their inherited dislike and hostility, the fact that they ruled over subjects of the same nation was sufficient to create between them distrust and jealousy and in general the strongest antipathy. The only object they could have had, then, was to deceive and trick each other by secret intrigues, and this is what they both were doing. For as he saw that Perseus was in an evil case, hemmed in on all sides, and ready to accept any terms in order to get peace, each year sending messages to the Roman commanders for this purpose; as the Romans likewise were in extreme difficulties, having up to the campaign of Aemilius Paullus made no progress in the war; and as the Aetolians were in a state of unrest: Eumenes thought it was by no means impossible that the Romans would consent to bring the war to a conclusion and make peace; and he considered that he himself was the person best fitted to mediate in the matter and reconcile the two adversaries. Making these reflections to himself he had in the previous year sounded Perseus through Cydas the Cretan as to how much he was willing to pay for the hope of his services. This, I think, was the beginning of their overtures to

each other; and as it was a match between two princes, one of whom had the reputation of being most unprincipled and the other most avaricious, the contest proved very ridiculous. For Eumenes on the one hand was holding out all kinds of hopes to Perseus and tempting him with every variety of bait, feeling sure he would catch him by his promises; while Perseus from a distance pretended to rush at these offers and to be coming to an agreement, but could never persuade himself to swallow any of the baits to the extent of making a sacrifice of money. The kind of tussle between the two was as follows. Eumenes asked five hundred talents for keeping quiet in the fourth year of the war and not supporting the Romans either by sea or by land, and fifteen hundred talents for putting an end to the war. For either of the two he promised to give at once hostages and security. Perseus was ready to receive the hostages, and arranged how many they should be, when they should be sent and how they were to be kept in charge by the people of Cnosus. As for the money, he said regarding the five hundred talents that it was disgraceful for the giver and still more so for the receiver to be thought to be hired to keep neutral; but he said he would send Polemocrates to Samothrace with the fifteen hundred talents and then mediate there, Samothrace being part of his own dominions. But Eumenes who, like bad physicians, was more concerned about his retaining fee than about his final fee, renounced his efforts, having found it beyond his power to get the better by his own cunning of the meanness of Perseus; and so, neither of them winning the prize for avarice, they made a drawn match of it like two good wrestlers. Some of these facts leaked out at the time and others shortly afterwards to the intimate friends of Perseus, from whom I learnt enough to convince me that avarice is, as it were, the tuning-peg of every vice.

I ask myself further on my own part: Does not avarice make fools of us? For who can help observing the folly of both kings? How could Eumenes expect, in view of the extremely distant terms they were on, to be trusted and to receive such a large sum of money, unable as he was to give Perseus any proper security for its return if he failed to fulfil his promises? And how did he think he could receive such a sum without the Romans finding it out? For if not at once, they would have done so later. So that, in return for the money given him, he was sure to have to reckon on a quarrel with Rome, which would result in the loss not only of the money he had received but of his kingdom and perhaps his life, once he was the declared enemy of Rome. For if now, when he had not done anything but merely had thought of it, he incurred such extreme danger, what was the treatment he would have deserved had he succeeded in carrying out the foregoing design! As to Perseus again, every one must wonder why he did not think it the most advantageous thing for himself and most in his interest to give the money and let Eumenes swallow the bait. For if Eumenes had helped him as he promised, and put an end to the war, the gift would have been worth his while; but if he had been deceived in this hope, he would certainly at least have involved Eumenes in enmity with Rome, it being in his power to make the transaction public. And it is easy to see, when we think of it, how valuable this would have been to Perseus, whether he were successful in the war or the reverse. For he considered Eumenes to have been the cause of all his misfortunes, and he could not have taken more effectual vengeance on him than by making him the enemy of Rome. What, then, was the reason of this evident folly on both sides? Avarice: what else could we say? For the one prince, to receive a gift which dishonoured him, neglect all other

considerations, and undertook to do any dirty service; while the other, to save giving it, was ready to suffer any disaster and shut his eyes to all consequences. Perseus behaved in the same way towards the Galatians and towards Genthius. . . .

Conduct of the Rhodians

When the question was put to the vote in Rhodes the majority was in favour of sending the envoys to try to make peace. The debate had decided the relative strength of parties in Rhodes in favour of the one which sided with Perseus and against those who were anxious to preserve their country and their laws. The prytaneis hereupon at once appointed envoys to bring the war to an end, sending to Rome Hagepolis, Diocles, and Clinombrotus and to the Roman commander and to Perseus, Damon, Nicostratus, Hagesilochus, and Telephus. Their subsequent proceedings were in accord with this, and even more offensive, making their fault inexcusable. For they at once sent envoys to Crete to renew friendly relations with the Cretans in general, and to beg them to consider the circumstances and the danger they were in, and to ally themselves with the Rhodian people and have the same enemies and friends. They were also charged to speak to the several cities in the same sense.

(Cp. Livy XLIV. 29. 6.)

When Parmenion and Morcus the envoys of Genthius, accompanied by Metrodorus, reached Rhodes, and the Rhodian senate met, the sitting was a very stormy one, Deinon and Polyaratus now venturing to speak openly in favour of Perseus, and Theaedetus and his friends being dismayed at what was happening. For the presence of the Illyrian galleys, the large losses of the Roman cavalry, and Genthius's change of attitude weighed on their

spirits. So that the sitting ended very much as the one described above had done. For the Rhodians decreed to give a courteous reply to both kings, and inform them that they had resolved to bring about peace and begged them also to be disposed to come to terms. They also entertained the envoys of Genthius very courteously at the public hearth or Prytaneum.

Digression on Method of Writing History

Other writers again have . . . about the war in Syria. The reason of this I have frequently explained. For when dealing with a subject which is simple and uniform they wish to be thought historians not because of what they accomplish, but because of the multitude of their books, and to make such an impression as I have described, they are compelled to magnify small matters, to touch up and elaborate brief statements of fact and to convert quite incidental occurrences of no moment into momentous events and actions, describing engagements and pitched battles in which the infantry losses were at times ten men or it may be a few more and the cavalry losses still fewer. As for sieges, descriptions of places, and such matters, it would be hard to describe adequately how they work them up for lack of real matter. But writers of universal history act in just the opposite manner. I should not therefore be condemned for slurring over events, when I sometimes omit and sometimes briefly report things to which others have devoted much space and elaborate descriptions; but I should rather be credited with treating each event on a proper scale. For those authors, when in the course of their work they describe, for instance, the sieges of Phanotea, Coronea, and Haliartus, find it necessary to place before their readers all the devices, all the daring strokes, and in addition to this describe at length the capture of Tarentum, the sieges of Corinth, Sardis, Gaza,

Bactra, and above all Carthage, adding inventions of their own; and they by no means approve of me, when I simply give a true and unvarnished account of such matters. The same remarks apply to descriptions of battles, the reports speeches, and the other parts of history. In all these—I include also subsequent portions of my work—I may be justly pardoned if I am found to be using the same style, or the same disposition and treatment, or even actually the same words as on a previous occasion; or again should I happen to be mistaken in the names of mountains and rivers or in my statements about the characteristics of places. For in all such matters the large scale of my work is a sufficient excuse. It is only if I am found guilty of deliberate mendacity or if it be for the sake of some profit, that I do not ask to be excused, as I have already stated several times in the course of this work when speaking on this subject.

Genthius of Illyria

(From Athenaeus X. 440 A; cp. Livy XLIV. 30. 2.)

In his 29th Book Polybius also states that Genthius, King of Illyria, owing to his intemperate habits, was guilty of many licentious acts, being constantly drunk night and day. Having put to death his brother Plator, who was about to marry the daughter of Monunius, he married the girl himself, and he treated his subjects with great cruelty.

The Campaigns against Perseus

(From Plutarch's *Life of Aemilius*, 15.)

The first of the officers present who volunteered to lead the force that went to turn the enemy's flank was Scipio Nasica, the son-in-law of Africanus and afterwards very powerful in the senate, and next Fabius Maximus, the eldest son of Aemilius, who was still quite a young man, got

up and proffered his services. This pleased Aemilius, who gave them not so many soldiers as Polybius says but as many as Nasica himself says in writing to one of the kings about this exploit.

(Suid.; cp. Livy XLIV. 35. 19.)

The Romans offered a strong resistance by the aid of their targets and Ligurian shields.

(From Plutarch, *Life of Aemilius Paullus*, 16.)

Perseus saw Aemilius remaining on his ground, and had no suspicion of the truth, when a Cretan deserter, who had abandoned the Romans on the line of march, informed him of their turning movement. The king was much disturbed; but, without moving his army, placed ten thousand foreign mercenaries and two thousand Macedonians under the command of Milo and sent him off with orders to make haste and occupy the heights. Polybius tells us that Romans surprised this force while still asleep, but Nasica affirms that there was a sharp struggle on the heights.

(Suid.; cp. Plutarch, *Aem*. 16.)

When there was an eclipse of the moon in the time of Perseus of Macedonia, the report gained popular credence that it portended the eclipse of a king. This, while it lent fresh courage to the Romans, discouraged the Macedonians. So true is the saying that "there are many empty things in war."

(Suid.; cp. Livy XLIV. 41. 1.)

Aemilius the consul, who had never seen a phalanx until this occasion in the war with Perseus, often confessed afterwards to certain persons in Rome that he had never seen anything more terrible and dreadful than a

Macedonian phalanx, and this although he had witnessed and directed as many battles as any man.

(Cp. Livy XLIV. 41. 4.)

Many inventions seem to be plausible and likely to succeed when described; but when put to the test of experience, like false coins exposed to the fire, no longer answer to our first conception of them.

(Suid.; cp. Livy XLIV. 42. 1.)

Perseus' one determination had been to conquer or to die; but his courage now gave way and he turned rein and fled as cavalry vedettes do.

(Suid.; cp. Livy, *ibid*.)

The courage of Perseus was exhausted by toil and time like that of athletes in bad condition. For when the danger approached, and it was his duty to fight a decisive battle, his courage broke down.

(From Plutarch, Aemilius Paullus, 19.)

The Macedonian king, as Polybius tells us, at the very beginning of the battle turned rein and rode off to the town, pretending that he was going to sacrifice to Heracles, a god who neither accepts the craven offerings of cowards, nor fulfils unlawful prayers.

(Cp. Livy XLV. 3. 3.)

At the time when Perseus was beaten and ran away, the senate decided to summon the envoys from Rhodes, who had come with the object of bringing the war with Perseus to an end: Fortune, as if of set purpose, bringing on the stage the folly of the Rhodians—if indeed we should say that of the Rhodians, and not rather that of the men who had then come to the surface at Rhodes. Agepolis and his colleagues, on entering, said they had come to bring the war to an end; for that the people of Rhodes, when

they saw that the war still continued to drag on, and observed that it was unprofitable to all the Greeks and to the Romans themselves owing to its great expense, had decided on this step; but now that war had terminated in the way that the Rhodians had wished, they congratulated the Romans. Having said this very briefly they departed. But the senate, availing itself of this opportunity and wishing to make and example of the Rhodians, issued an answer, the main tenour of which was that they did not believe that the Rhodians had sent the embassy on behalf of the Greeks or of themselves, but on behalf of Perseus. For if the embassy were on behalf of the Greeks, it would have been a more suitable time to send it then when Perseus was encamped for nearly two years in Thessaly, and was devastating the land and cities of Greece; but from their having neglected to come at that time, and coming now when the Roman legions were encamped in Macedonia, when Perseus was surrounded and had scarcely any hope of escape, it was obvious to anyone who judged correctly that they had sent their embassies with no wish to bring the war to a close, but desiring, as far as lay in their power, to rescue and save Perseus. For this reason, they said, the present was no moment for doing them favours of returning them a courteous answer. Such were the proceedings in the senate regarding the Rhodian envoys.

Speech of Aemilius Paullus

(Cp. Livy XLV. 7. 4.)

Aemilius, now speaking in Latin, exhorted those present at the council to learn from what they now witnessed—showing them Perseus who was present—never to boast unduly of achievements and never be overbearing and merciless in their conduct to anyone, in fact never place any reliance on

present prosperity. "It is chiefly," he said, "at those moments when we ourselves or our country are most successful that we should reflect on the opposite extremity of fortune; for only thus, and then with difficulty, shall we prove moderate in the season of prosperity. The difference," he said, "between foolish and wise men lies in this, that the former are schooled by their own misfortunes and the latter by those of others."

Reflections of the Fall of Perseus

(Cp. Livy XLV. 9. 2.)

So then often and bitterly did Perseus [1] call to mind the words of Demetrius of Phalerum. For he, in his treatise on Fortune, wishing to give men a striking instance of her mutability asks them to remember the times when Alexander overthrew the Persian empire, and speaks as follows: "For if you consider not countless years or many generations, but merely these last fifty years, you will read in them the cruelty of Fortune. I ask you, do you think that fifty years ago either the Persians and the Persian king or the Macedonians and the king of Macedon, if some god had foretold the future to them, would ever have believed that at the time when we live, the very name of the Persians would have perished utterly—the Persians who were masters of almost the whole world—and that the Macedonians, whose name was formerly almost unknown, would now be the lords of it all? But nevertheless this Fortune, who never compacts with life, who always defeats our reckoning by some novel stroke; she who ever demonstrates her power by foiling our expectations, now also, as it seems to me, makes it clear to all men, by endowing the Macedonians with the whole wealth of Persia, that she has but lent them these blessings until she decides to deal differently with them." And this now happened in the time of Perseus.

Surely Demetrius, as if by the mouth of some god, uttered these prophetic words. And I, as I wrote and reflected on the time when the Macedonian monarchy perished, did not think it right to pass over the event without comment, as it was one I witnessed with my own eyes; but I considered it was for me also to say something befitting such an occasion, and recall the words of Demetrius. This utterance of his seems to me to have been more divine than that of a mere man. For nearly a hundred and fifty years ago he uttered the truth about what was to happen afterwards.

[1] The subject of the sentence, as given by the epitomator, seems to be Perseus, although the reflection is essentially Polybius's own.

III. Affairs of Pergamus

Eumenes, King of Pergamus, after the battle between Perseus and the Romans was over, found himself, as most people say, strangely circumstanced; but, considering the nature of human affairs, it was nothing out of the way. For Fortune is quite capable of dashing reasonable explanations by unexpected blows; and, if she ever helps anyone and throws her weight in the balance, she will again, as if she repented of it, turn the scale against him, and in a moment mar all he has achieved. This is what happened to Eumenes on the present occasion. For, just when he thought that his kingdom stood on a firm footing, and that the future had perfect peace and quiet in store for him, as Perseus and the power of Macedonia had been utterly destroyed, there lighted on him this peril from the Gauls of Asia, who unexpectedly seized on the occasion to attack him.

IV. War between Antiochus and the two brothers Ptolemy

In the Peloponnesus, when an embassy arrived while it was still winter from both kings, asking for help, there were several very warm debates.

Callicrates, Diophanes, and Hyperbatus did not approve of sending help, but Archon, Lycortas, and Polybius were in favour of giving it according to the terms of the existing alliance. For the people had already proclaimed the younger Ptolemy king owing to the dangerous situation, while the elder one had come down from Memphis and shared the throne with his brother; and as they were in need of assistance from every possible quarter, they sent Eumenes and Dionysodorus on this embassy to the Achaeans begging for a thousand foot and two hundred horse, though force to be commanded by Lycortas and the cavalry by Polybius. They also sent a message to Theodoridas of Sicyon begging him to raise a mercenary force of a thousand men. The kings were particularly intimate with the men I have mentioned, owing to the circumstances narrated above. When the envoys arrived, the Achaean Assembly being then in session at Corinth, and when after renewing the friendly relations of the Achaeans and the kings, which were of a very close character, they brought before their eyes the danger in which the kings stood, and begged for help, the Achaean people were ready to go, not only with a part of their forces, but if necessary with the whole, to fight for the two kings, both of whom wore the crown and exercised royal authority. Callicrates and the others, however, opposed it, saying that generally speaking they should not meddle with such matters, and at the present time should most strictly avoid it and give undivided attention to serving the cause of Rome. For this was just the time when a decisive end of the war was expected, as Quintus Philippus was in winter quarters in Macedonia. The people were now in doubt, and afraid of failing to please the Romans, when Lycortas and Polybius, resuming the discussion, adduced several arguments, and especially the fact that in the previous year, when

the Achaeans had voted to join the Romans in full force, and sent Polybius as their envoy to propose it, Quintus after thanking them for their zeal, had informed them that he had no need of the proffered help, as he was master of the passes leading to Macedonia. This, they said, proved that the possible need of the Romans for them was a mere pretext for preventing the dispatch of help to the kings. They, therefore, pointing out the imminence of the peril that threatened the kingdom of Egypt, entreated the Achaeans not to neglect this opportunity, but, mindful of their agreement, of the benefits they had received, and especially of their sworn word, confirm the proposed treaty. The Assembly now inclining to send help, Callicrates for the time threw out the resolution, intimidating the magistrates by the assertion that the law gave them no authority to discuss the question of the dispatch of armed help in the popular assembly. When shortly afterwards a meeting was held at Sicyon, at which not only the Achaean senate was present, but all citizens over thirty years of age, several speeches were made; and Polybius especially maintained in the first place that the Romans stood in no need of their assistance—a statement thought to be by no means made at random, as in the previous summer he had been with Quintus Philippus in Macedonia —and said next, that if the Romans did really require their help, the dispatch of the two hundred horse and a thousand foot to Alexander would not make it impossible for the Achaeans to come to the aid of the Romans; for they could very well raise a force of even thirty or forty thousand men fit to take the field. His speech met with approval, and the people were now disposed to send the help. On the second day, when the law enjoined that those who wished to propose decrees should bring them forward, Lycortas proposed to send the auxiliaries, and Callicrates to send envoys to make

peace between the kings and Antiochus. Upon the resolution being proposed there was again a lively debate; but Lycortas and his party had much the best of it. For there was a great difference between the two kingdoms in comparison, since only rare instances could be found in which there had been any close relations between that of Antiochus and Greece, in former times at least—for the present king had acted with conspicuous generosity towards the Greeks—but the favours which the Achaeans had received from the kingdom of Egypt in former times had been so great and frequent, that no one could have expected more. Lycortas, by arguing thus, made a great impression, as the comparison showed the difference to be complete. For while it was not easy to enumerate the gifts conferred by the kings in Alexandria, there was not a single act of kindness of any practical value to be found which the Achaeans had met with from the dynasty of Antiochus.

Andronidas and Callicrates spoke for a time in favour of making peace; but as no one paid any attention to them, they had recourse to intervention from a higher quarter. For a courier fresh from his journey appeared in the theatre bearing a letter from Quintus Marcius, in which he begged the Achaeans to follow the Roman policy in attempting to make peace between the kings. Now it was true that the senate had sent envoys headed by Titus Numisius for this purpose; but the result had not been such as to favour this course, for Titus had found it impossible to make peace and had returned to Rome without achieving anything at all. Polybius, however, out of respect for Marcius not wishing to oppose the letter, retired from the discussion; and in this manner the project of the kings to secure help failed, and the Achaeans decided to send envoys to bring about peace, their choice falling

on Archon of Aegeira and Arcesilaus and Ariston of Megalopolis. Upon this the envoys from Ptolemy, foiled in their project of getting armed help, handed to the magistrates a letter from the kings which they had ready, begging the Achaeans to send Lycortas and Polybius to help in the war.

Forgetful of all he had written and spoken Antiochus was making preparations for war with Ptolemy, so that what Simonides said seems to be very true: "It is hard to be good." It is indeed easy to be disposed to act honourably and to strive to do so up to a certain point, but to be consistent and under every circumstance to be steadfast in our purpose, esteeming nothing to be of higher importance than justice and honour, is difficult.

At the time when Antiochus approached Ptolemy and meant to occupy Pelusium, Caius Popilius Laenas, the Roman commander, on Antiochus greeting him from a distance and then holding out his hand, handed to the king, as he had it by him, the copy of the senatus-consultum, and told him to read it first, not thinking it proper, as it seems to me, to make the conventional sign of friendship before he knew if the intentions of him who was greeting him were friendly or hostile. But when the king, after reading it, said he would like to communicate with his friends about this intelligence, Popilius acted in a manner which was thought to be offensive and exceedingly arrogant. He was carrying a stick cut from a vine, and with this he drew a circle round Antiochus and told him he must remain inside this circle until he gave his decision about the contents of the letter. The king was astonished at this authoritative proceeding, but, after a few moments' hesitation, said he would do all that the Romans demanded. Upon this Popilius and his suite all grasped him by the hand and greeted him warmly. The letter ordered him to put an end at once to the war with

Ptolemy. So, as a fixed number of days were allowed to him, he led his army back to Syria, deeply hurt and complaining indeed, but yielding to circumstances for the present. Popilius after arranging matters in Alexandria and exhorting the two kings there to act in common, ordering them also to send Polyaratus to Rome, sailed for Cyprus, wishing to lose no time in expelling the Syrian troops that were in the island. When they arrived, finding that Ptolemy's generals had been defeated and that the affairs of Cyprus were generally in a topsy-turvy state, they soon made the Syrian army retire from the country, and waited until the troops took ship for Syria. In this way the Romans saved the kingdom of Ptolemy, which had almost been crushed out of existence: Fortune having so directed the matter of Perseus and Macedonia that when the position of Alexandria and the whole of Egypt was almost desperate, all was again set right simply owing to the fact that the fate of Perseus had been decided. For had this not been so, and had not Antiochus been certain of it, he would never, I think, have obeyed the Roman behests.

THE END OF BOOK XXIX

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXX

I. AFFAIRS OF ITALY

Attalus at Rome; Embassies from Rhodes

(Cp. Livy XLV. 19.)

At this time Attalus arrived in Rome sent by his brother Eumenes, the pretext for his mission being, that even if there had not been the Galatian trouble in the kingdom, still he would have come with the wish to congratulate the senate and with the hope of receiving some marks of attention, as they had fought side by side with the Romans and loyally shared all their dangers. Now, however, the Galatian danger had obliged him to come to Rome. He was very cordially received on all sides since they had become intimate with him in camp, and thought he was very well disposed to Rome, and, as the warmth of his reception even surpassed his expectations, he began to entertain extravagant hopes, not knowing the true reason of their kindness. In consequence he narrowly escaped damaging the interests of himself and his brother and their kingdom in general. For as the regard of most of the Romans for Eumenes had been estranged, and they were convinced that he had not acted straight in the war, but had kept on communicating with Perseus and watching for a reverse in their fortunes, some of the most distinguished of them in private conversation with Attalus advised him to throw up his mission on behalf of his brother and to speak on his own behalf; for the senate, they said, wished to create a separate kingdom for him, owing to their hostility to his brother. Attalus's ambition

was much aroused by this, and in private conversation he was disposed to yield to the advice of those who urged him to act so. Finally he even entered into an agreement with some personages of importance to come before the senate and address that body on the subject.

Such being Attalus's state of mind, the king, who had divined what would happen, sent his physician Stratus, in whom he placed great confidence, to Rome, both furnishing him with suggestions and giving him positive orders to adopt every device to prevent Attalus from following the advice of those who wished to ruin their kingdom. Upon his arrival in Rome, he had a private interview the Attalus and reasoned with him at length, employing various arguments; for he was a man of good sense and persuasive power. With difficulty he attained his purpose and made Attalus renounce his foolish project, by representing to him that for the present he shared the throne with his brother, differing from him only in this that he did not wear a crown and had not the title of king, but otherwise having equal and in fact identical power; while as to the future he was the undisputed successor to the throne, and his hopes were not likely to be long deferred, as the king, owing to his infirm health, was in constant expectation of death, and, owing to his childlessness, could not, even if he wished, leave his kingdom to anyone else—the actual successor not having yet been recognized by him as his real son. And above all he said it surprised him that Attalus should do a thing so injurious under present circumstances. They should surely give great thanks to all the gods if by agreement and unity of action they could ward off the Galatian peril and the danger that threatened them from that quarter. But if now he proceeded to quarrel with his brother, it was evident that he would ruin the kingdom and

deprive himself both of his present power and his hope of future power, while at the same time depriving both brothers of the kingdom and the authority they exercised within its boundaries. By these and similar arguments Stratius succeeded in persuading Attalus to leave things alone.

Attalus therefore on entering the Curia congratulated the senate on all that had happened and solicited their favour in return for his kind offices and ready assistance in the war with Perseus. He also at some length begged them to send legates to check the desperate revolt of Galatia and restore the former submissive temper of that province. He also spoke about Aenus and Maronea, asking for these towns to be freely granted to him. As to what he had been about to say against Eumenes and about the division of the kingdom he did not utter a word. The senate, supposing that he would appear again and make a special speech about these matters, promised to send legates back with him, and voted on a lavish scale the customary gifts in his honour. They also promised to give him the two towns in question. But when, after receiving all these kindnesses, he left Rome without doing any of the things they expected, the senate, disabused of their hopes, could take no further action; but while he was still in Italy set free Aenus and Maronea, thus breaking their promise, but dispatched Publius Licinius Crassus as their legate to Galatia. It is difficult to state what instructions they gave this legate, but from what happened afterwards it is easy to guess what they were, as will be evident when I come to narrate the events.

Envoys also came from Rhodes, first Philocrates and next Philophron and Astymedes. For the Rhodians, on receiving the answer given to Hagepolis just after the battle of Pydna and seeing from this the angry and threatening attitude of the senate towards them, at once sent off these two

embassies. Astymedes and Philophron, noticing from the reception they met with both in public and in private the suspicion and hostility with which they were regarded, fell into a state of utter despondency and helplessness. And when one of the praetors mounted the rostra and urged the people to declare war on Rhodes, then, entirely losing their senses owing to the danger in which their country stood, they were in such a state of distress that they put on mourning and in seeking the aid of their friends no longer begged for it or asked for it, but implored them in tears not to resort to extreme measures against Rhodes. A few days afterwards, when they were introduced to the senate by the tribune Antonius, who had previously dragged down from the rostra the praetor who was inciting the people to make war, Philophron was the first to speak, and was followed by Astymedes. On this occasion after singing the dying swan's song, as the saying is, they received an answer which relieved indeed their extreme apprehension of war but in it the senate reproached them bitterly and severely for the several offences with which they were charged. The sense of the answer was that, had it not been for a few men who were their friends, and especially had it not been for their own conduct, they would have known well as they richly deserved what was the treatment proper for them. Astymedes, in his own opinion, had spoken well in defence of his country, but his speech by no means pleased the Greeks resident in Rome nor those at home. For he afterwards wrote out and published his defence, and most of those who perused it thought it strange and quite unconvincing, inasmuch as he had drawn it up relying not so much on the rights of his country, as on the accusations he brought against others. In comparing and judging the relative values of kindnesses and assistance rendered to the

Romans, he attempted to discredit and belittle the services of other states, while he magnified those of Rhodes, exaggerating them as much as he could. In regard to offences, on the contrary, he condemned those of others in a bitter and hostile spirit, but tried to cloak those of Rhodes, so that when compared the offences of Rhodes might seem to be small and deserving of pardon, but those of her neighbours great and quite inexpiable, although, as he said, the offenders had all been pardoned. Such a kind of justification, I think, is by no means becoming in a politician, since surely in the case of men who have taken part in secret designs we do not praise those who either from fear or for money turn informers and betray confidences, but we applaud and regard as brave men those who endure the extremity of torture and punishment without being the cause of similar suffering to their accomplices. How then could those who heard of it fail to disapprove the conduct of a man who for fear of an uncertain danger revealed to the ruling power and published all the errors of others, errors which time had already veiled from the eyes of their masters?

Philocrates, on receiving the above answer, at once left, but Philophron and Astymedes remained to be on the watch, so that nothing that was reported or said against their country should escape them. When the terms of the answer were announced in Rhodes, the people, thinking that they had been relieved of their greatest fear, that of war, bore the other demands, galling as they were, with equanimity. And so it ever is that the greater the evils we expect, the more easily we forget lesser misfortunes. So they at once voted a crown [1] of ten thousand gold pieces to Rome, and, appointing Theaedetus ambassador and admiral, sent him off in early summer with the crown accompanied by Rhodophon to try by every means

to make an alliance with Rome. This they did with the object, in case the Romans did not consent and the decree of the crown and their embassy were a failure, [2] of attempting to gain their end by the personal action of the admiral; for by their laws he was, as admiral, empowered to act in such matters. For the policy of Rhodes had been so little by sentiment, that although that state had from nearly a hundred and forty years taken part in the most glorious and finest achievements of the Romans, they had never made an alliance with Rome. The reason of their action in this respect should not be ignored. It was this. As they wished none of the kings and princes to despair of gaining their help and alliance, they did not desire to run in harness with Rome and engage themselves by oaths and treaties, but preferred to remain unembarrassed and able to reap profit from any quarter. But now they were most energetic in their efforts to obtain this distinction from Rome, not standing in urgent need of the alliance or fearing in the very least any other power except alone for the present, but wishing by insistence on this project to free themselves from the suspicions of those who entertained unfriendly ideas about their city. Soon after the arrival of Theaedetus at Rhodes, Caunus revolted, and the people of Mylasa took possession of the cities in Euromus. At the same time the senate issued a consultum setting free all the parts of Caria and Lycia which they had assigned to Rhodes at the time of the war with Antiochus. As for Caunus and Euromus the matter was soon set right by the Rhodians. Dispatching Lycon with troops they compelled the Caunians to submit again to them, although the people of Cibyra came to their help, and making an expedition to the cities in Euromus they defeated the Mylasians and Alabandians, who had both advanced with an armed force to Orthosia. But when they heard of

the senatus-consultum about Lycia and Caria they were again alarmed, fearing that their gift of the crown had been made in vain and that their hopes of an alliance were equally vain.

[1] *i.e.* a complimentary present offered to the goddess "Roma."

[2] There is something amiss with the text, but the sense required is what I give.

II. Affairs of Greece

Three Classes of Anti-Roman Statesmen

(Cp. Livy XLV. 31. 4; 26. 5.)

In the first place I will ask my readers after reflection to pronounce on the conduct of Deinon and Polyaratus. For, as the dangers were then great and the change of circumstances abrupt, not only at Rhodes but in nearly all other states, it will be, I think, of some service to examine into the principles of the leading politicians in each place and decide which of them prove to have acted in a rational manner and which to have failed in their duty; so that their successors, with these examples before them, may in similar circumstances be enabled without fail to pursue the course which is desirable and avoid that which is the reverse, and should not, by failing to see at the very end of their lives where the path of honour lies, dishonour all they may have achieved in the past. Now there were three classes of men who were accused for their conduct in the war with Perseus. The first consisted of those who did not indeed view with pleasure the final decision of the struggle and the subjection of the whole world by one power, yet neither supported the Romans in any way nor opposed them, but as it were committed the result to Fortune. The next class was composed of those who were glad to see matters coming to a decisive issue and wished Perseus

success, but were unable to impose their views on their fellow-citizens and compatriots. Finally, there were those who did convert their states to their views and involve them in alliance with Perseus. My present object, then, is to inquire how each of these classes handled their respective situations. Antinous, Theodotus, and Cephalus the Molottians involved themselves and their country in alliance with Perseus; and when facts fell out in a manner entirely adverse to their projects, when they stood in imminent danger, and the day of retribution was at hand, they all faced the situation and perished bravely. We should therefore very properly praise these men for not abandoning their principles and permitting themselves to adopt a principle that would give the lie to their previous life. Again in Achaea, Thessaly, and Perrhaebia numerous men were accused, owing to their inaction, of awaiting the development of circumstances and being favourably inclined to Perseus; but they were never convicted of having given expression to such sentiments either by writing to Perseus or communicating with him about any matter, and they gave no handle to anyone to accuse them. They were therefore justified in standing on their defence in submitting to trial, and employing every means to save themselves; for to put an end to one's life when one is not conscious of having done anything unworthy simply from fear of the threats of political opponents or the power of the conquerors is no less a sign of cowardice than to cling to life at the sacrifice of honour.

But again in Rhodes, in Cos, and in several other cities there were some among those who sided with Perseus who had the courage to speak about the Macedonians in their cities, to accuse the Romans and to recommend unity of action with Perseus, but who proved incapable of persuading their

countries to ally themselves with the king. Of these men the most distinguished in Cos were the brothers Hippocritus and Diomedon, and in Rhodes Deinon and Polyaratus. Their course was one that no one can avoid condemning. In the first place their fellow-citizens were cognisant of all they had done and said; next both the letters of Perseus to them and theirs to him had been captured and published, and the emissaries employed on both sides had fallen into the hands of the Romans: and yet they could not resolve to yield to facts and remove themselves but still continued to dispute. Therefore by thus obstinately clinging to life in face of this desperate position, they so far annihilated their reputation for daring and venturesomeness, that they did not leave to posterity the slightest ground for pitying or pardoning them. For, convicted as they were to their faces by their own handwriting and their own emissaries, they were considered not so much to be unfortunate, as to be unabashed. There was in fact a certain ship captain called Thoas, who had made frequent voyages to Macedonia commissioned by these men. This Thoas, at the time when the change in the situation took place, feeling the burden of what he had done weigh on his conscience, left for Cnidus. There the Cnidians put him in prison, and upon the Rhodians demanding his extradition he came to Rhodes, and there when put to the torture made full confession in agreement with the interpretation of the whole cypher used in the captured correspondence and with the reading of the letters sent by Perseus to Deinon and Polyaratus and theirs to the king. This makes one wonder on what Deinon calculated in clinging to life and enduring this exposure.

But Polyaratus much surpassed Deinon in stupidity and cowardice. For when Popilius ordered King Ptolemy to send Polyaratus to Rome, the king

did not think it fit to send him to Rome out of regard for Polyaratus himself and his country, but decided to send him to Rhodes, as Polyaratus had himself requested. He therefore procured a galley, and putting him in charge of Demetrius, one of the royal friends, sent him off, having written to inform the Rhodians that he had dispatched him. Polyaratus, when the ship put in to Phaselis on her voyage, with I don't know what notion in his head, took suppliant boughs and sought sanctuary at the common hearth of the town. It seems to me that if anyone had asked him what he wanted, he would not have been able to say himself. For had he wished to go to his country what was the use of the suppliant boughs, as such was the purpose of those who were conveying him? And had he wished to go to Rome, he would perforce have had to do so even had he not wished it. What other alternative then was open to him, there being no other place that could safely receive him? When, however, the Phaselites sent to Rhodes and begged the Rhodians to send to fetch Polyaratus and take him into their hands, the Rhodians, acting with great prudence, dispatched an undecked ship to escort him, but forbade the commander to take him on board, as people in Alexandria had been ordered to present the man at Rome. Then the ship arrived at Phaselis and the commander Epichares refused to receive Polyaratus on board, while Demetrius, who had been appointed by the king to convey him bade him leave the sanctuary and continue his voyage, the people of Phaselis backing up this demand, as they were afraid that in consequence of this matter they might incur some blame from Rome, Polyaratus, alarmed at his dangerous situation, went on board the galley again of Demetrius, but as they were sailing off availed himself of some plausible excuse to go ashore, and again took refuge at Caunus, where

likewise he implored the citizens to help him. When they again declined, as they formed part of the Rhodian dominion, he sent messengers to the people of Cibyra imploring them to receive him in their city and to send him an escort—the city being under obligations to him as the sons of their tyrant Pancrates had been brought up in his house—and they consented and did as he requested. By his arrival at Cibyra he placed himself and the people of that town in an even more difficult situation than the former one when he was at Phaselis. For they neither ventured to keep him with them, as they feared danger from Rome, nor could they send him to Rome owing to their ignorance of seamanship, as they were a purely inland people. Consequently they were compelled to send an embassy to Rhodes and another to the proconsul in Macedonia, begging them to take the man off their hands. When Aemilius wrote to the people of Cibyra to place Polyaratus under strict guard and take him to Rhodes, and at the same time to the Rhodians to see that he was properly escorted by sea, so that he might be conveyed safely to Roman territory, and when both requests were complied with, Polyaratus reached Rome in this manner, having made as notable an exhibition as he could of his stupidity and cowardice, and having been surrendered not only by King Ptolemy, but by the Phaselites, Cibyratae, and the Romans, all owing to his own folly.

If I am asked why I have dealt at length with the case of Polyaratus and Deinon, it was not in order to exult over their misfortunes, which would be indeed outrageous, but that I might by clearly exhibiting their lack of wisdom render such as find themselves placed by circumstance in a similar situation better prepared to act advisedly and wisely.

(Cp. Livy XLV. 27. 7.)

We can most clearly perceive both the abruptness and the uncertainty of Fortune from those instances where a man who thinks that he is undoubtedly labouring at certain objects for his own benefit suddenly finds out that he is preparing them for his enemies. For Perseus was constructing columns, and Lucius Aemilius, finding them unfinished, completed them and set statues of himself on them.

Aemilius in the Peloponnese

(Suid.; cp. Livy XLV. 28. 2.)

He admired the situation of Corinth and the favourable position of its acropolis as regards the command of both districts, that inside the Isthmus and that outside.

(Suid.; cp. Livy XLV. 28. 3.)

After noting the strength of the fortifications of Sicyon and the power of the city of Argos, he came to Epidaurus.

(Suid.; cp. Livy XLV. 28. 4.)

He hastened now to pay the visit to Olympia to which he had long looked forward.

(Suid.; cp. Livy XLV. 28. 5.)

Lucius Aemilius visited the temple in Olympia, and when he saw the statue of Zeus was awestruck, and said simply that Pheidias seemed to him to have been the only artist who had made a likeness of Homer's Zeus; for he himself had come to Olympia with high expectations but the reality had far surpassed his expectations.

State of Aetolia

(Cp. Livy XLV. 28. 6.)

The Aetolians were accustomed to get their living by robbery and similar lawless conduct. And as long as it was in their power to raid and plunder the Greeks they lived upon them, regarding every country as an enemy. But afterwards under Roman administration they were prevented from supplying their wants from outside, and had to turn upon each other. Formerly in time of civil war, there was no excess of which they had not been guilty, and having a short time previously tasted each other's blood in the massacres in the territory of Arsinoë, they were prepared to stick at nothing, having become utterly brutalized, so they did not even allow their leading men to meet in council. Thus the whole of Aetolia was full of turbulence, lawless violence, and bloodshed; not one of their actions being the result of deliberation and set purpose, but all done at haphazard and confusedly, as if a whirlwind had descended on them.

And of Epirus

The Epirots behaved in very much the same way. For while the majority of the people were more orderly than the Aetolians, their chief magistrate just so far exceeded all other men in contempt for divine and human law. For I think there never was and never will be a man more brutal and more unprincipled than Charops.

Congratulatory Embassies

(Cp. Livy XLV. 31. 6.)

After the fall of Perseus, matters being now finally decided, embassies from all parts were being sent to congratulate the senate on the event. Now that things had turned out entirely in favour of the Romans, those who were considered to be the friends of Rome came to the front owing to circumstances in all the states, and it was they who were appointed to these

embassies or other posts. In consequence those who flocked to Macedonia were Callicrates, Aristodamus, Agesias and Philippus for Achaea, Mnasippus from Boeotia, Chremas from Acarnania, Charops and Nicias from Epirus, and Lyciscus and Tisippus from Aetolia. As all these men joined together and vied with each other in working for the same end and met with no opposition, all their political opponents having yielded to circumstances and entirely retired from politics, they attained their end without trouble. The ten legates conveyed through the strategi themselves their orders to the other cities and national leagues as to which of the envoys should proceed to Rome, these being for the most part those nominated by the envoys themselves in their own list, the exceptions being men who had rendered conspicuous service. To the Achaean League, however, the legates sent their two most distinguished members, Gaius Claudius Pulcher and Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, for two reasons. In the first place they were apprehensive lest the Achaeans should refuse to comply with their written instructions, and lest Callicrates and his colleagues should run actual risk, as they were thought to have trumped up the false accusations brought against all the Greeks, as in fact they had; and secondly because in the captured correspondence nothing had been found clearly implicating any Achaean. On this subject the proconsul shortly afterwards forwarded the letters and the envoys, although not personally approving of the accusations brought by Lyciscus and Callicrates, as became evident from what actually took place.

A Saying of Aemilius

(Cp. Livy XLV. 32. 11.)

A man with a mind capable of making good arrangements for games, and managing properly a sumptuous entertainment and banquet is likewise capable of marshalling his troops to meet the enemy with the skill of a general.

(From Strabo VII. 7. 3; cp. Livy XLV. 34. 6.)

Polybius says that Aemilius Paullus after the fall of Perseus destroyed seventy cities in Macedonia, most of them belonging to the Molotti, and that he sold into slavery a hundred and fifty thousand persons.

III. Affairs of Egypt

In Egypt the kings, when relieved from the war with Antiochus, in the first place dispatched Numenius, one of the royal friends, on an embassy to Rome of return thanks for the benefits conferred on them. They also set free Menalcidas of Lacedaemon who had energetically availed himself of the distressed condition of the kingdom to obtain his restoration. It was Gaius Popilius who asked them to do this as a personal favour to himself.

I. Affairs of Italy

Embassy from Cotys

(Cp. Livy XLV. 42. 6.)

At this time Cotys, king of the Odrysae, sent envoys to Rome to beg that his son might be given back to him and also to defend his action in having joined Perseus. The Romans, thinking that they had attained their main object now that the war against Perseus had ended in their favour, and that it served no purpose to prolong their difference with Cotys, allowed him to take back his son, who had been sent as a hostage, to Macedonia and captured together with the children of Perseus, wishing to show their

leniency and magnanimity, and at the same time attaching Cotys to them by this favour.

Prusias at Rome; Eumenes not received

(Cp. Livy XLV. 44. 19.)

At the same time King Prusias also came to Rome to congratulate the senate and the generals on what had happened. This Prusias was a man by no means worthy of the royal dignity, as may easily be understood from the following facts. In the first place when some Roman legates had come to his court, he went to meet them with his head shorn, and wearing a white hat and toga and shoes, exactly the costume worn at Rome by slaves recently manumitted or "liberti" as the Romans call them. "In me," he said, "you see your libertus who wishes to endear to himself and imitate everything Roman"; a phrase as humiliating as one can conceive. And now, on entering the senate-house he stood in the doorway facing the members and putting both his hands on the ground bowed his head to the ground in adoration of the threshold and the seated senators, with the words, "Hail, ye saviour god," making it impossible for anyone after him to surpass him in unmanliness, womanishness, and servility. And on entering he conducted himself during his interview in a similar manner, doing things that it were unbecoming even to mention. As he showed himself to be utterly contemptible, he received a kind answer for this very reason.

After Prusias had received his answer news came that Eumenes was on his way. This matter very much embarrassed the senate. For as they had now quarrelled with him, and their opinion of him remained unshaken, they did not wish to make any pronouncement at all. For they had proclaimed to the whole world that this king was their first and greatest friend, and now, if

they allowed him to meet them and to defend himself, should they tell him in reply what they were really led to think of him by their own judgement, they would expose themselves to ridicule for having in former times paid this high honour to a man of such a character: if on the other hand they made themselves the slaves of appearances and gave him a kind answer, they would be ignoring truth and the interest of their country. Since therefore, whichever course they decided to adopt would put them in a position not easy to justify, they hit on the following solution of problem. Affecting to be displeased by the visit of kings in general, they issued a decree that no king would present himself to them; and in the next place, when they heard that Eumenes had arrived at Brundisium, they dispatched the quaestor bearing this decree, and with orders to tell Eumenes to inform him if he stood in need of any service from senate: in case there was nothing the king wanted he was to order him to leave Italy as soon as possible. Eumenes, when he met the quaestor, understood the intention of the senate and remained perfectly silent after saying that he was in want of nothing. This, then, was the way in which the king was prevented from going up to Rome. But another more practical purpose had contributed to this decision. For, as the kingdom of Pergamus was menaced with a great danger from the Gauls, it was evident that by this repulse all the allies of the king would be humiliated, and the Gauls would undertake the war with redoubled vigour. So that it was with the view of thoroughly humiliating Eumenes that the senate arrived at this decision. This took place at the beginning of winter, and afterwards the senate dealt with all the embassies that had arrived. For there was no city or prince or king who had not at this time sent a mission to congratulate them. To all these they replied in

suitable and kind terms with the exception of the Rhodians whom they dismissed with ambiguous declarations about their future. They also deferred giving an answer to the Athenians.

The Embassy from Athens

The embassy from Athens had come in the first place to beg that the people of Haliartus might be spared; but when this request was ignored, they changed the subject and spoke about Delos, Lemnos, and the territory of Haliartus, begging to be placed in possession of those places, for they had received a double set of instructions. We cannot blame them for asking for Delos and Lemnos, as they had previously laid claim to these islands; but as for the territory of Haliartus we are justified in finding fault with them. For not to strive by every means to retrieve the fallen fortunes of a city almost the most ancient in Boeotia, but on the contrary to erase it from the map, by depriving its unhappy inhabitants of all hope for the future, was evidently conduct unworthy of any Greek state and especially unworthy of Athens. For now, while they were making their own country the common refuge of all who wished to be citizens of it, to destroy thus the countries of others was by no means consonant with the traditions of the city. The senate, however, gave them, both Delos and Lemnos as well as this territory of Haliartus. Such was the decision about Athens.

In taking Lemnos and Delos they were, as the proverb has it, taking the wolf by the ears. For their connexion with the Delians had many unpleasant consequences, and from their possession of the territory of Haliartus they reaped more reproach than profit.

Rhodian Matters

At this time Theaedetus appeared before the senate, and spoke on the subject of an alliance; but the senate deferred their decision, and Theaedetus in the meantime died a natural death, being over eighty years of age. Exiles then arrived in Rome from Caunus and Stratonicea, and came before the senate, which passed a decree ordering the Rhodians to withdraw their garrisons from these cities. Philophron and Astymedes, on receiving this answer, took ship at once for home, as they were afraid of the Rhodians refusing compliance with the order to withdraw the garrisons, and thus giving rise to fresh complaints.

Lucius Anicius's Triumph over Genthius

(From Athenaeus XIV. p. 615; cp. Livy XLV. 43. 1.)

Lucius Anicius, the Roman praetor, upon conquering the Illyrians and bringing back as his prisoners Genthius, the king of Illyria, and his children, in celebrating games in honour of his victory, behaved in the most absurd manner, as Polybius tells us in his Thirtieth Book. For having sent for the most celebrated scenic artists from Greece and constructed an enormous stage in the census, he first brought on all the flute-players at once. These were Theodorus of Boeotia, Theopompus, Hermippus and Lysimachus, who were then at the height of their fame. Stationing them with the chorus on the proscenium he ordered them to play all together. When they went through their performance with the proper rhythmic movements, he sent to them to show more competitive spirit. They were at a loss to know what he meant, when one of the lictors explained that they should turn and go for each other and make a sort of fight of it. The players soon understood, and having got an order that suited their own appetite for licence, made a mighty confusion. Making the central groups of dancers face those on the outside, the flute-

players blowing loud in unintelligible discord and turning their flutes about this way and that, advanced towards each other in turn, and the dancers, clapping their hands and mounting the stage all together, attacked the adverse party and then faced about and retreated in their turn. And when one of the dancers girt up his robes on the spur of the moment, and turning round lifted up his hands in boxing attitude against the flute-player who was advancing towards have, there was tremendous applause on cheering on the part of the spectators. And while they were thus engaged in a pitched battle, two dancers with musicians were introduced into the orchestra and four prize-fighters mounted the stage accompanied by buglers and clarion-players and with all these men struggling together the scene was indescribable. As for the tragic actors Polybius says, "If I tried to describe them some people would think I was making fun of my readers."

II. Affairs of Greece

Cretan and Rhodian Matters

At this time the Cnosians and Gortynians finished their war with Rhaucus, having previously come to an agreement with each other not to desist from the war before they took Rhaucus by storm. The Rhodians on receiving the message about Caunus and seeing that the displeasure of the Romans did not diminish, when they had yielded complete obedience to the terms of their reply, at once appointed and sent Aristoteles and other envoys to Rome with instructions to try again to obtain an alliance. They reached Rome in the middle of summer, and, entering the senate-house, at once informed that body that their people had obeyed all orders, and begged for an alliance, using many various arguments. The senate returned an answer in which, making no mention of friendship, they said that as regards an

alliance the time had not come when it was proper for them to grant this to Rhodes.

The inhabitants of Peraea were like slaves unexpectedly released from their fetters, who, unable to believe the truth, take longer steps than their natural ones and fancy that those they meet will not know and see for certain that they are free unless they behave in some strange way and differently from other men.

III. Affairs of Asia

Games celebrated by Antiochus IV.

(From Athenaeus V. 194 and X. 439.)

This same king when he heard of the games celebrated in Macedonia by Aemilius Paullus the Roman general, ambitious of surpassing Paullus in magnificence sent out embassies and sacred missions to the towns to announce the games he was about to give at Daphne, so that people in Greece were very eager to visit Antioch then. The festival opened with a procession composed as follows: It was headed by five thousand men in the prime of life armed after the Roman fashion and wearing breastplates of chain-armour. Next came five thousand Mysians, and immediately behind them three thousand Cilicians armed in the manner of light infantry, wearing gold crowns. Next came three thousand Thracians and five thousand Gauls. They were followed by twenty thousand Macedonians of whom ten thousand bore golden shields, five thousand brazen shields and the rest silver shields. Next marched two hundred and fifty pairs of gladiators, and behind them a thousand horsemen from Nisa and three thousand from Antioch itself, most of whom had crowns and trappings of gold and the rest trappings of silver. Next to these came the so-called

"companion cavalry," numbering about a thousand, all with gold trappings, and next the regiment of "royal friends" of equal number and similarly accoutred; next a thousand picked horse followed by the so-called "agema", supposed to be the crack cavalry corps, numbering about a thousand. Last of all marched the "cataphract" or mailed horse, the horses and men being armed in complete mail, as the name indicated. All the above wore purple surcoats in many cases embroidered with gold and heraldic designs. Next came a hundred chariots drawn by six horses and forty drawn by four horses, and then a chariot drawn by four elephants and another drawn by a pair, and finally thirty-six elephants in single file with their housings.

It is a difficult task to describe the rest of the procession but I must attempt to give its main features. About eight hundred young men wearing gold crowns made part of it as well as about a thousand fat cattle and nearly three hundred cows presented by the various sacred missions and eight hundred ivory tusks. The vast quantity of images it is impossible to enumerate. For representations of all the gods and spirits mentioned or worshipped by men and of all the heroes were carried along, some gilded and others draped in garments embroidered with gold, and they were all accompanied by representations executed in precious materials of the myths relating to them as traditionally narrated. Behind them came images of Night and Day, of Earth and Heaven, and of Dawn and Midday. The quantity of gold and silver plate may be estimated from what follows. The slaves of one of the royal "friends," Dionysius, the private secretary, marched along carrying articles of silver plate none of them weighing less than a thousand drachmae, and six hundred of the king's own slaves went by bearing articles of gold plate. Next there were about two hundred women

sprinkling the crowd with perfumes from golden urns, and these were followed by eighty women seated in litters with golden feet and five hundred in litters with silver feet, all richly dressed. Such were the more remarkable features of the procession.

When the games, gladiatorial shows, and beast-fights, which lasted for the thirty days devoted to spectacles, were over, for the first five succeeding days every one who chose anointed himself in the gymnasium with saffron ointment out of gold jars: of those there were fifteen, and there were the same number of jars with ointment of cinnamon and spikenard. On the succeeding days ointments of fenugreek, marjoram, and orris were brought in, all of exquisite perfume. For banqueting there were sometimes a thousand tables laid and sometimes fifteen hundred, all furnished with most costly viands.

All the arrangements were made by the king in person. He rode on a sorry pony along the procession, ordering it to advance or halt as the case might be. At banquets, again, he stood himself in the entrance and led in some of the guests, and ushered others to their seats, himself leading in also the attendants who carried the dishes. Then he would walk round the room, occasionally sitting down and occasionally reclining, and then, putting down as the case might be the cup or the morsel he was holding, he would jump up and change his place, going all round the banquet, accepting toasts standing from this man or that and making fun of the musical performance. Finally when the carouse had been going on for long and many of the guests had already left, the king, entirely wrapped up, was carried in by the mimes and deposited on the ground as if he were one of themselves. The band was now summoned, and he, jumping up, would dance and act with the

burlesque players, so that all the guests were abashed and left the feast. All the above display and outlay was provided for by the robberies he had committed in Egypt when he treacherously attacked King Philometor while yet a child, and partly by contributions from his friends. He had also sacrilegiously despoiled most of the temples.

Shortly after the end of the games Tiberius Gracchus and the other legates arrived in the quality of inspectors. Antiochus, however, was so adroit and courteous when he met them that Tiberius and his colleagues, far from acquiring any real suspicion about him or detecting anything indicative of disaffection due to what had happened at Alexandria, even discredited those who said anything of the kind, owing to their exceedingly kind reception: for in addition to other favours he even gave up his palace to them, and very nearly gave up his crown to them as well, so far his demeanour went, although his real feelings were not so, but quite the reverse.

I. Affairs of Italy

Treatment of Galatia

The autonomy of their country was granted by the senate to the Galatian envoys on condition that they remained in their own settlements and did not cross their frontier in arms.

II. Affairs of Greece

Feeling against Callicrates

In Peloponnesus, when the envoys returned and reported the answer they had just received, there was no longer any disturbance but unconcealed indignation and hatred against Callicrates and his party.

One can guess from the following circumstances how cordially Callicrates, Andronidas, and the rest of their party were detested. When the festival of the Antigoneia was being celebrated in Sicyon, and all the baths had their large public bathing-tubs open, and smaller ones next them, which the more genteel people used to enter privately, whenever any of the party of Callicrates and Andronidas went in to them, none of those who were waiting their turn ventured to enter the water after them, before the bath-keeper had let imperial run off and poured in fresh. They did this because they considered that they would be, as it were, polluted by entering the same water as those people. And as for the hissing and hooting at public festivals when anyone attempted to proclaim one of these men as victor, it would not be easy to describe it. Even the children in the streets on their way back from school ventured to call them traitors to their faces. So deep was the prevailing aversion and hatred of them.

Affairs of Italy

Embassies from Prusias, Rhodes, and Achaea

Many other embassies also reached Rome this year, the principal ones being that under Astymedes from Rhodes, that from the Achaeans consisting of Eureas, Anaxidamus and Satyrus, and that from Prusias headed by Python. The senate gave audiences to all these. The envoys from Prusias complained of King Eumenes, asserting that he had annexed some Bithynian places, and did not by any means cease from meddling with Galatia, but disobeyed the decrees of the senate, continuing to strengthen his own partisans there and to weaken by every means in his power those who were favourable to Rome, and who desired to act in accordance with the decrees of the senate. There were also some envoys from Asiatic cities

who accused Eumenes, laying stress on his understanding with Antiochus. The senate, after listening to the accusations, neither repelled them nor pronounced any opinion, but took note of them, generally distrusting Eumenes and Antiochus. As for the Galatians they continued to add to and further secure their liberties. Tiberius and his colleagues, on returning from their mission, were incapable of forming themselves or stating to the senate any opinion about Eumenes and Antiochus further than that which they had formerly entertained when in Rome. So well had the kings succeeded in relaxing their vigour by the warmth of their reception.

After this the senate summoned the Rhodians and gave them a hearing. Astymedes on entering took up a more moderate and better position than on his last embassy. For, desisting from bringing accusations, he began to make excuses, as slaves when scourged beg to be let off a certain number of lashes, saying that his country had been sufficiently mulcted and beyond what her offences deserved. He then proceeded to sum up the losses which Rhodes had suffered, mentioning first of all that of Lycia and Caria, on which provinces they had spent from the outset a considerable sum, having been compelled to undertake three wars against them, and now they were deprived of the large revenue derived from them. "But perhaps," he said, "in this you are justified; for it is true that you gave these districts to our people as a favour and token of goodwill, and in revoking your gift now that we incur your suspicion and hostility you may seem to have acted reasonably. But as for Caunus, you will confess that we bought it from Ptolemy's generals for two hundred talents, and that Stratoniceia was given us as a great favour by Antiochus son of Seleucus. From these two towns our state derived an annual revenue of a hundred and twenty talents. We lose the

whole of this revenue if we consent to obey your orders. From this you see that you have imposed a heavier tribute on the Rhodians for a single mistake than on the Macedonians who had always been your foes. But the greatest calamity inflicted on our town is this. The revenue we drew from our harbour has ceased owing to your having made Delos a free port, and deprived our people of that liberty by which our rights as regards our harbour and all the other rights of our city were properly guarded. It is not difficult to convince you of the truth of this. For while the harbour-dues in former times were farmed for a million drachmae, they now fetch only a hundred and fifty thousand, so that your displeasure, men of Rome, has only too heavily visited the vital resources of the state. Now, had the whole people been responsible for our error and estrangement from you, you might possibly with some show of justice maintain that displeasure and deny forgiveness, but if, as you know well, the authors of this folly were quite few in number and have all been put to death by the state itself, why do you refuse to be reconciled to men who were in no way to blame, you who are considered to be most lenient and magnanimous towards all other peoples? Therefore, gentlemen, the people of Rhodes who have lost their revenue, their liberty, and their equality, things for which in past times they were ready to endure any suffering, beg and entreat you all, now that they have been sufficiently chastised, to abate your anger, to be reconciled to us and to make the alliance in order that it may be evident to all men that you have now laid aside your anger against the Rhodians and have resumed your original friendly attitude; for it is this that our people stands in need now and not of an ally to support them by arms and soldiers." In these and similar terms Astymedes addressed the senate, and he was thought to have

spoken in a manner befitting the situation. The thing, however, which helped the Rhodians most to get their alliance was the recent arrival of Tiberius Gracchus and the other legates. For by testifying in the first place that the Rhodians had obeyed all the decrees of the senate and next that all those guilty of disaffection had been condemned to death at Rhodes, he overcame all opposition, and so the alliance with Rome was made.

Embassy from Achaea

Shortly afterwards the Achaean envoys entered, with instructions consequent on the answer they had previously received. This was that the senate were surprised that they should be asked to pronounce judgement on a matter already judged by the Achaeans. Owing to this Eureas and his colleagues appeared on the present occasion to point out that the league had neither heard the defence of the accused nor pronounced any judgement on them, and they now begged the senate to consider the case of these men, and see that they were put on their trial, and not allowed to rot in exile unjudged. They begged the senate if possible to undertake the inquiry itself and to pronounce who were guilty of the charges; but if other calls on their time prevented this, to refer the matter to the Achaeans who would attempt to deal with the accused as their crimes merited. The senate, after listening to what the envoys said according to their instructions, found themselves in a quandary, as they were confronted by objections on all sides. They did not think it lay with them to pronounce judgement, while to set free the men without trial meant, they thought, the certain destruction of their own friends. Therefore, forced by circumstances, and wishing to cut short once for all the hope of the populace that those in detention might be saved, with the object of shutting people's mouths and making them obedient to the

party of Callicrates in Achaea, and to those in other states who were thought to be the friends of Rome, they gave a written answer in these words: "We do not think it the interest either of Rome or of your peoples that these men should return home." Upon this answer being issued not only did the Achaeans who had been summoned to Italy fall into a state of utter despondency and helplessness, but all the Greeks in Rome went as it were into mourning, since the answer seemed to deprive the unhappy sufferers of all hope of restoration. And when the answer given to the Achaeans on the subject of the accused was announced in Greece, the spirits of the people were crushed and something like despair everywhere prevailed. But Charops and Callicrates and the defenders of their policy were again in high spirits.

THE END OF BOOK XXX

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXXI

I. AFFAIRS OF ITALY

(Cp. Livy, epit. xlvi.)

Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus subjected to the Romans the Cammani [1] partly by force and partly by fraud.

[1] An Asiatic people.

Embassy from Eumenes

Several embassies arrived at Rome this year, and the senate dealt with that headed by Attalus and Athenaeus. For Prusias had not only pushed the accusations he brought himself against Eumenes and Antiochus, but had instigated the Galatians, the people of Selge and other Asiatic peoples to bring similar complaints. In consequence of this Eumenes had sent his brothers to defend him against all these charges. When they appeared before the senate it was thought that they made a satisfactory defence against all the accusers, and finally having not only freed Eumenes from the charges but having received special marks of honour they returned to Asia. The senate, however, did not cease to entertain suspicions of Eumenes and Antiochus, but appointed and dispatched Gaius Sulpicius and Manius Sergius as legates to observe the state of affairs in Greece, to decide the question of the territory in dispute between Megalopolis and Lacedaemon, but chiefly to inquire diligently into the proceedings of Antiochus and Eumenes in case they were making any preparations to attack Rome and acting in concert against her.

Measures taken regarding Syria, Macedonia, and Egypt

Demetrius, the son of Seleucus, had now been held in hostage at Rome for many years, and it had long been thought that his detention was unjust, since he had been given by his father Seleucus as a hostage for his own good faith, and now that Antiochus had succeeded to the crown he should not be required to serve as hostage for the children of Seleucus. He had, however, taken no steps previously, chiefly owing to want of capacity, as he was still a boy. But now, having fully come to years of discretion, he appeared before the senate and addressing that house begged and entreated to be sent home to assume the crown, to which he said he had a better claim than the children of Antiochus. When he had spoken at considerable length in this sense and especially appealed to his hearers by saying that Rome was his fatherland and his nurse, that the sons of the senators were all like brothers to him and the senators themselves like fathers, since he had come to Rome when quite an infant and was now twenty-three years of age, they were all personally affected, but their public decision was to keep Demetrius in Rome and help to establish on the throne the surviving child of Antiochus IV. The senate acted thus, in my opinion, because they were suspicious of a king in the prime of life like Demetrius and thought that the youth and incapacity of the boy who had succeeded to the throne would serve their purpose better. This was made evident by what happened afterwards. For they at once named as legates Gnaeus Octavius, Spurius Lucretius, and Lucius Aurelius and dispatched them to Syria to manage the affairs of that kingdom as the senate determined, there being no one likely to oppose their orders, since the king was a child and the principal people were only too glad that the government had not been put in the hands of

Demetrius, as they had been almost certain it would be. Octavius and his colleagues thereupon left, with orders in the first place to burn the decked warships, next to hamstring the elephants, and by every means to cripple the royal power. They were also ordered to look into the affairs of Macedonia; for the Macedonians, being unaccustomed to democratic and parliamentary government, were quarrelling among themselves. The legates also had to report on the condition of Galatia and the kingdom of Ariarathes, and shortly afterwards they received a dispatch from the senate ordering them to do all in their power to reconcile the kings in Alexandria.

Embassy from Ariarathes

At the same time envoys arrived from Ariarathes, who had recently succeeded to the throne of Cappadocia, to renew the previously existing alliance, and to beg the senate in general to avail themselves of the friendship and goodwill borne by that king towards the Roman state and all its citizens. The senate, after listening to their speech, renewed the alliance and replied in courteous terms, approving in general the king's attitude. This was chiefly owing to the fact that Tiberius and the other legates, when they were sent to inquire into the conduct of the kings, had on their return reported favourably concerning this king's father and the general state of the kingdom. Relying on this report the senate received the embassy courteously and approved the king's attitude.

II. Affairs of Greece

Rhodes and Caria

The Rhodians, delivered from their difficult position, now breathed freely and sent Cleagoras on an embassy to Rome to beg that Calynda might be ceded to them and to ask the senate to allow those of their citizens

who owned property in Lycia and Caria to hold possession of it as before. They also voted to erect in the temple of Athena a colossal statue of the Roman People thirty cubits high.

Upon Calynda revolting from Caunus and the Caunians undertaking the siege of the city, the Calyndians at first appealed to Cnidus for help. With the aid of the Cnidians they held out for a time against the enemy, but fearing for the future decided to send an embassy to Rhodes, to put their city in the hands of the Rhodians. The Rhodians, sending succour by sea and land, raised the siege and occupied the city, the possession of which was secured to them by the senate.

III. Affairs of Asia

Gaius Sulpicius Gallus, besides the indiscretions I have just mentioned, upon reaching Asia posted up notices in the principal towns, ordering all who wished to bring accusations against King Eumenes to present themselves at Sardis by a given date. Afterwards, when he himself arrived at Sardis, he sat for about ten days in the gymnasium listening to the accusers, admitting any kind of foul and abusive language about the king, and in general attaching weight to every fact and every accusation, being a man whose mind was deranged and who gloried in his quarrel with Eumenes.

The harsher the conduct of the Romans to Eumenes the more attached to him did the Greeks become, since men naturally bestow their affections on any one who is in distress.

Ariarathes of Cappadocia

Ariarathes, the king of Cappadocia, on the return of the envoys he had sent to Rome, thinking from the answers he received that his kingdom was

now on a safe footing, since he had succeeded in gaining the goodwill of the Romans, paid a thank-offering to the gods for his success and gave a banquet to his nobles. After this he sent envoys to Lysias [2] at Antioch, being anxious to recover the bones of his sister and mother. He thought it better not to accuse Lysias of the crime, as he did not wish to irritate him for fear of being disappointed in his object, although he was deeply aggrieved, but dispatched the envoys with instructions simply to proffer the request. Lysias granted it, and upon the bones being brought back to him, he gave them a splendid reception on their arrival and buried them reverently beside his father's tomb.

[2] The minister of Antiochus Eupator.

About this time legates arrived from Rome, in the first place Marcus Junius, to settle the difference between the Galatians and King Ariarathes. For since the Trocmi could not succeed by their own efforts in obtaining a slice of Cappadocia, but when they ventured on the attempt at once met with the punishment they deserved, they appealed to Rome and attempted to traduce Ariarathes. It was for this reason that Junius was sent. The king having addressed him in a suitable manner and behaved to him in other respects with every courtesy, was thanked by this legate before his departure; and when in the next place Gnaeus Octavius and Spurius Lucretius arrived and again spoke to Ariarathes about his difference with the Galatians, the king, after briefly touching on this matter and saying that he would be ready to bow to their decision, went on to talk about the affairs of Syria, as he knew that Octavius and his colleague were going on there. He called their attention to the unsettled state of the kingdom and the unprincipled character of its rulers, and in addition he offered to accompany

them with an armed force and wait to see what turn matters took until they returned safely from Syria. The legates, while gratefully acknowledging the king's kindness and zeal in every respect, said that they did not require the escort for the present, but as regards the future, if they had need of any such service they would have no hesitation in informing him, regarding him as they did, as one of the true friends of Rome.

Death of Antiochus Epiphanes

In Syria King Antiochus, wishing to provide himself with money, decided to make an expedition against the sanctuary of Artemis in Elymaïs. On reaching the spot he was foiled in his hopes, as the barbarian tribes who dwelt in the neighbourhood would not permit the outrage, and on his retreat he died at Tabae in Persia, smitten with madness, as some people say, owing to certain manifestations of divine displeasure when he was attempting this outrage on the above sanctuary.

IV. Affairs of Italy

The Rival Ptolemies

After the two Ptolemies had partitioned the kingdom the younger brother arrived in Rome, wishing to annul the terms of the partition between himself and his brother, saying that he had done what he was ordered not of his own free will, but forced to consent by the pressure of circumstances. He begged the senate to assign Cyprus to him, for even with this addition his share would be much inferior to his brother's. Canuleius and Quintus testified in favour of Menyllus the envoy of the elder brother, saying that the younger brother owed both Cyrene and his life to their own action, so great was the hostility and aversion with which the populace regarded him. When, therefore, contrary to his expectations and hopes the sovereignty of

Cyrene had been given to him, he had been only too glad to accept it and had exchanged oaths with his brother as to this over victims solemnly immolated. All this was denied by the younger Ptolemy, and the senate, seeing that the division had been quite unfair and wishing to make an effective partition of the kingdom due to themselves, acceded to the request of the younger brother, which coincided with their own interests. For many decisions of the Romans are now of this kind: availing themselves of the mistakes of others they effectively increase and build up their own power, at the same time doing a favour and appearing to confer a benefit on the offenders. So, seeing as they did the size of the Egyptian kingdom, and fearing lest if it once fell into the hands of a ruler capable of protecting it, he might have too high an idea of himself, they appointed Titus Torquatus and Gnaeus Merula as legates to accompany Ptolemy to Cyprus and carry out the purpose of that king and their own. They dispatched them at once with orders to reconcile the brothers and establish the younger brother in Cyprus without war.

Escape of Demetrius from Rome

At this time when the news arrived of the calamity that had happened to Gnaeus Octavius, how he had been assassinated, and when the envoys sent by Lysias on behalf of King Antiochus appeared and were profuse in their assurances that the friends of the king had had no part in the deed, the senate paid scant attention to the embassy, not wishing to pronounce any decision on the matter or to express in any manner their opinion. But Demetrius, excited by the news, at once sent for Polybius and submitted to him his doubt as to whether or not he should address the senate again on the question of his own situation. Polybius begged him not to stumble twice on

the same stone, but to trust in himself and take some bold course worthy of a throne; for, he said, there were many opportunities for action suggested by the present situation. Demetrius understood this advice and held his peace for the present, but shortly afterwards communicated with one of his intimate friends, about the same matter. This man, being of an unsuspecting character and quite young, advised him to try the senate once more, for he felt sure, that as they had unjustly deprived him of his kingdom, they would at least release him from his position as hostage, since it was quite unreasonable that now, when the young Antiochus had succeeded to the throne of Syria, Demetrius should serve as hostage for him. Persuaded by this reasoning Demetrius again appeared before the senate and begged the house to release him at least from his obligation as hostage, as they had decided to secure the throne to Antiochus. After he had spoken at some length in this sense, the senate adhered to its original resolve, as was only to be expected. For on the former occasion it was not because Demetrius was not right in what he said that they had decided to keep the young king on the throne, but because it suited their own interest. And as the conditions remained the same, it was to be expected that the decision of the senate should be based on the same policy.

But Demetrius, having sung his swan's song in vain and recognizing the soundness of Polybius's advice not to stumble twice on the same stone, repented of what he had done, but, being naturally high-spirited and having courage adequate to carry out his designs, at once called Diodorus who had recently arrived from Syria and informed him of his position. Diodorus had been the foster-father of Demetrius; he was an able man had carefully studied the situation in Syria, and he now pointed out to Demetrius that

since great disturbance prevailed there owing to the murder of Octavius, since Lysias and the populace mutually distrusted each other, and since the senate was convinced that the outrage on their envoys had been due to the king's friends, the time was very favourable for his appearing suddenly on the scene. For the Syrians would at once transfer the crown to him, even if he appeared accompanied only by a single slave, while the senate would not go so far as to help and support Lysias after his conduct. All that remained then was to escape from Rome secretly without anyone having any notion of his plan. Having come to this decision, Demetrius sent for Polybius and communicated the project to him, begging him to assist him in it and join him in planning the best means of escape. At that time it happened that there was a certain Menyllus of Alabanda present, on an embassy from the elder Ptolemy, with the object of confronting and answering the younger Ptolemy. Polybius had long been intimate with this Menyllus, and had great confidence in him. So that, thinking him to be the proper person to engage in the present service, he introduced him to Demetrius, recommending him very cordially and warmly. Menyllus consented to take part in the project, and engaged to have a ship ready and to provide all else that was required for the voyage. Finding a Carthaginian ship that had carried sacred offerings anchored at the mouth of the Tiber, he hired it. Such ships were specially selected at Carthage for the conveyance of the traditional offering of first-fruits to their gods that the Carthaginians send to Tyre. Menyllus chartered her openly to convey himself home; so that he could without any suspicion send on board a month's stock of provisions and could speak openly to the ship's officers and make arrangements with them.

When the skipper had made all his preparations and it only remained for Demetrius to make his own arrangements, he first of all sent his foster-father off to Syria, to find out by listening to conversations and by what he observed what was the state of popular feeling there. His foster-brother Apollonius had taken part in the project from the outset, and he also took the two brothers of Apollonius, Meleager, and Menestheus, into his confidence, but no other member of his suite, though it was fairly numerous. These brothers were really the sons of the Apollonius who had stood in high favour with Seleucus, but had removed to Miletus upon Antiochus succeeding to the crown. The day agreed upon with the ship's officers was now approaching, and it became necessary to arrange for a party at the house of one of his friends in order to enable Demetrius to go out; for it was impossible to dine at his own house, since he had been in the habit of scrupulously inviting all members of his suite. Those who had been initiated into the plot were to dine at home and come on board the ship, each attended by one slave, having sent their other slaves on to Anagnia, saying they would follow them on the following day. Polybius happened at the time to be ill in bed, but he knew of all that was going on, as Menyllus kept him constantly informed. So being very much afraid that if the banquet were unduly prolonged, as Demetrius was naturally fond of his cups and extremely young, he might find some difficulty in going out owing to the effects of drink, he wrote and sealed a short note, and sent off a slave of his own with it shortly after dusk with orders to call out Demetrius's cup-bearer and deliver the note to him, not mentioning who he was, or from whom it was, but begging him to give it to Demetrius to read at once. All was done

as had been ordered, and Demetrius took it and read it. The note contained the following saws:

The doer is away with all the tarrier's gear.

Night favours all alike but the most brave. [3]

Be brave and risk it, act to lose or win,

Anything but to give thyself away.

Be sober and remember to distrust;

These are the sinews of the mind. [4]

[3] Euripides, *Phoen*. 633.

[4] By Epicharmus. Cp. Bk. XVIII. 40.

Demetrius, having read this and understanding the purport of the lines and from whom they came, at once left the house pretending that he felt sick, escorted by his friends. On arriving at a hut he sent off to Anagnia those of his slaves whom it did not suit him to keep, ordering them to bring the nets and dogs and meet him at Cerceii, for that was where he used constantly to go and hunt the wild boar, which was in fact the beginning of his intimacy with Polybius. In the next place he informed Nicanor and his friends of his plan, and begged them to throw in their lot with him. Upon their all readily consenting, he asked them to return at once to their residences and order their slaves to proceed in the early morning to Anagnia, and joining the huntsmen meet them at Cerceii. They themselves were to put on travelling dress and return to him, after telling their slaves that they would fetch Demetrius and join them next day at the above place. All was managed as I have stated, and they went on by night to Ostia at the mouth of the Tiber. Menyllus had preceded them and communicated with the officers of the ship, saying that he must himself remain in Rome for the

present, but must send on to him in advance the most trustworthy of his young soldiers, who would give him all the news about his brother. So he said he himself would not embark, but that the soldiers who were to make the voyage would arrive about midnight. The ship's officers were not concerned at this, since the fare agreed upon had been prepaid, and they had made all their preparations for the voyage long ago. Demetrius and those with him arrived at the end of the third watch of the night, being eight in number with five grown-up slaves and three slave boys. After Menyllus had conversed with them, pointing out the provisions for the voyage, and recommending them very cordially to the skipper and his crew, they went on board and the pilot heaved anchor just as it was getting light and set sail, having no idea at all of the truth, but fancying he was conveying some soldiers from Menyllus to Ptolemy.

In Rome no one was likely to look next day for Demetrius or those who left with him. For those who remained on the spot supposed he had started for Cerceii, and those in Anagnia were going to meet him at the same spot, supposing he would come there. The consequence was that his escape was entirely unnoticed, until one of the slaves who had been scourged in Anagnia ran off to Cerceii, supposing he would meet Demetrius there, and when he failed to do so ran on again to Rome, thinking he would meet him on the road. But not finding him anywhere he informed the friends of Demetrius in Rome and the members of the household who were left behind. When four days after his departure people began to look for Demetrius, a suspicion of the truth arose, and on the fifth day, when Demetrius had already passed the Straits of Messina, a special meeting of the senate was held on the subject. Any idea of pursuit was abandoned

because on the one hand they supposed that he was well advanced on his voyage, as the wind was favourable, and on the other hand they saw that they could not prevent him even if they wished. After a few days they appointed three commissioners, Tiberius Gracchus, Lucius Lentulus, and Servilius Glaucia to examine first of all into the state of Greece, and then, crossing to Asia, to await the result of Demetrius's action, and to inquire into the sentiments of the other kings, and decide the differences between the latter and the Galatians. The reason why they appointed Tiberius Gracchus was that he had personal knowledge of all these subjects. Such was the state of affairs in Italy.

(Suid.)

Demetrius was anxiously expecting the arrival of the messenger who was to be sent to him.

V. Affairs of Asia

Artaxias wished to kill . . . but by the advice of Ariarathes instead of doing so held him in greater honour than formerly. Such is the power of justice, and of the opinion and advice of good men that thereby not only our friends but our enemies are often saved and their natures changed for the better.

Good looks are a better recommendation than any letter.

VI. Affairs of Africa

The Rival Ptolemies

After this the younger Ptolemy arriving in Greece with the legates, collected a powerful force of mercenaries, among whom was the Macedonian Damasippus, who, after murdering the members of the council at Phacus fled from Macedonia with his wife and family. Arriving in the

Rhodian Peraea, the king was hospitably received there by the state, and proposed to sail for Cyprus. Torquatus and his colleagues, seeing that he had got together this formidable force of mercenaries, reminded him of their instructions, which were that his return to Cyprus must be effected without war, and finally persuaded him after proceeding as far as Side to dismiss the troops, and abandoning his attempt on Cyprus to meet them on the borders of Cyrene. They themselves, they said, would sail to Alexandria, and after inducing the king to submit to the senate's request, would come to meet him on the frontier accompanied by his brother. The younger Ptolemy, persuaded by these arguments, gave up his Cyprian project, disbanded his mercenary force, and took ship first of all for Crete accompanied by Damasippus and one of the legates, Gnaeus Merula. After collecting in Crete a force of about a thousand soldiers he set sail and crossing to Africa landed at Apis. Meanwhile Torquatus and the other legates on arriving at Alexandria attempted to induce the elder Ptolemy to be reconciled to his brother and cede Cyprus to him. When the king kept on alternately promising and refusing and thus wasted time, his younger brother, who, as had been agreed, remained encamped with his Cretans near Apis in Africa, and was exceedingly put out at receiving no information, at first sent Gnaeus to Alexandria, supposing that he would bring Torquatus and the others. But when Gnaeus proved equally inactive, and time dragged on, forty days having passed without any news, he did not know what to make of the whole matter. For the elder king by every kind of complaisance won over the legates and detained them with him rather against their will than otherwise. At the same time news reached the younger Ptolemy that the Cyreneans had revolted, that the towns were in sympathy with them, and

that Ptolemy Sympetesis, an Egyptian, whom he had placed in charge of the country when he left for Rome, had taken the part of the insurgents. When he received this news, and when soon afterwards he heard that the Cyreneans had taken the field, fearing lest by trying to add Cyprus to his dominions he should lose Cyrene also, he treated all other matters as of lesser moment and at once marched on Cyrene. Upon reaching the place known as the Great Slope he found the Libyans and Cyreneans occupying the pass. Ptolemy, taken aback by this, embarked half of his force on the ships with orders to sail round the pass and take the enemy in the rear, while he himself with the other half advanced directly to force the ascent. Upon the Libyans taking fright at this double attack and abandoning their position, he made himself master of the ascent and the place called the Four Towers beneath it, where there was plenty of water. Setting out thence he arrived after six days' march through the desert. The force under Mochyrinus coasted along parallel to him until they found the Cyreneans encamped eight thousand strong in foot and five hundred in cavalry. For the Cyreneans had gained experience of Ptolemy's character from his behaviour at Alexandria, and, seeing that his government and his whole disposition were those of a tyrant rather than a king, they were by no means disposed to submit willingly to his rule, but were resolved to suffer anything for the prospect of liberty. They, therefore, on his approach, at once offered battle and in the end he was worsted.

At this time Gnaeus Merula also came from Alexandria and informed Ptolemy that his brother had not met any of the demands, but maintained that their original agreement must be adhered to. The king, on learning this, at once appointed the brothers Comanus and Ptolemy his envoys, and

dispatched them to Rome together with Gnaeus to inform the senate of his brother's selfish greed and contempt for their orders. At the same time the elder Ptolemy dismissed Torquatus without his having achieved anything. Such was the state of affairs at Alexandria and in Cyrene.

VII. Affairs of Italy

Embassies from the Ptolemies

At the time I am dealing with, Comanus and his brother arrived on an embassy from the younger Ptolemy and Menyllus of Alabanda from the elder one. They all entered the house together, where they had a long and acrimonious dispute with each other; but when both Torquatus and Merula confirmed the statements of the younger brother and warmly supported him, the senate decreed that Menyllus must leave Rome in five days, that their alliance with the elder Ptolemy was at an end, and that legates should be sent to the younger brother to inform him of their decision. Publius Apustius and Caius Lentulus were appointed and at once took ship for Cyrene where they announced this important decision to Ptolemy. The king, much elated by it, at once began to collect troops and was entirely occupied with his projected attempt on Cyprus. Such was the state of affairs in Italy.

VIII. Affairs of Africa

Massanissa and Carthage

In Africa Massanissa, seeing the numbers of the cities founded on the coast of the Lesser Syrtis and the fertility of the country which they call Emporia, and casting envious eyes on the abundant revenue derived from this district, had tried, not many years before the time I am dealing with, to wrest it from Carthage. He easily made himself master of the open country as he could command it, owing to the Carthaginians, who had always been

poor soldiers, having latterly become completely enervated in consequence of the long peace. He could not, however, get hold of the towns as they were carefully guarded by the Carthaginians. Both parties appealed to the senate about their differences, and numerous embassies had come from both on the subject, but the Carthaginians always came off second best at Rome, not because they had not right on their side, but because the judges were convinced that it was in their own interest to decide against them. Their claim to the country was evidently just; for Massanissa himself not many years previously, while pursuing with an army Aphther who had rebelled against him, had begged permission from them to pass through this district, thus acknowledging that he had no claim to it. But nevertheless at the end the Carthaginians were in such straits owing to the decisions of the senate at the time I am speaking of, that they not only lost the country and the towns in it, but had to pay in addition five hundred talents for the mesne revenue of it since the dispute originated.

IX. Affairs of Italy

Aemilius Paullus and Scipio

The most striking and splendid proof of the integrity of Lucius Aemilius became manifest to all after his death; for the same high reputation which he had possessed during his life continued when he had departed from it; and this we may say is the best proof there can be of virtue. The man, I say, who had brought to Rome from Spain more gold than any of his contemporaries, who had had at his disposal the vast treasure of Macedonia, and had been at perfect liberty to use all this money as he chose, died so poor that his sons could not pay his wife the whole of her jointure out of the personality, and without selling some of the real property. Of this I have

spoken in detail above. We may say that the reputation of those most admired in this respect by the ancient Greeks has been put into shadow. For it is an admirable thing to refuse to touch money offered in the interest of the giver, as Aristeides of Athens and Epaminondas of Thebes are said to have done, how much more admirable is it for one who had a whole kingdom at his sole disposal, and had liberty to do what he wished with it, to covet none of it? If this appears incredible to anyone, I beg him to consider that the present writer is perfectly aware that this work will be perused by Romans above all people, containing as it does an account of their most splendid achievements, and that it is impossible either that they should be ignorant of the facts or disposed to pardon any departure from truth. So that no one would willingly expose himself thus to certain disbelief and contempt. And this should be borne in mind through this whole work, whenever I seem to make any startling statements about Romans.

Now that the progress of my narrative and the date call our special attention to this family, I wish in order to satisfy the reader's curiosity to execute a promise I made in the previous book and left unfulfilled, and this was that I would tell how and why the fame of Scipio in Rome advanced so far and became so brilliant more quickly than it should, and to tell also how his friendship and intimacy with the author grew so great that this report about them not only spread to Italy and Greece, but that even further afield their liking and intercourse were a matter of common knowledge. Now I have already explained that their acquaintance took its origin in the loan of some books and conversation about them. But as their intimacy grew, and when the Achaeans in detention were sent off to provincial towns, Fabius

[5] and Scipio, the sons of Lucius Aemilius, urgently begged the praetor to allow Polybius to remain in Rome. This was done, and their intercourse now becoming much closer, the following incident took place. On one occasion when they were all coming out together from the house of Fabius, the latter happened to take a turning leading to the forum, while Polybius and Scipio turned off in the opposite direction. As they advanced Scipio, addressing Polybius in a quiet and gentle voice, and blushing slightly said: "Why, Polybius, since there are two of us, do you constantly converse with my brother and address to him all your questions and explanations, but ignore me? Evidently you also have the same opinions of me that I hear the rest of my countrymen have. For, as I am told, I am believed by everybody to be a quiet and indolent man, with none of the energetic character of a Roman, because I don't choose to speak in the law courts. And they say that the family I spring from does not require such a protector as I am, but just the opposite; and this is what I feel most."

[5] The brother of Scipio who was adopted by Quintus Fabius Maximus Cunctator.

Polybius was surprised at the way in which the young man opened the conversation; for he was then not more than eighteen years old. "For goodness' sake, Scipio," he said, "don't talk in that way, or get any such notion into your head. I don't, I assure you, do this because I have a low opinion of you or ignore you, but because your brother is your senior. I both begin conversation with him and finish with him, and as for any explanations and advice, I address myself especially to him in the belief that your opinions are the same as his. However, now I admire you when you say that you are pained to think that you are of a milder character than

becomes members of his family; for that shows that you have a high spirit. I myself would be delighted to do all in my power to help you to speak and act in a way worthy of your ancestors. For as those studies which I see now occupy and interest you, you will be in no want of those ready to help both of you; so great is the crowd of such men that I see flocking here from Greece at present. But as regards what you say now troubles you I don't think you could find anyone more efficient than myself to forward your effort and help you." Before Polybius ceased speaking, Scipio, grasping his their hand in both his own and pressing it warmly, said: "Would I could see the day on which you, regarding nothing else as of higher importance, would devote your attention to me and join your life with mine; for then I shall at once feel myself to be worthy of my house and my forefathers." Polybius was on the one hand very happy to see the enthusiasm and affection of the young man, yet was embarrassed when he reflected on the high position of the family and the wealth of its members. However, after this mutual explanation the young man never left his side, and preferred his society to anything else. From that time onwards continuing in the actual conduct of life to give proof to each other of their worth, they came to regard each other with an affection like that of father and son or near relations.

The first direction taken by Scipio's ambition to lead a virtuous life, was to attain a reputation for temperance and excel in this respect all the other young men of the same age. This is a high prize indeed and difficult to gain, but it was at this time easy to pursue at Rome owing to the vicious tendencies of most of the youths. For some of them had abandoned themselves to amours with boys and others to the society of courtesans, and

many to musical entertainments and banquets, and the extravagance they involve, having in the course of the war with Perseus been speedily infected by the Greek laxity in these respects. So great in fact was the incontinence that had broken out among the young men in such matters, that many paid a talent for a male favourite and many three hundred drachmas for a jar of caviar. This aroused the indignation of Cato, who said once in a public speech that it was the surest sign of deterioration in the republic when pretty boys fetch more than fields, and jars of caviar more than ploughmen. It was just at the period we are treating of that this present tendency to extravagance declared itself, first of all because they thought that now after the fall of the Macedonian kingdom their universal dominion was undisputed, and next because after the riches of Macedonia had been transported to Rome there was a great display of wealth both in public and in private. Scipio, however, setting himself to pursue the opposite course of conduct, combating all his appetites and moulding his life to be in every way coherent and uniform, in about the first five years established his universal reputation for strictness and temperance.

In the next place he sedulously studied to distinguish himself from others in magnanimity and cleanhandedness in money matters. In this respect the part of his life he spent with his real father [6] was an excellent grounding for him, and he had good natural impulses towards the right; but chance too helped him much in carrying out this resolve.

[6] Lucius Aemilius Paulus.

The first occasion was the death of the mother of his adoptive father. [7] She was the sister of his own father, Lucius Aemilius, and wife of his grandfather by adoption, the great Scipio. He inherited from her a large

fortune and in his treatment of it was to give the first proof of his high principle. This lady whose name was Aemilia, used to display great magnificence whenever she left her house to take part in the ceremonies that women attend, having participated in the fortune of Scipio when he was at the height of his prosperity. For apart from the richness of her own dress and of the decorations of her carriage, all the baskets, cups, and other utensils for the sacrifice were either of gold or silver, and were borne in her train on all such solemn occasions, while the number of maids and men-servants in attendance was correspondingly large. Immediately after Aemilia's funeral all these splendid appointments were given by Scipio to his mother, [8] who had been for many years separated from her husband, and whose means were not sufficient to maintain a state suitable to her rank. Formerly she had kept to her house on the occasion of such functions, and now when a solemn public sacrifice happened to take place, and she drove out in all Aemilia's state and splendour, and when in addition the carriage and pair and the muleteers were seen to be the same, all the women who witnessed it were lost in admiration of Scipio's goodness and generosity and, lifting up their hands, prayed that every blessing might be his. Such conduct would naturally be admired anywhere, but in Rome it was a marvel; for absolutely no one there ever gives away anything to anyone if he can help it. This then was the first origin of his reputation for nobility of character, and it advanced rapidly, for women are fond of talking and once they have started a thing never have too much of it.

[7] Aemilia, wife of the great Scipio and mother of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, who adopted his cousin the son of L. Aemilius Paulus.

[8] Her name was Papiria.

In the next place he had to pay the daughters of the great Scipio, the sisters of his adoptive father, the half of their portion. Their father had agreed to give each of his daughters fifty talents, and their mother had paid the half of this to their husbands at once on their marriage, but left the other half owing on her death. Thus Scipio had to pay this debt to his father's sisters. According to Roman law the part of the dowry still due had to be paid to the ladies in three years, the personal property being first handed over within ten months according to Roman usage. But Scipio at once ordered his banker to pay each of them in ten months the whole twenty-five talents. When the ten months had elapsed, and Tiberius Gracchus and Scipio Nasica, who were the husbands of the ladies, applied to the banker and asked him if he had received any orders from Scipio about the money, and when the banker asked them to receive the sum and made out for each of them a transfer of twenty-five talents, they said he was mistaken; for according to law they should not at once receive the whole sum, but only a third of it. But when he told them that these were Scipio's orders, they could not believe it, but went on to call on the young man, under the impression that he was in error. And this was quite natural on their part; for not only would no one in Rome pay fifty talents three years before it was due, but no one would pay one talent before the appointed day; so universal and so extreme is their exactitude about money as well as their desire to profit by every moment of time. However, when they called on Scipio and asked him what orders he had given the banker, and he told them he had ordered him to pay the whole sum to his sisters, they said he was mistaken, since he had the legal right to use the sum for a considerable time yet. Scipio answered

that he was quite aware of that, but that while as regards strangers he insisted on the letter of the law, he behaved as far as he could in an informal and liberal way to his relatives and friends. He therefore begged them to accept the whole sum from the banker. Tiberius and Nasica on hearing this went away without replying, astounded at Scipio's magnanimity and abashed at their own meanness, although they were second to none in Rome.

Two years later, when his own father Aemilius died, and left him and his brother Fabius heirs to his estate, he again acted in a noble manner deserving of mention. Aemilius was childless, as he had given some of his sons to be adopted by other families and those whom he had kept to succeed him were dead, and he therefore left his property to Scipio and Fabius. Scipio, knowing that his brother was by no means well off, gave up the whole inheritance, which was estimated at more than sixty talents, to him in order that Fabius might thus possess a fortune equal to his own. This became widely known, and he now gave an even more conspicuous proof of his generosity. His brother wished to give a gladiatorial show on the occasion of his father's funeral, but was unable to meet the expense, which was very considerable, and Scipio contributed the half of it out of his own fortune. The total expense of such a show amounts to not less than thirty talents if it is done on a generous scale. While the report of this was still fresh, his mother died, and Scipio, far from taking back any of the gifts I mentioned above, gave the whole of it and the residue of his mother's property to his sisters, who had no legal claim to it. So that again when his sisters had thus come into the processional furniture and all the

establishment of Aemilia, the fame of Scipio for magnanimity and family affection was again revived.

Having thus from his earliest years laid the foundations of it, Publius Scipio advanced in his pursuit of this reputation for temperance and nobility of character. By the expenditure of perhaps sixty talents—for that was what he had bestowed from his own property—his reputation for the second of these virtues was firmly established, and he did not attain his purpose so much by the largeness of the sums he gave as by the seasonableness of the gift and the gracious manner in which he conferred it. His reputation for temperance cost him nothing, but by abstaining from many and varied pleasures he gained in addition that bodily health and vigour which he enjoyed for the whole of his life, and which by the many pleasures of which it was the cause amply rewarded him for his former abstention from common pleasures.

It remained for him to gain a reputation for courage, nearly the most essential virtue in all states and especially so in Rome; and for this the training required of him was correspondingly severe. Chance, however, assisted him also in this determination. For the members of the royal house of Macedon had always been devoted to hunting, and the Macedonians had reserved the most suitable areas for breeding game. These districts during the war had been as carefully preserved as formerly, but had never been hunted for four years owing to the exigencies of the times, so that there was an abundance of big game of every kind. When the war had been brought to a conclusion, Aemilius, thinking that hunting was the best training and amusement for the young men, placed the royal huntsmen at Scipio's disposal, and gave him complete control over the preserves. Scipio, availing

himself of this and regarding himself as being nearly in the position of king, spent the whole time that the army remained in Macedonia after the battle of Pydna in this pursuit, and, as he became a very enthusiastic sportsman, being of the right age and physique for such an exercise, like a well-bred dog, this taste of his for hunting became permanent. So that when he arrived in Rome and when he found in Polybius one equally devoted to the chase, all the time that other young men gave up to law affairs and greetings, spending the whole day in the forum and thus trying to court the favour of the populace, Scipio was occupied by the chase, and by his brilliant and memorable exploits, acquired a higher reputation than anyone. For the others could not win praise except by injuring some of their fellow-citizens, this being the usual consequence of prosecutions in the law courts; but Scipio, without ever vexing a soul, gained this universal reputation for courage, matching his deeds against their words. So that in a short space of time he had outstripped his contemporaries more than is recorded of any other Roman, although the path he pursued to gain glory was quite the opposite of that followed by all others in accordance with Roman usage and custom.

I have spoken at such length of the development of Scipio's character from his earliest years partly because I thought the story would be agreeable to those advanced in years and salutary for the young, but chiefly in order to secure credence for all I shall have to tell of him in the Books which follow, so that readers may neither hesitate to accept as true anything in his subsequent life that seems astonishing nor depriving the man himself of the credit of his meritorious achievements put them down to chance from

ignorance of the true cause of each. There were some few exceptions which we may assign of good luck and chance.

After this long digression I will now resume my regular narrative.

X. Affairs of Greece

The Rhodians and Eumenes

The Rhodians, while in other respects maintaining the dignity of their state, slightly deviated from it at this time, in my opinion, by accepting from Eumenes 280,000 medimni of corn for the purpose of lending out the proceeds and applying the interest to the payment of the salaries of the tutors and teachers their sons. Such a gift might perhaps be accepted from his friends by a private person who found himself in temporary straits in order not to allow his children to remain untaught through poverty, but the last thing that anyone in affluent circumstances would submit to would be to go a-begging among his friends for money to pay teachers. And, as a state should have more pride than a private person, more strict propriety of conduct should be observed in public transactions than in private, and especially by the Rhodians owing to the wealth of the community and their noted sense of dignity.

XI. Affairs of Asia

In Asia, Prusias and the Galatians dispatched envoys to Rome to accuse Eumenes, and that prince sent his brother Attalus to defend him against the charges. Ariarathes sent a "crown" of a thousand gold pieces to the goddess Rome and envoys of the inform the senate of his reply to Tiberius, begging them to point out to him what they required of him, as he was ready to comply with all the commands of the Romans.

Submission of Demetrius

When Menochares reached Demetrius at Antioch and informed him of his interview with Tiberius Gracchus in Cappadocia, the king, thinking that the most urgent thing for the present was to talk over Tiberius as far as he could, treated other matters as of secondary importance and sent messages to Tiberius first to Pamphylia and next to Rhodes, engaging to submit entirely to Rome, and finally succeeded in getting himself recognized as king. Tiberius indeed was very kindly disposed to Demetrius, and therefore contributed much to the success of his efforts and his establishment on the throne. Demetrius having thus gained his object, at once sent envoys to Rome conveying a present of a "crown," as well as the murderer of Gnaeus Octavius and the critic Isocrates.

THE END OF BOOK XXXI

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXXII

I. AFFAIRS OF ITALY

Embassies of Ariarathes and Attalus

At this time arrived the envoys from Ariarathes, bringing the "crown" of ten thousand gold pieces, and informing the senate of the king's friendly mind towards Rome. They appealed for this to the testimony of Tiberius, and when the latter confirmed what they said, the senate accepted the crown with many thanks and sent in return the most honourable gifts that they are used to bestow, the sceptre and the ivory chair. These envoys were let go by the senate at once, before the beginning of winter, and afterwards when the consuls had already entered on office, Attalus presented himself. When the Galatians sent by Prusias and several other envoys from Asia accused Attalus, the senate, after giving them all a hearing, not only dismissed the charges, but sent Attalus back loaded with kindnesses. For the greater their estrangement from Eumenes and their hostility to him, the more did they court the friendship of Attalus and strengthen his power.

Embassies from Demetrius

Envoys headed by Menochares also came from King Demetrius bringing the "crown" of ten thousand gold pieces dedicated to Rome, and with the assassin of Gnaeus Octavius in their custody. The senate remained long in doubt as to how to deal with the matter, but nevertheless they received the crown and the envoys. They did not, however, take over the men who were in custody. And yet Demetrius had not only sent Leptines, the murderer of

Gnaeus, but also Isocrates. This man was one of those grammarians who declaim in public, and being by nature a chatterbox, a braggart, and a bore, had given offence in Greece also, where Alcaeus [1] had very cleverly taken him off and made fun of him in his *Comparisons*, and when he came to Syria and conceived a contempt for the inhabitants, he was not satisfied with holding forth on his own subjects, but gave vent to pronouncements on public affairs, saying that Gnaeus had met with his deserts, and that the other legates should have been killed also, so that not one should be left to report the matter to the Romans, and this would put a stop to their haughty orders and their unrestrained exercise of power. It was by these incautious utterances that he got himself into trouble as I have stated.

[1] Probably an Epicurean philosopher and writer of this name.

What happened in regard to these two men is worth mentioning. Leptines, after he had murdered Gnaeus, at once began to go about in Laodicea quite openly, saying that he had done rightly and with the favour of Heaven. Upon the accession of Demetrius he approached the king and begged him to have no fear owing to the murder of Gnaeus, and to take no vigorous steps against the Laodiceans. "For I, myself," he said, "will go to Rome and convince the senate that I did the deed by the will of the gods." And finally, owing to his readiness and eagerness to go, he was brought to Rome unfettered and without a guard. But Isocrates, as soon as he found himself accused, completely lost his wits, and after the collar with its chain had been put on his neck, seldom took any food and entirely left off taking any care of his person. So that when he arrived in Rome he was a wonderful spectacle, and when one looked at him one could not but confess that there is nothing more terrible in body and soul than a man once he has become

absolutely like a beast. For both his aspect was strangely terrifying and beastlike, as for more than a year he had neither washed nor cut his nails and hair; and the disorder of his mind, as was evident from the expression and rolling of his eyes, impressed one with such terror, that anyone who looked at him would have been readier to approach any beast than this man. Leptines, however, maintaining his original attitude, was ready to appear before the senate, and confessed his crime quite simply to those who conversed with him, maintaining at the same time that the Romans would not deal severely with him. And he proved to be quite right. For the senate, taking into consideration, as it seems to me, that the people would think that the murder was avenged, if those guilty of it were given up and punished, scarcely gave a reception to these envoys, but kept the grievance open so as to have the power to make use of the accusations when they wished. The reply, therefore, that they gave to Demetrius was simply this, that he would meet with kindness from them, if his conduct during his reign was satisfactory to the senate.

There also came from Achaea an embassy consisting of Xenon and Telecles to plead in favour of the accused Achaeans and chiefly on behalf of Polybius and Stratius. For most of the rest, at least those of any note, had already paid their debt to time. The envoys came with orders simply to present a request to avoid anything like a dispute with the senate. They appeared before the house and addressed it in suitable language, but even this had no result, the senate deciding on the contrary to leave matters as they were.

II. Affair of Greece

Aetolia after the Death of Lyciscus

Lyciscus the Aetolian was a turbulent and noisy man, and after he was slain, the Aetolians from this time forward lived in unison and concord, simply owing to the removal of this one man. So great it seems is the power exercised by men's natures that not only armies and cities, but national groups and in fact all the different peoples which compose the whole world, experience the extremities sometimes of misfortune and sometimes of prosperity, owing to the good or bad character of a single man.

Lyciscus was a thoroughly bad man but he ended his life nobly, so that most people reasonably upbraid Fortune, in that she sometimes grants to the worst men that fine death which is the guerdon due to the good and brave.

Career of Charops in Epirus

The condition of Aetolia at once improved when their civil broils were extinguished after the death of Lyciscus, and the state of affairs became much better also in Boeotia, when Mnasippus of Coronea had departed this life, and in Acarnania again the same took place when Chremas was removed. We may almost say, in fact, that Greece underwent a sort of purgation by the deaths of these men who had been her curse. For it happened that Charops of Epirus also ended his days at Brundisium during this year. Epirus, however, remained still as in the preceding years in a very unsettled and disturbed state, all due to the cruelty and lawless violence exercised by Charops ever since the end of the war with Perseus. For after the decision of Lucius Anicius and Lucius Aemilius to put some of the notables to death and transport to Rome all those who had incurred the least suspicion, Charops, being now at liberty to do what he wished, committed every kind of crime either personally or through his friends, being himself very young, and all the worst and most unprincipled characters having

gathered about him in the hope of stealing other people's property. A sort of support and colour for the belief that he did all he did for valid reason, and with the approval of Rome, lay in his previous close relations with the Romans and in his association with Myrton, an elderly man and his son Nicanor, both of them men of good character and supposed to be friends of the Romans. They had been previously very far from being guilty of any wrong, but for some reason or other they now devoted themselves to the support of Charops and participation in his crimes. After Charops had murdered some citizens openly in the market-place and others in their own houses, after he had sent emissaries to assassinate others at their country-seats and on the roads, and had confiscated the property of all who perished, he introduced a new device, which was to proscribe and sentence to exile all those who were well off, not only the men, but their wives. Under the terror of this menace he went on extorting money himself from the men and from the women through his mother Philotis: for she too was a great expert at this, and as regards the application of force more capable of helping him than one would expect from a woman.

After they had stripped them all, both men and women, to the utmost of their power, they nevertheless brought all the proscribed before the popular assembly. The people of Phoenice by a majority, either terrorized or seduced by Charops, condemned all the accused not to exile, but to death as enemies of Rome. So all these men went into exile; but Charops now left at once for Rome, taking plenty of money and Myrton into the bargain with him, wishing to obtain from the senate a sanction for his lawless violence. This was an occasion of which the Romans gave a very fine example of their high principle and a splendid exhibition of it to all the Greeks resident

in Rome, and especially to those in detention there. For both Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, who was pontifex maximus and princeps senatus, and Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who had conquered Perseus and possessed the highest credit and influence, when they learnt of what Charops had done in Epirus, forbade him to enter their houses; and when this was noised abroad all the Greek residents were filled with joy, recognizing the Roman hatred of iniquity. After this, when Charops appeared before the senate, that body neither accorded his requests nor consented to give the legates him a definite answer, but said that they would give the legates they were sending instructions to inquire into what had taken place. Charops, however, after his departure, suppressed this answer, but composed one that suited his own case and published it to make out that the Romans approved of his actions.

III. Affairs of Italy

Envoys arrived from Athens and Thearidas and Stephanus from Achaea on behalf of the Delians. For after the cession of Delos to Athens, the Delians, having in response to an embassy been ordered by the Romans to evacuate the island, taking their personal property with them, migrated to Achaea, and becoming Achaean citizens claimed that the procedure in suits brought by them against Athenians should be in accordance with the convention between Athens and the Achaeans. When the Athenians denied that this convention applied in any way to them, the Delians demanded the right to make reprisals on the Athenians. This was the reason of their embassy, and the answer received was that all arrangements about the Delians made by the Achaeans according to their laws should stand.

IV. Affairs of Pergamus

King Eumenes had lost all his bodily vigour, but his brilliant mental qualities were unimpaired. He was a man in most matters second to none of the princes his contemporaries, but he was greater and more brilliant than any of them in all that was most important and honourable. In the first place while the kingdom, as he inherited it from his father, was confined to a few wretched little towns, he made his own dominions such as to rival the greatest contemporary powers, not for the most part helped by Fortune or by any revolution of circumstance, but by his own acuteness, industry, and energy. Next he was most eager to win reputation, and not only conferred more benefits than any king of his time on Greek cities, but established the fortunes of more individual men. Thirdly, having three brothers not far behind him in age and activity, he kept them all in the position of his obedient satellites and guardians of the dignity of his throne, a thing for which one can find few parallels.

V. Affairs of Italy

Mission of Fannius to Dalmatia

As the people of Issa had often sent emissaries to Rome to complain that the Dalmatians continued to raid their territory and the cities in league with them, Epetium and Tragyrium, and as similar accusations had been brought by the Daorsi, the senate dispatched a commission under Gaius Fannius to inquire into the state of Illyria and especially into the conduct of the Dalmatians. The latter, as long as Pleuratus lived, submitted to him, but when he died and Genthius succeeded to the throne, revolting from him they took to making war on the tribes on their borders and reduced the neighbouring peoples, some of whom even paid them tribute in the shape of cattle and corn. This was the object of the mission of Fannius.

King Ariarathes arrived in Rome while it was yet summer; and then after the consuls Sextus Julius Caesar and Lucius Aurelius Orestes had entered on office, he occupied himself with private interviews, adapting his dress and retinue to his present distressed circumstances. Miltiades also arrived on a mission from Demetrius, tuned to speak in either sense; for he was ready to defend Demetrius against Ariarathes, and to accuse the latter with the utmost bitterness. Orophernes too had sent Timotheus and Diogenes as envoys bringing a crown dedicated to Rome and charged to renew the alliance, but chiefly to confront Ariarathes and both to defend themselves and to accuse him. In the private interviews Diogenes and Miltiades and their colleagues made a greater impression, being many against one, and having also all the outward appearance of a prosperity that contrasted with the king's distress. They also possessed over him a decided advantage in the statement of their case; for they had the courage to assert anything and to meet every kind of argument, with an utter disregard for truth, and they took no responsibility for what they said, as there was no one to confute them. So that as falsehood had no trouble in gaining the day, their business seemed to be going on as they wished.

VI. Affairs of Asia

Not a few men from lust for gain have sacrificed even their lives for money, among them Orophernes, the king of Cappadocia, who falling a victim to this passion perished himself and lost his kingdom. Now having given this brief account of the restoration of Ariarathes, I shall resume that regular course of my narrative which I follow throughout the whole of this work. For in the present instance, passing over the affairs of Greece, I appended those Asiatic affairs which relate to Cappadocia, as I found no

justifiable means of separating the departure of Ariarathes from Italy from his return to power. I will, therefore, now go back to the events that happened in Greece at the same date. Among these that which befell the city of Oropus [2] was especially singular and strange. I will give a succinct account of the whole of this matter, partly recurring to the past and partly anticipating the future, so that, the separate details of it being by no means striking, I may not by relating them under different dates produce a narrative both obscure and insignificant. For when the whole seems scarcely worth close attention what chance is there of any student really making it an object of study when it is told disjointedly under different dates?

[2] For some account of this matter see Pausanias VII. 11. 4-7.

For the most part when men are successful they get on well together, but when unsuccessful they get vexed with things and become irritable and fretful with their friends. This was the case with Orophernes when things went against him and Theotimus, and each blamed the other.

(From Athen. X. p. 440 b.)

Polybius says that Orophernes reigned for a short time in Cappadocia, and despising their traditional customs introduced the refined debauchery of Ionia.

The first example given by Attalus of his principles and policy after he succeeded his brother Eumenes was to restore Ariarathes to his kingdom.

VII. Affairs of Italy

War with Dalmatia resolved on

On the return of Gaius Fannius and the other legates from Illyria, they reported that the Dalmatians were so far from consenting to set right any of

the constant abuses complained of by their accusers, that they would not even listen to them, saying that they had nothing in common with the Romans. They also reported that they had neither been given a residence nor supplied with food, and that the Dalmatians had even taken away from them by force the horses they had brought from another town, and were ready to lay violent hands on the legates themselves, had they not yielded to circumstances and left quite quietly. The senate heard them with much attention and were highly indignant at the stubbornness and rudeness of the Dalmatians; but their chief motive for action was that for several reasons they thought the time a suitable one for making war on the Dalmatians. For to begin with they had never once set foot in those parts of Illyria which face the Adriatic since they expelled Demetrius of Pharos, and next they did not at all wish the Italians to become effeminate owing to the long peace, it being now twelve years since the war with Perseus and their campaigns in Macedonia. They, therefore, resolved by undertaking a war against the Dalmatians both to recreate, as it were, the spirit and zeal of their own troops, and by striking terror into the Illyrians to compel them to obey their behests. These, then, were the reasons why the Romans went to war with the Dalmatians, but to the world at large they gave out that they had decided on war owing to the insult to their ambassadors.

At this time envoys came from Epirus both on behalf of those in possession of the city of Phoenice and of the exiled party. After they had spoken in the presence of each other the senate answered that they would give instructions on the subject to the commissioners they were sending to Illyria under Gaius Marcius.

VIII. The War of Prusias with Attalus

Prusias on approaching Pergamus after his victory over Attalus prepared a magnificent sacrifice which he brought to the temple of Asclepius, and having offered the oxen and obtained favourable omens, returned on that day to his camp; but on the next day directing his army to the Nicephorium, he destroyed all the temples and sacred precincts of the gods, and carried off the bronze and marble statues; finally removing and carrying off for himself the statue of Asclepius, an admirable work of art by Phyromachus, that very Asclepius to whom on the previous day he had offered libations, sacrifices and prayers, supplicating him of course to be in every way merciful and gracious to him. On a previous occasion, in speaking of Philip, I have described such conduct as that of a madman. For at one and the same time to sacrifice and thus to sue for the favour of the god, worshipping and adoring most devoutly his tables and altars, as Prusias used to do with genuflexions and womanish mummery, and then to spoil these very objects and by their destruction to inflict an outrage on the divinity, cannot be otherwise described than as the act of a man frenzied by passion and with his mind unhinged—as was actually the case with Prusias then. For after doing nothing worthy of a man in his attacks on the town, but behaving in a cowardly and womanish manner both to gods and men, he marched his army back to Elaea. After making an attempt on Elaea and delivering a few assaults, which were quite ineffectual, as Sosander the king's foster-brother had entered the town with some troops and frustrated his attempts, he withdrew to Thyateira, attacking and despoiling on his retreat the temple of Artemis at Hiera Come. Similarly he not only despoiled, but burnt to the ground the sanctuary of Apollo Cynneius near Temnus, and after those exploits returned to his own country, having waged war not only on men but

on gods. His infantry also suffered much on the retreat from hunger and dysentery, so that it seemed that the vengeance of heaven visited him instantly for these misdeeds.

Attalus, when defeated by Prusias appointed his brother Athenaeus as his envoy and sent him off together with Publius Lentulus to inform the senate of the fact. For in Rome, when Andronicus arrived and informed them of the first attack by the enemy, they paid no attention to him, but suspected that Attalus, intending himself to attack Prusias, was preparing a pretext and anticipating the protest of Prusias by bringing false accusations against him. And as Nicomedes and the envoy of Prusias Antiphilus assured them that there was no truth in it, they were still less inclined to believe this report about Prusias. But after a short time, when further information to the same effect arrived, the senate, in doubt what to believe, dispatched as legates Lucius Apuleius and Gaius Petronius to inquire into the relations of the two kings.

THE END OF BOOK XXXII

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXXIII

I. AFFAIRS OF ITALY

The War between Prusias and Attalus

The senate, while it was still winter, had heard what Publius Lentulus had to report about King Prusias, as this legate had just returned from Asia, and they now summoned also Athenaeus, the brother of King Attalus. They did not, however, require many words about him, but at once appointed Gaius Claudius Cento, Lucius Hortensius, and Gaius Aurunculeius their legates and sent them off in company with Athenaeus with orders to prevent Prusias from making war on Attalus.

Embassy on behalf of the Achaean exiles

There came also to Rome an embassy from the Achaeans consisting of Xenon of Aegium and Telecles of Aegeira on behalf of those in detention. After they had spoken in the senate, upon the matter being put to the vote, the senate came very near setting the suspects free. That their liberation was not carried out was the fault of Aulus Postumius Albinus, at this time praetor and as such presiding over the senate. For while there were three resolutions, one for their release, another opposed to this, and a third for postponement of the release for the present, the majority being in favour of release, Aulus passing over the third alternative put the question in general terms: "Who is for releasing the men and who against it?" Consequently those who were for delay joined those who were for absolute refusal, and thus gave a majority against release. Such were these events.

Embassy from Athens

(From Aulus Gellius, N.A. vi. (vii.) 14. 8-10.)

A difference was noticed in the three philosophers whom the Athenians sent to Rome as their envoys to the senate, to obtain the remission of the fine imposed by the latter for the pillage of Oropus. It was a fine of about five hundred talents. The philosophers were Carneades of the Academy, Diogenes the Stoic, and Critolaus the Peripatetic. When introduced into the senate they employed the senator Gaius Acilius as their interpreter, but each of them had previously spoken before huge crowds to exhibit their skill. Rutilius and Polybius tell us that in each philosopher a different kind of eloquence was admired. "Carneades," they say, "spoke vehemently and rapidly, Critolaus with skill and smoothness, and Diogenes with sobriety and modesty."

The Achaean exiles

When the envoys from Rome returned to Achaea and reported that all those in detention had been very nearly returning, the people became hopeful and elated and at once sent off Telecles and Anaxidamus of Megalopolis on another embassy. Such was the state of matters in Peloponnesus.

II. Affairs of Rhodes

Aristocrates, the Rhodian general, was dignified and imposing in appearance, and from all this the Rhodians imagined that they had a perfectly capable commander and director of the war. But they were deceived in their hopes. For when he came to be tested by action, like base coin tried by fire, he turned out quite otherwise, as was shown by actual facts.

II. Affairs of Cyprus

(Suidas)

Demetrius offered Archias [1] five hundred talents if he gave up Cyprus, and pointed out to him the other advantages and honours that would accrue to him if he rendered him this service.

[1] The governor of Cyprus under Ptolemy.

(Suidas)

When news reached Ptolemy that Archias had arrived. . . .

(Cp. Suidas)

Archias purposed to betray Cyprus to Demetrius, but when detected and prosecuted he hanged himself by a rope taken from the curtain of the entrance door. So true is it that owing to covetousness "vain heads make vain plans," as the proverb says. For thinking to gain five hundred talents he lost both all the money he had and his life into the bargain.

IV. Affairs of Ariarathes

At about this time an unexpected disaster overtook the people of Priene. For having received from Orophernes when he was in power four hundred talents as a deposit, they were asked subsequently to return it by Ariarathes when he recovered his kingdom. Now the position of the Prienians in my opinion was correct, when they refused to give up the money to anyone except the depositor during the lifetime of Orophernes, and Ariarathes was thought by many to have exceeded his rights in demanding the return of a deposit not his own. One might, however, pardon him to a certain extent for this attempt, on the ground that the money as he thought belonged to his kingdom; but his conduct in proceeding to extreme measures dictated by anger and determination to enforce his will cannot, I think, be justified. At

the time I am speaking of he sent a force to devastate the territory of Priene, helped and encouraged by Attalus owing to that prince's own quarrel with Priene. After the loss of many slaves and cattle and when some buildings were laid in ruins closed to the city, the Prienians proved unable to defend themselves, and having in the first place sent an embassy to Rhodes appealed to the Romans, who paid no attention to their demand. The Prienians had based high hopes on their command of so large a sum but the result was just the opposite. For they paid the deposit back to Orophernes, and unjustly suffered considerable damage at the hands of King Ariarathes owing to this same deposit.

V. Affairs of Italy

Attalus and Prusias

On Hortensius and Aurunculeius returning from Pergamus and reporting how Prusias had treated the orders of the senate with scorn, and how by treachery he had shut them and Attalus up in Pergamus and been guilty of every kind of violence and lawlessness, the senate was very indignant and deeply aggrieved at his conduct, and at once appointed ten legates headed by Lucius Aicius, Gaius Fannius, and Quintus Fabius Maximus, whom they dispatched promptly with orders to put a stop to the war and compel Prusias to make amends to Attalus for the wrongs he had inflicted on him during the war.

Ligurian War

At about the same time envoys also arrived from the people of Marseilles, who had for long suffered from the incursions of the Ligurians, and were now entirely hemmed in, the cities of Antibes and Nice being besieged as well. They therefore sent envoys to Rome to inform the senate

of this and beg for help. Upon their coming before the senate, it was decided to send legates to witness with their own eyes what was happening, and to attempt by remonstrances to correct the misconduct of the barbarians.

Upon the Massaliots sending an embassy to Rome to complain of the conduct of the Ligurians, the senate at once appointed as their legates Flaminius Popilius Laenas and Lucius Pupius. Accompanying the Massaliots they put in to a town called Aegitna in the territory of the Oxybii. The Ligurians on hearing that they were coming to order them to raise the siege, prevented the others who were bringing their ship to anchor from disembarking, but finding that Flaminius was already on shore and had stowed away his baggage, they at first ordered him to quit the place, and, when he refused, began to pillage his things. When his slaves and freedmen tried to get hold of the things and prevent their seizure they forced them away and attacked them; and when Flaminius now came up to the help of his own people, they wounded him, struck down two of his servants, and chased the others on board, so that Flaminius only just managed by cutting the shore and anchor cables to escape from the danger. He was carried back to Marseilles, and nursed there with every attention; and the senate on hearing of the incident dispatched one of the consuls, Quintus Opimius, with an armed force to make war on the Oxybii and Decietae.

Opimius collected his forces at Piacenza, and marching across the Apennines reached the country of the Oxybii. Encamping beside the river Apro he waited for the enemy, hearing that they were collecting and were ready to give battle. Then leading his army to Aegitna, the town in which the legates had been treacherously attacked, he took it by assault, sold the

inhabitants into slavery, and sent the ringleaders of the outrage in chains to Rome. After this success he went to meet the enemy. The Oxybii, thinking that their offence against the legates was inexpiable, showed extraordinary spirit, and with frenzied eagerness for the fray, before being joined by the Decietae, collected a force of about four thousand men and threw themselves on the enemy. Opimius, seeing the barbarians attack him so boldly, was amazed at their desperate courage; but knowing that they had no good grounds for this display of valour, felt full of confidence, as he was a practised commander and exceedingly intelligent. Therefore, leading out his army and exhorting them in terms suitable to the occasion, he advanced slowly to meet the enemy. Pressing home his attack vigorously he soon got the better of his adversaries, slew many of them and forced the others to headlong flight. The Decietae now arrived in full force, thinking that they would take part in the battle side by side with the Oxybii, but arriving after all was over, received the fugitives into their ranks; they shortly afterwards attacked the Romans with great spirit and resolution, but when worsted in the fight at once unconditionally surrendered themselves and their city. Opimius having overcome these tribes added as much of their territory as he thought fit to that of Marseilles, and compelled the Ligurians to give the Massaliots in future hostages for certain periods. He himself, after disarming his adversaries and distributing his forces among the different cities, went into winter quarters in Liguria. This campaign, then, both began and ended rapidly.

The Rival Ptolemies

At the time when the senate dispatched Opimius to make war on the Oxybii the younger Ptolemy came to Rome and appearing before the senate

accused his brother, asserting that he was responsible for the plot against himself. Exhibiting the scars left by his wounds, and laying full stress besides in his speech on the atrocity of the deed, he pleaded for pity. Neolaïdes and Andromachus also came as envoys from the elder king to defend him against these accusations, but the senate would not even listen to their defence, so much were they prepossessed by the younger brother's charges. Ordering these envoys to leave Rome at once, they appointed five legates, headed by Gnaeus Merula and Lucius Thermus, to support the younger brother, and furnishing each of them with a quinquereme ordered them to re-establish Ptolemy in Cyprus, writing to their allies in Greece and Asia to the effect that they had their permission to assist his return.

VI. Affairs of Pergamus

In Asia Attalus began as early as the winter to collect large forces, Ariarathes and Mithridates having sent him under the terms of their alliance an army consisting of cavalry and infantry under the command of Demetrius, the son of Ariarathes. While he was occupied in these preparations, the ten legates arrived from Rome. After meeting him near Cadi and conversing about the situation they left to visit Prusias, and when they met him, delivered the message from the senate in a very threatening manner. Prusias yielded to some of the commands, but resisted most of them. Consequently the Romans broke with him, renouncing their friendship and alliance, and all of them left on the spot to join Attalus. Prusias now thought better of it, and followed them for some distance entreating them, but when this had no effect, he left them and was now at a loss what to do. The legates ordered Attalus to protect his frontiers with an army and not to open hostilities himself, but to place his towns and villages

in safety. They now separated, and while some of them left in haste to announce to the senate the contumacy of Prusias, others went to different parts of Ionia and others to the country near the Hellespont and Byzantium, all with one and the same project, that is to call on the inhabitants to desert the alliance of Prusias and, as far as lay in their power, to favour the cause of Attalus and cultivate his alliance.

At about the same time Athenaeus arrived with eighty decked ships of which five were Rhodian quadriremes from the fleet that had been sent to the Cretan war, twenty were Cyzicene, twenty-seven belonged to Attalus, and the rest to the other allies. Sailing to the Hellespont and approaching the cities which owed allegiance to Prusias he made frequent landings and inflicted damage on their territory. The senate, after hearing the report of the legates who had returned from Prusias, at once dispatched three others, Appius Claudius, Lucius Oppius, and Aulus Postumius, who on reaching Asia put an end to the war, inducing both kings to make a treaty, by the terms of which Prusias was to hand over at once twenty decked ships to Attalus, and to pay him five hundred talents in twenty years, each keeping the territory that was theirs before they entered on hostilities. Prusias also undertook to repair the damage he had done to the territory of Methymna, Aegae, Cyme, and Heracleia, paying a hundred talents to those cities. The treaty having been drawn up on these terms, Attalus withdrew his forces both military and naval to his own country. Such were the incidents in the quarrel between Attalus and Prusias and such was its end. . . .

VII. Affairs of Italy

The Achaean exiles

At Rome during this year when the envoys from Achaea appeared before the senate to plead for the Achaeans in detention it was decided to make no change.

Heracleides at the height of summer came to Rome bringing Laodice and Alexander. [2] He made a long stay there, trying by means of jugglery and base intrigue to work upon the senate.

[2] Alexander Balas, a pretended son of Antiochus Epiphanes.

Astymedes of Rhodes, who held the two posts of admiral and envoy, came at once on his arrival before the senate and spoke about their war with the Cretans. The senate after listening to him with attention instantly sent a commission under Quintus to put an end to the war.

VIII. The War between Rhodes and Crete

At this time the Cretans sent to the Achaeans as their envoy Antiphatas, the son of Telemnastus of Gortyna, and the Rhodians sent Theophanes, each begging for help. The Achaean assembly was sitting at Corinth, and when both envoys addressed them on the subject, the majority were more favourably inclined to the Rhodians out of respect for the dignity of that city and the character in general of the Rhodian state and its citizens. Antiphatas, noticing this, expressed a wish to address them a second time, and on receiving the permission of the strategus did so in terms more weighty and serious than is usual with a Cretan. For, as a fact, this young man was not at all Cretan in character but had escaped the contagion of Cretan ill-breeding. The Achaeans in consequence put up with his freedom of speech, and still more because his father Telemnastus had come with five hundred Cretans to help them in their war against Nabis, and had borne himself gallantly. Nevertheless, after they had listened to him, the majority

was still inclined to help the Rhodians, until Callicrates of Leontium rose and said that they should not go to war with anyone or send help to anyone without taking the advice of Rome. For this reason it was finally decided to take no steps.

The Rhodians, dissatisfied with the turn of events, adopted strange resolutions and expedients, and fell into a condition like that of those afflicted by chronic sickness. For such men, when, after following scrupulously all the treatment imposed on them and obeying the orders of their physician, they fail to see any sign of improvement, are often dissatisfied with the result and give up the treatment perforce, some of them taking the advice of performers of sacrifice and of soothsayers, and others resorting to all kinds of charms and amulets. The same thing happened to the Rhodians. For when everything had turned out contrary to their expectations, they listened perforce to all kinds of advice and gave substance and welcome to every kind of hope. And this seems quite natural; for when all reasonable action has failed and we are still compelled to go on doing something, we must perforce resort to unreasonable courses. The Rhodians, therefore, having reached this condition acted as often happens in such cases, choosing magistrates whom they had rejected and acting unreasonably in other respects.

IX. Affairs of Italy

Visits of the young Attalus, Demetrius, and Alexander Balas

Several embassies arrived in Rome, and the senate summoned in the first place Attalus, the son of King Eumenes, who had come to Rome at this time while still a boy to be introduced to the senate, and renew in his own person his father's friendships and hospitable relations. Having met with a kind

reception from the senate and his father's friends and received the answers he wished, and such honours as suited his age, he returned home after a few days, all the Greek cities through which he passed giving him a cordial and generous reception. Demetrius also arrived at the same time, and after being received with no great state, as he was still a boy, returned home. Heracleides too, after having spent some time in Rome, appeared before the senate accompanied by Laodice and Alexander. The young man spoke first in a reasonable manner, begging the Romans to remember their friendship and alliance with his father Antiochus, and entreating them, if they could, to help him to regain his kingdom, but if not, to allow his return and not to prevent those who were willing to assist him in winning back his father's throne. After him Heracleides addressed them, delivering a long panegyric of Antiochus and accusing Demetrius, and finally maintaining that it was only just that they should allow the return of the young man and Laodice, who were the real children of King Antiochus. None of this pleased sober-minded members who understood the artful construction of the plot, and were frankly disgusted with Heracleides, but the majority, seduced by the charlatanry of Heracleides, were persuaded to draw up a consultum in these terms. "Alexander and Laodice, the children of a king who was our friend and ally, came before the senate and addressed it. The senate thereupon gave them authority to go home to regain their father's throne, and it was decided to grant their request for help." Heracleides now, availing himself of this permission, at once began to hire mercenaries and summoned to his aid a number of distinguished men. On arriving at Ephesus he occupied himself with preparations for his enterprise.

X. Affairs of Syria

(Athenaeus X. 440 b.)

Polybius tells us in his thirty-third Book that Demetrius, who escaped from Rome when he was a hostage, and became king of Syria, was much given to drink and was tipsy for the greater part of the day.

UNPLACED

FRAGMENTS

When once the multitude are impelled to love or hate anyone in excess, any pretext is sufficient for them to execute their projects.

But I fear that the well-known adage may apply to me unknown to myself: "Which is the greater simpleton, the man who milks a he-goat or he who holds a sieve to catch the milk?" For it may be said of me that by confuting in detail what is confessed to be a lie, and doing so at great length, I am behaving in a very similar manner. So I shall be told I entirely waste my time in speaking of this matter, unless indeed I wish to record dreams and take into serious consideration the visions of a man with his eyes open.

THE END OF BOOK XXXIII

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXXIV

GREEK

FRAGMENTS CHIEFLY FROM STRABO

I. SOME GENERAL REMARKS. THE SUBJECT OF THIS BOOK.

(From Strabo VIII. 1. 1, C 332.)

Those who in a general history have dealt separately with the geography of the continents like Ephorus and Polybius.

(*Id*., X. 3. 5, C 465.)

Polybius says that in regard to Greece Eudoxus has given a good and Ephorus a very good account of the foundation of cities, genealogies, migrations, and the planters of colonies; "but I," he adds, "will describe the actual situation of places and give the actual distances, that being the most essential thing in geography." But yet it is you, Polybius, who introduce the popular misstatements of distances not only outside Greece, but in Greece itself.

(From Geminus, *Elements of Astronomy*, C 16.)

Polybius the historian has composed a book with the title *On the parts of the globe under the Celestial Equator*, that is to say in the middle of the torrid zone. He says that the region is inhabited, and has a more temperate climate than that of those who inhabit extremities of the torrid zone. On the one hand he cites the accounts given by those who have actually visited the region, and can testify to the fact, and on the other he argues from the nature of the sun's movements. For at the solstices the sun remains a long time near the tropic circles both in approaching them and receding from them, so that we actually see it stay in their neighbourhood for about forty days; for

which reason the length of the day remains almost the same for about forty days. So owing to the length of its stay over the climates lying under the tropic circles, that region is burnt up and is uninhabitable owing to the excessive heat. But from the equinoctial circle or equator the sun recedes rapidly, so that the length of the day rapidly increases or decreases after the equinoxes. It is reasonable then to suppose that the climates situated under the equator are more temperate, as the sun does not prolong his stay near the extreme point but rapidly recedes from it. For all those who live between the two tropic circles are equally exposed to the passage of the sun; but he remains longer over those who live under the actual tropics. So for this reason the region under the equator in the middle of the torrid zone has a more temperate climate than those at the extremities of the torrid zone, which lie under the tropic circles.

(From Strabo II. 3. 1, C 96.)

Polybius makes the zones six in number, two lying under the arctic circles, two between these and the tropic circles, and two between the latter and the equinoctial circle or equator.

(*Id*. II. 3. 2, C 97.)

Polybius is mistaken in making some zones determined by the arctic circles, two immediately under them, and two between them and the tropic circles.

(*Id*.)

But if, as Eratosthenes says, the zone under the equator is temperate, agreeing in this with Polybius—the latter adds that it is very high and therefore has a rainfall, the clouds from the north during the etesian winds being arrested by the heights in large masses—it is much better to assume

that this is a third narrow temperate zone, than to introduce here the two zones under the tropic circles.

(*Id*.)

Poseidonius is against the statement of Polybius that the region under the equator is very high.

(From Achilles, Introduction to the *Phaenomena*, C 31.)

Those after Aratus are not at all agreed about the number of the zones. Some, like Polybius and Poseidonius, say they are six, dividing the torrid zone into two.

II. On the Voyage of Ulysses, especially in the neighbourhood of Sicily

(Strabo I. 2. 9, C 30.)

It is not like Homer to build an empty narrative full of marvels on no basis of truth. For naturally the fact is that one makes falsehood more credible if one mixes a little truth with it, as Polybius also says when he undertakes to deal with the wanderings of Ulysses.

(*Id*. I. 2. 15-17, C 23-25.)

Polybius is right in his notion about the wanderings of Ulysses. For he says that Aeolus, the man who gave sailing directions for the seas near the Straits, which have a current setting both ways and are difficult to pass owing to the tides, was supposed to be the dispenser of the winds and a king, just as Danaus, who first showed them how to make the reservoirs in Argos, and Atreus who discovered that the motion of the sun was contrary to that of the heavens, and seers and those who practised divination from sacrifices, were styled kings, and the Egyptian priests, and the Chaldaeans and the Magi, who were distinguished from other men by some special science, enjoyed in early times peculiar precedence and honour, and just as

each of the gods is honoured as the author of some useful invention. Having thus prepared his way, he does not allow us to treat Aeolus and the whole of the wanderings of Ulysses as mythical, but he says, that while some mythical elements have been added, as in the case of the Trojan war, the main statements about Sicily correspond to those of the other writers who treat of the local history of Italy and Sicily. Neither does he applaud the dictum of Eratosthenes that we may find out where Ulysses travelled when we find the cobbler who sewed the bag of the winds. And it is, he says, quite in accordance with the facts about the Scyllaean rock and the method of fishing for sword-fish, when he says about Scylla—

Her heads, with which the ravening monster dives
In quest of dolphins, dog-fish, or of prey
More bulky. [1]

[1] *Od*. XII. 9597.

For when the tunnies swimming in shoals along the Italian coast are carried out of their course and are unable to approach the Sicilian coast they fall a prey to larger animals, such as dolphins, sharks, and other marine monsters. By preying on them the sword-fish (galeotae), also called xiphiae and sea-dogs, are fattened. For in this case and in that of the rising of the Nile and other waters, the same thing happens as in the case of forest fires. The wild animals collect to escape from the fire or the water and are devoured by the more powerful ones.

After saying this he describes the method of fishing the sword-fish as practised near the Scyllaean rock. There is a single signaller for the whole fleet of small sculling boats. In each boat, whenever the signaller announces the appearance of the sword-fish, one man rows and another stands on the

prow holding a harpoon. The fish swims with the third part of his body out of the water. When the boat gets near it the man strikes it from close quarters and then pulls out of its body the shaft of the spear, leaving the point, which is barbed and is on purpose loosely fixed into the shaft, having a long line attached to it. They give the wounded fish line until he is tired out by his struggles and his effort to escape. Then they land him or pull him into the boat, unless he is exceedingly heavy. If the shaft happens to fall into the sea, it is not lost, for it is composed of oak and pinewood, so that when the oaken part of it sinks owing to its weight the rest remains on the surface and can be easily picked up. Sometimes the rower is wounded through the boat owing to the length of the fish's sword, and the fact that in his force and in the method of hunting him he is like a wild board.

From all this, he says, one may conjecture that according to Homer Ulysses is wandering near Sicily, since he attributes to Scylla that method of fishing which is especially practised by the natives near the Scyllaean rock, and also because what he says about Charybdis resembles what happens in the straits. And as for "thrice she disgorges," [2] it is rather an error in the text for "twice" than an error of fact. And what happens in the island of Meninx is in agreement with the description of the Lotus-eaters.

[2] *Od*. XII. 105.

And if there is anything that does not correspond with reality, we must set it down to change or error or poetic license, a combination of history, disposition, and myth. Now the end aimed at by history is truth, and so we find the poet in the Catalogue of Ships mentioning the peculiar features of each place, calling one town "rocky," another "on the border," another "with many doves," another "by the sea"; and the end aimed at by disposition is

vividness, as in his battle scenes, while the aim of myth is to please or astonish. But to invent everything neither produces illusion nor is it like Homer; for all consider his poems to be philosophical works, and refuse to follow the advice of Eratosthenes who tells us not to judge the poems by their meaning or seek for history in them. Polybius says, too, that to understand

Nine days by cruel storms I thence was borne [3]

[3] Od. IX. 82.

of a short voyage is more likely, as cruel winds do not carry us strange, than to understand that he sailed out into the ocean as if fair winds blew all the time. And reckoning the distance from Cape Malea to the Pillars of Hercules as twenty-two thousand stades, he says if this were traversed in nine days at a uniform pace it would mean that each day he made 2500 stades. Now, who his ever heard of anyone sailing from Lycia or Rhodes to Alexandria in two days, the distance here being 4000 stades? And to those who object that Ulysses, though he came thrice to Sicily, did not once pass the Straits of Messina, he replies that every one after him also avoided this route. This, then, is what he says.

III. Polybius's Criticism of previous Geographical Writers

(*Id*. II. 4. 1-3, C 104.)

Polybius in his account of the geography of Europe says that he dismisses older authors, but that he will examine those who find fault with them, Dicaearchus and Eratosthenes, the latest author who has dealt with geography, and Pytheas who has led many people into error by saying that he traversed the whole of Britain on foot, giving the island a circumference of forty thousand stades, and telling us also about Thule, those regions in

which there was no longer any proper land nor sea nor air, but a sort of mixture of all three of the consistency of a jelly-fish in which one can neither walk nor sail, holding everything together, so to speak. He says he himself saw this jellyfish-like substance but the rest he derives from hearsay. That is the account that Pytheas gives, and he tells us that he came back thence and starting again followed the whole shore of the ocean from Cadiz to the river Tanaïs. Polybius, then, says that it is in itself incredible that a private man and a poor man should have traverse such vast distances in a ship or on foot, but that Eratosthenes, while doubting if one should believe this, still believes in the account of Britain and the neighbourhood of Gades and the rest of Spain. But Polybius says it is far better to believe the Messenian Euhemerus [4] than Pytheas, for Euhemerus says that he sailed only to one country, Panchaia, but Pytheas says that he personally visited the whole northern coast of Europe as far as the ends of the world, a thing we would not even believe of Hermes himself if he told us so. Eratosthenes, however, he says, calls Euhemerus a Bergaean, [5] but believes Pytheas whom not even Dicaearchus believed. Now to say "whom not even Dicaearchus believed" is ridiculous, as if we should take him as a standard, an author in whom Polybius himself detects so many errors. I have spoken above of Eratosthenes' mistaken notion of the west and north of Europe. But while we should excuse him and Dicaearchus who had never seen these districts, how can we excuse Polybius and Poseidonius? Who but Polybius is it who calls the statement they make about distances in this case and in many others popular misstatements, but he is not even correct when he confutes them. As for Dicaearchus at least he says that the distance from the Peloponnesus to the Pillars of Hercules is 10,000 stades, and that the

distance to the Adriatic is more. The distance as far as the Straits in going to the Pillars he estimates at 3000, so that the remainder from the Straits to the Pillars amounts to 7000. Here Polybius says that he leaves it out of consideration whether Dicaearchus is right or not in his estimate of 3000 stades, but that he is not right in that of 7000, whether we follow the coast or go straight across the sea. For the coast-line resembles an obtuse angle, the two sides resting on the apex being at Narbo, so that a triangle is formed the base of which is the straight line across the sea and the two sides those forming the above angle. Of these sides the one reaching from the Straits to Narbo measures more than 10,200 stades, and the other a little less than 8000 stades. Now the longest distance from Europe to Africa across the Tyrrhenian Sea is not more than 3000 stades; across the Sardinian Sea it is somewhat shorter, but let us, he says, call it there also 3000 stades, and besides this let us assume that the depth of the Gulf of Narbo, or let us say of a perpendicular from the apex to the base of the obtuse angle is 2000 stades. Then, he says, it is evident from a schoolboy's geometry that the whole coast-line from the Straits to the Pillars is longer by very nearly 500 stades than the strange line across the sea. Then if we add to this the 3000 stades from the Peloponnesus to the Straits, the whole distance along this strange line will be more than double the estimate of Dicaearchus, and according to him we must reckon the distance to the head of the Adriatic as even more than this.

[4] The celebrated rationalist, who pretended that he had discovered in an island called Panchaia evidence for his statements regarding the gods.

[5] *i.e.* as great a liar as Antiphanes of Berga, a traveller who told many marvellous tales.

But one feels inclined to say, "my dear Polybius, the falsity of all this is clearly demonstrated when tested by your own statements, which are that it is 700 stades from the Peloponnesus to Leucas, the same distance from Leucas to Corcyra, and again the same from Corcyra to the Ceraunian Mountains, and the length of the whole Illyrian coast on the right as far as Iapydia from the Ceraunian mountains onwards 6150 stades. So that both the above statements are false, both that of Dicaearchus that it is 7000 stades from the Straits to the Pillars and tone which you think you have proved. For almost every one is agreed that the direct distance by sea amounts to 12,000 stades.

How, then, can we avoid thinking that Eratosthenes in the nonsense he tells has surpassed even Antiphanes of Berga and rendered it impossible for any subsequent writer to excel him in absurdity?

(Strabo II. 4. 4, C 106.)

Next Polybius corrects Eratosthenes, in some cases rightly but in others making worse mistakes himself. For while Eratosthenes says it is 300 stades from Ithaca to Corcyra, Polybius says it is more than 900, and while Eratosthenes gives the distance from Epidamnus to Thessalonica as 900 stades, Polybius says it is above 2000. In these two cases he is right, but when, Eratosthenes having said that it is 7000 stades from Marseilles to the Pillars and 6000 from the Pyrenees to the Pillars, Polybius makes a worse mistake in giving these distances as 9000 and nearly 8000 respectively, Eratosthenes' statement being nearer the truth. For it is now generally agreed that the width of the whole of Spain from the Pyrenees to its western

coast is as the crow flies not more than 6000 stades. But Polybius says that the length of the Tagus alone from its source to its mouth is 8000 stades, not I suppose reckoning its windings—for that is not correct in geography—but meaning in a strange line. And yet the distance of the source of the Tagus from the Pyrenees is more than 1000 stades. Again, he is right in saying that Eratosthenes is mistaken about Spain, and that in some cases his statements about it are evidently contradictory. Eratosthenes indeed says that the further side of Spain as far as Gades is surrounded by Gaulish inhabitants, in which case if the Gauls inhabit the outer side of Europe as far as Gades, why forgetting this does he in his detailed description of Spain never mention Gauls? And when he states that the length of Europe is less than that of Africa and Asia combined he makes a false comparison. For he says that the Strait between the Pillars lies due west while the Tanaïs flows from south-east.

(*Id*. II. 4. 8, C 108.)

There are several peninsulas jutting out from Europe, and Polybius has given a better description of them than Eratosthenes, but not an adequate one. The latter says there are three, that which runs down to the Pillars and is occupied by Spain, that running down to the Straits and occupied by Italy, and thirdly that terminated by Cape Malea and comprising all the peoples between the Adriatic and the Euxine and Tanaïs. Polybius agrees about the two first, but makes the third that reaching to Malea and Sunium, occupied by the whole of Greece, by Illyria and parts of Thrace, the fourth being the Thracian Chersonese, on which is the Strait between Sestus and Abydus, inhabited by Thracians, and the fifth that of the Cimmerian Bosporus and the mouth of the Palus Maeotis.

IV. On Lusitania

(From Athenaeus VII. 302 e.)

Polybius of Megalopolis in the Thirty-Fourth Book of his *Histories*, in speaking of that portion of Iberia called Lusitania, says that there are oak-trees planted deep in the sea, on the fruit of which the tunnies feed and get fat. So that we should not be wrong in calling the tunnies sea-hogs.

(Strabo III. 2. 7, C 145.)

Polybius says that these acorns are carried as far as Latium and washed up, unless indeed, he adds, Sardinia too and that neighbourhood produce them.

(Athenaeus VIII. 330 c.)

Polybius, in the Thirty-Fourth Book of his *Histories* speaking of the natural wealth of Lusitania (a district of Iberia, or, as the Romans now call it, Spain), tells us that owing to the favourable climate both men and animals are very prolific, and the land is constantly productive. For roses, white violets, asparagus, and similar plants only cease flowering for three months, and as for the sea-fish, in quantity, excellence, and beauty it is far superior to that in our own sea. The Sicilian medimnus of barley costs one drachma and that of wheat nine Alexandrian obols, the metreta of wine costs a drachma and a fair-sized kid or hare one obol. Lambs are three or four obols apiece, a fat pig weighing a hundred minae costs five drachmae and a sheep two. A talent's weight of figs can be had for three obols, a calf for five drachmae and a ploughing ox for ten. The flesh of wild animals is scarcely thought worth pricing, but is given away for nothing or exchanged.

V. On Spain

(Strabo III. 1. 6, C 139.)

The inhabitants are known as Turdetani and Turduli, some considering them to be the same and others different. Among the latter is Polybius, who says that the Turduli are next to the Turdetani on the north.

(*Id*. III. 2. 15, C 151.)

The fertility of their country results in the Turdetani as well as the Celts, owing to their proximity, or as Polybius says, owing to their kinship, having a quiet and orderly character.

(*Id*. III. 5. 5, C 170.)

Dicaearchus, Eratosthenes, and Polybius and most Greeks place the Pillars at the Straits.

(*Id*. III. 5. 7, C 172.)

Polybius says there is a spring in the temple of Hercules at Gades, a few steps leading down to the water, which is drinkable. It behaves in a contrary manner to the tide of the sea, disappearing at high tide and filling again at low water. The reason of this, he says, is that the air which comes from the depths to the surface of the earth is prevented, when the spring is covered by the sea as the tide advances, from finding its natural outlet, and is driven back to the interior, thus stopping up the passage of the spring and causing the flow of water to cease; but when the spring is uncovered again the air resumes its direct course and sets free the veins of the spring so that it bubbles up in abundance.

(*Id*. III. 5. 7, C 172.)

Polybius, in speaking of the silver mines near New Carthage, says they are very extensive and are distant about twenty stades from the town, extending in a circle for four hundred stades. Here forty thousand miners lived who at that period produced for the Roman government a daily sum of

twenty-five thousand drachmae. I say nothing of the working of the mines in other respects—for it is a long story—but the lumps of silver ore which are washed down by the streams are crushed, he says, and passed through sieves into water. The deposit is then again crushed and while the water is running off undergoes a third crushing. This is done five times in all and the fifth deposit, after the lead has been drained off, produces pure silver.

(*Id*. III. 2. 11, C 148.)

Polybius says that this river (the Baetis) and the Anas flow from Celtiberia, being distant from each other about nine hundred stades.

(*Id*. III. 4. 13, C 62; Athenaeus I. 16 c.)

Polybius in enumerating the tribes and cities of the Paccaei and Celtiberians counts among the other cities Segesama and Intercatia.

(Athenaeus I. 16 c.)

The construction and splendour of the house of Menelaus as described by Homer recalls Polybius's description of the house of a Spanish king, who, he says, vied with the Phaeacians in luxury, except that the bowls in the middle of the house which were made of gold and silver were full of beer.

VI. On Gaul

(*Id*. VIII. 332 a.)

Polybius, in the Thirty-Fourth Book of his *Histories* says that after the Pyrenees as far as the river Narbo there is a plain traversed by the rivers Illeberis and Roscynus which pass towns of the same name inhabited by Celts. In this plain are found the so-called underground fish. The plain has a light soil and a great deal of agrostis grows there. Under the plants, when the soil consists of sand to the depth of two or three cubits, the flood water

of the rivers penetrates, and together with the water in flood-time certain fish descending in search of food—for they are very fond of the roots of the agrostis—make all the plain full of subterranean fish which they catch by digging them up.

(Strabo IV. 1. 8, C 183.)

As regards the mouths of the Rhone Polybius finds fault with Timaeus. It has not, he says, five mouths, but only two.

(*Id*. IV. 2. 1, C 190.)

The Loire falls into the sea between the Pictones and the Namnitae. There was formerly a trading port called Corbilo on this river, which Polybius mentions in talking of the fictions of Pytheas. He says that none of the Massaliots who met Scipio and were questioned by him had any particular information to give him about Britain, nor had the people from Narbo, or those from Corbilo, the finest cities in those parts, and yet Pytheas has boldly made so many false statements about it.

(*Id*. IV. 6. 10, C 207.)

Polybius says there is a peculiar animal in the Alps, like a deer in form except its neck and coat, which are like a boar's. Under its chin it has a hard growth about a span long and with hairs at the end, about as thick as a colt's tail.

(*Id*. IV. 6. 12, C 208.)

Polybius says that in his time a gold mine was discovered not far from Aquileia in the country of the Noric Taurisci, so easy to work that when the earth on the surface was scraped off to the depth of two feet the diggers found gold at once. The deposit was not deeper than fifteen feet. The gold consisted partly of nuggets as big as a bean or lupine, which were pure gold

when the eighth part only had been smelted off, and partly of stuff which required a good deal of smelting but was very rich. After the Italians had been working it together with the natives for two months, the price of gold throughout Italy at once fell by one-third. But the Taurisci, when aware of this, expelled the other workers and made a monopoly of it.

(*Id*.)

Polybius also in talking of the size and height of the Alps compares with them the greatest mountains in Greece, Taygetus, Lycaeum, Parnassus, Olympus, Pelion and Ossa, and Haemus, Rhodope, and Dunax in Thrace. He says that each of these can be ascended by a pedestrian in about one day and that the circuit of each may be made in the same time, but it takes at least five days to ascend the Alps, and the length of that part of the chain which rises from the plain is two thousand two hundred stades. He only mentions four passes, one through Liguria nearest the Tyrrhenian Sea, that through the country of the Taurini, which Hannibal crossed, that through the country of the Salassi, and that through Rhaetia, all very steep. He says there are several lakes in the mountains, three of them very large, Benacus (Garda) being five hundred stades long and thirty in breadth, the river Mincius flowing from it. Next comes Larius (Como), four hundred stades in length but narrower than the last, the Adda flowing from it. The third is Verbanus (Maggiore), three hundred stades long and thirty broad, from which a large river, the Ticinus, flows. All these streams fall into the Po.

VII. On Italy

(Athenaeus I. 31 d.)

Polybius says that the wine made in Capua from trellised vines is particularly good and no other can be compared with it.

(Strabo V. 1. 3, C 211.)

Polybius says the coast from Iapygia to the straits measures by road three thousand stades and is washed by the Sicilian sea. By sea the distance is less than five hundred stades.

(Strabo V. 2. 5, C 222.)

The extreme length of the coast of Etruria they say from Luna to Ostia is 2500 stades, the extreme breadth near the hills is less than half this. It is more than 400 stades from Luna to Pisa, from Pisa to Volaterra 280 stades and from there to Populonia 270. From Populonia to Cosa it is nearly 800 or as some say 600. Polybius is wrong in giving the whole length as 1330 stades.

(Steph. Byzantius.)

Aethale, an island off Etruria. Polybius in his Thirty-Fourth Book says that Lemnos was called Aethaleia.

(Strabo V. 4. 3, C 242.)

They call the bay which is formed by the two capes, Misenum and the temple of Minerva, the "Crater." Above this coast lies the whole of Campania, the most fertile of all plains. Antiochus says this region was inhabited by the Opici, who were also called Ausones. Polybius, however, evidently regards them as two nations, for he says that this region near the Crater is inhabited by Opici and Ausones.

(*Id*. VI. 3. 10, C 285.)

Polybius says that from Iapygia the road has milestones. It is 560 miles to Sila (?), and from there to Aquileia 178.

(*Id*. VI. 1. 4, C 261.)

After these capes comes the Lacinium, the temple of Juno, once very rich and full of numerous offerings. The distances are not stated exactly. Polybius, however, speaking roughly, gives the distance from the Straits to the Lacinium as 1300 stades and from thence to the headland of Iapygia as 700.

(*Id*. VI. 2. 10, C 276.)

Of the three craters of the Holy Island of Vulcan Polybius says one has partly collapsed, but the others are entire. The edge of the largest is circular and is five stades in circumference. It gradually contracts to a diameter of fifty feet. At this spot the height straight down to the sea is one stade, so that in calm weather the sea is visible. When the south wind is going to blow, a thick haze gathers all round the island so that not even Sicily is visible; but when the north wind is going to blow clear flames spring up to some height from the crater I was speaking of and louder rumblings than usual issue from it. The signs foretelling a west wind are half way between the two. The other craters are similar, but the force of their discharge is less. And he states that from the difference of the rumblings, and from the direction from which the discharges and the smoke and flame come, one can foretell from what quarter the wind will blow even three days later. At least some of the people in Lipara, he says, when wind-bound, foretold what wind would blow and were not wrong. So that what seems to us Homer's most mythical statement, when he calls Aeolus the dispenser of the winds, was not quite an idle tale, but darkly hinted at the truth.

VIII. On Thrace, Macedonia, and Greece

(Strabo VII. 5. 9, C 317.)

Among other improbable things Theopompus states that the Ionian Sea and the Adriatic have an underground connexion, Chian and Thasian pottery being found in the Naro, and again that the two seas are visible from a certain mountain, and that the Liburnian islands have a circumference of as much as 500 stades, and that one of the mouths of the Danube falls into the Adriatic. These and some assertions of Eratosthenes are mere vulgar errors, as Polybius says in speaking of the latter and other writers.

(*Id*. VII. 7. 4, C 322.)

From Apollonia the Via Egnatia runs east to Macedonia. It has been measured and marked with milestones as far as Cypsela and the river Hebrus, the distance being 535 miles. If we reckon the mile, as most people do, at 8 stades, this makes 4280 stades, but if like Polybius we add to the 8 stades 2 plethra, i.e. the third of a stade, we must add 678 stades, the third of the number of miles. Travellers starting from Apollonia and from Epidamnus strike this road at an equal distance from their point of departure. The whole road is called Via Egnatia, but the first section passing through the town of Lychnidus and through Pylon, the point on the road which separates Illyria from Macedonia, derives its name from Candavia, a mountain of Illyria. Thence it passes along Mt. Barnus through Heraclia Lyncestis, and Eordea to Edessa and Pella and finally Thessalonica. The length of this part is according to Polybius 267 miles.

(Strabo, epit. VII. 57.)

From Perinthus to Byzantium the distance is 630 stades, from the Hebrus and Cypsela to Byzantium as far as the Cyanean rocks it is 3100 according to Artemidorus, and the whole distance from the Ionian gulf at Apollonia to

Byzantium is 7320 stades, Polybius adding a further 180 stades, as he reckons the mile at 8 1/3 stades.

(*Id*. VIII. 21, C 335.)

The circumference of the Peloponnesus sailing from cape to cape is 4000 stades according to Polybius.

(*Id*. VIII. 8. 5, C 335.)

Polybius says that the distance due north from Cape Malea to the Danube is about 1000 stades, but Artemidorus corrects him, and no wonder. According to him the distance from the Danube to Malea is 6500 stades. The reason of the discrepancy is that Polybius does not reckon the distance in a straight line, but by the route some general chanced to follow.

IX. On Asia

(*Id*. XIV. 2. 29, C 663.)

Artemidorus agrees with Eratosthenes in his estimate of the direct distance from the Euphrates to India. Polybius says that we should mainly rely on Artemidorus for information about India.

X. On Alexandria

(*Id*. XIV. 2. 29, C 663.)

Polybius at least, who visited the city, was disgusted with its condition at the time. He says it is inhabited by three classes of people, first the native Egyptians, an acute and civilized race; secondly by the mercenaries, a numerous, rough, and uncultivated set, it being an ancient practice there to maintain a foreign armed force which owing to the weakness of the kings had learnt rather to rule than to obey; thirdly there were the Alexandrians themselves, a people not genuinely civilized for the same reason, but still superior to the mercenaries, for though they are mongrels they came from a

Greek stock and had not forgotten Greek customs. But when this population had been nearly annihilated, chiefly by Euergetes Physcon, in whose reign Polybius came to Alexandria—for this king being frequently troubled by seditions exposed the populace to the onslaught of the soldiers and destroyed them—the city fell into such a state that afterwards Homer's line was really true—

To Egypt is a long and dangerous road. [6]

[6] Homer, *Od*. IV. 185.

B. Latin Fragments

(Pliny, Nat. Hist. IV. 121.)

Polybius states that the breadth of Europe from Italy to the Ocean is 1150 miles, the true distance not having been determined at that date. For, as I said, the length of Italy as far as the Alps is 1120 miles and thence through Lyons to the British harbour of the Morini, which seems to be the distance measured by Polybius, 1169 miles.

(*Ibid*., Nat. Hist. VI. 206.)

Polybius says that the distance from the straits of Gades to the mouth of the Palus Maeotis is 3437 miles, from the same point in a direct line east to Sicily 1250 miles, thence to Crete 375 miles, thence to Rhodes 187 miles, thence to the Chelidonian islands the same, thence to Cyprus 225 miles, and thence to Seleucia Pieria in Syria 115 miles, the whole amounting to 2340 miles.

(*Ibid*., Nat. Hist. IV. 119.)

Not far at the very point of Baetica, twenty-five miles from the mouth of the strait is the island of Gades, 12 miles long and 3 miles broad according

to Polybius. It is distant from the continent at the nearest point less than 700 feet, the distance of most of it being more than 7 miles.

(*Ibid*., Nat. Hist. III. 75.)

The sea beyond Sicily as far as the Salentini is called by Polybius the Ausonian Sea.

(*Ibid*., Nat. Hist. IV. 77.)

Between the two Bospori, the Thracian and Cimmerian, the distance according to Polybius is 500 miles.

(Pliny, Nat. Hist. V. 40.)

Agrippa gives the total length of Africa from the Atlantic and including lower Egypt as 3050 miles. Polybius and Eratosthenes, who are considered the most careful authorities, make it 1100 miles from the ocean to Carthage and 1628 miles from Carthage to Canopus, the most westerly mouth of the Nile.

(*Ibid*. V. 9.)

When Scipio Aemilianus was in command in Africa Polybius the historian went round in a squadron furnished by the general for the purpose of exploring that continent, and tells us that from Mt. Atlas to the west as far as the river Anatis for 496 miles there are woods full of those wild beasts that Africa produces.

(*Ibid*. V. 26.)

To the lesser Syrtis from Carthage it is according to Polybius 300 miles, the Syrtis itself being 100 miles from the shore and 300 miles in circumference.

(*Ibid*. VI. 199.)

Polybius states that Cerne is an island at the extremity of Mauretania over against Mt. Atlas, 8 miles distant from the shore.

(*Ibid*. VIII. 31.)

The size of the elephants' tusks is chiefly to be observed in the temples, but still in the extreme parts of Africa which border on Aethiopia they are used in houses as door-posts, and palings round houses and stables are constructed of tusks, as Polybius tells us on the authority of the African prince Gulusa.

(Pliny, *Nat. Hist*. VIII. 47.)

Polybius, who accompanied Scipio Aemilianus, tells us that lions in their old age attack men, as they no longer have sufficient strength to pursue beasts. Then they haunt the neighbourhood of towns, and for this reason he and Scipio saw several hanging crucified, to deter the others from hurting men for fear of a similar penalty.

(*Ibid*. XXXI. 131.)

Trogus tells us that near Lycia very soft small sponges are produced at the bottom of the sea in the places where sponges have been plucked. Polybius says that if they are hung above a sick man, his nights are quieter.

THE END OF BOOK XXXIV

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXXV

I. THE CELTIBERIAN WAR.

(From Suidas)

The war between the Romans and the Celtiberians was called the "fiery war," so remarkable was the uninterrupted character of the engagements. For while wars in Greece and Asia are as a rule decided by one battle, or more rarely two, and while the battles themselves are decided in a brief space of time by the result of the first attack and encounter, in this war it was just the opposite. The engagements as a rule were only stopped by darkness, the combatants refusing either to let their courage flag or to yield to bodily fatigue, and ever rallying, recovering confidence and beginning afresh. Winter indeed alone put a certain check on the progress of the whole war and on the continuous character of the regular battles, so that on the whole if we can conceive a war to be fiery it would be this and no other one.

After the Celtiberians had made a truce with Marcus Claudius Marcellus, the Roman commander, and had sent embassies to Rome, they remained inactive awaiting the decision of the senate, while Marcus after an expedition into Lusitania, in which he took by assault the city of Nercobrica, retired into winter quarters at Cordova. When the embassies arrived in Rome those from the Belli and Titti who had taken the side of Rome were all admitted into the city, but those from the Aravacae, as they were enemies, were ordered to encamp on the other side of the Tiber until a

decision was arrived at about the whole question. When the time for their audience came the Praetor Urbanus first introduced the allies. Although foreigners they spoke at length and attempted to lay before the senate a clear statement of all the points in dispute, pointing out that if those who had taken up arms did not meet with proper chastisement they would at once take vengeance on themselves as having betrayed the cause, and if their former fault remained unpunished, very soon again commence disturbances and make the whole of Spain disposed to rebel, under the idea that they had proved themselves more than a match for the Romans. They therefore demanded either that the legions should remain in Spain and that a consul should proceed there every year to protect the allies and check the malpractices of the Aravacae, or if the senate desired to withdraw their forces, the revolt of the Aravacae should be punished in such an exemplary fashion that no one would dare do the like again. Such was the substance of the speeches made by the Belli and Titti, the allies of the Romans. The envoys of the hostile tribes were then introduced. The Aravacae when they presented themselves assumed in their speech a humble and submissive attitude, but made it evident that at heart they were neither disposed to make complete submission nor to accept defeat. For they more than once hinted at the uncertainty of Fortune, and by making out that the engagements that had taken place were hotly contested left the impression that in all of them they thought they themselves had fought more brilliantly than the Romans. The gist of the speeches was that if a fixed penalty were to be imposed on them for their error they would consent to pay it; but when they had complied with this they demanded that the Romans should revert to the terms of their convention with the senate in the time of Tiberius Gracchus.

After the senate had heard both parties, the legates from Marcellus were introduced. When the house saw that these also were pacifically inclined, and that the general himself was more disposed to favour the enemy than the allies, they replied to the Aravacae and to the allies, that Marcellus would inform both parties in Spain of the decision of the senate. But their private opinion being that what the allies said was both true and to the advantage of Rome, that the Aravacae still had a high opinion of themselves, and that the general was afraid of the war, they gave secret orders to the legates he had sent to continue to fight bravely and worthily of their country. Having thus determined to pursue the war, they first of all, as they distrusted Marcellus, were minded to send another general to Spain—for Aulus Postumius Albinus and Lucius Licinius Lucullus had already been designated as consuls and had entered on their office—and in the next place began to make energetic and lavish preparations for the campaign, thinking that the future of Spain depended on its issue. For they supposed that if this enemy were vanquished, all others would submit to their authority, but that if the enemy could avert their present peril, not only would the Aravacae be encouraged to resist, but all the other tribes also.

But the more eager the senate was to pursue the war, the more alarming did they find the state of affairs. For since Quintus Fulvius Nobilior, their former commander in Spain, and the members of his force had spread the report in Rome of the constant succession of pitched battles, the great losses suffered by the Romans and the valour of the Celtiberians, and as Marcellus was evidently afraid of continuing the war, such an extraordinary panic took hold of the young recruits as their elders said they never remembered before. This fit of cowardice went so far, that neither did competent officers

present themselves as military tribunes, but their posts were not filled, although formerly many more than the required number of qualified officers used to apply, nor were the legates, nominated by the consuls, who should have accompanied the general, willing to serve; but the worst of all was that the young men avoided enrolment, finding such excuses as it was disgraceful to allege, unseemly to examine, and impossible to check. Finally, when both the senate and the magistrates were at a loss to know what would be the end of this shameless conduct on the part of the young men—for so they were compelled by circumstances to describe it—Publius Cornelius Scipio, who was still young and was thought to have advised the prosecution of the war, having now attained an unquestioned reputation for nobility of conduct and temperance of life, but being desirous of gaining the like for courage, when he saw the difficulty that faced the senate, rose and asked to be allowed to be sent to Spain either as tribune or as legate with the consuls; for he was ready to go in either capacity. Although, he said, as far as concerned himself personally, it was both safer and more agreeable for him to proceed to Macedonia—for at this time he had been specially invited by the Macedonians to go there and settle their domestic quarrels, yet the voice of their country at this critical time summoned more urgently to Spain all true devotees of glory. All were surprised at this offer owing to Scipio's youth and his cautiousness in general, and Scipio became very popular both at the moment and still more on the following days. For those who previously shirked their duty, ashamed now of being shown up by a comparison of their conduct with his, began some of them to volunteer for the post of legate and the rest to flock in groups to enrol themselves as soldiers.

(Suidas; cp. Livy Epit. XLVIII.)

Scipio was assailed at the same time by an eager impulse to meet the barbarian in single combat and by doubt whether he should do so.

(Suidas)

Scipio's horse was disabled by the blow, but did not entirely collapse, so that in losing his seat he fell on his feet.

II. Liberation of the Achaean exiles

(From Plutarch, *Cato Mai*. 9.)

Cato was approached by Scipio on behalf of the Achaean exiles through the influence of Polybius, and when there was a long debate in the senate, some advocating their return and others opposing it, Cato rose and said" "Just as if we had nothing to do we sit here all day disputing about some wretched old Greeks whether they shall be carried to their graves by bearers from Rome or from Achaea." And when their restitution was voted, and a few days afterwards Polybius intended to enter the house to demand that the exiles should recover the honours they had previously enjoyed in Achaea, and asked Cato's advice, Cato smiled and said that Polybius, like Ulysses, wanted to enter the cave of the Cyclops again, because he had forgotten his cap and belt.

THE END OF BOOK XXXV

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXXVI

I. THE THIRD PUNIC WAR

Perhaps some may ask themselves why I do not, now that I have to deal with a subject of such importance and so momentous an event, display my talent and report the particular speeches after the fashion of most authors who lay before us all that it is possible to say on either side. That I do not disapprove of such a practice is evident from various passages of this work in which I have quoted both the speeches and writings of politicians, but it will now be made clear that it is not my principle to do this on any and every pretext. For it is not easy to find a subject more renowned than the present nor ampler material for comparisons; nor again is anything more facile for myself than such an exercise. But on the one hand neither do I think it is the proper part of a politician to display his ingenuity and indulge in discursive talk on any and every subject of debate that may arise, but simply to say what the situation demands, nor is it the proper part of a historian to practise on his readers and make a display of his ability to them, but rather to find out by the most diligent inquiry and report to them what was actually said, and even of this only what was most vital and effectual.

They had long ago made up their minds to act thus, but they were looking for a suitable opportunity and a pretext that would appeal to foreign nations. For the Romans very rightly paid great attention to this matter, since, as Demetrius says, when the inception of a war seems just, it makes victory greater and ill-success less perilous, while if it is thought to be

dishonourable and wrong it has the opposite effect. So on this occasion their disputes with each other about the effect on foreign opinion very nearly made them desist from going to war.

The Carthaginians had been for long debating how they should answer the Roman reply, and now when the people of Utica forestalled their design by surrendering their city to Rome, they were entirely at a loss how to act. The one and only hope that presented itself to them was to consent to commit themselves to the faith of the Romans; since they thought that was sure to gratify these, as not even in the season of their greatest danger when they had been utterly defeated and the enemy was at the gates had they ever thus surrendered the liberty of their country. But now the fruit of this project was snatched from them by the people of Utica anticipating them, since they would no longer seem to the Romans to be acting in any remarkable or unexpected way by following the example of Utica. However, now that they were left with the choice of two evils, either to accept war with brave hearts or to entrust themselves to the faith of Rome, after a long secret discussion in the senate they appointed plenipotentiaries and sent them to Rome with instructions to do whatever they thought was in the interest of their country under present circumstances. The names of the envoys were Giscon, surnamed Strytanus, Hamilcar, Misdes, Gillimas, and Mago. But when these envoys from Carthage arrived in Rome they found that war had already been decided on, and that the generals had left with their armies and therefore, as the situation left them no choice, they committed Carthage to the faith of Rome.

I have previously stated what this phrase (*dedere se in fidem*) means, but it is here necessary to remind my readers briefly of its significance. Those

who thus commit themselves to the faith of Rome surrender in the first place the whole of their territory and the cities in it, next all the inhabitants of the land and the towns, male and female, likewise all rivers, harbours, temples, tombs, so that the result is that the Romans enter into possession of everything and those who surrender remain in possession of absolutely nothing. Shortly after this surrender had been made by the Carthaginians they were called into the senate, where the praetor conveyed to them the decision of the senate, that as they had been well advised, the senate granted freedom and their laws, besides their whole territory and all other possessions both public and private. The Carthaginians on hearing this were pleased, thinking that in the choice of evils they had been well treated by the senate, as all that was most essential and important had been conceded to them. But after this, when the praetor informed them that they would obtain these favours if within thirty days they sent to Lilybaeum three hundred hostages, sons of senators or of members of the Gerousia, and if they obeyed the orders of the consuls, they were somewhat at a loss to know what these orders would be. However they left at once to announce all this at Carthage, and on coming there they informed their fellow-citizens of all the particulars. On hearing these they all thought that the envoys had obtained a satisfactory result in general, but the fact that there was no mention of the city caused serious anxiety and surprise.

At this time Mago the Bruttian was said to have spoken in a manly and practical fashion. For, as it seems, he said there were two opportunities of deciding about themselves and their country of which the one had been let slip. For the proper time, surely, to question what the orders of the consuls would be and why the senate made no reference to their city was not the

present but the time when they put themselves at the mercy of Rome. Once they had done this they should be clearly aware that they must accept any order unless it were flagrantly oppressive and beyond expectation. In the latter case they must again consider if they should expose their country to war and its terrors, or not daring to face the attack of the enemy, yield unresistingly to every demand. But as they all, owing to the war being close upon them and owing to the uncertainty of the future, were inclined to obey the orders, it was decided to send the hostages to Lilybaeum, and choosing at once three hundred of their young men they dispatched them with great lamentations and tears, as each was escorted by his near friends and relatives, the women being especially violent in their grief. On arriving at Lilybaeum the hostages were at once handed over through the consuls to Quintus Fabius Maximus, who was then in command in Sicily, and by him they were safely conveyed to Rome and the whole body confined in the dock of the large warship with sixteen banks of oars.

After the hostages had been brought to Rome the Roman commander landed at the Cape of Utica. Upon this news reaching Carthage the whole city was in great excitement and terror, owing to the uncertainty that prevailed as to what they were to expect. They decided, however, to send envoys to the consuls to ask them what they must do and inform them that all were disposed to obey any command. Upon their arrival at the Roman camp a council was called and the envoys spoke according to their instructions. The elder of the two consuls, after commending their decision and their compliant temper, ordered them to surrender all their arms and missiles without fraud or deceit. The envoys said they would comply with the order, but begged the Romans to consider what would happen to them if

they gave up all their arms and the Romans took them and sailed away with them. Nevertheless they gave them up.

(Suidas)

It was evident that power of the city was very great, for they gave up to the Romans more than two hundred thousand suits of mail and two thousand catapults.

(Suidas)

They had absolutely no notion of any kind of what was in store for them, but auguring the worst from the manner alone of the envoys, they gave vent to every kind of lament and plaint.

(Suidas)

After one loud cry they remained, as it were, without power of utterance. But when the news quickly spread among the people there was no more speechlessness, but some threw themselves upon the envoys, as if it were all their fault, others attacked such Italians as were detained in the city and vented their wrath on them, and others rushed to the gates.

(Suidas)

Hamilcar, also known as Phameas, the Carthaginian general, was in the prime of life, of great personal vigour, and what is most important in a soldier, a good and bold rider.

(Suidas)

Others from extreme jealousy of Scipio tried to belittle his achievements.

(Suidas)

Seeing the strength of the outposts, Phameas, who was by no means timid, used to avoid any engagement with Scipio, and once when he

approached the Roman reserve force he got under shelter of a steep ridge and halted there for a considerable time.

(Suidas)

The Roman maniples fled to the top of a hill, and when every one had given his advice, Scipio said, "When men are consulting about a fresh emergency they must rather take care to avoid disaster than scheme how to damage the enemy."

(Suidas)

It should not be a matter of surprise to anyone if I display particular interest in Scipio and report all his utterances at length.

II. Affairs of Greece

Both about the Carthaginians when they were crushed by the Romans and about the affair of the pseudo-Philip many divergent accounts were current in Greece, at first on the subject of the conduct of Rome to Carthage and next concerning their treatment of the pseudo-Philip. As regards the former the judgements formed and the opinions held in Greece were far from unanimous. There were some who approved the action of the Romans, saying that they had taken wise and statesmanlike measures in defence of their empire. For to destroy this source of perpetual menace, this city which had constantly disputed the supremacy with them and was still able to dispute it if it had the opportunity and thus to secure the dominion of the own country, was the act of intelligent and far-seeing men.

Others took the opposite view, saying that far from maintaining the principles by which they had won their supremacy, they were little by little deserting it for a lust of domination like that of Athens and Sparta, starting indeed later than those states, but sure, as everything indicated, to arrive at

the same end. For at first they had made war with every nation until they were victorious and until their adversaries had confessed that they must obey them and execute their orders. But now they had struck the first note of their new policy by their conduct to Perseus, in utterly exterminating the kingdom of Macedonia, and they had now completely revealed it by their decision concerning Carthage. For the Carthaginians had been guilty of no immediate offence to Rome, but the Romans had treated them with irremediable severity, although they had accepted all their conditions and consented to obey all their orders.

Others said that the Romans were, generally speaking, a civilized people, and that their peculiar merit on which they prided themselves was that they conducted their wars in a simple and noble manner, employing neither night attacks nor ambushes, disapproving of every kind of deceit and fraud, and considering that nothing but direct and open attacks were legitimate for them. But in the present case, throughout the whole of their proceedings in regard to Carthage, they had used deceit and fraud, offering certain things one at a time and keeping others secret, until they cut off every hope the city had of help from her allies. This, they said, savoured more of a despot's intrigue than of the principles of a civilized state such as Rome, and could only be justly described as something very like impiety and treachery. And there were others who differed likewise from these latter critics. For, they said, if before the Carthaginians had committed themselves to the faith of Rome the Romans had proceeded in this manner, offering certain things one at a time and gradually disclosing others, they would of course have appeared to be guilty of the charge brought against them. But if, in fact, after the Carthaginians had of their own accord committed themselves to

the faith of the Romans and given them liberty to treat them in any way they chose, the Romans, being thus authorized to act as it seemed good to them, gave the orders and imposed the terms on which they had decided, what took place did not bear any resemblance to an act of impiety and scarcely any to an act of treachery; in fact some said it was not even of the nature of an injustice. For every crime must naturally fall under one of these three classes, and what the Romans did belongs to neither of the three. For impiety is sin against the gods, against parents, or against the dead; treachery is the violation of sworn or written agreements; and injustice is what is done contrary to law and custom. Of none of these three were the Romans guilty on the present occasion. Neither did they sin against the gods, against their parents, or against the dead, nor did they violate any sworn agreement or treaty; on the contrary they accused the Carthaginians of doing this. Nor, again, did they break any laws or customs or their personal faith. For having received from a people who consented willingly full authority to act as they wished, when this people refused to obey their orders they finally resorted to force.

This, then, is what was said concerning the Romans and Carthaginians. As for the false Philip, at first the story seemed utterly inadmissible. Here is a Philip fallen from the skies who appears in Macedonia, making light not only of the Macedonians but of the Romans too, with no plausible reason to show for his enterprise, as it was well known that the real Philip died at the age of about eighteen at Alba in Italy, two years after the death of Perseus himself. But when three or four months later the report came that he had defeated the Macedonians in a battle beyond the Strymon in the country of the Odomanti, some accepted the news as true, but most people still

remained incredulous. But when again, a short time after, it was reported that he had defeated the Macedonians on this side of the Strymon and was master of the whole of Macedonia, and when the Thessalians sent a letter and envoys to the Achaeans begging for their help, as they themselves were now in peril, the whole thing seemed most wonderful and extraordinary, for such an event had not previously seemed remotely probable or at all to be reckoned with. Such was the state of opinion about these matters.

When a letter reached the Peloponnesus addressed to the Achaeans from Manilius, saying that they would do well to send Polybius of Megalopolis at once to Lilybaeum as he was required for the public service, the Achaeans voted to send him in response to this written request of the consul. I, myself, thinking that for many reasons I ought to obey the Romans, put every other consideration aside and set sail early in summer. On arriving at Corcyra and finding there a letter addressed by the consuls to the Corcyraeans, in which they informed them that the Carthaginians had already delivered the hostages to them and were ready to comply with all their orders, I thought that the war was over, and that there was no further need for my services, and therefore I at once sailed back to the Peloponnesus.

It should cause no surprise if at times I use my proper name in speaking of myself, and elsewhere use general expressions such "after I had said this" or again, "and when I agreed to this." For as I was personally much involved in the events I am now about to chronicle, I am compelled to change the phrases when alluding to myself, so that I may neither offend by the frequent repetition of my name, nor again by constantly saying "when I" or "for me" fall unintentionally into an ill-mannered habit of speech. What I

wish is by using these modes of expression alternately and in their proper place to avoid as far as possible the offence that lies in speaking constantly about oneself, as such personal references are naturally unwelcome, but are often necessary when the matter cannot be stated clearly without them. Luckily I have been assisted in this matter by the fortuitous fact that no one as far as I know, up to the time in which I live at least, has received from his parents the same proper name as my own.

It chanced that on one and the same day the portraits of Callicrates were carried in in darkness, while those of Lycortas on the same day were brought out into the light to occupy their original position, and this made every one remark that no one should misuse his success to persecute his neighbours, since he should know that it is the peculiar function of Fortune to bring to bear in turn on the legislators themselves the very laws they themselves originated and passed.

The love of innovation natural to man is in itself sufficient to produce any kind of revolution.

III. Affairs of Bithynia

(Livy, epit. L.)

The Romans sent legates to check the aggressive spirit of Nicomedes and to prevent Attalus from going to war with Prusias. Those appointed were Marcus Licinius, a gouty man quite weak upon his legs, Aulus Mancinus, who in consequence of a tile falling on his head had received so many serious wounds on the head, that it is a wonder he escaped with his life, and Lucius Malleolus, who was thought to be the most stupid man in Rome. As the matter called for rapid and bold action, the legates selected were considered to be the most incompetent that could be found for this task.

Owing to this they say that Marcus Porcius Cato remarked in the senate that before it was finished not only would Prusias be dead but Nicomedes, too, would have died of old age in his royal state; for how could the commission act expeditiously, or if it did, achieve any result, as it had not feet nor a head nor a heart.

King Prusias was an ill-favoured man, and though possessed of fair reasoning power, was but half a man as regards his appearance, and had no more military capacity than a woman; for not only was he a coward, but he was incapable of putting up with hardship, and, to put it shortly, he was effeminate in body and mind through his whole life, a defect that no one, and least of all Bithynians, like to see in a king. In addition to this he was most incontinent in satisfying his sensual appetites; he was entirely a stranger to literature, philosophy, and all such studies, and generally speaking had no notion whatever of what goodness and beauty are, but lived by day and night the barbarous life of a Sardanapallus. So that all his subjects, the moment they saw the least chance of success, became irrevocably resolved not only to throw off allegiance to the king, but to exact punishment from him.

IV. The Third Punic War

Massanissa, the king of the Numidians in Africa, one of the best and most fortunate men of our time, reigned for over sixty years, enjoying excellent health and attaining a great age, for he lived till ninety. He also excelled all his contemporaries in bodily strength, for when it was necessary to stand, he could stand in the same place for a whole day without shifting, and again, if he were seated, he never used to get up. And he could also continue to ride hard by night and day without feeling any the worse. The

following is a proof of his bodily strength. At the age of ninety, the age at which he died, he left a son of four years old called Sthembanus, subsequently adopted by Micipses, besides nine other sons. Owing to the affectionate terms they were all on he kept his kingdom during his whole life free from all plots and from any taint of domestic discord. But his greatest and most godlike achievement was this. While Numidia had previously been a barren country thought to be naturally incapable of producing crops, he first and alone proved that it was as capable as any other country of bearing all kinds of crops, by making for each of his sons a separate property of 10,000 plethra which produced all kinds of crops. It is only proper and just to pay this tribute to his memory on his death. Scipio arrived in Cirta two days after the king's death and set everything in order.

(From Plutarch, *An seni sit gerenda respublica*, 791 F.)

Polybius tells us that Massanissa died at the age of ninety, leaving a four-year-old child of which he was the father. A little before his death, he defeated the Carthaginians in a great battle, and next day he was seen in front of his tent eating a dirty piece of bread, and to those who expressed their surprise said he did it. . . .

V. The Macedonian War

For my part, says Polybius, in finding fault with those who ascribe public events and incidents to Fate and Chance, I now wish to state my opinion on this subject as far as it is admissible to do so in a strictly historical work. Now indeed as regards things the causes of which it is impossible or difficult for a mere man to understand, we may perhaps be justified in getting out of the difficulty by setting them down to the action of a god or of chance, I mean such things as exceptionally heavy and

continuous rain or snow, or on the other hand the destruction of crops by severe drought or frost, or a persistent outbreak of plague or other similar things of which it is not easy to detect the cause. So in regard to such matters we naturally bow to public opinion, as we cannot make out why they happen, and attempting by prayer and sacrifice to appease the heavenly powers, we send to ask the gods what we must do and say, to set things right and cause the evil that afflicts us to cease. But as for matters the efficient and final cause of which it is possible to discover we should not, I think, put them down to divine action. For instance, take the following case. In our own time the whole of Greece has been subject to a low birth-rate and a general decrease of the population, owing to which cities have become deserted and the land has ceased to yield fruit, although there have neither been continuous wars nor epidemics. If, then, any one had advised us to send and ask the gods about this, and find out what we ought to say or do, to increase in number and make our cities more populous, would it not seem absurd, the cause of the evil being evident and the remedy being in our own hands? For as men had fallen into such a state of pretentiousness, avarice, and indolence that they did not wish to marry, or if they married to rear the children born to them, or at most as a rule but one or two of them, so as to leave these in affluence and bring them up to waste their substance, the evil rapidly and insensibly grew. For in cases where of one or two children the one was carried off by war and the other by sickness, it is evident that the houses must have been left unoccupied, and as in the case of swarms of bees, so by small degrees cities became resourceless and feeble. About this it was of no use at all to ask the gods to suggest a means of deliverance from such an evil. For any ordinary man will tell you that the

most effectual cure had to be men's own action, in either striving after other objects, or if not, in passing laws making it compulsory to rear children. Neither prophets nor magic were here of any service, and the same holds good for all particulars. But in cases where it is either impossible or difficult to detect the cause the question is open to doubt. One such case is that of Macedonia. For the Macedonians had met with many signal favours from Rome; the country as a whole had been delivered from the arbitrary rule and taxation of autocrats, and, as all confessed, now enjoyed freedom in place of servitude, and the several cities had, owing to the beneficent action of Rome, been freed from serious civil discord and internecine massacres. . . . But now they witnessed in quite a short time more of their citizens exiled, tortured and murdered by this false Philip than by any of their previous real kings. . . . But while they were defeated by the Romans in fighting for Demetrius and Perseus, yet now fighting for a hateful man and displaying great valour in defence of his throne, they worsted the Romans. How can anyone fail to be nonplused by such an event? for here it is most difficult to detect the cause. So that in pronouncing on this and similar phenomena we may well say that the thing was a heaven-sent infatuation, and that all the Macedonians were visited by the wrath of God, as will be evident from what follows.

THE END OF BOOK XXXVI

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXXVIII

I. FROM THE INTRODUCTION.

The thirty-eighth Book contains the completion of the disaster of Greece. For though both the whole of Greece and her several parts had often met with mischance, yet to none of her former defeats can we more fittingly apply the name of disaster with all it signifies than to the events of my own time. For not only are the Greeks to be pitied for what they suffered, but we cannot fail to think that what they did was still more disastrous to them when we know the truth in detail. The ruin of Carthage is indeed considered to have been the greatest of calamities, but when we come to think of it the fate of Greece was no less terrible and in some ways even more so. For the Carthaginians at least left to posterity some ground, however slight, for defending their cause, but the Greeks gave no plausible pretext to any one who wished to support them and acquit them of error. And again the Carthaginians, having been utterly exterminated by the calamity which overtook them, were for the future insensible of their sufferings, but the Greeks, continuing to witness their calamities, handed on from father to son the memory of their misfortune. So that inasmuch as we consider that those who remain alive and suffer punishment are more to be pitied than those who perished in the actual struggle, we should consider the calamities that then befel Greece more worthy of pity than the fate of Carthage, unless in pronouncing on the matter we discard all notion of what is decorous and noble, and keep our eyes only on material advantage. Every one will

acknowledge the truth of what I say if he recalls what are thought to have been the greatest misfortunes that had befallen Greece and compares them with my present narrative.

The greatest terror with which fortune afflicted Greece is supposed to have been the crossing of Xerxes to Europe. For then we all were in danger but very few came to grief; first and foremost the Athenians, who, intelligently foreseeing what would happen, abandoned their city, taking their wives and children with them. Of course at the time they suffered severe damage, for the barbarians became masters of Athens and destroyed the town pitilessly. They did not, however, incur any reproach or shame but on the contrary their action was universally regarded as being most glorious, in that, regardless of what might happen to themselves, they decided to throw in their fortunes with the rest of Greece. And in consequence, by this brave resolve, not only did they at once recover their fatherland and their country, but were soon disputing with Sparta the hegemony of Greece. And subsequently, when they were crushed in the war with Sparta, they were actually forced to pull down the walls of their own city; but it must be said that the fault here lay not with the Athenians but with the Lacedaemonians, who made an oppressive use of the power that Fortune had placed in their hands. The Spartans again in their turn when defeated by the Thebans lost the hegemony of Greece, and afterwards renouncing all projects of foreign conquest were confined to the limits of Laconia. And what disgrace was there in this, if after struggling for the highest prize they so far failed that they had to retire once more to their ancestral dominions? So all these events may be described as misfortunes but not by any means as disasters. The Mantineans again were compelled to

abandon their city when the Spartans dispersed them and broke them up and to live in villages. But every one in this case blamed the Spartans, and not the Mantineans for their unwisdom. The Thebans some time afterwards witnessed the utter destruction of their city when Alexander, intending to cross to Asia, thought that by chastising the Thebans he would frighten the other cities into subjection to him while he was otherwise occupied. But then every one pitied the Thebans for the cruel and unjust treatment they suffered, and no one attempted to justify this act of Alexander. And consequently in a short time with some slight assistance they were able to restore their city and again dwell safely in it. For the compassion of others is no small help to those who have suffered undeserved misfortune, and we often see that general sympathy is attended by a change of Fortune and that those in power themselves repent of their conduct and repair the calamity that they unjustifiably inflicted. Again for a certain time Chalcis, Corinth and some other cities owing to their favourable situations were obliged to obey the kings of Macedonia and to receive garrisons. But in this case all did their best to free them from persistent slavery and looked with hatred and persistent enmity on those who had subjected them to it. To speak generally, they were single cities or groups of cities which in former times came to grief, some of them contending for supremacy or practical objects and others treacherously seized by despots and kings. So that in very few cases did the victims of misfortune incur reproach or did they continue to be spoken of as having met with disaster. For we should consider that all states or individuals who meet with exceptional calamities are unfortunate, but that only those whose own folly brings reproach on them suffer disaster. In the time I am speaking of a common misfortune befel the Peloponnesians,

the Boeotians, the Phocians, the Euboeans, the Locrians, some of the cities on the Ionian Gulf, and finally the Macedonians . . . not resulting merely from the number of defeats they suffered, far from it, but by their whole conduct they brought on themselves no misfortune, but a disaster as disgraceful and discreditable as it could be. For they showed both faithlessness and cowardice and brought on their heads all this trouble . . . Therefore they lost every shred of honour, and for various reasons consented to receive the Roman lictors into their cities, in such terror were they owing to their own offences, if they must be called their own. For I should rather say that the people in general acted mistakenly and failed in their duty, but that the actual authors of the mistakes were the real offenders.

It should not surprise anyone if abandoning here the style proper to historical narrative I express myself in a more declamatory and ambitious manner. Some, however, may reproach me for writing with undue animosity, it being rather my first duty to throw a veil over the offences of the Greeks. Now neither do I think that a man who is timid and afraid of speaking his mind should be regarded by those qualified to judge as a sincere friend, nor that man should be regarded as a good citizen who leaves the path of truth because his is afraid of giving temporary offence to certain persons; and in a writer of political history we should absolutely refuse to tolerate the least preference for anything but the truth. For inasmuch as a literary record of facts will reach more ears and last longer than occasional utterances, a writer should attach the highest value to truth and his readers should approve his principle in this respect. In times of danger it is true those who are Greek should help the Greeks in every way, by active

support, by cloaking faults and by trying to appease the anger of the ruling power, as I myself actually did at the time of the occurrences; but the literary record of the events meant for posterity should be kept free from any taint of falsehood, so that instead of the ears of readers being agreeably tickled for the present, their minds may be reformed in order to avoid falling more than once into the same errors. Enough on this subject.

I am not unaware that some people will find fault with this work on the ground that my narrative of events is imperfect and disconnected. For example, after undertaking to give an account of the siege of Carthage I leave that in suspense and interrupting myself pass to the affairs of Greece, and next to those of Macedonia, Syria and other countries, while students desire continuous narrative and long to learn the issue of the matter I first set my hand to; for thus, they say, those who desire to follow me with attention are both more deeply interested in the story and derive greater benefit from it. My opinion is just the reverse of this; and I would appeal to the testimony of Nature herself, who in the case of any of the senses never elects to go on persistently with the same allurements, but is ever fond of change and desires to meet with the same things after an interval and a difference. What I mean may be illustrated in the first place from the sense of hearing, which never either as regards melodies or recitation readily consents to give ear persistently to the same strain, but is touched by a diversified style and by everything that is disconnected and marked by abrupt and frequent transitions. Take again the sense of taste. You will find that it is incapable of constantly enjoying the most luxurious viands but becomes disgusted with them and likes change, often preferring quite simple dishes to expensive ones merely owing to their novelty. And the

same holds good as regards the sense of sight. For it is quite incapable of gazing constantly at one object, but requires variety and change to captivate it. But this is especially true as regards the intellect. For hard workers find a sort of rest in change of the subjects which absorb and interest them. And this, I think, is why the most thoughtful of the ancient writers were in the habit of giving their readers a rest in the way I say, some of them employing digressions dealing with myth or story and others digressions on matters of fact; so that not only do they shift the scene from one part of Greece to another, but include doings abroad. For instance, when dealing with the Thessalian affairs and the exploits of Alexander of Pherae, they interrupt the narrative to tell us of the projects of the Lacedaemonians in the Peloponnese or of those of the Athenians and of what happened in Macedonia or Illyria, and after entertaining us so tell us of the expedition of Iphicrates to Egypt and the excesses committed by Clearchus in Pontus. So that you will find that all historians have resorted to this device but have done so irregularly, while I myself resort to it regularly. For the authors I allude to, after mentioning how Bardyllis, the king of Illyria, and Cersobleptes, the king of Thrace, acquired their kingdoms, do not give us the continuation or carry us on to what proved to be the sequel after a certain lapse of time, but after inserting these matters as a sort of patch, return to their original subject. But I myself, keeping distinct all the most important parts of the world and the events that took place in each, and adhering always to a uniform conception of how each matter should be treated, and again definitely relating under each year the contemporary events that then took place, leave obviously full liberty to students to carry back their minds to the continuous narrative and the several points at which

I interrupted it, so that those who wish to learn may find none of the matters I have mentioned imperfect and deficient. This is all I have to say on the subject.

II. The Third Punic War

Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian general, was an empty-headed braggart and very far from being a competent statesman or general. There are many evidences of his lack of judgement. To begin with, at his meeting with Golosses, king of the Numidians, he appeared in a complete suit of armour over which was fastened a cloak of sea purple and with a retinue of ten swordsmen. Then advancing in front of these ten men he remained at a distance of about twenty feet from the king protected by a trench and palisade, and made signs to him to come to him, while it ought to have been the reverse. However, Golosses with true Numidian simplicity advanced to him unaccompanied, and when he approached him asked him in fear of whom he had come thus armed cap-a-pie. Hasdrubal answered, "In fear of the Romans." "But then," said Golosses, "you would scarcely have trusted yourself in the town without any necessity. But what do you want, what is your request?" "I beg you," answered Hasdrubal, "to act as my envoy to the general, and I consent on my part to submit to any terms, if only they will spare this unhappy city." "My good friend," said Golosses, "you seem to me to make a perfectly childish request. How do you expect, now you are surrounded by land and sea and have almost abandoned every hope of safety, to persuade the Romans to front you what they refused you, when at the time they were still in Utica, you approached them with your strength yet intact?" "You are mistaken," said Hasdrubal, "for I still have good hopes of what our foreign allies may do for us." For he had not yet heard what had

happened to the Moors or to his own force in the field. And he added that he was not even in despair as regards their own resources: for he chiefly relied on the support of the gods and the hope he placed in them. "Surely," he said, "they will not suffer us to be thus undisguisedly betrayed but will give us many means of salvation." He therefore begged him to implore the general to think of the gods and of Fortune and to spare the town, and he might be quite sure that if they could not obtain this request they would all rather be slaughtered than give up the town. After conversing more or less in this sense they separated, agreeing to meet again in three days. When Golosses communicated the conversation to Scipio the latter laughed and said, "I suppose you were about to make this request, when you treated our prisoners in such an inhuman manner, and now you expect help from the gods after violating even the laws of men." And when the king wished to submit some further reflections to Scipio and chiefly that he ought to bring matters to a conclusion; for, apart from the uncertainty of things, the appointment of the new consuls was close at hand and he should take this into consideration, lest when he was overtaken by winter another commander should succeed him and without any trouble credit himself with the result of all his pains, the general paid careful attention to what he said, and told him to inform Hasdrubal that he answered for the safety of himself, his wife and children, and the families of ten of his friends, and that, in addition to this, he might keep ten talents out of his own fortune and carry off with him any slaves he chose to the number of a hundred. Golosses conveying this kind offer met Hasdrubal again two days afterwards. The Carthaginian again advanced slowly to meet him in great state, wearing his full armour and purple robe, leaving the tyrants of tragedy much to seek. He

was by nature corpulent, and he had now become pot-bellied and was unnaturally red in the face, so that it looked as if he were living like a fatted ox in the plenty of a festival, instead of being at the head of a people suffering from such extreme misery that it would be difficult to set it down in words. However, when he met the king and listened to Scipio's offer, slapping his thigh often and calling upon the gods and Fortune, he said that the day would never come on which Hasdrubal would look at the same time on the sun and on his city being consumed by fire; for the most noble funeral for right-minded men was to perish in their native city and amid her flames. So that when we look at his utterances we admire the man and his high-souled words, but when we turn to his actual behaviour we are amazed by his ignobility and cowardice. For, to begin with, when the rest of the citizens were utterly perishing from famine, he gave drinking-parties and offered his guests sumptuous second courses and by his own good cheer exposed the general distress. For the number of deaths was incredibly large and so was the number of daily desertions due to famine. And next by making mock of some and inflicting outrage and death on others he terrorized the populace and maintained his authority in his sorely stricken country by means to which a tyrant in a prosperous city would hardly resort. Therefore I think I was exceedingly right in saying as I did that it would not be easy to find men more like each other than those who then swayed the destinies of Greece and Carthage. This will become evident when I come to speak of the former and compare them with this man.

III. The Achaean War

When Aurelius Orestes and the other legates returned from the Peloponnesus and informed the senate of what had happened to them and

how they had been very nearly in danger of their lives, both exaggerating the truth and exercising their invention—for they did not represent the danger to which they had been exposed as a fortuitous one, but pretended that the Achaeans had of set purpose determined to make and example of them—the senate was more indignant at the occurrence than it had ever been before, and at once appointed a commission under Sextus Julius Caesar and dispatched it with instructions, however, merely to administer a mild censure for what had taken place, and then to beg and instruct the Achaeans not to give heed in future to those who urged them to the worst courses or to incur before they were aware of it the hostility of Rome, but once again to correct their errors and bring the blame home to the real authors of the offence. This made it quite evident that by the instructions they gave to Aurelius they did not wish to dissolve the League, but to alarm the Achaeans and to deter them from acting in a presumptuous and hostile manner. Some, it is true, thought that the Romans were playing false, as the fate of Carthage was still undecided. This, however, was not the fact; but having for so long acknowledged the League and regarding it as the most loyal of the Greek powers, they thought fit to alarm the Achaeans and curb their undue arrogance, but by no means wished to go to war with them or proceed to an absolute rupture.

Sextus Julius and his colleagues on their way from Rome to the Peloponnesus met the envoys headed by Thearidas who had been sent by the Achaeans to excuse themselves and to inform the senate of the truth concerning the foolish insults inflicted on Aurelius and his fellow-legates. Sextus and his colleagues upon meeting the Achaean envoys begged them to return to Achaea, as they themselves were charged to discuss the whole

matter with the Achaeans. When upon reaching the Peloponnesus they conversed with the Achaeans in Aegium their language was most courteous; they scarcely alluded to the charge of ill-treating the legates or demanded any justification of the conduct of the Achaeans, but taking a most favourable view of what had occurred than the Achaeans themselves, begged them not to give any further offence either to the Romans or to the Lacedaemonians. Upon this all the wiser people gladly accepted the advice, conscious as they were of their error and having before their eyes the fate that awaited those who opposed Rome; but the majority, while having nothing to say against the just strictness of Sextus and being obliged to keep silence, yet remained ill-conditioned and demoralized. And Diaeus and Critolaus and all who shared their views—and these were, so to speak, a deliberate selection from each city of the worst men, the most god-forsaken and the greatest corruptors of the nation—not only as the proverb has it, took with left hand what the Romans gave with the right, but were under an entire and absolute misconception. For they imagined that the Romans, owing to their campaigns in Africa and in Spain, were afraid of a war with the Achaeans, and consequently tolerated everything and were ready to say anything. Consequently, thinking that they were masters of the situation, they answered the legates in courteous terms, insisting, however, upon sending Thearidas and his colleagues to the senate: they themselves would accompany the legates as far as Tegea, where they would discuss matters with the Lacedaemonians and try to find a means of coming to an agreement with them which would put an end to the war. After giving this answer, they by their future conduct, led on the unhappy nation to adopt the

mistaken policy they had set their hearts on. What else could be expected when those in power were so ignorant and ill-disposed?

The end of the catastrophe was brought about in the following way. When Sextus and the other legates reached Tegea they invited the Lacedaemonians to attend there so that they might act in unison towards the Achaeans, both as regards exacting justice for their offences in the past and as regards the suspension of hostilities, until the Romans should send commissioners to deal with the whole situation. Critolaus and his party now held a meeting at which it was decided that the others should decline to meet the Romans, but that Critolaus alone should proceed to Tegea. Critolaus arrived at Tegea when Sextus and his colleagues had almost given up all hope of his coming, and when they called in the Lacedaemonians to negotiate he refused to make any concessions, saying that he was not empowered to arrange anything without taking the opinion of the people, but that he would refer the matter to the next Assembly which was to meet in six months. So that Sextus and his colleagues, now recognizing that Critolaus was guilty of wilful obstruction, and indignant at his answer, allowed the Lacedaemonians to return home and themselves left for Italy, pronouncing Critolaus to have acted in a wrong-headed way and like a madman. After their departure Critolaus visited the different cities during the winter and called meetings, on the pretext that he wished to inform the people of the language he had used to the Lacedaemonians and the Roman legates at Tegea, but in reality for the purpose of accusing the Romans and giving the worst sense to all that they had said, by which means he inspired the populace with hostility and hatred. At the same time he advised the magistrates not to exact payment from debtors or to admit into the prisons

those arrested for debt, and also to make the enforced contributions permanent; until the war was decided. As a result of such appeals to the rabble everything he said was accepted as true, and the people were ready to do anything he ordered, incapable as they were of taking thought for the future, and enticed by the bait of present favour and ease.

When Quintus Caecilius in Macedonia heard of all this, and of the foolish excitement and commotion in the Peloponnesus, he dispatched there as legates Gnaeus Papirius, the younger Popilius Laenas, Aulus Gabinius, and Gaius Fannius. They happened to arrive when the General Assembly of the Achaeans was being held at Corinth, and when brought before the people addressed them at length in the same conciliatory terms as Sextus and his colleagues had done, employing every effort to prevent the Achaeans from proceeding to acts of declared hostility towards Rome, either on account of their difference with Sparta or owing to their dislike of the Romans themselves. The people, on listening to them, showed no disposition to comply, but jeered at the legates, hooted and hustled them out of the meeting. For never had there been collected such a pack of artizans and common men. All the towns, indeed, were in a drivelling state, but the malady was universal and most fierce at Corinth. There were a few, however, who were exceedingly gratified by the language of the legates. But Critolaus, thinking he had got hold of the very handle he had been praying for and of an audience ready to share his fervour and run mad, attacked the authorities and inveighed against his political opponents, and used the utmost freedom of language regarding the Roman legates, saying that he wished to be friends with Rome, but he was not at all minded to make himself subject to despots. The general tenour of his advice was that

if they behaved like men they would be in no want of allies, but if they behaved no better than women they would have plenty of lords and masters. By dealing freely and systematically in such phrases he continued to excite and irritate the mob. He much insisted that his policy was by no means a haphazard one, but that some of the kings and states shared his design. When the assembly of elders wished to check him and keep him from using such language, he defied them, soliciting the aid of the soldiery and calling on anyone who chose to come on, to approach him, or to dare even lay hands on his cloak. He said in fine that he had long held his hand, but would say what he felt. "For," he said, "we should not so much fear the Lacedaemonians or the Romans, as those among ourselves who are co-operating with the enemy. Yes, there are some who favour the Romans and Lacedaemonians more than our own interests." He even produced proofs of this, saying Euagoras of Aegium and Stratius of Tritaea communicated all the secret decisions of the magistrates to Gnaeus. And when Stratius confessed he had associated with the legates and said he would continue to do so, as they were friends and allies, but swore that he had never reported to them anything that had been said at the meetings of magistrates, a few people believed him, but most gave ear to the accusation. Critolaus having excited the mob by the charges he brought against these men, persuaded the Achaeans again to vote for war, nominally against Sparta, but really against Rome. He added another unconstitutional decree, enacting that the men they chose as strategi should have absolute power, by which means he acquired a kind of despotic authority.

Critolaus then, having carried through these measures, set himself to intrigue against and attack the Romans, not listening to reason, but forming

projects which outraged the laws of god and man. As for the legates, Gnaeus proceeded to Athens and thence to Sparta to await the progress of events, while Aulus went to Naupactus and the other two remained in Athens until the arrival of Caecilius. Such was the state of affairs in the Peloponnesus.

Pytheas was the brother of Acastides the stadium-runner and the son of Cleomnastus. He had led an evil life and was thought to have been debauched in his early years. He was also reckless and grasping in public life, and for the reasons I have stated above had been indebted for his advancement to Eumenes and Philetaerus.

(From Orosius V. 3.)

Polybius the Achaean, though he was then with Scipio in Africa, nevertheless, as he could not remain in ignorance of the disaster of his own country, tells us there was only one battle in Achaea, Critolaus being in command. But he adds that Diaeus, who was bringing up reinforcements from Arcadia, was defeated by the same praetor Metellus.

Upon the death of Critolaus, the strategus of the Achaeans, since the law enjoined that if anything happened to the actual strategus he should be succeeded by his predecessor until the regular Assembly of the Achaeans met, the management and direction devolved on Diaeus. Consequently, sending a message to Megara and proceeding himself to Argos, he wrote to all the cities to set free twelve thousand of such of their home-born and home-bred slaves as were in the prime of life, and after arming them, to send them to Corinth. But he apportioned the number of slaves ordered to be sent by each city as he chose and unfairly, as he always did about other matters. If they had not enough home-bred slaves, they had to supply the

deficiency from their other slaves. As he saw that their public exchequers were very badly off in consequence of the war with Sparta, he compelled them to make also special calls and to exact contributions from the wealthier inhabitants, not only from men but from women also. At the same time he ordered all citizens capable of bearing arms to muster at Corinth. In consequence all the cities were full of confusion, disturbance, and despondency. They praised those who had fallen and pitied those who were marching off, and everyone apart from this was perpetually in tears as if they foresaw the future. They suffered much from the insolence and impudence of the slaves, some of whom had been just set free while the rest were excited by the hope of freedom. At the same time the men were forced to contribute willy-nilly whatever they were supposed to possess, and the women, stripping themselves and their children of their jewellery, had to contribute this, almost as of set purpose, to a fund that could only bring destruction on them. As all this was happening at one and the same time, the dismay created by the particular events of every day rendered people incapable of that general and careful reflection, which would have made them foresee that they all with their wives and children were clearly on the road to ruin. So, as if carried away and swept down by the force a fierce torrent, they resigned themselves to the demented and perverse guidance of their leader. The people of Elis and Messene indeed remained at home in expectation of an attack by the fleet, but they would have profited nothing by the circumstances if that cloud had appeared on their horizon as was originally contemplated. The people of Patrae and those who contributed assistance together with them had a short time previously met with disaster in Phocis, and their case was much more lamentable than that of their allies

in the Peloponnese; for some of them in strange desperation had put an end to their lives, and others were flying from the cities across country, directing their flight to no particular place, but terror-stricken by what was taking place in the towns. Some arrested others to surrender them to the enemy as having been guilty of opposition to Rome, and others informed against their friends and accused them, although no such service was demanded of them at present. Others again presented themselves as suppliants, confessing their treachery and asking what their punishment should be, in spite of the fact that no one as yet demanded any explanation of their conduct in this respect. The whole country in fact was visited by an unparalleled attack of mental disturbance, people throwing themselves into wells and down precipices, so that, as the proverb says, the calamity of Greece would even arouse the pity of an enemy, had he witnessed it. In former times indeed they had erred gravely and sometimes entirely come to grief, quarrelling now about questions of state and now betrayed by despots, but at the time I speak of they met with what all acknowledge to be a real calamity owing to the folly of their leaders and their own errors. The Thebans even abandoned their city in a body and left it entirely desert: among them was Pytheas, who fled to the Peloponnese with his wife and children and was wandering about the country.

The enemies' answer seemed surprising to Diaeus; but I think that as the proverb says, "Empty heads have empty notions." So that naturally such people think that what is obvious is surprising.

And he (Diaeus) began to think about the best way of getting home, acting just like a man who cannot swim but is about to throw himself into

the sea, and never hesitates in making the plunge, but having made it begins to think how he can swim to shore.

A short time after the arrival of Diaeus at Corinth, on his having been appointed strategus by the people, Andronidas and his colleagues returned from their embassy to Caecilius. He had previously circulated a report that they were in league with the enemy and he now gave them up to the mob, so that they were arrested with every circumstance of ignominy and led off to prison in chains. Philo of Thessaly also came the bearer of many kind offers to the Achaeans, and certain Achaeans, on learning of this, gave him their support, among others Stratius, who was now advanced in years, and embracing and imploring Diaeus, begged him to accept the proposals of Caecilius. But the members of the assembly paid no attention to what Philo said, for they did not think that the whole nation would be spared, but that Philo spoke so in his own interest and concerned chiefly for his own safety and that of his friends. They therefore discussed the situation under this impression, although they were entirely wrong in entertaining it. For as they were perfectly conscious of their guilt, they could not conceive that the Romans could possibly have any compassion on them. They did not in the least think of making any brave sacrifice for the sake of the state, and the safety of the people in general, as was their duty if they were men who valued their reputations and pretended to be the leaders of Greece. But how could they possibly show any such spirit, for the members of the Council were Diaeus and Damocritus—who had recently been allowed to return owing to the prevailing unwisdom—and in addition Alcamenes, Theodectes, and Archicrates, all men of whom I have already spoken at

length, describing who they were and what were their characters, principles, and lives.

Such being the members of the council, the result of their deliberations was in accord with their characters. Not only did they at once imprison Andronidas and Lagius, but the under-strategus Sosicrates as well, alleging that he had presided over the previous council, and had taken part in the decision to send to Caecilius, and was in fact the main cause of all the evil. On the following day they appointed a tribunal and condemned Sosicrates to death, and binding him on the rack continued the torture until he died under it without making any such avowal as they expected. As for Lagius and Andronidas and Archippus, they released them, partly because the attention of the people had been aroused by the flagrant injustice of their treatment of Sosicrates, and partly because Diaeus received a talent from Andronidas and forty minae from Archippus; for Diaeus could not even when he was at bay, as the saying is, abstain from such shameless and illegal exactions. He had a short time previously behaved in a very similar manner to Philinus of Corinth. For accusing him of communicating with Menalcidas and of being a partisan of the Romans, he continued to flog and rack Philinus himself and his sons before each others' eyes until both the father and the boys gave up the ghost. One is inclined to ask oneself, in view of the fact that all were guilty of such folly and demoralization as it would not be easy to find among barbarians, how it came to pass that the whole nation was not utterly destroyed. For my part I should say that some sort of resourceful and ingenious fortune counteracted the folly and insanity of the leading statesmen—a power which, though the leaders in their folly took every means and every opportunity to expel her, yet had resolved to

leave nothing undone to save Achaea, and like a skilful wrestler adopted the sole device left to her, and that was to bring about the speedy discomfiture and easy defeat of the Greeks, as she in fact did. For owing to this the indignation and wrath of the Romans were not still further aroused, nor did the forces come from Africa, nor were the leading statesmen, whose characters were such as I said and who only wanted a pretext, able to reveal fully their guilty intentions to their countrymen. For it is evident from the analogy of their previous conduct, such as I have described it, how they would probably have acted against their own people if they had had any opportunity or achieved any success. Everybody in fact kept repeating the proverb, "Had we not perished so soon we would never have been saved."

V. The Fall of Carthage

(From Plutarch, *Apophthegmata*, p. 200.)

Scipio had reached the wall, the Carthaginians still defending themselves from the citadel, and as he found that the depth of the sea between them was not very great, Polybius advised him to set it with iron caltrops or to throw into it planks furnished with spikes to prevent the enemy from crossing and attacking the mole, "But it is absurd," said Scipio, "now we have taken the wall and are inside the town to take steps to prevent our fighting the enemy."

When Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian commander, threw himself as a suppliant at Scipio's knees, the general turning to those round him said, "Look, my friends, how well Fortune knows to make and example of inconsiderate men. This is that very Hasdrubal who lately rejected the many kind offers I made him, and said that his native city and her flames were the most splendid obsequies for him; and here he is with suppliant boughs

begging for his life from me and reposing all his hopes on me. Who that witnesses this with his eyes can fail to understand that a mere man should never either act or speak presumptuously?" Some of the deserters now came forward to the edge of the roof and begged the front ranks of the assailants to hold back for a moment, and when Scipio gave this order they began to abuse Hasdrubal, some of them for having violated his oath, saying that he had often sworn solemnly that he would not desert them, and others for his cowardice and general baseness of spirit. And this they did with jeers and in the most insulting, coarse, and hostile language.

At this moment his wife, seeing Hasdrubal seated with Scipio in front of the enemy, came out from the crowd of deserters, herself dressed like a great lady, but holding her children, who wore nothing but their smocks, by each hand and wrapping them in her cloak. At first she called on Hasdrubal by his name, but when he maintained silence and bent his eyes to the ground, she began by calling on the gods and expressing her deepest thanks to Scipio for sparing as far as he was concerned not only herself but her children. Then, after a short silence, she asked Hasdrubal how without saying a word to her he had deserted them all and betaken himself to the Roman general to secure his own safety; how he had thus shamelessly abandoned the state and the citizens who trusted in him, and gone over secretly to the enemy; and how he had the face to sit now beside the enemy with suppliant boughs in his hands, that enemy to whom he had often boasted that the day would never dawn on which the sun would look on Hasdrubal alive and his city in flames . . . Turning round to me at once and grasping my hand Scipio said, "A glorious moment, Polybius; but I have a dread foreboding that some day the same doom will be pronounced on my

own country." It would be difficult to mention an utterance more statesmanlike and more profound. For at the moment of our greatest triumph and of disaster to our enemies to reflect on our own situation and on the possible reversal of circumstances, and generally to bear in mind at the season of success the mutability of Fortune, is like a great and perfect man, a man in short worthy to be remembered.

(From Appian, *Punica*, 132.)

Scipio, when he looked upon the city as it was utterly perishing and in the last throes of its complete destruction, is said to have shed tears and wept openly for his enemies. After being wrapped in thought for long, and realizing that all cities, nations, and authorities must, like men, meet their doom; that this happened to Ilium, once a prosperous city, to the empires of Assyria, Media, and Persia, the greatest of their time, and to Macedonia itself, the brilliance of which was so recent, either deliberately or the verses escaping him, he said:

A day will come when sacred Troy shall perish,

And Priam and his people shall be slain. [1]

[1] *Iliad* VI. 4489.

And when Polybius speaking with freedom to him, for he was his teacher, asked him what he meant by the words, they say that without any attempt at concealment he named his own country, for which he feared when he reflected on the fate of all things human. Polybius actually heard him and recalls it in his history.

THE END OF BOOK XXXVIII

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XXXIX

I. AFFAIRS OF GREECE.

Aulus Postumius was a man deserving of mention for the following reason. He was a member of one of the first families, but naturally wordy, loquacious, and vainglorious to excess. From childhood he had set his heart on acquiring Greek culture and the Greek tongue, and in both he was too much of an adept, so much so that it was partly his fault that admiration for Greece became offensive in the eyes of the older and more distinguished Romans. He even went so far as to attempt to write in Greek a poem and a serious history, in the preface to which he begs his readers to excuse him, if, as a Roman, he has not a complete mastery of the Greek language and their method of treating the subject. Marcus Porcius Cato answered him, as I think, very properly on the subject. For he said he wondered what reason he had for making this apology. Had he indeed been ordered by the Amphictyonic Council to write a history, possibly he would have been justified in speaking thus and offering excuses; but to undertake of his own accord and under no compulsion to write a history, and then to beg to be pardoned for his barbarisms, was obviously ludicrous, and served just as little purpose, as if a man who had entered his name at the games for the boxing-contest or the pancration, upon appearing in the stadium, when the time came for the fight, were to beg the spectators to pardon him if he could not support the labour of the tussle or the blows. For it is evident that such a man would certainly be ridiculed and receive summary punishment; and so

should such historians have been treated, to prevent them from such audacious disregard of the proprieties. This man in the rest of his behaviour likewise had adopted the worst vices of the Greeks. For he was both fond of pleasure and averse to toil, as will be evident from the actual facts. On his very first appearance, indeed, in Greek parts, when the battle in Phocis took place, he feigned indisposition and retired to Thebes so as not to have to take part in the fight, and when it was over he was the first to write to the senate about the victory, adding abundance of detail as if he had himself taken part in the engagement.

The Capture of Corinth

(From Strabo VIII. 6. 28.)

Polybius, appealing to our sentiments of pity in his account of the capture of Corinth, mentions among other things the contempt of the soldiers for works of art and votive offerings. He says he was present himself and saw pictures thrown on the ground with the soldiers playing draughts on them. Among them he names the picture of Dionysus by Aristeides which some say gave origin to the phrase, "Nothing like Dionysus," and the Heracles tortured by the tunic of Deianeira.

Owing to the long-standing affection of the people for Philopoemen, the statues of him which existed in some towns were left standing. So it seems to me that all that is done in a spirit of truth creates in those who benefit by it an undying affection.

Therefore we may justly cite the current saying that he had been foiled not at the door but in the street.

(From Plutarch, *Philopoemen* 21.)

There were many statues and many decrees in his honour in the different cities, and a certain Roman at the time so disastrous to Greece, when Corinth was destroyed, attempted to destroy them all, and, as it were, to expel him from the country, accusing him as if he were still alive of being hostile and ill-disposed to the Romans. But on the matter being discussed and on Polybius refuting the false accusation, neither Mummius nor the legates would suffer the honours of the celebrated man to be destroyed.

Polybius set himself to give full information to the legates about Philopoemen, corresponding to what I originally stated about this statesman. And that was, that he often was opposed to the orders of the Romans, but that his opposition was confined to giving information and advice about disputed points, and this always with due consideration. A real proof of his attitude, he said, was that in the wars with Antiochus and Philip he did, as the saying is, save them from the fire. For then, being the most influential man in Greece owing to his personal power and that of the Achaean League, he in the truest sense maintained his friendship for Rome, helping to carry the decree of the league, in which four months before the Romans crossed to Greece the Achaeans decided to make war from Achaea on Antiochus and the Aetolians, nearly all the other Greeks being at the time ill-disposed to Rome. The ten legates therefore, giving ear to this and approving the attitude of the speaker, permitted the tokens of honour Philopoemen had received in all the towns to remain undisturbed. Polybius, availing himself of this concession, begged the general to return the portraits, although they had been already carried away from the Peloponnesus to Acarnania—I refer to the portraits of Achaeus, of Aratus,

and of Philopoemen. The people so much admired Polybius's conduct in the matter that they erected a marble statue of him.

After the appointment of the ten commissioners which took place in Achaea, these commissioners ordered the quaestor who was about to sell the property of Diaeus to set aside and present to Polybius whatever objects he chose to select for himself and then sell the rest to bidders. Polybius was so far from accepting any gift of the kind that he even begged his friends not to desire to acquire any of the things sold by the quaestor, who was now visiting the cities, and selling the property of all who had sided with Diaeus and had been condemned, except those who had children or parents. Some of his friends did not pay attention to his advice, but those who followed it earned the high approval of their fellow-citizens.

The ten commissioners, having settled these matters in six months, left for Italy in the spring, leaving behind them a good example to the whole of Greece of the policy of Rome. On quitting Polybius, they enjoined him to visit the cities, and clear up any matters about which people were doubtful, until they grew accustomed to the constitution and laws; and after a certain time he succeeded in making people accept the constitution granted to them, and saw to it that no difficulty on any subject arose either in public or in private due to the laws. So that while they had from the first generally approved and honoured Polybius, in this latter period, and in their satisfaction with what he advised as I above narrated, each city now took every means to confer the highest honours on him during his life and after his death. And this was universally thought to be fully justified; for had he not perfected and drawn up the laws on the subject of common jurisdiction, all would have remained undecided and in the utmost confusion. So we

should consider this to be the most brilliant achievement of Polybius among all those I mentioned.

The Roman general, after the general assembly had left Achaea, repaired the Isthmian course and adorned the temples at Delphi and Olympia, and on the following days visited the different cities, honoured in each of them and receiving testimonies of the gratitude due to him. It was only natural indeed that he should be treated with honour both in public and in private. For his conduct had been unexacting and unsullied and he had dealt leniently with the whole situation, though he had such great opportunities and such absolute power in Greece. If, indeed, he was thought to be guilty of any deflection from his duty I at least put it down not to his own initiative, but to the friends who lived with him. The most notable instance was that of the cavalrymen of Chalcis whom he slew.

II. Affairs of Egypt

Ptolemy, King of Syria, died of his wounds in the war. In the opinion of some he deserved high praise and a place in history, but others think contrariwise. It was true that he was gentle and good, more so than any previous king. The strongest proof of this is, that in the first place he did not put to death any of his own friends on any of the charges brought against them; and I do not believe that any other Alexandrian suffered death owing to him. Again, although his dethronement was thought to be due to his brother, firstly, when in Alexandria he had, as was admitted, a chance of being revenged on him he treated his fault as one to be condoned, and next when his brother again conspired to deprive him of Cyprus, and he was master at Lapethus of his person and his life, he was so far from punishing him as an enemy that he loaded him with gifts in addition to what he

already possessed under treaty, and promised him his daughter in marriage. However, in seasons of good fortune and success his mind grew relaxed and weakened, and he suffered from a sort of Egyptian waste of energy and indolence. And it was when he was in this condition that reverses used to befall him.

III. From the Epilogue

Polybius says at the end of his work: "Accordingly, having achieved this I returned home from Rome. I had, as it were, been enabled to capitalize the results of my previous political action, a favour which my devotion to Rome well merited. Therefore, I pray to all the gods, that during the rest of my life all may remain in the same condition and on the same terms, seeing as I do how apt Fortune is to envy men, and how she especially puts forth her power in cases where we think that our life has been most blessed and most successful.

"So it happened to fall out; and I, now I have reached the end of my whole work, wish, after recalling to my readers the initial scheme that I laid before them as the foundation of the work, to give a summary of the whole subject matter, establishing both in general and in particular the connexion between the beginning and the end. I explained therefore at the beginning that I would commence my introductory books from the point where Timaeus left off, and after a cursory view of events in Italy, Sicily, and Africa—this author having dealt only with these parts in his history—upon reaching the time when Hannibal was entrusted with the Carthaginian forces, when Philip, son of Demetrius, succeeded to the throne of Macedon, when Cleomenes of Sparta was exiled from Greece and when Antiochus inherited the throne of Syria and Ptolemy Philopator that of Egypt, I

undertook to make a fresh beginning from this date, i.e. the 139th Olympiad, and henceforth to deal with the general history of the whole world, classing it under Olympiads, dividing those into years and taking a comparative view of the succession of events until the capture of Carthage, the battle of the Achaeans and Romans at the Isthmus and the consequent settlement of Greece. As I said, students by this treatment will attain the best and most salutary result, which is to know how and by what system of polity the whole world was subjected to the single rule of Rome—an event without any parallel in the past. Now that I have actually accomplished all this, nothing remains for me but to indicate the dates included in the history, to give a list of the number of books and an index of the whole work."

THE END OF BOOK XXXIX

THE END OF THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS